TCRLA_Public/170803.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

               Thursday, August 3, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 153


                            Headlines



B O L I V I A

BOLIVIA: Moody's Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms Ba3 Rating


B R A Z I L

INVESTIMENTOS E PARTICIPACOES: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Global Scale CCR


C H I L E

AES GENER: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Jr Subordinate Rating, Outlook Neg
AES GENER: Fitch Puts 'BB' IDR on Rating Watch Negative


C U B A

CUBA: Drought Affecting Future Sugar Cane Harvest


M E X I C O

MEXICO: Growth Seen More Dependent on Domestic Issues


P U E R T O    R I C O

PUERTO RICO: San Juan Sues Oversight Board Over GDB Deal
PUERTO RICO: Oversight Board Opposes Bid for PREPA Receiver


S T.  K I T T S  &  N E V I S

BRITISH AMERICAN: Possible 2017 Payout for ECCU Policyholders


T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O

* TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: NGOs Face Funding Challenges


V E N E Z U E L A

CORPORACION ELECTRICA: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Long-Term IDR


X X X X X X X X X

* TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Where Will The $$ Come From?


                            - - - - -


=============
B O L I V I A
=============


BOLIVIA: Moody's Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms Ba3 Rating
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook on Bolivia's
issuer and senior unsecured bond ratings to stable from negative,
and has affirmed the ratings at Ba3.

The key drivers for the change in outlook to stable from negative
are:

1) Bolivia's stabilizing fiscal and current account deficits which
suggest that the impact of lower hydrocarbon prices on the
sovereign's credit profile has been contained;

2) Moody's expectation that Bolivia's growth, fiscal and external
metrics, although weakened, are likely to remain consistent with
its Ba3 rating.

Bolivia's Ba3 ratings reflects the sovereign's underlying credit
strengths, including robust growth which compares favorably with
Ba-rated peers and relatively strong fiscal metrics, including a
moderate debt burden with high debt affordability. Bolivia's
credit challenges relate primarily to a high degree of commodity
dependence, especially to natural gas exports, and relatively weak
institutional and policy frameworks, as reflected in low rankings
on the Worldwide Governance Indicators.

Bolivia's country ceilings are unchanged. The long-term foreign
currency bond ceiling remains at Ba2, the long-term foreign
currency deposit ceiling at B1, and the long-term local currency
bond and deposit ceilings at Ba1.

RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR CHANGING THE OUTLOOK TO STABLE

FIRST DRIVER -- STABILIZING FISCAL AND CURRENT ACCOUNT POSITIONS

Bolivia is exposed to the volatility in hydrocarbon prices, given
the country's dependence on hydrocarbon exports. Prior to the drop
in oil prices, hydrocarbon exports accounted for over 50% of
exports, and related fiscal revenues accounted for around 30% of
government revenues. Given the sovereign's large exposure to
hydrocarbon exports, the negative outlook, previously assigned to
the rating, reflected the risk the drop in oil prices would weaken
growth, fiscal and external metrics significantly.

Over the past two years, although Bolivia's fiscal and current
account positions have weakened, the extent of deterioration in
relative credit metrics has been contained. The non-financial
public sector (NFPS) fiscal deficit widened to 6.9% of GDP in
2015, and started to narrow in 2016, at 6.6% of GDP. At the
general government aggregation, the improvement in the fiscal
balance was more pronounced, coming down from a fiscal deficit of
4.5% of GDP in 2015 to 3% of GDP in 2016. The smaller deficit
corresponds to slower pace of investment spending, down from 36.1%
of GDP in 2015 to 31.4% at the end of 2016, more than offsetting
the drop in government revenues. Moody's expects a similar level
of fiscal deficits in 2017.

The current account balance turned into deficit of 5.6% of GDP in
2015 from a surplus of 1.7% in 2014, due to the drop in oil
prices. and stabilized at 5.5% of GDP in 2016. Consequently,
Bolivia's foreign exchange reserve buffer has declined over the
past two years. However, foreign exchange reserves (excluding
gold) remain large and higher than peers, standing around $8
billion or 24% of GDP at end 2016, down from $13.2 billion (43% of
GDP) at end-2014. And reserves amply cover foreign exchange
payments due. Moody's external vulnerability indicator (EVI),
measuring the ratio of external short-term debt and debt service
coming due to the stock of foreign exchange reserves, stood at
34%, compared to a Ba-median of 58% in 2016. Moody's expects the
EVI to remain low over the next 2-3 years.

SECOND DRIVER -- BOLIVIA'S CREDIT METRICS ARE EXPECTED TO REMAIN
IN LINE WITH ITS Ba3 RATING

The fiscal and external buffers that Bolivia built up during the
period of high hydrocarbon prices are likely to support the
sovereign credit profile as energy prices remain subdued. In
addition, overall GDP growth remains robust. Bolivia's average
growth of 5.3% over the last 5 years (2012-2016) has outpaced the
median of Ba-rated sovereigns of 3.3% over the same period. Growth
has slowed down slightly over the past two years, still, Moody's
expects it will remain above the median for Ba rated sovereigns.

Government debt ratios remain below the Ba-median, and Moody's
expects it will remain in line with Ba-rated peers. Bolivia's NFPS
debt, stood at 43% of GDP at end 2016, compared to a Ba-median of
48% of GDP; while Bolivia's central government debt was around 20%
of GDP. Debt affordability is much higher than Ba3 peers.

Around 45% of Bolivia's NFPS debt is denominated in foreign
currency, slightly below the Ba median of 47.9%. However, over 60%
of external debt is owed to multilateral creditors at favorable
terms and long-term maturity, which mitigates the risks posed by
the foreign currency debt. Interest payments have averaged 2.1% of
general government revenues over the past five years, compared to
the Ba median of 8.3%, and Moody's expects debt affordability to
remain stable in the coming years.

WHAT COULD MAKE THE RATING GO UP

Moody's could upgrade Bolivia's rating as a result of: (1) steady
improvement in fiscal and external balances, and a longer track
record of sound fiscal management in the context of lower
hydrocarbon prices; and (2) robust growth rates that do not rely
on fiscal and monetary stimulus to be sustained.

WHAT COULD MAKE THE RATING GO DOWN

Bolivia's Ba3 ratings could be downgraded in case of (1) a
continued material deterioration of the fiscal accounts, leading
Bolivia's government debt metrics to significantly diverge from
those observed in Ba peers; (2) a significant depletion of fiscal
and external financial buffers; or (3) a return of political
instability that leads to an elevated level of policy
unpredictability.

GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 7,208 (2016 Actual) (also known
as Per Capita Income)

Real GDP growth (% change): 4.3% (2016 Actual) (also known as GDP
Growth)

Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 4% (2016 Actual)

Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -3% (2016 Actual) (also known as
Fiscal Balance)

Current Account Balance/GDP: -5.5% (2016 Actual) (also known as
External Balance)

External debt/GDP: 21.9% (2016 Actual)

Level of economic development: Low level of economic resilience

Default history: No default events (on bonds or loans) have been
recorded since 1983.

On July 28, 2017, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of the Bolivia, Government of. The main points raised
during the discussion were: The issuer's economic fundamentals,
including its economic strength, have not materially changed. The
issuer's fiscal or financial strength, including its debt profile,
has not materially changed. The issuer's susceptibility to event
risks has not materially changed.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Sovereign Bond
Ratings published in December 2016.

The weighting of all rating factors is described in the
methodology used in this credit rating action, if applicable.



===========
B R A Z I L
===========


INVESTIMENTOS E PARTICIPACOES: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Global Scale CCR
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB-' global scale and 'brA-'
national scale corporate credit ratings on Investimentos e
Participacoes em Infraestrutura S.A. - Invepar. The outlook is
stable.

S&P said, "At the same time, we affirmed our 'brA-' national scale
corporate credit and issue-level ratings on Invepar's toll road,
Concessionaria Auto Raposo Tavares S.A. (CART). We also affirmed
CART's secured debenture recovery ratings at '4'. Finally, we
affirmed our 'brA-' issue-level rating on Invepar's third
debentures issuance, while lowering its recovery ratings to '3'.

"The rating action is supported by our positive view of Invepar's
diversified portfolio of operating assets in the transportation
infrastructure sector, including toll roads, airports, and urban
mobility (subways), which have relatively long concession tenors
and operate under a fairly stable regulatory framework in Brazil.

"We expect Invepar to slightly improve its cash flow generation in
the next two years, amid recovering traffic levels in most of its
operating assets and the consolidation of new projects, which
should allow the group to continue deleveraging, driven by modest
growth of GDP prospects for the next two years. We also believe
that capex will decrease to R$650-700 million per year, converging
to maintenance levels because mandatory investments have already
been performed--except for the highway VIA-040--and given the
existing idle capacity. As a result, we expect FFO to debt of 7.0-
7.5% and debt to EBITDA below 6.0x in the next two years--much
stronger than the 1.5% and 6.6x, respectively, in 2016--driven by
the reduction of gross debt after the asset sale of LĀ°nea Amarilla
S.A.C.(LAMSAC) in December 2016."



=========
C H I L E
=========


AES GENER: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Jr Subordinate Rating, Outlook Neg
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the Baa3 senior unsecured and
Ba2 junior subordinate ratings of AES Gener S.A. Concurrently
Moody's changed Gener's rating outlook to negative from stable.

RATING RATIONALE

The change of Gener's outlook to negative from stable largely
reflects the continued high level of uncertainty surrounding the
development of the Alto Maipo (AM) hydro-electric 531 MW project.

On July 31, Gener announced that the project had entered in
technical default following the termination of Constructora Nuevo
Maipo S.A (CNM), one of the construction consortiums involved in
the project. Alto Maipo continues to face significant construction
challenges, which directly or indirectly expose Gener to a number
of credit negative developments, including additional potential
cost overruns that, in turn, may require additional equity
contributions.

The negative outlook also factors in the potential for other risks
to emerge that could affect Gener as it seeks to resolve the
challenges at the Alto Maipo project. While Moody's acknowledges
the non-recourse nature of the project's debt, the negative
outlook factors in potential reputational and legal consequences
that could adversely affect Gener's leading position in Chile or
could result in a material non-cash impairment's (book value of
the project's long-lived assets approximates US$1.2 billion). To
date, Gener's equity commitment to the project aggregates US$619
million (including an $83 million contribution still pending)
which equals to around 22% of the company's total equity of US$2.8
billion end of March 2017. This is important because Gener's local
bonds include a financial covenant to maintain minimum
shareholder's equity of at least US$1.57 billion.

Alto Maipo's technical default was triggered by the termination of
CNM, owing to contract breaches. Alto Maipo has taken control of
the works assigned to CNM (equivalent to around one third of the
project's scope) while it seeks a replacement. Concurrently, the
excavation works are progressing at levels materially below the
original expectations. As a result, Alto Maipo is likely to face
additional delays and cost overruns that could exceed the April
2017 initial estimates of US$460 million. Based on the April 2017
cost overruns, Moody's estimates that the project's cost
approximates US$4,700/MW which already compares poorly with other
hydro-electric projects recently completed in the region.
Incremental cost overruns will further weaken the economics of
this project, another credit negative for Gener.

The technical default prevents AM from disbursing additional funds
under its US$1.3 billion committed non-recourse project credit
facility (currently outstanding amount: US$613 million). Moody's
understands that the project's cash balance, includes US$73
million in bank guarantees collected in connection with the
termination of CNM. Gener believes that the project's cash balance
along with its pending contributions provides Alto Maipo with
enough liquidity to satisfy any claims that could arise should the
project be unable to continue.

The affirmation of Gener's Baa3 rating acknowledges its strong
liquidity profile including US$503 million in cash end of March
2017 and its fully available US$230 million committed credit
facility scheduled to expire in October 2018.

Factors that Could Lead to an Upgrade

Given the negative outlook, limited prospects exist for an upgrade
of Gener's rating. An outlook stabilization could result after
Moody's gains more certainty regarding the future of the project
and potential implications for Gener's business risk profile and
financial performance.

Factors that Could Lead to a Downgrade

Downward pressure could result if Moody's perceives further
deterioration of Gener's business or credit profile following
decisions related to the Alto Maipo project, including the
requirement of additional contributions to the project funded with
debt and the lack of a clear path to successfully complete the
project without further significant delays. Gener's rating could
be downgraded if Moody's anticipates that Gener's debt/EBITDA and
FFO/debt will remain above 4.0x and below 18%, respectively, after
2018. Gener's inability to maintain its long-term contracted
operations, and/or if it re-contracts its load at prices
significantly below US$60/MWh (2018 real prices) is also likely to
trigger downward pressure on the rating.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Unregulated
Utilities and Unregulated Power Companies published in May 2017.


AES GENER: Fitch Puts 'BB' IDR on Rating Watch Negative
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed AES Gener S.A.'s ratings on Rating Watch
Negative including the company's 'BBB-' Long-Term Foreign Currency
and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDR), its 'BB'
outstanding junior subordinated notes and its 'A+(cl)' national
scale rating. Fitch has also placed AES Gener's affiliates -
Empresa Electrica Angamos, Guacolda Energia and Sociedad Electrica
Santiago on Rating Watch Negative.

The Rating Watch Negative follows July 31's announcement regarding
delays and difficulties surrounding the construction of Alto Maipo
SpA's generation plant, which heightens risks for AES Gener and
could pressure its balance sheet. AES Gener would need to either
find a solution to make the construction viable or decide to
terminate the project. If AES Gener moves forward with the
construction, it will need to quantify the cost overruns and the
commercial implications of the construction delay. The impact of
both scenarios could be negative for the company's credit quality.

The Rating Watch Negative will be resolved when AES Gener
announces a decision on whether to continue with Alto Maipo's
construction or terminates the project. A decision to continue
with Alto Maipo's construction will also require negotiating with
the project creditors as the entity is currently under technical
default and is unable to draw more funds from its financing.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Additional Cost Overruns Negative for AES Gener: Substantial cost
overruns at Alto Maipo, combined with significant completion
delays, may result in a material and sustained deterioration of
AES Gener's credit metrics. In a scenario of significant
additional cost overruns, Fitch conservatively assumes that equity
contribution from AES Gener to Alto Maipo will need to be financed
with recourse debt; Fitch expects additional debt at AES Gener
level to trigger a downgrade of the company's ratings given its
currently pressured credit metrics.

Alto Maipo Cancelation Potentially Negative: In an event where AES
Gener does not continue with the construction contracts of Alto
Maipo, the company will need to contribute USD83 million of
pending capital commitments and face all termination costs related
to its affiliate. AES Gener's exposure, in addition to
reputational damage, will be limited to the capital commitments
and termination cost as the outstanding financial debt of USD613
million at Alto Maipo has no recourse to AES Gener. AES Gener will
declare the USD536 million already contributed to the project as
impairment. Although the deconsolidation of Alto Maipo from AES
Gener will accelerate the strengthening of the company's credit
metrics, the potential reputational risk could severely damage AES
Gener's financial flexibility.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

AES Gener capital structure remains pressured and in the high end
of its rating category relative to its peers: Enel Generacion
('BBB+'/Outlook Positive), Colbun ('BBB'/Outlook Stable) and Engie
Energia Chile ('BBB'/Outlook Stable), given the company's
aggressive expansion plan during the last few years. AES Gener
benefits from geographical diversification with operating assets
in Chile, Colombia, and to a lesser extent, in the slightly
improving regulatory environment of Argentina. In addition, the
company has no exposure to hydrological conditions in Chile or
Argentina, concentrating its hydro assets in Boyaca, Colombia.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within its ratings case for the issuer
include:

-- Cochrane continues being a positive contributor for AES Gener;
-- No debt repayment during 2017-2019. Hybrid issuance is
    considered with 50% equity credit;
-- Dividend pay-out ratio of 100% net income;
-- Angamos' base case forecast is pared back to reflect lower
    spot prices as 80 MW in capacity is sold in the spot market
    until the Quebrada Blanca contract goes online in 2018.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Rating Watch will be resolved once the medium term
capital structure of AES Gener is defined following a final
decision on the status of Alto Maipo's power generation assets,
combined with the resolution of the technical default event at
Alto Maipo. Fitch continues to assess the ongoing developments
with the construction of Alto Maipo's generation assets and
expects to resolve the Rating Watch Negative once more information
is available or the company makes a decision regarding this
project.

Although a positive rating action is not expected in the
foreseeable future, Fitch will view positively a funding structure
that prioritizes consolidated debt-to-EBITDA ratios between 3.0x-
3.5x.

LIQUIDITY

AES Gener's liquidity is supported by USD513 million of cash on
hand against USD220 million of short-term debt as of March 31,
2017. The company enjoys an extended maturity profile, with over
60% of debt coming due after 2022. Liquidity is further buoyed by
committed and uncommitted credit lines of approximately USD239
million and undrawn credit lines totalling USD224 million.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has placed the following ratings of AES Gener on Rating
Watch Negative:

-- Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings
    (IDRs) 'BBB-';
-- International senior unsecured bond ratings 'BBB-';
-- International junior subordinated bond ratings 'BB';
-- Long-term national scale rating 'A+(cl)';
-- National senior unsecured bond ratings 'A+(cl)';

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings of AES Gener:
-- National equity rating at 'Primera Clase Nivel 2(cl)'.

Fitch has placed the following ratings of Guacolda Energia S.A. on
Rating Watch Negative:
-- Long-Term Foreign and Local currency IDRs 'BBB-';
-- International senior unsecured bond ratings 'BBB-'.

Fitch has placed the following ratings of Empresa Electrica
Angamos S.A. on Rating Watch Negative:
-- Long-Term Foreign and Local currency IDRs 'BBB-';
-- International senior secured bond ratings 'BBB-'.

Fitch has placed the following ratings of Sociedad Electrica
Santiago SA on Rating Watch Negative:
-- Long-term national scale rating 'A(cl)';
-- National senior unsecured bond ratings 'A(cl)';



=======
C U B A
=======


CUBA: Drought Affecting Future Sugar Cane Harvest
-------------------------------------------------
Caribbean News Now reports that the drought that has affected Cuba
since 2015 is delaying the sowing time of sugar cane in Villa
Clara province, especially in areas located in the north of the
province, because it impedes irrigation of the soil destined for
this crop.

Andres Duran Fundora, the provincial director of AZCUBA, the state
entity responsible for the cultivation and production of sugar
cane, told the press that the levels of the reservoirs in the
territory are low, and limiting the use of water for agricultural
purposes, according to Caribbean News Now.

About 40 percent of the sugar cane plantations are located in the
northern part of Villa Clara, he said, the report relays.

Mr. Fundora commented that experts are analyzing the effects in
the area and evaluating the real situation, to take action, and
look for alternatives to guarantee the sowing of the sugar cane
destined for the upcoming harvest, the report notes.

Representative of AZCUBA in Villa Clara, Norbelio Machado,
explained that the lack of rain and the reduced availability of
water resulted in incomplete sowing in the first half of the year,
the report discloses.

By the end of June, 93 percent of the planned sowing in the area
was completed and 903 hectares (2,231 acres) were left unplanted,
the specialist said, the report says.

The report discloses that Mr. Machado added that, despite the
current situation, they continue to sow in the province and during
the first week of July they had already covered 494 hectares.

The major effects and difficulties were concentrated in the
northern part of the province and that is why they are working in
the rest of the territory where recent rain facilitated the work,
the report says.

The report relays that Mr. Machado highlighted the importance of
new technology with the use of five seeding machines with high
productivity.  These machines replace the work of some 120 people
and maintain working hours of between 10 and 12 hours a day,
during which they can sow some ten hectares, the report notes.

Another alternative applied to ease the effects of the drought is
an increase in a method called sowing on a wide base, the report
relays.

The specialist said that with this technique, over 10,800 hectares
will be covered, which should contribute between 25 to 30 percent
more sugar cane, the report says.

Mr. Machado stressed that the increase is vital to expand the
industrial capacity of Villa Clara, currently at 65 percent, the
report notes.

The factories in the territory can process enough raw material to
reach up to 450,000 tons of sugar in one harvest, the report adds.



===========
M E X I C O
===========


MEXICO: Growth Seen More Dependent on Domestic Issues
-----------------------------------------------------
Anthony Harrup at The Wall Street Journal reports that private
economists surveyed last month by the Bank of Mexico kept their
expectations for economic growth this year at 2%, but put domestic
matters such as politics and public security at the top of the
list of things that could stymie the economy.

The survey, published, shows growth estimates have picked up from
the start of the year, when concerns about strained U.S.-Mexican
trade and investment relations under the administration of
President Donald Trump led business and consumer confidence to
sink, according to The Wall Street Journal.

Foreign direct investment in Mexico has remained steady, and
negotiations to update the 23-year-old North American Free Trade
Agreement, due to start mid-August, are no longer expected to
disrupt the trade on which Mexico relies heavily, the report
relays.

Potential obstacles to growth most mentioned in the central bank's
July survey of 35 analysts were internal political uncertainty and
problems with public security, followed by Mexico's low oil
production and rising inflation, the report says.  The level of
concern averaged 5.3 on a scale of 1 to 7, where 7 indicates the
most limitations to growth, the report notes.

In January, the main problems were seen as international political
instability, weakness in export demand and the global economy, and
international financial instability, the report discloses.

As concerns about the "Trump effect" fade, analysts are turning
their sights to rising criminal violence in Mexico and next year's
presidential election, in which opinion polls show leftist
presidential hopeful Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador leading voter
preferences, the report relays.

Although polls at this early stage should be taken with a grain of
salt, "a potential Lopez Obrador victory would increase the
likelihood of a market selloff," Nomura strategist Benito Berber
said in a July 20 report, the report notes.

On the security front, the National Statistics Institute reported
last week that the country's murder rate rose to 20 per 100,000
inhabitants in 2016 from 17 in 2015, and government data show
homicides rising sharply this year, the report relays.  The murder
rate was 24 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2011, the report notes.

Despite those concerns, business and consumer confidence have been
recovering, the report relays.  The peso is at its strongest level
in more than a year, the economy grew about 2.3% in the first half
of 2017, and unemployment is at an 11-year low, the report says.

A fifth of the analysts in the July survey considered now a good
time to invest in Mexico, compared with none in November, in the
wake of the U.S. election, the report notes. Inflation
expectations held steady at 6% for 2017, and the median estimate
for the year-end exchange rate was 18.38 pesos to the U.S. dollar,
compared with 18.70 in June, the report adds.



======================
P U E R T O    R I C O
======================


PUERTO RICO: San Juan Sues Oversight Board Over GDB Deal
--------------------------------------------------------
The Autonomous Municipality of San Juan commenced a lawsuit
against the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto
Rico, the Government Development Bank of Puerto Rico, and the
Puerto Rico Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority
(D.P.R.), seeking a declaratory judgment that the Restructuring
Support Agreement ("RSA") to restructure the debts of the
Government Development Bank of Puerto Rico ("GDB") under Title VI
of PROMESA is, among others, invalid.

San Juan is the capital and most populous municipality in Puerto
Rico.  As of July 1, 2016, the City had an estimated population of
347,052 inhabitants and a daily number of visitors, which brings
its population to approximately 1 million per day.  The City is
home to over 10,000 businesses and provides employment for over
195,000 individuals who reside in Puerto Rico.

Created in 1942, GDB is a public corporation and instrumentality
of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.  The GDB holds a substantial
sum of monies belonging to the people of San Juan in the form of
general deposits, as well as special deposits held in trust at the
GDB pursuant to the Puerto Rico Municipal Financial Act of 1996.

The GDB is the trustee of a trust account established by the
Municipal Revenue Collection Center (the "CRIM") known as the
Municipal Public Debt Redemption Fund (the "Fondo"), which has an
account for each municipality in which CRIM deposits the entire
amount of the Additional Special Contribution ("CAE") tax imposed
by each municipality, which is needed to service the
municipalities' general obligation bonds or notes.  In the event
that the amount of CAE in the Fondo in a given year exceeds the
debt service due that year, Puerto Rican Law and the trust
agreement between the CRIM and GDB require that GDB return any
over deposited CAE ("Excess CAE") to the municipality.

San Juan says that a substantial amount of deposits belonging to
San Juan have been trapped at the GDB for well over a year
consisting of: municipal deposits related to, among other things,
the portion of the sales tax corresponding to the municipalities
(the "IVU," as it is referred to in Spanish), funds for the
betterment of schools and other similar amounts as well as Excess
CAE funds that belong to the City under the Trust Agreement.  The
GDB has admitted that it is holding approximately $152 million
that belongs to San Juan.

On July 14, 2017, the Financial Oversight and Management Board for
Puerto Rico ("Oversight Board") conditionally certified a
Restructuring Support Agreement ("RSA") to restructure the debts
of the Government Development Bank of Puerto Rico ("GDB") under
Title VI of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic
Stability Act, 48 U.S.C. Sec. 2101-2241 ("PROMESA").

Title VI of PROMESA established a framework for restructuring
"Bond Claims" with less than the unanimous support of the affected
bondholders, and with significantly less court involvement and
protection for affected parties than in a full-blown Title III
case.  Title VI is not an all-purpose restructuring tool like
Title III.  Instead, as set forth in Sections 104(i)(1) and 601
(48 U.S.C. Sec. 2124(i)(1), 2231) of PROMESA, Title VI is a
targeted mechanism pursuant to which only "Bond Claims" may be
restructured.

San Juan points out that the RSA provides:

     * Property tax revenues held in a trust pursuant to a trust
agreement at GDB for the benefit of San Juan and other
municipalities will be appropriated and used to pay creditors,
including public bondholders.

     * San Juan and other municipalities who maintain deposits
established pursuant to statutes of Puerto Rico at the GDB will be
barred from setting off the amount of their deposits in the GDB
against the amount of their debts to the GDB.

The City of San Juan said it was excluded by the GDB and the
Puerto Rico Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority
("AAFAF") from negotiations that led to the RSA.

In addition, the GDB and AAFAF have grouped San Juan and other
municipal depositors together with all of the GDB's other
creditors in one single voting pool.  According to San Juan, this
is improper because, among other reasons, the claims of San Juan
and other municipalities are secured (at least in part) by, for
example, their setoff rights.

After the GDB RSA was announced, the market price of GDB bonds
jumped from a range of 21 to 23 cents on the dollar to a range of
30 to 35 cents on the dollar.  San Juan claims that by improperly
classifying all of its bondholders and municipal depositors
together in one voting pool as "creditors," the GDB could
conceivably obtain the required approval of such pool, even if
almost none of the adversely affected municipalities voted in
favor of the RSA.

Accordingly, San Juan now brings this action seeking (1) a
declaratory judgment that the RSA is invalid for violating PROMESA
because (a) it fails to provide a separate voting pool for
municipal depositors with setoff rights, (b) it purports to
provide for a "settlement" of funds held in trust that are San
Juan's property and are not subject to restructuring under Title
VI, and (c) it violates PROMESA's transparency requirements; (2) a
declaratory judgment that PROMESA preempts Puerto Rican laws and
executive orders that purport to stop withdrawals of municipal
deposits from the GDB; and (3) a permanent injunction enjoining
the GDB and AAFAF from submitting to the Oversight Board, or the
Oversight Board from certifying, any RSA which confiscates San
Juan's trust funds and that does not provide a separate voting
pool for municipal depositors.

A copy of the Complaint is available for free at:

         http://bankrupt.com/misc/PR_San_Juan_Suit.pdf

The City of San Juan's attorneys:

         CHARLIE HERNANDEZ LAW OFFICES
         Charlie M. Hernandez
         206 Tetuan St., Suite 701
         Old San Juan, P.R. 00901-1839
         Tel: 787.382.8360
         Fax: 787.382.8360
         E-mail: charliehernandezlaw@gmail.com

                  - and -

         MARIANI FRANCO LAW, P.S.C.
         Raul S. Mariani Franco
         P.O. Box 9022864
         San Juan, P.R. 00902-2864
         Tel: 787.620.0038
         Fax: 787.620.0039
         E-mail: marianifrancolaw@gmail.com

                  - and -

         NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US LLP
         Lawrence A. Larose
         Marcelo M. Blackburn
         Eric Daucher
         1301 Avenue of the Americas
         New York, New York 10019-6022
         Tel: 212.318.3000
         Fax: 212.408.5100
         E-mail: lawrence.larose@nortonrosefulbright.com
                 marcelo.blackburn@nortonrosefulbright.com
                 eric.daucher@nortonrosefulbright.com

                  - and -

         WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
         Julissa Reynoso
         Aldo A. Badini
         Michael A. Fernandez
         E-mail: jreynoso@winston.com
                 abadini@winston.com
                 mafernandez@winston.com

                       About Puerto Rico

Puerto Rico is a self-governing commonwealth in association with
the United States that's facing a massive bond debt of $70
billion, a 68% debt-to-GDP ratio and negative economic growth in
nine of the last 10 years.

The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has sought bankruptcy protection,
aiming to restructure its massive $74 billion debt-load and $49
billion in pension obligations.

The debt restructuring petition was filed by Puerto Rico's
financial oversight board in U.S. District Court in Puerto Rico
(Case No. 17-01578) on May 3, 2017, and was made under Title III
of 2016's U.S. Congressional rescue law known as the Puerto Rico
Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act ("PROMESA").

The Financial Oversight and Management Board later commenced Title
III cases for the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation
(COFINA) on May 5, 2017, and the Employees Retirement System (ERS)
and the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (HTA) on
May 21.  On July 2, 2017, a Title III case was commenced for the
Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority ("PREPA").

U.S. Chief Justice John Roberts has appointed U.S. District Judge
Laura Taylor Swain to oversee the Title III cases.  The Honorable
Judith Dein, a United States Magistrate Judge for the District of
Massachusetts, has been designated to preside over matters that
may be referred to her by Judge Swain, including discovery
disputes, and management of other pretrial proceedings.

Joint administration of the Title III cases, under Lead Case No.
17-3283, was granted on June 29, 2017.

The Oversight Board has hired as advisors, Proskauer Rose LLP and
O'Neill & Borges LLC as legal counsel, McKinsey & Co. as strategic
consultant, Citigroup Global Markets as municipal investment
banker, and Ernst & Young, as financial advisor.

Martin J. Bienenstock, Esq., Scott K. Rutsky, Esq., and Philip M.
Abelson, Esq., of Proskauer Rose; and Hermann D. Bauer, Esq., at
O'Neill & Borges are onboard as attorneys.

McKinsey & Co. is the Board's strategic consultant, Ernst & Young
is the Board's financial advisor, and Citigroup Global Markets
Inc. is the Board's municipal investment banker.

Prime Clerk LLC is the claims and noticing agent.  Prime Clerk
maintains a case web site at:

           https://cases.primeclerk.com/puertorico

Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC is the service agent for ERS, HTA,
and PREPA.

O'Melveny & Myers LLP is counsel to the Commonwealth's Puerto Rico
Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority (AAFAF), the agency
responsible for negotiations with bondholders.

The Oversight Board named Professor Nancy B. Rapoport as fee
examiner and to chair a committee to review professionals' fees.

                      Bondholders' Attorneys

Toro, Colon, Mullet, Rivera & Sifre, P.S.C. and Kramer Levin
Naftalis & Frankel LLP serve as counsel to the Mutual Fund Group,
comprised of mutual funds managed by Oppenheimer Funds, Inc.,
Franklin Advisers, Inc., and the First Puerto Rico Family of
Funds, which collectively hold over $3.5 billion in COFINA Bonds
and over $2.9 billion in other bonds issued by Puerto Rico and
other instrumentalities, including over $1.8 billion of Puerto
Rico general obligation bonds ("GO Bonds").

White & Case LLP and Lopez Sanchez & Pirillo LLC represent the UBS
Family of Funds and the Puerto Rico Family of Funds, which hold
$613.3 million in COFINA bonds.

Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, Robbins, Russell,
Englert, Orseck, Untereiner & Sauber LLP, and Jimenez, Graffam &
Lausell are co-counsel to the ad hoc group of General Obligation
Bondholders, comprised of Aurelius Capital Management, LP,
Autonomy Capital (Jersey) LP, FCO Advisors LP, Franklin Mutual
Advisers LLC, Monarch Alternative Capital LP, Senator Investment
Group LP, and Stone Lion Capital Partners L.P.

Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP and Reichard & Escalera are
co-counsel to the ad hoc coalition of holders of senior bonds
issued by COFINA, comprised of at least 30 institutional holders,
including Canyon Capital Advisors LLC and Varde Investment
Partners, L.P.

Correa Acevedo & Abesada Law Offices, P.S.C., is counsel to Canyon
Capital Advisors, LLC, River Canyon Fund Management, LLC, Davidson
Kempner Capital Management LP, OZ Management, LP, and OZ
Management II LP (the QTCB Noteholder Group).

                            Committees

The U.S. Trustee formed a nine-member Official Committee of
Retirees and a seven-member Official Committee of Unsecured
Creditors of the Commonwealth.  The Retiree Committee tapped
Jenner & Block LLP and Bennazar, Garcia & Milian, C.S.P., as its
attorneys.   The Creditors Committee tapped Paul Hastings  LLP and
O'Neill & Gilmore LLC as counsel.


PUERTO RICO: Oversight Board Opposes Bid for PREPA Receiver
-----------------------------------------------------------
A motion filed by holders of bonds issued by the Puerto Rico
Electric Power Authority ("PREPA") to seek appointment of a
receiver is being opposed by the Financial Oversight and
Management Board for Puerto Rico and the Puerto Rico Fiscal Agency
and Financial Advisory Authority ("AAFAF").

PREPA has issued $8.3 billion in revenue and revenue refunding
bonds  under a trust agreement by and between PREPA and U.S. bank
National Association, as successor trustee (the "Trustee"), dated
as of Jan. 1, 1974.

Following extensive negotiations, PREPA, bondholders and other
parties executed a restructuring support agreement in late 2015,
and agreed to certain enhancements in April 2017.  Under the RSA,
bondholders agreed to voluntary concessions, including the
voluntary exchange of uninsured Bonds at a discount into
securitization bonds issued by a newly created public corporation
(the "SPV"), and an agreement by insurers to defer approximately
$340 million of principal through forward purchase commitments
that otherwise would be due within six years of the closing date.

On June 28, 2017, the Financial Oversight and Management Board for
Puerto Rico (the "Oversight Board") established under the Puerto
Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act of 2016
("PROMESA") formally notified PREPA that it refused to certify the
RSA for implementation under Title VI of PROMESA.  On June 29,
2017, AAFAF and PREPA's board chose to terminate the RSA,
triggering an avoidable payment default and forcing this Title III
proceeding.

Facing an upcoming debt service payment, a pension plan
underfunding of approximately $2.2 billion (see Fiscal Plan at
18), and the Government's request that PREPA seek a plan of
adjustment, the FOMB decided the best path forward was to file a
petition on behalf of PREPA to adjust its debts through a Title
III case under PROMESA filed on July 2, 2017.

On July 3, 2017, an event of default occurred under the Trust
Agreement when the Authority failed to make its semi-annual
payment on the Bonds in the aggregate amount of $427,949,881.

In mid-July 2017, the ad hoc group of PREPA bondholders, National
Public Finance Guaranty Municipal Corp., Assured Guaranty Corp.,
Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp., and Syncora Guarantee Inc. --
holders and/or insurers of bonds issued by the Puerto Rico
Electric Power Authority representing approximately 65% of the
approximately $8.3 billion in outstanding bond debt -- submitted a
combined motion to lift the automatic stay to commence an action
in a court of competent jurisdiction against PREPA for the
appointment of a receiver to collect the revenues, enforce the
Rate Covenant, and raise electricity rates.

U.S. Bank submitted a joinder to the motion for the appointment of
a receiver.

                             Receiver

With the failure of the RSA, the return of PREPA's politicization,
and rates inadequate to fund PREPA's obligations, the Bondholders
are now seeking the appointment of a receiver.

"A receiver is needed to give undivided focus to the needs of
PREPA, including pursuing revenue enhancements, in order to
improve PREPA's operations and return PREPA to financial
stability.  By contrast, given the conflicts of interest that
permeate much of the decision-making by the Rossello
Administration, PREPA's interests cannot be adequately served or
protected if they are subjected to the whims of the Governor's
agenda," the Bondholders said.

According to the Bondholders, the receiver would ensure that the
lien granted to bondholders and insurers as part of their
collateral package produces net revenues in amounts sufficient to
timely pay debt service on the Bonds and have such other powers
provided for under the Authority Act or the Trust Agreement and
that the court appointing the receiver may deem appropriate.

The Bondholders also cited mismanagement at PREPA as basis for the
appointment of a receiver.

"For decades, PREPA has been crippled by politicized mismanagement
and outright corruption.  As a result of such mismanagement, PREPA
has been unable to generate adequate cash flow to service PREPA's
debt obligations on the Bonds as required by the Trust Agreement
and the Authority Act.  Pursuant to the Authority Act and under
the bond documents, Movants are therefore entitled to the
appointment of a receiver," the Bondholders said.

A copy of the Motion is available for free at:

         http://bankrupt.com/misc/PREPA_74_M_Receiver.pdf

                      Oversight Board Objection

The Oversight Board says the motion should be denied.

"Congress makes clear in PROMESA section 301(d)(7) that whenever
Bankruptcy Code provisions incorporated into Title III refer to
the "trustee," the trustee shall mean the FOMB.  Additionally,
Congress did not make Bankruptcy Code section 1104 applicable to
Title III.   Rather, it adopted the chapter 9 rule that the Court
cannot order the appointment of a trustee.  Moreover, Bankruptcy
Code section 105(b) (incorporated in Title III by PROMESA section
301(a)) bars this Court from appointing a receiver for PREPA.
Thus, the FOMB steps into the statutory rights of a trustee under
the Bankruptcy Code, and no other trustee or receiver can be
appointed," Martin J. Bienenstock, Esq., at Proskauer Rose LLP,
counsel to the Oversight Board, said.

The Oversight Board claims that mismanagement cannot be cause
under Section 362(d)(1) of the Bankruptcy to terminate the
automatic stay to enable creditors to obtain a receiver.

"Movants' claim of mismanagement is neither factually nor legally
sustainable as "cause" for stay relief.  It is factually
unsustainable because Movants' are focusing on past mismanagement
that PREPA has been correcting for more than a year with new
management and advisors.  It is legally unsustainable for obvious
reasons.  Congress allows the appointment of a chapter 11 trustee
for "gross mismanagement" pursuant to Bankruptcy Code section
1104(a)(1).  Conversely, PROMESA Title III, like Bankruptcy Code
chapter 9, does not allow a federal court to appoint a Title III
trustee to control a governmental instrumentality under any
circumstances, and especially when Congress designated the FOMB to
oversee and be the representative of each Title III debtor.
Therefore, the notion that, due to historical mismanagement for
which Congress put the Oversight Board in charge, the Title III
Court should effectively oust the Oversight Board and turn PREPA
over to a state court receiver rebuts itself," Mr. Bienenstock
argued.

                   Efforts to Transform PREPA

The Puerto Rico Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority
("AAFAF"), as fiscal agent for PREPA, agrees with and supports all
positions expressed by the FOMB in its Opposition but offers this
separate submission to emphasize the significant progress that
Governor Rossello's administration has made in its efforts to
transform PREPA.

"In just a little more than six months since Governor Rossello
took office, he has made PREPA's restructuring a priority for his
administration.  For example, Govenor Rossello's administration
made certain changes to the PREPA Board of Directors to address
the need to have both independent directors with industry
experience and directors who understand the energy policy of
Puerto Rico.  The PREPA Board hired an Executive Director with
substantial industry experience and created a Project Management
Office to oversee and help effectuate the implementation of
critical changes to PREPA's operations.  PREPA has retained Ankura
Consulting as its financial advisor, and Kevin Lavin, Co-President
and Global Head of Ankura's Turnaround and Restructuring Practice,
and the team from Ankura will be involved substantially to work
with PREPA management and the FOMB to assure best practices and
implementation of the Fiscal Plan.  Further, PREPA has instituted
a series of operational, safety, financial, compliance, and
service reforms to improve the overall system, reforms that
are beginning to bear fruit. It is clear, therefore, that far from
"politicizing" PREPA, the new administration has taken significant
steps to de-politicize the utility and reform all elements of its
financial, operation, and service performance," the AAFAF said.

                     Movants' Attorneys

Counsel to the Ad Hoc Group of PREPA Bondholders:

         TORO, COLON, MULLET, RIVERA & SIFRE, P.S.C.
         Manuel Fernandez-Bared
         Linette Figueroa-Torres
         Nayda Perez-Roman
         P.O. Box 195383
         San Juan, PR 00919-5383
         Tel: (787) 751-8999
         Fax: (787) 763-7760
         E-mail: mfb@tcmrslaw.com
                 lft@tcmrslaw.com
                 nperez@tcmrslaw.com

                - and -

         KRAMER LEVIN NAFTALIS & FRANKEL LLP
         Gregory A. Horowitz
         Amy Caton
         Thomas Moers Mayer
         Gregory A. Horowitz
         Natan Hamerman
         Alice J. Byowitz
         1177 Avenue of the Americas
         New York, New York 10036
         Tel: (212) 715-9100
         Fax: (212) 715-8000
         E-mail: tmayer@kramerlevin.com
                 acaton@kramerlevin.com
                 ghorowitz@kramerlevin.com
                 nhamerman@kramerlevin.com
                 abyowitz@kramerlevin.com

Counsel for Assured Guaranty Corp. and Assured Guaranty Municipal
Corp:

         CASELLAS ALCOVER & BURGOS P.S.C.
         Heriberto Burgos Perez
         Ricardo F. Casellas-Sanchez
         Diana Perez-Seda
         P.O. Box 364924
         San Juan, PR 00936-4924
         Tel: (787) 756-1400
         Fax: (787) 756-1401
         E-mail: hburgos@cabprlaw.com
                 rcasellas@cabprlaw.com
                 dperez@cabprlaw.com

                - and -

         CADWALADER, WICKERSHAM & TAFT LLP
         Howard R. Hawkins, Jr.
         Mark C. Ellenberg
         Nathan Bull
         Ellen Halstead
         Thomas J. Curtin
         Casey J. Servais
         200 Liberty Street
         New York, New York 10281
         Tel: (212) 504-6000
         Fax: (212) 406-6666
         E-mail: howard.hawkins@cwt.com
                 mark.ellenberg@cwt.com
                 nathan.bull@cwt.com
                 ellen.halstead@cwt.com
                 thomas.curtin@cwt.com
                 casey.servais@cwt.com

Counsel for National Public Finance Guarantee Corp.:

         ADSUAR MUNIZ GOYCO SEDA & PEREZOCHOA PSC
         Eric Perez-Ochoa
         Luis A. Oliver-Fraticelli
         208 Ponce de Leon Ave., Suite 1600
         San Juan, PR 00936
         Tel: (787) 756-9000
         Fax: (787) 756-9010
         E-mail: epo@amgprlaw.com
                 loliver@amgprlaw.com

                - and -

         WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP
         Marcia Goldstein
         JONATHAN POLKES
         SALVATORE A. ROMANELLO
         GREGORY SILBERT
         767 Fifth Avenue
         New York, New York 10153
         Tel: (212) 310-8000
         Fax: (212) 310-8007
         E-mail: marcia.goldstein@weil.com
                 jonathan.polkes@weil.com
                 salvatore.romanello@weil.com
                 gregory.silbert@weil.com

         Stephen A. Youngman
         200 Crescent Court, Suite 300
         Dallas, Texas 75201-6950
         Tel: (214) 746-7700
         Fax: (214) 746-7777
         E-mail: stephen.youngman@weil.com

Counsel for Syncora Guarantee Inc.:

         GOLDMAN ANTONETTI & CORDOVA, LLC
         Carlos A. Rodriguez-Vidal
         Solymar Castillo-Morales
         P.O. Box 70364
         San Juan, PR 00936-8364
         Tel: (787) 759-4117
         Fax: (787) 767-9177
         E-mail: crodriguez-vidal@gaclaw.com
                 scastillo@gaclaw.com

                - and -

         DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP
         My Chi To
         Craig A. Bruens
         Elie J. Worenklein
         919 Third Avenue
         New York, New York 10022
         Tel: (212) 909-6000
         Fax: (212) 909-6836
         E-mail: mcto@debevoise.com
                 cabruens@debevoise.com
                 eworenklein@debevoise.com

Attorneys for U.S. Bank national association, in its capacity as
Trustee:

          Rivera, Tulla And Ferrer, LLC
          E-mail: etulla@ riveratulla.com
          Eric A. Tulla
          Iris J. Cabrera-Gomez
          E-mail: icabrera@riveratulla.com
          Rivera Tulla & Ferrer Building
          50 Quisqueya Street
          San Juan, PR 00917-1212
          Tel: (787)753-0438
          Fax: (787)767-5784 (787)766-0409

                - and -

          MASLON LLP
          Clark T. Whitmore
          William Z. Pentelovitch
          John T. Duffey
          Jason M. Reed
          90 South Seventh Street, Suite 3300
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Telephone: 612-672-8200
          Facsimile: 612-672-8397
          E-mail: clark.whitmore@maslon.com
                  bill.pentelovitch@maslon.com
                  john.duffy@maslon.com
                  jason.reed@maslon.com

                       About Puerto Rico

Puerto Rico is a self-governing commonwealth in association with
the United States that's facing a massive bond debt of $70
billion, a 68% debt-to-GDP ratio and negative economic growth in
nine of the last 10 years.

The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has sought bankruptcy protection,
aiming to restructure its massive $74 billion debt-load and $49
billion in pension obligations.

The debt restructuring petition was filed by Puerto Rico's
financial oversight board in U.S. District Court in Puerto Rico
(Case No. 17-01578) on May 3, 2017, and was made under Title III
of 2016's U.S. Congressional rescue law known as the Puerto Rico
Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act ("PROMESA").

The Financial Oversight and Management Board later commenced Title
III cases for the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation
(COFINA) on May 5, 2017, and the Employees Retirement System (ERS)
and the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (HTA) on
May 21.  On July 2, 2017, a Title III case was commenced for the
Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority ("PREPA").

U.S. Chief Justice John Roberts has appointed U.S. District Judge
Laura Taylor Swain to oversee the Title III cases.  The Honorable
Judith Dein, a United States Magistrate Judge for the District of
Massachusetts, has been designated to preside over matters that
may be referred to her by Judge Swain, including discovery
disputes, and management of other pretrial proceedings.

Joint administration of the Title III cases, under Lead Case No.
17-3283, was granted on June 29, 2017.

The Oversight Board has hired as advisors, Proskauer Rose LLP and
O'Neill & Borges LLC as legal counsel, McKinsey & Co. as strategic
consultant, Citigroup Global Markets as municipal investment
banker, and Ernst & Young, as financial advisor.

Martin J. Bienenstock, Esq., Scott K. Rutsky, Esq., and Philip M.
Abelson, Esq., of Proskauer Rose; and Hermann D. Bauer, Esq., at
O'Neill & Borges are onboard as attorneys.

McKinsey & Co. is the Board's strategic consultant, Ernst & Young
is the Board's financial advisor, and Citigroup Global Markets
Inc. is the Board's municipal investment banker.

Prime Clerk LLC is the claims and noticing agent.  Prime Clerk
maintains a case web site at:

           https://cases.primeclerk.com/puertorico

Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC is the service agent for ERS, HTA,
and PREPA.

O'Melveny & Myers LLP is counsel to the Commonwealth's Puerto Rico
Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority (AAFAF), the agency
responsible for negotiations with bondholders.

The Oversight Board named Professor Nancy B. Rapoport as fee
examiner and to chair a committee to review professionals' fees.

                      Bondholders' Attorneys

Toro, Colon, Mullet, Rivera & Sifre, P.S.C. and Kramer Levin
Naftalis & Frankel LLP serve as counsel to the Mutual Fund Group,
comprised of mutual funds managed by Oppenheimer Funds, Inc.,
Franklin Advisers, Inc., and the First Puerto Rico Family of
Funds, which collectively hold over $3.5 billion in COFINA Bonds
and over $2.9 billion in other bonds issued by Puerto Rico and
other instrumentalities, including over $1.8 billion of Puerto
Rico general obligation bonds ("GO Bonds").

White & Case LLP and Lopez Sanchez & Pirillo LLC represent the UBS
Family of Funds and the Puerto Rico Family of Funds, which hold
$613.3 million in COFINA bonds.

Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, Robbins, Russell,
Englert, Orseck, Untereiner & Sauber LLP, and Jimenez, Graffam &
Lausell are co-counsel to the ad hoc group of General Obligation
Bondholders, comprised of Aurelius Capital Management, LP,
Autonomy Capital (Jersey) LP, FCO Advisors LP, Franklin Mutual
Advisers LLC, Monarch Alternative Capital LP, Senator Investment
Group LP, and Stone Lion Capital Partners L.P.

Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP and Reichard & Escalera are
co-counsel to the ad hoc coalition of holders of senior bonds
issued by COFINA, comprised of at least 30 institutional holders,
including Canyon Capital Advisors LLC and Varde Investment
Partners, L.P.

Correa Acevedo & Abesada Law Offices, P.S.C., is counsel to Canyon
Capital Advisors, LLC, River Canyon Fund Management, LLC, Davidson
Kempner Capital Management LP, OZ Management, LP, and OZ
Management II LP (the QTCB Noteholder Group).

                            Committees

The U.S. Trustee formed a nine-member Official Committee of
Retirees and a seven-member Official Committee of Unsecured
Creditors of the Commonwealth.  The Retiree Committee tapped
Jenner & Block LLP and Bennazar, Garcia & Milian, C.S.P., as its
attorneys.   The Creditors Committee tapped Paul Hastings  LLP and
O'Neill & Gilmore LLC as counsel.

                       About Puerto Rico

Puerto Rico is a self-governing commonwealth in association with
the United States that's facing a massive bond debt of $70
billion, a 68% debt-to-GDP ratio and negative economic growth in
nine of the last 10 years.

The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has sought bankruptcy protection,
aiming to restructure its massive $74 billion debt-load and $49
billion in pension obligations.

The debt restructuring petition was filed by Puerto Rico's
financial oversight board in U.S. District Court in Puerto Rico
(Case No. 17-01578) on May 3, 2017, and was made under Title III
of 2016's U.S. Congressional rescue law known as the Puerto Rico
Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act ("PROMESA").

The Financial Oversight and Management Board later commenced Title
III cases for the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation
(COFINA) on May 5, 2017, and the Employees Retirement System (ERS)
and the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (HTA) on
May 21.  On July 2, 2017, a Title III case was commenced for the
Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority ("PREPA").

U.S. Chief Justice John Roberts has appointed U.S. District Judge
Laura Taylor Swain to oversee the Title III cases.  The Honorable
Judith Dein, a United States Magistrate Judge for the District of
Massachusetts, has been designated to preside over matters that
may be referred to her by Judge Swain, including discovery
disputes, and management of other pretrial proceedings.

Joint administration of the Title III cases, under Lead Case No.
17-3283, was granted on June 29, 2017.

The Oversight Board has hired as advisors, Proskauer Rose LLP and
O'Neill & Borges LLC as legal counsel, McKinsey & Co. as strategic
consultant, Citigroup Global Markets as municipal investment
banker, and Ernst & Young, as financial advisor.

Martin J. Bienenstock, Esq., Scott K. Rutsky, Esq., and Philip M.
Abelson, Esq., of Proskauer Rose; and Hermann D. Bauer, Esq., at
O'Neill & Borges are onboard as attorneys.

McKinsey & Co. is the Board's strategic consultant, Ernst & Young
is the Board's financial advisor, and Citigroup Global Markets
Inc. is the Board's municipal investment banker.

Prime Clerk LLC is the claims and noticing agent.  Prime Clerk
maintains a case web site at:

           https://cases.primeclerk.com/puertorico

Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC is the service agent for ERS, HTA,
and PREPA.

O'Melveny & Myers LLP is counsel to the Commonwealth's Puerto Rico
Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority (AAFAF), the agency
responsible for negotiations with bondholders.

The Oversight Board named Professor Nancy B. Rapoport as fee
examiner and to chair a committee to review professionals' fees.

                      Bondholders' Attorneys

Toro, Colon, Mullet, Rivera & Sifre, P.S.C. and Kramer Levin
Naftalis & Frankel LLP serve as counsel to the Mutual Fund Group,
comprised of mutual funds managed by Oppenheimer Funds, Inc.,
Franklin Advisers, Inc., and the First Puerto Rico Family of
Funds,
which collectively hold over $3.5 billion in COFINA Bonds and over
$2.9 billion in other bonds issued by Puerto Rico and other
instrumentalities, including over $1.8 billion of Puerto Rico
general obligation bonds ("GO Bonds").

White & Case LLP and Lopez Sanchez & Pirillo LLC represent the UBS
Family of Funds and the Puerto Rico Family of Funds, which hold
$613.3 million in COFINA bonds.

Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, Robbins, Russell,
Englert, Orseck, Untereiner & Sauber LLP, and Jimenez, Graffam &
Lausell are co-counsel to the ad hoc group of General Obligation
Bondholders, comprised of Aurelius Capital Management, LP,
Autonomy Capital (Jersey) LP, FCO Advisors LP, Franklin Mutual
Advisers LLC, Monarch Alternative Capital LP, Senator Investment
Group LP, and Stone Lion Capital Partners L.P.

Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP and Reichard & Escalera are
co-counsel to the ad hoc coalition of holders of senior bonds
issued by COFINA, comprised of at least 30 institutional holders,
including Canyon Capital Advisors LLC and Varde Investment
Partners, L.P.

Correa Acevedo & Abesada Law Offices, P.S.C., is counsel to Canyon
Capital Advisors, LLC, River Canyon Fund Management, LLC, Davidson
Kempner Capital Management LP, OZ Management, LP, and OZ
Management II LP (the QTCB Noteholder Group).

                            Committees

The U.S. Trustee formed a nine-member Official Committee of
Retirees and a seven-member Official Committee of Unsecured
Creditors of the Commonwealth.  The Retiree Committee tapped
Jenner & Block LLP and Bennazar, Garcia & Milian, C.S.P., as its
attorneys.   The Creditors Committee tapped Paul Hastings LLP and
O'Neill & Gilmore LLC as counsel.



=============================
S T.  K I T T S  &  N E V I S
=============================


BRITISH AMERICAN: Possible 2017 Payout for ECCU Policyholders
-------------------------------------------------------------
LK Hewlett at Caribbean News Now reports that regional
policyholders of the British American Insurance Company Limited
(BAICO) may be one step closer to receiving a payout, eight years
after the company collapsed.

Close to 4,000 individuals and businesses in St. Kitts and Nevis
were among the many policyholders in the Eastern Caribbean who
suffered losses when BAICO failed, according to Caribbean News
Now.  For the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)
alone, the loss from BAICO was estimated at over $300 million, the
report relays.

Coming out of the 84th meeting of the Monetary Council of the
Eastern Caribbean Central Bank held in Dominica, it was reported
that the Council received a report from the Technical Core
Committee on Insurance - BAICO, which indicated a payout could
come for the thousands of affected policyholders later this year,
the report notes.

"The Plan of Arrangement (BAICO and CLICO) Act has been passed in
all ECCU member countries and in the home jurisdiction of The
Bahamas.  Council noted that once the agreements of the respective
courts are received, this would pave the way for the meeting of
the creditors and a distribution to BAICO policyholders in the
last quarter of 2017," the report relays

As it relates to Colonial Life Insurance Company (CLICO), however,
the Monetary Council said progress has been markedly slower and
resolution is a greater challenge.

"The Technical Core Committee is exploring a number of options to
have the issues relating to the CLICO policy holders addressed
effectively."

                           About BAICO

British American Insurance Company is a Nassau, Bahamas-based
insurance and financial services company.  BAIC is owned by
Trinidad-based parent CL Financial.  BAIC listed debt of $500
million to $1 billion and assets of more than $100 million in its
Chapter 15 petition (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Case No. 09-3588).

By order entered Aug. 4, 2009, the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court
in the High Court of Justice Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
appointed Brian Glasgow as Judicial Manager for BAICO under
Section 52 of the Insurance Act, No. 45 of 2003 of the Laws of
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.



===============================
T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O
===============================


* TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: NGOs Face Funding Challenges
-------------------------------------------------
Trinidad Express reports that Jason Narinesingh, director of
compliance for the eastern and southern Caribbean, Scotiabank T&T
spoke to Marina Hilaire-Bartlett, left, executive director of non-
profit organisation PSI-Caribbean, and Anya Schnoor Scotiabank's
senior vice president and head, Caribbean east and south, during
the 5th installment of Scotiabank Insights at Hyatt Regency
(Trinidad) hotel in Port of Spain.

Non-Governmental organizations (NGOs) are facing aid funding
challenges as a result of the economic downturn, according to
Trinidad Express.

Funds are crucial to NGOs executing their programs and maintaining
their day to day operations, the report relays.

But with dwindling financial support from major donors,
communities, philanthropic trusts and foundations they are finding
it more and more difficult to do so, the report notes.

Scotiabank Trinidad and Tobago hosted the fifth installment of its
Insights series, where more than 100 people from 80 local NGOs
were guided on remaining sustainable in these tough economic
times, the report relays.

They were also provided with insights on effective fundraising,
financial planning, management and marketing, the report says.

The event was held at the Hyatt Regency (Trinidad) in Port of
Spain, the report discloses.

                     Turning of The Tide

Executive director of non-profit organisation Population Services
International (PSI) Caribbean, Marina Hilaire-Bartlett noted that
from the late 1990s to the early 2000s there was a wave of funding
from big international companies to NGOs.


=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================


CORPORACION ELECTRICA: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Long-Term IDR
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Corporacion Electrica Nacional S.A.'s
(CORPOELEC) local and foreign currency long-term Issuer Default
Ratings (IDRs) at 'CCC'. Fitch has simultaneously affirmed its
long-term rating of 'CCC/RR4' on the company's USD650 million of
senior unsecured notes due April 2018.

CORPOELEC's ratings reflect the company's strong linkage to the
government of Venezuela (rated 'CCC' by Fitch), given its tight
integration into the public sector. This is evidenced by its 100%
public ownership and CORPOELEC's dependence on public funding to
carry on its day-to-day operations, honor its financial
obligations and finance its capital expenditure needs. The
company's monopolistic condition as the sole provider of
electricity generation, transmission and distribution in the
country is also factored into the rating.

The ratings also reflect the environment of weak administrative
control under which CORPOELEC operates. The poor quality of its
financial and accounting information has prevented the auditors
from issuing an opinion on the company's financial statements for
the period 2009 to 2015 and the company is yet to issue 2016
financial statements. Despite this data limitation, Fitch is able
to assess the credit quality of CORPOLEC as it primarily relies on
its linkage to the government.

The ratings incorporate Venezuela's weakening policy framework,
which is the result of increased vulnerability to commodity price
shocks and deterioration in fiscal and external credit metrics.
The lack of sustained and coherent policy adjustments could lead
to further erosion in external buffers, macroeconomic and
financial instability. The sovereign's strong repayment record on
commercial debt and demonstrated willingness to continue timely
payments despite the difficult political and economic environment
support the sovereign and CORPOELEC's ratings.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Ratings Linked to the Government
CORPOELEC's credit profile reflects its strong credit linkage with
the Republic of Venezuela as the latter is closely integrated
within the public sector. The company's sole shareholder is the
Ministry of Popular Power for Electricity (MPPE), which has a
public mandate to operate the nation's electricity sector
according to its planning directives, and heavily depends on
public sector transfers and subsidies for the sustainability of
its operations. The company receives explicit support from both
the Central Government, through operational and capital
expenditure allocations contained in the nation's budget, and from
PDVSA (Petroleos de Venezuela, SA) in the form of subsidized fuel
costs.

Poor Quality of Information
CORPOELEC recently made available its audited consolidated
financial statements for the period 2015. The auditor, (Deloitte),
could not issue an opinion on the reasonability of the statements
given the weaknesses observed in the administrative control
environment and lack of accounting support to establish an opinion
on key components of the company's financial statements. At the
time of publication the company did not make available its audited
financial statements for FY 2016. Despite this data limitation,
Fitch is able to assess the credit quality of CORPOLECT as it
primarily relies on its linkage to the government.

Monopolistic Position
CORPOELEC is a vertically integrated public utility in charge of
the operation of the country's electricity assets and the
provision of electricity services in Venezuela. The company
absorbed all generation assets and transmission, distribution and
retail infrastructure in the country during the period 2010 to
2011, affording it an installed capacity of 29,180 MW (52% Hydro,
48% Thermo) and a client base of 6.4 million users by December
2016. CORPOELEC's monopolistic position conveys the company's
strategic relevance to the country given the essential nature of
the service provided and the sector's correlation with GDP growth.

Operational Results Impacted by Tariff Lag
The State's control of CORPOELEC exposes the company to political
interference in its day-to-day operations. Tariffs are set by the
MPPE and are expected to continue to be below the level necessary
to allow for cost recovery. Tariffs had been frozen since 2002 but
recently the MPPE has implemented tariff adjustments to
residential and non-residential costumers, respectively, during
the period 2013 to 2015 in its efforts to try to diminish its
operational deficit. In spite of these price adjustments CORPOELEC
continued to post a large operational deficit as evidenced by pro
forma results that report negative EBIT Bs. 166 billion (adjusted
for inflation) for FY 2016.

As a result, Fitch expects CORPOELEC's dependence on public
funding to remain unchanged going forward, preserving the linkage
to the sovereign, and as its standalone credit profile
deteriorates over time due to low tariffs preventing the recovery
of operational costs.

Sovereign Support Needed to Fund CAPEX:
CORPOELEC, with the support of the Government via direct capital
transfers, executed USD 1 billion in capex during 2016 a
substantially lower investment outlay than what was observed in
2014-2015 (USD 2.6 billion in 2015 and USD4.1billion in 2014). The
low level of additional capex and the progress in ongoing capex
execution funded with public transfers allowed CORPOELEC to
incorporate 870 MW of new capacity and re-establish 3,340 MW to
the national electric system in 2016.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within the rating case for CORPOELEC
include:

-- Tariff lag and dependence on public transfers continues;
-- Government transfers are assumed to continue sustaining the
    business and perfected on a timely basis;
-- The Government transfers to the Paying Agent the resources to
    honor CORPOELEC's 2018 bond obligations on a timely basis.

RATINGS DERIVATION

CORPOELEC's ratings are supported by its strong linkage to the
sovereign and its vertically integrated utility business model
that confer it a monopolistic position and a strategic importance
as the sole operator of the electricity sector in Venezuela.

CORPOELEC's foreign and local currency IDRs are not well-
positioned relative to peers as a result of insufficient cost
recovery, which is explained by a continuing tariff lag that
impedes a sustainable CFFO performance, especially when compared
with relevant peers such as Comision Federal de Electricida (CFE,
'BBB+'/Outlook Negative) and Instituto Costarricense de
Electricidad y Subsidiarias (ICE, 'BB'/Outlook Stable), both of
which have a strong relationship with their sovereign parent.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The key rating triggers that could lead to a negative rating
action include:

-- A downgrade of the sovereign;
-- Lack of financial support coming from the central government
    and its agencies in order to allow CORPOELEC to service its
    financial obligations on a timely basis, particularly the EDC
    bond maturing in April 2018 (USD650 million).

A positive rating action is not expected in the foreseeable
future.

LIQUIDITY

Liquidity is determined by timely access to government transfers
that allow CORPOELEC to meet operating costs, finance its capex
and meet its financial obligations. The company's liquidity is
expected to be pressured over the next 12 months as a result of
the sizable foreign currency denominated payments of USD650
million due April 2018.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has affirmed CORPOELEC's ratings:

-- Local Currency Long-Term IDR at 'CCC';
-- Foreign Currency Long-Term IDR at 'CCC';
-- National Long-Term Rating at 'AA(ven)';
-- National Short-Term Rating at 'F1+(ven)';
-- EDC's USD650 million senior unsecured bond issuances due 2018
    at 'CCC/RR4'.



=================
X X X X X X X X X
=================


* TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Where Will The $$ Come From?
-------------------------------------------------
David Renwick at Trinidad Express reports that the Caribbean
region will require US$30 billion over the next ten years -- or
US$3 billion a year -- to "modernise" its power and other
infrastructure, such as roads, bridges and port facilities" and to
achieve "related efficiencies" in relation to "the environment".

Who has worked out this mind-boggling number?

None other than the Americas Programme of the US-based Centre for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), according to Trinidad
Express.

Where will the money come from?

Presumably, international lending agencies and private investors,
once the latter can be guaranteed a return on their investment.
One would expect the United States, (US), to whom the Caribbean is
of traditional concern, to be at the forefront of stumping up most
of the required funding, the report notes.

But, at the present time, there is extensive uncertainty that this
will happen, for the very good reason that President Donald Trump
has not yet "formulated his policies towards the region," the
report relays.

The sooner he does so, therefore, the better, the report notes.
But the challenges are enormous, the report adds.


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Joseph Cardillo at
856-381-8268.


                   * * * End of Transmission * * *