TCRLA_Public/170628.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

            Wednesday, June 28, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 127


                            Headlines



B E R M U D A

WEATHERFORD INT'L: Tack-on Debt Offer No Impact on Moody's B3 CFR


B R A Z I L

BANCO DA AMAZONIA: Fitch Affirms BB Long-Term IDR; Outlook Neg.
BANCO NACIONAL: Fitch Affirms BB Long-Term IDR; Outlook Negative
BANCO PAN: Fitch Affirms BB- Long-Term IDR; Outlook Negative
BANCO DO NORDESTE: Fitch Affirms BB IDR; Outlook Negative
BRAZIL: President Michel Temer Charged With Corruption

CAIXA ECONOMICA: Fitch Affirms BB Long-Term IDR; Outlook Negative


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

ALP HOLDINGS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
CHINA PENGFENG: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 11
DEFIANCE FUND: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
GALANOS LIMITED: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
HELIOS II HOLDINGS: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up

MALIBU CAYMAN: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
MALACCA GROUP: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 21
MASSIMO LIMITED: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
MAUA BRASIL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
VEGA RESOURCES: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 17


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

BANCO DE RESERVAS: Fitch Affirms BB- IDR; Outlook Stable
BANCO MULTIPLE: Fitch Affirms BB- Long-Term IDR; Outlook Stable
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Politicos, Business Push to Control Judiciary


M E X I C O

MEXICO: Registers $1.08 Billion Trade Deficit in May


P E R U

SAN MIGUEL INDUSTRIAS: Fitch Raises Long-Term IDR to BB+


P U E R T O    R I C O

ECRA GROUP: Court Confirms Reorganization Plan
FABRICA DE BLOQUES: Unsecureds to Get Nothing Under Plan
JAYUYA MEMORIAL: Disclosures Okayed; Plan Outline Confirmed
OLIVER C&I: August 30 Disclosure Statement Hearing Set


T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O

PETROTRIN: Boosts Oil Output


X X X X X X X X X

LATAM: Regional Accounting Profession Imperilled by De-risking


                            - - - - -


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B E R M U D A
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WEATHERFORD INT'L: Tack-on Debt Offer No Impact on Moody's B3 CFR
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service said that Weatherford International
Ltd.'s (Weatherford, incorporated in Bermuda) proposed $250
million unsecured note offering will not have any impact on its
credit ratings or negative outlook. These notes will be issued as
a tack-on to Weatherford's existing 9.875% notes due 2024.

Net proceeds will be used primarily to repay outstanding
borrowings under the company's revolving credit facility.

"The proposed debt offering will modestly improve Weatherford's
liquidity profile, but the company's high debt level will remain
unchanged," said Sajjad Alam, Moody's Senior Analyst.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The proposed notes will be issued under the same indenture
governing Weatherford's existing 9.875% notes, and the new notes
and the existing notes will be classified as a single class of
debt. The Caa1 rating on Weatherford's proposed notes are rated
in-line with the existing Caa1 unsecured debt ratings of both
Weatherford Bermuda and Weatherford Delaware. The unsecured notes
are rated one notch below Weatherford's B3 Corporate Family Rating
(CFR), reflecting the contractual and structural subordination of
the unsecured notes to the company's credit facility.
Weatherford's credit facility benefits from upstream guarantees
from a material portion of its operating and holding company
subsidiaries and the facility includes a $413 million term loan
that has a first lien security interest on substantially all of
Weatherford's assets.

Weatherford's B3 CFR reflects the company's high financial
leverage and the prospects of significant ongoing negative free
cash flow generation through mid-2018. While Moody's expects
Weatherford will benefit from a modest recovery in activity levels
and cash flows in coming quarters, Moody's believes the company
will struggle to achieve break-even cash flow and leverage metrics
will remain at unsustainably high levels. However, the company
expects to receive $535 million when the OneStim joint-venture
with Schlumberger closes in late 2017, and is looking to sell its
Land Rigs business to further enhance financial flexibility.
Weatherford's B3 CFR is supported by: its scale and strong market
positions in several product lines; its geographic
diversification, with a substantial portion of its revenue coming
from markets outside the more volatile North American market; and
its numerous patented products and technologies, which give the
company a competitive edge in several markets. The rating also
considers the actions Weatherford has taken in response to the
downturn, including cost reduction efforts, raising equity,
managing its debt maturity profile, and focusing on a goal of free
cash flow generation and debt reduction.

Weatherford's SGL-3 rating reflects its adequate liquidity profile
through mid-2018. Weatherford had $546 million of cash at March
31, 2017 and had additional liquidity under an amended bank credit
facility that includes a $1.2 billion revolver, of which $0.2
billion matures in July 2017 and the remaining $1 billion matures
in July 2019. The company will use proceeds from the proposed note
offering to repay outstanding revolver borrowings. Weatherford is
currently in compliance with its financial covenants under its
bank credit facility, and earnings improvements from modest
activity increases along with anticipated asset divestiture
proceeds should help maintain ongoing compliance.

The negative rating outlook reflects the risks for further
degradation in leverage and liquidity due to persistently weak
industry conditions. Weatherford's ratings could be downgraded
should liquidity weaken or negative free cash flow continues
leading to increased debt levels. The ratings could be upgraded if
Weatherford is able to generate positive cash flow from operations
that support a retained cash flow/debt ratio above 5%.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Oilfield Services Industry Rating Methodology published in May
2017.

Weatherford International Ltd. and Weatherford International, LLC
are wholly-owned subsidiaries of Weatherford International plc,
which is headquartered in Switzerland and is a diversified
international energy service and manufacturing company that
provides a variety of services and equipment to the oil and gas
industry.


===========
B R A Z I L
===========


BANCO DA AMAZONIA: Fitch Affirms BB Long-Term IDR; Outlook Neg.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings of the following Brazilian
banks:

-- Banco da Amazonia S.A. (BdA)
-- Banco do Brasil S.A. (BdB)
-- Banco do Nordeste do Brasil S.A. (BNB)
-- Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Economico e Social (BNDES)
-- Caixa Economica Federal (Caixa)
-- Caixa's subsidiary Banco Pan S.A. (Pan)

The Rating Outlook for the long-term Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs)
of each bank remains Negative, mirroring the Negative Outlook of
Brazil's sovereign ratings.

For further details and regulatory information including rating
drivers and sensitivities, please see the individual press
releases for each bank published and available at
'www.fitchratings.com' and 'www.fitchratings.com.br'.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

BdA
-- Long-term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'BB', Outlook
    Negative;
-- Short-term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'B';
-- National long-term Rating at 'AA+(bra)', Outlook Negative;
-- National Short-term Rating at 'F1+(bra)';
-- Support Rating at '3';
-- Support Rating Floor at 'BB'.

BdB
-- Long-term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'BB', Outlook
    Negative;
-- Short-term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'B';
-- National long-term Rating at 'AA+(bra)', Outlook Negative;
-- National Short-term Rating at 'F1+(bra)';
-- Support Rating at '3';
-- Support Rating Floor at 'BB';
-- Senior unsecured notes due 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2022 ratings
at 'BB';
-- Viability Rating at 'bb-'.

BNB
-- Long-term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'BB', Outlook
    Negative;
-- Short-term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'B';
-- National long-term Rating at 'AA+(bra)', Outlook Negative;
-- National Short-term Rating at 'F1+(bra)';
-- Support Rating at '3';
-- Support Rating Floor at 'BB'.

BNDES
-- Long-term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'BB', Outlook
    Negative;
-- Short-term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'B';
-- National long-term Rating at 'AA+(bra)', Outlook Negative;
-- National Short-term Rating at 'F1+(bra)';
-- Support Rating at '3';
-- Support Rating Floor at 'BB';
-- Senior unsecured notes due 2019 and 2023 at 'BB'.

Caixa
-- Long-term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'BB', Outlook
    Negative;
-- Short-term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'B';
-- National long-term Rating at 'AA+(bra)', Outlook Negative;
-- National Short-term Rating at 'F1+(bra)';
-- Support Rating at '3';
-- Support Rating Floor at 'BB';
-- Senior unsecured notes due 2017, 2018, 2019 and 2022 at 'BB';
-- Subordinated notes due 2024 at 'B+'.

Pan
-- Long-term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'BB-', Outlook
    Negative;
-- Short-term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'B';
-- National long-term Rating at 'A+(bra)', Outlook Stable;
-- National Short-term Rating at 'F1(bra)';
-- Support Rating at '3';
-- Viability Rating at 'b'.


BANCO NACIONAL: Fitch Affirms BB Long-Term IDR; Outlook Negative
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Long-Term Foreign and Local
Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) of Banco Nacional de
Desenvolvimento Economico e Social (BNDES) at 'BB' and its long-
term National rating at 'AA+(bra)'. The Outlooks of the Long-Term
IDRs and National rating remain Negative. Fitch also affirmed
BNDES's Support Rating (SR) at '3', Support Rating Floor (SRF) at
'BB' and long-term National rating at 'AA+(bra)'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - IDRS, NATIONAL RATINGS

The affirmation of BNDES's IDRs reflect Fitch's view that the bank
would receive support from the federal government, should the need
arise. BNDES's IDRs are driven by sovereign support and are
aligned with Brazil's sovereign ratings. This reflects the full
federal government ownership and its key policy role in the
implementation of government economic policies. Fitch considers
BNDES a public-mission bank and does therefore not assign a
Viability rating.

The Outlook on BNDES's Long-Term IDRs remains Negative, mirroring
the Outlook of the sovereign ratings. Fitch believes that BNDES,
similar to other public entities, remain subject to political
influence given its state-owned nature and strong links with the
government. BNDES's executive management generally undergoes
changes following changes in the government. Most recently, in the
second quarter of 2017, a new CEO was appointed following the
resignation of the former CEO, who, in turn, had taken office in
2016 following the inauguration of the new government.

BNDES has been subject to intensified public and political
scrutiny in recent years, with respect to alleged irregularities
in a number of its lending and investment operations in Brazil and
abroad. As of the publication date of this release, an official
investigation of its subsidiary BNDES Participacoes S.A.'s
(BNDESPAR) operations with J&F Investimentos S.A., the holding
company of JBS S.A., was ongoing. In May 2017, a parliamentary
commission was created for the same purpose. An earlier
parliamentary commission was concluded in February 2016 without
identifying any misconduct.

BNDES has historically been Brazil's main lender of long-term
credit at preferential rates. However, Fitch expects BNDES's
market share to gradually decline over the long term, as the bank
will not be able to count on new low-cost funding from the
National Treasury (Tesouro Nacional; TN) for loan growth, as per
government policy changes in 2016. BNDES prepaid BRL100 billion of
its debt to the TN at year-end 2016; this had only a minor effect
on its funding structure. At March 2017, TN funds, excluding
hybrid capital, were 52% of the bank's total liabilities, while
funds from the Workers' Assistance Fund (Fundo de Amparo ao
Trabalhador; FAT) corresponded to a further 30% (57% and 26%,
respectively, in June 2016).

Since 2015, lower demand for loans, tightening of underwriting
standards and lower risk appetite jointly led to a continuous drop
in BNDES's loan disbursements. In 2015 and 2016 total
disbursements fell 28% and 35%, respectively, due to continued
suppressed demand and offer of loans, despite a reduction in the
pace of the decline in the third quarter of the year. The negative
trend has persisted through May 2017. As a result, in first-
quarter 2017 (1Q17) and 2016, loan growth was negative 3%
(quarter-on-quarter) and 11% (annual), respectively.

BNDES's loan quality indicators remain better than sector
averages, despite the downward revision of internal borrower
ratings and the subsequent increase in impaired loans and
provisioning requirements in 2016. Further, since 3Q16, BNDES has
been setting up loan loss reserves above the minimum requirements.
The relatively low impairment ratios are partly explained by
BNDES's loans to financial institutions for on-lending which made
up 43% of total loans at March 2017.

Impaired loans classified in the D-H range under the central
bank's range and non-performing loans above 90 days stood at 3.8%
and 2.1%, respectively, at March 2017 (3.6% and 2.4% in 2016). In
the same period, chargeoffs remained very low at 0.4% of average
gross loans (0.07% in 2016 and 2015, respectively), and reserve
coverage of D-H loans and non-performing loans (NPLs) over 90 days
stood at an adequate 67% and 122%, respectively (58% and 86% in
2016).

BNDES's profitability has been declining since 2015 as a result of
loan and securities impairment charges, and lower income from
investments (either via dividends or the equity method),
reflecting both the deterioration in the operating environment and
the bank's revision of its reserve policy. Impairment charges
reached 72% of pre-impairment operating income at March 2017 (62%
and 54%, in 2016 and 2015, respectively). As a result, operating
profit/risk weighted assets (RWAs) declined to an historically low
0.93% in the same period (1.40% and 1.47%, in 2016 and 2015,
respectively). Fitch expects BNDES's profitability to remain
modest over the next year, as loan impairment charges are likely
to remain high and further loan rating reviews might be needed.
Large single-name exposures both in the loan book and in the
equity and investments holdings of BNDESPAR pose downside risks to
earnings.

In Fitch's view, BNDES's capitalization is adequate considering
the expected continuation of modest loan growth and the adoption
of a more conservative dividend policy. At March 2017 the bank's
FCC ratio stood at a comfortable 14.39%, compared with an average
of 10.10% between 2013 and 2015 and 13.51% in 2016. In 2016 a
significant increase in the security revaluation reserves (from
negative BRL12.3 billion at year-end 2015 to positive BRL7.2
billion at year-end 2016), the decline in RWAs and the fall in the
dividend payout to 27% of net income (from an average of 105%
between 2012 and 2015) boosted capitalization. In the same period,
the recognition of impairments in the stock portfolio and their
transfer from security revaluation reserves to the income
statement explained about a quarter of the increase in these
reserves.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - SUPPORT RATING, SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

The affirmation of BNDES's SRs at '3' reflects the moderate
probability of sovereign support. Fitch believes that the
Brazilian government would have a high willingness to support
BNDES in case of need; however, its capacity to do so has fallen
in the recent past, as reflected in the successive sovereign
rating downgrades in 2015 and 2016. BNDES's SRF is affirmed at
'BB' and aligned with the sovereign rating.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - SENIOR and SUBORDINATED DEBT RATING

The affirmation of BNDES's senior debt ratings at 'BB' reflects
the affirmation of the bank's Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR,
which is the anchor rating for the debt ratings.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - IDRS, NATIONAL RATINGS, SUPPORT RATINGS,
SUPPORT RATING FLOORS, DEBT RATINGS

Any changes in Brazil's sovereign ratings or in Fitch's evaluation
of the government's willingness to provide support to BNDES, in
case of need, would directly affect these banks' IDRs, National
ratings, SRs, SRFs and debt ratings, all of which are driven by
expected sovereign support.

The National ratings of BNDES will not necessarily be downgraded
in the case of a sovereign ratings downgrade. However, the
Negative Outlook of the long-term National rating reflects that
there could potentially be changes in the local relativities that,
in turn, could lead to a downgrade of the National ratings, if the
sovereign ratings are downgraded.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:
-- Long-term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'BB', Outlook
    Negative;
-- Short-term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'B';
-- National long-term Rating at 'AA+(bra)', Outlook Negative;
-- National Short-term Rating at 'F1+(bra)';
-- Support Rating at '3';
-- Support Rating Floor at 'BB';
-- Senior unsecured notes due 2019 and 2023 'BB'.


BANCO PAN: Fitch Affirms BB- Long-Term IDR; Outlook Negative
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings
(IDRs), National Ratings, Viability Rating (VR) and Support Rating
(SR) of Banco Pan S.A. (Pan).

KEY RATING DRIVERS
IDRS AND NATIONAL RATINGS

The affirmation of Pan's IDRs follows the affirmation of Caixa
Economica Federal's IDRs (Caixa; Long-Term IDR 'BB'/Negative
Outlook) announced. Pan's IDRs and National ratings are driven by
the institutional support of Caixa, one of its
co-controlling shareholders. Pan is notched down one from Caixa's
Long-Term IDRs. In turn, Caixa's IDRs are driven by sovereign
support and are aligned with Brazil's sovereign ratings

Since the beginning of its restructuring process in 2011, Pan has
relied on the ordinary support of its controlling shareholders,
mainly Caixa, through liquidity lines with competitive cost and
credit assignment agreements. Pan has already originated
approximately BRL44 billion in retail credit since 2011, which was
subsequently sold to Caixa. The agreements, in which Pan has no
risk retention, have been an important source of results for the
bank and the viability of its franchise (as the revenues from the
sales are anticipated), while its recurring operating
results(excluding anticipated revenues) remain weak and below
market peers.

In March 2017 Pan had a loan portfolio of BRL20.1 billion. The
balance of credit portfolio assigned without risk retention and
accounted in the balance sheet of Caixa amounted to BRL19.4
billion in the same period.

Pan intends to pursue a more independent funding franchise and a
closer relationship with the market. However, this move will be
gradual and extremely contingent on an improvement in Pan's
performance, which Fitch expects to be gradual and to not occur in
the short term. In addition, as soon as the market offers better
growth opportunities, Pan faces the challenge of increasing the
volume of credits retained on its balance sheet, in Fitch's view.
Its capital situation is close to regulatory limits and equity
injections, specifically for growth purposes, are not expected to
occur in the foreseeable future. However, in a stress situation,
Fitch believes Pan's relative small size in relation to their
parents makes support easily manageable for BTG and Caixa, should
it be needed.

VR
Pan's 'b' Viability Rating (VR) is highly influenced by the bank's
lack of recurrent earnings, which remain largely dependent on
credit sales to Caixa, and impacted by some remaining legacy
funding sources, as well as the maintenance of a weak operating
environment.

Capital position has also weakened as a result of Pan's low
internal capital generation, accumulated losses over the last five
years and the increase in minimum requirements due to the phase-in
of the Basel III framework. Regulatory ratio of 11.3% is now
closer to the minimum regulatory ratio of 10.50%. Should it be
needed, Fitch believes shareholders would easily manage to inject
capital in the bank, mainly considering Pan's low relative size in
comparison with their parent's franchise.

Pan's IDRs are notched down one from Caixa's IDRs as Fitch
believes Caixa is currently the most likely source of support for
Pan, especially considering the possibility of large credit sales,
through assignment agreements, if capital ratios happen to tighten
even more.

On a positive note, Pan's funding and liquidity profile reflects
the intrinsic support from Caixa, which consists basically of loan
assignments and interbank deposit agreements. The funding
availability has been an important tool for Pan to better address
potential asset/liability mismatches, given the long-term profile
of its payroll loans portfolio.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - SUPPORT RATING

The affirmation of Pan Support Ratings at '3' reflects the
moderate probability of support from Caixa. Fitch believes that
while Caixa's capital ratios are tight and will remain under
pressure as Basel III requirements increase, it would be able to
support Pan through the flow of sovereign support, given that the
required support is likely to be relatively small. As of March
2017, Pan's equity represented less than 2% of Caixa's equity.

Fitch also believes that the cost of Caixa not providing support
would be higher than providing support, with respect to the
reputational risk of CEF.

RATING SENSITIVITIES
IDRS, NATIONAL RATINGS AND SUPPORT RATINGS

Pan's IDRs, National Ratings and Support Ratings could be
downgraded if Caixa reduces its willingness or capacity to provide
support to Pan. Changes in funding limits and credit sales
agreement limits provided by Caixa, or in Pan's shareholder
structure could also trigger a negative rating action. Also, the
emergence of any new risk event affecting BTG's image negatively
could undermine Pan's capacity to generate new business and thus
trigger a negative rating action.

VR
A downgrade to Pan's VR could be triggered by successive net
losses combined with a backdrop of capital ratios falling to even
lower levels.

Fitch has affirmed Pan's ratings:
-- Long-Term Foreign- and Local-Currency IDRs at 'BB-'; Outlook
    Negative;
-- Short-Term Foreign- and Local-Currency IDRs at 'B';
-- Viability Rating at 'b';
-- Long-Term National Rating at 'A+(bra)'; Outlook Stable;
-- Short-Term National Rating at 'F1+(bra)';
-- Support Rating at '3';



BANCO DO NORDESTE: Fitch Affirms BB IDR; Outlook Negative
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Long-term Foreign and Local
Currency Issuer Defaults Ratings (IDRs), Support Ratings, Support
Rating Floors (SRFs) and National Ratings of Banco do Nordeste do
Brasil S.A. (BNB). The Rating Outlooks for the Long-term IDRs and
National Rating remain Negative.

Fitch does not assign Viability ratings to the entity due to their
development bank status.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - IDRS, NATIONAL RATINGS

BNB's IDRs and Support Rating Floors are equalized with and linked
to Brazil's sovereign ratings; hence, the bank is rated at its
Support Rating Floor of 'BB'. The support ratings of '3' reflect
Fitch's view that the probability of support, in case of need,
from the federal government is high. The ratings also reflect the
important and relatively stable funding source from shareholders
and the important role that the bank plays in the implementation
of government fostering policies in Brazil's northeast region.

The Rating Outlook on BNB's Long-term IDRs remains Negative,
mirroring the outlook for the sovereign ratings. Fitch believes
that BNB, similar to other public entities, could be subject to
political influence given its state owned nature and strong links
with the government.

BNB's strategy is aligned with the government's objective of
fostering development and helping the northeast region of Brazil.
The bank is, by law, the manager of Fundo Constitucional de
Financiamento do Nordeste (FNE), and its operations are largely
determined by its policy role in promoting credit loans to the 11
Brazilian states, indicating the institution's importance to the
government.

For that reason, BNB's asset quality and profitability ratios are
historically weak vs private peers, due to the bank's role of
bearing risk related to development loans, presenting higher
delinquency and expected losses. Provisioning expenditures eroded
a significant part of the operating results since 2015, while
impaired loans, or loans classified between 'D-H' over total
loans, increased to 19.5% in March 2017, from 10.5% in December
2015, in line with the deterioration of the economic environment
in Brazil. During the first quarter of 2017, BNB posted losses of
BRL17.7 million, which should be gradually reverted along the
year, also benefited from a increasing amount of recovery of past
due loans after the local Resolution 3.340 which grants better
conditions and benefits for the refinancing of past due debts of
rural producers.

Still, Fitch expects operating profit to remain under some
pressure through the remainder of 2017, as the agency's outlook on
the Brazilian banking system remains negative. Credit growth
dynamics for development regional banks, such as BNB, tend to be
different when compared with commercial banks, given the counter-
cyclical policy role. Still, Fitch expects loan growth to be
cautious going forward, in line with the bank's strategic
alignment of persevering its capital, improve efficiency in credit
concession and manage to reduce delinquency to a more controlled
level, which all should contribute to slow but gradual improvement
on profitability going forward.

BNB has a solid funding base, in which nature is less vulnerable
to withdrawals. This is justified by both FNE's deposits and, like
other public banks, BNB is considered a safe haven during crisis
periods. Proceeds from FNE remain the largest funding source at
BRL18.5 billion, or around 50% of total funding.

The bank's capital base, which tightened because of rapid loan
growth and high dividends during previous years, improved recently
after the conversion of legacy Tier II capital, held by the
treasury, to common equity Tier 1 (CET1). The operation, concluded
in December 2016, led BNB's Tier I capital to rise to 10.6% in
March 2017, from 7.6% in September 2016 (prior the injection) -
compared with a required minimum of 6.0%.

RATING SENSITIVITIES
IDRS, NATIONAL RATINGS, SUPPORT RATINGS, SUPPORT RATING FLOORS

Any changes in Brazil's sovereign ratings or in Fitch's evaluation
of the government's willingness to provide support to BNB, in case
of need, would directly affect these banks' IDRs, National
Ratings, SRs and SRFs, all of which are driven by expected
sovereign support.

The National Ratings of BNB will not necessarily be downgraded in
the case of a sovereign ratings downgrade. However, the Negative
Outlook of the long-term National Rating reflects that there could
potentially be changes in the local relativities that, in turn,
could lead to a downgrade of the National Ratings, if the
sovereign ratings are downgraded.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

Banco do Nordeste do Brasil:
-- Long-term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'BB'; Outlook
    Negative;
-- Short-term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'B';
-- Long-term National Rating at 'AA+(bra)'; Outlook Negative;
-- Short-term National Rating at 'F1+(bra)';
-- Support Rating at '3';
-- Support Rating Floor at 'BB'.


BRAZIL: President Michel Temer Charged With Corruption
------------------------------------------------------
Paul Kiernan and Paulo Trevisani at The Wall Street Journal report
that Brazil's top prosecutor filed criminal charges against
President Michel Temer, marking a critical new phase for the
corruption crackdown that has roiled Latin America's largest
country for the past three years.

Attorney General Rodrigo Janot brought charges of corruption
against Mr. Temer, alleging the leader took about $150,000 in
bribes from the former chairman of meatpacking giant JBS SA, the
world's biggest meatpacker, according to The Wall Street Journal.

According to former JBS Chairman Joesley Batista, Mr. Temer led a
group of politicians that acted as a criminal syndicate, charging
bribes in exchange for financing from state banks and favorable
regulatory actions, the report relays.

"The spurious practices aimed at serving private interests with
voluminous public resources aren't restricted to those reported in
the charges hereby presented," Mr. Janot wrote in his indictment,
saying Mr. Temer "swindled" Brazil's citizens, the report notes.
"The criminal organization didn't just operate in the recent past
but remains in full activity," Mr. Janot added.

A representative for Mr. Temer declined to comment.  Mr. Temer has
previously denied any wrongdoing and has said he wouldn't step
down from the presidency.

Two-thirds of Congress must vote to allow the case against Mr.
Temer to go to a trial, which would occur before the country's
Supreme Court, the report relays.  That sets the stage for a high-
stakes showdown between Brazil's crusading law-enforcement
apparatus and an entrenched political class at a time of growing
tension between the two sides, the report discloses.

Launched in 2014, the so-called Operation Car Wash has expanded
from a narrow money-laundering probe into Brazil's most
significant anticorruption push ever, the report relays.  In a
country where the rich and powerful historically faced few
consequences for wrongdoing, the investigation has led to the
jailing of scores of high-profile businessmen and politicians,
yielded more than $7 billion in settlements and stirred broad
hopes for a fairer society, the report notes.

But it hasn't magically given Brazilians a new roster of honest
politicians, something even the most optimistic political
scientists say would take years, the report says.  Instead, the
investigations have fueled a state of nearly constant political
turmoil, contributing to Brazil's deepest economic downturn in
more than a century and leading to the impeachment of President
Dilma Rousseff in 2016, the report relays.

"So far, the confrontation of systemic corruption has basically
been the work of law enforcement: police, prosecutors and judges,
with strong support from civil society and public opinion," Sergio
Moro, the judge spearheading Car Wash who is widely seen as a
national hero, told The Wall Street Journal.  "It needs to become
part of the political agenda."

But with a second president in little more than a year teetering,
some Brazilians are beginning to wonder if the costs of cleaning
up corruption outweigh the benefits, the report relates.  Brazil's
per capita economic output has contracted by some 11% since Car
Wash began, forcing millions of layoffs, the report notes.

The WSJ discloses that the instability has been compounded by
growing evidence of corruption's omnipresence in Brazilian
politics.

In a videotaped testimony he gave as part of a plea deal earlier
this year, Marcelo Odebrecht, the former chief executive of Latin
America's largest construction company, said he was unaware of any
politician managing to get elected without illegal cash, the
report relays.  Undeclared contributions, he estimated, account
for some three-fourths of all campaign money, the report notes.

"Even if the guy says he didn't know, he still received money from
his party that was [illegal]," Mr. Odebrecht testified, the report
says.

But with a budget deficit in excess of 9% of gross domestic
product, Brazil desperately needs to pass sweeping reforms to
avert a potential debt crisis, economists said, the report notes.
Mr. Temer, who is deeply unpopular with ordinary Brazilians but
enjoys cozy relations with much of Congress, was seen a capable
negotiator until the latest scandal erupted, the report relays.

Growing numbers of politicians, and some members of the judiciary,
have said Brazil should focus on fixing the economy under Mr.
Temer, whose term ends in 2018, the report notes.  The president's
governing coalition in Congress has remained largely intact even
after the attorney general placed Mr. Temer under investigation in
May, the report relays.

Brazil's electoral court, known as the TSE, this month acquitted
Mr. Temer on charges of receiving illicit campaign funds in the
2014 election, a case that could have forced him from office, the
report discloses.  To reach its ruling, the court tossed out
evidence from Car Wash showing that the campaign had taken
clandestine money from Mr. Odebrecht's firm, the report notes.

"You can't replace a president every hour, even if you want to,"
TSE President Gilmar Mendes said as he cast the tiebreaking vote
to absolve Mr. Temer, the report relays.

That decision was roundly criticized.  "TSE Ignores Proof," blared
a headline in Rio's O Globo newspaper, notes WSJ.  Activists
placed funeral wreaths outside the TSE's building in Brasilia, the
report relays.

But tellingly, street protests on the scale of those that shook
Brazil in 2013 and 2016 didn't materialize, the report notes.  Nor
were there major demonstrations following last month's release of
a taped conversation in which Mr. Batista told Mr. Temer of his
efforts to obstruct investigations into JBS and its parent
company, adds the report.

Prosecutors worry the public's apparent fatigue is giving
politicians the cover they need to undermine Car Wash, the report
relays.

"Without the support of the population, Car Wash wouldn't have
happened, and without the support of the population it will die
sooner than it should," said Carlos Fernando dos Santos Lima, a
prosecutor on the original task force, in an interview.

Mr. Lima, like many here, sees law enforcement as only part of the
solution to Brazil's corruption problem. He says Congress should
also seek to reduce the number of parties -- currently around 35 -
-to make politics less transactional, the report notes.  An
electoral system that awards congressional seats to parties rather
than individual candidates makes it possible for unpopular
legislators to remain in office, the report relays.  Elected
officials and cabinet members also enjoy special legal
protections, such as a rule that they can only be tried in the
Supreme Court for criminal offenses, WSJ discloses.

Instead of making its members more accountable to voters, Congress
is working on a bill that would expose law-enforcement officials
to lawsuits for "abuse of authority," the report relays.
Legislators have been talking openly of giving themselves amnesty
for undeclared campaign cash, the report notes.  Mr. Temer's
Brazilian Democratic Movement Party, or PMDB, is working behind
the scenes to influence the choice of a new attorney general to
succeed Mr. Janot when his term ends in September, according to
one of the party's senators, the report discloses.

"We will vote the necessary reforms and purge the dictatorship of
the prosecutors," the report quoted Darcisio Perondi, a PMDB
congressman and staunch ally of the president, as saying.  "Temer
is indispensable," Mr. Perondi added.

The stakes have risen since Mr. Batista's bombshell testimony
shattered many politicians' complacent belief that Ms. Rousseff's
government was a "sacrificial lamb to prosecutors" rather than a
milestone in a probe seeking even deeper political change, said
Chris Garman, a political analyst at Eurasia Group, the report
relays.

"They are seeing investigations as reaching a politically
dangerous tipping point," Mr. Garman said, noting that PMDB
politicians have been openly trying to discredit Car Wash in
recent weeks, the report notes.

Against that backdrop, some analysts say Mr. Janot is unlikely to
secure the Supreme Court votes necessary to indict the president,
who is cozy with much of the political class, the report
discloses.

But Mr. Temer's dismal popularity -- 7% of Brazilians approve of
his government, according to a poll released Saturday by Datafolha
-- sets limits on how far legislators are willing to stick their
necks out for him, the report notes.

"A lot of deputies are very nervous about their reelection
possibilities," said David Fleischer, a political-science
professor at the University of Brasilia, the report adds.


CAIXA ECONOMICA: Fitch Affirms BB Long-Term IDR; Outlook Negative
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the long-term foreign and local
currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) of Caixa Economica Federal
(Caixa) at 'BB' and its long-term National Rating at 'AA+(bra)'.
The Outlooks of the long-term IDRs and National Rating remain
Negative. Fitch also affirmed Caixa's Support Rating (SR) at '3',
Support Rating Floor (SRF) at 'BB' and long-term National Rating
at 'AA+(bra)'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - IDRS, NATIONAL RATINGS

The affirmation of Caixa's IDRs reflect Fitch's view that the bank
would receive support from the federal government, should the need
arise. Caixa's IDRs are driven by sovereign support and are
aligned with Brazil's sovereign ratings. This reflects the
majority federal government ownership, its key policy role in the
implementation of government economic policies, and the bank's
systemic importance. Fitch considers Caixa a public-mission bank
and does not assign it a Viability Rating.

The Outlook on Caixa's long-term IDRs remains Negative, mirroring
the Outlook of the sovereign ratings. Fitch believes that Caixa,
similar to other public entities, remain subject to political
influence given its state owned nature and strong links with the
government.

Caixa has historically played a crucial policy role in
implementing the government's anticyclical measures, including
significant increase in lending to small and medium enterprises
(SMEs) and individuals between 2010 and 2014, and social and
economic policies, as well as extending credit at preferential
rates, with a particular focus on lower-income groups and
mortgages. Since 2016, Caixa's strategic objectives shifted from
aggressive growth to the improvement of profitability and internal
capital generation. To that end, the bank has implemented measures
to increase efficiency and policies to grow only in segments with
adequate return on capital.

Caixa's capital adequacy ratios have been on a downward trend
since 2014. Caixa aims to be in compliance with the regulatory
requirements, in 2019 without any government support and without
resorting to any large asset sales. Fitch expects the bank's new
strategic direction to be supportive of its capital adequacy
indicators and to minimize any potential external capital support
needs, if any.

Caixa's capitalization has been under pressure due to low internal
capital generation, high dividend payouts, a decline in security
revaluation reserves and rapid asset growth, leading to a decline
in the bank's Fitch Core Capital (FCC) ratio to 9.7% at March 2017
(9.6% in 2016m 10% in 2015, and 11% in 2014). During the same
period, regulatory ratios have fallen faster than the FCC ratio,
due to the gradual phase-in of the Basel III framework. At March
2017, the bank's Common Equity Tier 1 declined to 8.9% from 9.5%
in 2016.

Caixa's asset quality indicators have come under pressure as the
operating environment worsened and loan growth slowed down.
However, Caixa's NPLs as a percentage of gross loans fell slightly
in 2016 and first-quarter 2017, in part, reflecting
renegotiations, better collection and write-offs. At March 2017,
this stood at 2.8%. The deterioration was driven by both the
companies and individuals segments. In the mortgage portfolio,
where growth was faster, NPLs remained relatively low at 2% at
March 2017.

In 2015 and 2016, Caixa's earnings fell significantly, mainly due
to a significant rise in loan impairment charges, particularly in
unsecured consumer loans and SME lending. First-quarter 2017
results were better as a result of a slight decline in impairment
charges and an improvement in net interest margin, which, in turn,
was mainly due to the reduction in interest rates. In 2015, the
bank's operating profit was slightly below break-even, but it
increased to 0.5% and 1.3% of RWA, in 2016 and March 2017,
respectively. Fitch expects the improvement to be sustainable,
although pressure from high credit costs is likely to persist
through 2017. Potential large corporate defaults and/or debt
restructurings are downside risks to earnings.

The system-wide net outflow from savings deposits has pressured
Caixa's mortgage lending growth since 2016. It also led to the
gradual increase in the share of mortgages funded by Fundo de
Garantia do Tempo de Servico, which stood at 51% of all mortgage
funding at March 2017 (46% at March 2016). As Caixa's growth in
lending to companies and individuals should remain negative, its
liquidity needs should remain at a minimum.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - SUPPORT RATING, SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

The affirmation of Caixa's SRs at '3' reflects the moderate
probability of sovereign support. Fitch believes that the
Brazilian government would have a high willingness to support
Caixa in case of need, but its capacity to do so has fallen in the
recent past, as reflected in the successive sovereign rating
downgrades in 2015 and 2016. Caixa's SRF is affirmed at 'BB' and
aligned with the sovereign rating.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - SENIOR and SUBORDINATED DEBT RATING

The affirmation of Caixa's senior and subordinate debt ratings at
'BB' and 'B+' reflects the affirmation of the bank's long-term
foreign currency IDR, which is the anchor rating for both debt
ratings. Caixa's senior unsecured debt rating corresponds to the
bank's long-term IDR, while its subordinated debt is rated two
notches below its long-term IDR. The notching is driven by the
expected high loss severity of the notes. No notching for
nonperformance is applied because coupons are not deferrable and
the writedown trigger is close to the point of non-viability. As a
result, Fitch believes the nonperformance risk is not material
from the rating perspective. Also, because Caixa is a fully
government-owned domestic systemically important bank, it likely
would receive owner (i.e. government) support before the loss-
absorption features of the notes are triggered.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - IDRS, NATIONAL RATINGS, SUPPORT RATINGS,
SUPPORT RATING FLOORS, DEBT RATINGS

Any changes in Brazil's sovereign ratings or in Fitch's evaluation
of the government's willingness to provide support to Caixa, in
case of need, would directly affect these banks' IDRs, National
Ratings, SRs, SRFs and debt ratings, all of which are driven by
expected sovereign support.

The National Ratings of Caixa will not necessarily be downgraded
in the case of a sovereign ratings downgrade. However, the
Negative Outlook of the long-term National Rating reflects that
there could potentially be changes in the local relativities that,
in turn, could lead to a downgrade of the National Ratings, if the
sovereign ratings are downgraded.

Fitch has affirmed Caixa's ratings:
-- Long-term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'BB', Outlook
    Negative;
-- Short-term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'B';
-- National long-term Rating at 'AA+(bra)', Outlook Negative;
-- National Short-term Rating at 'F1+(bra)';
-- Support Rating at '3';
-- Support Rating Floor at 'BB';
-- Senior unsecured notes due 2017, 2018, 2019 and 2022 at 'BB';
-- Subordinated notes due 2024 at 'B+'.



==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


ALP HOLDINGS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-----------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of ALP Holdings Ltd., on May 30, 2017, passed
a resolution to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Walkers Liquidations Limited
          Cayman Corporate Centre
          27 Hospital Road, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9008
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100


CHINA PENGFENG: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 11
-----------------------------------------------------
The creditors of China Pengfeng Auto Group Limited are required to
file their proofs of debt by July 11, 2017, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced wind-up proceedings on June 6, 2017.

The company's liquidator is:

          Richard Fear
          c/o Kevin Butler
          P.O. Box 2681 Grand Cayman KY1-1111
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 814 7374
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3902


DEFIANCE FUND: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
------------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Defiance Fund, Ltd., on June 5, 2017,
passed a resolution to voluntarily liquidate the company's
business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Walkers Liquidations Limited
          Cayman Corporate Centre
          27 Hospital Road, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9008
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100


GALANOS LIMITED: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
-----------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Galanos Limited, on June 6, 2017, passed a
resolution to voluntarily wind up the company's operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Alexandria Bancorp Limited
          c/o Dayra Triana-Munroe
          Tharien Meyer
          The Grand Pavilion Commercial Centre
          802 West Bay Road
          P.O. Box 2428 Grand Cayman KY1-1105
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 945-1111


HELIOS II HOLDINGS: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
--------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Helios II Holdings Corporation, on June 6,
2017, passed a resolution to voluntarily wind up the company's
operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Alexandria Bancorp Limited
          c/o Dayra Triana-Munroe
          Tharien Meyer
          The Grand Pavilion Commercial Centre
          802 West Bay Road
          P.O. Box 2428 Grand Cayman KY1-1105
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 945-1111


MALIBU CAYMAN: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
---------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Malibu Cayman Limited, on June 7, 2017,
passed a resolution to voluntarily wind up the company's
operations.

The company's liquidators are:

          Probitas Limited
          Equitas Limited
          Clifton House
          75 Fort Street
          P.O. Box 1350 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands


MALACCA GROUP: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 21
----------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Malacca Group Technology Limited are required to
file their proofs of debt by July 21, 2017, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on June 7, 2017.

The company's liquidators are:

          Hu Yonghua
          Michelle R. Bodden-Moxam
          Portcullis (Cayman) Ltd,
          The Grand Pavilion Commercial Centre
          Oleander Way, 802 West Bay Road,
          P.O. Box 32052, Grand Cayman, KY1-1208
          Cayman Islands


MASSIMO LIMITED: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
-----------------------------------------------
At an extraordinary general meeting held on March 17, 2017, the
sole shareholder of Massimo Limited resolved to voluntarily wind
up the company's operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Massimo Bietti
          Via Felice Cavallotti n. 34 - 00152 Rome
          Italy
          e-mail: mxbiet@gmail.com


MAUA BRASIL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
----------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Maua Brasil Master Fund Ltd., on May 31,
2017, passed a resolution to voluntarily liquidate the company's
business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Maua Investimentos Ltda.
          c/o Joao Moura
          Rua Joaquim Floriano 413
          16 andar
          Sao Paulo SP
          Brazil
          CEP 04534 011
          Telephone: +1 (55) 11 2102 0733


VEGA RESOURCES: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 17
-----------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Vega Resources Limited are required to file their
proofs of debt by July 17, 2017, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on June 2, 2017.

The company's liquidator is:

          Matthew Wright
          c/o Omar Grant
          Windward 1, Regatta Office Park
          P.O. Box 897 Grand Cayman KY1-1103
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 949 7576
          Facsimile: (345) 949 8295


===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================


BANCO DE RESERVAS: Fitch Affirms BB- IDR; Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Banco de Reservas de la Republica
Dominicana, Banco de Servicios Multiples' (Banreservas) Long-Term
Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB-'. The Rating Outlook is
Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS
IDRS AND NATIONAL RATINGS

Banreservas' IDRs and National scale ratings reflect Fitch's
expectations of the support the bank would receive from its sole
shareholder, the Dominican government (IDR 'BB-'/Stable Outlook),
if needed.

The Stable Outlooks on Banreservas' Long-Term IDRs are in line
with those of the sovereign.

VR

Banreservas' asset concentrations highly influence its Viability
Rating (VR). The bank's VR also considers comparatively weaker
capitalization, structural improvements in profitability and a
stabilization of private sector loan quality.

Even though loan quality indicators have stabilized in recent
years, asset concentrations still highly influence Banreservas'
VR. Exposure to a highly speculative-grade sovereign is high,
though it has remained around 3.5x equity since 3Q16, compared
with 4.4x at YE15. Private sector loan concentrations could lead
to volatility in loan quality metrics due to a high level of
restructured loans.

Private sector loan quality ratios have been in line with peers
since 2014 due to charge-offs, restructurings and private-sector
loan growth. In Fitch's view, despite some deterioration since the
last review, loan quality ratios are well within acceptable levels
for the bank's rating category.

Banreservas' capitalization is tight relative to its rating
category, particularly when considering its high asset
concentrations. Although the bank's regulatory capital ratio is
well above the minimum required, at 7%, its tangible common equity
ratio is one of the weakest among peers (emerging market
commercial banks with highly speculative-grade ratings) which is
expected to continue given moderate growth expectations and
profitability.

The bank's ROAA remains low compared with similarly rated peers.
Fitch expects this ratio to stabilize between 1.3% and 1.5% as
investments in technology and the expansion of its distribution
channels continue to wind down.

Banreservas has a strong franchise and has been a refuge bank in
times of systemic stress. The bank has the largest deposit market
share in the Dominican Republic (18% of the financial system).
Despite high deposit concentration, its deposit base has been
stable over time. Fitch views Banreservas' liquidity as adequate
for its market. Cash and cash equivalents covered 24% of deposits
and short-term funding.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR
The bank's systemic importance, its role collecting funds for the
government's single treasury account to pay debt obligations, and
its role as a provider of domestic loans results in an
equalization of its Support Rating Floor (SRF) with the
sovereign's LT IDR of 'BB-'. Additionally, Fitch believes the
government's willingness to support Banreservas should it be
required is substantial given its 100% stake in the bank. However,
the Dominican Republic's speculative-grade rating limits the
sovereign's capacity of support, resulting in a Support Rating
(SR) of '4'.

SUBORDINATED DEBT

Banreservas' outstanding subordinated debt includes an
international issuance of USD300 million due 2023 and a domestic
issuance of DOP10 billion due 2024. The bank's subordinated note
ratings are one notch below its supported IDR and Long-Term
National rating, reflecting one notch for loss severity, but no
notches for incremental non-performance risk relative to the
bank's IDR. In Fitch's view, given the "gone concern"
characteristics of the security, the anchor rating is the IDR,
even though there is no explicit government guarantee on the
security. Although these subordinated bonds are included in the
bank's regulatory capital calculation, Fitch views these
instruments as debt rather than capital.

RATING SENSITIVITIES
IDRS AND NATIONAL RATINGS

The bank's IDRs and National ratings are sensitive to a change in
Fitch's assumptions as to support. Changes in the IDRs are also
contingent on sovereign rating actions. There is limited upside
for the bank's national ratings.

VR

A material reduction in asset concentrations and a stronger
capital base could lead to an upgrade of the bank's VR.

An unexpected deterioration in loan quality or profitability or
sustained high disbursements of income to the government that
pressures Banreservas' tangible common equity-to-tangible assets
ratio to below 5.5% could trigger a downgrade of its VR.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

The SR and SRF are potentially sensitive to any change in
assumptions as to the propensity or ability of the Dominican
government to provide timely support to the bank. This could arise
in the event of a sovereign rating action. Currently, the Outlook
on the Dominican Republic's LT Local and Foreign-Currency IDRs is
Stable.

SUBORDINATED DEBT

Banreservas' subordinated debt ratings are broadly sensitive to
the same considerations that might affect the bank's IDR and LT
National rating.

Fitch has affirmed Banreservas' ratings:
-- Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'BB-'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- Short-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'B';
-- Viability Rating at 'b+';
-- Support Rating at '4';
-- Support Rating Floor at 'BB-';
-- Long-term subordinated notes at 'B+'
-- Long-Term National rating at 'AA+(dom)'; Outlook Stable;
-- Short-Term National rating at 'F1+(dom)';
-- National subordinated debt rating at 'AA(dom)'.


BANCO MULTIPLE: Fitch Affirms BB- Long-Term IDR; Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings for Banco Multiple BHD Leon
S.A. (BHDL) and its related entity, BHD Leon Puesto de Bolsa, S.A.
(BHDLPB).

KEY RATING DRIVERS BHDL

IDRs, VR, SUPPORT AND NATIONAL RATINGS

BHDL's Viability Rating (VR), or standalone creditworthiness,
drives its Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) and National
Ratings. The bank's ratings do not consider any support, resulting
in a Support Rating of '5' and a Support Floor of 'NF'.

The Stable Outlooks on BHDL's Long-term IDRs are in line with
those of the sovereign and reflect the supportive operating
environment that benefits the bank's profile.

The bank's VR is highly influenced by the operating environment
and financial performance. Additionally, the bank's VR also
considers the moderate decline in capitalization, steady asset
quality, stable funding base and sound liquidity.

BHDL reported solid performance in 2016, with an operating profit
over average total assets of 3.06%, higher than the Dominican
financial system's average. The bank's profitability is driven by
sound interest income on earning assets and credit expansion into
higher margin segments. In Fitch's opinion, profitability is
sustainable in light of the expected economic expansion, sound
credit growth, resilient margins, controlled credit, and operating
expenses.

BHDL's Fitch core capital to weighted-risks ratio declined to
14.9% at YE16, primarily as a result of asset growth. Despite this
deterioration, BHDL's capitalization remains among the highest in
its market. In Fitch's view, if the bank maintains double-digit
asset growth in 2017 and the current levels of internal capital
generation, capitalization may continue adjusting downwards and be
more aligned with that of its domestic peers.

Loan quality ratios have stabilized at a level similar to 2015,
but compare unfavorably with the historical average. BHDL's
impaired loans to gross loans ratio decreased to 1.99% at YE16, a
slight improvement caused primarily by faster loan growth. While
Fitch expects loan quality ratios to stabilize at current levels,
these will remain slightly weaker than those of BHDL's domestic
peers. Nevertheless, the bank's impaired loans to gross loans
ratio will remain well within the parameters of its VR.

BHDL ranks third in customer deposits with a market share in the
Dominican market of 19.2% at YE16. As such, the bank has a
recognized franchise and reputation as a long-standing,
conservative institution that supports a well-diversified and
stable funding base. Customer deposits have covered about 90% of
BHDL's funding needs over the last four years. Liquidity remained
comfortably high given the cash and due from banks that
represented a sound 27% of total deposits and short-term funding
at 1Q17.

KEY RATING DRIVERS BHDLPB
NATIONAL RATINGS

BHDLPB's ratings reflect the operational and financial support
provided by BHDL and its sole shareholder Centro Financiero BHD
Leon (CFBHDL). In Fitch's view, BHDLPB is a key and integral part
of CFBHDL's business as it provides some financial products to
core clients. Furthermore, a clear commercial identification among
this entity with BHDL and CFBHDL, and the reputational risk at
which they would be exposed in the case of eventual troubles at
BHDLPB results in a high probability of direct or indirect support
by BHDL and CFBHDL, should it be required.

RATING SENSITIVITIES BHDL

IDRs, VR and NATIONAL RATINGS
Given BHDL's current ratings and the Stable Outlook on the
sovereign's Long-Term IDRs, there is limited upside potential. A
deterioration in asset quality or profitability that causes the
bank's Fitch core capital to risk-weighted assets ratio to fall
below 10%, could pressure creditworthiness.

SUPPORT RATINGS

The Dominican government's propensity or ability to provide timely
support to BPD is not likely to change given the sovereign's low
speculative-grade IDR. As such, the Support Rating and Support
Rating Floor have no upgrade potential.

RATING SENSITIVITIES BHDLPB
NATIONAL RATINGS

There is limited upside potential for BHDLPB's national ratings. A
negative change in the capacity or propensity of CFBHDL to provide
support could pressure creditworthiness.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

Banco Multiple BHD Leon S.A.:
-- Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'BB-'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- Short-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'B';
-- Viability Rating at 'bb-';
-- Support Rating at '5';
-- Support Rating Floor at 'NF';
-- Long-Term National Rating at 'AA+(dom)'; Outlook Stable;
-- Short-Term National Rating at 'F1+(dom)'.

BHD Leon Puesto de Bolsa, S.A.:
-- Long-Term National Rating at 'AA+(dom)'; Outlook Stable;
-- Short-Term National Rating at 'F1+(dom).


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Politicos, Business Push to Control Judiciary
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that the outspoken head of the Herrera and
Santo Domingo Province Industries Association (AEIH) called the
politicos and business leaders effort to control the Judiciary, a
threat to democracy and the business climate. "They want to place
their favorite judges there."

Antonio Taveras said the Judiciary must be shielded with new
reforms and with the selection of career judges with total
independence from the other State powers and external private
actors, according to Dominican Today.

"We wager on career judges, with a career of impeccable service,
without political militancy, socially respected citizens and
admired for their life conduct and professionally competent to
administer justice," the business leader said in a statement
obtained by the news agency.

"No economic group or political power can seek to control justice,
much less to have favorite judges to defend their particular
interests or ensure impunity against possible crimes committed in
violation of laws," the report quoted Mr. Taveras as saying.

Mr. Taveras said the business sector must wager that democracy
works well and for there to be a favorable and propitious rule of
law for business, the report relays.

"A dangerous setback has been observed a in recent times in the
progress achieved in justice, which has allowed the intrusion of
private actors into the judiciary, whose purpose is to kidnap the
judicial system for their own interests," Mr. Taveras added, notes
the report.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
May 1, 2017, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB-/B' long- and
short-term sovereign credit ratings on the Dominican Republic.
The outlook remains stable.  The transfer and convertibility (T&C)
assessment is unchanged at 'BB+'.


===========
M E X I C O
===========


MEXICO: Registers $1.08 Billion Trade Deficit in May
----------------------------------------------------
Anthony Harrup at The Wall Street Journal reports that Mexico had
a $1.08 billion trade deficit in May, more than double the
shortfall in the year-earlier month as the deficit in petroleum
goods widened, the National Statistics Institute said.

Exports last month rose 12.9% from a year earlier to $35.47
billion thanks to solid gains in shipments of factory-made goods,
while imports increased 14.7% to $36.54 billion, according to The
Wall Street Journal.

The May trade balance brought the deficit for the first five
months of the year to $2.97 billion, with a $6.88 billion deficit
in petroleum partly offset by a $3.91 billion surplus in
nonpetroleum goods, the report notes.

Average crude oil prices rose from May 2016, but export volume
fell to 958,000 barrels a day from 1.2 million barrels a day, the
report relays.  Imports of fuels such as gasoline, diesel and
natural gas rose 23% from a year before, the report discloses.

Mexico exports crude oil, but imports more than half of the
gasoline and natural gas that it consumes, the report relays.
State oil company Petroleos Mexicanos imported 494,000 barrels a
day of gasoline in May, up from 461,000 the year before, and is
expected to raise imports further after flooding and a fire this
month forced it to shut down its biggest refinery until the end of
July, the report notes.

Exports of manufactured goods remained buoyant in May, rising
12.9% to $31.79 billion with strong gains in vehicles, auto parts,
and nonautomotive sectors, the report says.

Consumer goods imports continued to recover along with the rebound
in the Mexican peso against the U.S. dollar, the report relays.
Excluding petroleum products, consumer imports rose 7% from May
2016, but were still down 0.9% for the first five months of the
year, the report adds.


=======
P E R U
=======


SAN MIGUEL INDUSTRIAS: Fitch Raises Long-Term IDR to BB+
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded San Miguel Industrias PET S.A.'s (SMI)
Foreign Currency Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) and senior
unsecured notes to 'BB+' from 'BB'. The rating Outlook is Stable.

The upgrade reflects SMI's improved business profile due to the
successful renewal of its long-term contracts with several key
customers and its expansion outside of Peru. Fitch expects to see
rapid deleveraging over the next 18 months, based mainly on the
execution of existing and new contracts (notably with Aje, Arca,
and Plastiglas) and organic growth. In addition, Fitch does not
expect any large debt-funded M&A over the next two years.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Leading Position in Peru:
San Miguel Industrias PET S.A. (SMI) is a leading Peruvian rigid
plastic company with injection, blowing and cap-molding operations
in Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Panama, Guatemala and
Mexico. It also has recycling operations in Peru and Colombia and
thermoforming business units, in line with the company's product
diversification strategies. The company has significantly
increased its scale and product diversification over the last
three years.

Geographical Diversification:
The company has diversified its operations by expanding its
operations in Colombia, Ecuador and Central America during the
last two years; 58% of the group's volumes were generated outside
Peru as of March 2017. This geographical and product
diversification enable SMI to bid for international contracts and
be more competitive. Fitch does not expect SMI to enter new
markets in the coming years as the company is focused on executing
its new contracts and recent acquisitions.

Contracted-Sales:
About 95% of SMI's sales are based on long-term contract
agreements which have been renewed beneficially. The average
maturity of SMI's contracts is now about eight years, which
ensures good predictability of cash flow.

Deleveraging Expected:
SMI's deleveraging process has been slowed due to higher capex.
Fitch expects a reduction of net leverage toward 3.0x by 2018 from
4.8x at fiscal year-end (FYE) 2016 (including only six months of
Plastiglas) due to increased EBITDA as a result of acquisitions
made in 2016 and lower capex, notably in 2018. Fitch understands
that the group's medium-term leverage policy is to operate under a
gross leverage ratio below the incurrence-debt covenant, which is
at 3.5x.

Steady Operating Margin:
Fitch expects EBITDA to grow significantly over the next 18 months
due to increased volumes from long-term contracts recently signed
with its main clients. Fitch projects SMI to maintain its EBITDA
margin at about 20% because of its product mix and operating model
which is based on highly contracted revenues, and its pass-through
model that gives margin protection against price volatility in
resin (about 75% of total costs) and the natural hedges against
currency fluctuation, as equipment and client contracts are in
U.S. dollars.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within the rating case for SMI include
-- Double-digit revenue growth;
-- EBITDA margin of about 19%-20%;
-- Capex of about USD70 million in 2017;
-- No dividend payment in 2017-2018.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Negative Rating Action: A negative rating action could be
triggered by net debt leverage above 4.0x or the nonrenewal of a
large supply contract.

A positive rating action could result from a sustained
strengthening of the company's net leverage to below 2.5x on a
prolonged basis, strong FCF, and improved client diversification
while sustaining an EBITDA margin above 20%.

LIQUIDITY

The company had cash and cash equivalents of about USD17 million
and short-term debt of USD37million as of March 2017. The short-
term debt is mainly related to working capital and debt for import
financing. The USD200 million senior unsecured notes mature in
2020. SMI is a private company fully owned by Nexus Group SA.
Positive support from the shareholder is factored into SMI's
Issuer Default Rating (IDR).


======================
P U E R T O    R I C O
======================


ECRA GROUP: Court Confirms Reorganization Plan
----------------------------------------------
Judge Edward A. Godoy of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Puerto Rico approved Ecra Group Corp.'s disclosure
statement filed on May 6, 2017, and confirmed its plan of
reorganization, dated May 1, 2017.

The Troubled Company Reporter previously reported that under the
Plan, Class 2 General Secured Claims are estimated at $7,457.71.
Secured claims #1 by the Internal Revenue Services will be paid in
full. Claim #2 by Scotiabank de Puerto Rico will be paid and
treated directly with the bank as per stipulation filed. Any
allowed amount owed under this class will be paid in full over a
period not exceeding five years from the effective date of the
Plan.

The Amended Disclosure Statement is available at:

            http://bankrupt.com/misc/prb16-04651-83.pdf

                      About ECRA Group

ECRA Group, Corp., is organized under the laws of the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico and organized on Nov. 16, 2005.  Annette Cancel
Lorenzana is the president of the corporation and co-owner with
45% of the stocks; Carlos I. Arce is the owner of 45% of the
stocks; Iannette Arce Cancel is the secretary of the corporation
and owner of 5% of the stocks, and Liannette Arce Cancel is the
owner of 5% of the stocks of the corporation.  The Debtor operates
its business dba Ferreteria Arce at a rented commercial property
dedicated to servicing and selling construction materials and
hardware equipment and related materials to general customers and
construction technicians.  The store is located at road 670.23
Marginal Street, Parcelas Marquez, Vega Baja, Puerto Rico.  The
Debtor owns the real property dedicated for the leasing business
operation.

The Debtor filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition (Bankr. D.P.R.
Case No. 16-04651) on June 10, 2016.  Luis D. Flores Gonzalez,
Esq., at The Law Offices of Luis D. Flores Gonzalez serves as the
Debtor's bankruptcy counsel.

As of the date of the filing of the Chapter 11 petition, the
Debtor had assets of $545,500 and liabilities of $782,989.


FABRICA DE BLOQUES: Unsecureds to Get Nothing Under Plan
--------------------------------------------------------
Fabrica de Bloques Vega Baja, Inc., filed with the U.S. Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Puerto Rico a small business disclosure
statement describing their plan of reorganization, dated June 15,
2017, a full-text copy of which is available at:

     http://bankrupt.com/misc/prb17-00965-11-100.pdf

On March 27, 2017, the Debtor and Master Group filed a Motion to
Sell Property Free and Clear of Liens under Section 363(f): (A)
Approving the Asset Purchase Agreement and Sale of the Acquired
Assets Free and Clear of Liens to the Buyer or to the Successful
Bidder; and (B) Approving the Bidding Procedures to Solicit Higher
and Better Offers and Select the Successful Bidder.  On April 26,
2017, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order granting the Sale
Motion and approving the bidding procedures pursuant to which the
Debtor could solicit bids for the Acquired Assets from interested
parties.  The sale was held as scheduled, on May 9, 2017.

Class 3 under the Plan consists of the unsecured creditors who
will receive a distribution of 0% of their allowed claims. This
class is impaired.

Payments and distributions under the Plan will be funded by the
sale of Debtor's Acquired Assets to Master Group.

The Plan Proponent believes that the Debtor will have enough cash
on hand on the Effective Date of the Plan to pay all the claims
and expenses that are entitled to be paid on that date.

               About Fabrica De Bloques Vega Baja

Fabrica De Bloques Vega Baja, Inc., sought protection under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 17-
00965) on February 15, 2017.  The petition was signed by Rafael
Ivan Casanova Tirado.  MRO Attorneys at Law, LLC represents the
Debtor as its legal counsel.

At the time of the filing, the Debtor estimated assets and
liabilities of less than $50,000.


JAYUYA MEMORIAL: Disclosures Okayed; Plan Outline Confirmed
-----------------------------------------------------------
Judge Edward A. Godoy of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Puerto Rico approved Jayuya Memorial Inc.'s disclosure
statement and confirmed its plan of reorganization filed on Feb.
15, 2017.

As previously reported by the Troubled Company Reporter, under the
plan, Class 2 Claims of General Unsecured Creditors are impaired.
Holders of Allowed Class 2 Claims will receive a distribution
$14,400. This distribution is projected to equal a 50%
distribution on the Allowed Class 2 Claims. These claims will be
paid via 48 monthly payments in the amount of $300.  Payments on
the Class 2 Claims will commence on the first day of the 74th
month following the Effective Date of the Plan and continue, on a
monthly basis, through the last day of the 120th month following
the Effective Date of the Plan.

The Disclosure Statement is available at:

           http://bankrupt.com/misc/prb16-06235-50.pdf

                     About Jayuya Memorial

Jayuya Memorial, Inc, is managed and operated by its president,
Juan Morales.  It is a mortuary services company which offers
funerary services.

The Debtor filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition (Bankr. D.P.R.
Case No. 16-06235) on Aug. 5, 2016, listing under $1 million in
assets and debts.

The Batista Law Group, P.S.C., serves as the Debtor's bankruptcy
counsel.

The Debtor hired Manuel E. Feliciano Rios, CPA, as financial
consultant.


OLIVER C&I: August 30 Disclosure Statement Hearing Set
------------------------------------------------------
Judge Mildred Caban Flores of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Puerto will convene a hearing on August 30, 2017, at
9:00 a.m. to consider and rule upon the adequacy of the disclosure
statement filed by Oliver C&I Corp.

Objections to the form and content of the disclosure statement
should be in writing and filed with the court and served upon
parties in interest not less than 14 days prior to the hearing.

                    About Oliver C & I Corp.

Oliver C & I Corp., based in Guaynabo, Puerto Rico, filed a
Chapter 11 petition (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 16-08311) on October
17, 2016.

The petition was signed by Max Olivera, vice-president and
treasurer.  The case is assigned to Judge Mildred Caban Flores.
In its petition, the Debtor indicated $29.94 million in total
assets and $1.06 million in total liabilities.

The Debtor is represented by Carmen D. Conde Torres, Esq. at C.
Conde & Assoc.  The Debtor employs Doris Barroso Vicens of RSM
Puerto Rico as its accountant; and Aurora Oti-Yvonnet of Villafane
& Oti, Certified Public Accountants, PSC, as its external auditor.


================================
T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O
================================


PETROTRIN: Boosts Oil Output
----------------------------
Trinidad Express reports that state oil firm Petrotrin said it is
continuing to pursue drilling opportunities in its land operations
and offshore.

"To date, the company has recorded some successes with production
increases recorded over the past few months," the company said in
a statement obtained by the news agency.

These increases were highlighted by company president Fitzroy
Harewood during a presentation at a luncheon hosted by the Energy
Chamber in May, according to Trinidad Express.

At that presentation, Harewood said production figures had climbed
from 41,000 barrels of oil per day (bopd) at the end of December
2016, to over 46,000 barrels per day by the end of April this
year, Petrotrin stated, the report relays.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
April 28, 2017, Moody's Investors Service downgraded Petroleum Co.
of Trinidad & Tobago corporate family rating and senior unsecured
debt ratings to B1 from Ba3. Simultaneously, Moody's lowered
Petrotrin's Baseline Credit Assessment ("BCA") to caa1 from b3.
The outlook on the ratings is stable. The rating actions are
linked to Moody's April 25, 2017 downgrade of the government of
Trinidad & Tobago bond ratings to Ba1 from Baa3, with a stable
outlook.



=================
X X X X X X X X X
=================


LATAM: Regional Accounting Profession Imperilled by De-risking
--------------------------------------------------------------
Caribbean News Now reports that Veteran Caribbean diplomat, Sir
Ronald Sanders, has warned the accounting and auditing community
of the Caribbean that their businesses could soon be at risk as a
result of rules that governments are expected to legislate and
implement.

According to the Antigua and Barbuda ambassador, who has been
actively involved in Caribbean discussions with the Financial
Action Task Force (FATF) and the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) on financial matters since
1996, the FATF has set guidelines imposing new requirements on
accountants and auditors, the report notes.

Sir Sanders made the observations at the 35th Annual Meeting of
the Caribbean Association of Accountants, held in Guyana on
Friday, June 23, 2017, at which he was the keynote speaker,
according to Caribbean News Now.

Sir Sanders warned more than 100 delegates from all the region
that "accountants, tax advisers, auditors, estate planners -- are
now expected to be 'whistle blowers' on their own clients" and "to
establish unprecedented machinery to guard against charges of
facilitating money laundering, tax evasion and the financing of
terrorism," the report relays.

"These requirements", he said, "have serious implications the
survival of many of their businesses for they will be costly and
risky," the report notes.

"Some small accounting firms could opt for closure, leaving the
accounting business in the region only to very large firms that
have the capacity to conduct extensive checks on clients and their
business" he declared, adding that "there would also be the danger
that small businesses would not be able to pay the fees charged by
large accounting firms, resulting in a large number of small
businesses being deprived of accounting services for many
activities, including filing tax returns," the report relays.

This de-risking exercise is similar to the present experience of
the banking sector in the region from whom correspondent banking
relations are being withdrawn by global banks in the US and UK,
the report relays.

Sir Sanders also emphasized that there continues to be a double
standard in which FATF and OECD rules are being applied that
disadvantage Caribbean jurisdictions, the report discloses.

"Nothing is being done about powerful countries that disregard the
rules and rake in huge revenues as a result'," Sir Sanders said,
the report relays.

But, Caribbean jurisdictions have little choice but to implement
the rules or suffer the consequences of black listing and counter
measures, the report notes.  He cautioned the accounting and
auditing community to know the business of their clients in far
greater detail than ever before, and to exercise extreme caution
in providing a range of advice, the report relays.

Speaking to an attentive audience, including international
accountancy leaders, Sanders advised that "Practitioners must now
constantly keep abreast of international, regional and national
developments, the report relays.  You will need to invest in
systems, including software, to know and understand your clients'
business to protect yourselves, the report notes.  Increasingly,
the costs and risks involved will rise," the report adds.


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B.
Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Joseph Cardillo at
856-381-8268.


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