/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA

/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/170530.mbx T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R L A T I N A M E R I C A Tuesday, May 30, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 106 Headlines B E R M U D A ALAMO RE: Fitch Upgrades Rating on $300MM Notes to BB-sf B R A Z I L BANCO NACIONAL: Head of Bank Resigns BRAZIL: Protesters Clash With Police in Brazil's Capital BRAZIL: Moody's Revises Outlook to Neg.; Affirms Ba2 Rating BR PROPERTIES: Fitch Puts BB- IDR on Rating Watch Negative JBS SA: Shares Plunge Nearly 20% Over Brazilian Corruption Scandal PETROBRAS: Moody's B1 Rating Unaffected by Brazil Outlook Change C A Y M A N I S L A N D S AKYLAS LIMITED: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for June 22 ARES INVESTMENT: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for June 16 BBGP ODENSE: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up CAP-ENDURANCE FUND: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up MERIDIAN GLOBAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due June 8 PATRONUS SELECT: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due June 22 POINT72 CAYMANS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings S.A.C. OFFSHORE: Commences Liquidation Proceedings SHANGHAI (Z.J.): Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on June 5 SYSWIN INC: Shareholders' Final Meeting Today C O L O M B I A ESTRATEGIAS EN VALORES: Chapter 15 Case Summary ESTRATEGIAS EN VALORES: Probe Into US$220M Fraud Still Ongoing ESTRATEGIAS EN VALORES: Seeks Recognition of Colombian Liquidation J A M A I C A JAMAICA: Slow Growth in Agriculture Sector During January-March JAMAICA: Consumer Confidence Declined to Lowest Level in 2016 - - - - - ============= B E R M U D A ============= ALAMO RE: Fitch Upgrades Rating on $300MM Notes to BB-sf -------------------------------------------------------- Fitch Ratings has taken rating actions on the following Principal At-Risk Variable Rate notes issued by Alamo Re Limited, a special purpose insurer vehicle in Bermuda as follows: -- $300,000,000 2015-1 Class A Principal At-Risk Variable Rate Notes; scheduled maturity June 7, 2018 upgraded to 'BB-sf' from 'B+sf'. -- $400,000,000 2015-1 Class B Principal At-Risk Variable Rate Notes; scheduled maturity June 7, 2019 affirmed at 'BB-sf'. The Rating Outlook on each class is Stable. The one-notch rating upgrade to the 2015-1 Class A notes and the rating affirmation of the 2015-1 Class B notes is based on Fitch's annual surveillance review of the notes coinciding with an updated evaluation of the natural catastrophe risk, counterparty exposure, collateral assets and structural performance. Fitch expects the 2014-1 Class A Principal At-Risk Variable Rate notes to be paid in full on June 7, 2017. KEY RATING DRIVERS The Series 2015-1 Class A and B notes provide multi-year protection for the Subject Business written by the Texas Windstorm Insurance Association (TWIA) on an annual aggregate basis using an indemnity trigger. The notes are exposed to insured property losses due to 'named storms' within the covered area, which solely covers the 14 first-tier, coastal counties of Texas (and a small portion of Harris County). To date, there have been no reported Covered Events for these notes. On April 14, 2017, AIR Worldwide (AIR), acting as the Reset Agent, completed reset reports for the 2015-1 notes that provided updated annual attachment probabilities for each Class of notes for the Annual Risk Period beginning June 1, 2017 using AIR's escrowed software models and TWIA's updated Subject Business data. At each reset date, TWIA may exercise an option to decrease (or increase) the respective attachment levels on each of the classes within an exceedance probability range of 4.40% to 1.00%. 2015-1 Class A Notes: Effective June 1, 2017, the Updated Attachment Level increases to $4.20 billion (from $2.70 billion for the current Risk Period that ends May 31, 2017) and the Updated Exhaustion Level increases to $4.50 billion (from about $3.245 billion). The updated probability of attachment decreases to 1.40% (from 2.58%). This corresponds to an implied rating of 'BB-', per the calibration table listed in Fitch's "Insurance- Linked Securities Methodology". The Updated Risk Interest Spread will decrease to 4.81% (from 5.20%). 2015-1 Class B Notes: Effective June 1, 2017, the Updated Attachment Level increases to $4.50 billion (from about $3.97 billion for the current Risk Period that ends May 31, 2017) and the Updated Exhaustion Level increases to $4.90 billion (from $4.50 billion). The updated probability of attachment decreases to 1.30% (from 1.40%). This corresponds to an implied rating of 'BB- ', per the calibration table. The Updated Risk Interest Spread will decrease to 4.40% (from 4.62%). Hannover Rueck SE (Hannover), a reinsurance company that acts as a transformer, sits between TWIA and Alamo Re and has an 'A+' Issuer Default Rating (IDR)/Stable Outlook (affirmed on Dec. 8, 2016). The Permitted Investments meet Fitch's criteria for highly-rated U.S. money market funds. Fitch believes the notes and indirect counterparties are performing as required. There have been no reported early redemption notices or events of default, and all agents remain in place. Additional information regarding the 2015-1 notes can be found in prior press releases dated May 13, 2015 and May 6, 2016 and available at www.fitchratings.com. RATING SENSITIVITIES This rating is sensitive to the occurrence of a Covered Event(s), the counterparty rating of Hannover and the rating on the permitted investments held in the respective collateral accounts. If qualifying Covered Events occur that causes annual aggregate losses to exceed the Series 2015-1 Class A or Class B Updated Attachment Levels, Fitch will downgrade the applicable class of notes reflecting an effective default and issue a Recovery Rating. In the case of a future reset election by TWIA, the rating of the Series 2015-1 Class B note may be downgraded if the probability of attachment exceeds 1.989%. Conversely, if TWIA elected to move the Series 2015-1 Class B attachment probability closer to 1.00%, the rating on the note would be unaffected. To a much lesser extent, the Series 2015-1 Class A or B notes may be downgraded if the money market funds should 'break the buck', Hannover fails to make timely retrocession premium payments or TWIA materially changes its mission or operations. The catastrophe risk element is highly model-driven and actual losses may differ from the results of the simulation analysis. The AIR escrow models may not reflect future methodology enhancements by AIR, which may have an adverse or beneficial effect on the implied rating of the notes were such future methodology considered. =========== B R A Z I L =========== BANCO NACIONAL: Head of Bank Resigns ------------------------------------ EFE News reports that the head of state development bank Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Economico e Social (BNDES) and a key member of beleaguered Brazilian President Michel Temer's economic team resigned, citing personal reasons. Maria Silvia Bastos Marques communicated her decision in a brief letter to officials at that institution, the Brazilian government's main financial arm for development projects, according to EFE News. The report notes that she said she would be replaced on an interim basis by a BNDES director, Ricardo Ramos, and that all other directors at that financial institution would remain at their posts. The report relays that President Temer, for his part, praised Bastos' leadership during her year-long tenure, saying her efforts had ensured BNDES was using more rigorous criteria in assessing applications for loans to fund large corporate projects. Ms. Bastos, nicknamed the "iron lady" because she had previously headed up Brazilian steelmaker Companhia Siderurgica Nacional, was the first woman to lead BNDES, one of the world's largest development banks with a loan portfolio comparable to that of the Inter-American Development Bank, the report notes. Her resignation, attributed to pressure from business leaders unhappy with a sharp drop in loan disbursements during her tenure and to the government's lukewarm defense of her job performance, leaves President Temer even more isolated amid serious corruption allegations, the report relays. Some key allies of the president have distanced themselves from him since the Supreme Court formally launched an investigation into bribery and obstruction of justice allegations, the report notes. President Temer is accused of accepting millions of dollars' worth of bribes from Brazilian meatpacking giant JBS and encouraging continued payments to an imprisoned former speaker of Brazil's lower house of Congress to keep him from turning state's witness, the report says. Executives from JBS, whose business empire has significantly expanded due to billions of dollars' worth of acquisitions in the United States over the past decade, made those allegations to prosecutors as part of plea-bargain testimony, saying they paid the bribes to secure contracts and ensure easy access to credit from BNDES and other state-run banks, says EFE. President Temer has vehemently denied the accusations and vowed not to resign, the report relays. Earlier this month, Brazil's Federal Police launched an investigation of suspected irregularities on the part of BNDES in the granting of loans to the holding company behind JBS, the world's largest meatpacker, the report notes. The bank's decision to loan money to J&F Investimentos without requiring the necessary repayment guarantees cost the Brazilian treasury BRL1.2 billion ($368 million), the Federal Police said in a statement on May 12, the report adds. As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on May 4, 2017, Moody's Investors Service has assigned a Ba2 long-term foreign currency debt rating to the proposed senior unsecured notes to be issued by Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Economico e Social (BNDES). The notes will be denominated and settled in US dollars, with maturity between five and ten years. The notes will be issued as a green bond. The outlook on the rating is stable. BRAZIL: Protesters Clash With Police in Brazil's Capital -------------------------------------------------------- Paulo Trevisani and Samantha Pearson at The Wall Street Journal report that tens of thousands of protesters descended on Brazil's capital, setting fire to ministry buildings and clashing with riot police as calls grew for President Michel Temer to resign over allegations he was involved in a vast corruption scandal. Chanting "out with Temer" and "elections now," angry demonstrators crowded around Congress and ministry buildings as police fired tear gas, according to WSJ. Protesters set off fires inside two ministerial buildings and vandalized six others and Brasilia's modernist cathedral, the Federal District's Security Secretariat said, the report notes. Portable restrooms nearby were also burnt, with firefighters struggling to break through the crowds to get to the scene, the report relays. The Secretariat said 49 people were hurt, eight of whom were police officers, the report discloses. One protester was shot, but the injury wasn't life-threatening, it said, the report notes. It said it would investigate photos posted on social media showing police officers pointing their guns toward the crowd, the report says. Brazil was thrown into turmoil last week when the Supreme Court released testimony from executives of meatpacking giant JBS SA saying they bribed 1,829 politicians, including President Michel Temer and his two immediate predecessors, Dilma Rousseff and Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, the report relays. Brazil's Supreme Court said it had opened an investigation into Mr. Temer for alleged corruption, obstruction of justice and criminal organization, the report says. He has denied wrongdoing and vehemently rejected calls to resign. Ms. Rousseff and Mr. da Silva have also denied wrongdoing. Thick black smoke billowed from Brasilia's iconic row of ministry buildings, as masked protesters broke the windows of government buildings and as ambulances arrived to treat injuries, the report discloses. Government officials said about 35,000 people took part in the protest, the report notes. "A demonstration that was meant to be peaceful quickly degenerated into vandalism and disrespect," said Raul Jungmann, Brazil's defense minister, in a televised statement, adding that federal troops had been called in an attempt to restore order, notes the report. Mr. Temer's allies have battled to keep the government functioning while opposition politicians have refused to discuss anything other than his removal from government, the report relays. His plans for an economic overhaul, including a restructuring of the country's pension system, are now on hold, the report notes. "We can't have any structural reform voted by a Congress Brazilians can't trust," said Congressman Henrique Fontana, whose Workers' Party, or PT, lost power last year when former President Rousseff was impeached for violating budget laws, the report says. She was succeeded by her vice president, Mr. Temer, from the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party, or PMDB. He has been expected to serve out the rest of her term until presidential elections in 2018, the report adds. As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on May 24, 2017, S&P Global Ratings placed its 'BB' long-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on the Federative Republic of Brazil on CreditWatch with negative implications. S&P also affirmed the short-term foreign and local currency ratings at 'B'. The transfer and convertibility assessment is unchanged at 'BBB-'. In addition, S&P placed the 'brAA-' national scale rating on CreditWatch with negative implications. BRAZIL: Moody's Revises Outlook to Neg.; Affirms Ba2 Rating ----------------------------------------------------------- Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook on Brazil's issuer rating to negative from stable and affirmed its issuer, senior unsecured and shelf ratings at Ba2 and (P)Ba2 respectively. Moody's decision to change Brazil's outlook to negative was driven by the following factors: 1. The rise in uncertainty regarding reform momentum following recent political events 2. And in consequence the rising threat to the economic recovery and to Brazil's medium-term economic strength. Whatever its outcome, the political crisis that erupted in Brazil last week seems likely to undermine the government's reform agenda and stall passage of future reforms, including social security. This is likely to negatively impact investor confidence and lead to increased market volatility, threatening the positive macroeconomic momentum observed since President Temer began to push through reforms. RATINGS RATIONALE RATIONALE FOR CHANGING BRAZIL'S RATING OUTLOOK TO NEGATIVE First Driver: Rise in uncertainty regarding reform momentum following recent political events The stable outlook, previously assigned to Brazil's rating was based on Moody's expectations that the observed improvement in macroeconomic conditions would persist, reinforced by the strong reform momentum witnessed under the Temer administration. Whatever the outcome, the recent corruption allegations against the President risk reversing the virtuous cycle between political normalcy, reform implementation, and investor confidence that underpinned the stabilization of economic conditions. In recent months, the government has passed a number of important reforms including a constitutional amendment to cap government spending, and has promoted discussion in Congress of planned social security reforms, which are critical to medium-term fiscal sustainability. However, the controversy surrounding President Temer will likely cause negotiations around social security reform to stall, with the result that the reform does not pass in Congress this year, as Moody's had previously expected. Moreover, looking further ahead, with the focus of the administration shifting towards the political crisis, the government's ability to continue to develop and implement the reforms needed to address Brazil's economic and fiscal malaise will likely be undermined. Second Driver: Prospects of deteriorating macroeconomic conditions that will increase downside risks to the economic recovery After two years of economic contraction, the economy has begun to stabilize. Moody's expects modest GDP growth of 0.5% in 2017 with inflation dropping to 4.0%, below the mid-point of the 4.5% inflation target, but within the +/- 1.5% tolerance interval, and remaining within the central bank target range, allowing the central bank to continue monetary easing. That recovery, and the related boost to Brazil's medium-term economic strength, is threatened by the political crisis, which will likely undermine investor confidence and increase financial market volatility. Improved investor confidence was driven by the government's focus on structural reforms and its ability to deliver results in this area. In the current context, prolonged political uncertainty and the risk of another leadership transition will likely weigh on the incipient recovery. The central bank's ability to deliver further rate cuts could be hampered if a confidence-related shock to the exchange rate were to feed into higher inflation, stunting the potential for a positive impact on growth in 2018 and undermining fiscal savings from lower interest payments on government debt. As a consequence of these developments, downside risks to Moody's growth forecasts for 2017 and 2018 have increased. Short-term growth is generally of limited significance for credit ratings; however, in Brazil's case, the persistence of the very significant shock to growth witnessed in recent years would signal further diminishing of economic strength in the medium-term. RATIONALE FOR AFFIRMATION OF BRAZIL'S Ba2 RATING Brazil's issuer rating at Ba2 reflects the strengths and weaknesses of Brazil's credit profile. Below-potential economic growth and weak fiscal metrics, which will result in continued rise in government debt ratios over the next two to three years, are important constraints on the rating. This is balanced against Brazil's large and diversified economy, limited balance of payments-related vulnerabilities, and recent reforms to arrest the rise in government spending. WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS UP Moody's could change the outlook back to stable if the political crisis is resolved quickly, clearing the way for approval of fiscal reforms this year; particularly social security reform. Structural reforms that lead to higher medium-term growth and accelerate the pace of fiscal consolidation, stabilizing government debt ratios could lead to a rating upgrade. Policy continuity and consistent implementation of fiscal reforms, including compliance with the spending cap beyond 2018 could also lead to a rating upgrade. WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS DOWN Intensification of the political crisis that lead to a prolonged period of uncertainty and materially impacts macroeconomic and fiscal prospects would exert further negative pressure on the rating. Back-tracking on fiscal reforms already approved, particularly compliance with the spending cap, would be particularly negative for the rating. COUNTRY CEILINGS The long-term foreign currency bond rating remains unchanged at Ba1/NP. The long-term foreign currency deposit ceiling is unchanged at Ba3/NP. The long-term local currency bond and deposit ceilings are unchanged at A3. GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 15729.3 (2015 Actual) (also known as Per Capita Income) Real GDP growth (% change): -3.6% (2016 Actual) (also known as GDP Growth) Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 6.3% (2016 Actual) Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -9.0% (2016 Actual) (also known as Fiscal Balance) Current Account Balance/GDP: -1.3% (2016 Actual) (also known as External Balance) External debt/GDP (2016 Actual): 37.4% Level of economic development: Moderate level of economic resilience Default history: At least one default event (on bonds and/or loans) has been recorded since 1983. On May 25, 2017, a rating committee was called to discuss the rating of Government of Brazil. The main points raised during the discussion were: The issuer's governance and/or management, have materially decreased. The systemic risk in which the issuer operates has materially increased. The principal methodology used in these ratings was Sovereign Bond Ratings published in December 2016. The weighting of all rating factors is described in the methodology used in this credit rating action, if applicable. BR PROPERTIES: Fitch Puts BB- IDR on Rating Watch Negative ---------------------------------------------------------- Fitch Ratings has placed BR Properties S.A.'s (BR Properties) ratings on Rating Watch Negative including the company's 'BB-' foreign currency and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) and its 'A(bra)'national scale long-term rating. KEY RATING DRIVERS The Negative Watch follows the announcement that BR Properties signed an agreement to acquire the condominium Centenario Plaza for BRL433.4 million and reflects the expected negative impact on the company's high leverage ratios and liquidity. Currently, BR Properties' leverage is high for the rating category. On a pro forma basis, net leverage should increase to about 8.7x with the acquisition and should remain high for a longer period than Fitch's initial expectations of a gradual reduction. Fitch's base case in the last rating review incorporated the expectation that the company would use cash balances to reduce gross debt and net leverage to gradually reduce to about 6x by the end of 2018. If the acquisition is approved according to the terms and conditions announced, BR Properties' ratings will be downgraded to 'B+'/'BBB+(bra)'. In May 24, 2017, BR Properties announced the intention to acquire the condominium Centenario Plaza from Caixa de Previdencia dos Funcionarios do Banco do Brasil (PREVI). The acquisition includes two office buildings in Sao Paulo, with a GLA of 53,892 sqm. Considering current occupancy level of 80%, this acquisition should add about BRL36 million to the company's annual EBITDA. The conclusion of the acquisition is still subject to certain conditions, including the approval of BR Properties' Board of Directors. In Fitch's opinion, BR Properties has not demonstrated commitment to reduce leverage to more conservative levels. During 2014 to 2016, the company sold more than BRL6 billion of assets with a debt reduction of only about BRL1.8 billion, while dividends totalled approximately BRL2.5 billion. As of March 31, 2017, BR Properties had BRL3.8 billion of total debt and BRL1.2 billion of total cash and marketable securities. BR Properties is facing the challenge of recovering its cash flow generation and reducing leverage to more conservative levels, to avoid continued pressure on its ratings. The company's cash flow generation reduced in the last couple of years, due to the negative business environment and lower scale of operations, which resulted in an increase in leverage and lower interest coverage ratios. BR Properties generated BRL313 million of EBITDA and cash flow from operations (CFFO) was negative BRL163 million in the LTM ended March 31, 2017, pressured by high financial expenses of about BRL447 million. In this period, total debt/EBITDA and net debt/EBITDA ratios were 12x and 8.2x, respectively, and compare with 6.1x and 4.0x in 2015. Interest coverage, measured as EBITDA/interest ratio, remains weak and fell to 0.7x in the LTM ended March 31, 2017, from 0.8x in 2016 and 1.5x in 2015. RATING SENSITIVITIES If the acquisition is approved according to the terms and conditions announced, BR Properties' ratings will be downgraded to 'B+'/'BBB+(bra)'. A rating upgrade for BR Properties is not likely in the near future and will only occur following a sustainable and material leverage reduction. LIQUIDITY BR Properties' liquidity was strong as of March 31, 2017, benefitting from the sale of assets. However, it should materially deteriorate following the cash disbursement from the announced transaction. Total cash and marketable securities of BRL1.2 billion covered short-term debt by 2.0x and was used to finance the company's negative free cash flow. FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS Fitch has placed the following ratings on Negative Watch: -- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR 'BB-'; -- Long-Term Local Currency IDR 'BB-'; -- USD285 million senior unsecured perpetual notes 'BB-'; -- Long-term national scale rating 'A(bra)'. JBS SA: Shares Plunge Nearly 20% Over Brazilian Corruption Scandal ------------------------------------------------------------------ EFE News reports that shares of Brazil-based global meatpacking giant JBS plunged 19.98 percent in trading May 22 in the wake of a corruption scandal involving several executives. JBS's woes took a toll on the benchmark Ibovespa index, which fell 2.21 percent to 61,257, according to EFE News. The company, one of the world's largest meat exporters, has been in the spotlight since several of its executives cut plea-bargain deals with prosecutors and revealed that they paid bribes to more than 1,800 politicians, including President Michel Temer, from 28 parties, the report relays. Joesley Batista, one of JBS's owners, told prosecutors that the company had paid bribes to President Temer since 2010, documents released by the nation's highest court showed, the report notes. Supreme Court Justice Edson Fachin, who is overseeing cases related to the investigation of a $2 billion bribes-for-inflated- contracts scheme centered on state oil company Petrobras, approved an investigation into President Temer based on the totality of Batista's confession, says the report. Mr. Batista made the confession as part of plea-bargain testimony related to the scandal surrounding JBS, which has been investigated for alleged bribes paid to meat inspectors and purportedly irregular loans from state development bank BNDES to its holding company, J&F Investimentos, the report discloses. The documents ratcheted up the pressure on Temer, who was rocked last week by allegations he encouraged the payment of hush money to a former top lawmaker -- and potential government witness -- convicted earlier this year of graft, the report notes. The most explosive evidence are audio tapes, which Batista secretly recorded during a meeting with the president in Brasilia in March, the report relays. On the tapes, the president can be heard apparently recommending that the JBS chairman maintain the flow of money to the former speaker of Brazil's lower house, the imprisoned Eduardo Cunha, to buy his silence, the report says. The report notes that Mr. Cunha was convicted in March of offenses that included receiving bribes in connection with a contract Petrobras signed in the African nation of Benin. On the tapes, released to the media, Batista says that he is looking to have his company receive favors from government ministries, that he is in contact with prosecutors who are informing him about investigations and that he is bribing Mr. Cunha to keep him from entering into a plea-bargain arrangement, the report relays. The report discloses that President Temer, for his part, either murmurs apparent approval or simply listens without making any comment, behavior that legal analysts have interpreted as explicit support for the unlawful actions. J&F, for its part, has not yet reached an agreement with prosecutors to cooperate with the investigation, the report notes. JBS and prosecutors must still work out the terms of the fine to be paid for the crimes committed, the report relays. The Securities Commission (CVM), the agency that regulates the financial market, has opened five investigations of JBS, one related to the bribery case and another involving purchases of dollars before the scandal broke, the report says. JBS executives purchased a large amount of US dollars to allegedly hedge the drop in the value of the real that would occur when the scandal became public, the report adds. As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on May 24, 2017, Moody's Investors Service has downgraded by one notch the ratings of JBS S.A. and of its wholly-owned subsidiary JBS USA Lux S.A. ("JBS USA") and placed the ratings of both companies under review for further downgrade. The rating downgrades include JBS S.A.'s Corporate Family Rating to Ba3 from Ba2, JBS USA's senior secured rating to Ba2 from Ba1, and JBS USA's senior unsecured rating to Ba3 from Ba2. This action follows confirmation by JBS S.A. that seven executives of the company and its controlling entity, J&F Investimentos, entered into a plea bargain agreement with the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office concerning allegations of corruption. PETROBRAS: Moody's B1 Rating Unaffected by Brazil Outlook Change --------------------------------------------------------------- On May 26, 2017, Moody's changed the outlook on the Government of Brazil's Ba2 rating to negative from stable given the rise in uncertainty regarding reform momentum following recent political events and, in consequence, the rising threat to the economic recovery and to Brazil's medium-term economic strength. However, as Moody's stated previously, the change in Brazil's outlook does not directly affect the B1 ratings or positive outlook of state- owned oil company Petroleo Brasileiro (Petrobras). The positive outlook on Petrobras' B1 ratings assumes that the company will continue focused on its strategy to reduce debt and strengthen its operating performance, which should improve cash generation and credit metrics. This assumes that political or economic uncertainties will not materially affect Petrobras' ability to access the capital markets and that the company's refinancing or liquidity risk will not increase. On April 10, 2017, Moody's raised Petrobras' Baseline Credit Assessment to b2 from b3, upgraded its ratings to B1 from B2, and changed the ratings outlook to positive from stable. The actions considered improvements in the company's liquidity profile and in the regulatory framework in Brazil, both of which reduced Petrobras' credit risk. Moody's continues to monitor progress on Petrobras' execution of asset sales, operational improvements, and debt refinancing initiatives. Petrobras' asset sales could indicate a reduction in its future revenues and cash flow. But any actions that strengthen Petrobras' liquidity while also improving its operating margins and leverage would likely have a greater impact on the company's credit quality than reductions in its production, revenues and reserve base. Petrobras' liquidity risk has declined in the last quarters on the back of $13.6 billion in asset sales from 2015 to date and around $8 billion in exchanged notes so far in 2017, which helped to extend the company's debt maturity profile. However, refinancing risk remains high: Moody's estimates that Petrobras' maturing debt in the remainder of 2017 and 2018 amounts to $6.1 billion and $9.7 billion, respectively, for a total of $15.8 billion. In addition, possible fines derived from the class action lawsuit, the US Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)'s civil investigation, and the US Department of Justice (DoJ)'s criminal investigation related to bribery and corruption will negatively affect the company's cash position in an amount yet unclear. Other threats to Petrobras' operating and financial performance, include tax contingent liabilities, execution risk related to the 2017-21 business plan and potential delays in fully executing its asset sales plan. Petrobras' asset sales could indicate a reduction in its future revenues and cash flow. But any actions that strengthen Petrobras' liquidity while also improving its operating margins and leverage would likely have a greater impact on the company's credit quality than reductions in its production, revenues and reserve base. Petrobras' ratings and outlook reflect Moody's joint-default analysis for the company as a government-related issuer. The ratings reflect Moody's assumption for a moderate likelihood of timely extraordinary support from the Government of Brazil. As a result, Petrobras' rating incorporates only one notch of uplift between Petrobras' b2 BCA and its B1 senior unsecured rating given the government's persistently tight fiscal position. Moody's continues to assume moderate default dependence between Petrobras and the government. Petrobras is an integrated energy company, with total assets of $249 billion as of March 31, 2017. The company dominates Brazil's oil and natural gas production, as well as downstream refining and marketing. Petrobras also holds a significant stake in petrochemicals and a position in sugar-based ethanol production and distribution. The Brazilian government directly and indirectly owns about 45.3% of Petrobras' outstanding capital stock and 60.4% of its voting shares. ========================== C A Y M A N I S L A N D S ========================== AKYLAS LIMITED: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for June 22 ----------------------------------------------------------- The shareholders of Akylas Limited will hold their final meeting on June 22, 2017, at 4:00 p.m., to receive the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal. The company's liquidator is: DMS Corporate Services Ltd. c/o Nicola Cowan dms House, 2nd Floor P.O. Box 1344 Grand Cayman KY1-1108 Cayman Islands Telephone: (345) 946 7665 Facsimile: (345) 949 2877 ARES INVESTMENT: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for June 16 ------------------------------------------------------------ The shareholders of Ares Investment Funds SPC will hold their final meeting on June 16, 2017, at 11:00 a.m., to receive the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal. The company's liquidator is: Highwater Limited c/o Nicole Gagliano Grand Pavilion Commercial Centre 1st Floor, 802 West Bay Road P.O. Box 31855 Grand Cayman KY1-1207 Cayman Islands Telephone: (345) 943 2295 Facsimile: (345) 943 2294 BBGP ODENSE: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up ------------------------------------------- At an extraordinary meeting held on April 21, 2017, the sole shareholder of BBGP Odense Cayman Limited resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's operations. Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company's liquidator is: Fides Limited c/o Oliver Propper The Grand Pavilion, 2nd Floor Commercial Centre P.O. Box 10338 Grand Cayman KY1-1003 Cayman Islands Telephone (345) 949 7232 CAP-ENDURANCE FUND: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up -------------------------------------------------- At an extraordinary meeting held on April 24, 2017, the sole shareholder of Cap-Endurance Fund SPC resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's operations. Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company's liquidator is: Fides Limited c/o Oliver Propper The Grand Pavilion, 2nd Floor Commercial Centre P.O. Box 10338 Grand Cayman KY1-1003 Cayman Islands Telephone (345) 949 7232 MERIDIAN GLOBAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due June 8 ----------------------------------------------------- The creditors of Meridian Global Opportunities Fund SPC are required to file their proofs of debt by June 8, 2017, to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company commenced liquidation proceedings on April 21, 2017. The company's liquidator is: Margot Macinnis Borrelli Walsh (Cayman) Limited Harbour Place, Ground Floor 103 South Church Street, George Town Grand Cayman Cayman Islands Telephone: +1 (345) 743 8800 Facsimile: +1 (345) 743 8801 PATRONUS SELECT: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due June 22 ------------------------------------------------------ The creditors of Patronus Select Ltd. are required to file their proofs of debt by June 22, 2017, to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company commenced wind-up proceedings on April 30, 2017. The company's liquidator is: Trinity Fund Administration (Cayman) Ltd c/o Angela Nightingale Telephone: (345) 743 6620 Facsimile: (345) 743 6720 Citrus Grove, 3rd Floor, 106 Goring Ave P.O. Box 10364 Grand Cayman KY1-1004 Cayman Islands POINT72 CAYMANS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings -------------------------------------------------- The sole shareholder of Point72 Caymans, Ltd., on April 13, 2017, passed a resolution to voluntarily liquidate the company's business. Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company's liquidator is: Point72 Asset Management, L.P. c/o Kevin O'Connor 72 Cummings Point Road Stamford CT 06902 USA Telephone: (203) 890 3896 S.A.C. OFFSHORE: Commences Liquidation Proceedings -------------------------------------------------- The sole shareholder of S.A.C. Offshore Capital Funding, Ltd., on May 2, 2017, passed a resolution to voluntarily liquidate the company's business. Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company's liquidator is: S.A.C. Capital Advisors, L.P. c/o Kevin O'Connor 72 Cummings Point Road Stamford CT 06902 USA Telephone: (203) 890 3896 SHANGHAI (Z.J.): Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on June 5 ------------------------------------------------------------- The shareholder of Shanghai (Z.J.) Industry Limited will hear on June 5, 2017, at 9:00 a.m., the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal. The company's liquidator is: Wang Fahua B Building, 213 Room 563 Songtao Road Pudong, Shanghai China Telephone: +8621 3870 1553/8001 Facsimile: +8621 5856 1927 SYSWIN INC: Shareholders' Final Meeting Today --------------------------------------------- The shareholders of Syswin Inc. will hold their final meeting today, May 30, 2017, at 9:00 a.m., to receive the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal. The company's liquidator is: Richard Fear c/o Kevin Butler P.O. Box 2681 Grand Cayman KY1-1111 Cayman Islands Telephone: (345) 814 7374 Facsimile: (345) 945 3902 =============== C O L O M B I A =============== ESTRATEGIAS EN VALORES: Chapter 15 Case Summary ----------------------------------------------- Chapter 15 Debtor: Estrategias en Valores S.A., et al. Calle 98#21-50 PH Bogota, Colombia Type of Business: Estrategias en Valores ("Estraval") was a finance company engaged in the business of buying and selling pagare libranzas, which are consumer loans made to an indivdiual secured by their paycheck. Foreign Proceeding: Interventional Judicial Liquidation of Estrategias en Valores, S.A. et al. in Colombia. Chapter 15 Petition Date: May 25, 2017 Chapter 15 Lead Case No.: 17-16559 Court: United States Bankruptcy Court Southern District of Florida (Miami) Judge: Hon. Laurel M Isicoff Foreign Representative: Luis Fernando Alvarado Ortiz, the liquidator appointed in Colombia Foreign Representative's Counsel: Michael C Fasano, Esq. FASANO LAW FIRM, PLLC 333 SE 2nd Ave Miami, FL 33131 Tel: 786 871 3327 E-mail: mfasano@fasanolawfirm.com - and - RIVERO MESTRE LLP Andres Rivero, Esq. Charles Whorton, Esq. Kirk Villalon, Esq. 2525 Ponce de Leon Boulevard Suite 1000 Miami, FL Tel: (305) 445-2505 E-mail: arivero@riveromestre.com cwhorton@riveromestre.com amegovern@riveromestre.com kvillalon@riveromestre.com Estimated Assets: Not Indicated Estimated Debt: Not Indicated A full-text copy of the petition is available for free at: http://bankrupt.com/misc/flsb17-16559.pdf ESTRATEGIAS EN VALORES: Probe Into US$220M Fraud Still Ongoing -------------------------------------------------------------- The liquidator appointed in the liquidation proceedings of Estrategias en Valores S.A. ("Estraval") said the investigation into the fraud perpetrated by the company and its principals remain ongoing. Luis Fernando Alvarodo Ortiz, the court-appointed liquidator, estimates that Estraval, which guaranteed returns of 14% to 21% from the sale of securities packaged from consumer loans known as "pagare libranzas" before its collapse in 2015, defrauded investors for more than 600 billion Colombian pesos (approximately US $220 million). Mr. Ortiz says he has identified at least 4,600 direct victims of the Estraval fraud. According to Mr. Ortiz, the Colombian government on Jan. 23, 2017, intercepted principal Cesar Mondragon at a Bogota airport after he returned from Miami (where he deposited US $l00,000 in cash). As part of a sting operation with the help of the Colombian law enforcement officials, including the DEA, the Colombian government arrested principals Cesar Mondragon and Juan Carlos Bastidas, as well as Rosalba FonseLa, Angela Marina Daza, Jose Ivan Castiblanco Fuquene, Pedro Harold Carvajal, and Ferna do Joya Rodriguez, who were all high-level managers involved in the Estraval fraud. These individuals have been charged with committing financial and aggravated fraud, massive collection of public money, failing to reimburse public proceeds money laundering, conspiracy, falsification of private documents, and illicit enrichment in Colombia. Pagare Libranzas Pagare libranzas are consumer loans made to an individual secured by their paycheck. A borrower would apply for a pagare libranza through a lender, and monthly principal and interest payments would be deducted from the borrower's paycheck until the loan was paid. The Colombian government permitted the issuance of pagare libranzas as a way to offer more opportunities for the growing Colombian lower and middle class to obtain credit. While the market for these loans was initially unregulated, the Colombian government instituted a regulatory framework for pagare libranzas and their derivative financial products in 2012. Pagare libranzas were initially issued by "bookkeeping cooperatives" that would make a loan directly to consumers. The cooperatives would then sell booklets of libranza notes to third-party investment firms, such as Estraval. This is where, in the case of Estraval and several other Colombian investment firms, including some of the Debtors, rampant fraud began to develop. Estraval bought libranza notes in bulk and then packaged them into securities. Each security, which represented a group of pagare libranzas would then be documented by a single promissory note. Estraval then began selling these new promissory notes through false advertising to anyone -- rich, poor, and everyone in between -- who was willing to listen. Ponzi Scheme The company claimed that Estraval libranza notes "guaranteed" returns of 14% to 21%, while failing to disclose that the notes came with that the notes came with a risk of default. Additionally, Estraval failed to warn investors that libranza contracts contained no prepayment penalties and that many loans would be paid off early, thus reducing interest income. Using false and predatory solicitation methods, Estraval made millions selling risky investments while warranting that they were safe. The millions earned through the scheme were not enough for Estraval and its principals. As the market for libranza notes became larger, the company began opening dozens of "bookkeeping cooperatives" to sell individual libranza loans to vulnerable individuals looking to secure credit with their livelihoods. This increased the pool of loans that could be packaged by Estraval and sold to other unsuspecting investors. Estraval's need to continually create notes was fueled by the fundamental problem with its scheme. The libranza notes were not generating the "guaranteed" returns as promised. Estraval's solution was to use a portion of their fees from selling the notes to new investors to supplement older investors' returns. By the mid-2000s, Estraval was engaged in a full-fledged ponzi scheme. Estraval also enlisted "sales representatives" to sell pagare libranzas to anyone they could find. Estraval promised these untrained and unlicensed representatives a 3.5% commission and all expense paid trips to Miami, Florida, for selling Estraval financial products. The Colombian Attorney General has deemed Estraval's sales practices an illegal pyramid scheme. As the Colombian credit market cooled, Estraval could not sell enough new notes to pay off prior investors, so they simply began copying already-sold notes and sizzling them to unsuspecting new investors. These notes had no economic value and produced up legitimate return. According to a study done by Fiduagraria, Estraval also began asking unsuspecting investors to sign up to six notes at one time with only one of them having any in actual economic value. Moreover, Estraval began selling notes that were already paid, prepaid, or expired to new investors. In 2012, Estraval began having problems repaying investors due to a combination of factors. First, legitimate bookkeeping cooperatives, the originators of the pagare libranzas, stopped lending because of a rise in the rate of borrower defaults. Second, as the pagare libranza market cooled, fewer investors were willing to buy Estraval products, despite Estraval's incessant efforts to sell falsified notes while making false representations about their returns. Slowly, Estraval began to collapse under the weight of its own fraud. It could not pay investors and it had nowhere to raise new capital. Colombian Proceedings On March 13, 2015, the Superintendency of Companies concluded, after an extensive investigation, that Estraval had filed multiple false reports to the Superintendency of Companies that misrepresented its liquidity. The investigation revealed that Estraval had incurred obligations that exceeded its capital by more than fifty percent. As a result, the Superintendency of Companies placed Estraval and the other Debtors in receivership. Simultaneously, the prosecutor general's office pursued a criminal investigation against Mondragon, Bastidas, Rosalba Fonseca, Jose Ivan Castiblanco, and others involved in the Estraval ponzi scheme. On Aug. 4, 2015, following the placement of Estraval into receivership, the Superintendent started an administrative investigation relating to Estraval's registration of various front entities and shell companies. On Dec. 9, 2015, after concluding the investigation, the Superintendency imposed a fine on Mondragon and Bastidas. On May 25, 2016, the Colombian government officially opened the liquidation process for Estraval under Colombian Article 15.3 of the 1116 Law of 2006. This law gives the Superintendency of Companies the power to convert a reorganization into an insolvency proceeding. On May 26, 2016, the Colombian government attempted to place Estraval in a reorganization plan; however, this was unsuccessful, and liquidation proceeding began under the leadership of Ortiz. Also on May 26, the Superintendency of Companies used its power to freeze, lien, and foreclose Estraval-related assets for the benefit of creditors. Moreover, the Superintendency ordered an entity called MIT, which acted as an administrator of Estraval securities, to cease transferring, delivering, or dealing in any way with Estraval promissory notes. On June 15, 2016, pursuant to Colombian Article 49.3 of 1116 law of 2006, the Superintendency of Companies issued an ex officio decree to initiate the judicial liquidation process of Estrategias en Valores SA.. - Estraval S.A., as well as three of its related companies: Tecnicas Financieras S.A.A, Estrategias en Liquidez and Estradinamicas. An investigation in the Colombian liquidation proceedings led to the conclusion that Estraval had, in fact, defrauded investors and creditors by using illegal methods to promote and sell pagare libranzas. The investigation also confirmed that many of the pange libranza notes sold were either falsified, duplicated, or had no real economic value at the time of sale. The investigation found that there was no reasonable financial justification for Estraval's activities and that because Estraval offered a return that did not correspond to the economic reality of its operations, it was determined that the company perpetuate a financial fraud on the Colombian public. The Colombian Attorney General's Office, in a parallel criminal investigation, completely supported these factual findings. The decree appointed Luis Fernando Alvarodo Ortiz as liquidator for Estraval, its related entities, and its key management. By order dated Sept. 2, 2016, the Colombian Superintendency of Companies granted its Superintendent Delegate for inspection, Surveillance, and Control's petition commencing the Colombian Proceeding as an "intervention judicial liquidation" under Law 1116 of 2006, Legislative Decree 4334 of 2008 and appointing Order as Controller, the agent responsible for the management of the assets of tie parties under intervention. The goal of an "intervention judicial liquidation" for the recovery of illegally obtained proceeds in Colombia, according to the Colombian Constitutional Court is to: (i) immediately suspend the operations or businesses of natural or legal persons who, through unauthorized deposits or collections, such as pyramids, prepaid cards, sale of services and other operations and massive negotiations, "generate abuse of law and fraud to the law" in exercising irregular financial activity; and (ii) provide for the organization of a procedure that allows the prompt return of resources obtained in furtherance of such activities." Article 1 of the Legislative Decree 4334 of 2008 requires the intervention to apply to "business, operation and assets of individuals and corporations involved in a financial activity without the proper governmental authorization. The Decree gives the Superintendence broad powers to issue orders to obtain control of the assets, proceeds and business. The main goal is to reestablish and preserve the public interest under threat." Moreover, Colombian law and the Constitutional Court find this decree to have the highest importance in Colombia because it helps to maintain the public economic order of the country. The Constitutional Court has also concluded that the Superintendency's formal decision to place companies into liquidation and to recover misappropriated assets for the public good has the same effect and may be enforced in the same manner as a court order. About Estraval Bogota, Colombia-based Estrategias en Valores S.A. (Estraval) was a finance company incorporated under Colombian law on August 16, 2000, by Cesar Mondragon and Juan Carlos Bastidas. Estraval engaged in the business of buying and selling pagare libranzas, which are consumer loans made to an individual secured by their paycheck. Estraval guaranteed returns of 14% to 21% from the sale of notes packaged from pagare libranzas but the business, which the liquidator says was a ponzi scheme, collapsed in 2015. The Debtors were placed into liquidation proceedings in Colombia after a lengthy investigation May 26, 2016. Luis Fernando Alvarodo Ortiz was appointed by the Superintendency of Companies to administer the liquidation. Mr. Ortiz, as foreign representative, filed a Chapter 15 petition for Estraval (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Case No. 17-16559) on May 25, 2017, to seek U.S. recognition of the proceedings in Colombia. Hon. Laurel M Isicoff is the case judge in the U.S. case. Michael C. Fasano, Esq., at Fasano Law Firm, PLLC, in Miami, is the Foreign Representative's primary U.S. counsel. ESTRATEGIAS EN VALORES: Seeks Recognition of Colombian Liquidation ------------------------------------------------------------------ The liquidator of Estrategias en Valores S.A. ("Estraval"), a company liquidating in Colombia, filed a Chapter 15 petition in Miami, Florida, to be able to look into "millions of dollars in fraudulently obtained funds" transferred by its principals to the United States before their arrest in January 2017. Estraval, which guaranteed returns of 14% to 21% from the sale of securities packaged from consumer loans known as "pagare libranzas" before its collapse in 2015, defrauded investors for more than 600 billion Colombian pesos (approximately US $220 million). "I decided to pursue this [Chapter 15] case after I discovered, with the assistance of creditors, that a substantial portion of Estraval's and its related persons' and entities' assets, illicitly obtained through their fraud, were transferred to Miami- Dade County, Florida," Luis Fernando Alvarodo Ortiz, the liquidator said in a U.S. court filing May 24, 2017. Mr. Ortiz believes that Estraval principals Cesar Mondragon and Juan Carlos Bastidas appear to be operating a network of finance companies in Coral Gables, Florida, one of which has already been sued in Miami-Dade County Circuit Court for suspect investment sales practices. Additionally, Mondragon operated a money exchange business in Miami-Dade County, Florida that Ortiz believes was used to hide more than $10 million from Estraval to various financial institutions in Florida. Finally, Mondragon's ex-wife and daughter live in Aventura, Florida in a multi-million- dollar penthouse that as ostensibly sold to a third party in early 2017 for $6,000,000. "Through my investigation in Colombia, I have determined that Estraval, Mondragon, Bastidas, and the additional named Debtors have transferred millions of dollars in fraudulently obtained funds to the United States. Moreover, the investigation has revealed significant real property, personal property, business, and financial holdings in Miami-Dade County that were removed from Colombia during the course of Estraval scheme. Many of these assets were transferred after the Superintendency of Companies' intervention, and those transfers are in direct violation of a Colombian administrative order," Mr. Ortiz said. Mr. Ortiz seeks U.S. recognition of the liquidation proceedings in Colombia as a foreign main proceeding. "I believe that the majority of the assets transferred to the United States during this scheme either currently exist or passed through intermediaries in this Judicial District," Mr. Ortiz said. Moreover, according to Mr. Ortiz, the law firm of Rivero Mestre LLP has received funds in escrow in Miami-Dade, Florida, on behalf of Estraval and related Debtors. "[I] anticipate that through recognition of the Colombian Proceeding and the exercise of the discovery powers requested in the Petition, I will be able to identify additional assets . . . belonging to the Debtors, located in the United States," Mr. Ortiz said. Mr. Ortiz was appointed by the Superintendency of Companies in Colombia to administer Estraval's liquidation. Under Colombian law, Mr. Ortiz is tasked to liquidate Estraval and to recover assets on behalf of creditors and the public who were harmed by Estraval's and the related Debtors' massive fraud. About Estraval Bogota, Colombia-based Estrategias en Valores S.A. (Estraval) was a finance company incorporated under Colombian law on August 16, 2000, by Cesar Mondragon and Juan Carlos Bastidas. Estraval engaged in the business of buying and selling pagare libranzas, which are consumer loans made to an individual secured by their paycheck. Estraval guaranteed returns of 14% to 21% from the sale of notes packaged from pagare libranzas but the business, which the liquidator says was a ponzi scheme, collapsed in 2015. The Debtors were placed into liquidation proceedings on May 26, 2016, in Colombia after a lengthy investigation. Luis Fernando Alvarodo Ortiz was appointed by the Superintendency of Companies to administer the liquidation. Mr. Ortiz, as foreign representative, filed a Chapter 15 petition for Estraval (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Case No. 17-16559) on May 25, 2017, to seek U.S. recognition of the proceedings in Colombia. The Hon. Laurel M. Isicoff is the case judge in the U.S. case. Michael C. Fasano, Esq., at Fasano Law Firm, PLLC, in Miami, is the Foreign Representative's primary U.S. counsel. ============= J A M A I C A ============= JAMAICA: Slow Growth in Agriculture Sector During January-March --------------------------------------------------------------- RJR News reports that there was a slowdown in growth in Jamaica's agricultural sector during the January to March quarter when compared to the corresponding period last year. The Bank of Jamaica said the deceleration was chiefly reflected in domestic crop production, the impact of which was partly offset by continued strong growth in traditional export crops, according to RJR News. There was strong performance in sugar production, associated with an early start of the crop season in December, the report notes. Banana and cocoa output also increased during the first three months of 2017, the report relays. According to the Central Bank, the deceleration in domestic crop production followed record output levels in the March 2016 quarter, the report adds. As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on Feb. 9, 2017, Fitch Ratings affirmed Jamaica's Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'B' with a Stable Outlook. The issue ratings on Jamaica's senior unsecured Foreign and Local Currency bonds are also affirmed at 'B'. The Outlooks on the Long-Term IDRs are Stable. The Country Ceiling is affirmed at 'B' and the Short-Term Foreign Currency and Local Currency IDRs at 'B'. JAMAICA: Consumer Confidence Declined to Lowest Level in 2016 ------------------------------------------------------------- RJR News reports that consumer confidence in the country has declined to its lowest level in the past year. This is based on the Jamaica Conference Board's first quarter Business and Consumer Confidence Indices, according to RJR News. However, the results show that consumer confidence has remained more favorable than in the prior decade with the exception of one survey, the report relays. A preview of the indices shows that economic confidence among Jamaican firms has remained largely unchanged during the past five quarters, the report discloses. Firms were asked their opinion about increased business taxes to meet the country's financial needs, the report notes. As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on Feb. 9, 2017, Fitch Ratings affirmed Jamaica's Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'B' with a Stable Outlook. The issue ratings on Jamaica's senior unsecured Foreign and Local Currency bonds are also affirmed at 'B'. The Outlooks on the Long-Term IDRs are Stable. The Country Ceiling is affirmed at 'B' and the Short-Term Foreign Currency and Local Currency IDRs at 'B'. *********** Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par. Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside sources during the prior week we think are reliable. Those sources may not, however, be complete or accurate. The Monday Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication. Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices for actual trades are probably different. Our objective is to share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities. Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report. Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to publication. At first glance, this list may look like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short. Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's assets. A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize. The prices at which equity securities trade in public market are determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test. Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged. Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com *********** S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors. Copyright 2017. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2746. This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior written permission of the publishers. Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is not guaranteed. The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year, delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof are US$25 each. For subscription information, contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Joseph Cardillo at 856-381-8268. * * * End of Transmission * * *