TCRLA_Public/170807.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

               Thursday, August 7, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 155


                            Headlines



B E L I Z E

BELIZE: S&P Affrims 'B-/B' Sovereign Credit Rating, Outlook Stable


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

APTOS (CAYMAN): S&P Affirms 'B-' Senior Secured Issue-Level Rating
FALCON GROUP: S&P Affirms BB-/B ICR on $100MM Loan, Outlook Stable


P U E R T O    R I C O

ERGON CARIBBEAN: Sept. 6 Plan Confirmation Hearing
LA HABICHUELA: Unsecureds to Get 15% for 60 Months Under Plan
PUERTO RICO: Creditors Panel Opposes Committee Reconstitution Bid
PUERTO RICO: Oversight Board to Probe Debt, Fiscal Crisis
PUERTO RICO: Retirees Panel Objects to Additional Appointments


                            - - - - -


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B E L I Z E
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BELIZE: S&P Affrims 'B-/B' Sovereign Credit Rating, Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------------------
Belize 'B-/B' Sovereign Credit Ratings Affirmed; Outlook Remains
Stable
03-Aug-2017 14:04 EDT

On Aug. 3, 2017, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its long-term foreign
and local currency sovereign credit ratings of 'B-' and short-term
foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings of 'B' on
Belize. The outlook on both long-term ratings remains stable. S&P
also affirmed its transfer and convertibility assessment at 'B-'.

OUTLOOK

S&P said, "The stable outlook reflects our view that Belize's
fiscal adjustment plan, along with the lower debt service burden
and modest economic recovery, would allow for a reduction of the
fiscal deficits in the next two years, albeit not at the pace
agreed upon under the debt restructuring recent agreement. This
reduction of the country's financing needs would balance the risks
related to a high debt burden and weak external liquidity.

"We could lower the ratings over the next two years if Belize
fails to capitalize on the short-term fiscal benefits of the debt
rescheduling and reverses the trend of fiscal consolidation. This
could lead to renewed liquidity pressures and higher likelihood
that the government will delay future interest payments on its
commercial debt.

"We do not expect an upgrade over the next two years. Belize's
very weak institutional and economic profile weighs on the rating,
and improvement would depend on establishing a track record of
more effective economic decision-making, supporting a sounder debt
payment culture, or a meaningful improvement in economic
prosperity. Alternatively, a consistent reduction in fiscal
deficits that results in a sharp decline in its debt burden beyond
our expectations, coupled with a reduction in its external
vulnerabilities, could have a positive impact on the ratings.

RATIONALE

"The ratings reflect our appraisal of Belize's large fiscal and
external imbalances, alongside other economic risks, including the
country's vulnerability to external shocks and natural disasters.
The ratings also incorporate our assessment of Belize's weak
institutions and the absence of monetary and exchange-rate
flexibility. Flexibility and performance profile: Lower fiscal
deficits and debt service payments could help stabilizing Belize's
financial and external profiles. We expect that adjustment
measures and some pickup in growth will improve the fiscal metrics
over the forecast.

"However, we assume that the country will miss its fiscal targets
and that net general government debt will remain over 80% during
2017-2019.

"External vulnerability is significant in the context of a fixed
exchange-rate regime that also constrains monetary policy
flexibility. Belize's general government deficit was 4.4% of GDP
in fiscal-year 2016-2017, below our previous projection and the
7.5% deficit of fiscal-year 2015-2016. We expect progress in
lowering the fiscal deficit over the coming years. Various tax
measures put in place this year, including higher excises or
import duties on selected products and some changes in the general
sales tax, combined with further cuts in capital spending, should
reduce the fiscal deficit (and change in general government debt)
toward 2.4% of GDP during 2017-2020. Hence, we have improved our
assessment of fiscal performance and flexibility.

"In March 2017, the government reached a restructuring agreement
with private external bondholders on its US$526 million so-called
"superbond." The restructuring entailed a reduction in the
interest rate on the bonds (which was scheduled to step up to
6.767% in August 2017) and pushed back the beginning of principal
repayments to February 2030 from February 2019 in the original
amortization schedule. In addition, the agreement advanced the
final maturity date to February 2034 instead of February 2038. As
part of the agreement, Belize is committed to achieve a primary
surplus equal to at least 2% of GDP in the fiscal years 2018-2019
to 2020-2021. Under the agreement, if Belize fails to meet its
surplus targets, interest payments will become payable quarterly
rather than semiannually. In addition, the government would submit
a report to the national assembly to explain why the targets were
missed and need to request International Monetary Fund technical
assistance.

"Although we anticipate the government will make progress in
lowering the fiscal deficit over the coming years, we expect the
government to miss these fiscal targets based on our forecasts for
sluggish economic growth next year. In our opinion, the government
has limited ability to cut spending substantially, given Belize's
shortfall in basic infrastructure and the government's commitment
to implement the third and final stage of the three-year wage
increase agreement. In addition, the large informal sector and low
per capita GDP growth prospects limit the ability to raise
revenues. On the other hand, according to the government,
resources were set aside at the central bank for the final
compensation payment for the nationalized company Belize
Telecommunication Ltd. (BTL)--estimated around US$90 million.
Therefore, we do not expect additional significant pressures on
the budget coming from this claim.

"Fiscal discipline will be critical in reducing Belize's high
general government debt burden, which we project at 85% of GDP in
2017, in net terms. This heavy debt burden is a credit constraint,
particularly given Belize's narrow, open economy and fixed
exchange regime. Belize's interest costs will average 9.6% of
government revenues in 2017-2020, in line with the amended
interest rate on the U.S. dollar bonds.

"The composition of government debt, predominantly denominated in
foreign currency and held by nonresidents, weighs on our debt
assessment. The government has not tapped global capital markets
since its restructuring in 2012. In our opinion, access to global
capital markets will remain limited in the coming years given
Belize's legacy of defaults. The government relies on shallow
domestic capital markets, central bank financing, and financing
from official creditors, though we expect lower funding from
Venezuela through its Petrocaribe program. We assess Belize's
contingent liabilities as limited.

"Despite an expected further narrowing of Belize's current account
deficit in 2017, to 7.3% of GDP from 9.4% in 2016 (based on a
recovery in commodity exports and growth in tourism), Belize's
external position is highly vulnerable. We expect Belize's gross
external financing needs to average 146% of current account
receipts (CAR) plus usable reserves in 2017-2020. We project
foreign direct investment (FDI) will remain low in the near term
because of the likely repatriation of the compensation payments in
foreign currency for the nationalization of BTL, as has been
observed in the past two years. As a result, we expect net FDI to
remain stable at low levels (2% of GDP) in 2017-2019 given that
there are no significant foreign investments in the pipeline. This
will underpin an ongoing fall in international reserves.

"We expect narrow net external debt to reach almost 74% of CAR in
2017. Belize's net external liabilities are, however,
substantially larger than narrow net external debt. The country's
external profile is vulnerable to a risk of marked deterioration
in external financing caused by worsening financing conditions for
the banking sector, as seen most recently with the loss of
correspondent banking relations (CBRs), or a potential significant
shift in FDI."

The loss of CBRs in 2015-2016 hurt Belize's financial sector and
the entire economy, as a result of higher transaction and
compliance costs and restricted access to financial services for
key economic sectors, including tourism and trade. While all banks
eventually found replacement correspondents, their financial
relationships are not as extensive, and the range of services is
more limited than those previously provided.
Belize's monetary flexibility is limited by its fixed exchange and
lack of development of local currency capital markets. On the
other hand, the currency peg fosters price stability, keeping
price inflation low (just below 2% projected on average over 2017-
2020).

Institutional and economic profile:

-- Belize's weak institutional capacity, along with its history
    of debt defaults and low economic growth, continues to
    constrain S&P's ratings.
-- S&P expects the economy to expand by 1.6% in 2017, after a
    contraction of 0.8% in 2016.
-- Belize's weak rule of law limits prospects for an improvement
    of the business environment Belize's poor payment history
    influences S&P's ratings.
-- In March 2017, Belize has completed its third debt
    restructuring in the last 10 years.

Economic growth in Belize continues to be below that of peers.
Falling primary output, damage caused by Hurricane Earl, the loss
of CBRs, and the appreciation of the inflation-adjusted exchange
rate underpin the estimated economic contraction in 2016 (-0.8%).
S&P said, "We expect that GDP will increase by 1.6% in 2017 and 2%
in 2018 based on agriculture and tourism growth. On the other
hand, fiscal tightening may further disrupt the economic activity

"We project Belize's per capita GDP will be US$4,667 in 2017, and
per capita growth remains below that of its peers with a similar
level of development. Domestic industry is small, constrained by
relatively high-cost labor and energy and a small domestic market
(estimated population of 376,000). In addition, Belize is
vulnerable to natural disasters. The authorities failed to take
advantage of periods of stronger economic growth to improve the
country's physical infrastructure, which is very deficient.

"Although risks to political stability will remain low in the
coming four years, we find Belize's institutions to be weak.
Policy choices under successive governments have weakened the
capability and willingness to maintain sustainable public
finances. Governments have shown limited capacity to reduce the
high cost of doing business. Prime Minister Dean Barrow, of the
centre-right United People's Party, is serving his third and final
five-year term (2015-2020). Fiscal imbalance and debt overhang are
key challenges for the government. Belize's repeated debt
restructurings influence our ratings.

"In accordance with our relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by
the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and
was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision."

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee agreed that the fiscal performance assessment had
improved. All other key rating factors were unchanged.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot above.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.

The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook. The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

RATINGS LIST
  Ratings Affirmed

  Belize
   Sovereign Credit Rating                B-/Stable/B
   Transfer & Convertibility Assessment   B-
   Senior Unsecured                       B-
   Short-Term Debt                        B


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C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


APTOS (CAYMAN): S&P Affirms 'B-' Senior Secured Issue-Level Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B-' issue-level rating on
Atlanta, Ga.-based point of sale (POS) and business software
solutions provider Aptos (Cayman) L.P., following its plan to
issue an incremental $83 million add-on to its first-lien term
loan and draw approximately $15 million on its revolver, which
will be upsized by $10 million to a $25 million facility. Aptos
will use proceeds to fund an acquisition.

S&P said, "In our view, this transaction does not materially
change Aptos' credit profile. We expect pro forma leverage to be
in the low-7x area at close, and remain in that range through
fiscal 2018 ending Sept. 30, 2018, with only modest EBITDA
contribution from the acquisition. The recovery rating is '3'
indicating our expectation of meaningful (50%-70%; rounded
estimate: 55%) recovery in the event of a default.

"The 'B-' corporate credit rating and outlook on Aptos are
unchanged. The stable outlook reflects our expectation that Aptos
will achieve modest top-line and EBITDA growth over the next 12
months, while maintaining positive free cash flow generation and
adequate liquidity. Liquidity remains adequate, in our view, with
cash of about $10 million and roughly $10 million of availability
under the company's $25 million revolving credit facility expiring
2021 at transaction close. The company's net leverage financial
maintenance covenant on its term loan and revolving credit
facility will be reset as a result of this transaction, and we
expect the company to maintain over 20% cushion over the next 12
months."

For the latest rationale, see S&P's research update on Aptos,
published on June 28, 2017.

RATINGS LIST
Aptos (Cayman) L.P.
Corporate Credit Rating                B-/Stable/--


Affirmed Ratings
Aptos (Cayman) L.P.
Senior Secured*                       B-
  Recovery Rating                      3 (55%)

*$83 mil 1st-lien term loan add-on and $10 mil revolver upsize.


FALCON GROUP: S&P Affirms BB-/B ICR on $100MM Loan, Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said it has affirmed its 'BB-/B' long- and
short-term issuer credit ratings on trade finance provider Falcon
Group Holdings (Cayman) Ltd. The outlook is stable.

S&P said, "The affirmation follows Falcon's recent finalization of
a $100 million five-year term loan transaction with KKR Credit. In
our view, this new loan enables Falcon to expand and diversify
funding sources, support international growth, and broaden its
client and product base."

Falcon continues to fund the majority of its transactions through
nonrecourse refinancing with a range of banks shortly after
origination. However, the KKR Credit loan, an updated $150 million
securitization transaction with Natixis, and Falcon's own balance
sheet resources provide additional capacity to finance new
business. We note from Falcon's latest accounts that the
securitization facility has become fully consolidated, adding
$16.7 million in debt to its balance sheet as of Jan. 31, 2017.
S&P said, "We follow the revised accounting treatment when
assessing Falcon's financial risk profile.

"We had previously assumed a $150 million benchmark debt issue in
our financial projections for Falcon. Therefore, the KKR Credit
loan and the consolidation of the securitization facility do not
materially affect our expectations for Falcon's debt and cash flow
metrics. Under our revised forecasts for 2017-2018, we project
gross debt at the lower end of 3x-4x of adjusted EBITDA, with
funds from operations at the middle of the 20%-30% range of gross
debt. These metrics remain commensurate with our significant
financial risk profile assessment. We understand that Falcon's
internal policy is to maintain at least $40 million in cash and
liquid assets on its balance sheet at all times, and we recognize
$30 million of this sum as surplus cash in our debt leverage
metrics.

"The ratings on Falcon continue to reflect our view of its niche
position in the global trade finance market and the leverage and
debt servicing profiles resulting from its funding strategy.
Founded in 1994, it specializes in financing midsize corporate
clients through short-term transactions that are generally too
bespoke or too small to be a focus for many bank competitors. We
expect that Falcon will continue to generate relatively
predictable, recurring cash flows from its asset-light and low-
cost business model. We consider that barriers to entry into this
market are relatively low, but Falcon's track record and
established client and counterparty relationships would be
difficult to replicate."

Falcon reported a gross profit margin of 2.6% in the financial
year ending Jan. 31, 2017, down from 3.0% the previous year. The
slowdown in global trade, weaker economic growth in some Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, combined with increased U.S.$
libor interest rates, led to a 25% reduction in Falcon's revenues.
Nevertheless, credit losses were minimal and Falcon remained
profitable, continued to invest in its franchise, and maintained a
low risk appetite.

S&P said, "We think that Falcon's earnings and activity levels
will grow modestly in 2017-2018, as trade volume recovers and GCC
countries benefit from more stable prices. We also expect that
recent geographical expansion and new product investments will
start to contribute to Falcon's bottom-line results in the medium
term.

"Our stable outlook on Falcon reflects our expectation that the
company will successfully operate in the currently difficult
global environment and expand organically by broadening the range
of its trade finance services and widening its geographic spread.
If Falcon revises its established financing strategy, we expect it
to maintain leverage and debt servicing metrics consistent with
the current ratings.

"We could lower the ratings if Falcon introduces a more aggressive
financial policy, such as by raising materially more debt
(including securitized debt) than we assume, with no mitigating
factors. We could also lower the ratings if we thought that Falcon
had materially increased its risk appetite, particularly if it
weakened its underwriting criteria or expanded in noncore, riskier
business areas in an uncontrolled manner.

"A positive rating action is unlikely in the next 12 months. In
the longer term, we could raise the ratings if Falcon executes its
growth and financing strategy successfully, benefiting its
franchise, revenue base, and financial metrics. In addition, we
would consider whether Falcon is continuing to enhance its
corporate governance and internal controls as it grows."


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P U E R T O    R I C O
======================


ERGON CARIBBEAN: Sept. 6 Plan Confirmation Hearing
--------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Brian K. Tester of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Puerto Rico has conditionally approved Ergon Caribbean
Corp.'s disclosure statement dated July 24, 2017, referring to the
Debtor's plan of reorganization.

A hearing for the consideration of the final approval of the
Disclosure Statement and the confirmation of the Plan and of
objections as may be made to either will be held on Sept. 6, 2017,
at 2:00 p.m.

Objections to the final approval of the Disclosure Statement and
the confirmation of the Plan must be filed on or before 10 days
prior to the date of the hearing on confirmation of the Plan.

Acceptances or rejections of the Plan may be filed in writing by
the holders of all claims on or before 10 days prior to the date
of the hearing on confirmation of the Plan.

                   About Ergon Caribbean Corp.

Ergon Caribbean Corp. sought protection under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 17-00366) on Jan. 25,
2017.
The petition was signed by Juan Gabriel Pla, president.

At the time of the filing, the Debtor estimated assets and
liabilities of less than $500,000.

Carmen D. Conde Torres, Esq., at C. Conde & Assoc. serves as the
Debtor's bankruptcy counsel.


LA HABICHUELA: Unsecureds to Get 15% for 60 Months Under Plan
-------------------------------------------------------------
La Habichuela, Inc., filed with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Puerto Rico an amended disclosure statement explaining
its plan of reorganization, dated July 28, 2017.

Class 4 under the plan consists of the General Unsecured
Commercial Creditors & Unsecured Tax deficiencies of the Puerto
Rico Treasury Department. This class will get a prorated monthly
disbursement of 15% of claim for 60 months from the effective date
of the plan.

The funding of the plan will come from the savings since filing
the petition for relief and continuation of operations of the
three restaurants.

A full-text copy of the Amended Disclosure Statement is available
at:

     http://bankrupt.com/misc/prb15-09171-11.pdf

                    About La Habichuela, Inc.

La Habichuela, Inc, based in Carolina, Puerto Rico, filed a
Chapter 11 petition (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 15-09171) on November
19, 2015.  Francisco R. Moya Huff, Esq. serves as bankruptcy
counsel.  In its petition, the Debtor estimated $164,372 in assets
and $1.23 million in liabilities. The petition was signed by
Francisco Cabello Dominguez, secretary.


PUERTO RICO: Creditors Panel Opposes Committee Reconstitution Bid
-----------------------------------------------------------------
BankruptcyData.com reported that the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico's
official committee of unsecured creditors filed with the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court an objection to the ad hoc group of general
obligation (GO) bondholders' motion to reconstitute the official
committee of unsecured creditors. The objection asserts, "The
Trustee has ably fulfilled its statutory duties by appointing a
diverse and representative Committee comprised of trade creditors,
unions representing current employees, and tax refund creditors.
Each of the Committee members remains unpaid and is dedicated to
working diligently to protect and maximize the recoveries of all
general unsecured creditors. The Committee's members have one
other thing in common: they are undoubtedly unsecured creditors.
By contrast, the GO Group has been arguing for years that it holds
secured claims, and it does so again in the first paragraph of
this Motion where it requests to be appointed to the unsecured
creditors' committee. The GO Group fails to cite a single case
where a court appointed a creditor holding only secured claims (or
a creditor arguing that it is 'fully secured') to an unsecured
creditors' committee because no such case exists. While the
Committee does not disagree with the basic premise that an
unsecured bondholder owed several billion dollars could be
selected by the Trustee to sit on an unsecured creditors'
committee, the Trustee refused to appoint the GO Group to the
Committee because it insists that it holds fully secured claims,
rather than unsecured claims. The GO Group is, therefore, the
architect of its own predicament. The relief requested by the GO
Group is simply premature. If, in the future, they concede that
they are unsecured creditors, or the Court makes that
determination for them, it may be appropriate for Trustee to add
representation from the Commonwealth Bondholders to the Committee.
That cannot happen, however, as long as the question remains in
doubt regarding whether the Commonwealth's general obligation
bonds are fully secured by all available resources."

                      About Puerto Rico

Puerto Rico is a self-governing commonwealth in association with
the United States that's facing a massive bond debt of $70
billion, a 68% debt-to-GDP ratio and negative economic growth in
nine of the last 10 years.

The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has sought bankruptcy protection,
aiming to restructure its massive $74 billion debt-load and $49
billion in pension obligations.

The debt restructuring petition was filed by Puerto Rico's
financial oversight board in U.S. District Court in Puerto Rico
(Case No. 17-01578) on May 3, 2017, and was made under Title III
of 2016's U.S. Congressional rescue law known as the Puerto Rico
Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act ("PROMESA").

The Financial Oversight and Management Board later commenced Title
III cases for the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation
(COFINA) on May 5, 2017, and the Employees Retirement System (ERS)
and the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (HTA) on
May 21.  On July 2, 2017, a Title III case was commenced for the
Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority ("PREPA").

U.S. Chief Justice John Roberts has appointed U.S. District Judge
Laura Taylor Swain to oversee the Title III cases.  The Honorable
Judith Dein, a United States Magistrate Judge for the District of
Massachusetts, has been designated to preside over matters that
may be referred to her by Judge Swain, including discovery
disputes, and management of other pretrial proceedings.

Joint administration of the Title III cases, under Lead Case No.
17-3283, was granted on June 29, 2017.

The Oversight Board has hired as advisors, Proskauer Rose LLP and
O'Neill & Borges LLC as legal counsel, McKinsey & Co. as strategic
consultant, Citigroup Global Markets as municipal investment
banker, and Ernst & Young, as financial advisor.

Martin J. Bienenstock, Esq., Scott K. Rutsky, Esq., and Philip M.
Abelson, Esq., of Proskauer Rose; and Hermann D. Bauer, Esq., at
O'Neill & Borges are onboard as attorneys.

McKinsey & Co. is the Board's strategic consultant, Ernst & Young
is the Board's financial advisor, and Citigroup Global Markets
Inc. is the Board's municipal investment banker.

Prime Clerk LLC is the claims and noticing agent.  Prime Clerk
maintains a case web site at:

           https://cases.primeclerk.com/puertorico

Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC is the service agent for ERS, HTA,
and PREPA.

O'Melveny & Myers LLP is counsel to the Commonwealth's Puerto Rico
Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority (AAFAF), the agency
responsible for negotiations with bondholders.

The Oversight Board named Professor Nancy B. Rapoport as fee
examiner and to chair a committee to review professionals' fees.

                      Bondholders' Attorneys

Toro, Colon, Mullet, Rivera & Sifre, P.S.C. and Kramer Levin
Naftalis & Frankel LLP serve as counsel to the Mutual Fund Group,
comprised of mutual funds managed by Oppenheimer Funds, Inc.,
Franklin Advisers, Inc., and the First Puerto Rico Family of
Funds, which collectively hold over $3.5 billion in COFINA Bonds
and over $2.9 billion in other bonds issued by Puerto Rico and
other instrumentalities, including over $1.8 billion of Puerto
Rico general obligation bonds ("GO Bonds").

White & Case LLP and Lopez Sanchez & Pirillo LLC represent the UBS
Family of Funds and the Puerto Rico Family of Funds, which hold
$613.3 million in COFINA bonds.

Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, Robbins, Russell,
Englert, Orseck, Untereiner & Sauber LLP, and Jimenez, Graffam &
Lausell are co-counsel to the ad hoc group of General Obligation
Bondholders, comprised of Aurelius Capital Management, LP,
Autonomy Capital (Jersey) LP, FCO Advisors LP, Franklin Mutual
Advisers LLC, Monarch Alternative Capital LP, Senator Investment
Group LP, and Stone Lion Capital Partners L.P.

Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP and Reichard & Escalera are
co-counsel to the ad hoc coalition of holders of senior bonds
issued by COFINA, comprised of at least 30 institutional holders,
including Canyon Capital Advisors LLC and Varde Investment
Partners, L.P.

Correa Acevedo & Abesada Law Offices, P.S.C., is counsel to Canyon
Capital Advisors, LLC, River Canyon Fund Management, LLC, Davidson
Kempner Capital Management LP, OZ Management, LP, and OZ
Management II LP (the QTCB Noteholder Group).

                            Committees

The U.S. Trustee formed a nine-member Official Committee of
Retirees and a seven-member Official Committee of Unsecured
Creditors of the Commonwealth.  The Retiree Committee tapped
Jenner & Block LLP and Bennazar, Garcia & Milian, C.S.P., as its
attorneys.   The Creditors Committee tapped Paul Hastings  LLP and
O'Neill & Gilmore LLC as counsel.



PUERTO RICO: Oversight Board to Probe Debt, Fiscal Crisis
---------------------------------------------------------
The Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico,
created by Congress under the bipartisan Puerto Rico Oversight,
Management and Economic Stability Act ("PROMESA"), announced Aug.
2 its intention to commence a comprehensive investigation of
Puerto Rico's debt and its relationship to the fiscal crisis.

Consistent with the Procedures for Conducting PROMESA
Investigation, adopted by the Oversight Board on May 26, 2017, the
investigation will include a review of the fiscal crisis and its
contributors, and an examination of Puerto Rico's debt and its
issuance, including disclosure and selling practices.  The
Oversight Board will conduct this investigation pursuant to the
authority granted to it by Congress and the President under
PROMESA.

The Oversight Board has been specifically given the authority by
Congress under PROMESA to conduct an investigation into Puerto
Rico's debt and its connection to the current fiscal crisis.  The
Oversight Board considers this investigation an integral part of
its mission to restore fiscal balance and economic opportunity and
to promote Puerto Rico's reentry to the capital markets pursuant
to its responsibilities under PROMESA.  The Board proposes to form
a special committee of the Oversight Board for the purpose of
appointing an independent investigator to carry out such
investigation.  The Oversight Board will make its findings public.

"As we develop the parameters of the investigation and progress in
the appointment of the independent investigator, we will be
providing more information," said Oversight Board Executive
Director Natalie Jaresko.

Contact:

         Jose Luis Cedeno
         Tel: 787-400-9245
         E-mail: jcedeno@forculuspr.com
                 info@forculuspr.com

Board's Contact Information:

         E-mail: comments@oversightboard.pr.gov
         Web site: www.oversightboard.pr.gov

                           About Puerto Rico

Puerto Rico is a self-governing commonwealth in association with
the United States that's facing a massive bond debt of $70
billion, a 68% debt-to-GDP ratio and negative economic growth in
nine of the last 10 years.

The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has sought bankruptcy protection,
aiming to restructure its massive $74 billion debt-load and $49
billion in pension obligations.

The debt restructuring petition was filed by Puerto Rico's
financial oversight board in U.S. District Court in Puerto Rico
(Case No. 17-01578) on May 3, 2017, and was made under Title III
of 2016's U.S. Congressional rescue law known as the Puerto Rico
Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act ("PROMESA").

The Financial Oversight and Management Board later commenced Title
III cases for the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation
(COFINA) on May 5, 2017, and the Employees Retirement System (ERS)
and the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (HTA) on
May 21.  On July 2, 2017, a Title III case was commenced for the
Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority ("PREPA").

U.S. Chief Justice John Roberts has appointed U.S. District Judge
Laura Taylor Swain to oversee the Title III cases.  The Honorable
Judith Dein, a United States Magistrate Judge for the District of
Massachusetts, has been designated to preside over matters that
may be referred to her by Judge Swain, including discovery
disputes, and management of other pretrial proceedings.

Joint administration of the Title III cases, under Lead Case No.
17-3283, was granted on June 29, 2017.

The Oversight Board has hired as advisors, Proskauer Rose LLP and
O'Neill & Borges LLC as legal counsel, McKinsey & Co. as strategic
consultant, Citigroup Global Markets as municipal investment
banker, and Ernst & Young, as financial advisor.

Martin J. Bienenstock, Esq., Scott K. Rutsky, Esq., and Philip M.
Abelson, Esq., of Proskauer Rose; and Hermann D. Bauer, Esq., at
O'Neill & Borges are onboard as attorneys.

McKinsey & Co. is the Board's strategic consultant, Ernst & Young
is the Board's financial advisor, and Citigroup Global Markets
Inc. is the Board's municipal investment banker.

Prime Clerk LLC is the claims and noticing agent.  Prime Clerk
maintains a case web site at:

           https://cases.primeclerk.com/puertorico

Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC is the service agent for ERS, HTA,
and PREPA.

O'Melveny & Myers LLP is counsel to the Commonwealth's Puerto Rico
Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority (AAFAF), the agency
responsible for negotiations with bondholders.

The Oversight Board named Professor Nancy B. Rapoport as fee
examiner and to chair a committee to review professionals' fees.

                      Bondholders' Attorneys

Toro, Colon, Mullet, Rivera & Sifre, P.S.C. and Kramer Levin
Naftalis & Frankel LLP serve as counsel to the Mutual Fund Group,
comprised of mutual funds managed by Oppenheimer Funds, Inc.,
Franklin Advisers, Inc., and the First Puerto Rico Family of
Funds, which collectively hold over $3.5 billion in COFINA Bonds
and over $2.9 billion in other bonds issued by Puerto Rico and
other instrumentalities, including over $1.8 billion of Puerto
Rico general obligation bonds ("GO Bonds").

White & Case LLP and Lopez Sanchez & Pirillo LLC represent the UBS
Family of Funds and the Puerto Rico Family of Funds, which hold
$613.3 million in COFINA bonds.

Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, Robbins, Russell,
Englert, Orseck, Untereiner & Sauber LLP, and Jimenez, Graffam &
Lausell are co-counsel to the ad hoc group of General Obligation
Bondholders, comprised of Aurelius Capital Management, LP,
Autonomy Capital (Jersey) LP, FCO Advisors LP, Franklin Mutual
Advisers LLC, Monarch Alternative Capital LP, Senator Investment
Group LP, and Stone Lion Capital Partners L.P.

Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP and Reichard & Escalera are
co-counsel to the ad hoc coalition of holders of senior bonds
issued by COFINA, comprised of at least 30 institutional holders,
including Canyon Capital Advisors LLC and Varde Investment
Partners, L.P.

Correa Acevedo & Abesada Law Offices, P.S.C., is counsel to Canyon
Capital Advisors, LLC, River Canyon Fund Management, LLC, Davidson
Kempner Capital Management LP, OZ Management, LP, and OZ
Management II LP (the QTCB Noteholder Group).

                            Committees

The U.S. Trustee formed a nine-member Official Committee of
Retirees and a seven-member Official Committee of Unsecured
Creditors of the Commonwealth.  The Retiree Committee tapped
Jenner & Block LLP and Bennazar, Garcia & Milian, C.S.P., as its
attorneys.   The Creditors Committee tapped Paul Hastings  LLP and
O'Neill & Gilmore LLC as counsel.


PUERTO RICO: Retirees Panel Objects to Additional Appointments
--------------------------------------------------------------
BankruptcyData.com reported that the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
and its official committee of retired employees of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico's filed with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court
separate objections to the motion seeking appointment of
additional committee of government employees and active pension
plan participants or, in the alternative, reconstitution of the
retiree committee.  The committee's objection explains, "Both a
motion to direct the appointment of an additional committee and a
motion to change the membership of an existing committee require
the movant to demonstrate that any existing committee as a whole,
or in part, does not adequately represent creditors' interests."
The Commonwealth also objected to the ad hoc group of general
obligation bondholders' motion to reconstitute the statutory
committee of unsecured claimholders. This objection asserts, "The
Motion should be denied. Primarily, as the U.S. Trustee put it in
denying the reconstitution of the UCC to include Constitutional
Debtholders, creditors asserting secured claims or full priority
over other unsecured claims have no place on an existing or
separate statutory committee of unsecured claimholders." Finally,
the Commonwealth objected to the ad hoc municipalities committee's
motion requesting the appointment of an additional committee of
municipalities.  This objection argues, "The Commonwealth's
critical need for all its components to work together means its
components cannot square off against each other like lone rangers
with each fighting for its independent glory at the expense of one
another. This may sound obvious, but the numerous pending requests
for separate statutory committees for different entities and
groups show it is not so obvious.  Creation of new committees to
focus on one group, entity, or issue, rather than the integrated
enterprise, imperils the Commonwealth's survival, just as one
would expect when a committee arms itself to pursue one parochial
interest at the expense of others."

                          About Puerto Rico

Puerto Rico is a self-governing commonwealth in association with
the United States that's facing a massive bond debt of $70
billion, a 68% debt-to-GDP ratio and negative economic growth in
nine of the last 10 years.

The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has sought bankruptcy protection,
aiming to restructure its massive $74 billion debt-load and $49
billion in pension obligations.

The debt restructuring petition was filed by Puerto Rico's
financial oversight board in U.S. District Court in Puerto Rico
(Case No. 17-01578) on May 3, 2017, and was made under Title III
of 2016's U.S. Congressional rescue law known as the Puerto Rico
Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act ("PROMESA").

The Financial Oversight and Management Board later commenced Title
III cases for the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation
(COFINA) on May 5, 2017, and the Employees Retirement System (ERS)
and the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (HTA) on
May 21.  On July 2, 2017, a Title III case was commenced for the
Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority ("PREPA").

U.S. Chief Justice John Roberts has appointed U.S. District Judge
Laura Taylor Swain to oversee the Title III cases.  The Honorable
Judith Dein, a United States Magistrate Judge for the District of
Massachusetts, has been designated to preside over matters that
may be referred to her by Judge Swain, including discovery
disputes, and management of other pretrial proceedings.

Joint administration of the Title III cases, under Lead Case No.
17-3283, was granted on June 29, 2017.

The Oversight Board has hired as advisors, Proskauer Rose LLP and
O'Neill & Borges LLC as legal counsel, McKinsey & Co. as strategic
consultant, Citigroup Global Markets as municipal investment
banker, and Ernst & Young, as financial advisor.

Martin J. Bienenstock, Esq., Scott K. Rutsky, Esq., and Philip M.
Abelson, Esq., of Proskauer Rose; and Hermann D. Bauer, Esq., at
O'Neill & Borges are onboard as attorneys.

McKinsey & Co. is the Board's strategic consultant, Ernst & Young
is the Board's financial advisor, and Citigroup Global Markets
Inc. is the Board's municipal investment banker.

Prime Clerk LLC is the claims and noticing agent.  Prime Clerk
maintains a case web site at:

           https://cases.primeclerk.com/puertorico

Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC is the service agent for ERS, HTA,
and PREPA.

O'Melveny & Myers LLP is counsel to the Commonwealth's Puerto Rico
Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority (AAFAF), the agency
responsible for negotiations with bondholders.

The Oversight Board named Professor Nancy B. Rapoport as fee
examiner and to chair a committee to review professionals' fees.

                      Bondholders' Attorneys

Toro, Colon, Mullet, Rivera & Sifre, P.S.C. and Kramer Levin
Naftalis & Frankel LLP serve as counsel to the Mutual Fund Group,
comprised of mutual funds managed by Oppenheimer Funds, Inc.,
Franklin Advisers, Inc., and the First Puerto Rico Family of
Funds, which collectively hold over $3.5 billion in COFINA Bonds
and over $2.9 billion in other bonds issued by Puerto Rico and
other instrumentalities, including over $1.8 billion of Puerto
Rico general obligation bonds ("GO Bonds").

White & Case LLP and Lopez Sanchez & Pirillo LLC represent the UBS
Family of Funds and the Puerto Rico Family of Funds, which hold
$613.3 million in COFINA bonds.

Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, Robbins, Russell,
Englert, Orseck, Untereiner & Sauber LLP, and Jimenez, Graffam &
Lausell are co-counsel to the ad hoc group of General Obligation
Bondholders, comprised of Aurelius Capital Management, LP,
Autonomy Capital (Jersey) LP, FCO Advisors LP, Franklin Mutual
Advisers LLC, Monarch Alternative Capital LP, Senator Investment
Group LP, and Stone Lion Capital Partners L.P.

Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP and Reichard & Escalera are
co-counsel to the ad hoc coalition of holders of senior bonds
issued by COFINA, comprised of at least 30 institutional holders,
including Canyon Capital Advisors LLC and Varde Investment
Partners, L.P.

Correa Acevedo & Abesada Law Offices, P.S.C., is counsel to Canyon
Capital Advisors, LLC, River Canyon Fund Management, LLC, Davidson
Kempner Capital Management LP, OZ Management, LP, and OZ
Management II LP (the QTCB Noteholder Group).

                            Committees

The U.S. Trustee formed a nine-member Official Committee of
Retirees and a seven-member Official Committee of Unsecured
Creditors of the Commonwealth.  The Retiree Committee tapped
Jenner & Block LLP and Bennazar, Garcia & Milian, C.S.P., as its
attorneys.   The Creditors Committee tapped Paul Hastings  LLP and
O'Neill & Gilmore LLC as counsel.


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B.
Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Joseph Cardillo at
856-381-8268.


                   * * * End of Transmission * * *