TCRLA_Public/170713.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

           Thursday, July 13, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 138


                            Headlines



A N T I G U S  A N D  B A R B U D A

* ANTIGUA & BARBUDA: Credit Reporting Bill Passed But Put on Hold


A R G E N T I N A

ACINDAR PYMES: Moody's Withdraws B2 IFS Rating
TINUVIEL SERIE XXIII: Moody's Rates ARS1.445MM Certificates C(sf)


B R A Z I L

BANCO DO ESTADO: S&P Maintains Watch Neg. on 'BB-/B' Ratings
ODEBRECHT SA: Pemex Cancels $100 Million Contract


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

LIFE PREMIUM: Chapter 15 Case Summary


C H I L E

VTR FINANCE: Fitch Affirms BB- Long-Term IDR, Outlook Stable


C O L O M B I A

COLOMBIA: Fiscal Slippage Could Risk Outlook, Fitch Says


C U R A C A O

PUBLE NV: Unsecureds to Recoup 100% Under Plan


D O M I N I C A N  R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Coffee Sector at Edge of Collapse


P U E R T O  R I C O

HAIRLAND CORP: Unsecured Creditors to be Paid 3% Under Exit Plan
LIBERTY CABLEVISION: Fitch Affirms B+ IDR, Outlook Stable
MINI MASTER: Unsecureds to Get Paid from $50K Carve-Out
MOTEL TROPICAL: Disclosures OK'd; Plan Hearing on Aug. 23


V E N E Z U E L A

PDVSA: Could Seek to Renegotiate October Bond Payment
VENEZUELA: S&P Lowers Sovereign Credit Ratings to 'CCC-'


X X X X X X X X X

* Cigarette Black Market Costing Governments Billions in Losses


                            - - - - -



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A N T I G U S  A N D  B A R B U D A
===================================


* ANTIGUA & BARBUDA: Credit Reporting Bill Passed But Put on Hold
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Daily Observer reports that a new legislation that will make
it harder for bad debtors to obtain loans from financial
institutions in Antigua & Barbuda has been passed in parliament
but its enforcement was placed on hold pending further amendments.

The Credit Reporting Bill of 2017, which seeks to establish the
legal framework for credit reporting in members of the Currency
Union was passed on July 10, the report relates.

It will do so through "reasonable" procedures that meet the needs
of commerce for credit information in a manner that is said to be
fair and equitable to borrowers, the Daily Observer says.

Simply put, the new system will capture the credit information of
residents, which will then be made available to lending agencies
and credit facilities, says the report.

It clears the way for banks or credit institutions to contact the
credit bureau to get information about one's credit and if there
is any derogatory information their loan request will be declined,
according to the report.

However, when PM Browne spoke about the Bill in Parliament, he
said its amendment will be delayed because of concerns about the
privacy of citizens, which he said will be placed on the table
when the Monetary Council meets soon, the report relays.

The Daily Observer adds that while admitting that the Antigua &
Barbuda government is not at liberty to make any changes to the
bill at this stage, "because it is a harmonised bill", Browne said
the concerns will be made to the heads of government.



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A R G E N T I N A
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ACINDAR PYMES: Moody's Withdraws B2 IFS Rating
----------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo S.A. has
withdrawn Acindar Pymes S.G.R.'s B2 global local currency
insurance financial strength (IFS) rating, with positive outlook,
and its A2.ar Argentine national scale IFS rating, with stable
outlook.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has withdrawn the ratings for its own business reasons.

Moody's National Scale Credit Ratings (NSRs) are intended as
relative measures of creditworthiness among debt issues and
issuers within a country, enabling market participants to better
differentiate relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's global
scale credit ratings in that they are not globally comparable with
the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with NSRs
for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same country.
NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier signifying the
relevant country, as in ".za" for South Africa. For further
information on Moody's approach to national scale credit ratings,
please refer to Moody's Credit rating Methodology published in May
2016 entitled "Mapping National Scale Ratings from Global Scale
Ratings". While NSRs have no inherent absolute meaning in terms of
default risk or expected loss, a historical probability of default
consistent with a given NSR can be inferred from the GSR to which
it maps back at that particular point in time. For information on
the historical default rates associated with different global
scale rating categories over different investment horizons.


TINUVIEL SERIE XXIII: Moody's Rates ARS1.445MM Certificates C(sf)
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo has rated
Fideicomiso Financiero Tinuviel Serie XXIII. This transaction will
be issued by TMF Trust Company (Argentina) S.A. -- acting solely
in its capacity as issuer and trustee.

This credit rating is subject to the fulfillment of contingencies
that are highly likely to be completed, such as finalization of
documents and issuance of the securities. This credit rating is
based on certain information that may change prior to the
fulfillment of such contingencies, including market conditions,
financial projections, transaction structure, terms and conditions
of the issuance, characteristics of the underlying assets or
receivables, allocation of cash flows and of losses, performance
triggers, transaction counterparties and other information
included in the transaction documentation. Any pertinent change in
such information or additional information could result in a
change of this credit rating.

- ARS 32,369,442 in Class A Floating Rate Debt Securities (VDFA)
   of "Fideicomiso Financiero Tinuviel Serie XXIII", rated Aaa.ar
   (sf) (Argentine National Scale) and Ba3 (sf) (Global Scale)

- ARS 4,335,193 in Class B Floating Rate Debt Securities (VDFB)
   of "Fideicomiso Financiero Tinuviel Serie XXIII", rated Baa2.ar
   (sf) (Argentine National Scale) and B3 (sf) (Global Scale)

- ARS 19,652,875 in Class C Fixed Rate Debt Securities (VDFC) of
   "Fideicomiso Financiero Tinuviel Serie XXIII", rated Ca.ar (sf)
   (Argentine National Scale) and Ca (sf) (Global Scale)

- ARS 1,445,064 in Certificates (CP) of "Fideicomiso Financiero
   Tinuviel Serie XXIII", rated C.ar (sf) (Argentine National
   Scale) and C (sf) (Global Scale).

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rated securities are payable from the cash flow coming from
the assets of the trust, which is an amortizing pool of
approximately 5,532 eligible personal loans denominated in
Argentine pesos. The loans bear a fixed interest rate and are
originated by Tinuviel, a non-regulated financial company based in
Argentina. Only the installments due after April 20th, 2017 are
assigned to the trust.

The VDFA will bear a floating interest rate (BADLAR plus 300bps)
with the first coupon payment date in August 2017. The VDFA's
interest rate will never be higher than 31% or lower than 22%. The
VDFB will bear a floating interest rate (BADLAR plus 400bps) from
the issue date which will never be higher than 32% or lower than
23%. The VDFC will bear a fixed interest rate of 39%.

Overall credit enhancement is comprised of subordination, various
reserve funds and excess spread. The transaction has initial
subordination levels of 20.8% for the VDFA and 8.8% for the VDFB,
based on the pool's principal balance as of April 20th, 2017. The
subordination levels will increase overtime due to the turbo semi-
sequential payment structure.

The transaction also benefits from an estimated 32.6% annual
excess spread, before considering losses, taxes or prepayments and
calculated at the caps of 31% and 32% for the VDFA and VDFB
respectively.

The securitized loans are primarily granted to pensioners and
retirees domiciled in Argentina.

Tinuviel has signed different agreements with local banks to
deduct the installments directly from the borrower's bank
accounts.

Tinuviel has also entered into a special agreement with
Cooperativa de CrÇdito, Consumo y Vivienda 20 de Julio Ltda.
(Cooperative) to act as complementary collection agent. Through
this agreement, Tinuviel can deduct the loan installments from
borrowers with accounts in Banco de la Nacion Argentina (BNA). The
percentage collected by the cooperative accounts for 83% of the
pool.

Tinuviel has signed agreements with Banco Patagonia (Patagonia)
and Banco Meridian (Meridian) to deduct the loans installments
from the borrower's account for the other 17% of the securitized
pool.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Although Moody's analyzed the historical performance data of
previous transactions and similar receivables originated by
Tinuviel, the actual performance of the securitized pool may be
affected, among others, by economic activity, high inflation rates
compared to nominal pensions increases in Argentina, the
operational and financial strength of Tinuviel (and the
cooperative), as well as any change in the agreements with the
collecting banks.

Factors that may lead to a downgrade of the ratings include an
increase in delinquency levels beyond the level Moody's assumed
when rating this transaction.

Delinquency levels can be affected by changes in the macroeconomic
variables that impact the borrower's credit profile. Serious
operational disruption that affects Tinuviel, the cooperative
and/or the bank agreements may also lead to an increase in
delinquency levels.

Factors that may lead to an upgrade of the ratings include the
building of credit enhancement over time due to the turbo semi-
sequential payment structure.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's considered the credit enhancement provided in this
transaction through the initial subordination levels for each
rated class, the historical performance of Tinuviel's portfolio
and performance of previous series.

In addition, Moody's considered the impact of any change/issue in
the role played by the cooperative as complementary collection
agent, Tinuviel's role as servicer and the bank agreements as the
main collection mechanism.

Considering the above factors, Moody's determines its assumptions
of default levels, prepayments and losses upon the default of
counterparties.

These factors were incorporated in a cash flow model that takes
into account all the relevant features of the transaction's assets
and liabilities. Monte Carlo simulations were run, which determine
the expected loss for the rated securities.

In assigning the rating to this transaction, Moody's assumed a
lognormal distribution for defaults on the main pool with a mean
of 12.9% and a coefficient of variation of 60%. Also, Moody's
assumed conditional prepayment rate (CPR) of 6.0%.

Moody's modelled scenarios in which the counterparties default,
assuming that the defaults on the pool would increase by three
times as well as one month of collection lost due to commingling
risk.

To determine the rating assigned to the notes, Moody's has used an
expected loss methodology that reflects the probability of default
multiplied by the severity of the loss expected for each security.
In order to allocate losses to each class in accordance with their
priority of payment and relative size, Moody's has used a cash-
flow model (ABSCORE) that reproduces many deal-specific
characteristics. Weighting each loss scenario's severity result
with its probability of occurrence, the model has calculated the
expected loss level for each security, as well as the expected
average life. Moody's model then compares the quantitative values
to the Moody's Idealized Expected Loss table for each tranche.

The model results showed 1.1% expected loss for the VDFA, 6.2% for
the VDFB, 46.6% for the VDFC and 100.0% for the Certificates.

Stress Scenarios:

Moody's ran several stress scenarios, including increases in the
default rate assumptions. If default rates were increased by 3
percentage points from the base case scenario, the ratings of the
VDFA Floating Rate Securities would likely be downgraded to B1
(sf), the VDFB Floating Rate Securities would likely be downgraded
to Caa1 (sf), whereas the VDFC and the Certificates would remain
unchanged.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Consumer Loan-Backed ABS" published in
September 2015.

Moody's National Scale Credit Ratings (NSRs) are intended as
relative measures of creditworthiness among debt issues and
issuers within a country, enabling market participants to better
differentiate relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's global
scale credit ratings in that they are not globally comparable with
the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with NSRs
for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same country.
NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier signifying the
relevant country, as in ".za" for South Africa. For further
information on Moody's approach to national scale credit ratings,
please refer to Moody's Credit rating Methodology published in May
2016 entitled "Mapping National Scale Ratings from Global Scale
Ratings". While NSRs have no inherent absolute meaning in terms of
default risk or expected loss, a historical probability of default
consistent with a given NSR can be inferred from the GSR to which
it maps back at that particular point in time. For information on
the historical default rates associated with different global
scale rating categories over different investment horizons.


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B R A Z I L
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BANCO DO ESTADO: S&P Maintains Watch Neg. on 'BB-/B' Ratings
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings maintained its 'BB-/B' global scale and
'brA/brA-2' national scale ratings on Banco do Estado do Para
S.A.(Banpara) on CreditWatch negative. The bank's stand-alone
credit profile (SACP) remains at 'bb-'.

S&P's ratings on Banpara reflect its narrow business lines -- it
mainly offers payroll deductible lending to the state's public
employees and retirees -- and our expectation that current
economic conditions constrain diversification. The ratings also
reflect the bank's adequate capitalization levels, due to an
average risk-adjusted capital (RAC) ratio of 8.0%-8.5% for the
next 18-24 months, supported by strong profitability metrics and
historically stable dividend payouts.

Banpara has improved its asset quality metrics in light of the
reduction in its exposure to small and medium enterprises (SMEs)
lending. S&P said, "We currently view its payroll loans as less
vulnerable to the country's economic downturn than corporate
lending activities, which should continue supporting low
delinquency levels. Still, the bank is highly exposed to
counterparty concentration, given that its payroll portfolio
performance relies on the state to provide timely payments to its
employees. Banpara also has abundant access to retail funding
thanks to its widespread branch network across the state, its
well-recognized regional brand, and its position as the state's
financial agent. Its stable and diverse deposits are crucial for
the bank's strong liquidity position, which provides a comfortable
cushion against financial obligations in the next 12 months.
Additionally, we don't incorporate any notching of government
support into the bank's SACP."

The state of Para owns 99.98% of Banpara. S&P said, "We view the
likelihood of government support to the bank as moderate, given
the latter's limited importance to, and its strong link with, the
government. We base this assessment on the state government's
majority control of the bank, Banpara's role as the state's
financial agent, and the bank's mission to expand banking services
to Para's isolated municipalities. On the other hand, we believe
Banpara's services could eventually be replaced by another lender,
limiting the likelihood of government support."


ODEBRECHT SA: Pemex Cancels $100 Million Contract
-------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that Mexican state-owned oil company Pemex said in
a filing on July 11 it canceled a 1.8-billion peso ($100-million)
contract with Odebrecht SA, a Brazilian engineering company that
has admitted paying bribes in a dozen countries in recent years.

According to Reuters, Pemex said it notified Odebrecht in mid-June
that it was canceling the 2015 engineering, procurement and
construction contract at the Miguel Hidalgo refinery in Tula,
Hidalgo state, following an investigation into "administrative
irregularities."

Odebrecht has admitted in a settlement with U.S. and Brazilian
prosecutors to paying bribes across 12 countries to win contracts,
the report notes. According to the U.S. court ruling, between 2001
and 2016, Odebrecht paid about $788 million in bribes in countries
including Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela,
Reuters relates.

In Mexico, Odebrecht paid $10.5 million to obtain public works
contracts between 2010 and 2014, which generated more than $39
million in profits, according to the U.S. ruling cited by Reuters.

Since settling in the United States, Brazil and Switzerland for a
record $3.5 billion, Odebrecht has sought to negotiate leniency
deals that would allow it to keep operating in other countries
across Latin America, Reuters adds.

As reporter in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Dec. 2, 2016, The Wall Street Journal related that Marcelo
Odebrecht, the jailed former head of Brazilian construction giant
Odebrecht SA, agreed to sign a plea-bargain agreement in
connection with Brazil's largest corruption probe ever, according
to a person close to the negotiations.  The move could roil the
nation's political class yet again.  The testimony of the former
industrialist, which is part of the deal, has the potential to
implicate numerous politicians who allegedly took kickbacks from
contractors as part of a years-long graft ring centered on
Brazil's state-run oil company, Petroleo Brasileiro SA, known as
Petrobras, according to The Wall Street Journal.



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C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
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LIFE PREMIUM: Chapter 15 Case Summary
-------------------------------------
Chapter 15 Petitioner: Andrew Richard Victor Morrison
                       FTI Consulting (Cayman) Limited
                       53 Market Street, Suite 3212
                       P.O. Box 30613
                       Camana Bay
                       Grand Cayman, KY1-1203
                       Cayman Islands
                       Tel: 212-488-1200

Foreign
Proceeding in
which appointment
of the foreign
representative
occurred:              Fin. Servs. Div. of the Grand Ct.
                       Cayman Is., Cause No. FSD 3 of
                       2015 (AJJ)

Chapter 15 Debtor:     Life Premium Fund, SPC
                       FTI Consulting
                       53 Market Street, Suite 3212
                       P.O. Box 30613
                       Camana Bay
                       Grand Cayman KY1-1203
                       Cayman Islands

Chapter 15 Case No.: 17-11899

About the Debtor: Life Premium Fund was incorporated on May 8,
                  2007, in the Cayman Islands as a closed-ended
                  exempted segregated portfolio company under the
                  laws of the Cayman Islands.  The Company has an
                  authorized share capital of $50,000 divided into
                  100 "voting shares" and 4,999,900 "non-voting
                  participating shares", with all shares having a
                  nominal value of $0.01 each.

                  The Company carried on business as an investment
                  fund.  It was formed to procure and pool: (1)
                  life insurance policies that insure the lives of
                  elderly persons who were either terminally or
                  chronically ill; and (2) rights to receive death
                  benefits that would otherwise have been paid to
                  the beneficiary of the insured or the original
                  owner, capitalizing on their maturity, or
                  selling the assets prior to their maturity.

                  The Company initially established and operated
                  three segregated portfolios denominated
                  as LS1, LS2 and LS3.  An additional portfolio,
                  LS4, was later established in or around August
                  2011.

                  A winding up order was made in relation to Life
                  Premium Fund, SPC on March 6, 2015.  In
                  accordance with the provisions of the Order,
                  David Griffin and Andrew Morrison (FTI
                  Consulting (Cayman) Ltd) were appointed as Joint
                  Official Liquidators.

                  Website: http://www.lpfliquidation.com

Chapter 15 Petition Date: July 10, 2017

Court: United States Bankruptcy Court
       Southern District of New York (Manhattan)

Judge: Hon. Stuart M. Bernstein

Chapter 15 Petitioner's
Counsel:                  David Farrington Yates, Esq.
                          KOBRE & KIM LLP
                          800 Third Avenue
                          New York, NY 10022
                          Tel: (212) 488-1211
                          Email: farrington.yates@kobrekim.com

Estimated Assets: Not Indicated

Estimated Debts: Not Indicated

A full-text copy of the Chapter 15 petition is available at:

         http://bankrupt.com/misc/nysb17-11899.pdf


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C H I L E
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VTR FINANCE: Fitch Affirms BB- Long-Term IDR, Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed VTR Finance B.V. (VTR) Long-Term
Foreign Currency and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDR)
at 'BB-'. The Rating Outlook is Stable. Fitch has also affirmed
the company's USD1.4 billion senior secured notes due 2024 and
revolving credit facility at 'BB-'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

VTR's ratings reflect its strong market position in the Chilean
telecom industry, primarily in pay-TV and Internet services. VTR's
ratings are supported by its competitive network quality, brand
recognition, and successful commercial strategy for its bundled
services offerings. The company's cash flow generation is
relatively stable, despite a highly competitive environment, and
it boasts strong financial flexibility underpinned by its long
debt maturity profile and committed credit facility.

The ratings are tempered by VTR's moderately high leverage for the
rating level, pressured free cash flow (FCF) generation in the
short to medium term due to high capex, a mature and highly
competitive industry backdrop, and a lack of service
diversification compared to the other integrated telecom operators
with established mobile services in the country.

VTR is a wholly owned subsidiary of Liberty Global plc (LG), and
is a part of the LiLAC Group (LiLAC), which represents LG's Latin
America and Caribbean operations. The company benefits from the
strategic oversight by LG and its management expertise, as well as
procurement and operating synergies. LiLAC operating entities are
separately capitalized and operations are managed independently.
LG maintains the common group leverage target of 4.0x-5.0x for its
subsidiaries. Fitch believes that any material improvement in the
company's financial profile from the current level would be
difficult as any significant deviation from the group's financial
target could be limited. LiLAC group has a share buyback program
with USD260 million remaining until 2019, which Fitch expects to
be partially funded by VTR given its stable operational
performance and cash flow generation.

Strong Market Position: VTR is the leading provider of pay TV and
broadband services in Chile, with subscriber market shares of 34%
and 37% on a national basis, respectively, followed closely by its
main incumbent competitor, Telefonica Chile S.A., as of Dec. 31,
2016. VTR is also the second largest fixed-line telephony service
provider, with a 20% of subscriber market share during the same
period. The company has consistently increased its overall revenue
generating units (RGU) in recent years, backed by its effective
bundled product strategy based on network and service
competitiveness. In mobile, the company operates as a virtual
network operator (MVNO) with a low market share of just 1%. Fitch
does not expect any material cash flow contribution from this
segment in the short to medium term.

Stable Operating Performance: VTR's performance has remained solid
through the combination of continued ARPU growth and subscriber
expansion. The company's revenue growth averaged 6.1% during 2013-
2016 period with solid EBITDA margin around 39%, and the trend has
continued during the first three months of 2017. This has been
achieved mainly by growth in its Internet and pay TV services,
which have fully offset revenue contraction in its fixed-line
telephony services due to the ongoing mobile-fixed substitution
trend. Fitch expects the company's steady revenue growth to
continue over the medium term, with relatively stable EBITDA
margins of around 38%-39% over the medium term.

High Capex: Fitch does not expect any meaningful FCF generation
over the medium term due to high capex and cash upstream to
support LiLAC's buyback program. Fitch expects the company's
capital intensity, measured by cable to sales, to remain at the
higher end of the 21%-23% range of LiLAC's guidance, given
investments for consumer premise equipment as it continues to grow
the subscriber base, and networks new builds and upgrades. Fitch
does not foresee any net debt reduction over the medium term.

Stable Leverage: VTR's adjusted financial leverage is deemed
moderately high for the rating category. The company's debt is
mostly comprised of its USD1.4 billion senior secured notes due
2024, which were issued in 2014. The company's adjusted debt to
EBITDAR was 3.9x, including the net fair value of hedge
derivatives, as of March, 2017, which was a modest improvement
from 4.2x at end-2014 due to EBITDA improvement. Fitch expects the
company's leverage to remain stable during 2016-2018, barring any
material amounts of cash upstream, as its suppressed FCF
generation to be offset to a degree by continued modest growth in
EBITDA.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

VTR's lack of service diversification into mobile amid the mature
market conditions in Chile, and its moderately high leverage
compared to the more diversified competitors in Chile and the
regional peers in the 'BB' rating category are credit negatives.
The company's financial profile is weaker than Millicom's
operating subsidiaries in the region, such as Comcel Trust
('BB+/Stable), and Telefonica Celular del Paraguay ('BB+'/Stable),
and is deemed in line with Axtel S.A.B. de C.V. ('BB-'/Stable).
Also, LG's group financial policy is a constraint on VTR's
ratings. These weaknesses are mitigated to a degree by its leading
market positions and solid network competitiveness, and financial
flexibility, all of which are deemed solid for the rating level.
No country ceiling, parent-subsidiary linkage, or operating
environment aspects impact.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's projections assume the follow assumptions:
-- Mid-single digits revenue growth over the medium term, with
    strong growth in Internet services and Pay TV;
-- Capex-to-sales ratio to remain at around 23%;
-- No meaningful FCF generation in 2017-2019;
-- EBITDA margin in the range of 38%-39% during 2017-2019.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Negative Rating Action
-- Deterioration in operating performance leading to muted
    revenue growth amid margin erosion;
-- Sustained negative FCF generation amid higher-than-expected
    capex requirement;
-- Any material cash flow upstream to LG;
-- Adjusted net leverage increasing toward 4.5x on a sustained
basis.

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Positive Rating Action
-- Continued solid top-line growth along with margin expansion,
    and positive FCF generation;
-- Clear commitment for deleveraging in the absence of any
    material cash flow upstream to LG, resulting in its adjusted
    net leverage falling well below 3.5x on a sustained basis.

LIQUIDITY

VTR's liquidity profile is sound as the company does not face any
debt maturity until 2024 when its senior secured notes become due.
The company's cash balance amounted to CLP65 billion by end-March
2017, and its operational cash flow generation is relatively
stable. In line with other LG operating subsidiaries, the Chilean
operating subsidiaries of VTR has a senior secured credit facility
of USD160 million and CLP22 billion in place, which remains
undrawn and supports financial flexibility, if necessary.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has affirmed VTR Finance B.V.'s ratings as follows:

-- Long-Term Foreign Currency and Local Currency IDRs at 'BB-',
    Outlook Stable;
-- USD1.4 billion senior secured notes 'BB-';
-- Secured revolving credit facility 'BB-'.


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C O L O M B I A
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COLOMBIA: Fiscal Slippage Could Risk Outlook, Fitch Says
--------------------------------------------------------
Colombia's creditworthiness could be pressured if growth is lower
than expected and higher fiscal deficits undermine efforts to
stabilize and gradually reduce the government's debt burden, Fitch
Ratings says.

The government's recently published Medium Term Fiscal Framework
forecasts a lower GDP and a slower reduction of the fiscal deficit
to 3.1% of GDP in 2018, up from a 2.7% forecast a year earlier. As
a result, debt to GDP is expected to stabilize in 2018 instead of
beginning to fall, as expected in the 2016 report. The changed
fiscal targets do not jeopardize the overall trend toward reducing
the debt burden in the medium term, but they do highlight risks of
fiscal slippage. Colombia's gross debt burden, at just under 50%
of GDP, is nearly 10 percentage points higher than the 'BBB'
median.

According to the framework, the 0.5% of GDP adjustment in the 2018
fiscal deficit will rely more on cutting capital expenditures than
increasing government revenues. These cuts will prove difficult
with congressional elections set for March 11 and the presidential
election on May 27. There are also additional spending pressures
resulting from the 2016 Peace Accord with the FARC rebels.

The 2019 target remains unchanged at a deficit of 2.2% of GDP,
converging to the structural fiscal deficit target of 1% of GDP by
2022. The nearly 1% of GDP adjustment needed to reach the 2019
target is ambitious without additional tax revenue measures, and
relies on additional spending cuts and anti-tax evasion measures
earned by beefing up the tax authority's capacities.

Fitch recently revised its 2017 growth forecast to 2% from 2.3%
given slower than expected execution of Fourth Generation (4G)
road infrastructure projects and a decline in oil production. Our
forecast for 2018 remains unchanged at 3.2%. Monetary easing
currently underway will likely boost domestic demand,
infrastructure bottlenecks are likely to be resolved beginning in
2H17, and oil production should stabilize.

Colombia's growth and fiscal metrics remain at risk from the oil
sector outlook. Colombia's oil production fell to 840,000 barrels
per day in 1Q17 from over one million in 2015. The government
expects oil production to stabilize in 2018 and only gradually
fall afterwards. Further significant falls in oil production would
undermine overall growth prospects as well as oil revenues, which
are expected to reach 0.3% of GDP in 2018 and 0.5% in 2019. Delays
in the completion of 4G infrastructure projects would also
undermine medium-term growth.

Annualized inflation fell below 4% in June 2017, within the
central bank's target for the first time since January 2015 and
significantly below its peak of 8.9% in July 2016. We expect it to
increase to 4.2% at year-end. While that is slightly above the
central bank's upper limit, inflation should converge toward the
midpoint of the 3 +/-1% target in 2018. Since December 2016, the
central bank has lowered the policy rate by 175bps as the actual
inflation rate and the central bank's target began to converge.
Fitch expects further rate cuts in 2017 but expects the pace of
the cuts will be data dependent.

Fitch revised its outlook on Colombia's 'BBB' rating to stable
from negative last March. The change reflected a tax reform
package passed in December 2016 to reduce the fiscal deficit and a
reduction in the country's economic imbalances, notably a sharply
lower current account deficit at 4.4% of GDP in 2016 from 6.4% a
year earlier.

The 2018 budget will be presented to the Congress by end-July for
passage by end-October.


=============
C U R A C A O
=============


PUBLE NV: Unsecureds to Recoup 100% Under Plan
----------------------------------------------
Puble NV and Scotia Valley NV filed with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court
for the Southern District of New York a disclosure statement dated
June 26, 2017, in connection with their joint Chapter 11 plan of
reorganization dated June 26, 2017.

The Debtors will (a) pay holders of Class 3A General Unsecured
Claims against Puble 100% of the amount of their allowed claim in
full, in cash, with interest from the Petition Date to the
Confirmation Date at the contract rate to the extent the
underlying agreement or instrument giving rise to the Allowed
Class 3B Claim provides for interest, within 30 days of the
Effective Date, from the Plan Distribution Fund, or (b) satisfy
Allowed Class 3A Claim on other terms and conditions as the holder
of an Allowed Class 3A Claim and Puble will agree, in full and
final satisfaction of such Claims as against Puble.  Class 3A
Claims are not impaired under the Plan and are deemed to accept
the Plan.

The Debtors will (a) pay holders of Class 3B General Unsecured
Claims Against Scotia Valley 100% of the amount of their allowed
claim in full, in cash, with interest from the Petition Date to
the Confirmation Date at the contract rate to the extent the
underlying agreement or instrument giving rise to the Allowed
Class 3B Claim provides for interest, within 30 days of the
Effective Date, from the Plan Distribution Fund, or (b) satisfy
Allowed Class 3B Claims on other terms and conditions as the
holder of an Allowed Class 3B Claim and Scotia Valley will agree,
in full and final satisfaction of claims as against Scotia Valley.
Class 3B Claims are not impaired under the Plan and are deemed to
accept the Plan.

Distributions under the Plan will be paid from the Plan
Distribution Fund, which will be funded by the Transaction
Proceeds, but only to the extent those proceeds are needed to
satisfy allowed claims after giving effect to the Debtors' cash on
hand on the Effective Date.  The Transaction Proceeds will be the
primary source of distributions under the Plan.  The Plan
Distribution Fund will be administered by Togut, Segal & Segal
LLP, solely in its capacity as disbursing agent, in accordance
with the terms of the Plan.

A copy of the Disclosure Statement is available at:

          http://bankrupt.com/misc/nysb17-10747-48.pdf

                  About Puble & Scotia Valley

Scotia Valley NV, which was initially incorporated in Curacao,
Netherlands Antilles in 1979, owns and operates the real property
located in Washington, DC, known as 1737 H Street NW, an
approximately 17,800-square foot, five-story office building that
has been leased to commercial tenants over the years.

Puble NV, initially formed in Curacao, Netherlands Antilles in
1985, owns and operates the real property located in New York City
known as 67-69 Irving Place, a 3,933-square foot parcel of land
with a 12-story commercial office building.

Puble NV (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 17-10747) and Scotia Valley NV
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 17-10748) filed Chapter 11 petitions on
March 28, 2017.  The Chapter 11 cases are jointly administered.
The Hon. Michael E. Wiles presides over the cases.  Togut, Segal &
Segal LLP represent the Debtors as counsel.  Tramonte, Yeonas,
Martin & Roberts PLLC, serves as the Debtors' real estate counsel.

In its petition, Puble estimated $10 million to $50 million in
both assets and liabilities, while Scotia Valley estimated $1
million to $10 million in both assets and liabilities.  The
petitions were signed by Charis Lapas, president/treasurer.



==================================
D O M I N I C A N  R E P U B L I C
==================================



DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Coffee Sector at Edge of Collapse
-----------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that over 90% of Dominican Republic's
coffee growers have gone broke as coffee rust hobbles production
and decimates plantations across the country during the last four
years.

The report relays that San Juan Valley coffee growers and farmers
grouped in FECADESJ said that most of the country's 30,000 coffee-
growing families "have fallen into indigence because of the
decline in production as a result of rust, which has resulted in
losses for grain farmers of around 18.0 billion pesos (US$375.0M)
in only four years."

They ask the Chamber of Deputies to hold public hearings and
create the Dominican Coffee Institute (INDOCAFE) to replace
CODOCAFE, because it's their view the latter would end up ruining
their sector, notes the report.

FECADESJ president Meraris Sanchez said production has plunged
dramatically during the last two years, "due to the damages caused
by the spread of rust and the Agriculture Ministry's lack of
action," reports Dominican Today.



====================
P U E R T O  R I C O
====================


HAIRLAND CORP: Unsecured Creditors to be Paid 3% Under Exit Plan
----------------------------------------------------------------
Unsecured creditors of Hairland Corporation will be paid 3% of
their claims under the company's proposed plan to exit Chapter 11
protection.

Under the restructuring plan, creditors holding Class 1 general
unsecured claims will receive a monthly payment of $35.74 over 60
months or a total of $2,144.  Payments will start 30 days after
the plan is confirmed.

General unsecured creditors assert a total of $71,473 in claims.

Payments under the plan will be funded from the collection of fees
for services provided by the company, according to its disclosure
statement filed on June 27 with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in
Puerto Rico.

A copy of the disclosure statement is available for free at
https://is.gd/ZgIN6a

Hairland is represented by:

     Emily Darice Davila Rivera, Esq.
     Law Office Emily D. Davila Rivera
     420 Ponce de Leon Avenue Midtown, Suite 311
     San Juan, PR 00918
     Phone: 787-759-8090
     Email: davilalawe@prtc.net

                   About Hairland Corporation

Hairland Corporation operates a barber shop located at Plaza Las
Americas in Puerto Rico.

The Debtor sought protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 17-00286) on January 23, 2017.  Liza
Diou, president, signed the petition.

At the time of the filing, the Debtor estimated less than $50,000
in assets and less than $500,000 in liabilities.

The Law Office Emily D. Davila Rivera represents the Debtor as
bankruptcy counsel.


LIBERTY CABLEVISION: Fitch Affirms B+ IDR, Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Liberty Cablevision of Puerto Rico's
(LCPR) Long-term Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) at
'B+'/Stable Outlook. Fitch has also upgraded the company's senior
secured revolver and its first lien term loan B to 'BB-'/'RR3'
from 'B+'/'RR4' and affirmed the company's senior secured second
lien term loan C at
'B-'/'RR6'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

LCPR's ratings reflect the company's strong business position as
the leading pay-tv and broadband services provider in Puerto Rico.
The company has extensive network coverage and quality, and strong
brand recognition. The ratings also incorporate the company's
improved scale and cash flow generation following the acquisition
of Choice in 2015, and adequate liquidity. The ratings are
tempered by LCPR's lack of diversification in its service
offerings, with no presence in mobile, and operating geography,
making it vulnerable to the weak macroeconomic conditions in
Puerto Rico.

LCPR is 60% owned by Liberty Global plc (LG) and 40% owned by
Searchlight Capital Partners, and is a part of the LiLAC Group
(LiLAC), which represents LG's Latin America and Caribbean
operations. LCPR benefits from LG 's strategic oversight and its
management expertise, as well as the procurement and operating
synergies that come from being part of a larger operational group.
LiLAC operating entities are separately capitalized and managed
independently; LG maintains a group leverage target of 4.0x to
5.0x for its subsidiaries. LCPR's leverage level is currently
aligned with that target. Fitch forecasts that the company will
maintain relatively stable leverage based on its operational
fundamentals over the medium term, while any potential material
improvement in the financial profile could be difficult, as any
significant deviation from the group's financial target could be
limited.

The upgrade of LCPR's Senior Secured Revolver and its First Lien
Term Loan 'B' to 'BB-'/'RR3' reflects Fitch's expectation of good
recovery prospects in the event of default and as a result the
first lien facilities are rated one notch above the IDR. 'RR3'
rated securities have characteristics consistent with historical
recoveries between 51% to 70% of current principal and related
interest. Based on Fitch's recovery analysis, the agency has
affirmed the company's second lien term loan at 'B-'/'RR6',
indicating below average recovery prospects in the event of
default and as a result the company's second lien term loan is
rated two notches lower than the company's IDR.

Strong Business Position: Fitch expects LCPR's market leadership
to remain intact, supported by its extensive network coverage and
quality. LCPR is the leading pay-tv and broadband provider in
Puerto Rico with subscriber market shares of 42% and 49%,
respectively. Competitive pressures are high in the broadband and
pay-tv segments, and the fixed-voice service continues to suffer
from the unfavourable industry trend of mobile-fixed substitution.
This trend should continue to limit any material growth in average
revenue per user (ARPU) and operating margins in the short-to-
medium term. Positively, Fitch believes that LCPR's competitive
advantages should enable the company to maintain its leading
market shares.

Weak Operating Environment: Economic conditions in Puerto Rico
continue to be negative for LCPR. The company's lack of geographic
diversification exposes it to Puerto Rico's struggling economy,
which is undergoing a declining population, low GDP per capita,
and high unemployment rates. Despite the company's stable
performance in recent years, these factors could begin to erode
service affordability and negatively affect LCPR's cash flow
generation going forward. Fitch forecasts LCPR's revenue growth to
be in the low single digits in the short-to-medium term,
reflecting the weak macro environment and a high level of market
competition.

Financial Profile Improvement: LCPR's cash flow from operations
(CFFO) has grown consistently in recent years due to continued
expansion of its subscriber base and the acquisition of Choice.
During the LTM ended March 31, 2017, the company generated CFFO of
USD140 million, which favourably compares to the 2015 level of
USD113 million. LCPR's improving operational cash flow generation
has provided the company with comfortable headroom to cover its
capex, averaging approximately USD80 million annually during 2015
and 2016. While Fitch expects the company's pre-dividend FCF
generation to remain solid over the medium-term, FCF generation
after cash upstream should remain limited to support LiLAC's share
buyback program.

Stable Leverage: Fitch expects LCPR's total adjusted net leverage
to remain comfortably below 5x over the medium-to-long term in
line with the group's leverage target. The company's net leverage
declined to 4.4x a year-end 2016, in line with Fitch's base case
scenario, which positively compares to 5.3x at year-end 2015.
Leverage improved during that period as a result of the improved
EBITDA following a full year of Choice subscribers. EBITDA
improved to USD199 million during 2016 from USD167 million during
2015, excluding non-recurring item adjustment, such as
reimbursement of legal fees. Fitch expects only modest improvement
in the company's EBITDA generation going forward, reflecting the
economic constraints of the economy in which it operates.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

LCPR's credit weaknesses, compared to its regional peers in the
'BB' rating category, include its relatively small scale of
operations and lack of diversified service offerings, with no
mobile operation. In addition, the company's operating environment
in Puerto Rico, which has undergone tough economic challenges, is
also a key credit concern. These weaknesses offset LCPR's leading
market position and network competitiveness, which are broadly in
line with VTR Finance, a Chilean cable operator of LiLAC group and
rated 'BB-'/Stable Outlook. The company's financial profile is
stronger than Digicel Group Limited, which is an integrated
telecom operator and is rated 'B'/Stable Outlook.
Parent/Subsidiary Linkage is not applicable and the ratings are
not constrained by the country ceiling.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within Fitch ratings case for the issuer
include:
-- Low-single digits revenue and EBITDA growth from 2017 and
    beyond;
-- Capex to sales to remain in the range of 21% to 23% in the
    short-to-medium term;
-- Limited FCF generation due to cash upstream to support LiLAC
    share buyback program;
-- Total adjusted net leverage to remain in the range of 4.0x to
    4.5x over the short-to-medium term.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Positive Rating Action
-- Continued solid top-line growth along with margin expansion,
    and positive FCF generation;
-- Clear commitment for deleveraging in the absence of any
    material cash flow upstream to LG, resulting in its adjusted
    net leverage falling well below 4.0x on a sustained basis.


Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Negative Rating Action
-- Deterioration in operating performance caused by unfavorable
    macroeconomic conditions and competitive landscape;
-- Sustained negative FCF generation amid higher-than-expected
    capex requirement;
-- Any material cash flow upstream to LG;
-- Adjusted net leverage increasing to above 5.0x on a sustained
    basis.

LIQUIDITY

Adequate Liquidity: Fitch does not foresee any liquidity problem
for LCPR in the short to medium term since the company does not
face any sizable debt maturities until 2022, when its first lien
term loan B becomes due. LCPR's liquidity is adequate given its
cash balance of USD46 million and USD0.1 million in short term
debt as of March 31, 2017. The company's liquidity position is
further strengthened by its USD40 million undrawn credit facility,
good access to local financing as well as shareholder support in
the form of subordinated shareholder loans and equity injections.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Liberty Cablevision of Puerto Rico, LLC.
-- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR affirmed at 'B+'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- Senior Secured Revolver upgraded to 'BB-/RR3' from 'B+/RR4';
-- Senior Secured 1st Lien Term Loan B due 2022 upgraded to 'BB-
    /RR3' from 'B+/RR4';
-- Senior Secured 2nd Lien Term Loan C due 2023 affirmed at 'B-
    '/'RR6'


MINI MASTER: Unsecureds to Get Paid from $50K Carve-Out
-------------------------------------------------------
Mini Master Concrete Services, Inc., filed with the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico a first amended
disclosure statement to accompany its plan of reorganization.

Under this amended plan, Class 4 Allowed General Unsecured
Claimants, excluding the claim of Mrs. Bess M. Taylor Mitchell,
who will not receive any dividends under the Plan, but including
ESSROC's San Juan, Inc.'s claim, will be paid in full satisfaction
of their claims, their pro-rata share from a $50,000 carve-out to
be reserved from the proceeds of the sale of Debtor's assets. The
estimated amount of allowed claim for this class is now $932,374,
48. The previous estimated amount was $897,123.63

The original version of the plan asserted that Class 4 Allowed
General Unsecured Claimants, excluding the claim of Mrs. Bess M.
Taylor Mitchell, who will not receive any dividends under the
Plan, but including the Claims of ESSROC San Juan, Inc. and
Economic Development Bank of P.R's and Wells Fargo Financial
Leasing's deficiency claims, shall be paid in full satisfaction of
their claims, approximately 1.75%, from a $50,000 carve out to be
reserved from the proceeds of the sale of Debtor's assets.

The Plan contemplates that substantially all of Debtor's assets
securing the claims will be sold, excepting the real properties of
both Debtor and those of the estate of Victor Maldonado Davila to
be transferred to EDB. With the proceeds of the sale to Master
Group P.R. Holdings, LLC  and the other sales, the Debtor will be
able to make the payments to Holders of Allowed Administrative
Expense Claims, Holders of Allowed Priority Tax Claims, Holders of
Other Priority Tax Claims and to Classes 1, 2, 3, and 4.

A copy of the First Amended Disclosure Statement is available at:

     http://bankrupt.com/misc/prb16-09956-11-145

              About Mini Master Concrete Services

Mini Master Concrete Services, Inc. filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy
petition (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 16-09956) on December 22, 2016.
The Hon. Mildred Caban Flores over the case. Charles A. Cuprill,
PCS Law Offices represents the Debtor as counsel.

The Debtor disclosed total assets of $15.78 million and total
liabilities of $5.46 million. The petition was signed by Carmen M.
Betancourt, president.


MOTEL TROPICAL: Disclosures OK'd; Plan Hearing on Aug. 23
---------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Brian K. Tester of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Puerto Rico has approved Puerto Rico Tourism Co.'s
disclosure statement dated May 25, 2017, referring to the Chapter
11 plan dated May 25, 2017.

A hearing for the consideration of confirmation of the Plan will
be held on Aug. 23, 2017, at 2:00 p.m.

Objections to claims must be filed prior to the hearing on
confirmation.  The Debtor will include in its objection to claim a
notice that if no response to the objection is filed within 30
days, the motion will be considered and decided without the actual
hearing.  If a written response or opposition to the objection to
claim is timely filed, the contested matter will be heard on the
date that the hearing on confirmation has been scheduled and the
next available hearing date.

Any objection to confirmation of the Plan must be filed on or
before seven days prior to the date of the hearing on confirmation
of the Plan.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter on June 12, 2017, the
Debtor's priority claim will be paid in full under the latest plan
proposed by the Debtor to exit Chapter 11 protection.  According
to
the latest plan, Motel Tropical will pay the agency's priority
claim of $46,611.67 in its entirety on or before February 2022 or
within 72 months from the petition date.

                      About Motel Tropical

Motel Tropical Inc. sought protection under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 16-00966) on Feb. 11,
2016, disclosing under $1 million in both assets and liabilities.
The Debtor is represented by Isabel M. Fullana, Esq., at
Garcia-Arregui & Fullanan PSC.

The Debtor manages a motel business located at Carr 2.KM 110.7
Ave. Militar, Isabel Puerto Rico. The property on which the Debtor
operates is leased to Manuel Gonzalez Valeting.

No official committee of unsecured creditors has been appointed in
the case.

On July 14, 2016, the Debtor filed a disclosure statement, which
explains its proposed Chapter 11 plan of reorganization.



=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================


PDVSA: Could Seek to Renegotiate October Bond Payment
-----------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that Venezuelan state oil producer Petroleos de
Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA) could seek to renegotiate a looming
October bond payment given low oil prices, Hector Andrade, PDVSA's
managing director for planning, said on July 11.

"I guess there are a lot of chances of that," Reuters quotes
Andrade as saying when asked about a possible payment
renegotiation. "Right now it's not just about the cooperation
between producers . . . (but) cooperation between producer and
consumer."

Reuters relates that the firm also expects to invest $50 billion
over the next 7 years to raise capacity by 1 million barrels per
day, Andrade told reporters on the sidelines of an energy
conference in Istanbul.

Venezuela currently produces about 2 million barrels per day, the
report notes.

Reuters says struggling under triple-digit inflation and Soviet-
style product shortages as its socialist economy unravels,
Venezuela has been hit hard by low prices for oil, its economic
lifeline.

The OPEC nation's oil output has slipped and PDVSA is struggling
to maintain investment in its oilfields, which hold the world's
largest crude reserves, the report notes.

Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA) is a Venezuelan state-owned
oil producer.


VENEZUELA: S&P Lowers Sovereign Credit Ratings to 'CCC-'
--------------------------------------------------------
On July 11, 2017, S&P Global Ratings lowered its long-term foreign
and local currency sovereign credit ratings on the Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela to 'CCC-' from 'CCC'. The outlook on the
long-term ratings is negative. S&P said, "We affirmed our 'C'
short-term foreign and local currency sovereign ratings. In
addition, we lowered our transfer and convertibility assessment on
the sovereign to 'CCC-' from 'CCC'."

RATIONALE

The downgrade reflects continued deterioration in economic
conditions, rising political tensions, including within the
Chavista government base, and the government's worsening liquidity
position. Economic policy continues to be erratic, in a context of
very high inflation; severe fiscal, monetary, and exchange-rate
rigidities; and draconian controls on imports. Recent developments
have raised the risk of default, including through a debt exchange
that we would view as a distressed exchange, within the next six
months, absent unanticipated significant improvement in
Venezuela's economic and political conditions.

In March 2017, Venezuela's Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ,
Spanish acronym) passed a ruling to transfer the legislative
powers of the opposition-led National Assembly to the TSJ and to
President Nicol†s Maduro. This ruling, which was later revoked,
contributed to further political polarization and increased public
demonstrations against the government. Amid this turmoil there
have been nearly 100 deaths. Moreover, the country continues to
suffer from severe shortages of basic goods given the controls on
imports and higher levels of violence, exacerbating political
tensions.

Amid the increased social unrest, President Maduro and his
supporters are seeking to rewrite the country's constitution. This
political strategy is perceived by many as an effort to
concentrate more power in the presidency. The government has
scheduled elections for a National Constitutional Assembly
(ANC, Spanish acronym) on July 30. Several prominent members of
the government and the dominant Chavista political movement have
spoken out against the TSJ ruling and the proposed ANC. We expect
internal divisions within the Chavista movement could sharpen.
Ongoing social unrest could also deepen divisions within the
country's military, which has supported the government thus far.

After three years of economic contraction, S&P Global Ratings
expects Venezuela's economy to contract again by at least 6% in
2017 and real GDP per capita by 7.2%. Based on our oil price deck
forecast (see "S&P Global Ratings Raises Its Oil And Natural Gas
Prices Assumptions For 2017," published Dec.
14, 2016), we would expect Venezuelan oil exports to enjoy higher
prices on average in 2017, but output is likely to decline toward
an average of 2 million barrels per day from 2.4 million barrels
per day in 2016. In S&P's opinion, the level of GDP per capita in
dollar terms is currently a misleading indicator given severe
distortion on exchange rates.

Shrinking oil output, which represents 95% of Venezuela's exports,
will result in a current account deficit of around 4% of GDP this
year, contributing to deteriorating external liquidity (in the
absence of new external funding). Therefore, S&P said, "we expect
the government to maintain import controls to try and preserve the
level of international reserves. According to Venezuela's central
bank, the country's foreign exchange reserves stood at US$10
billion as of June 2017, but we estimate non-gold reserves between
US$3 billion and US$4 billion. There is no updated information
about other government funds denominated in foreign currency; we
believe other significant noncash assets may already have been
used as collateral for existing debt. Absent significant new
external funding, we expect the government to have difficulty
paying debt service of around US$2.8 billion in the second half of
2017 and around US$7 billion in 2018."

Moreover, the state-owned energy company, Petr¢leos de Venezuela
S.A. (PDVSA), faces US$4 billion of external debt maturities
during the remainder of 2017. PDVSA's debt is not guaranteed by
the government, and the government's debt does not have cross-
default clauses connected with the debt of the national oil
company. However, S&P expects PDVSA's debt service needs will put
pressure on Venezuela's international reserves and external
liquidity.

The combination of poor monetary, fiscal, and other policies has
resulted in rising inflation. The latest published information
shows a 180% inflation rate in 2015. Doubts about the accuracy of
reported economic data (whose disclosure has decreased, and delays
in reporting have mounted since early 2016) have weakened market
confidence and made it more difficult to make inflation forecasts.
S&P estimates inflation was 500% in 2016, and S&P expects it to be
950% in 2017.

With around 50% of the government's revenues coming from the oil
sector, low oil prices have undermined fiscal policy, resulting in
large budget deficits and increased recourse to inflationary
financing from the central bank.

Official data on fiscal balances have not been published since
2014, but estimates from private sources and the International
Monetary Fund suggest that the general government deficit was
around 20%-25% of GDP in 2016. S&P expects it to be at a similar
level in 2017.

General government debt was 2% of GDP as of year-end 2016.
However, Venezuela's reported low debt stocks and interest burden
are misleading as the government uses the preferential foreign
exchange rate of 10 bolivares (VEF) per $US1 to account for
external debt. S&P said, "Venezuela's fiscal deficits will be
mostly financed by domestic sources, but if the preferential
exchange rate were to depreciate at the same pace as our inflation
forecast, as our base-case scenario suggests, the increase in
Venezuela's net general government debt could be as much as 40% of
GDP in 2017. Under our base-case scenario, net general government
debt would rise toward 45% of GDP and interest payments toward 25%
of general government revenue in 2017."

The government has not published balance of payments and
international investment position data since September 2015. S&P
said, "We estimate the country's gross external financing needs in
2017 at around 200% of current account receipts (CAR) plus usable
reserves, a similar level to our estimate for 2016 but twice the
level in 2013. We expect Venezuela to finance this need by the
public sector running arrears with most of its suppliers and
noncommercial creditors, and liquidating external assets. We
expect Venezuela's external debt net of reported public- and
financial-sector assets will remain around 250% of CAR during
2017-2019."

OUTLOOK

The negative outlook reflects the heightened risk of the
Venezuelan government defaulting, including through undertaking a
distressed debt exchange, in the next six months. Failure to
introduce substantial corrective measures to stabilize the
economy, alleviate shortages, and reverse the recent growth in
political polarization could lead to worsening external liquidity
and debt default.

Steps to defuse the heightened political tensions in Venezuela
would reduce the risks of eroding governability and high
volatility in economic policies.

That, along with prompt, corrective reforms that begin to address
the country's economic imbalances and to strengthen its external
liquidity, could lead us to affirm the ratings at their current
level.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

     http://bit.ly/2tI6xpb



=================
X X X X X X X X X
=================


* Cigarette Black Market Costing Governments Billions in Losses
---------------------------------------------------------------
Trinidad and Tobago Newsday reports that an estimated 600 billion
cigarettes currently under the contraband scheme represents a loss
of between US$50 billion and $60 billion for governments in tax
revenues.

This is according to Cesar Agurcia, a senior manager for the
British American Tobacco's interests in the Caribbean and Central
America who told a recent conference on anti-illicit trade in
tobacco conference in Georgetown, Guyana that the illicit economy
affects businesses, governments, civil society and individuals,
notes the report.

The conference held on June 29 was sponsored by British American
Tobacco, West Indian Tobacco Company, Demerara Tobacco Company and
Crime Stoppers International, says Newsday.

According to the report, participants which included law-
enforcement, industry and customs officials from Trinidad and
Tobago, Guyana, Jamaica, Costa Rica, and Suriname focused on
modern trendsetting tactics and strategies of illicit traders, and
key characteristics and tools used by tax evaders attempting to
smuggle cigarettes into Caribbean countries.

A release from the West Indian Tobacco said there was need to curb
the growing illegal activity, reports Newsday.

"This is a national security issue, because it has been globally
proven that the profits of illicit trade are going to criminal
organisations around the world," the report quoted the release as
saying.

Trinidad and Tobago Newsday relates that Darrin Carmichael,
consultant for Crime Stoppers International, called on public and
private institutions to work together to take swift action against
the illicit trade. Crime Stoppers International, he said,
"recognises that illicit trade is a growing problem worldwide, be
it smuggling, counterfeiting, or tax evasion." While governments
are losing billions of dollars in tax revenues, he said,
"Legitimate businesses are being undermined and consumers in all
our communities are exposed to unregulated, poor made and inferior
products." Attendees praised the hosting of the event and
expressed the need for government and industry officials to work
together to tackle the issue, it notes.

The organisers of the event voiced their hope that greater
relationships would be formed between the customs and law
enforcement officials in attendance and that "formal bilateral and
inter-customs arrangements can be established to collaborate and
share intelligence and track, disrupt, and confiscate the illicit
products across these countries," notes the report.





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Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B.
Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Joseph Cardillo at
856-381-8268.


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