TCRLA_Public/170703.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

               Monday, July 3, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 130


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

ARGENTINA: To Get $25MM-IDB Loan to Implement Safety Program


B E R M U D A

WEATHERFORD INTERNATIONAL: Offering $250 Million of Senior Notes


B R A Z I L

BRAZIL: Supreme Court Allows Senator to Resume Work
BRAZIL: Banks Struggle to Sell $4.2 Billion of Seized Collateral
OI SA: Scandal, Debt Turn Champion Into a Cautionary Tale


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Can Tap into T&T's US$4BB Food Bill


J A M A I C A

JAMAICA: COJ to Clamp Down on Delinquent Firms


P E R U

* PERU: Future Growth Can be Lifted Through Structural Reforms


P U E R T O    R I C O

METROPOLITAN INDUSTRIAL: Disclosures OK'd; Hearing on Sept. 13
OLIVER C&I: Unsecureds Get Paid in Full Plus Interest


T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O

PETROTRIN: Committee Submits First 3-Mo. Report
PETROTRIN: No Decision Yet on Company Report


V E N E Z U E L A

VENEZUELA: Is Apocalyptic But Bond Traders Are Sitting It Out


X X X X X X X X X

* BOND PRICING: For the Week From June 26 to June 30, 2017


                            - - - - -


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A R G E N T I N A
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ARGENTINA: To Get $25MM-IDB Loan to Implement Safety Program
------------------------------------------------------------
Argentina will implement a public safety program aimed at curbing
the robbery and murder rate in high crime incidence areas across
the country with a $25 million loan from the Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB).

The country has the highest recorded robbery rate in the region:
1,096 thefts per 100,000 inhabitants in 2015, more than three
times the regional average. While the intentional homicide rate
remains relatively low compared with the region's average, it is
currently on the rise. Between 2008-2015 it rose by 10 percent,
whereas the number of homicide victims grew more than 20 percent,
going from 2.371 to 2.837 per year. Five districts (the provinces
of Buenos Aires, Cordoba, Santa Fe and Mendoza and the Autonomous
City of Buenos Aires) account for about 70 percent of these
crimes, which in turn are concentrated in a small number of areas
within these districts.

The loan's goal is to help improve the efficiency of the country's
Safety Ministry and of provincial and municipal governments to
reduce the theft and murder rates in priority areas. To this end,
it is focusing on strengthening three key spheres of the safety
policy.

First, the program will boost up the criminal information quality
and analysis with new hardware and software as well as technical
assistance and training. It will fund yearly National Victims
Polls, improve police records, and develop analytical tools,
including a Unified Database.

Second, it will increase police efficiency by strengthening the
newly created Strategic Leadership Team Institute (ICCE, after its
Spanish initials). The ICCE will feature federal and provincial
police forces trained in coordinated teamwork to prevent, dissuade
and investigate criminal activities. Additionally, it will train
police officers and security division officials at local and
provincial level in hot-spot patrolling action oriented to problem
solving, criminal investigation, relations with the community and
force integrity, as well as 1,400 new academic instructors.

Thirdly, the program will strengthen local security management
through the design and implementation of municipal safety plans
oriented towards the reduction of robbery and murder rates in
priority departments by means of interventions based on impact
evidence.

It will also include measures aimed at preventing violence against
women, such as breakdown of criminal statistics by gender,
training of local police forces on protocols to deal with domestic
violence victims, and interventions to prevent intrafamily
violence.

The IDB $25 million loan is for a 25-year term at a LIBOR-based
interest rate.

                           *     *    *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
May 10, 2017, Fitch Ratings affirmed Argentina's Long-Term Foreign
and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'B' with a
Stable Outlook. The issue ratings on Argentina's senior unsecured
Foreign and Local Currency bonds are also affirmed at 'B'. The
Country Ceiling is affirmed at 'B' and the Short-Term Foreign and
Local Currency IDRs at 'B'.

On Jan. 30, 2017, the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America
reported that Moody's Investors Service has assigned a B3 rating
to the Government of Argentina's US$3.25 billion bond due 2022 and
the US$3.75 billion bond due 2027. The outlook on the Government
of Argentina's rating is stable.

As previously reported by the TCR-LA, Argentina defaulted on some
of its debt late July 30, 2014, after expiration of a 30-day grace
period on a US$539 million interest payment.  Earlier that day,
talks with a court-appointed mediator ended without resolving a
standoff between the country and a group of hedge funds seeking
full payment on bonds that the country had defaulted on in 2001.
A U.S. judge had ruled that the interest payment couldn't be made
unless the hedge funds led by Elliott Management Corp., got the
US$1.5 billion they claimed. The country hasn't been able to
access international credit markets since its US$95 billion
default 13 years ago.

On March 30, 2016, after more than 12 hours of debate in the
Senate, Argentina's Congress passed a bill that will allow the
government to repay holders of debt that the South American
country defaulted on in 2001, including a group of litigating
hedge funds that won judgments in a New York court. The bill
passed by a vote of 54-16.


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B E R M U D A
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WEATHERFORD INTERNATIONAL: Offering $250 Million of Senior Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Weatherford International plc announced the launch of a private
offering of an additional $250 million aggregate principal amount
of its 9.875% senior notes due 2024 to qualified institutional
buyers pursuant to Rule 144A under the Securities Act of 1933, as
amended, and to certain non-U.S. persons in accordance with
Regulation S under the Securities Act.  The New Notes will be
senior, unsecured obligations of Weatherford International Ltd., a
Bermuda exempted company and indirect, wholly owned subsidiary of
the Company.  The New Notes will be fully and unconditionally
guaranteed, on a senior, unsecured basis, by the Company and by
Weatherford International, LLC, a Delaware limited liability
company and indirect subsidiary of Weatherford Bermuda.
The New Notes will be issued as additional securities under an
indenture pursuant to which Weatherford Bermuda previously issued
$540 million aggregate principal amount of its 9.875% senior notes
due 2024.  The New Notes will have identical terms, other than the
issue date, as the Initial Notes, and the New Notes and the
Initial Notes will be treated as a single class of securities
under the indenture governing the Notes.

The purpose of the Offering is to repay amounts outstanding under
the Company's revolving credit facility, give the Company
additional liquidity throughout 2017, and provide assurance it
will comply with the financial covenants set forth in its senior
revolving and term loan credit facilities.

The New Notes will not be registered under the Securities Act or
any state securities laws and may not be offered or sold in the
United States absent registration or an applicable exemption from
such registration requirements.

                Errors Found in Quarterly Report

In June 2017, the Company identified an immaterial error, with no
cash flow impact, of approximately $28 million, net, related to
the recognition of revenue with a customer, Petroleos de
Venezuela, S.A. in its previously reported 2016 Annual Report on
Form 10-K and Quarterly Reports on Form 10-Q for the periods ended
Sept. 30, 2016, and March 31, 2017.  The Company has concluded
that beginning in the third quarter of 2016, the duration of time
expected to collect revenue earned with PDVSA significantly
exceeds the contractual payment terms and represents an implied
financing arrangement.  This has required the Company to recognize
revenue at a discount reflecting the time value of money and
accrete the discount as interest income over the expected
collection period using the effective interest method.

This immaterial error resulted in the overstatement of both
accounts receivable and revenue of approximately $22 million and
$23 million, respectively, as of and for the year ended Dec. 31,
2016, and $6 million and $8 million, respectively, as of and for
the three-month period ended March 31, 2017.

In connection with this development, the Company will correct this
immaterial error in its Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the
three and six month periods ended June 30, 2017.  The impact of
the correction will decrease revenue and increase interest income
by approximately $31 million and $3 million, respectively, for the
three and six month periods ended June 30, 2017, and reduce
accounts receivable by approximately $28 million as of June 30,
2017.

The impact of this error, had it been recorded in the prior
periods, would have no impact on the Company's previously reported
compliance with financial covenants under its senior revolving and
term loan credit facilities.  There is also no impact to cash flow
from operating activities or any other cash flow measures.

                       About Weatherford

Ireland-based Weatherford International plc (NYSE: WFT) --
http://www.weatherford.com/-- is a multinational oilfield service
company providing innovative solutions, technology and services to
the oil and gas industry.  The Company operates in over 90
countries and has a network of approximately 880 locations,
including manufacturing, service, research and development, and
training facilities and employs approximately 29,500 people.

Weatherford International reported a net loss attributable to the
Company of $3.39 billion on $5.74 billion of total revenues for
the year ended Dec. 31, 2016, compared to a net loss attributable
to the Company of $1.98 billion on $9.43 billion of total revenues
for the year ended Dec. 31, 2015.  As of March 31, 2017,
Weatherford had $12.16 billion in total assets, $10.47 billion in
total liabilities and $1.69 billion in total shareholders' equity.

                         *     *     *

In November 2016, Fitch Ratings has downgraded the ratings for
Weatherford and its subsidiaries, including the companies'
Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) to 'CCC' from 'B+'.

In November 2016, S&P Global Ratings lowered its corporate credit
rating on Weatherford International to 'B+' from 'BB-'.  "The
downgrade reflects our revised free operating cash flow estimates
for Weatherford following weaker-than-anticipated cash inflows in
the third quarter," said S&P Global Ratings credit analyst Carin
Dehne-Kiley.



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B R A Z I L
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BRAZIL: Supreme Court Allows Senator to Resume Work
----------------------------------------------------
Paulo Trevisani at The Wall Street Journal reports that Brazil's
Supreme Court said it will permit Senator Aecio Neves to resume
legislative work, after the lawmaker was suspended by the same
court for more than a month following corruption allegations.

Justice Marco Aurelio Mello ruled unconstitutional the action
against Mr. Neves, one of Brazil's top politicians and key ally to
President Michel Temer, according to The Wall Street Journal.

"The suspension by injunction . . . is unacceptable," Judge Mello
wrote, adding that only the Senate itself can make that decision,
the report notes.  "The judiciary mustn't replace the
legislative."

Brazil's constitution allows the suspension of lawmakers by the
judiciary branch only in very specific circumstances-such as when
they are caught in the act of committing a crime-none of which was
present in Mr. Neves' case, according to Judge Mello, the report
relates.

Mr. Neves is accused by Attorney General Rodrigo Janot of
accepting about $604,000 in bribes from Joesley Batista, the
former chairman of Brazilian meatpacking giant JBS SA, the report
recalls.  The senator was also accused of trying to obstruct the
sprawling graft investigation known as Operation Car Wash, which
has ensnared business executives, lawmakers and former presidents,
the report discloses.

Mr. Neves' has denied wrongdoing.

The accusations stem from Mr. Batista's plea deal with the Car
Wash prosecutors, in which the businessman said he paid bribes to
hundreds of politicians in exchange for special treatment by
government agencies, the report relays.

Shortly after Mr. Batista's allegations surfaced, Mr. Neves was
banned from casting a vote in the Senate or participating in
hearings, the report notes.  The decision was made by another
justice, Edson Fachin, who is in charge of initial decisions on
cases related to the Car Wash probe, the report relays.

The senator's case has since been transferred to Mr. Mello, notes
WSJ.

The Supreme Court still has to decide whether or not to accept
charges filed by Mr. Janot against Mr. Neves, because a sitting
federal lawmaker can only be tried by the high court, the report
relates.  A spokeswoman for Mr. Janot's office had no comment.

Mr. Neves' lawyer Alberto Toron said the ruling repairs a
"flagrant illegality" and "reaffirms the independence of powers,"
the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
May 24, 2017, S&P Global Ratings placed its 'BB' long-term foreign
and local currency sovereign credit ratings on the Federative
Republic of Brazil on CreditWatch with negative implications.  S&P
also affirmed the short-term foreign and local currency ratings at
'B'. The transfer and convertibility assessment is unchanged at
'BBB-'. In addition, S&P placed the 'brAA-' national scale rating
on CreditWatch with negative implications.


BRAZIL: Banks Struggle to Sell $4.2 Billion of Seized Collateral
----------------------------------------------------------------
Cristiane Lucchesi and Felipe Marques at Bloomberg News report
that Brazilian banks are wrestling with a growing pile of assets
they'd rather not own: at least BRL13.8 billion ($4.2 billion) of
cars, real estate, equipment and other collateral seized when
borrowers defaulted on their loans.

The total surged 42 percent in the first quarter from a year
earlier at eight of the nation's biggest lenders as fallout from
the worst recession in Brazil's history continues to weigh on
banks' finances, according to the companies' financial statements,
reports Bloomberg News.  The assets represent as much as 27
percent of shareholders' equity in mid-size companies such as
Banco Pine SA, squeezing profit because they don't generate fee or
interest income, Bloomberg News relays.

Regulators are trying to help, Bloomberg News notes.  A
provisional measure was enacted June 7 to kill requirements that
banks sell seized assets within a maximum of three years,
Bloomberg News discloses.  The changes were proposed by the
central bank and the finance ministry, according to a legal
filing, Bloomberg News says.

"With more time, banks can now hold off on selling those assets
until they manage to get a better price," Eric Barreto, a
professor at Sao Paulo business schools Insper and M2M Saber, told
Bloomberg News in an interview.  "But in the event of a liquidity
crisis like we had at the end of 2008, those banks with a lot of
real estate assets may face troubles," he added.

Brazil's ongoing political crisis is weighing on prospects for an
economic rebound, making it harder for the real estate market to
recover, Bloomberg News relays.  Housing prices fell 0.16 percent
in May from April, the biggest drop ever recorded on the FipeZap
index, which was created in 2012, Bloomberg News notes.  For the
past 12 months, prices of residential properties rose 0.46
percent, well below the nation's 3.77 percent inflation rate as
measured by the IPCA-15 index, Bloomberg News says.

"The fact that banks are asking for more collateral signifies a
still-high risk environment and, given the weakness of the
economic recovery, collateral valuations will draw increasing
scrutiny," Arjun Bowry, a Bloomberg Intelligence analyst, said in
an interview.

Government-owned Caixa Economica Federal, the biggest mortgage
lender in Brazil, has the largest chunk of seized assets, based on
the company's most recent financial statements Bloomberg News
notes.  The total includes properties valued at BRL5.79 billion at
the end of the first quarter, 90 percent more than in the same
period a year earlier and 9 percent of total equity Bloomberg News
relays.  Caixa didn't reply to an email seeking comment.

At Banco Pine, such assets amount to BRL316.7 million, or 3.6
percent of total assets and 27 percent of shareholders' equity of
BRL1.1 billion, Bloomberg News discloses.  Seized assets increased
10 percent from last year Bloomberg News notes.  Banco Pine shares
produced a total return of negative 21 percent this year, the
worst performance among Brazilian lenders, according to data
compiled by Bloomberg.

Banco Pine said in an emailed statement that seized collateral
helps protect capital from loan losses, Bloomberg News relays.
Most of the assets are real estate, the bank said, and have been
submitted to valuation analysis from specialists outside the
company, most recently in December. The firm usually works with an
excess of collateral in relation to the value of the credit, Banco
Pine said, Bloomberg News says.

                            Cash Cushion

Bloomberg News discloses that Claudio Gallina, an analyst at Fitch
Ratings, said he doesn't believe the assets pose a great risk for
Brazilian banks, especially larger ones, because real estate
prices "haven't gone down that much."

Brazilian banks also have high cash positions right now, which
curbs liquidity risks associated with carrying such assets,
Bloomberg News notes.  He cited Caixa as an example: Even though
the bank had BRL5.8 billion in unused real estate as of March, it
also reported BRL140 billion in cash or high liquidity bonds,
Bloomberg News relays.

At another mid-size lender, Sao Paulo-based Banco Pan, jointly
owned by BTG Pactual and Caixa, seized assets rose 23 percent from
last year to BRL339.8 million, or 10 percent of shareholders'
equity, Bloomberg News discloses.  In an emailed statement, Banco
Pan said the increase should be expected given the current
macroeconomic backdrop.

At the four biggest banks in Brazil by market value, the total of
goods seized from delinquent borrowers also increased, though they
represent a smaller portion of shareholders' equity and total
assets, Bloomberg News says.

                              Bradesco, Itau

Provisions for losses on seized collateral increased 39 percent at
Banco Bradesco SA in first quarter, to BRL1.29 billion, while the
total of real estate, cars and equipment seized rose 28 percent to
BRL3 billion, Bloomberg News relays.

"As long as there isn't any recovery in real estate prices, the
volume of provisions for those assets should keep increasing,"
Insper's Barreto said.

Adding to the problem is the decision by many large banks to
eliminate some branches, Bloomberg News relays.  While the move
lowers expenses, it can also add the now-unused real estate to the
banks' list of property on the balance sheets, Bloomberg News
notes.

Figures from Banco Santander Brasil SA and Itau Unibanco Holding
SA also show an increase, Bloomberg News says.  Santander has
BRL2.788 billion in collateral seized from delinquent borrowers, 7
percent more than last year, while at Itau the total rose 65
percent to BRL994.1 million, Bloomberg News notes.

Banco do Brasil SA, also a government-owned bank, is best-
positioned among Brazilian lenders, with total collateral seized
increasing 8 percent to BRL296.2 million, Bloomberg News notes.
That's just 0.02 percent of total assets of BRL1.4 trillion and
0.33 percent of total equity of BRL89.8 billion, Bloomberg News
relates.

Mid-size lender Banco Votorantim SA was the only bank to show a
drop, with total collateral seized from delinquent borrowers down
3.5 percent at the end of the first quarter from the same period
last year, Bloomberg News adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
May 24, 2017, S&P Global Ratings placed its 'BB' long-term foreign
and local currency sovereign credit ratings on the Federative
Republic of Brazil on CreditWatch with negative implications.  S&P
also affirmed the short-term foreign and local currency ratings at
'B'. The transfer and convertibility assessment is unchanged at
'BBB-'. In addition, S&P placed the 'brAA-' national scale rating
on CreditWatch with negative implications.



OI SA: Scandal, Debt Turn Champion Into a Cautionary Tale
---------------------------------------------------------
Cristiane Lucchesi and Fabiola Moura at Bloomberg News report that
a year into its bankruptcy saga, Oi SA is reinforcing to the rest
of the world that Brazil is a hazardous place even for the most
experienced of investors.

In the two decades since the telecom giant was privatized, it's
been strong-armed into disastrous acquisitions and turned into a
dumping ground for the debt of its controlling shareholders,
according to Bloomberg News.  It was used by Brazil's government
to push political policies and was saddled with regulations that
drained it of cash.  Now, 12 months into Brazil's biggest-ever
bankruptcy protection filing, there's still no resolution in
sight, Bloomberg News relays.

Investors weighing whether to take a chance on Oi should study the
phone carrier's history to understand how small groups of
shareholders and a meddling government can drastically alter a
Brazilian company's fate, Bloomberg News discloses.  Non-voting
shareholders who bet on Oi have seen almost $10 billion in market
value evaporate and could only watch as a minority with voting
power squandered the potential of a massive fiber-optic network
spread out over a country larger than the continental U.S,
Bloomberg News relays.

"Even before it was born, Oi was being plundered by controlling
shareholders," the report qouted Mauro Cunha, president of the
capital markets investors association known as Amec, which fights
for minority investors' rights and counts money managers Will
Landers and Luis Stuhlberger as members of its advisory board, as
saying.  "We're still waiting for someone to be held accountable,"
he added.

Drowning in $19 billion in debt, Brazil's only home-grown telecom
operator is struggling to reach an accord with creditors,
shareholders and potential investors, Bloomberg News relays.  Two
turnaround proposals, one in September and the other in March,
were soundly rejected by bondholders.

                         Would-Be Investors

According to the report, would-be investors are circling, like
Paul Singer's Elliott Management Corp. and Egyptian billionaire
Naguib Sawiris, offering a capital injection in exchange for a
chance to take the reins.  One investor, Nelson Tanure, has
already built up a 7 percent stake in Oi and demonstrated how easy
it is to use a small holding to gain power, seizing two out of 11
board seats so far, Bloomberg News discloses.

"There have been a number of mistakes, from acquisitions they
shouldn't have undertaken, bad management and a lack of
investment, but that's all in the past," said Tanure, whose
Societe Mondiale fund is Oi's second-largest shareholder,
Bloomberg News relays.  "If it's well-managed, with healthy
investments a.d the right alliances, Oi can once again regain the
prominence in the market that should never have been lost."

Oi's woes go back to the company's 1998 privatization and a
pyramid holding structure that handed control of the company to a
cabal of well-connected tycoons who could steer the company just
by owning a small stake with voting rights, Bloomberg News relays.
Such ownership structures, which still exist in Brazil, are a
quirk that makes the country's capital markets a minefield for
uninitiated investors, said Evandro Pontes, a professor of
corporate law at business school Insper in Sao Paulo, Bloomberg
News notes.

Among early controlling shareholders were Carlos Jereissati, whose
brother is a long-time politician, and Sergio Andrade, whose
Andrade Gutierrez construction firm admitted last year to taking
part in the sweeping bribery scheme that helped plunge Brazil's
economy into depression, Bloomberg News relays.

                      Questionable Acquisitions

Under their leadership, the telecom company (back then Oi was
known as Tele Norte Leste) embarked on a series of questionable
acquisitions that transferred their controlling shareholders' debt
to Oi, Bloomberg News recalls.  In 2002, Tele Norte Leste snapped
up Pegasus Telecom SA, which counted the Andrade Group and
Jereissati's La Fonte group as owners, for almost 700 million
reais in equity and debt.  A year later, it gobbled up mobile
phone operator Oi -- also controlled by Andrade and La Fonte --
and became Telemar Oi.  The acquisition cost was just BRL1 -- plus
BRL4.8 billion in debt. Andrade and Jereissati, who left Oi's
board in 2015 and are no longer shareholders, declined to comment,
Bloomberg News notes.

Then, in 2008, Oi agreed to buy Brasil Telecom, a rival phone
company whose under-reporting of legal liability provisions tacked
a surprise BRL1.3 billion onto the BRL5.9 billion-real price tag,
Bloomberg News relays.  Brasil Telecom's former CEO and CFO, as
well as Telemar's investor relations head, are among executives
named in an ongoing investigation into accounting mismanagement
being carried out by Brazil's national securities regulator,
Bloomberg News notes.

The deal ushered Oi into the era of what the local media dubbed
"National Champions," too-big-to-fail industry leaders that had
explicit government backing, Bloomberg News says. (Meatpacker JBS
SA and pulp producer Fibria SA were also part of the club.)
Brazil's BNDES development bank injected 2.5 billion reais in
capital to help finance the Oi-Brasil Telecom merger, while state-
owned Banco do Brasil SA provided BRL4.3 billion in credit to
controlling shareholders, Bloomberg News relates.  Pension funds
for state-run companies also invested.

Meanwhile, Oi's debt ballooned from BRL4.4 billion in 2009 to 33.4
billion reais in 2012, data compiled by Bloomberg show.  As
Brazil's biggest landline operator, Oi struggled under cumbersome
regulations that delayed its expansion into mobile telephone
service as rivals plowed ahead.  As recently as last year, Oi was
spending 300 million reais annually to maintain a network of
650,000 public pay-phones in places as remote as the Amazon forest
that only generated BRL17 million in revenue, Bloomberg News
discloses.  What's more, for every payphone that broke and wasn't
promptly fixed, Brazil's telecommunications regulator levied a 1
million-real fine.  Oi now owes the regulator BRL11.1 billion,
Bloomberg News notes.

But it wasn't until 2014 that Oi made what many consider to be its
most disastrous deal, merging with Portugal Telecom SGPS SA,
according to the report.  Minority investors cried foul and tried
to prevent the Andrade and Jereissati groups from voting on the
transaction because it included a BRL4.5 billion-real debt
transfer from their holding company into Oi, Bloomberg News notes.
They also questioned Portugal Telecom's valuation.  Another
surprise followed, this time in the form of almost EUR900 million
of bonds from a unit of Grupo Espirito Santo held by Portugal
Telecom that were defaulted on after the deal closed, Bloomberg
News says.

                       Restructuring Plan

By 2014, Oi was desperately trying to avoid filling for bankruptcy
protection, Bloomberg News recalls. It sold all its Portuguese
telecom assets to billionaire Patrick Drahi's Altice SA, and tried
unsuccessfully to attract capital the following year.  In June
2016, 10 days before Oi filed for bankruptcy, then-CEO Bayard
Gontijo, who had been leading restructuring efforts, suddenly
quit.

It's a year two weeks ago that Oi filed for protection from
creditors, notes the report. Oi is considering another revision to
its restructuring plan, and a vote by debt holders is supposed to
take place through September, Bloomberg News notes.  If the
parties can agree on a plan -- a big if -- whoever emerges with
control of the company will be entrusted with making decisions
that benefit all stakeholders. Since Oi didn't pay dividends for
three years, now all of its shares have voting power, Bloomberg
News relays.  But the company could still be vulnerable to the
whims of a minority with its own agenda, Bloomberg News notes.

"It's very cheap to buy Oi's control today," said Raphael Martins,
a partner of the law firm Faoro & Fucci in Rio that fought for
minority shareholders' rights in Oi, Bloomberg News notes.  "If a
restructuring succeeds to reduce the company's indebtedness to
reasonable levels, it will be a very good investment," he added.

                              About Oi SA

Headquartered in Rio de Janeiro, and operating almost exclusively
within Brazil, the Oi Group provides services like fixed-line data
transmission and network usage for phones, internet, and cable,
Wi-Fi hot-spots in public areas, and mobile phone and data
services, and employs approximately 142,000 direct and indirect
employees.

On June 20, 2016, pursuant to Brazilian Law No. 11.101/05 (the
"Brazilian Bankruptcy Law"), Oi S.A. and certain of its
subsidiaries filed for recuperas judicial (judicial
reorganization) in Brazil.

On June 21, 2016, OI SA and its affiliates Telemar Norte Leste
S.A.
and Oi Brasil Holdings Cooperatief U.A. commenced Chapter 15
proceedings (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Lead Case No. 16-11791).  Ojas N.
Shah, as foreign representative, signed the petitions.

Coop and PTIF are also subject to proceedings in the Netherlands.

The Chapter 15 cases are assigned to Judge Sean H. Lane.

In the Chapter 15 cases, the Debtors are represented by John K.
Cunningham, Esq., and Mark P. Franke, Esq., at White & Case LLP,
in
New York; and Jason N. Zakia, Esq., Richard S. Kebrdle, Esq., and
Laura L. Femino, Esq., at White & Case LLP, in Miami, Florida.

On July 22, 2016, the New York Court recognized the Brazilian
Proceedings as foreign main proceedings with respect to the
Chapter
15 Debtors, and granted certain additional related relief.



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D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Can Tap into T&T's US$4BB Food Bill
-------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that Dominican Republic's ambassador to
Trinidad & Tobago on Thur. announced the coordination of a visit
of a trade and business mission to his country from September 6 to
9.

Jose Serulle Ramia said Trinidad & Tobago buys, annually, in
around US$4.0 billion worth of food from several countries," a
market in which Dominican producers and entrepreneurs can
materialize important business," according to Dominican Today.

"The commercial and business mission that will visit the country
at the beginning of September aims to explore the possibilities of
investing and purchase of Dominican products that the English-
speaking Caribbean nation isn't producing at the moment," the
diplomat said in a statement obtained by the news agency.


=============
J A M A I C A
=============


JAMAICA: COJ to Clamp Down on Delinquent Firms
----------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that directors of more than 30,000 delinquent
companies on the company register could soon have their names, and
that of the entities they operate, published on a quarterly basis
as the Companies Office of Jamaica (COJ) seeks to enforce
compliance.

Companies that will make the list for publication are those that
the Agency's compliance officers have made multiple attempts to
engage through field visits as well as written and verbal
correspondence, according to RJR News.

Compliance Manager at the Companies Office of Jamaica, Heather Mae
Sutherland, the Agency has had a challenge in getting company
directors and secretaries become compliant in filing the necessary
documents, the report notes.

These include annual returns and change documents, the report
discloses.

Statistics from the COJ indicate that Kingston and St. Andrew
account for 72 per cent of the delinquency rate, the report
relays.

Under the Companies Act, all registered companies are obliged to
file Annual Returns and change notices concerning the operation of
the entity, the report adds.



=======
P E R U
=======


* PERU: Future Growth Can be Lifted Through Structural Reforms
--------------------------------------------------------------
With growth averaging over 51/4 percent since 2000, Peru has
significantly reduced unemployment and poverty. Inflation is in
the low single digits, the fiscal position has strengthened, and
dollarization (borrowing and saving in U.S dollars) has declined
markedly.  Sound economic policies and structural reforms -- in
the context of the recently ended commodity boom -- have played an
essential role in this improvement.

But building on these gains will require additional reforms to
help Peru, an emerging middle-income country, reach high-income
status. Given the experience of other countries, Peru will need to
be careful to avoid being stuck in a "middle income trap." Even if
high-income status is attainable, international experience
suggests that it will take time.

Short-term picture: Resilience in The Face Of Major Domestic
Shocks

The current environment is difficult given the Odebrecht
corruption scandal and one of the worst episodes of flooding and
landslides in over 50 years. On the external side, while commodity
prices have recovered somewhat since late 2016, they remain
significantly lower than during the commodity boom. There is also
uncertainty about the U.S outlook and how much protectionist
pressures will rise globally.  These developments will hurt growth
in 2017-forecast at 2.7 percent-but the economy is expected to
bounce back in 2018-19, the report said.

Boosting Potential Growth: Increasing Investment And Productivity

Potential growth in Peru has been declining since the end of the
commodity boom. During 2001-08, before the Great Recession, the
country's potential growth averaged 5.7 percent, and it has been
on a steady decline ever since. The main factors behind this
decrease are low productivity and not enough capital. The IMF
estimates potential growth over the medium term at about 33/4
percent.

To enhance potential growth, the government has introduced several
structural reforms to tackle the main impediments to higher
investment, stronger tax collection, and lower financing costs.
These policies include:

   -- a new institutional framework for public and public-private
      infrastructure investment to reduce red tape;

   -- improving the business climate by cutting administrative
      procedures and promoting the use of digital processes;

   -- a new tax regime for small and medium enterprises to make
      the current tax system more progressive, reduce compliance
      costs, increase the use of electronic payments, and
      formalize value chains.

Increasing potential growth above 4 percent over the medium term,
however, will likely require additional reforms to boost
investment and productivity. The IMF recommends that Peru consider
measures that help investment grow at a similar pace to during the
commodity boom and that increase productivity to around double the
rate assumed in the report's baseline scenario.

                       Labor Market Policies

The government is also looking to modernize labor markets that
make it easier for employers to hire new workers and hence boost
growth. With labor laws that offer generous protection to workers,
the result is that about 53 percent of Peru's workforce is outside
the formal job market, with no protection, no social security or
unemployment contributions and paying no taxes.

A recent opinion survey also pointed to labor market regulations
as a key impediment to growth in Peru. For instance, terminating
employees for economic reasons is severely limited as it requires
authorization from the Ministry of Labor or the courts. And these
regulations are linked to informality, although other factors such
as education levels, the tax system, access to public services,
and enforcement of laws have also played a role.

The government, therefore, is rightly focusing on reducing the
high levels of informality. It has set up a Social Protection
Commission to reform the social security system, with the aim of
increasing its coverage while reducing informality.

IMF analysis suggests that the growth gains from labor market
reform-such as relaxing policies that push labor costs above
productivity growth, or reducing labor taxes and firing costs-can
be significant. The Social Protection Commission can therefore
make an important contribution to help Peru reach its high-income
goal.


======================
P U E R T O    R I C O
======================


METROPOLITAN INDUSTRIAL: Disclosures OK'd; Hearing on Sept. 13
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Mildred Caban Flores of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Delaware has approved Metropolitan Industrial Food
Services, Inc.'s disclosure statement dated Feb. 27, 2017,
referring to the debtor's Chapter 11 plan dated Feb. 27, 2017.

A hearing for the consideration of confirmation of the Plan and of
the objections as may be made to the confirmation of the Plan will
be held on Sept. 13, 2017, at 9:00 a.m.

Any objection to confirmation of the Plan must be filed on or
before 14 days prior to the date of the hearing on confirmation of
the Plan.

Acceptances or rejections of the Plan must be filed on or before
14 days prior to the date of the hearing on confirmation of the
Plan.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter on March 13, 2017,
the Debtor filed with the Court a disclosure statement dated Feb.
27, 2017, referring to the Debtor's plan of reorganization.  The
Plan provides for payment of approximately 1.08% to allowed
unsecured claims, through 60 equal monthly payments commencing on
the Effective Date.  The Plan also provides for $25,000 for
distribution to holders of Class 5 General Unsecured Claims --
estimated to be $2,313,944 -- through 60 equal monthly payments on
a pro-rata basis.

                  About Metropolitan Industrial

Headquartered in San Juan, Puerto Rico, Metropolitan Industrial
Food Services, Inc., filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection
(Bankr. D. P.R. Case No. 15-08302) on Oct. 23, 2015, listing $2.09
million in total assets and $4.62 million in total liabilities.
The petition was signed by Josue V. Navarro, president.

Judge Edward A Godoy presides over the case.

Alexis Fuentes Hernandez, Esq., at Alexis Fuentes-Hernandez serves
as the Debtor's bankruptcy counsel.


OLIVER C&I: Unsecureds Get Paid in Full Plus Interest
-----------------------------------------------------
Oliver C & I Corp. filed with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Puerto Rico a disclosure statement and summary of
proposed plan of reorganization dated June 14, 2017.

Class 4 general unsecured claims not including third parties'
guarantees were listed in the Debtor's schedules in the total
amount of $238,903,49.  The total liability under this class is
$238,903.49.  This class will be paid in full plus interest within
60 days from Effective date.  This class is impaired.

The proposed plan will be funded from the cash at hand, collection
of account receivables, litigation proceeds against The
Partnerships, the General Partners, the Limited Partners and their
Affiliates.

The Disclosure Statement is available at:

            http://bankrupt.com/misc/prb16-08311-77.pdf

                     About Oliver C & I Corp.

Oliver C & I Corp., based in Guaynabo, Puerto Rico, is a profit
corporation organized under the laws of Puerto Rico.  It was
incorporated on Dec. 17, 2003.  The Debtor is wholly owned by
Maria del Carmen Magraner Folch.  The Debtor's main assets are
participations in certain limited partnerships and the
corporations which serve as general partners of the limited
partnerships.

The Debtor filed a Chapter 11 petition (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No.
16-08311) on Oct. 17, 2016.  The petition was signed by Max
Olivera, vice-president and treasurer.  The case is assigned to
Judge Mildred Caban Flores.  In its petition, the Debtor indicated
$29.94 million in total assets and $1.06 million in total
liabilities.

The Debtor is represented by Carmen D. Conde Torres, Esq., at C.
Conde & Assoc.  The Debtor employed Doris Barroso Vicens of RSM
Puerto Rico as its accountant; and Aurora Oti-Yvonnet of Villafane
& Oti, Certified Public Accountants, PSC, as its external auditor.


================================
T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O
================================


PETROTRIN: Committee Submits First 3-Mo. Report
------------------------------------------------
Now that the Cabinet-appointed committee to review the operations
of State-owned Petroleum Co. of Trinidad & Tobago (Petrotrin) has
submitted its first report within three months (March-June), we
expect the government to act on its implementable recommendations
with equal dispatch, according to Trinidad Express.

Petrotin Committee notes that Cabinet's Energy Sub-committee,
which is chaired by the Prime Minister, has already met and
discussed the report, notes Trinidad Express.

The Petrotrin Committee, which is chaired by Permanent Secretary
in the Ministry of Energy Selwyn Lashley, and includes UWI
professor Chandrabhan Sharma, Wilfred Espinet, Helen Drayton and
OWTU representatives Gregory Marchan and David Abdulah, must be
commended for the work its members must have put in to meet its
first deadline, and for agreeing to stay on until December 31, if
their services are further required, the report relays.

The Petrotin Committee do not know what their recommendations are,
but we can assume that they are endorsed by the union, which is
critical to any reviewing or restructuring of the behemoth that is
Petrotrin, notes Trinidad Express.  Indeed, there ought to be
national consensus on rescuing Petrotrin from collapse because of
the sheer size of the oil giant: it is too big to be allowed to
fail, hence the reason why Government must act with urgency on the
Committee's recommendations, or any other solutions to its many
problems, the report relays.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
April 28, 2017, Moody's Investors Service downgraded Petroleum Co.
of Trinidad & Tobago corporate family rating and senior unsecured
debt ratings to B1 from Ba3. Simultaneously, Moody's lowered
Petrotrin's Baseline Credit Assessment ("BCA") to caa1 from b3.
The outlook on the ratings is stable. The rating actions are
linked to Moody's April 25, 2017 downgrade of the government of
Trinidad & Tobago bond ratings to Ba1 from Baa3, with a stable
outlook.



PETROTRIN: No Decision Yet on Company Report
--------------------------------------------
Trinidad Express reports that Energy Minister Franklin Khan said
the Government has made no decision yet on the recently completed
Petroleum Co. of Trinidad & Tobago Petrotrin report.

The company report includes recommendations for restructuring the
State-owned oil company, according to Trinidad Express.

Mr. Khan assured that the Government intends to take action on
Petrotrin in the shortest possible time as the State could not
continue "kicking the can down the road," Trinidad Express notes.

"All options are being currently evaluated and I want to further
state that nothing is off the table. These decisions that will be
taken on Petrotrin call for deep analysis and some prudent
business judgments, but I want to again state that nothing is off
the table," Mr. Khan said at a press conference at his office at
the International Waterfront Centre, Port of Spain, Trinidad
Express relays.

Noting Petrotrin's "crisis" situation, which included the
company's unsustainable debt stock, high debt servicing payments,
high wage bill and declining revenues, Khan said it was clear that
the Government had to act, Trinidad Express adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
April 28, 2017, Moody's Investors Service downgraded Petroleum Co.
of Trinidad & Tobago corporate family rating and senior unsecured
debt ratings to B1 from Ba3. Simultaneously, Moody's lowered
Petrotrin's Baseline Credit Assessment ("BCA") to caa1 from b3.
The outlook on the ratings is stable. The rating actions are
linked to Moody's April 25, 2017 downgrade of the government of
Trinidad & Tobago bond ratings to Ba1 from Baa3, with a stable
outlook.

=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================


VENEZUELA: Is Apocalyptic But Bond Traders Are Sitting It Out
-------------------------------------------------------------
Christine Jenkins at Bloomberg News reports that on June 27,
Venezuela, armed groups attacked Congress and a police helicopter
may or may not have dropped grenades onto the Supreme Court.

June 28's reaction from traders? Mostly a shrug, according to
Bloomberg News.  Venezuela's benchmark bonds due in 2027 edged
higher, while notes from the state oil company coming due this
year were a hair lower.  The cost to insure sovereign debt from
default dropped the most in a month, Bloomberg News relays.

Bloomberg News notes that investors saw the latest chaos -- which
President Nicolas Maduro says was a coup attempt by terrorists and
the opposition called a staged event to justify a power grab -- as
just another grim development in a nation on the edge of collapse.

But it wasn't enough to significantly alter their views on whether
the country will make good on its debt payments, Bloomberg News
relays.  Trading volume in bonds from Petroleos de Venezuela SA
has trailed off in recent weeks to below $100 million a day,
showing a lack of conviction about how it will all turn out,
Bloomberg News discloses.

"There's been a strong drop in activity," said Daniel Urdaneta, a
Caracas-based strategist at Knossos Asset Management, Bloomberg
News says.  "Everyone I've talked to said the same thing: in this
context, there's no clarity," he added.

As reported by The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America,
S&P Global Ratings, on Feb. 28, 2017, affirmed its 'CCC' long-term
foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.  The outlook on both long-term
ratings remains negative.  S&P also affirmed its 'C' short-term
foreign and local currency sovereign ratings.  In addition, S&P
affirmed its 'CCC' transfer and convertibility assessment on the
sovereign.


=================
X X X X X X X X X
=================


* BOND PRICING: For the Week From June 26 to June 30, 2017
----------------------------------------------------------


Issuer Name               Cpn     Price   Maturity  Country  Curr
-----------               ---     -----   --------  -------   ---

BA-CA Finance Cayman Lt   0.518    62.07               KY    EUR
CSN Islands XII Corp      7        68                  BR    USD
CSN Islands XII Corp      7        67.75               BR    USD
Decimo Primer Fideicomi   4.54     52.63  10/25/2041   PA    USD
Decimo Primer Fideicomi   6        63.5   10/25/2041   PA    USD
Dolomite Capital Ltd     13.26     67.2   12/20/2019   CN    ZAR
Empresa de Telecomunica   7        73.14   1/17/2023   CO    COP
Empresa de Telecomunica   7        73.14   1/17/2023   CO    COP
ESFG International Ltd    5.75      0.66               KY    EUR
General Shopping Financ  10        72.5                KY    USD
General Shopping Financ  10        71.7                KY    USD
Global A&T Electronics   10        74      2/1/2019    SG    USD
Global A&T Electronics   10        74.5    2/1/2019    SG    USD
Global A&T Electronics   10        65.5    2/1/2019    SG    USD
Global A&T Electronics   10        65      2/1/2019    SG    USD
Gol Finance               8.75     63                  BR    USD
Gol Finance               8.75     63.88               BR    USD
Gol Linhas Aereas SA     10.75     34.63   2/12/2023   BR    USD
Gol Linhas Aereas SA     10.75     34.63   2/12/2023   BR    USD
Inversora Electrica de    6.5      55      9/26/2017   AR    USD
Inversora Electrica de    6.5      55      9/26/2017   AR    USD
MIE Holdings Corp         7.5      75.16   4/25/2019   HK    USD
MIE Holdings Corp         7.5      75.26   4/25/2019   HK    USD
NB Finance Ltd/Cayman I   3.88     58.01   2/7/2035    KY    EUR
Newland International P   9.5      19.88   7/3/2017    PA    USD
Newland International P   9.5      19.88   7/3/2017    PA    USD
Noble Holding Internati   5.25     72.98   3/15/2042   KY    USD
Ocean Rig UDW Inc         7.25     39      4/1/2019    CY    USD
Ocean Rig UDW Inc         7.25     38      4/1/2019    CY    USD
Odebrecht Drilling Norb   6.35     48.5    6/30/2021   KY    USD
Odebrecht Drilling Norb   6.35     47.25   6/30/2021   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.5      49                  KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     4.3      48.29   4/25/2025   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.12     48.2    6/26/2042   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.25     46.15   6/27/2029   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7        57.02   4/21/2020   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.12     53.51   6/26/2022   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     8.25     70.88   4/25/2018   KY    BRL
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     6        51.47   4/5/2023    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.25     45.92   6/27/2029   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.1      47.82   6/26/2042   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.5      49.25               KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     4.3      48.39   4/25/2025   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     6        51.77   4/5/2023    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     8.2      70.88   4/25/2018   KY    BRL
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7        56.85   4/21/2020   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.1      52.99   6/26/2022   KY    USD
Odebrecht Offshore Dril   6.6      39.64  10/1/2022    KY    USD
Odebrecht Offshore Dril   6.7      36.44  10/1/2022    KY    USD
Odebrecht Offshore Dril   6.6      38.79  10/1/2022    KY    USD
Odebrecht Offshore Dril   6.7      38.75  10/1/2022    KY    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela   12.75     67.19   2/17/2022   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela      9      58.28  11/17/2021   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela      6      40.32   5/16/2024   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    9.75     50.15   5/17/2035   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6        38.22  11/15/2026   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    5.37     37.39   4/12/2027   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    5.5      37.1    4/12/2037   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6        41.25  10/28/2022   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6        40.01   5/16/2024   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    9        58.11  11/17/2021   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6        38.13  11/15/2026   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela   12.75     67.2    2/17/2022   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    9.75     49.94   5/17/2035   VE    USD
Polarcus Ltd              5.6      60      3/30/2022   AE    USD
Siem Offshore Inc         5.8      49.75   1/30/2018   NO    NOK
Siem Offshore Inc         5.59     50.25   3/28/2019   NO    NOK
STB Finance Cayman Ltd    2.04     58.35               KY    JPY
Sylph Ltd                 2.36     50.93   9/25/2036   KY    USD
Uruguay Notas del Tesor   5.25     68.02  12/29/2021   UY    UYU
US Capital Funding IV L   1.25     51.35  12/1/2039    KY    USD
US Capital Funding IV L   1.25     51.35  12/1/2039    KY    USD
USJ Acucar e Alcool SA    9.87     67.5   11/9/2019    BR    USD
USJ Acucar e Alcool SA    9.87     65.75  11/9/2019    BR    USD
Venezuela Government In   9.25     48.75   5/7/2028    VE    USD
Venezuela Government In  13.63     82.58   8/15/2018   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   9        51.75   5/7/2023    VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   9.37     49      1/13/2034   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   7        71.88  12/1/2018    VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   9.25     52      9/15/2027   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   7.65     46.38   4/21/2025   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In  13.63     82.58   8/15/2018   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   7.75     61.75  10/13/2019   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In  11.95     58.13   8/5/2031    VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   6        53.75  12/9/2020    VE    USD
Venezuela Government In  12.75     67      8/23/2022   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   7        44      3/31/2038   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   6.5      36.53  12/29/2036   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   8.25     47.75  10/13/2024   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In  11.75     57.75  10/21/2026   VE    USD
Venezuela Government TI    5.25    69.59   3/21/2019   VE    USD


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B.
Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Joseph Cardillo at
856-381-8268.


                   * * * End of Transmission * * *