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                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

               Tuesday, May 30, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 106


                            Headlines



B E R M U D A

ALAMO RE: Fitch Upgrades Rating on $300MM Notes to BB-sf


B R A Z I L

BANCO NACIONAL: Head of Bank Resigns
BRAZIL: Protesters Clash With Police in Brazil's Capital
BRAZIL: Moody's Revises Outlook to Neg.; Affirms Ba2 Rating
BR PROPERTIES: Fitch Puts BB- IDR on Rating Watch Negative
JBS SA: Shares Plunge Nearly 20% Over Brazilian Corruption Scandal

PETROBRAS: Moody's B1 Rating Unaffected by Brazil Outlook Change


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

AKYLAS LIMITED: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for June 22
ARES INVESTMENT: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for June 16
BBGP ODENSE: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
CAP-ENDURANCE FUND: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
MERIDIAN GLOBAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due June 8

PATRONUS SELECT: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due June 22
POINT72 CAYMANS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
S.A.C. OFFSHORE: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
SHANGHAI (Z.J.): Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on June 5
SYSWIN INC: Shareholders' Final Meeting Today


C O L O M B I A

ESTRATEGIAS EN VALORES: Chapter 15 Case Summary
ESTRATEGIAS EN VALORES: Probe Into US$220M Fraud Still Ongoing
ESTRATEGIAS EN VALORES: Seeks Recognition of Colombian Liquidation


J A M A I C A

JAMAICA: Slow Growth in Agriculture Sector During January-March
JAMAICA: Consumer Confidence Declined to Lowest Level in 2016


                            - - - - -


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B E R M U D A
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ALAMO RE: Fitch Upgrades Rating on $300MM Notes to BB-sf
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken rating actions on the following Principal
At-Risk Variable Rate notes issued by Alamo Re Limited, a special
purpose insurer vehicle in Bermuda as follows:

-- $300,000,000 2015-1 Class A Principal At-Risk Variable Rate
    Notes; scheduled maturity June 7, 2018 upgraded to 'BB-sf'
    from 'B+sf'.
-- $400,000,000 2015-1 Class B Principal At-Risk Variable Rate
    Notes; scheduled maturity June 7, 2019 affirmed at 'BB-sf'.

The Rating Outlook on each class is Stable.

The one-notch rating upgrade to the 2015-1 Class A notes and the
rating affirmation of the 2015-1 Class B notes is based on Fitch's
annual surveillance review of the notes coinciding with an updated
evaluation of the natural catastrophe risk, counterparty exposure,
collateral assets and structural performance.

Fitch expects the 2014-1 Class A Principal At-Risk Variable Rate
notes to be paid in full on June 7, 2017.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The Series 2015-1 Class A and B notes provide multi-year
protection for the Subject Business written by the Texas Windstorm
Insurance Association (TWIA) on an annual aggregate basis using an
indemnity trigger. The notes are exposed to insured property
losses due to 'named storms' within the covered area, which solely
covers the 14 first-tier, coastal counties of Texas (and a small
portion of Harris County).

To date, there have been no reported Covered Events for these
notes.

On April 14, 2017, AIR Worldwide (AIR), acting as the Reset Agent,
completed reset reports for the 2015-1 notes that provided updated
annual attachment probabilities for each Class of notes for the
Annual Risk Period beginning June 1, 2017 using AIR's escrowed
software models and TWIA's updated Subject Business data. At each
reset date, TWIA may exercise an option to decrease (or increase)
the respective attachment levels on each of the classes within an
exceedance probability range of 4.40% to 1.00%.

2015-1 Class A Notes: Effective June 1, 2017, the Updated
Attachment Level increases to $4.20 billion (from $2.70 billion
for the current Risk Period that ends May 31, 2017) and the
Updated Exhaustion Level increases to $4.50 billion (from about
$3.245 billion). The updated probability of attachment decreases
to 1.40% (from 2.58%). This corresponds to an implied rating of
'BB-', per the calibration table listed in Fitch's "Insurance-
Linked Securities Methodology". The Updated Risk Interest Spread
will decrease to 4.81% (from 5.20%).

2015-1 Class B Notes: Effective June 1, 2017, the Updated
Attachment Level increases to $4.50 billion (from about $3.97
billion for the current Risk Period that ends May 31, 2017) and
the Updated Exhaustion Level increases to $4.90 billion (from
$4.50 billion). The updated probability of attachment decreases to
1.30% (from 1.40%). This corresponds to an implied rating of 'BB-
', per the calibration table. The Updated Risk Interest Spread
will decrease to 4.40% (from 4.62%).

Hannover Rueck SE (Hannover), a reinsurance company that acts as a
transformer, sits between TWIA and Alamo Re and has an 'A+' Issuer
Default Rating (IDR)/Stable Outlook (affirmed on Dec. 8, 2016).

The Permitted Investments meet Fitch's criteria for highly-rated
U.S. money market funds.

Fitch believes the notes and indirect counterparties are
performing as required. There have been no reported early
redemption notices or events of default, and all agents remain in
place.

Additional information regarding the 2015-1 notes can be found in
prior press releases dated May 13, 2015 and May 6, 2016 and
available at www.fitchratings.com.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

This rating is sensitive to the occurrence of a Covered Event(s),
the counterparty rating of Hannover and the rating on the
permitted investments held in the respective collateral accounts.

If qualifying Covered Events occur that causes annual aggregate
losses to exceed the Series 2015-1 Class A or Class B Updated
Attachment Levels, Fitch will downgrade the applicable class of
notes reflecting an effective default and issue a Recovery Rating.

In the case of a future reset election by TWIA, the rating of the
Series 2015-1 Class B note may be downgraded if the probability of
attachment exceeds 1.989%. Conversely, if TWIA elected to move the
Series 2015-1 Class B attachment probability closer to 1.00%, the
rating on the note would be unaffected.

To a much lesser extent, the Series 2015-1 Class A or B notes may
be downgraded if the money market funds should 'break the buck',
Hannover fails to make timely retrocession premium payments or
TWIA materially changes its mission or operations.

The catastrophe risk element is highly model-driven and actual
losses may differ from the results of the simulation analysis. The
AIR escrow models may not reflect future methodology enhancements
by AIR, which may have an adverse or beneficial effect on the
implied rating of the notes were such future methodology
considered.


===========
B R A Z I L
===========


BANCO NACIONAL: Head of Bank Resigns
------------------------------------
EFE News reports that the head of state development bank Banco
Nacional de Desenvolvimento Economico e Social (BNDES) and a key
member of beleaguered Brazilian President Michel Temer's economic
team resigned, citing personal reasons.

Maria Silvia Bastos Marques communicated her decision in a brief
letter to officials at that institution, the Brazilian
government's main financial arm for development projects,
according to EFE News.

The report notes that she said she would be replaced on an interim
basis by a BNDES director, Ricardo Ramos, and that all other
directors at that financial institution would remain at their
posts.

The report relays that President Temer, for his part, praised
Bastos' leadership during her year-long tenure, saying her efforts
had ensured BNDES was using more rigorous criteria in assessing
applications for loans to fund large corporate projects.

Ms. Bastos, nicknamed the "iron lady" because she had previously
headed up Brazilian steelmaker Companhia Siderurgica Nacional, was
the first woman to lead BNDES, one of the world's largest
development banks with a loan portfolio comparable to that of the
Inter-American Development Bank, the report notes.

Her resignation, attributed to pressure from business leaders
unhappy with a sharp drop in loan disbursements during her tenure
and to the government's lukewarm defense of her job performance,
leaves President Temer even more isolated amid serious corruption
allegations, the report relays.

Some key allies of the president have distanced themselves from
him since the Supreme Court formally launched an investigation
into bribery and obstruction of justice allegations, the report
notes.

President Temer is accused of accepting millions of dollars' worth
of bribes from Brazilian meatpacking giant JBS and encouraging
continued payments to an imprisoned former speaker of Brazil's
lower house of Congress to keep him from turning state's witness,
the report says.

Executives from JBS, whose business empire has significantly
expanded due to billions of dollars' worth of acquisitions in the
United States over the past decade, made those allegations to
prosecutors as part of plea-bargain testimony, saying they paid
the bribes to secure contracts and ensure easy access to credit
from BNDES and other state-run banks, says EFE.

President Temer has vehemently denied the accusations and vowed
not to resign, the report relays.

Earlier this month, Brazil's Federal Police launched an
investigation of suspected irregularities on the part of BNDES in
the granting of loans to the holding company behind JBS, the
world's largest meatpacker, the report notes.

The bank's decision to loan money to J&F Investimentos without
requiring the necessary repayment guarantees cost the Brazilian
treasury BRL1.2 billion ($368 million), the Federal Police said in
a statement on May 12, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on May
4, 2017, Moody's Investors Service has assigned a Ba2 long-term
foreign currency debt rating to the proposed senior unsecured
notes to be issued by Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Economico
e Social (BNDES). The notes will be denominated and settled in US
dollars, with maturity between five and ten years. The notes will
be issued as a green bond. The outlook on the rating is stable.


BRAZIL: Protesters Clash With Police in Brazil's Capital
--------------------------------------------------------
Paulo Trevisani and Samantha Pearson at The Wall Street Journal
report that tens of thousands of protesters descended on Brazil's
capital, setting fire to ministry buildings and clashing with riot
police as calls grew for President Michel Temer to resign over
allegations he was involved in a vast corruption scandal.

Chanting "out with Temer" and "elections now," angry demonstrators
crowded around Congress and ministry buildings as police fired
tear gas, according to WSJ.

Protesters set off fires inside two ministerial buildings and
vandalized six others and Brasilia's modernist cathedral, the
Federal District's Security Secretariat said, the report notes.
Portable restrooms nearby were also burnt, with firefighters
struggling to break through the crowds to get to the scene, the
report relays.

The Secretariat said 49 people were hurt, eight of whom were
police officers, the report discloses.  One protester was shot,
but the injury wasn't life-threatening, it said, the report notes.
It said it would investigate photos posted on social media showing
police officers pointing their guns toward the crowd, the report
says.

Brazil was thrown into turmoil last week when the Supreme Court
released testimony from executives of meatpacking giant JBS SA
saying they bribed 1,829 politicians, including President Michel
Temer and his two immediate predecessors, Dilma Rousseff and Luiz
Inacio Lula da Silva, the report relays.

Brazil's Supreme Court said it had opened an investigation into
Mr. Temer for alleged corruption, obstruction of justice and
criminal organization, the report says.  He has denied wrongdoing
and vehemently rejected calls to resign.  Ms. Rousseff and Mr. da
Silva have also denied wrongdoing.

Thick black smoke billowed from Brasilia's iconic row of ministry
buildings, as masked protesters broke the windows of government
buildings and as ambulances arrived to treat injuries, the report
discloses.  Government officials said about 35,000 people took
part in the protest, the report notes.

"A demonstration that was meant to be peaceful quickly degenerated
into vandalism and disrespect," said Raul Jungmann, Brazil's
defense minister, in a televised statement, adding that federal
troops had been called in an attempt to restore order, notes the
report.

Mr. Temer's allies have battled to keep the government functioning
while opposition politicians have refused to discuss anything
other than his removal from government, the report relays.  His
plans for an economic overhaul, including a restructuring of the
country's pension system, are now on hold, the report notes.

"We can't have any structural reform voted by a Congress
Brazilians can't trust," said Congressman Henrique Fontana, whose
Workers' Party, or PT, lost power last year when former President
Rousseff was impeached for violating budget laws, the report says.

She was succeeded by her vice president, Mr. Temer, from the
Brazilian Democratic Movement Party, or PMDB. He has been expected
to serve out the rest of her term until presidential elections in
2018, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
May 24, 2017, S&P Global Ratings placed its 'BB' long-term foreign
and local currency sovereign credit ratings on the Federative
Republic of Brazil on CreditWatch with negative implications.  S&P
also affirmed the short-term foreign and local currency ratings at
'B'. The transfer and convertibility assessment is unchanged at
'BBB-'. In addition, S&P placed the 'brAA-' national scale rating
on CreditWatch with negative implications.


BRAZIL: Moody's Revises Outlook to Neg.; Affirms Ba2 Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook on Brazil's
issuer rating to negative from stable and affirmed its issuer,
senior unsecured and shelf ratings at Ba2 and (P)Ba2 respectively.

Moody's decision to change Brazil's outlook to negative was driven
by the following factors:

1. The rise in uncertainty regarding reform momentum following
recent political events

2. And in consequence the rising threat to the economic recovery
and to Brazil's medium-term economic strength.

Whatever its outcome, the political crisis that erupted in Brazil
last week seems likely to undermine the government's reform agenda
and stall passage of future reforms, including social security.
This is likely to negatively impact investor confidence and lead
to increased market volatility, threatening the positive
macroeconomic momentum observed since President Temer began to
push through reforms.

RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR CHANGING BRAZIL'S RATING OUTLOOK TO NEGATIVE

First Driver: Rise in uncertainty regarding reform momentum
following recent political events

The stable outlook, previously assigned to Brazil's rating was
based on Moody's expectations that the observed improvement in
macroeconomic conditions would persist, reinforced by the strong
reform momentum witnessed under the Temer administration. Whatever
the outcome, the recent corruption allegations against the
President risk reversing the virtuous cycle between political
normalcy, reform implementation, and investor confidence that
underpinned the stabilization of economic conditions.

In recent months, the government has passed a number of important
reforms including a constitutional amendment to cap government
spending, and has promoted discussion in Congress of planned
social security reforms, which are critical to medium-term fiscal
sustainability. However, the controversy surrounding President
Temer will likely cause negotiations around social security reform
to stall, with the result that the reform does not pass in
Congress this year, as Moody's had previously expected.

Moreover, looking further ahead, with the focus of the
administration shifting towards the political crisis, the
government's ability to continue to develop and implement the
reforms needed to address Brazil's economic and fiscal malaise
will likely be undermined.

Second Driver: Prospects of deteriorating macroeconomic conditions
that will increase downside risks to the economic recovery

After two years of economic contraction, the economy has begun to
stabilize. Moody's expects modest GDP growth of 0.5% in 2017 with
inflation dropping to 4.0%, below the mid-point of the 4.5%
inflation target, but within the +/- 1.5% tolerance interval, and
remaining within the central bank target range, allowing the
central bank to continue monetary easing.

That recovery, and the related boost to Brazil's medium-term
economic strength, is threatened by the political crisis, which
will likely undermine investor confidence and increase financial
market volatility. Improved investor confidence was driven by the
government's focus on structural reforms and its ability to
deliver results in this area. In the current context, prolonged
political uncertainty and the risk of another leadership
transition will likely weigh on the incipient recovery. The
central bank's ability to deliver further rate cuts could be
hampered if a confidence-related shock to the exchange rate were
to feed into higher inflation, stunting the potential for a
positive impact on growth in 2018 and undermining fiscal savings
from lower interest payments on government debt.

As a consequence of these developments, downside risks to Moody's
growth forecasts for 2017 and 2018 have increased. Short-term
growth is generally of limited significance for credit ratings;
however, in Brazil's case, the persistence of the very significant
shock to growth witnessed in recent years would signal further
diminishing of economic strength in the medium-term.

RATIONALE FOR AFFIRMATION OF BRAZIL'S Ba2 RATING

Brazil's issuer rating at Ba2 reflects the strengths and
weaknesses of Brazil's credit profile. Below-potential economic
growth and weak fiscal metrics, which will result in continued
rise in government debt ratios over the next two to three years,
are important constraints on the rating. This is balanced against
Brazil's large and diversified economy, limited balance of
payments-related vulnerabilities, and recent reforms to arrest the
rise in government spending.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS UP

Moody's could change the outlook back to stable if the political
crisis is resolved quickly, clearing the way for approval of
fiscal reforms this year; particularly social security reform.
Structural reforms that lead to higher medium-term growth and
accelerate the pace of fiscal consolidation, stabilizing
government debt ratios could lead to a rating upgrade. Policy
continuity and consistent implementation of fiscal reforms,
including compliance with the spending cap beyond 2018 could also
lead to a rating upgrade.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS DOWN

Intensification of the political crisis that lead to a prolonged
period of uncertainty and materially impacts macroeconomic and
fiscal prospects would exert further negative pressure on the
rating. Back-tracking on fiscal reforms already approved,
particularly compliance with the spending cap, would be
particularly negative for the rating.

COUNTRY CEILINGS

The long-term foreign currency bond rating remains unchanged at
Ba1/NP. The long-term foreign currency deposit ceiling is
unchanged at Ba3/NP. The long-term local currency bond and deposit
ceilings are unchanged at A3.

GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 15729.3 (2015 Actual) (also known
as Per Capita Income)

Real GDP growth (% change): -3.6% (2016 Actual) (also known as GDP
Growth)

Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 6.3% (2016 Actual)

Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -9.0% (2016 Actual) (also known
as Fiscal Balance)

Current Account Balance/GDP: -1.3% (2016 Actual) (also known as
External Balance)

External debt/GDP (2016 Actual): 37.4%

Level of economic development: Moderate level of economic
resilience

Default history: At least one default event (on bonds and/or
loans) has been recorded since 1983.

On May 25, 2017, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of Government of Brazil. The main points raised during the
discussion were: The issuer's governance and/or management, have
materially decreased. The systemic risk in which the issuer
operates has materially increased.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Sovereign Bond
Ratings published in December 2016.

The weighting of all rating factors is described in the
methodology used in this credit rating action, if applicable.


BR PROPERTIES: Fitch Puts BB- IDR on Rating Watch Negative
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed BR Properties S.A.'s (BR Properties)
ratings on Rating Watch Negative including the company's 'BB-'
foreign currency and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDR)
and its 'A(bra)'national scale long-term rating.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The Negative Watch follows the announcement that BR Properties
signed an agreement to acquire the condominium Centenario Plaza
for BRL433.4 million and reflects the expected negative impact on
the company's high leverage ratios and liquidity. Currently, BR
Properties' leverage is high for the rating category. On a pro
forma basis, net leverage should increase to about 8.7x with the
acquisition and should remain high for a longer period than
Fitch's initial expectations of a gradual reduction. Fitch's base
case in the last rating review incorporated the expectation that
the company would use cash balances to reduce gross debt and net
leverage to gradually reduce to about 6x by the end of 2018. If
the acquisition is approved according to the terms and conditions
announced, BR Properties' ratings will be downgraded to
'B+'/'BBB+(bra)'.

In May 24, 2017, BR Properties announced the intention to acquire
the condominium Centenario Plaza from Caixa de Previdencia dos
Funcionarios do Banco do Brasil (PREVI). The acquisition includes
two office buildings in Sao Paulo, with a GLA of 53,892 sqm.
Considering current occupancy level of 80%, this acquisition
should add about BRL36 million to the company's annual EBITDA. The
conclusion of the acquisition is still subject to certain
conditions, including the approval of BR Properties' Board of
Directors.

In Fitch's opinion, BR Properties has not demonstrated commitment
to reduce leverage to more conservative levels. During 2014 to
2016, the company sold more than BRL6 billion of assets with a
debt reduction of only about BRL1.8 billion, while dividends
totalled approximately BRL2.5 billion. As of March 31, 2017, BR
Properties had BRL3.8 billion of total debt and BRL1.2 billion of
total cash and marketable securities.

BR Properties is facing the challenge of recovering its cash flow
generation and reducing leverage to more conservative levels, to
avoid continued pressure on its ratings. The company's cash flow
generation reduced in the last couple of years, due to the
negative business environment and lower scale of operations, which
resulted in an increase in leverage and lower interest coverage
ratios. BR Properties generated BRL313 million of EBITDA and cash
flow from operations (CFFO) was negative BRL163 million in the LTM
ended March 31, 2017, pressured by high financial expenses of
about BRL447 million. In this period, total debt/EBITDA and net
debt/EBITDA ratios were 12x and 8.2x, respectively, and compare
with 6.1x and 4.0x in 2015. Interest coverage, measured as
EBITDA/interest ratio, remains weak and fell to 0.7x in the LTM
ended March 31, 2017, from 0.8x in 2016 and 1.5x in 2015.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

If the acquisition is approved according to the terms and
conditions announced, BR Properties' ratings will be downgraded to
'B+'/'BBB+(bra)'.

A rating upgrade for BR Properties is not likely in the near
future and will only occur following a sustainable and material
leverage reduction.

LIQUIDITY

BR Properties' liquidity was strong as of March 31, 2017,
benefitting from the sale of assets. However, it should materially
deteriorate following the cash disbursement from the announced
transaction. Total cash and marketable securities of BRL1.2
billion covered short-term debt by 2.0x and was used to finance
the company's negative free cash flow.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has placed the following ratings on Negative Watch:

-- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR 'BB-';
-- Long-Term Local Currency IDR 'BB-';
-- USD285 million senior unsecured perpetual notes 'BB-';
-- Long-term national scale rating 'A(bra)'.


JBS SA: Shares Plunge Nearly 20% Over Brazilian Corruption Scandal
------------------------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that shares of Brazil-based global meatpacking
giant JBS plunged 19.98 percent in trading May 22 in the wake of a
corruption scandal involving several executives.

JBS's woes took a toll on the benchmark Ibovespa index, which fell
2.21 percent to 61,257, according to EFE News.

The company, one of the world's largest meat exporters, has been
in the spotlight since several of its executives cut plea-bargain
deals with prosecutors and revealed that they paid bribes to more
than 1,800 politicians, including President Michel Temer, from 28
parties, the report relays.

Joesley Batista, one of JBS's owners, told prosecutors that the
company had paid bribes to President Temer since 2010, documents
released by the nation's highest court showed, the report notes.

Supreme Court Justice Edson Fachin, who is overseeing cases
related to the investigation of a $2 billion bribes-for-inflated-
contracts scheme centered on state oil company Petrobras, approved
an investigation into President Temer based on the totality of
Batista's confession, says the report.

Mr. Batista made the confession as part of plea-bargain testimony
related to the scandal surrounding JBS, which has been
investigated for alleged bribes paid to meat inspectors and
purportedly irregular loans from state development bank BNDES to
its holding company, J&F Investimentos, the report discloses.

The documents ratcheted up the pressure on Temer, who was rocked
last week by allegations he encouraged the payment of hush money
to a former top lawmaker -- and potential government witness --
convicted earlier this year of graft, the report notes.

The most explosive evidence are audio tapes, which Batista
secretly recorded during a meeting with the president in Brasilia
in March, the report relays.

On the tapes, the president can be heard apparently recommending
that the JBS chairman maintain the flow of money to the former
speaker of Brazil's lower house, the imprisoned Eduardo Cunha, to
buy his silence, the report says.

The report notes that Mr. Cunha was convicted in March of offenses
that included receiving bribes in connection with a contract
Petrobras signed in the African nation of Benin.

On the tapes, released to the media, Batista says that he is
looking to have his company receive favors from government
ministries, that he is in contact with prosecutors who are
informing him about investigations and that he is bribing Mr.
Cunha to keep him from entering into a plea-bargain arrangement,
the report relays.

The report discloses that President Temer, for his part, either
murmurs apparent approval or simply listens without making any
comment, behavior that legal analysts have interpreted as explicit
support for the unlawful actions.

J&F, for its part, has not yet reached an agreement with
prosecutors to cooperate with the investigation, the report notes.

JBS and prosecutors must still work out the terms of the fine to
be paid for the crimes committed, the report relays.

The Securities Commission (CVM), the agency that regulates the
financial market, has opened five investigations of JBS, one
related to the bribery case and another involving purchases of
dollars before the scandal broke, the report says.

JBS executives purchased a large amount of US dollars to allegedly
hedge the drop in the value of the real that would occur when the
scandal became public, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on May
24, 2017, Moody's Investors Service has downgraded by one notch
the ratings of JBS S.A. and of its wholly-owned subsidiary JBS USA
Lux S.A. ("JBS USA") and placed the ratings of both companies
under review for further downgrade. The rating downgrades include
JBS S.A.'s Corporate Family Rating to Ba3 from Ba2, JBS USA's
senior secured rating to Ba2 from Ba1, and JBS USA's senior
unsecured rating to Ba3 from Ba2. This action follows confirmation
by JBS S.A. that seven executives of the company and its
controlling entity, J&F Investimentos, entered into a plea bargain
agreement with the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office concerning
allegations of corruption.


PETROBRAS: Moody's B1 Rating Unaffected by Brazil Outlook Change
---------------------------------------------------------------
On May 26, 2017, Moody's changed the outlook on the Government of
Brazil's Ba2 rating to negative from stable given the rise in
uncertainty regarding reform momentum following recent political
events and, in consequence, the rising threat to the economic
recovery and to Brazil's medium-term economic strength. However,
as Moody's stated previously, the change in Brazil's outlook does
not directly affect the B1 ratings or positive outlook of state-
owned oil company Petroleo Brasileiro (Petrobras).

The positive outlook on Petrobras' B1 ratings assumes that the
company will continue focused on its strategy to reduce debt and
strengthen its operating performance, which should improve cash
generation and credit metrics. This assumes that political or
economic uncertainties will not materially affect Petrobras'
ability to access the capital markets and that the company's
refinancing or liquidity risk will not increase.

On April 10, 2017, Moody's raised Petrobras' Baseline Credit
Assessment to b2 from b3, upgraded its ratings to B1 from B2, and
changed the ratings outlook to positive from stable. The actions
considered improvements in the company's liquidity profile and in
the regulatory framework in Brazil, both of which reduced
Petrobras' credit risk. Moody's continues to monitor progress on
Petrobras' execution of asset sales, operational improvements, and
debt refinancing initiatives.

Petrobras' asset sales could indicate a reduction in its future
revenues and cash flow. But any actions that strengthen Petrobras'
liquidity while also improving its operating margins and leverage
would likely have a greater impact on the company's credit quality
than reductions in its production, revenues and reserve base.

Petrobras' liquidity risk has declined in the last quarters on the
back of $13.6 billion in asset sales from 2015 to date and around
$8 billion in exchanged notes so far in 2017, which helped to
extend the company's debt maturity profile. However, refinancing
risk remains high: Moody's estimates that Petrobras' maturing debt
in the remainder of 2017 and 2018 amounts to $6.1 billion and $9.7
billion, respectively, for a total of $15.8 billion. In addition,
possible fines derived from the class action lawsuit, the US
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)'s civil investigation, and
the US Department of Justice (DoJ)'s criminal investigation
related to bribery and corruption will negatively affect the
company's cash position in an amount yet unclear. Other threats to
Petrobras' operating and financial performance, include tax
contingent liabilities, execution risk related to the 2017-21
business plan and potential delays in fully executing its asset
sales plan.

Petrobras' asset sales could indicate a reduction in its future
revenues and cash flow. But any actions that strengthen Petrobras'
liquidity while also improving its operating margins and leverage
would likely have a greater impact on the company's credit quality
than reductions in its production, revenues and reserve base.

Petrobras' ratings and outlook reflect Moody's joint-default
analysis for the company as a government-related issuer. The
ratings reflect Moody's assumption for a moderate likelihood of
timely extraordinary support from the Government of Brazil. As a
result, Petrobras' rating incorporates only one notch of uplift
between Petrobras' b2 BCA and its B1 senior unsecured rating given
the government's persistently tight fiscal position. Moody's
continues to assume moderate default dependence between Petrobras
and the government.

Petrobras is an integrated energy company, with total assets of
$249 billion as of March 31, 2017. The company dominates Brazil's
oil and natural gas production, as well as downstream refining and
marketing. Petrobras also holds a significant stake in
petrochemicals and a position in sugar-based ethanol production
and distribution. The Brazilian government directly and indirectly
owns about 45.3% of Petrobras' outstanding capital stock and 60.4%
of its voting shares.



==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


AKYLAS LIMITED: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for June 22
-----------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Akylas Limited will hold their final meeting
on June 22, 2017, at 4:00 p.m., to receive the liquidator's report
on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          DMS Corporate Services Ltd.
          c/o Nicola Cowan
          dms House, 2nd Floor
          P.O. Box 1344 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 946 7665
          Facsimile: (345) 949 2877


ARES INVESTMENT: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for June 16
------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Ares Investment Funds SPC will hold their
final meeting on June 16, 2017, at 11:00 a.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Highwater Limited
          c/o Nicole Gagliano
          Grand Pavilion Commercial Centre
          1st Floor, 802 West Bay Road
          P.O. Box 31855 Grand Cayman KY1-1207
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 943 2295
          Facsimile: (345) 943 2294


BBGP ODENSE: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
-------------------------------------------
At an extraordinary meeting held on April 21, 2017, the sole
shareholder of BBGP Odense Cayman Limited resolved to voluntarily
wind up the company's operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Fides Limited
          c/o Oliver Propper
          The Grand Pavilion, 2nd Floor
          Commercial Centre
          P.O. Box 10338 Grand Cayman KY1-1003
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone (345) 949 7232


CAP-ENDURANCE FUND: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
--------------------------------------------------
At an extraordinary meeting held on April 24, 2017, the sole
shareholder of Cap-Endurance Fund SPC resolved to voluntarily wind
up the company's operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Fides Limited
          c/o Oliver Propper
          The Grand Pavilion, 2nd Floor
          Commercial Centre
          P.O. Box 10338 Grand Cayman KY1-1003
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone (345) 949 7232


MERIDIAN GLOBAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due June 8
-----------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Meridian Global Opportunities Fund SPC are
required to file their proofs of debt by June 8, 2017, to be
included in the company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on April 21, 2017.

The company's liquidator is:

          Margot Macinnis
          Borrelli Walsh (Cayman) Limited
          Harbour Place, Ground Floor
          103 South Church Street, George Town
          Grand Cayman
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 743 8800
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 743 8801


PATRONUS SELECT: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due June 22
------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Patronus Select Ltd. are required to file their
proofs of debt by June 22, 2017, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.

The company commenced wind-up proceedings on April 30, 2017.

The company's liquidator is:

          Trinity Fund Administration (Cayman) Ltd
          c/o Angela Nightingale
          Telephone: (345) 743 6620
          Facsimile: (345) 743 6720
          Citrus Grove, 3rd Floor, 106 Goring Ave
          P.O. Box 10364 Grand Cayman KY1-1004
          Cayman Islands


POINT72 CAYMANS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
--------------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Point72 Caymans, Ltd., on April 13, 2017,
passed a resolution to voluntarily liquidate the company's
business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Point72 Asset Management, L.P.
          c/o Kevin O'Connor
          72 Cummings Point Road
          Stamford CT 06902
          USA
          Telephone: (203) 890 3896


S.A.C. OFFSHORE: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
--------------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of S.A.C. Offshore Capital Funding, Ltd., on
May 2, 2017, passed a resolution to voluntarily liquidate the
company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          S.A.C. Capital Advisors, L.P.
          c/o Kevin O'Connor
          72 Cummings Point Road
          Stamford CT 06902
          USA
          Telephone: (203) 890 3896


SHANGHAI (Z.J.): Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on June 5
-------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholder of Shanghai (Z.J.) Industry Limited will hear on
June 5, 2017, at 9:00 a.m., the liquidator's report on the
company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Wang Fahua
          B Building, 213 Room
          563 Songtao Road
          Pudong, Shanghai
          China
          Telephone: +8621 3870 1553/8001
          Facsimile: +8621 5856 1927


SYSWIN INC: Shareholders' Final Meeting Today
---------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Syswin Inc. will hold their final meeting
today, May 30, 2017, at 9:00 a.m., to receive the liquidator's
report on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Richard Fear
          c/o Kevin Butler
          P.O. Box 2681 Grand Cayman KY1-1111
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 814 7374
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3902


===============
C O L O M B I A
===============


ESTRATEGIAS EN VALORES: Chapter 15 Case Summary
-----------------------------------------------
Chapter 15 Debtor: Estrategias en Valores S.A., et al.
                   Calle 98#21-50 PH
                   Bogota, Colombia

Type of Business: Estrategias en Valores ("Estraval") was a
                  finance company engaged in the business of
                  buying and selling pagare libranzas, which are
                  consumer loans made to an indivdiual secured by
                  their paycheck.

Foreign Proceeding: Interventional Judicial Liquidation of
                    Estrategias en Valores, S.A. et al.
                    in Colombia.

Chapter 15 Petition Date: May 25, 2017

Chapter 15 Lead Case No.: 17-16559

Court: United States Bankruptcy Court
       Southern District of Florida (Miami)

Judge: Hon. Laurel M Isicoff

Foreign Representative: Luis Fernando Alvarado Ortiz, the
                        liquidator appointed in Colombia

Foreign Representative's
Counsel:                 Michael C Fasano, Esq.
                         FASANO LAW FIRM, PLLC
                         333 SE 2nd Ave
                         Miami, FL 33131
                         Tel: 786 871 3327
                         E-mail: mfasano@fasanolawfirm.com

                           - and -

                         RIVERO MESTRE LLP
                         Andres Rivero, Esq.
                         Charles Whorton, Esq.
                         Kirk Villalon, Esq.
                         2525 Ponce de Leon Boulevard
                         Suite 1000
                         Miami, FL
                         Tel: (305) 445-2505
                         E-mail: arivero@riveromestre.com
                                 cwhorton@riveromestre.com
                                 amegovern@riveromestre.com
                                 kvillalon@riveromestre.com

Estimated Assets: Not Indicated

Estimated Debt: Not Indicated

A full-text copy of the petition is available for free at:

        http://bankrupt.com/misc/flsb17-16559.pdf


ESTRATEGIAS EN VALORES: Probe Into US$220M Fraud Still Ongoing
--------------------------------------------------------------
The liquidator appointed in the liquidation proceedings of
Estrategias en Valores S.A. ("Estraval") said the investigation
into the fraud perpetrated by the company and its principals
remain ongoing.

Luis Fernando Alvarodo Ortiz, the court-appointed liquidator,
estimates that Estraval, which guaranteed returns of 14% to 21%
from the sale of securities packaged from consumer loans known as
"pagare libranzas" before its collapse in 2015, defrauded
investors for more than 600 billion Colombian pesos (approximately
US $220 million).  Mr. Ortiz says he has identified at least 4,600
direct victims of the Estraval fraud.

According to Mr. Ortiz, the Colombian government on Jan. 23, 2017,
intercepted principal Cesar Mondragon at a Bogota airport after he
returned from Miami (where he deposited US $l00,000 in cash). As
part of a sting operation with the help of the Colombian law
enforcement officials, including the DEA, the Colombian government
arrested principals Cesar Mondragon and Juan Carlos Bastidas, as
well as Rosalba FonseLa, Angela Marina Daza, Jose Ivan Castiblanco
Fuquene, Pedro Harold Carvajal, and Ferna do Joya Rodriguez, who
were all high-level managers involved in the Estraval fraud.

These individuals have been charged with committing financial and
aggravated fraud, massive collection of public money, failing to
reimburse public proceeds money laundering, conspiracy,
falsification of private documents, and illicit enrichment in
Colombia.

                         Pagare Libranzas

Pagare libranzas are consumer loans made to an individual secured
by their paycheck.  A borrower would apply for a pagare libranza
through a lender, and monthly principal and interest payments
would be deducted from the borrower's paycheck until the loan was
paid.

The Colombian government permitted the issuance of pagare
libranzas as a way to offer more opportunities for the growing
Colombian lower and middle class to obtain credit.  While the
market for these loans was initially unregulated, the Colombian
government instituted a regulatory framework for pagare libranzas
and their derivative financial products in 2012.

Pagare libranzas were initially issued by "bookkeeping
cooperatives" that would make a loan directly to consumers.  The
cooperatives would then sell booklets of libranza notes to
third-party investment firms, such as Estraval.  This is where, in
the case of Estraval and several other Colombian investment firms,
including some of the Debtors, rampant fraud began to develop.

Estraval bought libranza notes in bulk and then packaged them into
securities.  Each security, which represented a group of pagare
libranzas would then be documented by a single promissory note.

Estraval then began selling these new promissory notes through
false advertising to anyone -- rich, poor, and everyone in between
-- who was willing to listen.

                           Ponzi Scheme

The company claimed that Estraval libranza notes "guaranteed"
returns of 14% to 21%, while failing to disclose that the notes
came with that the notes came with a risk of default.
Additionally, Estraval failed to warn investors that libranza
contracts contained no prepayment penalties and that many loans
would be paid off early, thus reducing interest income.

Using false and predatory solicitation methods, Estraval made
millions selling risky investments while warranting that they were
safe.

The millions earned through the scheme were not enough for
Estraval and its principals.  As the market for libranza notes
became larger, the company began opening dozens of "bookkeeping
cooperatives" to sell individual libranza loans to vulnerable
individuals looking to secure credit with their livelihoods.  This
increased the pool of loans that could be packaged by Estraval and
sold to other unsuspecting investors.

Estraval's need to continually create notes was fueled by the
fundamental problem with its scheme.  The libranza notes were not
generating the "guaranteed" returns as promised.  Estraval's
solution was to use a portion of their fees from selling the notes
to new investors to supplement older investors' returns.  By the
mid-2000s, Estraval was engaged in a full-fledged ponzi scheme.

Estraval also enlisted "sales representatives" to sell pagare
libranzas to anyone they could find.  Estraval promised these
untrained and unlicensed representatives a 3.5% commission and all
expense paid trips to Miami, Florida, for selling Estraval
financial products.  The Colombian Attorney General has deemed
Estraval's sales practices an illegal pyramid scheme.

As the Colombian credit market cooled, Estraval could not sell
enough new notes to pay off prior investors, so they simply began
copying already-sold notes and sizzling them to unsuspecting new
investors.  These notes had no economic value and produced up
legitimate return.

According to a study done by Fiduagraria, Estraval also began
asking unsuspecting investors to sign up to six notes at one time
with only one of them having any in actual economic value.
Moreover, Estraval began selling notes that were already paid,
prepaid, or expired to new investors.

In 2012, Estraval began having problems repaying investors due to
a combination of factors.  First, legitimate bookkeeping
cooperatives, the originators of the pagare libranzas, stopped
lending because of a rise in the rate of borrower defaults.
Second, as the pagare libranza market cooled, fewer investors were
willing to buy Estraval products, despite Estraval's incessant
efforts to sell falsified notes while making false representations
about their returns.

Slowly, Estraval began to collapse under the weight of its own
fraud.  It could not pay investors and it had nowhere to raise new
capital.

                       Colombian Proceedings

On March 13, 2015, the Superintendency of Companies concluded,
after an extensive investigation, that Estraval had filed multiple
false reports to the Superintendency of Companies that
misrepresented its liquidity.  The investigation revealed that
Estraval had incurred obligations that exceeded its capital by
more than fifty percent.  As a result, the Superintendency of
Companies placed Estraval and the other Debtors in receivership.

Simultaneously, the prosecutor general's office pursued a criminal
investigation against Mondragon, Bastidas, Rosalba Fonseca, Jose
Ivan Castiblanco, and others involved in the Estraval ponzi
scheme.

On Aug. 4, 2015, following the placement of Estraval into
receivership, the Superintendent started an administrative
investigation relating to Estraval's registration of various front
entities and shell companies.

On Dec. 9, 2015, after concluding the investigation, the
Superintendency imposed a fine on Mondragon and Bastidas.

On May 25, 2016, the Colombian government officially opened the
liquidation process for Estraval under Colombian Article 15.3 of
the 1116 Law of 2006.  This law gives the Superintendency of
Companies the power to convert a reorganization into an insolvency
proceeding.

On May 26, 2016, the Colombian government attempted to place
Estraval in a reorganization plan; however, this was unsuccessful,
and liquidation proceeding began under the leadership of Ortiz.

Also on May 26, the Superintendency of Companies used its power to
freeze, lien, and foreclose Estraval-related assets for the
benefit of creditors. Moreover, the Superintendency ordered an
entity called MIT, which acted as an administrator of Estraval
securities, to cease transferring, delivering, or dealing in any
way with Estraval promissory notes.

On June 15, 2016, pursuant to Colombian Article 49.3 of 1116 law
of 2006, the Superintendency of Companies issued an ex officio
decree to initiate the judicial liquidation process of Estrategias
en Valores SA.. - Estraval S.A., as well as three of its related
companies: Tecnicas Financieras S.A.A, Estrategias en Liquidez and
Estradinamicas.

An investigation in the Colombian liquidation proceedings led to
the conclusion that Estraval had, in fact, defrauded investors and
creditors by using illegal methods to promote and sell pagare
libranzas.  The investigation also confirmed that many of the
pange libranza notes sold were either falsified, duplicated, or
had no real economic value at the time of sale.

The investigation found that there was no reasonable financial
justification for Estraval's activities and that because Estraval
offered a return that did not correspond to the economic reality
of its operations, it was determined that the company perpetuate a
financial fraud on the Colombian public.

The Colombian Attorney General's Office, in a parallel criminal
investigation, completely supported these factual findings.

The decree appointed Luis Fernando Alvarodo Ortiz as liquidator
for Estraval, its related entities, and its key management.

By order dated Sept. 2, 2016, the Colombian Superintendency of
Companies granted its Superintendent Delegate for inspection,
Surveillance, and Control's petition commencing the Colombian
Proceeding as an "intervention judicial liquidation" under Law
1116 of 2006, Legislative Decree 4334 of 2008 and appointing Order
as Controller, the agent responsible for the management of the
assets of tie parties under intervention.

The goal of an "intervention judicial liquidation" for the
recovery of illegally obtained proceeds in Colombia, according to
the Colombian Constitutional Court is to: (i) immediately suspend
the operations or businesses of natural or legal persons who,
through unauthorized deposits or collections, such as pyramids,
prepaid cards, sale of services and other operations and massive
negotiations, "generate abuse of law and fraud to the law" in
exercising irregular financial activity; and (ii) provide for the
organization of a procedure that allows the prompt return of
resources obtained in furtherance of such activities."

Article 1 of the Legislative Decree 4334 of 2008 requires the
intervention to apply to "business, operation and assets of
individuals and corporations involved in a financial activity
without the proper governmental authorization.  The Decree gives
the Superintendence broad powers to issue orders to obtain control
of the assets, proceeds and business.  The main goal is to
reestablish and preserve the public interest under threat."

Moreover, Colombian law and the Constitutional Court find this
decree to have the highest importance in Colombia because it helps
to maintain the public economic order of the country.

The Constitutional Court has also concluded that the
Superintendency's formal decision to place companies into
liquidation and to recover misappropriated assets for the public
good has the same effect and may be enforced in the same manner as
a court order.

                          About Estraval

Bogota, Colombia-based Estrategias en Valores S.A. (Estraval) was
a finance company incorporated under Colombian law on August 16,
2000, by Cesar Mondragon and Juan Carlos Bastidas.  Estraval
engaged in the business of buying and selling pagare libranzas,
which are consumer loans made to an individual secured by their
paycheck.

Estraval guaranteed returns of 14% to 21% from the sale of notes
packaged from pagare libranzas but the business, which the
liquidator says was a ponzi scheme, collapsed in 2015.

The Debtors were placed into liquidation proceedings in Colombia
after a lengthy investigation May 26, 2016.  Luis Fernando
Alvarodo Ortiz was appointed by the Superintendency of Companies
to administer the liquidation.

Mr. Ortiz, as foreign representative, filed a Chapter 15 petition
for Estraval (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Case No. 17-16559) on May 25, 2017,
to seek U.S. recognition of the proceedings in Colombia.  Hon.
Laurel M Isicoff is the case judge in the U.S. case.

Michael C. Fasano, Esq., at Fasano Law Firm, PLLC, in Miami, is
the Foreign Representative's primary U.S. counsel.


ESTRATEGIAS EN VALORES: Seeks Recognition of Colombian Liquidation
------------------------------------------------------------------
The liquidator of Estrategias en Valores S.A. ("Estraval"), a
company liquidating in Colombia, filed a Chapter 15 petition in
Miami, Florida, to be able to look into "millions of dollars in
fraudulently obtained funds" transferred by its principals to the
United States before their arrest in January 2017.

Estraval, which guaranteed returns of 14% to 21% from the sale of
securities packaged from consumer loans known as "pagare
libranzas" before its collapse in 2015, defrauded investors for
more than 600 billion Colombian pesos (approximately US $220
million).

"I decided to pursue this [Chapter 15] case after I discovered,
with the assistance of creditors, that a substantial portion of
Estraval's and its related persons' and entities' assets,
illicitly obtained through their fraud, were transferred to Miami-
Dade County, Florida," Luis Fernando Alvarodo Ortiz, the
liquidator said in a U.S. court filing May 24, 2017.

Mr. Ortiz believes that Estraval principals Cesar Mondragon and
Juan Carlos Bastidas appear to be operating a network of finance
companies in Coral Gables, Florida, one of which has already been
sued in Miami-Dade County Circuit Court for suspect investment
sales practices.  Additionally, Mondragon operated a money
exchange business in Miami-Dade County, Florida that Ortiz
believes was used to hide more than $10 million from Estraval to
various financial institutions in Florida.  Finally, Mondragon's
ex-wife and daughter live in Aventura, Florida in a multi-million-
dollar penthouse that as ostensibly sold to a third party in early
2017 for $6,000,000.

"Through my investigation in Colombia, I have determined that
Estraval, Mondragon, Bastidas, and the additional named Debtors
have transferred millions of dollars in fraudulently obtained
funds to the United States.  Moreover, the investigation has
revealed significant real property, personal property, business,
and financial holdings in Miami-Dade County that were removed from
Colombia during the course of Estraval scheme.  Many of these
assets were transferred after the Superintendency of Companies'
intervention, and those transfers are in direct violation of a
Colombian administrative order," Mr. Ortiz said.

Mr. Ortiz seeks U.S. recognition of the liquidation proceedings in
Colombia as a foreign main proceeding.

"I believe that the majority of the assets transferred to the
United States during this scheme either currently exist or passed
through intermediaries in this Judicial District," Mr. Ortiz said.

Moreover, according to Mr. Ortiz, the law firm of Rivero Mestre
LLP has received funds in escrow in Miami-Dade, Florida, on behalf
of Estraval and related Debtors.

"[I] anticipate that through recognition of the Colombian
Proceeding and the exercise of the discovery powers requested in
the Petition, I will be able to identify additional assets . . .
belonging to the Debtors, located in the United States," Mr. Ortiz
said.

Mr. Ortiz was appointed by the Superintendency of Companies in
Colombia to administer Estraval's liquidation.  Under Colombian
law, Mr. Ortiz is tasked to liquidate Estraval and to recover
assets on behalf of creditors and the public who were harmed by
Estraval's and the related Debtors' massive fraud.

                          About Estraval

Bogota, Colombia-based Estrategias en Valores S.A. (Estraval) was
a finance company incorporated under Colombian law on August 16,
2000, by Cesar Mondragon and Juan Carlos Bastidas.  Estraval
engaged in the business of buying and selling pagare libranzas,
which are consumer loans made to an individual secured by their
paycheck.

Estraval guaranteed returns of 14% to 21% from the sale of notes
packaged from pagare libranzas but the business, which the
liquidator says was a ponzi scheme, collapsed in 2015.

The Debtors were placed into liquidation proceedings on May 26,
2016, in Colombia after a lengthy investigation.  Luis Fernando
Alvarodo Ortiz was appointed by the Superintendency of Companies
to administer the liquidation.

Mr. Ortiz, as foreign representative, filed a Chapter 15 petition
for Estraval (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Case No. 17-16559) on May 25, 2017,
to seek U.S. recognition of the proceedings in Colombia.  The Hon.
Laurel M. Isicoff is the case judge in the U.S. case.

Michael C. Fasano, Esq., at Fasano Law Firm, PLLC, in Miami, is
the Foreign Representative's primary U.S. counsel.



=============
J A M A I C A
=============


JAMAICA: Slow Growth in Agriculture Sector During January-March
---------------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that there was a slowdown in growth in Jamaica's
agricultural sector during the January to March quarter when
compared to the corresponding period last year.

The Bank of Jamaica said the deceleration was chiefly reflected in
domestic crop production, the impact of which was partly offset by
continued strong growth in traditional export crops, according to
RJR News.

There was strong performance in sugar production, associated with
an early start of the crop season in December, the report notes.

Banana and cocoa output also increased during the first three
months of 2017, the report relays.

According to the Central Bank, the deceleration in domestic crop
production followed record output levels in the March 2016
quarter, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Feb. 9, 2017, Fitch Ratings affirmed Jamaica's Long-Term Foreign
and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'B' with a
Stable Outlook. The issue ratings on Jamaica's senior unsecured
Foreign and Local Currency bonds are also affirmed at 'B'. The
Outlooks on the Long-Term IDRs are Stable. The Country Ceiling is
affirmed at 'B' and the Short-Term Foreign Currency and Local
Currency IDRs at 'B'.


JAMAICA: Consumer Confidence Declined to Lowest Level in 2016
-------------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that consumer confidence in the country has
declined to its lowest level in the past year.

This is based on the Jamaica Conference Board's first quarter
Business and Consumer Confidence Indices, according to RJR News.

However, the results show that consumer confidence has remained
more favorable than in the prior decade with the exception of one
survey, the report relays.

A preview of the indices shows that economic confidence among
Jamaican firms has remained largely unchanged during the past five
quarters, the report discloses.

Firms were asked their opinion about increased business taxes to
meet the country's financial needs, the report notes.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Feb. 9, 2017, Fitch Ratings affirmed Jamaica's Long-Term Foreign
and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'B' with a
Stable Outlook. The issue ratings on Jamaica's senior unsecured
Foreign and Local Currency bonds are also affirmed at 'B'. The
Outlooks on the Long-Term IDRs are Stable. The Country Ceiling is
affirmed at 'B' and the Short-Term Foreign Currency and Local
Currency IDRs at 'B'.



                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B.
Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Joseph Cardillo at
856-381-8268.


                   * * * End of Transmission * * *