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                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

               Friday, June 16, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 119


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

JOHN DEERE: Moody's Assigns B2 Global Foreign Currency Debt Rating
PROVINCE OF SANTA FE: Fitch Affirms B LT IDRs; Outlook Stable


B R A Z I L

ELDORADO BRASIL: S&P Lowers CCR to 'B-' on Weak Governance
CONCESSIONARIA: Moody's Updates Debentures Amount to BRL600MM
J&F INVESTIMENTOS: S&P Lowers CCR to 'B-' on Weaker Balance Sheet
JBS SA: S&P Lowers CCR to 'B+' on Weak Governance


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

AMS-TAOS INTERNATIONAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
ASHENDEN GLOBAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due June 26
ASHENDEN GLOBAL MASTER: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due June 26
CHC GROUP: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due June 28
ENSO GLOBAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 5

LEHMAN (CAYMAN ISLANDS): Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 3
MAXSCEND TECHNOLOGIES: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 3
NIGHT SQUARE: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
TONTINE TOTAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 5
UBS IB CO-INVESTMENT: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 7


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Paris Court Orders Partner to Pay US$30MM
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Puts US$500M Bond to Finish Power Plant


M E X I C O

ECATEPEC DE MORELOS: Moody's Cuts Issuer Rating to B1; Outlook Neg


P A N A M A

AES PANAMA: Fitch Ups Long-Term IDRs from BB+; Outlook Stable


P U E R T O    R I C O

PUERTO RICO: Governor Pitches Statehood as Debt Solution


T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O

TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Foreign Direct Investment to T&T Plummets


                            - - - - -


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A R G E N T I N A
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JOHN DEERE: Moody's Assigns B2 Global Foreign Currency Debt Rating
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo (MLA) has
assigned a B2 global scale and a A1.ar national scale foreign
currency debt rating to John Deere Credit Compania Financiera
S.A.(JDC)'s Class tenth and eleventh senior debt issuance. The
issuances, for up to a combined amount of $30 million, will be due
in 36 and 48 months respectively.

The outlook on the ratings is stable.

The following ratings were assigned to JDC's Class X and XI senior
unsecured debt issuance.:

B2 Global Foreign Currency Debt Rating

A1.ar Argentina National Scale Foreign Currency Debt Rating

RATINGS RATIONALE

JDC's global scale rating is constrained by Argentina's operating
environment, which remains challenging despite various market-
friendly policy reforms implemented by Macri's administration that
are expected to result in a return to economic growth and a
continued decline in inflation this year. These environmental
challenges outweigh JDC's relatively sound financial fundamentals.
There is very high probability that JDC will receive support from
its foreign-owned parent, John Deere Credit Inc, rated (P)A2 with
negative outlook, in an event of stress. However, the company's
long-term global senior unsecured foreign currency debt rating is
constrained by Argentina's foreign currency bond ceiling.
Reflecting this constraint, the A1.ar national scale rating
assigned to the notes is the highest of the three national scale
rating categories corresponding to a global scale rating of B2.

The ratings also consider JDC's reliance on market funds, which
expose it to swings in interest rates and refinancing risk, and
this risk is partially mitigated by credit facilities available
from the company's parent in an event of stress, as well as long
term financing provided by John Deere & Co's local subsidiary,
Industrias John Deere Argentina. The rating is also supported by
an ample capital cushion which provides loss absorption capacity
in case of stress, and low asset quality metrics. Given the
company's narrow focus on providing financing to the agricultural
sector, its asset quality is susceptible to climate risk. Although
the company posts ample nominal profitability, its results are
distorted by the high rate of inflation.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

An upgrade of the Argentine sovereign and a corresponding increase
in Argentina's debt and deposit ceilings would put upward pressure
on the company's ratings, provided the entity continues to
demonstrate sound operating performance. Conversely, a downgrade
of the Argentine sovereign could put downward pressure on the
entity's ratings, but this is unlikely at this time given
Argentina's positive outlook.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Finance
Companies published in December 2016.

Moody's National Scale Credit Ratings (NSRs) are intended as
relative measures of creditworthiness among debt issues and
issuers within a country, enabling market participants to better
differentiate relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's global
scale credit ratings in that they are not globally comparable with
the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with NSRs
for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same country.
NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier signifying the
relevant country, as in ".za" for South Africa. For further
information on Moody's approach to national scale credit ratings,
please refer to Moody's Credit rating Methodology published in May
2016 entitled "Mapping National Scale Ratings from Global Scale
Ratings". While NSRs have no inherent absolute meaning in terms of
default risk or expected loss, a historical probability of default
consistent with a given NSR can be inferred from the GSR to which
it maps back at that particular point in time. For information on
the historical default rates associated with different global
scale rating categories over different investment horizons.


PROVINCE OF SANTA FE: Fitch Affirms B LT IDRs; Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Province of Santa Fe, Argentina's
Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs)
at 'B'. The Rating Outlook is Stable. The issue ratings on Santa
Fe's senior unsecured foreign currency notes (USD250 million each)
are also affirmed at 'B'. The ratings of the Province are
constrained by the sovereign.

Santa Fe's rating reflects strong sustainability and leverage
ratios when compared to local and international peers, despite
recent issuances. The rating also takes into consideration an
adequate liquidity position and low refinancing risk relative to
its annual budget, as well as positive and increasing operating
balances, underpinned by a solid and stable revenue system. The
rating considers Santa Fe's relatively sound socioeconomic
profile, amid high inflation and economic volatility, as the third
largest province in Argentina, in terms of Gross Geographic
Product and population. In contrast, the rating is limited by the
restrained although increasing fiscal and budgetary flexibility as
well as the contingent liabilities related to unfunded pension and
retirement obligations.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

To finance major capital projects and tackle infrastructure lag,
Santa Fe has issued notes for USD500 million through two USD250
million placements. The first one, placed on Nov. 1, 2016, accrues
a 6.9% rate, payable on a semi-annual basis, with a final maturity
of 11 years, through three annual instalments of USD83.3 million
in the last three years. A retap of USD250 million was issued on
March 23, 2017, accruing a 7% rate, payable on a semi-annual
basis, with a final maturity of six years, through two annual
instalments of USD125 million in the last two years, during which
the refinancing risk would increase. Both notes are senior
unsecured obligations of Santa Fe.

Santa Fe's total debt increased 240% to ARS7.2 billion in 2016 and
is expected to increase 57.3% in 2017 due to the issuance of new
debt and the depreciation of the ARS. Even though recent
indebtedness significantly increased debt burden ratios, Fitch
believes that Santa Fe's debt profile will not be weakened for the
next two to three years, as current and expected debt levels
remain relatively low. According to Fitch calculations, direct
debt-to-current revenue will remain under 10% from 2017 to 2019,
while direct debt servicing-to-operating balance ratio will be
around 20% from 2017 to 2018 and 17.7% in 2019.

Although almost 100% of the provincial long-term debt is
denominated in foreign currency (mainly USD), Fitch considers that
the currency risk faced by Santa Fe is manageable, due to its low
leverage and to the relatively long maturity and low interest
rates of its outstanding debt. The Province began to use treasury
bills as a short-term financing instrument in 2016. The Province's
Treasury bill program set a cap of ARS1.2 billion nominal amount
outstanding under these instruments from 2015 to 2017. Fitch
considers the refinancing risk of Santa Fe is low, as the share of
this financial tool in the annual budget is less than 2%.

Santa Fe's expenditure flexibility is low, as it has significant
responsibilities that are operational in nature, such as the
provision of health care and education. Staff expenditure to
operating expenditure ratio remained at 57.7% in 2016, resulting
in a capex to total expenditure ratio relatively low of 10.9%, yet
it has constantly improved from 5.8% in 2012.

In November 2015, the Supreme Court of Argentina declared
unconstitutional the deduction from federal tax co-participation
payments assessed on Santa Fe: 15% to fund the National Social
Security Administration and 1.9% of the custom duties to finance
the Federal Administration of Public Revenue. Pursuant to this
ruling, the Province is entitled to receive approximately ARS18.8
billion and ARS4.7 billion, respectively, plus applicable
interest, from the federal government. The terms and conditions of
the compensation are currently under negotiation.

Provincial taxes showed a 45.4% upturn in 2016, while federal tax
co-participation increased 55.8%, as a result of the Supreme Court
ruling. The positive performance of operating revenues, coupled
with a restrained evolution of operating expenditures,
strengthened Santa Fe's operating margin (operating balance-to-
operating revenue) to 11.2% in 2016, from 4% in 2015. This
improvement (better than the expected 6.9%) was accompanied by a
surplus before net financing of ARS2.7 billion or 2.7% of total
revenue, the highest of the last five years. In turn, this surplus
strengthened the Province's liquidity position, as accounts
payables remained relatively stable (ARS9.1 billion), while cash
and liquid deposits increased to ARS9.8 billion in 2016, from
ARS1.8 billion in 2015.

Salary and price adjustments and the deficit in Social Security
may pressure operating expenditure in the forthcoming years. Under
conservative assumptions, Fitch estimates that operating margin
may decline to 7.5% in 2018 and 5.9% in 2019, from 9% in 2017.
However, these margins could still be adequate for the current
rating category.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The IDR of Santa Fe should move in tandem with Argentina's
sovereign ratings. An upgrade of the sovereign IDR could lead to
an upgrade in Santa Fe's rating. Conversely, a downgrade of
Argentina's IDR, or a sudden increase in the public debt burden
along with weak operating margins that significantly affect
sustainability ratios, could lead to a negative rating action.


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B R A Z I L
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ELDORADO BRASIL: S&P Lowers CCR to 'B-' on Weak Governance
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its global scale corporate credit
rating on Eldorado Brasil Celulose S.A. to 'B-' from 'B+'.  S&P
also lowered the national scale rating to 'brB-' from 'brBBB' on
the company.  The ratings remain on CreditWatch negative.  At the
same time, S&P lowered its senior unsecured ratings on Eldorado's
debentures to 'brB-' from 'brBBB' and its 2021 bond issuance to
'B-' from 'B+'.  S&P is revising the recovery ratings to '4' on
these debts, indicating the expectation of an average recovery
(35%), from '3'.

The downgrade reflects Eldorado's higher refinancing risks and
weak governance standards, stemming from the corruption scandal
that damaged Eldorado's and J&F's reputation.

Since S&P's CreditWatch placement on May 18, 2017, J&F was able to
reach a leniency agreement with Brazilian authorities to pay a
R$10.3 billion fine during the next 25 years through a back-loaded
payment profile.  All liabilities are expected to be allocated at
the holding level, with no financial implications for Eldorado.
Even though S&P views the agreement as easing the concerns over
the group's business continuity, it highlights the group's
inability to deploy sufficient risk tolerance and controls.  In
S&P's view, the corruption scandal is an indicative of severe
governance deficiencies that weigh on Eldorado's ability to
efficiently execute its business plan and manage risks and
liabilities, which sharply weaken its risk profile.  As a result,
S&P changed its management and governance assessment score to weak
from fair on Eldorado.  S&P will continue to closely evaluate the
company's management and governance practices including new risk
management and board oversight policies, which in due course could
lead to a reassessment of S&P's management and governance score.

The past month was also marked by higher scrutiny from key lenders
towards J&F and the companies, in which it has investments.  Given
that Eldorado holds a limited cash position compared with a
sizable amount of short-term maturities, it's dependent on
refinancing.  Given that the corruption case had exacerbated
reputational risks for the group, S&P currently believes that the
refinancing efforts for it and its companies will be more
difficult.  Until the end of 2017, around 60% of Eldorado's
amortization schedule is related to trade finance lines (ACC and
NCE), which are linked to an export contract and usually are
relatively easy to renew.  Additionally, S&P don't expect any
support from J&F, given the deterioration of its own credit
quality.  Given the likely shortfall in cash in the next 12 months
and the reputational damage that could crimp access to banks, S&P
views liquidity as a major concern for Eldorado.

On the other hand, S&P continues viewing the company's cash flow
generation as improving, given S&P's expectation of continued
reduction of its cash costs due to the lower distance from the
forest to the company's mills and a smaller share of third-party
wood for the company's output in coming years.  In addition, S&P
expects international average pulp prices in 2017 to be higher
than in last year, given tight supply/demand dynamics, and still
weak Brazilian real.  These factors should continue to be positive
for the domestic pulp and paper sector this year, boosting the
company's cash flow generation.


CONCESSIONARIA: Moody's Updates Debentures Amount to BRL600MM
-------------------------------------------------------------
On May 17, 2017, Moody's America Latina assigned a Ba2 global
scale rating and a Aa1.br national scale rating to the planned
BRL800 million senior unsecured debentures due in June 2022, to be
issued by Concessionaria do Sistema Anhanguera-Bandeirantes S/A.
At that time, the additional and supplementary amounts during the
book building process could increase total issuance up to BRL 1.1
billion. On June 12, 2017, as per the company's announcement, the
total amount to be issued decreased to BRL600 million with up to
BRL810 million considering the additional and supplementary
amounts, maturing in July 2022.


J&F INVESTIMENTOS: S&P Lowers CCR to 'B-' on Weaker Balance Sheet
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its global scale corporate credit
rating on J&F Investimentos S.A. (J&F) to 'B-' from 'B+'.  S&P
also lowered the national scale rating to 'brB-' from 'brBBB' on
the company.  S&P changed the CreditWatch status on the ratings to
developing from negative.  At the same time, S&P lowered its
senior unsecured ratings on J&F's debentures to 'brB-' from
'brBBB'.  The recovery rating of '3', indicating the expectation
of a meaningful recovery (55%), remains unchanged.

The downgrade reflects J&F's increased leverage when comparing the
fine to company's adjusted debt, higher refinancing risks, and a
perceived weakening credit quality of its main assets, which are
now also grappling with higher refinancing risks and reputational
repercussions, following the corruption scandal.

Since S&P's CreditWatch placement on May 18, 2017, J&F was able to
reach a leniency agreement with Brazilian authorities in the
amount of R$10.3 billion (about $3 billion), to be paid over the
next 25 years through a back-loaded payment profile with an
interest rate equivalent to Brazilian inflation index, IPCA.  Even
though S&P views this agreement as easing the concerns over the
group's business continuity, it not only sharply increase J&F's
leverage, but it also points to the group's inability to deploy
meaningful risk tolerance and controls.  In S&P's view, the recent
corruption scandal is an indication of severe governance
deficiencies that weigh on the group's ability to efficiently
execute its business plan and manage risks and liabilities, which
significantly weakened its risk profile.  As a result, S&P has
revised its management and governance assessment on J&F to weak
from fair.  S&P will continue to closely evaluate J&F's management
and governance practices including new risk management and board
oversight policies, which in due course could lead to a
reassessment of S&P's current management and governance score.

The past month was also marked by higher scrutiny from key lenders
towards the group.  Given that J&F holds a limited cash position
to handle a sizable amount of short-term maturities, it's
dependent on refinancing and/or asset sales.  Given that the
corruption case had exacerbated reputational risks, S&P believes
that the group's refinancing efforts will be more difficult.  The
weaker credit quality of J&F's investments (such as JBS S.A. and
Eldorado Brasil Celulose S.A.) also increase these risks, in our
view.  S&P currently believes that J&F is more dependent on asset
sales than before in order to maintain financial obligation
commitments.  According to management, two divestitures are in the
formal stage of process--transmission lines and Vigor--and other
relevant assets that interested buyers are approaching J&F with
formal acquisition proposals (including Eldorado, Alpargatas, and
Flora) that are currently under analysis.

Even if the status of asset sales is currently uncertain in terms
of timing and amount, S&P believes that J&F continues to hold a
sizable portfolio of assets valued at more than R$18 billion,
according to S&P's assumptions.  The portfolio consists of the
meat processor JBS (42% stake), the footwear company Alpargatas
S.A. (55%), the dairy company Vigor Alimentos S.A. (72%), the pulp
producer Eldorado (81%), the cosmetics company Flora Produtos de
Higiene e Limpeza S.A. (fully owned), Banco Original S.A. (fully
owned), and some minor investments in infrastructure, such as
transmission lines and thermo plants.  S&P sees, nevertheless, a
credit quality deterioration in the portfolio, mainly due to a
lower rating on JBS, which prompted S&P to revise J&F's business
risk profile to weak from fair.


JBS SA: S&P Lowers CCR to 'B+' on Weak Governance
-------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its global scale corporate credit
ratings on JBS S.A. and JBS USA to 'B+' from 'BB' on global scale.
In addition, S&P lowered its national scale rating on JBS to
'brBBB-' from 'brAA-'.  S&P also lowered the senior unsecured debt
ratings on JBS and JBS USA to 'B+' from 'BB' and the senior
secured debt ratings on JBS USA to 'BB' from 'BBB-'.  All ratings
remain on CreditWatch negative.

All recovery ratings remain unchanged.  The recovery rating of '1'
on JBS USA's senior secured debt reflects very high (95%) recovery
expectations.  The recovery rating of '3' on JBS USA's senior
unsecured debt reflects meaningful (65%) recovery expectations.
And the recovery rating of '4' on JBS's senior unsecured debt
reflects average (30%) recovery expectations.

The downgrade reflects S&P's view that the corruption
investigations and the leniency agreement that JBS' parent company
J&F Investimentos S.A. reached with the authorities are evidence
of weak governance standards and result in reduced financial
flexibility for JBS.  The ratings remain on CreditWatch negative
due to the still considerable refinancing risks and liquidity
pressures, given that the company has large short-term debt
maturities.


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C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
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AMS-TAOS INTERNATIONAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
---------------------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of AMS-Taos International, on May 26, 2017,
passed a resolution to voluntarily liquidate the company's
business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Martin Resch
          c/o Paul Goss
          Walkers
          190 Elgin Avenue, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9001
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 914 4985


ASHENDEN GLOBAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due June 26
------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Ashenden Global Fund Ltd are required to file
their proofs of debt by June 26, 2017, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on April 26, 2017.

The company's liquidator is:

          Richard Murphy
          FFP (Cayman) Limited
          Harbour Centre, 2nd Floor
          42 North Church Street, George Town
          Grand Cayman
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 640 5863


ASHENDEN GLOBAL MASTER: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due June 26
-------------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Ashenden Global Master Fund Ltd. are required to
file their proofs of debt by June 26, 2017, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on April 26, 2017.

The company's liquidator is:

          Richard Murphy
          FFP (Cayman) Limited
          Harbour Centre, 2nd Floor
          42 North Church Street, George Town
          Grand Cayman
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 640 5863


CHC GROUP: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due June 28
------------------------------------------------
The creditors of CHC Group Ltd. are required to file their proofs
of debt by June 28, 2017, to be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The creditors will hold their first meeting on July 4, 2017, at
10:00 a.m.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on May 18, 2017.

The company's liquidator is:

          Stuart Sybersma
          c/o Michael Green
          Deloitte & Touche
          P.O Box 1787 Grand Cayman KY1-1109
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1(345) 814 2223
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949 8258


ENSO GLOBAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 5
-------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Enso Global Equities Fund, Ltd. are required to
file their proofs of debt by July 5, 2017, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on May 25, 2017.

The company's liquidator is:

          Intertrust SPV (Cayman) Limited
          190 Elgin Avenue, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9005
          Cayman Islands
          c/o Kim Charaman
          Telephone: (345) 943-3100


LEHMAN (CAYMAN ISLANDS): Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 3
-------------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Lehman (Cayman Islands) Ltd. are required to file
their proofs of debt by July 3, 2017, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on May 23, 2017.

The company's liquidator is:

          Christopher Smith
          Krys Global VL Services Ltd
          KRyS Global, Governors Square
          Building 6, 2nd Floor
          23 Lime Tree Bay Avenue
          P.O. Box 31237 Grand Cayman KY1-1205
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 947 4700


MAXSCEND TECHNOLOGIES: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 3
-----------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Maxscend Technologies Inc. are required to file
their proofs of debt by July 3, 2017, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on May 15, 2017.

The company's liquidator is:

          Christopher Smith
          Krys Global VL Services Ltd
          KRyS Global, Governors Square
          Building 6, 2nd Floor
          23 Lime Tree Bay Avenue
          P.O. Box 31237, Grand Cayman KY1-1205
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 947 4700


NIGHT SQUARE: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
--------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Night Square Capital Partners Offshore,
Ltd., on May 26, 2017, passed a resolution to voluntarily wind up
the company's operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Night Square Capital Partners, LP
          c/o Justin Savage
          Ogier
          89 Nexus Way, Camana Bay
          Grand Cayman KY1-9009
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 9876
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949-9877


TONTINE TOTAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 5
---------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Tontine Total Return Overseas Fund, Ltd. are
required to file their proofs of debt by July 5, 2017, to be
included in the company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on May 24, 2017.

The company's liquidator is:

          DMS Corporate Services Ltd.
          c/o Nicola Cowan
          dms House, 2nd Floor,
          P.O. Box 1344, Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 946 7665
          Facsimile: (345) 949 2877


UBS IB CO-INVESTMENT: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 7
----------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of UBS IB Co-Investment 2001 GP Limited are required
to file their proofs of debt by Aug. 7, 2017, to be included in
the company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on May 19, 2017.

The company's liquidator is:

          Simon Conway
          c/o Gabby Whitter
          P.O. Box 258 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 949 7000
          Facsimile: (345) 945 4237


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D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Paris Court Orders Partner to Pay US$30MM
-------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that the International Arbitration Court
in Paris ordered the Dominican Government's private partner in the
EGE-Haina power company to pay US$30 million to the Reformed
Companies Capital Fund (Fonper), which stem from former State-
owned industries.

The Court found that the terms of the agreement between Haina
Investment Co. (HIC) and Fonper didn't correspond to EGE-Haina's
income tax to be paid by the former, according to Dominican Today.

The report notes that the Dominican State and HIC are majority
partners in EGE-Haina and the administration is in charge of the
private part, according to the Law Capitalization.

The provision of the Arbitration Award indicates that HIC will pay
US$22.5 million to Fonper, plus interest since 2001, calculated at
2 percent per annum, totaling around US$30.0 million, the report
relays.

It cited as an example the investments in the 215MW Quisqueya II
combined cycle power plant; the wind farms Los Cocos (I and II)
and Larimar I, of 126.7 megawatts, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
May 1, 2017, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB-/B' long- and
short-term sovereign credit ratings on the Dominican Republic.
The outlook remains stable.  The transfer and convertibility (T&C)
assessment is unchanged at 'BB+'.


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Puts US$500M Bond to Finish Power Plant
-----------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that Dominican Republic placed a US$500
million bond on the international market, with proceeds earmarked
to finish construction on the coal-fired power plant at Punta
Catalina, Bani (south), Finance minister, Donald Guerrero
announced June 13.

He called the bond issue "historic" because of its 10-year rate at
5.10%, according to Dominican Today.

Jefferies, Drexel Hamilton, Stifel Nicolaus & Company are the
banks in charge of the placement of the Dominican bond, local
media report, citing sources, the report notes.

However, because of the corruption scandal of Odebrecht, the lead
builder of the power plant, "the world keeps its eyes on the
Dominican Republic," the report relays.

The US$500 million are part of the US$1.7 billion package that the
Dominican Republic decided to place. US$1.2 billion has already
been sold, and the US$500 million placed are still available, the
report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
May 1, 2017, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB-/B' long- and
short-term sovereign credit ratings on the Dominican Republic.
The outlook remains stable.  The transfer and convertibility (T&C)
assessment is unchanged at 'BB+'.



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M E X I C O
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ECATEPEC DE MORELOS: Moody's Cuts Issuer Rating to B1; Outlook Neg
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's de Mexico downgraded the issuer ratings of the
Municipality of Ecatepec de Morelos to B1/Baa3.mx from Ba3/A3.mx.
The outlook remains negative.

At the same time, Moody's de Mexico downgraded the debt ratings of
the municipality's MXN 250 million loan (original face value) from
BBVA Bancomer S.A. to Ba1/A1.mx from Baa3/Aa3.mx.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade reflects the significant deterioration in the
municipality's gross operating balance (GOB) over the past year, a
trend that Moody's expects will continue over the next two years,
combined with Ecatepec's high cash financing needs, which will
raise pressure for it to continue increasing its current
liabilities and possibly take on short-term debt. The downgrade
also reflects the municipality's poor governance and transparency.

In 2016, Ecatepec's GOB equaled -18.8% of operating revenues, a
significant deterioration from the previous year, when its GOB was
-3.4%. This result is primarily the result of a 14.6% increase in
operating expenditure, fueled by rising salaries, transfers to
municipal dependencies and general services costs. At the same
time, own-source revenues declined 12.6%, mostly due to lower
collections in the turn over tax. Moody's notes that despite the
municipality's pledge to control salaries and benefits, year-to-
date results indicate spending in this category continues to
climb, having risen 25% in the first four months of 2017 compared
with the same period of 2016.

In addition, capital expenditure rose considerably in 2016, driven
by spending on public works, which contributed to an increase in
the municipality's cash financing requirement to 15% of operating
revenues. This marked a reversal from the previous three years,
when Ecatepec posted modest cash surpluses of 4.1% on average. To
bridge its financing shortfall, the municipality's current
liabilities doubled last year, and Moody's expects it will
continue to face cash financing needs this year and in 2018.

Although non-earmarked government transfers (participations)
continue to grow, Ecatepec's inadequate efforts to strengthen its
operating performance leave it highly dependent on these state and
federal revenues.

The administration has indicated that it is considering taking on
a short-term loan this year. While Ecatepec's level of
indebtedness remains manageable at current levels (23.7% of
operating revenues), given the weak operating results which
restrict the municipality's ability to improve its liquidity
holdings, any increase would likely result in deterioration of
relative liquidity metrics.

Finally, the municipality's weak operating performance reflects
its poor governance and management practices. This has not only
caused its financial position to deteriorate, but has led to a
decline in the quality of its reported financial statements.
Specifically, the municipality does not adhere to accounting
methods used by the majority of Mexican regional and local
governments, which complicates efforts to assess its
creditworthiness.

RATIONALE FOR THE NEGATIVE OUTLOOK

The negative outlook reflects the municipality's limited
flexibility to shore up its operating performance over the coming
year, which will lead to continued negative operating balances,
driving up cash financing needs. The outlook also reflects
Mexico's negative outlook.

RATIONALE FOR THE DOWNGRADE OF THE LOAN RATINGS

The rating downgrade of the MXN 250 million (original face value)
enhanced loan with BBVA Bancomer reflects the downgrade of
Ecatepec's issuer ratings. Per Moody's methodology on rating
enhanced loans, the loan ratings are directly linked to the credit
quality of the issuer, which ensures that underlying contract
enforcement risks, economic risks and credit culture risks (for
which the issuer rating acts as a proxy) are embedded in the
ratings of the enhanced loan.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP OR DOWN

A rating upgrade of the issuer ratings is unlikely given the
negative outlook. However, successful efforts to contain operating
expenses and to boost tax collections combined with improvements
in liquidity metrics, such as cash to current liabilities, could
result in upward pressure. Conversely, a failure to reduce the
currently high GOB deficit and an increase in the reliance on
short term debt would exert downward pressure on the ratings.

Given the links between the loan and the credit quality of the
obligor, an upgrade on the issuer rating would likely result in an
upgrade of the enhanced loan ratings. Conversely, a downgrade on
the issuer ratings could also exert downward pressure on the
ratings of the loan. In addition, the ratings could face downward
pressure if debt service coverage levels fall materially below
Moody's expectations.

The methodologies used in these ratings were Rating Methodology
for Enhanced Municipal and State Loans in Mexico published in June
2014, and Regional and Local Governments published in January
2013.

The period of time covered in the financial information used to
determine the Municipality of Ecatepec de Morelos's rating is
between 01/01/2012 and 31/12/2016. (Source: Municipality of
Ecatepec de Morelos)

Moody's National Scale Credit Ratings (NSRs) are intended as
relative measures of creditworthiness among debt issues and
issuers within a country, enabling market participants to better
differentiate relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's global
scale credit ratings in that they are not globally comparable with
the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with NSRs
for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same country.
NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier signifying the
relevant country, as in ".za" for South Africa. For further
information on Moody's approach to national scale credit ratings,
please refer to Moody's Credit rating Methodology published in May
2016 entitled "Mapping National Scale Ratings from Global Scale
Ratings". While NSRs have no inherent absolute meaning in terms of
default risk or expected loss, a historical probability of default
consistent with a given NSR can be inferred from the GSR to which
it maps back at that particular point in time. For information on
the historical default rates associated with different global
scale rating categories over different investment horizons.


===========
P A N A M A
===========


AES PANAMA: Fitch Ups Long-Term IDRs from BB+; Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded AES Panama SRL's (AESP) Long-Term
Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) to 'BBB-'
from 'BB+'. The Rating Outlook is Stable. The rating action
affects USD375 million of notes due 2022. Additionally, Fitch has
upgraded AESP's National Scale rating to 'AA+(pan)' from 'AA-
(pan)'. The upgrade of the National Scale rating also affects the
notes due 2022.

The rating upgrades reflect AES Panama's strategic changes to its
generation portfolio and to its re-contracting strategy,
underpinned by Panama's evolving electricity matrix designed to
mitigate spot price volatility. Under normal hydrological
conditions, Fitch expects leverage of 3.0x or lower through the
rating horizon, supported by higher average energy prices under
Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Improving credit Metrics: AESP's ratings reflect the material
credit metrics' improvement resulting from better hydrology
conditions, adequate contractual position and stabilized spot
prices. In 2016, AESP reported an EBITDA of USD119 million on
revenues of USD316 million, up from USD12 million of EBTIDA on
USD261.8 million of revenues in 2014. The increase in cash flow
generation was primarily driven by improved hydrological
conditions and by lower and more stable spot prices. The currently
low global oil and gas prices combined with an increasingly
diverse energy matrix in Panama should keep spot price more
stable. Consequently, the company's margins have recovered to 38%,
up from 5% in 2014, while leverage improved to 3.1x and interest
coverage rebounded to 4.9x from a peak leverage of 33.4x in 2014.
As Fitch expected, AESP has seen tighter liquidity as the company
returns to its stated cash policy whereby excess funds over USD20
million are paid out as dividends.

Moderate Hydrological Risk: AESP's highly contracted position of
around 90% of installed capacity exposes it somewhat to changes in
hydrological conditions and spot market prices such as those
observed during 2014 and 2013. To manage hydrology risk, AESP
added a 72MW thermal barge, Estrella del Mar, to its asset base.
This thermoelectric generation barge serves as an effective hedge
against spot price volatility through the life of its PPA ending
in 2020. Thereafter, assuming AESP does not sell it, the barge
could function as back-up generation capacity for AESP in an event
of low hydrology.

Balanced Contractual Position Expected: The company's re-
contracting strategy will prove equally important as AESP intends
to lower its exposure to hydrology volatility by improving its
contractual balance between short- and long-term PPA. Panama has
nearly 1300 MW of non-hydro based generation under various stages
of constructions between now and 2020, including a 380MW natural
gas plant that will be operated by AES Corp through a joint
venture with Inversiones Bahia. The expansion of alternative
generation sources within the Panamanian power matrix should help
keep spot prices low, even in stressed hydrological conditions.

Low Off-taker Risk: AES Panama's ratings reflect the company's low
counterparty risk. Generation companies in Panama are permitted to
enter into PPAs for up to their firm capacity allocation. The
company sells electricity under separate PPAs with the country's
three distribution companies, Empresa de Distribucion Electrica
Metro-Oeste S.A. (Edemet), Elektra Noreste (Fitch IDR of 'BBB'),
and Empresa de Distribucion Electrica Chiriqui (Edechi), with
various maturities. Panamanian distribution companies appear to
have the sufficient credit quality and financial ability to
support their respective obligations under the PPAs with AES
Panama. According to the local regulator, firm capacity is
calculated based on a 30-year historical average. The regulations
promote the use of PPAs by requiring distribution companies to
secure 100% of their peak regulated demand for the following year.
AES Panama maintains PPAs for approximately 90.5%, on average, of
available capacity through 2018.

Strong Market Position: AES Panama is the largest generation
company in the country based on installed capacity accounting for
24% market share (including AES Changuinola's installed capacity
of 223MW). AES Panama benefits from a competitive portfolio of
low-cost hydroelectric generating assets, including dam-based
reservoirs and run of the river units. The diverse location of the
company's assets somewhat mitigates its exposure to hydrology risk
as the plants are located in different hydrology regions.

Exposure to Regulatory Risk: The company's ratings also reflect
its exposure to regulatory risk. Historically, generation
companies in Panama were competitive unregulated businesses free
to implement their own commercial strategies. In the past years,
the increase in electricity prices has resulted in increased
government intervention in the sector in order to curb the impact
of high energy prices for end-users. Efforts to diversify the
country's energy matrix will help to lower prices over the medium,
reducing the need for regulatory interference.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

The ratings reflect the company's EBITDA recovery over the past
year and expected continued improvement as result of lower spot
purchases going forward, supported by the start of commercial
operation of the power barge in the second quarter of 2015, and a
more flexible contractual strategy after 2018. All these factors
should jointly serve to mitigate the impact of potential adverse
hydrological conditions in the future. Strategically and
fundamentally AESP compares closely with the Colombian
hydroelectric generators Emgesa and Isagen, rated 'BBB' and 'BBB-
', respectively. Isagen is currently on positive outlook, in spite
of recently experiencing temporary contraction in its cash flow as
a result of its high contractual position and weak hydrology.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within Fitch ratings case for the issuer
include:

-- New capacity through the next five years keeps spot prices
    low;

-- Increase in average monomial price in 2018, as new DisCo PPA's
    become active;
-- No significant El Nino effects in the near-to-medium term;
-- Excess cash above USD20 million paid out as dividends;
-- AESP guarantees the transmission line for AES's LNG project
    (off-balance, beginning in 2018);
-- Barge fuel costs track Fitch WTI forecast.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Positive Rating Action

- A positive rating in the near-term is unlikely. However,
possible factors that could trigger a positive rating action
include: a sustained decrease in leverage below 2.5x coupled with
a contracting strategy that promotes cashflow stability through a
diversification of asset types.

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Negative Rating Action

- A downgrade could result from a combination of the following
factors: leverage above 3.5x on a sustained basis, increased
government intervention in the sector coupled with weakening
regulatory framework, deterioration in the company's ability to
mitigate spot market risk, and/or payment of dividends coupled
with high leverage levels

LIQUIDITY

AESP's policy is to maintain a cash balance of USD20 million,
dividends payments are subordinated to this policy. The company
maintains short-term credit facilities for up to USD90 million;
one with Scotiabank for USD20 million, another with Banco General
for USD10 million, Citibank for USD20 million, Banco de Centro
America for USD15 million, and BNP Paribas for USD25 million. The
company's current debt consists of its USD375 million bond due
2022.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch upgrades the following ratings:
AES Panama SRL
-- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR to 'BBB-' from 'BB+';
-- Long-Term Local Currency IDR to 'BBB-' from 'BB+';
-- National Long-Term Rating to 'AA+(pan)' from 'AA-(pan)';
-- USD375 million notes due 2022 to 'BBB-' and 'AA+(pan)' from
    'BB+' and 'AA-(pan)', respectively.


======================
P U E R T O    R I C O
======================


PUERTO RICO: Governor Pitches Statehood as Debt Solution
--------------------------------------------------------
Andrew Scurria at The Wall Street Journal reports that Puerto
Rico's governor said he would travel to Washington to lobby
Congress to recognize the U.S. territory's vote in favor of
becoming the 51st state, even if it means surrendering its
newfound debt-restructuring powers.

Despite boycotts by opposition parties that depressed voter
turnout, Puerto Rican voters delivered "a clear rejection of the
current colonial status and a path forward through statehood,"
Gov. Ricardo Rossello said in an interview with The Wall Street
Journal.

Voters opted for U.S. statehood by a 97% margin in Sunday (June
11)'s vote, though turnout was just 23% as opponents of the
governor urged their constituents to snub the vote, the report
notes.  The last time Puerto Rico called a plebiscite on its
political status, in 2012, 78% of voters turned out, the report
relays.

The results aren't binding on Congress, which must approve any
change in Puerto Rico's political status, the report notes.

The vote also took place without approval from the Justice
Department, which had earlier raised objections to the governor's
proposed ballot language, the report discloses.  He said he would
attempt to convince members of Congress that the 3.4 million
island residents had nonetheless supplied a mandate in favor of
becoming the 51st state, the report notes.

"The rules that have always applied are, those who go to the
ballot box determine the outcome," the report quoted Gov. Rossello
as saying.

U.S. lawmakers, who have historically been skeptical of accepting
Puerto Rico as a state, are especially loathe to do so now with
the territory grappling with a financial crisis that is stifling
its economy and elevating rates of poverty and joblessness, said
Amilcar Antonio Barreto, a professor at Northeastern University,
the report relays.

Congress has historically favored keeping the territorial status
quo "because it's the constitutional arrangement that gives them
maximum flexibility over Puerto Rican affairs," he said, the
report notes.

Lawmakers last year passed a rescue package to install a federal
financial oversight board with a mandate to get Puerto Rico's
yawning budget gaps under control and tackle its $73 billion
mountain of debt, the report says.

While many U.S. municipalities can restructure their obligations
under chapter 9 of the U.S. bankruptcy code, U.S. states don't
have a similar restructuring option to deal with a potential
default on their general obligations, the report discloses.  The
Puerto Rico rescue law, however, gave the oversight board
authority to adjust debts obligations in ways the states can't,
the report relays.

Mr. Rossello said that making Puerto Rico the 51st state would
lead to dramatic growth "as the natural reaction of a stronger
economy impacting a smaller one," removing the need for those
restructuring powers, the report notes.

"This economic growth would allow us to be able to service our
debt adequately even without the tools provided in Promesa," he
said, referring to the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and
Economic Stability Act, which established a process for
restructuring debt, the report relays.  "Our debt is simply a
symptom of a much greater problem which is our economy," he added.

A national television advertisement released by a pro-statehood
group echoed those themes, saying that statehood "benefits all
Americans, ends corporate tax breaks and enables Puerto Rico to
compete, prosper and pay its fair share on equal footing."

The oversight board last month placed Puerto Rico under what
amounts to the largest-ever U.S. municipal bankruptcy, the report
notes.  Its delay in approving a $9 billion restructuring deal
covering the island power utility has rankled Republicans in
Congress who viewed the agreement as a road map toward consensual
settlements of Puerto Rico's other debts, the report adds.

                        About Puerto Rico

Puerto Rico is a self-governing commonwealth in association with
the United States. The chief of state is the President of the
United States of America. The head of government is an elected
Governor. There are two legislative chambers: the House of
Representatives, 51 seats, and the Senate, 27 seats. The
governor-elect is Ricardo Antonio Ricky Rossello Nevares,
the son of former governor Pedro Rossello.

In 2016, the U.S. Congress passed PROMESA, which, among other
things, created the Financial Oversight and Management Board and
imposed an automatic stay on creditor lawsuits against the
government, which expired May 1, 2017.

The members of the oversight board are: (i) Andrew G. Biggs, (ii)
Jose B. Carrion III, (iii) Carlos M. Garcia, (iv) Arthur J.
Gonzalez, (v) Jose R. Gonzalez, (vi) Ana. J. Matosantos, and
(vii) David A. Skeel Jr.

On May 3, 2017, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico filed a petition
for relief under Title III of the Puerto Rico Oversight,
Management, and Economic Stability Act ("PROMESA"). The case is
pending in the United States District Court for the District of
Puerto Rico under case number 17-cv-01578. A copy of Puerto
Rico's PROMESA petition is available at

          http://bankrupt.com/misc/17-01578-00001.pdf

On May 5, 2017, the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation
(COFINA) commenced a case under Title III of PROMESA (D.P.R. Case
No. 17-01599). Joint administration has been sought for the
Title III cases.

On May 21, 2017, two more agencies Employees Retirement System
of the Government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and Puerto
Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (Case Nos. 17-01685 and
17-01686) commenced Title III cases.

U.S. Chief Justice John Roberts has named U.S. District Judge
Laura Taylor Swain to preside over the Title III cases.

The Oversight Board has hired as advisors, Proskauer Rose LLP and
O'Neill & Borges LLC as legal counsel, McKinsey & Co. as strategic
consultant, Citigroup Global Markets as municipal investment
banker, and Ernst & Young, as financial advisor.

Martin J. Bienenstock, Esq., Scott K. Rutsky, Esq., and Philip M.
Abelson, Esq., of Proskauer Rose LLP; and Hermann D. Bauer, Esq.,
at O'Neill & Borges LLC are onboard as attorneys.

Prime Clerk LLC is the claims and noticing agent. Prime Clerk
maintains a case web site at:

           https://cases.primeclerk.com/puertorico

Jones Day is serving as counsel to certain ERS bondholders.

Paul Weiss is counsel to the Ad Hoc Group of Puerto Rico General
Obligation Bondholders.


================================
T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O
================================


TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Foreign Direct Investment to T&T Plummets
------------------------------------------------------------
Trinidad Express reports that there may be more of an argument
that a 2014-2017 tax write-off incentive did more harm than good
to the economy, and little to spur oil and gas exploration and
production.

The report notes that the 2017 edition of the World Investment
Report, normally released by government agencies with fanfare
annually, remained unheralded last week on the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) website.

It was the first time in four years Trinidad and Tobago suffered a
negative foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow of minus US$60
million, according to Trinidad Express.

Put in layman's terms, more foreign investors pulled money out
than put money in to the economy, the report discloses.

Further evidence was found in corridor interviews at the second
annual bpTT and EOG-sponsored Oil & Gas Law Conference at the
Hilton Trinidad hotel in Port of Spain recently, the report
relays.  An untethered lunch-time group concluded rig days, a key
industry metric used to measure the pace of E&P declined 31 per
cent year-on-year in 2016 compared to 2015, the report notes.

Rig days fluctuated, as far back as Energy Ministry data show, but
fell 31 per cent to 1,906 in 2016 versus 2015, the lowest since
2010, the report adds.


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
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Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

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