/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/170814.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

               Monday, August 14, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 160


                            Headlines



C O L O M B I A

COLOMBIA TELECOMUNICACIONES: Fitch Puts B Rating on Watch Negative


C O S T A   R I C A

COSTA RICA: Tighter Liquidity Adds to Fiscal Squeeze, Fitch Says


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REP: Deficit Financing Snaps up 74% of US$7BB Fund


J A M A I C A

JAMAICA: JEA Assessing Impact of Strike My Haulage Contractors


P U E R T O    R I C O

AFICA: S&P Withdraws 'D' LT Rating on 2000 Series A Revenue Bonds
LA HABICHUELA: Hearing on Plan Outline Approval Set for Sept. 22
MARKETS & FUN: Plan Outline Okayed; Plan Hearing on Sept. 5
PUERTO RICO: Aurelius Seeks Dismissal of Title III Case
PUERTO RICO: Aurelius to Question Constitutionality of Board


U R U G U A Y

URUGUAY: Mercosur Nations Seek to Boost Regional Tourism


V E N E Z U E L A

VENEZUELA: Remain in Forefront of Real Estate Buying, Amid Crisis


X X X X X X X X X

LATIN AMERICA: UN Panel Reports Sharp Drop in Foreign Investment
* BOND PRICING: For the Week From Aug. 7 to Aug. 11, 2017


                            - - - - -



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C O L O M B I A
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COLOMBIA TELECOMUNICACIONES: Fitch Puts B Rating on Watch Negative
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed the following ratings of Colombia
Telecomunicaciones S.A. ESP (ColTel) on Rating Watch Negative:
Long-Term Foreign- and Local-Currency Issuer Default Ratings
(IDR), its senior unsecured notes, rated 'BB-', and its
subordinated perpetual notes, rated 'B'.

The Negative Watch reflects increased pressure on ColTel's already
weak liquidity position due to the negative arbitration ruling in
force since Aug. 8, 2017, related to the concession assets from
1994, which requires the company to pay a COP1.6 trillion
arbitration verdict (equivalent to 160% of the capex projected by
the company in 2017). The company is negotiating payment terms
with the Ministry of Telecommunications (MinTic) to minimize the
negative cash flow impact. A short deferral period without any
material payment-in-kind arrangements will be negative for the
ratings. Also, any material delay in the recapitalization plan due
to the arbitration ruling will be critically negative for the
ratings. The Rating Watch will be resolved based on the final
terms of the arbitration payment agreement and the progress on
recapitalization.

ColTel's tight liquidity condition and constrained financial
flexibility, due to piercing of an incurrence covenant, remain
unresolved. Its weak cash flow generation forced it to postpone
COP170 billion in PARAPAT payments during March through June 2017.
An additional waiver was approved for COP170 billion for the July
through October 2017 time period. These PARAPAT arrears must be
paid with interest by no later than Oct. 31, 2017. The company has
additional permitted debt of only USD92 million as of June 30,
2017.

Future ratings actions will depend on the payment terms for the
arbitration verdict and the timeliness of the capitalization.
Fitch believes ColTel cannot afford further delays in the
implementation of its planned capital injection, which is
necessary to turn around its weak cash flow generation. ColTel's
ratings will be downgraded should the company fail to show
meaningful measures to improve its weak financial position in the
short term.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

EBITDA Performance Improvement: ColTel's EBITDA increased by 7.1%
during the six-months as of June 2017, compared to the same period
in 2016 and its EBITDA margin expanded to 32% from 30%. The margin
expansion is a result of the company's efforts to increase prices
for some of its services during the fourth quarter of 2016 and
first half of 2017 which helped achieve a 2.6% revenue increase as
of June 2017, year over year, just over the increase in costs and
expenses of 0.1% during the same period.

Fitch expects the company's ability to adjust prices going forward
to be more limited given the fierce competitive landscape and
relatively weaker GDP growth expected in the near term. Fitch also
expects ARPU pressure to continue in its mobile operation. Fitch
expects EBITDA growth to be modest given the expectation of a slow
diversification from voice revenues to non-traditional services,
keeping ColTel's margins close to 31% in 2017-2019.

Future cash outflow for the payment of the arbitration verdict,
whether it is in cash or as payment-in-kind (capex), will be
negative to ColTel's competitiveness given that it will likely
lead to a reduction in core capex, which is focused on
strengthening and expanding network quality. Fitch estimates that,
regardless of the payment arrangement, the company will have to
allocate a part of its investment funding to pay for the
arbitration consideration, which in Fitch's view can negatively
impact its competitive position.

Cash Flow Performance Hinges on Capitalization: ColTel's negative
FCF generation will not turn around in the short- to medium-term
unless the company is recapitalized. Under the current capital
structure, the cash outflow burden related to its PARAPAT payments
remains high. ColTel's CFFO stood at COP875 billion as of LTM June
2017 because the company received a waiver on its PARAPAT payments
in 2017. With these payments, adjusted CFFO would have been COP700
billion during this period. With the recapitalization, FCF is
expected to be positive and average close to COP130 billion in
2017-2019.

High Leverage due to PARAPAT: ColTel's leverage is high for the
rating category. Fitch's calculation of net debt-to-EBITDA
(including PARAPAT debt, 50% of the perpetual bond and the hedging
of FX risk) remained above 5x as of June 2017, while the leverage
ratio calculated under the 2022 USD750 million senior bond
covenant (which includes 100% of the perpetual bond, excludes the
PARAPAT debt but adjusts EBITDA by subtracting LTM PARAPAT
payments), stood at 4.3x during the same period. Fitch expects
ColTel's leverage to fall close to 3x if the capitalization takes
place.

Weakening Competitive Position: ColTel had yet to show meaningful
growth in its high-ARPU products, such as broadband (UBB) and HD-
TV, which would improve its EBITDA and achieve higher revenue
diversification. The contribution from its pay-TV service remained
at just 6% of total sales as of June 2017, significantly lower
than its 10% target. On UBB the company lost market share due to
limited ability to bundle services and lower speeds than what the
competition can offer. Fitch expects ColTel's capex intensity to
fall from an average of 23.8% in 2012-2016 to approximately 18% in
2017-2019 if the recapitalization is successful. The company plans
to optimize its capex primarily focusing on deploying its fiber-
to-the-home (FTTH) network and plans to increase home passes (HPs)
to 203,000 by FY2018 while HP are expected to reach 109,000 as of
FY 2017. It may prove difficult for ColTel to double HPs in the
short term - a situation that would continue to negatively impact
its fixed operation and, as a result, its competitive position.

Equity Remains Negative: ColTel's equity has remained in negative
territory as of June 2017 (-COP 1.4 trillion once the perpetual
bond is adjusted for 50% equity credit), pointing to the need to
find a structural and permanent solution to the capital structure
of the company. ColTel was already forced to implement a major
restructuring of the PARAPAT obligation in 2012, when it became
evident that EBITDA performance was not sufficient to absorb
PARAPAT payments agreed to in the Investment agreement signed
between Telefonica and ColTel in 2006. The EBITDA underperformance
during 2006 - 2011 led the government to assume 48% of the total
PARAPAT consideration (estimated then at USD3 billion) and leaving
ColTel to assume the remaining 52%. However; the remaining PARAPAT
obligation following the restructuring has proven to be too large
an obligation for ColTel's cash generation capacity.

In 2015, ColTel adopted the IFRS accounting standard, which
required registering the PARAPAT obligation on its balance sheet.
This drove the company's equity position into negative territory,
requiring the issuance of a deeply subordinated bond to bring the
equity position back to positive numbers. However: the continuing
deteriorating financial results have again created a negative
equity position as of June 2016, begging the need for a structural
solution that ensures a sustainable capital structure.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Coltel's financial profile is weak compared to other 'BB' category
telecom operators in the region. Empresa de Telecomunicaciones de
Bogota, S.A., E.S.P. (ETB), which is rated 'BB+'/Negative and is a
direct competitor to ColTel in Colombia, boasts significantly
lower leverage than Coltel, although its narrow breadth of service
offerings offsets the strength to an extent. Also, the company
financial profile is materially weaker than Millicom's operating
subsidiaries in Guatemala and Paraguay, which are both rated
'BB+'/Stable. While Coltel's current liquidity profile, leverage,
and cash flow generation are deemed weaker than Cable & Wireless
Communications Limited, VTR Finance, and Axtel S.A.B. de C.V.,
which are all rated 'BB-', its pro forma financial profile as far
as capitalization will place the company's financial profile more
in line with a 'BB' category. No parent-subsidiary, and operating
environment factors were considered in the rating.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within the rating case for Coltel include:

- The capitalization is expected to take place in September 2017;
- Waved PARAPAT payments are paid with the capitalization;
- Leverage after capitalization remains approximately 3x in 2017-
   2019.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Positive Rating Action

- A positive rating action is unlikely absent the perfection of
   the capital structure in the short term.

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Negative Rating Action

- Failure to improve its current precarious capital structure and
   liquidity profile.
- Continued profitability deterioration due to competitive
   pressures and slow growth in its non-traditional business
   segments.
- Negative FCF generation amid persistently high PARAPAT payments
- Adjusted net leverage, excluding the PARAPAT liability to
   remain above 3x on a sustained basis.
- Adjusted net leverage, including the PARAPAT liability to
   remain above 5x on a sustained basis.
- An unfavorable (i.e. below management expectations) payment
   agreement with MinTic to honor the recently awarded arbitration
   verdict.

LIQUIDITY

ColTel's liquidity remained weak as of June 2017 when cash
balances, including short-term investments, fell to COP87 billion
from COP215 billion in 2016, representing just 8% of short-term
debt obligations of COP1,157 billion, an amount that includes
COP692 billion associated with the PARAPAT consideration. If the
mark to market asset derivative position that could be unwound
during the second half of 2017 is considered, then the company
could obtain additional cash resources of approximately COP500
billion. Although ColTel reported COP309 billion in available
lines of credit as of March 2017, the company cannot draw a
significant amount from this liquidity backup as the piercing of
its 2002 bond leverage covenant threshold (3.75x) continues.

The company's financial flexibility has diminished following its
crossing of the 3.75x leverage incurrence covenant under the 2022
bond indenture as of March 2016 and as a result can only take
additional debt to a maximum of USD300 million. As of June 30,
2017, USD207.6 million out of the permitted USD300 million
additional debt was drawn from its credit facilities. The limited
headroom for additional debt imposes a material financial
constraint to meet financial obligations and simultaneously fund
its capex strategy. Further delays in the capitalization of the
company to pay down its PARAPAT liability could lead to an
important reduction in capex execution in the short term,
postponing the deployment of its FTTH investment strategy further
weakening its competitive position.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has placed the following ratings on Rating Watch Negative:


Colombia Telecomunicaciones S.A. ESP
  -- FC IDR at 'BB-'
  -- LC IDR at 'BB-';
  -- 2022 notes at 'BB-';
  -- Subordinated bond at 'B'.



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C O S T A   R I C A
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COSTA RICA: Tighter Liquidity Adds to Fiscal Squeeze, Fitch Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
Tighter liquidity conditions in Costa Rica are adding pressure to
the sovereign's already weak fiscal position. The local capital
market should remain a reliable source of fiscal financing
supporting the sovereign's debt service capacity, Fitch Ratings
says, but it is becoming more costly.

Fitch downgraded Costa Rica's rating to 'BB' from 'BB+' in January
on a sustained projected rise in the public debt burden, but
revised the Outlook to Stable on the expectation the sovereign
would preserve the financing flexibility that it had demonstrated
in the local market. Consequently, evidence of financing
constraints would run counter to this baseline and could be
negative for the rating.

Costa Rica's high central government deficit, averaging around 5%
of GDP since 2009, is a result of structural spending increases
and institutional gridlock preventing tax increases to fund them.
This led central government debt to nearly double to 45% of GDP in
2016 from 24% in 2008.

The government has relied heavily on the local market to finance
its high deficit since 2015, when congressional authorization for
external bond issuance ran out. The local market has been a
reliable financing source so far, due to a sizeable investor base
dominated by largely captive publicly administered funds, such as
social security and state-owned banks, and the use of a diverse
array of borrowing mechanisms including direct placements,
auctions and swaps.

Low inflation and interest rates since 2015 also benefitted
financing conditions for the sovereign, but this favorable
backdrop has unwound swiftly in recent months. Rapid depreciation
of the Cost Rican colon in May prompted the central bank to hike
its policy rate (275 bps since April), sell US dollar reserves and
line up a USD1 billion credit line with the Latin American Reserve
Fund. This resulted in tighter liquidity conditions and a rise in
the local-currency sovereign yield curve of 100 bps-150 bps at
medium tenors.

Initial reluctance on the part of the National Treasury to
validate these higher rates led to unsuccessful auctions in June
and July. This prompted the government to announce it was facing a
liquidity squeeze and led to reported delays in some payments.
Recent auctions and direct debt placements in early August have
been successful, however, supporting Fitch's baseline that
financing will remain forthcoming and thus supportive of the
sovereign's debt service capacity.

But local financing will now come at higher cost, compounding
Costa Rica's fiscal imbalances. Colon depreciation and higher
interest rates are already lifting interest costs in 2017, and
capital spending is rising on a large pre-election budget hike. As
a result, the deficit has resumed an upward trend so far in 2017,
after it fell to 5.2% of GDP in 2016 from 5.7% in 2015. A rising
deficit will become more expensive to finance, as will an
additional 5.0% of GDP in debt maturities in the coming year,
mostly short-term treasury bills.

The government announced spending containment measures to ease the
pressure, but Fitch believes scope for these is narrow given Costa
Rica's rigid spending profile. It also aims to restart talks
around stalled tax reforms in pursuit of a more lasting solution
to the fiscal imbalance, and to seek new authorization for
external bond issuance to ease pressure on the local market.
However, prospects for meaningful progress on these proposals in
Costa Rica's gridlock-prone legislature appear dim in Fitch's
view, especially given upcoming elections in February 2018.



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D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
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DOMINICAN REP: Deficit Financing Snaps up 74% of US$7BB Fund
------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that economist Ernesto Selman said that
74% of the Pension Fund, currently at RD$371.0 billion (US$7.7
billion) have been used to finance the fiscal deficits of
governments and of the Central Bank.

Mr. Selman said 24% of the Fund is held by financial
intermediaries, while 9% is used to issue government bonds, rather
than reinvesting to create more jobs and wealth, according to
Dominican Today.

The executive vice president of the Regional Center for
Sustainable Economic Strategies (CREES) said the Dominican
Republic is the only country which charges a 25% fee on the
profitability of the Pension Fund, which he affirms should be
reformed, the report notes.

"There are a number of characteristics of the local economy that
prevent achieving universality and improve the low replacement
rate, that is, the percentage of wages with which workers will be
pensioned at the end of their productive life and in the current
conditions barely reaches 22," the economist said at INTEC
Technological Institute's 2nd Dialogue for Action, "Social
Security: Necessary reforms," the report relays.

Among the factors, Mr. Selman notes, is unemployment which the
Central Bank puts at 18%; 58.9% of those in informal jobs; only
48% of the economically active population contributing to the
system and a low level of income, below half the Latin American
average, the report says.

Mr. Selman said to undertake institutional reforms that improve
the social security system, public policies that contribute to
reversing these aspects must be promoted, "starting with
correcting and vetting public finances, as well as increasing the
retirement age from 60 to 65; raising workers' contributions from
8 to 10%, eliminate the commissions structure, among other points,
the report adds.

As reported in Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on July 24,
2017, Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the Dominican
Republic's long term issuer and debt ratings to Ba3 from B1 and
changed the outlook to stable from positive, based on the
following key drivers:

(1) The Dominican Republic's continued robust growth outlook
     compared to rating peers, coupled with a reduction in
     external risks as current account deficits have declined and
     international reserves have increased.

(2) The reduction in fiscal deficits over the last four years and
     Moody's expectation that fiscal deficits will remain shy of
     3% of GDP, supported by fiscal restraint and reduced
     transfers to the electricity sector.



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J A M A I C A
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JAMAICA: JEA Assessing Impact of Strike My Haulage Contractors
--------------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that Jamaican local exporters are bracing for
millions of dollars in losses arising from the three day strike by
haulage contractors which crippled the transportation of cargo to
the Kingston Freeport Terminal.

According to the acting general manager of the Jamaica Exporters
Association (JEA), Tamra Thomas, an assessment is being carried
out on the impact the strike has had on the sector, the report
notes.

The Customs Brokers and Freight Forwarders Association of Jamaica
told RJR News that it will take a few days for things to return to
normal at the wharf.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Feb. 9, 2017, Fitch Ratings affirmed Jamaica's Long-Term Foreign
and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'B' with a
Stable Outlook. The issue ratings on Jamaica's senior unsecured
Foreign and Local Currency bonds are also affirmed at 'B'. The
Outlooks on the Long-Term IDRs are Stable. The Country Ceiling is
affirmed at 'B' and the Short-Term Foreign Currency and Local
Currency IDRs at 'B'.



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======================


AFICA: S&P Withdraws 'D' LT Rating on 2000 Series A Revenue Bonds
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings corrected its ratings release by withdrawing
its 'D' long-term rating on Puerto Rico Industrial, Tourist,
Educational, Medical and Environmental Control Facilities
Financing Authority's (AFICA) 2000 series A revenue bonds (Palmas
Del Mar Country Club Project).


LA HABICHUELA: Hearing on Plan Outline Approval Set for Sept. 22
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Edward A. Godoy of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Puerto Rico will hold on Sept. 22, 2017, at 9:30 a.m.
a hearing to consider the adequacy of the disclosure statement
filed by La Habichuela, Inc., referring to the Debtor's plan of
reorganization.

Objections to the Disclosure Statement must be filed not less than
14 days prior to the hearing.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter on Aug. 4, 2017, the
Debtor filed with the Court an amended disclosure statement
explaining its plan of reorganization, dated July 28, 2017.  Class
under the plan consists of the General Unsecured Commercial
Creditors & Unsecured Tax deficiencies of the Puerto Rico Treasury
Department.  This class will get a prorated monthly disbursement
of 15% of claim for 60 months from the effective date of the plan.

                    About La Habichuela, Inc.

La Habichuela, Inc, based in Carolina, Puerto Rico, filed a
Chapter 11 petition (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 15-09171) on Nov. 19,
2015.  Francisco R. Moya Huff, Esq., serves as bankruptcy counsel.
In its petition, the Debtor estimated $164,372 in assets and $1.23
million in liabilities.  The petition was signed by Francisco
Cabello Dominguez, secretary.


MARKETS & FUN: Plan Outline Okayed; Plan Hearing on Sept. 5
------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Puerto Rico will consider approval of
the Chapter 11 plan of reorganization for Markets & Fun LLC at a
hearing on Sept. 5, 2017.

The hearing will be held at 10:00 a.m., at the Jose V. Toledo
Federal Building & U.S. Courthouse, Courtroom 2, Second Floor, 300
Del Recinto Sur, Old San Juan, Puerto Rico.

The court will also consider at the hearing final approval of the
company's disclosure statement, which it conditionally approved on
August 4.

Under the proposed plan, Class 2 general unsecured claims in the
total amount of $168,966 will be paid from a carve-out of $5,000,
equivalent to 3%.  Payments will be made in
60 monthly installments in the amount of $83 for each claim.

Payments under the plan will be funded by the company's on-going
operations, according to its disclosure statement filed on
August 1.

A copy of the disclosure statement is available for free at
https://is.gd/X48qmy

                     About Markets & Fun LLC

Based in Humacao, Puerto Rico, Markets & Fun LLC is a company
organized and authorized to do business under the laws of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico since 2010.  The Debtor executed a
franchisee agreement to operate a David's Cookies bakery located
at Hotel Four Points Sheraton in Palmas del Mar, Humacao.

The Debtor filed a Chapter 11 petition (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No.
16-08010) on Oct. 5, 2016.  Abdiel Rosado, president and sole
shareholder, signed the petition.  At the time of the filing, the
Debtor disclosed that it had estimated assets of less than $50,000
and liabilities of less than $500,000.

Judge Enrique S. Lamoutte Inclan presides over the case.

MRO Attorneys at Law, LLC, serves as counsel to the Debtor.  The
Debtor hired Aida Escribano-Ramallo from the firm BDO Puerto Rico,
PSC, as financial consultant.


PUERTO RICO: Aurelius Seeks Dismissal of Title III Case
-------------------------------------------------------
Aurelius Investment, LLC, Aurelius Opportunities Fund, LLC, and
Lex Claims, LLC ask the U.S. District Court for the District of
Puerto Rico to dismiss the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico's Title III
petition, and grant them relief from the automatic stay.

Aurelius, et al. question the constitutionality of the Puerto Rico
Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act ("PROMESA"),
Pub. L. No. 114-187, 130 Stat. 549 (2016), on the grounds that the
appointment of the Board members of the Fiscal Management and
Oversight Board for Puerto Rico violates the Appointments Clause
of the U.S. Constitution and the separation of powers.

The Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico
derives its existence and authority entirely from PROMESA, and it
controls almost every aspect of the Commonwealth's finances
pursuant to that federal law.

Aurelius asserts that the actions the Board has purported to take
since its inception -- including its authorization of this Title
III proceeding -- are therefore void because of the appointment of
the members violates the Appointments Clause of the United States
Constitution and principles of separation of powers.

Aurelius notes that:

   -- The Oversight Board is composed of seven voting members who
      have no superior officer save the President, yet were never
      subject to Senate confirmation.

   -- Six of the members of the Oversight Board were effectively
      hand-picked by individual members of Congress pursuant to an
      intricate system of Balkanized lists designed to severely
      constrain the President's appointment powers.

"[S]ince 1789, every civilian official appointed by the federal
government to oversee the operation of a territorial government
has been recognized as a principal federal officer, with
advice-and-consent Senate appointment.  This includes all
governors of Puerto Rico until Congress granted Puerto Rico's
citizens the right to select their governors," Theodore B. Olson,
Esq., at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, explains in court filings.

"Even if the Board members were inferior officers, PROMESA would
still violate the Appointments Clause because the Act does not
vest the appointment power "in the President alone."  PROMESA
effectively required the President to "choose" six of the seven
Board members from seat-specific lists compiled by the Speaker of
the House, the Majority Leader of the Senate, the Minority Leader
of the Senate, and the Minority Leader of the House. 48 U.S.C.
Sec. 2121(e)(2). This novel procedure was intended to "ensure[ ]
that a majority of [the Board's] members are effectively chosen by
Republican congressional leaders."  And that is exactly what
happened: Congressional leaders dictated lists of potential Board
members, and the President "selected" the Board from those lists."

According to Aurelius, the Board's actions are invalid; it cannot
act until it is properly constituted.  Aurelius thus seeks the
dismissal of the Board's petition for the Commonwealth's debt
restructuring under Title III of PROMESA.

"Because the Commonwealth is not eligible to be a debtor under
Title III and the Board lacks lawful authority to operate as
presently constituted, the Board cannot act as the Commonwealth's
representative, and this Title III petition should be dismissed
and this proceeding thereby terminated," Mr. Olson tells the
Court.

Funds managed by Aurelius hold substantial amounts of outstanding
bonds that were issued by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and
backed by a pledge of Puerto Rico's full faith, credit, and taxing
power.

Aurelius is represented by:

         Luis A. Oliver-Fraticelli
         Katarina Stipec-Rubio
         ADSUAR MUNIZ GOYCO SEDA & PEREZ-OCHOA PSC
         208 Ponce de Leon Ave., Suite 1600
         San Juan, P.R. 00918
         Tel: (787) 756-9000
         Fax: (787) 756-9010
         E-mail: loliver@amgprlaw.com
                 kstipec@amgprlaw.com

                - and -

         Theodore B. Olson
         Matthew D. McGill
         Helgi C. Walker
         Michael R. Huston
         Lochlan F. Shelfer
         Jeremy M. Christiansen
         GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
         1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
         Washington, D.C. 20036
         Phone: (202) 955-8500
         Fax: (202) 467-0539
         E-mail: tolson@gibsondunn.com
                 mmcgill@gibsondunn.com
                 hwalker@gibsondunn.com
                 mhuston@gibsondunn.com
                 lshelfer@gibsondunn.com
                 jchristiansen@gibsondunn.com

A copy of the Motion is available at:

    http://bankrupt.com/misc/PR_913_Aurelius_M_Dismissal.pdf

                       About Puerto Rico

Puerto Rico is a self-governing commonwealth in association with
the United States that's facing a massive bond debt of $70
billion, a 68% debt-to-GDP ratio and negative economic growth in
nine of the last 10 years.

The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has sought bankruptcy protection,
aiming to restructure its massive $74 billion debt-load and $49
billion in pension obligations.

The debt restructuring petition was filed by Puerto Rico's
financial oversight board in U.S. District Court in Puerto Rico
(Case No. 17-01578) on May 3, 2017, and was made under Title III
of 2016's U.S. Congressional rescue law known as the Puerto Rico
Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act ("PROMESA").

The Financial Oversight and Management Board later commenced Title
III cases for the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation
(COFINA) on May 5, 2017, and the Employees Retirement System (ERS)
and the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (HTA) on
May 21.  On July 2, 2017, a Title III case was commenced for the
Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority ("PREPA").

U.S. Chief Justice John Roberts has appointed U.S. District Judge
Laura Taylor Swain to oversee the Title III cases.  The Honorable
Judith Dein, a United States Magistrate Judge for the District of
Massachusetts, has been designated to preside over matters that
may be referred to her by Judge Swain, including discovery
disputes, and management of other pretrial proceedings.

Joint administration of the Title III cases, under Lead Case No.
17-3283, was granted on June 29, 2017.

The Oversight Board has hired as advisors, Proskauer Rose LLP and
O'Neill & Borges LLC as legal counsel, McKinsey & Co. as strategic
consultant, Citigroup Global Markets as municipal investment
banker, and Ernst & Young, as financial advisor.

Martin J. Bienenstock, Esq., Scott K. Rutsky, Esq., and Philip M.
Abelson, Esq., of Proskauer Rose; and Hermann D. Bauer, Esq., at
O'Neill & Borges are onboard as attorneys.

McKinsey & Co. is the Board's strategic consultant, Ernst & Young
is the Board's financial advisor, and Citigroup Global Markets
Inc. is the Board's municipal investment banker.

Prime Clerk LLC is the claims and noticing agent.  Prime Clerk
maintains a case web site at:

           https://cases.primeclerk.com/puertorico

Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC is the service agent for ERS, HTA,
and PREPA.

O'Melveny & Myers LLP is counsel to the Commonwealth's Puerto Rico
Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority (AAFAF), the agency
responsible for negotiations with bondholders.

The Oversight Board named Professor Nancy B. Rapoport as fee
examiner and to chair a committee to review professionals' fees.

                      Bondholders' Attorneys

Toro, Colon, Mullet, Rivera & Sifre, P.S.C. and Kramer Levin
Naftalis & Frankel LLP serve as counsel to the Mutual Fund Group,
comprised of mutual funds managed by Oppenheimer Funds, Inc.,
Franklin Advisers, Inc., and the First Puerto Rico Family of
Funds, which collectively hold over $3.5 billion in COFINA Bonds
and over $2.9 billion in other bonds issued by Puerto Rico and
other instrumentalities, including over $1.8 billion of Puerto
Rico general obligation bonds ("GO Bonds").

White & Case LLP and Lopez Sanchez & Pirillo LLC represent the UBS
Family of Funds and the Puerto Rico Family of Funds, which hold
$613.3 million in COFINA bonds.

Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, Robbins, Russell,
Englert, Orseck, Untereiner & Sauber LLP, and Jimenez, Graffam &
Lausell are co-counsel to the ad hoc group of General Obligation
Bondholders, comprised of Aurelius Capital Management, LP,
Autonomy Capital (Jersey) LP, FCO Advisors LP, Franklin Mutual
Advisers LLC, Monarch Alternative Capital LP, Senator Investment
Group LP, and Stone Lion Capital Partners L.P.

Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP and Reichard & Escalera are
co-counsel to the ad hoc coalition of holders of senior bonds
issued by COFINA, comprised of at least 30 institutional holders,
including Canyon Capital Advisors LLC and Varde Investment
Partners, L.P.

Correa Acevedo & Abesada Law Offices, P.S.C., is counsel to Canyon
Capital Advisors, LLC, River Canyon Fund Management, LLC, Davidson
Kempner Capital Management LP, OZ Management, LP, and OZ
Management II LP (the QTCB Noteholder Group).

                            Committees

The U.S. Trustee formed a nine-member Official Committee of
Retirees and a seven-member Official Committee of Unsecured
Creditors of the Commonwealth.  The Retiree Committee tapped
Jenner & Block LLP and Bennazar, Garcia & Milian, C.S.P., as its
attorneys.   The Creditors Committee tapped Paul Hastings  LLP and
O'Neill & Gilmore LLC as counsel.


PUERTO RICO: Aurelius to Question Constitutionality of Board
------------------------------------------------------------
Aurelius Investment, LLC, Aurelius Opportunities Fund, LLC, and
Lex Claims, LLC filed with the U.S. District Court for the
District of Puerto Rico a motion seeking: (1) a clarification that
the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362 and 922 does not
apply; or, alternatively, (2) relief from the stay so that
Aurelius may pursue an independent action for declaratory and
injunctive relief outside the Title III case against the Financial
Management and Oversight Board for Puerto Rico and its members on
the grounds that they were appointed in violation of the
Appointments Clause of the United States Constitution and that the
Board violates the separation of powers.

Aurelius notes that Oversight Board derives its existence and
authority entirely from PROMESA, and it controls almost every
aspect of the Commonwealth's finances pursuant to that federal
law.  Aurelius claims that the appointment of members of the Board
without senate confirmation violates the Appointments Clause of
the United States Constitution and principles of separation of
powers.

"Consequently, the actions that the Board has purported to take
since its inception -- including, but not limited to, its
certification of a fiscal plan for Puerto Rico, approval of faulty
budgets, and the authorization of this Title III proceeding -- are
void.  All of these actions have already inflicted serious harm on
Aurelius, and the continued operation of the Board threatens to
perpetrate yet more harm on Aurelius.  The structural
constitutional defects inherent in the Board raises these harms to
an irreparable level.  Another consequence of the Board's
unconstitutionality is that it lacks authority to take any further
official action unless and until it is lawfully constituted.  For
many of the same reasons that this Title III proceeding must be
dismissed, Aurelius is also entitled to broader declaratory and
injunctive relief on these constitutional questions," Theodore B.
Olson, Esq., at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, explains in court
filings.

Aurelius submits that the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362
and 922 is inapplicable to its constitutional claims against the
Oversight Board.

"Aurelius's claims are not against the Debtor (the Commonwealth),
nor do they seek to enforce Aurelius's claims as beneficial owners
of bonds against the Debtor.  Nevertheless, out of an abundance of
caution, Aurelius requests a comfort order declaring that the stay
does not apply to the contemplated suit, which would be filed
outside the Title III proceeding but in the U.S. District Court of
the District of Puerto Rico," Mr. Olson tells the Court.

"Alternatively, there is good cause to lift the stay given the
severe constitutional harms imposed on Aurelius through the
Board's various past unlawful acts and continuing operation.
Complete relief on these claims cannot be afforded Aurelius within
the confines of this Title III proceeding because Aurelius plans
to seek declaratory and injunctive relief as to the status of the
Board under Title I and its actions under Title II, which goes
well beyond the instant case and controversy over the
Commonwealth's debt restructuring.  The many types of harm created
by the unconstitutional status of the Board -- and the remedies
necessary to address them -- are outside the scope of this case."

Funds managed by Aurelius hold substantial amounts of outstanding
bonds that were issued by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and
backed by a pledge of Puerto Rico's full faith, credit, and taxing
power.

A copy of the Motion is available at:

     http://bankrupt.com/misc/PR_914_Aurelius_M_Lift_Stay.pdf

                       About Puerto Rico

Puerto Rico is a self-governing commonwealth in association with
the United States that's facing a massive bond debt of $70
billion, a 68% debt-to-GDP ratio and negative economic growth in
nine of the last 10 years.

The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has sought bankruptcy protection,
aiming to restructure its massive $74 billion debt-load and $49
billion in pension obligations.

The debt restructuring petition was filed by Puerto Rico's
financial oversight board in U.S. District Court in Puerto Rico
(Case No. 17-01578) on May 3, 2017, and was made under Title III
of 2016's U.S. Congressional rescue law known as the Puerto Rico
Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act ("PROMESA").

The Financial Oversight and Management Board later commenced Title
III cases for the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation
(COFINA) on May 5, 2017, and the Employees Retirement System (ERS)
and the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (HTA) on
May 21.  On July 2, 2017, a Title III case was commenced for the
Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority ("PREPA").

U.S. Chief Justice John Roberts has appointed U.S. District Judge
Laura Taylor Swain to oversee the Title III cases.  The Honorable
Judith Dein, a United States Magistrate Judge for the District of
Massachusetts, has been designated to preside over matters that
may be referred to her by Judge Swain, including discovery
disputes, and management of other pretrial proceedings.

Joint administration of the Title III cases, under Lead Case No.
17-3283, was granted on June 29, 2017.

The Oversight Board has hired as advisors, Proskauer Rose LLP and
O'Neill & Borges LLC as legal counsel, McKinsey & Co. as strategic
consultant, Citigroup Global Markets as municipal investment
banker, and Ernst & Young, as financial advisor.

Martin J. Bienenstock, Esq., Scott K. Rutsky, Esq., and Philip M.
Abelson, Esq., of Proskauer Rose; and Hermann D. Bauer, Esq., at
O'Neill & Borges are onboard as attorneys.

McKinsey & Co. is the Board's strategic consultant, Ernst & Young
is the Board's financial advisor, and Citigroup Global Markets
Inc. is the Board's municipal investment banker.

Prime Clerk LLC is the claims and noticing agent.  Prime Clerk
maintains a case web site at:

           https://cases.primeclerk.com/puertorico

Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC is the service agent for ERS, HTA,
and PREPA.

O'Melveny & Myers LLP is counsel to the Commonwealth's Puerto Rico
Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority (AAFAF), the agency
responsible for negotiations with bondholders.

The Oversight Board named Professor Nancy B. Rapoport as fee
examiner and to chair a committee to review professionals' fees.

                      Bondholders' Attorneys

Toro, Colon, Mullet, Rivera & Sifre, P.S.C. and Kramer Levin
Naftalis & Frankel LLP serve as counsel to the Mutual Fund Group,
comprised of mutual funds managed by Oppenheimer Funds, Inc.,
Franklin Advisers, Inc., and the First Puerto Rico Family of
Funds, which collectively hold over $3.5 billion in COFINA Bonds
and over $2.9 billion in other bonds issued by Puerto Rico and
other instrumentalities, including over $1.8 billion of Puerto
Rico general obligation bonds ("GO Bonds").

White & Case LLP and Lopez Sanchez & Pirillo LLC represent the UBS
Family of Funds and the Puerto Rico Family of Funds, which hold
$613.3 million in COFINA bonds.

Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, Robbins, Russell,
Englert, Orseck, Untereiner & Sauber LLP, and Jimenez, Graffam &
Lausell are co-counsel to the ad hoc group of General Obligation
Bondholders, comprised of Aurelius Capital Management, LP,
Autonomy Capital (Jersey) LP, FCO Advisors LP, Franklin Mutual
Advisers LLC, Monarch Alternative Capital LP, Senator Investment
Group LP, and Stone Lion Capital Partners L.P.

Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP and Reichard & Escalera are
co-counsel to the ad hoc coalition of holders of senior bonds
issued by COFINA, comprised of at least 30 institutional holders,
including Canyon Capital Advisors LLC and Varde Investment
Partners, L.P.

Correa Acevedo & Abesada Law Offices, P.S.C., is counsel to Canyon
Capital Advisors, LLC, River Canyon Fund Management, LLC, Davidson
Kempner Capital Management LP, OZ Management, LP, and OZ
Management II LP (the QTCB Noteholder Group).

                            Committees

The U.S. Trustee formed a nine-member Official Committee of
Retirees and a seven-member Official Committee of Unsecured
Creditors of the Commonwealth.  The Retiree Committee tapped
Jenner & Block LLP and Bennazar, Garcia & Milian, C.S.P., as its
attorneys.   The Creditors Committee tapped Paul Hastings  LLP and
O'Neill & Gilmore LLC as counsel.



=============
U R U G U A Y
=============


URUGUAY: Mercosur Nations Seek to Boost Regional Tourism
--------------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that stakeholders from Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay and Uruguay gathered in Montevideo for a Regional
Destinations Congress about boosting tourism in the Southern Cone
through research and the development of marketing strategies.

The aim is to foster an "exchange of knowledge about new trends in
destination marketing" to bring more visitors to the region,
Arnaldo Nardone, president of the Latin American and Caribbean
Convention Centers Association, told EFE.

Mr. Nardone said that most tourism in the Southern Cone involves
residents of the region, according to EFE News.

"If you look at the case of Uruguay, we see that over 65 percent
of foreign visitors to the country come from Argentina, about 20
percent from Brazil, and the rest from Paraguay and Chile," he
said, the report notes.

A similar situation can be seen in Argentina and Chile, Mr.
Nardone said, the report relays.

"There is proximity tourism among these four countries," so "it is
important that we know each other," the report quoted Mr. Nardone
as saying.

Uruguay's deputy tourism minister, Benjamin Liberoff, told EFE
that the annual number of foreign visitors exceeds the country's
population of 3.4 million, adding that between 75 percent and 80
percent of those travelers come from within the surrounding
region, the report notes.

"It is important for us to diversify attractions and to target
segments and markets in the region," he said, the report relays.

Antonio Carambula, executive director of the Uruguay XXI foreign
trade promotion agency, told EFE that "four out of every five
journeys are within the region," the report adds.



=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================


VENEZUELA: Remain in Forefront of Real Estate Buying, Amid Crisis
-----------------------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that Venezuelans, despite their country's ongoing
political and economic crisis, remain in the forefront of real
estate purchasing in Miami, especially in the city of Doral, where
buyers have been laying out up to $500,000 for new homes.

The booming city of Doral - in the Greater Miami metro area and
known as "Doralzuela" for the large number of Venezuelans living
there - is presently experiencing an explosion of new home
building, according to EFE News.

The peak zone for construction of new condominiums in Doral is so-
called Midtown, where new condos are being snapped up by
Venezuelans eager to shelter some of their money in the US, the
report notes.

"Venezuelans continue to be No. 1 in the Miami real estate market,
above all in Doral and in new (construction) projects," Sandra
Benedetti Olivo, the manager of First Service Realty, told EFE.

The report relays that Mr. Benedetti said that, although the
explosive political and economic situation in Venezuela concerns
South Florida real estate experts, "so far the prices of condos
and homes in Doral have not been affected."

In that regard, the Venezuelan professional, with more than 17
years of experience in the sector, focused on one critical point:
the state control mechanism for change in the South American
country, the report says.

Since what she called the "fraud" of the government-sponsored
Constituent National Assembly, the members of which are tasked
with rewriting the constitution and were elected on July 30, the
price of the dollar has risen and it is bringing more than 10,000
bolivares on the parallel market, Mr. Benedetti said, the report
notes.

In 2016, 17 percent of Latin American buyers of Miami-Dade County
real estate came from Venezuela, with Brazilians comprising 15
percent, Argentines 14 percent and Colombians 6 percent, according
to the January 2017 report released by the Miami Association of
Realtors, the report relays.

However, so far this year, initial figures coming from that
association show that the purchasing of property by Venezuelans
has declined by 3 percent, compared with the same period in 2016,
Lynda Fernandez told EFE.

The very active role being played by Venezuelans in the Doral real
estate sector contrasts with the growing arrivals of citizens from
that country who find themselves in precarious economic
circumstances as they flee the Nicolas Maduro regime and the
turmoil in their home country, the report says.

Patricia Andrade, president of the Venezuela Awareness human
rights organization, says that two types of Venezuelans are coming
to Miami: "Those who have been able to plan their departure and
sold their property in time," that is, those who have a certain
amount of money now, and a "new wave" fleeing "repression" who
have little capital.

In the first eight months of the year, a daily average of 20-30
Venezuelan families have been coming to Andrade and to her Raices
Venezolanas organization seeking help to get by and find lodging,
particularly in Miami-Dade County.

This is a "humanitarian crisis" situation that "nobody is seeing,"
with couples with children as the "victims of repression ... (who
are) arriving" in great need and are trying to accommodate
themselves by sharing apartments with others.

According to various sources, over the past two years, some 23,000
Venezuelans have requested political asylum in the US.

As reported on Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on July 13,
2017, S&P Global Ratings lowered its long-term foreign and local
currency sovereign credit ratings on the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela to 'CCC-' from 'CCC'. The outlook on the long-term
ratings is negative. S&P said, "We affirmed our 'C' short-term
foreign and local currency sovereign ratings. In addition, we
lowered our transfer and convertibility assessment on the
sovereign to 'CCC-' from 'CCC'."



=================
X X X X X X X X X
=================


LATIN AMERICA: UN Panel Reports Sharp Drop in Foreign Investment
----------------------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that foreign direct investment in Latin America
and the Caribbean plunged 7.9 percent in 2016 and is expected to
fall another 5 percent this year, the UN Economic Commission for
Latin American and the Caribbean (ECLAC) said.

Regional FDI has declined by 17 percent since reaching a peak of
$206.9 billion in 2011, ECLAC says in a report released in
Santiago, according to EFE News.

The nations of Latin America and the Caribbean received a total of
$167.04 billion in FDI last year, according to the study, which
attributed the downward trend to a decline in commodity prices and
the slump affecting several major economies in the region, the
report relays.

At the same time, ECLAC suggested that the shift toward a digital
economy is leading toward a concentration of FDI in developed
countries, the report notes.

Latin America and the Caribbean accounted for 10 percent of global
FDI in 2015 and 2016, down from an average of 14 percent during
the period 2011-2014, the report discloses.

ECLAC pointed out that FDI represents 3.6 percent of cumulative
regional GDP, compared with an international average of 2.5
percent, reflecting the proportionally greater importance of
inflows from abroad, the report says.

The report relays recession-plagued Brazil, the region's largest
economy, remained the undisputed leader in FDI last year, with an
inter-annual increase of 5.7 percent to $78.9 billion.

The flow of FDI to Mexico decreased 7.9 percent to $32.11 billion,
or 19 percent of the region's total, the report says.

Colombia enjoyed a 15.9 percent surge in FDI, receiving $13.59
billion, ahead of Chile, with $12.23 billion, the report
discloses.

Panama and the Dominican Republic were the biggest beneficiaries
in Central America and the Caribbean, respectively, the report
notes.

The leading sources of FDI were the United States, 20 percent, and
the countries of the European Union, 53 percent. China was the No.
4 investor, when taking into account merger-and-acquisition
activity, ECLAC said, the report adds.


* BOND PRICING: For the Week From Aug. 7 to Aug. 11, 2017
---------------------------------------------------------


Issuer Name               Cpn     Price   Maturity  Country  Curr
-----------               ---     -----   --------  -------   ---

BA-CA Finance Cayman Lt   0.518    62.07               KY    EUR
CSN Islands XII Corp      7        68                  BR    USD
CSN Islands XII Corp      7        67.75               BR    USD
Decimo Primer Fideicomi   4.54     52.63  10/25/2041   PA    USD
Decimo Primer Fideicomi   6        63.5   10/25/2041   PA    USD
Dolomite Capital Ltd     13.26     67.2   12/20/2019   CN    ZAR
Empresa de Telecomunica   7        73.14   1/17/2023   CO    COP
Empresa de Telecomunica   7        73.14   1/17/2023   CO    COP
ESFG International Ltd    5.75      0.66               KY    EUR
General Shopping Financ  10        72.5                KY    USD
General Shopping Financ  10        71.7                KY    USD
Global A&T Electronics   10        74      2/1/2019    SG    USD
Global A&T Electronics   10        74.5    2/1/2019    SG    USD
Global A&T Electronics   10        65.5    2/1/2019    SG    USD
Global A&T Electronics   10        65      2/1/2019    SG    USD
Gol Finance               8.75     63                  BR    USD
Gol Finance               8.75     63.88               BR    USD
Gol Linhas Aereas SA     10.75     34.63   2/12/2023   BR    USD
Gol Linhas Aereas SA     10.75     34.63   2/12/2023   BR    USD
Inversora Electrica de    6.5      55      9/26/2017   AR    USD
Inversora Electrica de    6.5      55      9/26/2017   AR    USD
MIE Holdings Corp         7.5      75.16   4/25/2019   HK    USD
MIE Holdings Corp         7.5      75.26   4/25/2019   HK    USD
NB Finance Ltd/Cayman I   3.88     58.01   2/7/2035    KY    EUR
Newland International P   9.5      19.88   7/3/2017    PA    USD
Newland International P   9.5      19.88   7/3/2017    PA    USD
Noble Holding Internati   5.25     72.98   3/15/2042   KY    USD
Ocean Rig UDW Inc         7.25     39      4/1/2019    CY    USD
Ocean Rig UDW Inc         7.25     38      4/1/2019    CY    USD
Odebrecht Drilling Norb   6.35     48.5    6/30/2021   KY    USD
Odebrecht Drilling Norb   6.35     47.25   6/30/2021   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.5      49                  KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     4.3      48.29   4/25/2025   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.12     48.2    6/26/2042   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.25     46.15   6/27/2029   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7        57.02   4/21/2020   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.12     53.51   6/26/2022   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     8.25     70.88   4/25/2018   KY    BRL
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     6        51.47   4/5/2023    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.25     45.92   6/27/2029   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.1      47.82   6/26/2042   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.5      49.25               KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     4.3      48.39   4/25/2025   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     6        51.77   4/5/2023    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     8.2      70.88   4/25/2018   KY    BRL
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7        56.85   4/21/2020   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.1      52.99   6/26/2022   KY    USD
Odebrecht Offshore Dril   6.6      39.64  10/1/2022    KY    USD
Odebrecht Offshore Dril   6.7      36.44  10/1/2022    KY    USD
Odebrecht Offshore Dril   6.6      38.79  10/1/2022    KY    USD
Odebrecht Offshore Dril   6.7      38.75  10/1/2022    KY    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela   12.75     67.19   2/17/2022   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela      9      58.28  11/17/2021   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela      6      40.32   5/16/2024   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    9.75     50.15   5/17/2035   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6        38.22  11/15/2026   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    5.37     37.39   4/12/2027   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    5.5      37.1    4/12/2037   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6        41.25  10/28/2022   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6        40.01   5/16/2024   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    9        58.11  11/17/2021   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6        38.13  11/15/2026   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela   12.75     67.2    2/17/2022   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    9.75     49.94   5/17/2035   VE    USD
Polarcus Ltd              5.6      60      3/30/2022   AE    USD
Siem Offshore Inc         5.8      49.75   1/30/2018   NO    NOK
Siem Offshore Inc         5.59     50.25   3/28/2019   NO    NOK
STB Finance Cayman Ltd    2.04     58.35               KY    JPY
Sylph Ltd                 2.36     50.93   9/25/2036   KY    USD
Uruguay Notas del Tesor   5.25     68.02  12/29/2021   UY    UYU
US Capital Funding IV L   1.25     51.35  12/1/2039    KY    USD
US Capital Funding IV L   1.25     51.35  12/1/2039    KY    USD
USJ Acucar e Alcool SA    9.87     67.5   11/9/2019    BR    USD
USJ Acucar e Alcool SA    9.87     65.75  11/9/2019    BR    USD
Venezuela Government In   9.25     48.75   5/7/2028    VE    USD
Venezuela Government In  13.63     82.58   8/15/2018   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   9        51.75   5/7/2023    VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   9.37     49      1/13/2034   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   7        71.88  12/1/2018    VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   9.25     52      9/15/2027   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   7.65     46.38   4/21/2025   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In  13.63     82.58   8/15/2018   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   7.75     61.75  10/13/2019   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In  11.95     58.13   8/5/2031    VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   6        53.75  12/9/2020    VE    USD
Venezuela Government In  12.75     67      8/23/2022   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   7        44      3/31/2038   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   6.5      36.53  12/29/2036   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   8.25     47.75  10/13/2024   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In  11.75     57.75  10/21/2026   VE    USD
Venezuela Government TI    5.25    69.59   3/21/2019   VE    USD



                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Joseph Cardillo at
856-381-8268.


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