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                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

             Friday, July 14, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 139



BRAZIL: Former President is Convicted of Corruption
CONCESSAO METROVIARIA: Moody's Affirms Ba2 GS Rating on Sr. Debt.

D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REP: Prices Up .6% in June, Paced by Goods & Services
* DOMINICAN REP: RD$500MM in Bonds to Help Low-Cost Home Buyers

P U E R T O    R I C O

CONDADO RESTAURANT: Plan Outline Okayed, Plan Hearing on Oct. 25
GOODMAN AND DOMINGUEZ: Simon Property Wants New Cases Tossed
GOODMAN AND DOMINGUEZ: U.S. Trustee Unable to Appoint Committee
GOODMAN AND DOMINGUEZ: Case Summary & 20 Top Unsecured Creditors
HAIRLAND CORP: Hearing on Plan and Disclosures Set for August 1

PUERTO RICO: Univ. Trust Seeks Appointment of Employee Committee
UNIVERSITY OF THE SACRED HEART: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Bond Rating

T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O

PETROTRIN: Stakeholders Asked to Make Sacrifices


PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: Said to Plan Investor Calls This Week

                            - - - - -


BRAZIL: Former President is Convicted of Corruption
Samantha Pearson and Luciana Magalhaes at The Wall Street Journal
report that former President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, the front-
runner for next year's presidential election, was sentenced to
almost a decade in prison for corruption, dealing a heavy blow to
his leftist Workers' Party and its chances of regaining control
over Latin America's biggest country.

Sergio Moro, the crusading judge at the head of Brazil's vast Car
Wash graft investigation, found Mr. da Silva guilty of corruption
and money laundering, sentencing the 71-year-old to 9 1/2 years in
prison, according to a court document, reports The Wall Street

"The responsibility of a President of the Republic is enormous
and, consequently, so is the guilt when he commits crimes," Mr.
Moro wrote in his verdict, the report notes.

Under Brazilian law, Mr. da Silva can stay out of jail while he
appeals the ruling, the report relays.  If he loses the appeal --
a process that could take up to a year -- he would be expected to
go to prison and be barred from public office, the report notes.

The conviction throws Brazilian politics into further turmoil,
coming less than a year after the impeachment of former President
Dilma Rousseff, who succeeded her mentor Mr. da Silva, for
covering up the country's growing budget gap, the report says.
The country's current president, Michel Temer, has been charged
with corruption, too, and could also be ousted in coming weeks,
the report discloses.  The sprawling corruption probe known as Car
Wash has also put scores of other leading politicians and captains
of industry behind bars, and delayed the country's economic
recovery, the report relays.

The ruling is a remarkable turn of events for a man whom former
President Barack Obama in 2009 hailed as "the most popular
politician on earth," the report notes.  Mr. da Silva, who rose
from a union activist to president on his fourth try, raised
Brazil's profile both economically and diplomatically, the report
says.  His government secured both the Olympics and soccer's World
Cup, and embarked on a state lending spree that helped Brazil's
largest companies take on their global rivals, the report

But a grinding recession -- and then corruption allegations that
tarnished him and much of his party -- have throttled his legacy,
the report relays.  Many of the companies he championed in office,
such as construction firm Odebrecht, have admitted they paid
hundreds of millions of dollars in bribes to secure contracts in
Brazil and elsewhere, the report notes.

"It's a terrible outcome for his legacy and not just for Lula the
person," said Andrea Murta, a deputy director at the Atlantic
Council, a think tank, the report notes.  "He was a symbol of hope
for an entire country, and now we don't have anyone that even
comes close to offering that to the Brazilian people," he added.

The WSJ relays that Mr. Moro ruled that Mr. da Silva received
about $700,000 from construction group OAS and laundered money by
trying to hide his ownership of a luxury beachside apartment in
Sao Paulo that the company built.  Prosecutors had accused the
former president of accepting the apartment and its costly
renovation in exchange for securing contracts with state-owned oil
company Petroleo Brasileiro, or Petrobras, as part of the Car Wash
scheme, the report notes.

The former president has repeatedly denied any wrongdoing, saying
he is the victim of a political witch-hunt, the report relays.
His lawyers rejected the verdict in a televised news conference.
"The sentence is merely speculative . . . it disregards the
evidence of his innocence," said defense lawyer Cristiano Zanin,
the report notes.

The WSJ relays that the ruling, the highest-profile sentence yet
in the Car Wash case, is the first verdict to emerge from five
graft-related charges against Mr. da Silva.

Brazil's currency and stocks extended their gains after the
sentence as traders bet the move would make it harder for Mr. da
Silva and his Workers' Party to return to power, the report notes.

"The market's view is that a candidacy by ex-President Lula could
put many uncertainties regarding economic and fiscal policy on the
horizon," said Pedro Paulo Silveira, an economist at Nova Futura
brokerage in Sao Paulo, the report discloses.

A former metal worker, Mr. da Silva became Brazil's first working-
class president in 2003, the report relays.  His social policies,
coupled with a commodity boom during his eight years in office,
are credited with lifting close to 30 million Brazilians out of
poverty, the report notes.  Despite being accused by prosecutors
of masterminding Brazil's multibillion-dollar bribery-and-kickback
scheme, Mr. da Silva still ranks as the country's most popular
politician, the report says.

The Workers' Party has said it has no "Plan B" for winning in 2018
other than with its founder Mr. da Silva as candidate, the report

Constitutional experts fear Mr. da Silva's conviction, as well as
the outstanding charges against him, could plunge next year's
elections into a legal quagmire, presenting one of the biggest
challenges yet for the country's courts, the report discloses.  In
one of several scenarios being explored in Brazil, it would even
be technically possibly for Mr. da Silva to be elected president
from inside jail, the report says.

"This is really an unprecedented situation," said Ricardo Cury, a
professor of constitutional law at Brazil's FAAP University, the
report relays.  "Brazilian politics is truly like a game of chess
-- there are so many moving parts right now," he added.

The decision on Mr. da Silva's expected appeal would fall to a
group of three judges in a higher regional court in the southern
city of Porto Alegre, the report notes.  If the conviction is
upheld, Mr. da Silva would be expected to go to jail, based on a
Supreme Court ruling last year, the report says.  Under the 2010
'Clean Record' law, Mr. da Silva would also not be allowed to run
for public office for the next eight years, the report relays.

The higher court has usually upheld Mr. Moro's decisions, but the
magnitude of this case would makes its outcome more unpredictable,
Mr. Cury said, the report discloses.

The three judges would also be working to a tight deadline.
Appeal decisions can take more than a year, but the court would be
under intense pressure to reach a verdict before political parties
announce their presidential candidates in the middle of next year
ahead of elections in October, the report says.

If the higher court turned down his appeal while he was running
for president, Mr. da Silva could be sent to jail but remain a
candidate, said Silvana Batini, a Brazilian prosecutor and
professor in public law at Fundacao Getulio Vargas in Rio de
Janeiro, the report relays.  If he were to then win, he wouldn't
automatically be freed from jail, she said, although he would
struggle to officially assume the presidency, the report says.

The Supreme Court may also intervene in various situations, adding
even more uncertainty, Ms. Batini said, the report notes.

Since it began in 2014, Operation Car Wash has unveiled a
nationwide bribery and kickback scheme in which companies paid
billions of dollars of bribes in exchange for government
contracts, cheap state loans and other favors, the report recalls.
Politicians spent the cash on everything from jewelry and yachts
to their election campaigns, the report relays.

Mr. da Silva, who presided over a China-led commodities boom that
saw everything from the price of iron ore to soybeans soar, left
office at the beginning 2011 with his approval ratings above 80%,
the highest for any Brazilian president on record, the report
notes.  President Michel Temer currently has an approval rating of

"For many, Lula became the personification of Brazil's recent
social gains," said Rafael Cortez, a political scientist at the
consultancy Tendencias, the report relays.  With all of Brazil's
major parties now implicated in Car Wash, it is also easier for
voters to dismiss the importance of the corruption cases against
him, he said, the report notes.

But Mr. da Silva may struggle to win the presidency even if he is
able to run, the report says.  Though he remains popular, the bloc
of voters who strongly oppose him has also grown, making it hard
for him to win a second-round runoff vote, said Ricardo Ribeiro, a
political consultant from MCM Consultores, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
May 24, 2017, S&P Global Ratings placed its 'BB' long-term foreign
and local currency sovereign credit ratings on the Federative
Republic of Brazil on CreditWatch with negative implications.  S&P
also affirmed the short-term foreign and local currency ratings at
'B'. The transfer and convertibility assessment is unchanged at
'BBB-'. In addition, S&P placed the 'brAA-' national scale rating
on CreditWatch with negative implications.

CONCESSAO METROVIARIA: Moody's Affirms Ba2 GS Rating on Sr. Debt.
Moody's America Latina Ltda., affirmed the Ba2 global scale rating
and downgraded to from the National Scale Rating
assigned to Concessao Metroviaria do Rio de Janeiro S/A
(MetroRio)'s backed senior unsecured debentures due in May 2018.
At the same time, Moody's affirmed the Ba2/ ratings assigned
to Linha Amarela S.A. (LAMSA)'s senior secured debentures due in
May 2027. As part of this rating action, Moody's also withdrew
MetroRio's Ba2/ issuer ratings and assigned Corporate Family
Ratings of Ba2/ to this company. The outlook for all the
ratings remains negative.


Concessao Metroviaria do Rio de Janeiro S/A (MetroRio)

BRL100 million backed senior unsecured debentures due in May 2018
(7th issue): global scale affirmed at Ba2 and National Scale
Rating downgraded to from

Issuer Ratings of Ba2 and withdrawn

Corporate Family Ratings assigned at Ba2 and

Outlook: negative

Linha Amarela S.A. (LAMSA)

BRL387 million senior secured debentures due in May 2027: affirmed
at Ba2 and

Outlook: negative


The downgrade of MetroRio's National Scale Rating to from reflects Moody's expectations that the company's credit
metrics will deteriorate due to: (i) a slowdown of economic
activity in the Municipality of Rio de Janeiro (Ba2, negative)
that has resulted in lower ridership demand in MetroRio's service
area; and (ii) increasing costs imposed by a new operating and
maintenance and service agreement on the subway line 4.

The outlook remains negative in face of MetroRio's large upcoming
debt maturities of approximately BRL480 million through mid-2018
and uncertainties on the refinancing strategy amid volatile market

MetroRio's Ba2 global scale credit profile remains underpinned by
its strong and predictable operating cash flows, supported by a
long-term concession contract to operate the subway lines 1 and 2
in the city of Rio de Janeiro through 2038. As a regulated
concession, MetroRio is entitled to receive annual tariff
adjustments indexed to the domestic inflation as well as
regulatory allowances to earn return on its investments. The
ratings also consider the decreasing capital investment
requirements following completion of new stations and improved
connectivity with the new subway line 4. Those recent
developments, coupled with a clear comparative advantage of subway
over other means of transportation in its service area, should
contribute to revenues resuming a solid growth path once the
market fundamentals improve.

Despite Brazil's (Ba2 negative) recent recession, MetroRio
reported a relevant growth in ridership through 2016, evidenced by
a 2.7% increase in paying passengers when compared to 2015.
Revenue growth was further boosted by a 10.8% increase in tariffs
granted in April 2016, in line with inflation. Since then, traffic
volumes have significantly deteriorated, reflecting a slowdown of
the economic activity in the city of Rio de Janeiro after the
completion of infrastructure developments for the 2016 Summer
Olympic Games, as well as lower investment rates in the oil & gas
and related services. During the first quarter of 2017, MetroRio's
ridership decreased 14.5%, compared to the same quarter in 2016.
The lower demand in 2017 will be partially mitigated by a 4.9%
increase in tariffs that was granted last April. But if there is
no reversal in traffic trends, net revenues will likely by
decrease 5% towards year end.

Another source of negative pressure on MetroRio's credit metrics
in 2017 will come from the new operating and service agreement
with the Concessionaria Rio Barra (CRB) for the new subway line 4.
Moody's estimates this contract will result in about BRL45 million
of incremental expenses to MetroRio in 2017, leading to a further
deterioration in its EBITDA margin to the low thirties, down from
the mid-forties over the last five years. MetroRio's compensation
for the incremental operating and maintenance costs depends on the
effective breakeven and successful ramp-up of line 4, which will
happen only after 2019.

MetroRio's liquidity is currently tight. The company has
approximately BRL480 million in debt maturities through mid-2018
that compares to a cash balance of approximately BRL63 million as
of March 31 2017, and BRL60 million in expected free cash flow
generation over the next twelve months. So far, MetroRio has been
able to raise financing from both public as well as private banks
on a timely fashion, but the volatile market conditions and
tighter financial covenants could reflect in shorter tenors and
higher costs for the company.

The affirmation of the Ba2/ ratings assigned to LAMSA's
debentures reflect the company's strong credit metrics and
predicable operating cash flows, supported by robust toll road
asset features, resilient urban traffic profile and long remaining
concession life through 2037. Notwithstanding the strong
fundamentals of LAMSA's concessions, its ratings are somewhat
constrained by the credit profile of MetroRio, due to a cross
default provision embedded in its loan documents.


In light of the negative outlook, an upgrade of MetroRio's ratings
is unlikely in the near term. However, evidence of a reversal in
MetroRio's ridership growth trend along with an anticipated
improvement in the company's liquidity position will contribute to
a rating outlook stabilization. An upgrade of the LAMSA's rating
is also unlikely in the near term, since it remains limited by
Brazil's sovereign rating (Ba2, negative).

Sustained drop in passenger demand for MetroRio's concession that
results in net revenues to decline more than 5% on a year-over-
year basis through December 2017 will exert downward ratings
pressure as well as rising operating costs that increase the
likelihood of financial covenant's breach. Further deterioration
in the in liquidity profile, prolonged delay to refinance short
term debt maturities or Moody's perception of reduced support from
the shareholders, will also increase downward pressure on
MetroRio's ratings. Quantitatively, a rating downgrade could occur
if RCF/Net Debt stays below 7% (11.7% as of March 31,2017), and
Funds from Operations (FFO) Interest coverage remains below 2.0x
(2.1x as of March 31,2017) for an extended period.

LAMSA's ratings could be downgraded if there is a sustainable
deterioration of its credit metrics and liquidity so that its RCF/
CAPEX ratio stays below 1.0x (2.6x as of March 31, 2017), and the
Cash Interest Coverage falls below 3.0x (2.9x as of March
31,2017). A LAMSA's rating downgrade would also be considered with
deterioration on MetroRio's credit profile, or in the level of
regulatory support, such as a prolonged suspension of toll tariff
adjustments or political interference in the normal course of its

Concessao Metroviaria do Rio de Janeiro S.A. (MetroRio) is an
urban railway passenger transportation company, which has the
concession rights to operate Lines 1 and 2 of the subway system in
the City of Rio de Janeiro comprising an extension of 42 km and 36
stations. The concession rights granted by the State Government of
Rio de Janeiro in 1998 and regulated by AGETRANSP is valid for a
40-year period through January 2038. Since September 2016,
MetroRio is also part on the operation and maintenance of Rio de
Janeiro's subway system's Line 4, adding 12.7 kilometers and 5
stations to its operations. In the last twelve months ended March
31 2017, MetroRio reported net revenues (excluding construction
revenues) of BRL875 million and net profits of BRL26 million.

Linha Amarela S.A.(LAMSA) has the concession to operate the toll
road services of a 20-km urban route in the City of Rio de
Janeiro, Brazil. The concession was granted by the Municipality of
Rio de Janeiro (Ba2; negative) in 1994, and toll road operation
started in 1998, for a 25-year period. On May 14, 2010, LAMSA
signed an amendment to its concession contract, whereby the
Municipality of Rio de Janeiro (the Granting Authority) granted a
15-year extension of the Concession, until December 2037. In the
last twelve months ended March 31 2017, LAMSA reported net
revenues (excluding construction revenues) of BRL251 million and
net profits of BRL80 million.

MetroRio and LAMSA are wholly owned by Investimentos e
Participacoes em Infraestrutura S.A. - INVEPAR (B2/;
negative), a holding company controlled by three of the largest
Brazilian pension funds (PREVI, FUNCEF and PETROS) as well as the
construction company OAS S.A. (rating withdrawn).

The principal methodology used in rating Concessao Metroviaria do
Rio de Janeiro S/A was Global Passenger Railway Companies
published in June 2017. The principal methodology used in rating
Linha Amarela S.A. was Privately Managed Toll Roads published in
May 2014.

D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REP: Prices Up .6% in June, Paced by Goods & Services
Dominican Today reports that Dominican Republic's Central Bank
said June prices climbed 0.06% compared with May this year, while
accumulated inflation during the first six months (January-June)
stands at 1.02%.

It said annualized inflation, measured from June 2016 to June
2017, was located at 2.55%, "below the lower limit of the
established target range in the Monetary Program for 2017 of 4.0%
(Ò 1.0%)," according to Dominican Today.

On its website, the Central Bank adds hat June inflation responds
to higher prices in the Goods and Services group (0.29%), the
report notes.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
May 1, 2017, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB-/B' long- and
short-term sovereign credit ratings on the Dominican Republic.
The outlook remains stable.  The transfer and convertibility (T&C)
assessment is unchanged at 'BB+'.

* DOMINICAN REP: RD$500MM in Bonds to Help Low-Cost Home Buyers
Dominican Today reports that Presidency Chief of Staff Gustavo
Montalvo announced the Government's low-cost housing construction
policy, and a RD$500 million in bonds for first-time home buyers.

"Decent housing is a yearning for each person and each family.
It's one of the fundamental pillars of human development and,
therefore, is a priority for the government," said Mr. Montalvo,
during the Housing Builders and Promoters Association (ACOPROVI)
luncheon, according to Dominican Today.

The official said the Government has disbursed more than RD$500
million in housing bonds, benefiting more than 4,100 for first-
time buyers, the report notes.

Mr. Montalvo said President Danilo Medina's administration is also
determined to assist low income families, with ongoing studies to
define new housing models to be developed through a trust, with a
RD$700,000 cost limit, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
May 1, 2017, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB-/B' long- and
short-term sovereign credit ratings on the Dominican Republic.
The outlook remains stable.  The transfer and convertibility (T&C)
assessment is unchanged at 'BB+'.

P U E R T O    R I C O

CONDADO RESTAURANT: Plan Outline Okayed, Plan Hearing on Oct. 25
Condado Restaurant Group, Inc., and Restaurant Associates of
Puerto Rico, Inc., are now a step closer to emerging from Chapter
11 protection after a bankruptcy judge approved the outline of
their plan of reorganization.

Judge Brian Tester of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Puerto Rico
gave the thumbs-up to the disclosure statement after finding that
it contains "adequate information."

A court hearing to consider confirmation of the plan is scheduled
for October 25, at 2:00 p.m.  The hearing will take place at the
Jose V. Toledo Federal Building & U.S. Courthouse, Courtroom No.
1, Second Floor, 300 Del Recinto Sur Street, Old San Juan, Puerto

Any objection to confirmation of the plan must be filed no later
than seven days prior to the hearing.

                    About Condado Restaurant

Condado Restaurant Group, Inc., and Restaurant Associates of
Puerto Rico filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection (Bankr. D.
P.R. Case Nos. 16-01329 and 16-01330) on Feb. 24, 2016.  The
petitions were signed by Dayn Smith, president.  The Debtors'
cases were consolidated on May 12, 2016, in lead Case No. 16-

The Debtors are represented by Javier A. Vega Villalba, Esq., at
Weinstein Bacal & Miller, PSC.  The Debtor hired Acosta & Ramirez
as financial consultant.

Condado Restaurant Group, Inc. estimated assets and liabilities at
$1 million to $10 million.  Restaurant Associates of Puerto Rico,
Inc., estimated less than $500,000 in assets and $1 million to $10
million in liabilities.

GOODMAN AND DOMINGUEZ: Simon Property Wants New Cases Tossed
Goodman and Dominguez, Inc., owner of Traffic Shoes stores in the
U.S. and Mexico, commenced new Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases on
June 9, 2017, less than six months after obtaining court approval
of a reorganization plan that allowed existing owner David Goodman
retain control of the business and touted a recovery of at least
26.9% for unsecured creditors.

Two days later, on June 11, 2017, Simon Property Group promptly
filed a motion to dismiss the new Chapter 11 cases of Goodman and
Dominguez and its affiliates.

Simon Property Group stated in court filings, "After the
Reorganized Debtors defaulted on their post-confirmation
obligations to Simon and other landlords to pay rent under certain
nonresidential real property leases assumed under a confirmed and
effective Chapter 11 plan of reorganization that the Reorganized
Debtors have admitted has not been substantially consummated, the
Reorganized Debtors filed new Chapter 11 petitions to (i) avoid
the express result of Section 365(g)(2)(a) of the Bankruptcy Code,
which would grant Simon administrative expense priority for its
unpaid rent and rejection damages claims based upon the
Reorganized Debtors' post-assumption rejection of such leases,
(ii) improperly obtain a second 120-day period to assume or reject
nonresidential real property leases that have already been
assumed, and (iii) improperly interpose a new automatic stay to
forestall the efforts of Simon to evict the Reorganized Debtors
and obtain possession of the premises under the defaulted leases.
However, the Reorganized Debtors cannot be debtors in simultaneous
Chapter 11 cases seeking to reorganize the same debts and, in any
event, the new Chapter 11 cases were filed in a bad faith."

                         Timeline of Cases

On Jan. 4, 2016, Goodwin and Dominguez and its affiliates Traffic,
Inc., Traffic Las Plazas, Inc., and Traffic Plaza Del Norte, Inc.,
commenced Chapter 11 cases ("Pending Chapter 11 Cases").

On Sept. 14, 2016, the Court in the Pending Chapter 11 Cases
granted the Debtors' Motion to Assume Unexpired Leases for
Non-Residential Real Property and approved the assumption of
several leases.

On Dec. 28, 2016, in the Pending Chapter 11 Cases, the Court
entered an Order Confirming the Second Amended Plan of
Reorganization dated Nov. 4, 2016, that was proposed by the
Debtors and the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors.  A copy
of the Plan is available at:

Under the Plan, unsecured claims held by vendors totaling $4.03
million and holders of lease rejections claims totaling $621,000
were slated to have a recovery of 26.9%.  General unsecured
creditors were to receive (i) a pro rata share of $1.25 million in
cash over a three-year period of the Plan, (ii) 50% percent of any
excess cash flow generated by the Debtors' business between the
Effective Date and Dec. 31, 2020, and (iii) 50% of the net
proceeds of causes of action.

According to Simon Property Group, pursuant to the confirmed plan
in the Pending Chapter 11 Cases, the Debtors assumed numerous
non-residential leases, including 12 leases held by Simon (the
"Simon Leases").

The Effective Date of the Plan occurred on Jan. 17, 2017.

As a result of the Reorganized Debtors' failure to make the
initial installment payment of $325,000 to the general unsecured
creditors required under the terms of the Plan, on March 1, 2017,
the Creditors' Committee filed a motion to enforce the
Confirmation Order or to undo the effective date of the Plan and
convert the cases to Chapter 7 (the "Enforcement/Conversion
Motion").  The Enforcement/Conversion Motion was scheduled to be
heard on June 12, 2017.

As a result of the Reorganized Debtors' post-confirmation defaults
on the Simon Leases assumed under the confirmed Plan, on April 27,
2017, Simon filed a Motion for Relief from Stay or, in the
Alternative, an Order Compelling Debtor to Immediately Pay
Post-Confirmation Rent (the "Stay Relief Motion").  Simon's Stay
Relief Motion was also scheduled to be heard on June 12, 2017.

Thereafter CBL & Associates Management, Inc., GGP Limited
Partnership, and Dolphin Mall Associates, LLC, also filed motions
for stay relief based upon the Reorganized Debtors' defaults in
payment of their assumed leases.

On May 26, 2017, the Reorganized Debtors filed a Motion to Modify
Second Amended Plan of Reorganization alleging unforeseen
circumstances involving the deterioration of the retailers in
shopping malls (the "Motion to Modify").  In the Motion to Modify,
the Reorganized Debtors admit that the Pending Chapter 11 Cases
have not been substantially consummated.

On June 9, 2017, the Reorganized Debtors filed voluntary petitions
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code commencing the instant
Chapter 11 cases (the "New Chapter 11 Cases").

                      Two Simultaneous Cases

The New Chapter 11 Cases must be dismissed for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction because a chapter 11 debtor may not
seek to reorganize the same debts in two simultaneously pending
chapter 11 cases

Freshman v. Atkins, 269 U.S. 121 (1925) prohibits simultaneous
bankruptcy cases involving the same debts.  Under In re Delaware
Valley Broadcasters LP, 166 B.R. 36, 38-39 (Bankr. D. Del. 1994),
simultaneous bankruptcy petition may not proceed if the prior
confirmed plan has not been consummated, no final degree has been
entered, and the case has remained open.

According to Simon, because the Reorganized Debtors have not
substantially consummated the confirmed Plan, the Reorganized
Debtor are still subject to the jurisdiction of this Court in the
Pending Chapter 11 Cases. Accordingly, until the Reorganized
Debtors' plan in the Pending Chapter 11 Cases is substantially
consummated or the Pending Chapter 11 Cases are dismissed, the
Reorganized Debtors cannot be debtors in the New Chapter 11 Cases.

Simon Property Group's attorneys:

         BUSH ROSS, P.A.
         Adam Lawton Alpert
         Post Office Box 3913
         Tampa, Florida 33601-3913
         Tel: (813) 224-9255
         Fax: (813) 223-9620

                   About Goodman and Dominguez

Goodwin and Dominguez, Inc. and its affiliated entities own and
operate a closely-held business in the retail shoe industry and
on-line sales via e-commerce at
The business, which started in Miami in 1989 with just one store,
strives to provide the hottest footwear to a fashion forward,
budget conscious consumer.

On Jan. 4, 2016, Goodwin and Dominguez and its affiliates
co-debtors Traffic, Inc., Traffic Las Plazas, Inc., and Traffic
Plaza Del Norte, Inc., filed voluntary petitions for relief under
chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code and those cases remain pending
and are jointly administered under Case No. 16-10056.

When they sought bankruptcy protection in 2016, the Debtors
operated 83 mall-based stores located in 9 states within the U.S.
and Puerto Rico and employed 608 employees.  Upon the effective
date of the reorganization plan confirmed December 2016, the
Debtors expected to continue operating 62 mall-based stores with
477 employees.

The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors formed in the
original cases tapped Christopher A. Jarvinen and the Law Firm of
Berger Singerman LLP as counsel and KapilaMukamal as financial

On June 9, 2017, Goodwin and Dominguez and its affiliated debtors
commenced new Chapter 11 cases (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Lead Case No.

Goodwin and Dominguez estimated $1 million to $10 million in
assets and liabilities.

The Hon. Robert A Mark is the case judge.

Meland Russin & Budwick, P.A., is serving as counsel to the
Debtors.  It also served as counsel to the Debtors in the original

GOODMAN AND DOMINGUEZ: U.S. Trustee Unable to Appoint Committee
The Office of the U.S. Trustee on July 10 disclosed in a court
filing that no official committee of unsecured creditors has been
appointed in the Chapter 11 case of Goodman and Dominguez, Inc.

Goodman is represented by:

     Joshua W. Dobin, Esq.
     Meland Russin & Budwick, P.A.
     200 S Biscayne Blvd., Suite 3200
     Miami, FL 33131
     Tel: (305) 358-6363

                About Goodman and Dominguez Inc.

Goodman and Dominguez, Inc. is a footwear retailer based in
Florida.  Founded in 1989, the Debtor operates the Traffic Shoes
chain in the US and Puerto Rico.  It previously filed for
protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code on Jan. 4, 2016
(Bank. S.D. Fla. Case No. 16-10056).

The Debtor sought protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Case No. 17-17237) on June 9, 2017.  David
Goodman, president, signed the petition.

Judge Robert A. Mark presides over the case.

At the time of the filing, the Debtor disclosed that it had
estimated assets and liabilities of $1 million to $10 million.

GOODMAN AND DOMINGUEZ: Case Summary & 20 Top Unsecured Creditors
Lead Debtor: Goodman and Dominguez, Inc.
             dba Traffic
             dba Traffic Shoe
             dba Goodman & Dominguez, Inc.
             dba Traffic Shoes
             dba Traffic Shoe, Inc.
             10701 NW 127 St
             Medley, FL 33178

Business Description: Goodman and Dominguez, Inc., is a footwear
                      retailer based in Florida.  Founded in 1989,

                      the Company operates the Traffic Shoes chain

                      in the US and Puerto Rico.  The Debtor
                      previously filed for protection under
                      Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code on Jan. 4,

                       2016 (Bank. S.D. Fla. Case No. 16-10056).

                      Web site:

Chapter 11 Petition Date: June 9, 2017

Affiliated debtors that filed Chapter 11 petitions on June 9,

    Debtor                                       Case No.
    ------                                       --------
    Goodman and Dominguez, Inc.                  17-17237
    Traffic, Inc.                                17-17239
    Traffic Las Plazas, Inc.                     17-17240
    Traffic Plaza del Norte, Inc.                17-17241

Court: United States Bankruptcy Court
       Southern District of Florida (Miami)

Judge: Hon. Robert A Mark

Debtors' Counsel: Joshua W Dobin, Esq.
                  MELAND RUSSIN & BUDWICK, P.A.
                  200 S Biscayne Blvd # 3200
                  Miami, FL 33131
                  Tel: (305) 358-6363

Estimated Assets: $1 million to $10 million

Estimated Liabilities: $1 million to $10 million

The petition was signed by David Goodman, president.

Goodman and Dominguez's list 20 largest unsecured creditors is
available for free at:


HAIRLAND CORP: Hearing on Plan and Disclosures Set for August 1
Judge Enrique S. Lamoutte Inclan of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for
the District of Puerto Rico conditionally approved Hairland
Corporation's disclosure statement with respect to its Chapter 11
plan filed on June 27, 2017.

August 1, 2017, at 10:00 A.M. is fixed for the hearing on final
approval of the disclosure statement and for the hearing on
confirmation of the plan at the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Puerto Rico, Jose V. Toledo Fed. Bldg. & U.S.
Courthouse, 300 Recinto Sur, Courtroom No. 2, Floor 2, San Juan,
Puerto Rico.

Three days prior to the hearing is fixed as the last day for
filing written acceptances or rejections to the plan.

Three days prior to the hearing is fixed as the last day for
filing and serving written objections to the disclosure statement
and confirmation of the plan.

                About Hairland Corporation

Headquartered at San Juan, Puerto Rico, Hairland Corporation
manages a barbershop.  The Debtor filed a petition for relief
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No.
17-00286) on January 23, 2017.  The Debtor is represented by Emily
Darice Davila Rivera, Esq., at the Law Office of Emily D. Davila

PUERTO RICO: Univ. Trust Seeks Appointment of Employee Committee
---------------------------------------------------------------- reported that University of Puerto Rico
Retirement System Trust filed with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court a
motion requesting appointment of an additional committee of
government employees and active pension plan participants or, in
the alternative, for the reconstitution of the official retiree
committee. The motion explains, "On behalf of all Trust
participants, particularly its 10,432 active members not currently
represented by the Retiree Committee, the Trust respectfully
requests that the Court order the appointment of an additional
committee of active government employees and pension plan
participants (an 'Employee Committee'), which should include,
among others, at least one Active Trust Participant. In the
alternative, the Trust respectfully requests that the Court order
the reconstitution of the Retiree Committee in order to exclude
any Retired Trust Participants and include at least one Active
Trust Participant."

                       About Puerto Rico

Puerto Rico is a self-governing commonwealth in association with
the United States that's facing a massive bond debt of $70
billion, a 68% debt-to-GDP ratio and negative economic growth in
nine of the last 10 years.

The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has sought bankruptcy protection,
aiming to restructure its massive $74 billion debt-load and $49
billion in pension obligations.

The debt restructuring petition was filed by Puerto Rico's
financial oversight board in U.S. District Court in Puerto Rico
(Case No. 17-01578) on May 3, 2017, and was made under Title III
of 2016's U.S. Congressional rescue law known as the Puerto Rico
Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act ("PROMESA").

The Financial Oversight and Management Board later commenced Title
III cases for the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation
(COFINA) on May 5, 2017, and the Employees Retirement System (ERS)
and the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (HTA) on
May 21.  On July 2, 2017, a Title III case was commenced for the
Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority ("PREPA").

U.S. Chief Justice John Roberts has appointed U.S. District Judge
Laura Taylor Swain to oversee the Title III cases.  The Honorable
Judith Dein, a United States Magistrate Judge for the District of
Massachusetts, has been designated to preside over matters that
may be referred to her by Judge Swain, including discovery
disputes, and management of other pretrial proceedings.

Joint administration of the Title III cases, under Lead Case No.
17-3283, was granted on June 29, 2017.

The Oversight Board has hired as advisors, Proskauer Rose LLP and
O'Neill & Borges LLC as legal counsel, McKinsey & Co. as strategic
consultant, Citigroup Global Markets as municipal investment
banker, and Ernst & Young, as financial advisor.

Martin J. Bienenstock, Esq., Scott K. Rutsky, Esq., and Philip M.
Abelson, Esq., of Proskauer Rose; and Hermann D. Bauer, Esq., at
O'Neill & Borges are onboard as attorneys.

McKinsey & Co. is the Board's strategic consultant, Ernst & Young
is the Board's financial advisor, and Citigroup Global Markets
Inc. is the Board's municipal investment banker.

Prime Clerk LLC is the claims and noticing agent. Prime Clerk
maintains a case web site at:


Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC is the service agent for ERS, HTA,
and PREPA.

O'Melveny & Myers LLP is counsel to the Commonwealth's Puerto Rico
Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority (AAFAF), the agency
responsible for negotiations with bondholders.

The Oversight Board named Professor Nancy B. Rapoport as fee
examiner and to chair a committee to review professionals' fees.

                      Bondholders' Attorneys

Toro, Colon, Mullet, Rivera & Sifre, P.S.C. and Kramer Levin
Naftalis & Frankel LLP serve as counsel to the Mutual Fund Group,
comprised of mutual funds managed by Oppenheimer Funds, Inc.,
Franklin Advisers, Inc., and the First Puerto Rico Family of
which collectively hold over $3.5 billion in COFINA Bonds and over
$2.9 billion in other bonds issued by Puerto Rico and other
instrumentalities, including over $1.8 billion of Puerto Rico
general obligation bonds ("GO Bonds").

White & Case LLP and Lopez Sanchez & Pirillo LLC represent the UBS
Family of Funds and the Puerto Rico Family of Funds, which hold
$613.3 million in COFINA bonds.

Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, Robbins, Russell,
Englert, Orseck, Untereiner & Sauber LLP, and Jimenez, Graffam &
Lausell are co-counsel to the ad hoc group of General Obligation
Bondholders, comprised of Aurelius Capital Management, LP,
Autonomy Capital (Jersey) LP, FCO Advisors LP, Franklin Mutual
Advisers LLC, Monarch Alternative Capital LP, Senator Investment
Group LP, and Stone Lion Capital Partners L.P.

Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP and Reichard & Escalera are
co-counsel to the ad hoc coalition of holders of senior bonds
issued by COFINA, comprised of at least 30 institutional holders,
including Canyon Capital Advisors LLC and Varde Investment
Partners, L.P.

Correa Acevedo & Abesada Law Offices, P.S.C., is counsel to Canyon
Capital Advisors, LLC, River Canyon Fund Management, LLC, Davidson
Kempner Capital Management LP, OZ Management, LP, and OZ
Management II LP (the QTCB Noteholder Group).


The U.S. Trustee formed a nine-member Official Committee of
Retirees and a seven-member Official Committee of Unsecured
Creditors of the Commonwealth.  The Retiree Committee tapped
& Block LLP and Bennazar, Garcia & Milian, C.S.P., as its
attorneys.   The Creditors Committee tapped Paul Hastings  LLP and
O'Neill & Gilmore LLC as counsel.

UNIVERSITY OF THE SACRED HEART: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Bond Rating
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the Ba3 rating on
University of the Sacred Heart's (Universidad del Sagrado Corazon
or Sagrado) General Revenue and Refunding Bonds, 2012A issued
through Puerto Rico Industrial, Tourist, Educational, Medical and
Environmental Pollution Control Facilities Financing Authority.
The rating outlook is negative.

The affirmation of Sagrado's Ba3 rating reflects active fiscal
management and financial oversight working to manage the
university's expense structure against enrollment and revenue
declines. Available liquidity provides some flexibility to manage
through current challenges, Further, Sagrado is distinguished in
its competitive domestic market as a large private Catholic
university located in San Juan.

As offsetting considerations, the university confronts a highly
challenging environment in its primary market, the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico (Caa3 negative). The university projects it will meet
financial covenants related to its Series 2012A bonds for fiscal
2017, after failing to do so in both fiscal 2015 and 2016.
However, Sagrado faces material market and operating pressures for
the foreseeable future. Additionally, the university is appealing
a decision by US Department of Education deeming Sagrado as not
financially responsible, which would require the university to
post a letter of credit to maintain eligibility to participate in
the federal Title IV financial aid program.

Rating Outlook

The negative outlook reflects the likelihood of a rating downgrade
if the university produces weaker than anticipated fiscal 2017
operating results or fails to achieve compliance on its financial
covenants for the year, or should the university materially fail
to meet its fall 2017 enrollment targets, continuing further
operating pressures and liquidity usage.

Factors that Could Lead to an Upgrade

Stabilized student demand with growing net tuition per student and
higher non-resident enrollment

Substantial growth in balance sheet resources and liquidity

Factors that Could Lead to a Downgrade

Department of Education denying appeal of calculation of composite
score, requiring the posting of a letter of credit to continue to
receive federal Title IV financial aid

Fall 2017 enrollment and fiscal 2017 operating results weaker than

Failure to achieve covenant compliance for fiscal 2017

Decline in unrestricted liquidity

Legal Security

The Series 2012A bonds are an unsecured general obligation of
university. There is an additional bonds test and rate covenant.
There is no debt service reserve fund.

The Loan Agreement for the bonds has two financial covenants, a
Debt Service Coverage covenant of more than 110% and a Expendable
Financial Resources to Debt covenant of more than 35%. Sagrado
failed both covenants in fiscal 2015 and 2016 but estimates it
will ample cushion for fiscal 2017 based on its preliminary
results. The negative debt service coverage is largely
attributable to pension adjustments and the charges related to its
voluntary transition program for employee retirements included in
the changes in unrestricted net assets and, consequently, in the
debt service coverage calculation for the covenant. Moody's
considers pension adjustments as non-operating expenses and,
therefore, not included in Moody's debt service coverage
calculation, resulting in a positive debt service coverage number.

Due to failing to meet the financial covenants for two consecutive
years, Sagrado retained a consultant for recommendations to review
its business operations and pricing. As long as the university is
taking all lawful actions to comply with the recommendations, the
covenant failure is not an Event of Default. On June 23, Sagrado
filed a notice on EMMA of the board's acceptance of 1) the
consultant's report and 2) management expects the university to be
in full compliance of the financial covenants as of June 30, 2017
(the fiscal year-end).

Use of Proceeds


Obligor Profile

Universidad del Sagrado Corazon (University of the Sacred Heart)
is a large, private Catholic liberal arts university founded in
1880 by the religious order of the Society of the Sacred Heart. In
1970 the Sisters of the Sacred Heart transferred the governance to
a lay Board of Trustees. Sagrado is located in the Santurce
section of San Juan, a historic area. The university is largely
undergraduate and offers selected masters and post-graduate
certificates programs. Notable programs include those in the
communications major, including digital media. Headcount
enrollment for fall 2016 was over 4,900 students.


The principal methodology used in this rating was Global Higher
Education published in November 2015.

T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O

PETROTRIN: Stakeholders Asked to Make Sacrifices
Carolyn Kissoon at Trinidad Express reports that as government
crafts solutions to keep State-owned Petrotrin afloat, every
stakeholder will be called upon to make a sacrifice, says Energy
Minister Franklin Khan.

Mr. Khan said the Government was now coming to terms with the
challenges at the oil company, according to Trinidad Express.

The report notes that Mr. Khan was addressing the issue during
"Conversations with the Prime Minister", at Point Fortin East
Secondary School.

He said: "As a Government we are going to craft solutions for
Petrotrin in the best possible way to keep that company afloat, to
keep it alive for everybody. But every single stakeholder, from
the trade union, management, from the residents of Point Fortin
has to make sacrifice. I say no more," the report notes.

Mr. Khan noted that Petrotrin had made some fundamental investment
errors in the past decade, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
April 28, 2017, Moody's Investors Service downgraded Petroleum Co.
of Trinidad & Tobago corporate family rating and senior unsecured
debt ratings to B1 from Ba3. Simultaneously, Moody's lowered
Petrotrin's Baseline Credit Assessment ("BCA") to caa1 from b3.
The outlook on the ratings is stable. The rating actions are
linked to Moody's April 25, 2017 downgrade of the government of
Trinidad & Tobago bond ratings to Ba1 from Baa3, with a stable


PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: Said to Plan Investor Calls This Week
Daniel Cancel, Katia Porzecanski, and Christine Jenkins at
Bloomberg News report that Venezuela's state oil company, one of
the most distressed credits in emerging markets, hired BancTrust &
Co. to help arrange calls with investors, according to a person
with direct knowledge of the matter.

The calls with Petroleos de Venezuela SA officials including Chief
Financial Officer Simon Zerpa, set to begin July 10, are meant to
improve communication with bond investors and will be invitation-
only to some of the company's biggest creditors and emerging-
market funds, said the person, according to Bloomberg News.  While
the company has no immediate plans to sell debt, it may weigh a
benchmark offering of senior unsecured dollar notes after the
calls, the person said, adds the report.

Bonds due this year from PDVSA yield 60 percent, one of the
highest rates in the world for non-defaulted corporate debt, on
concern the oil producer will struggle to come up with the cash it
needs to stay current on its obligations, Bloomberg News relays.
Investors have turned increasingly pessimistic as the country's
international reserves dropped to a 15-year low and anti-
government street protests heated up amid shortages of basic food
and medicine, Bloomberg News discloses.

"Given soft commodity prices, constant street protests and
political uncertainty, it is hard to see a deal getting done,"
said Ray Zucaro, the chief investment officer of Miami-based RVX
Asset Management, Bloomberg News notes.  "That said, it appears
their backs are against the wall," he added.

PDVSA officials didn't immediately reply to emails and two phone
calls seeking comment, notes the report.

Last October, the company persuaded creditors to swap their
securities for longer-dated bonds, but fell short of its goal,
Bloomberg News recalls.  The amount of bonds left untendered had
some questioning if new fundraising would follow this year.

Goldman Sachs Asset Management, which purchased $2.8 billion of
PDVSA notes at a discount in May that had been held by the central
bank, began selling some of its holdings last month to create
liquidity, Bloomberg News notes.  The transaction drew criticism
from Venezuela's opposition arguing that the cash sent a lifeline
to President Nicolas Maduro's government, Bloomberg News adds.

As reported by The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America,
S&P Global Ratings, on July 13, 2017, affirmed its 'CCC' long-term
foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.  The outlook on both long-term
ratings remains negative.  S&P also affirmed its 'C' short-term
foreign and local currency sovereign ratings.  In addition, S&P
affirmed its 'CCC' transfer and convertibility assessment on the


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B.
Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Joseph Cardillo at

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