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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

               Thursday, August 17, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 163


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

ARGENTINA: Reaffirms Commitment w/ US to Increase Bilateral Trade
QUINQUELA AHORRO: Moody's Assigns B-bf Global Bond Fund Rating


B R A Z I L

BRAZIL: S&P Affirms 'BB/B' Ratings, Removed From CreditWatch Neg.
JBS SA: BENDES to Back Suit Against Batista Brothers
JBS SA: Misses Estimates as Financial Expenses Soar
JBS SA: CEO May Oppose Calls to Step Down in Brazil
RB CAPITAL: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Real Estate Certs.


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

LUZ Y FUERZA: Ordered to Cease Operations in Samana


J A M A I C A

JAMAICA: Economy Still Reeling From May's Flood Rains


P E R U

ANDINO INVESTMENT: S&P Lowers CCR to 'CCC+', Outlook Negative


P U E R T O    R I C O

HAIRLAND CORP: Court Okays Disclosures, Confirms Plan
ROJESIE INC: Plan Outline Okayed; Plan Hearing on Oct. 4


                            - - - - -


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A R G E N T I N A
=================


ARGENTINA: Reaffirms Commitment w/ US to Increase Bilateral Trade
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Argentine President Mauricio Macro and US Vice President Mike
Pence emphasized their joint commitment to increase bilateral
trade relations after meeting in Buenos Aires on the latter's
first Latin American tour.

"When Latin America embraces economic reforms, Latin America
succeeds and so does the United States," Pence said, notes the
report.

                          *     *    *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
May 10, 2017, Fitch Ratings affirmed Argentina's Long-Term Foreign
and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'B' with a
Stable Outlook. The issue ratings on Argentina's senior unsecured
Foreign and Local Currency bonds are also affirmed at 'B'. The
Country Ceiling is affirmed at 'B' and the Short-Term Foreign and
Local Currency IDRs at 'B'.

On Jan. 30, 2017, the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America
reported that Moody's Investors Service has assigned a B3 rating
to the Government of Argentina's US$3.25 billion bond due 2022 and
the US$3.75 billion bond due 2027. The outlook on the Government
of Argentina's rating is stable.

As previously reported by the TCR-LA, Argentina defaulted on some
of its debt late July 30, 2014, after expiration of a 30-day grace
period on a US$539 million interest payment.  Earlier that day,
talks with a court-appointed mediator ended without resolving a
standoff between the country and a group of hedge funds seeking
full payment on bonds that the country had defaulted on in 2001.
A U.S. judge had ruled that the interest payment couldn't be made
unless the hedge funds led by Elliott Management Corp., got the
US$1.5 billion they claimed. The country hasn't been able to
access international credit markets since its US$95 billion
default 13 years ago.

On March 30, 2016, after more than 12 hours of debate in the
Senate, Argentina's Congress passed a bill that will allow the
government to repay holders of debt that the South American
country defaulted on in 2001, including a group of litigating
hedge funds that won judgments in a New York court. The bill
passed by a vote of 54-16.


QUINQUELA AHORRO: Moody's Assigns B-bf Global Bond Fund Rating
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo has
assigned first-time bond fund ratings to Quinquela Ahorro Dolares
FCI (the Fund), a new medium-term bond fund managed by QM Asset
Management SGFCI SA.

The ratings assigned are:

- Global scale bond fund rating: B-bf

- National scale bond fund rating: A-bf.ar

RATINGS RATIONALE

"The B-bf global scale bond fund rating reflects Moody's
expectation that the Fund will have a mid-to-high single B credit
profile supported by investments in Argentinian fixed-income
securities, mostly in corporate bonds as well as in local
treasuries. All investments will be denominated in US dollars,"
said Carlos de Nevares, Moody's Vice President. The Fund will seek
to provide a return above the local USD time deposit yield for 360
days, and its average duration will not exceed 2.5 years. The
Fund's A-bf.ar national scale rating reflects a national scale
mapping consistent with a B global scale credit profile.

The rating agency noted that the Fund is a new fund managed by an
experienced investment manager. Moody's analysis was performed on
a model portfolio provided by the fund sponsor. The rating agency
expects the Fund to be managed in line with this model portfolio.
However, Moody's noted that if the Fund's actual portfolio
deviates materially from the model portfolio, the Fund's ratings
could change.

QM Asset Management is a medium sized Argentinian independent
asset manager with a 1.3% market share. As of July 2017, QM Asset
Management had assets under management of approximately ARS 6.2
billion (USD 336 million).

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's Bond
Fund Rating Methodology published in May 2013.

Other methodologies and factors that may have been considered in
the process of rating this fund can also be found under Rating
Methodologies on Moody's website.

Moody's National Scale Credit Ratings (NSRs) are intended as
relative measures of creditworthiness among debt issues and
issuers within a country, enabling market participants to better
differentiate relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's global
scale credit ratings in that they are not globally comparable with
the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with NSRs
for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same country.
NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier signifying the
relevant country, as in ".za" for South Africa. For further
information on Moody's approach to national scale credit ratings,
please refer to Moody's Credit rating Methodology published in May
2016 entitled "Mapping National Scale Ratings from Global Scale
Ratings". While NSRs have no inherent absolute meaning in terms of
default risk or expected loss, a historical probability of default
consistent with a given NSR can be inferred from the GSR to which
it maps back at that particular point in time. For information on
the historical default rates associated with different global
scale rating categories over different investment horizons.


===========
B R A Z I L
===========


BRAZIL: S&P Affirms 'BB/B' Ratings, Removed From CreditWatch Neg.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
On Aug. 15, 2017, S&P Global Ratings removed its 'BB' long-term
foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on the
Federative Republic of Brazil from CreditWatch, where it had
placed them with negative implications on May 22, 2017. S&P said,
"At the same time, we affirmed the 'BB' long-term ratings, and the
outlook is negative. We also affirmed our 'B' short-term foreign
and local currency ratings on Brazil. The transfer and
convertibility assessment is unchanged at 'BBB-'. In addition, we
removed the 'brAA-' national scale rating from CreditWatch with
negative implications and affirmed the rating with a negative
outlook. This incorporates the revision of the mapping table for
Brazil national scale ratings, published Aug. 14, 2017."

OUTLOOK

The negative outlook reflects S&P's view that there is at least a
one-in-three likelihood that it could lower the ratings on Brazil
over the coming six to nine months. Congress has a limited window
of opportunity to pass controversial legislation before political
maneuvering ahead of the 2018 presidential elections picks up by
early next year. With the backing of the administration, it has
already advanced some legislation aimed at strengthening Brazil's
fiscal and growth trajectories--even amid difficult political
conditions in recent months. However, given the size of Brazil's
needed fiscal correction, additional legislative effort to redress
budgetary rigidities cannot wait until after the 2018 elections,
in our view, given its high and rising debt-to-GDP ratio. Absent
additional progress by Congress, for example, on pension reform
and reducing subsidies in public-sector lending (such as with the
proposed new TLP lending rate for the Brazilian Development Bank
[BNDES]), the prospect for moderating growth in non-discretionary
expenditure to satisfy the conditions of the constitutional cap on
spending, challenging as it already is for 2019, would be that
much more remote.

Failure by Congress to advance key pieces of fiscal-related
legislation would suggest the absence of political resolve, and we
could lower the ratings on a weaker assessment of governability
and policy commitment across branches of government.
Alternatively, a downgrade could occur if the government relaxes
its demonstrated commitment to streamline and constrain spending
growth this year and next. Revision of its primary fiscal targets
owing to slippage in spending differs from revisions related to
revenue shortfalls associated with a weak recovery in tax revenues
or delays in nonrecurring revenue from concessions.

The ratings could stabilize over the coming six to nine months
even amid fluid political dynamics associated with proactive
corruption investigations and key plea bargain deals by former
politicians and private-sector participants. Factors that could
help stabilize the ratings include a demonstrated policy
commitment by the government, including Congress, to mitigate
fiscal deterioration and strengthen GDP growth prospects. S&P
expects that these improvements could help Brazil solidify
economic recovery, improve fiscal performance over time, and
provide more room to maneuver in the face of economic shocks.

RATIONALE

S&P said, "Our ratings on Brazil reflect our view of its
established political institutions that provide important backing
for economic stability. We find that the ongoing investigations of
corruption allegations against high-profile individuals and
companies in both the private and public sectors and across
political parties have increased near-term political uncertainty,
but the institutional framework is guiding resolution. The
government has advanced sound and corrective policy, but
governability challenges have slowed recent progress and present
downside risk to the rating.

"Meanwhile, subdued economic prospects and fiscal weaknesses are
key credit constraints. The diversified economy is exiting a steep
multiyear contraction, and its growth is expected to remain below
peers. High general government deficits persist with debt
continuing to rise over the forecast period until 2020. Fiscal
correction is a multiyear, multiadministration challenge, in our
view. In contrast, Brazil's external position and monetary policy
credibility are relative credit strengths."

Institutional and economic profile: Despite setbacks to
governability in recent years, Brazil's institutional framework
and checks and balances have provided conditions for some
correction in economic policies and an end to the deep recession.

-- Ongoing corruption investigations have become part of Brazil's
    political landscape, and their positive and negative effects
    will inform politics and the 2018 elections.

-- The administration and Congress have made strides toward
    sounder policy, but further advances are pending, given the
    high and rising government debt.

-- The economy has ceased contracting, but growth prospects
    remain subdued amid fiscal overhang and fragility in the
    private sector.

Ongoing corruption investigations and allegations that have hit
politicians across party lines, as well as prominent private-
sector individuals and companies, have rocked Brazil's political
landscape. While this has posed a challenge for governability, the
independent investigations and subsequent prosecutions of corrupt
practices are reinforcing Brazil's institutional framework. This
framework has facilitated the impeachment of former president
Dilma Rousseff, the removal of politicians from Congress,
indictment of former politicians, and the recent charges against
President Temer (the first time corruption charges were raised
against a sitting president, with additional charges potentially
forthcoming).

Growth suffered deeply, owing in part to uncertainties related to
these investigations, which also involve key companies that drive
investment in the country. However, it now appears that the
economy has stopped contracting despite lingering political
uncertainties. In addition, during the recent months of heightened
political uncertainty, Congress passed labor reform, and leading
politicians remain committed to additional fiscal action this
year. S&P said, "Our base case is that given the size of pressing
fiscal weaknesses and rising debt, Congress will pass politically
difficult measures this year to alleviate some budgetary pressure
and rigidity. However, our negative outlook reflects the risk that
Congress will fail to do so."

Brazil's solid economic team, which includes appointees at state-
owned banks and companies, garners respect from the executive
branch more broadly, Congress, and the private sector. The more
active Federal Accounting Court (TCU) and Ministry of Finance are
working together to strengthen transparency in fiscal accounts.
The administration has articulated a comprehensive macroeconomic
and microeconomic agenda to put in place conditions for stronger
growth and fiscal performance in the coming years. Congress has
already passed part of the agenda: a constitutional cap on
spending, two phases of labor reform, immigration law, reopening
of the oil and gas sector with lower domestic content rules, and a
fiscal recovery regime for highly indebted, cash-strapped states
willing to undertake spending reform.

The rich pending agenda includes politically challenging efforts
to lessen distortions in the credit markets, including updating
the bankruptcy code and revising subsidized credit at the BNDES,
the new TLP, as well as those in the tax and environmental
licensing regimes. Given the limited time until 2018 elections and
the need to manage coalition dynamics, S&P doesn't expect approval
of all items on this micro agenda. However, Congressional approval
is necessary to streamline rigid fiscal expenditure to set the
stage for adhering to the already legislated cap on primary
expenditure growth in the coming years. The administration has
systematically evaluated and streamlined numerous spending
programs where it can--such as student loans, subsidies for
housing (minha casa minha vida), and disability benefits--to
generate budget savings. And year to date fiscal performance in
2017 highlights spending compression in virtually all areas,
except for payroll, pensions, and indexed components of mandatory
spending. The administration proposed pension reform given
Brazil's generous benefits and worsening demographics. Pension-
related expenditure has grown rapidly over the past several years
and accounts for 34% of federal primary (non-interest) spending.
The social security deficit for private workers in 2016 was 2.4%
of GDP, almost as large as the general government primary deficit
of 2.6% of GDP.

Given that additional, politically challenging legislated measures
to lessen other budgetary rigidities are likely to be needed in
2019 (under the next administration) to comply with the spending
cap, passage of some pension reform cannot wait until after the
scheduled 2018 elections, in S&P's view. Otherwise, the
administration's strategy of a back-loaded fiscal adjustment
anchored by structural reform will not have proven credible. Given
the magnitude of the fiscal and economic challenges, failure to
advance pension reform would be consistent with a more limited
ability of Brazil's political class to advance policies to support
economic prosperity and sustainable fiscal policies.

S&P said, "Our base case continues to be one of a prolonged
economic adjustment with a slow correction in fiscal policy amid
modest growth this year and subdued growth over the next several
years. With per capita GDP expected at US$9,700 for 2017,
following two years of negative GDP growth, Brazil's growth
prospects have--and will continue to be--below that of other
countries at a similar stage of development, in our view. We
expect real GDP of about 0.5% in 2017 to pick up toward 2.25% over
the next several years.

"The high level of household, corporate, and government
indebtedness constrains a fast rebound in growth. Given the
proximity of the 2018 elections and the prevalence of discredited
traditional politicians, which sets the stage for potentially
competitive outsider candidates, we expect a muted pickup in
investment in the nearer term. That said, the more pronounced
easing of monetary policy, given favorable inflation dynamics,
should support a pickup in growth next year. We expect net exports
to support growth this year and next, though the small
contribution of net exports in Brazil's GDP and the absence of a
commodity boom mean they won't drive a robust economic rebound.
Continued efforts to restore macroeconomic balance are critical,
as is advancing microeconomic, to support higher private
investment and growth over the medium term."

Flexibility and performance profile: Comparative strength in
Brazil's external position and monetary policy flexibility
contrasts with the severe challenges related to its high and
rising debt, large deficits, and spending rigidities.

-- Fiscal challenges remain significant given reduced revenue
    buoyancy and highly rigid expenditures that generate high
    primary and headline deficits with rising net general
    government debt.

-- Brazil's current account deficit continues to decline and
    remain more than financed by net foreign direct investment
    (FDI), bolstering international reserves and a decline in
    narrow net external debt.

-- Inflation below the midpoint of the tolerance interval and
    well-anchored inflation expectations have facilitated a deeper
    monetary easing cycle.

S&P said, "Besides the lack of growth, Brazil's fiscal position is
its other key rating weakness. Its fiscal trajectory is one of
continued primary (non-interest) deficits and rising debt through
2020. Despite revision of the primary targets for 2017 and 2018,
we believe the government remains committed to lowering Brazil's
primary deficit. The base case we incorporate in our projections
assumes some slippage this year and next. While discretionary
spending has been compressed, growth in non-discretionary
spending, subdued tax revenue, and likely slippage in concession
and other one-off revenues render the target unattainable. In
July, the administration raised some taxes on fuel (over which it
has purview) with an eye on minimizing any slippage. While intense
negotiations continue regarding phasing out payroll tax exemptions
and payment of overdue taxes, Congress is resistant to broad tax
increases. It's unlikely the government will have scope to
meaningfully raise taxes--from an already high and distortionary
base--until after next year's election, when there's a president
with potentially stronger political capital. This contrasts with
our view of relatively stronger political support to advance a
pension reform this year. We also assume a strong commitment from
the government, including Congress, on spending restraint."

Brazil's state and municipal governments face similar budgetary
challenges to the federal government: high, rigid spending on
payroll, pensions, and interest payments, and a revenue base hurt
by the economic contraction. Despite some temporary relief on debt
service due to the federal government, state and local
governments' finances remain under pressure. In addition, unlike
the sovereign, their financing is more constrained because they
cannot issue debt. The federal government has also strengthened
transparency and protocols for approving (and guaranteeing)
borrowing by local governments. S&P said, "We view this positively
from the sovereign perspective--in terms of institution building
and containing fiscal slippage at the state and local levels.
However, fragilities in Brazil's federal fiscal framework remain
to be tackled. Just like a deeper tax reform, further resolution
of these weaknesses will remain pending until after the 2018
elections.

"In 2017, we expect the general government deficit will be 8.8% of
GDP, little changed from 2016, and then decline to 5.8% by 2020.
This is consistent with a slow reduction in the general government
primary deficit that averages 1.7% in 2017-2020. Brazil's interest
burden is high, and we expect it to moderate slowly over the
forecast period given the decline in interest rates, though at a
slower pace than the drop in 2016 associated with gains on real-
denominated currency swaps. The slightly larger change in general
government debt to GDP vis-Ö-vis the headline deficit assumes some
fluctuations in central bank repurchase operations, exchange and
inflation rates, but no off-budget (below-the-line) spending.

"We expect general government debt, net of liquid assets (not
including international reserves), to rise to 72% of GDP by 2020
from 52% in 2016. We expect interest to revenues to average 16%
during 2017-2020 given still-high interest rates despite expected
monetary easing. We assess contingent liabilities from the
financial sector and all Brazilian nonfinancial public enterprises
(including Petrobras) as limited.

"Brazil's external accounts continue to adjust, with the current
account deficit now expected to be 1.1% of GDP this year, versus
1.3% of GDP in 2016 and a 4.2% peak in 2014. We expect the current
account deficit to average 1.8% of GDP in 2018-2020 on higher
imports and to be fully financed by net FDI. We expect narrow net
external debt--projected at -12% of current account receipts in
2017--to return to a debtor position by 2019-2020 as the private
sector taps global markets, nonresident holdings of government
securities increase, and reserve accumulation slows. We calculate
our estimates of external debt on a residency basis. They include
nonresident holdings of locally issued real-denominated government
debt estimated at about US$127 billion as of June 2017 (almost 50%
of current account receipts.)

"Our external debt data, however, do not include debt raised
offshore by Petrobras and other Brazilian companies that is
transferred in the form of FDI to head offices in Brazil. For
Petrobras, this could be approximately 25% of current account
receipts. This is captured in Brazil's net external liability
position, projected at 274% of current account receipts in 2017.
This ratio is one of the largest among the sovereigns we rate,
suggesting that there are greater risks to Brazil's external
accounts--should market conditions deteriorate--than it would
appear looking at debt indicators alone. The Brazilian real floats
and is an actively traded currency, and Brazil has lower external
financing needs compared with its current account receipts and a
high level of international reserves relative to some of its
peers."

Inflation has declined significantly, consistently surprising
markets on the downside over the last nine months. Consumer price
inflation was 2.7% in July 2017, a record low since 1999 and below
the lower limit of the inflation tolerance interval. This compares
with 6.3% at year-end 2016 and 10.7% at year-end 2015. A drop in
agriculture prices and a large output gap reinforce the better
dynamics associated with the waning of administered price
increases and depreciation of the Brazilian real that hit
inflation in 2015. In addition, improved credibility of the team
at the central bank has also reanchored inflation expectations.

S&P said, "We expect inflation to pick up somewhat in 2017-2019
from current lows as the economy strengthens but to remain in line
with the official targets. The bank initiated an easing cycle in
October 2016, which we expect to continue over the rest of 2017.
Since the onset of the easing, the central bank has cut the
overnight SELIC interest rate by a total of 500 basis points to
9.25% as of July. In late June, the National Monetary Council
established a lower inflation target of 4.25% and 4% plus/minus
1.5% for 2019 and 2020, respectively, from 4.5% plus/minus 1.5%
for 2017 and 2018 in light of these positive developments and to
guide longer-term inflation down further."

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable (see 'Related Criteria And Research'). At
the onset of the committee, the chair confirmed that the
information provided to the Rating Committee by the primary
analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and was sufficient
for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.
The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot above.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook. The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating action
(see 'Related Criteria And Research').

  RATINGS LIST

  Ratings Affirmed; CreditWatch Action
                             To                 From

  Brazil (Federative Republic of)

   Sovereign Credit Rating   BB/Negative/B      BB/Watch   Neg/B
   Brazil National Scale     brAA-/Negative/--  brAA-/Watch Neg/--
   Senior Unsecured          BB                 BB/Watch Neg
   Senior Unsecured          brAA-              brAA-/Watch Neg

  Ratings Affirmed

   Brazil (Federative Republic of)
    Transfer & Convertibility Assessment   BBB-


JBS SA: BENDES to Back Suit Against Batista Brothers
----------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that the investment arm of Brazilian development
bank Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Economico e Social (BNDES)
favors a civil suit against current and former executives and
controlling shareholders of meatpacker JBS SA for allegedly
causing losses due to their roles in a corruption scandal.

BNDES Participacoes SA said it would vote in a Sept. 1 shareholder
meeting in favor of a suit against JBS Chief Executive Officer
Wesley Batista, forcing him to step down from his post, according
to a statement from the bank, notes Reuters.

BNDESPar, as the bank's investment arm is known, said it will also
support suits against the CEO's brother, Joesley Batista, who sits
on JBS's board, and other former executives, as well as against
controlling shareholder J&F Investimentos SA, the report notes.

The Batista brothers struck a deal with prosecutors that imposes a
record-setting fine of BRL10.3 billion ($3.2 billion) on J&F to
avoid prosecution after admitting to bribing scores of
politicians, the report relays.

Efforts to contact Wesley and Joesley Batista were unsuccessful,
Reuters discloses.

In a statement, JBS said it will not comment on any remarks by
shareholders prior to the meeting, notes the report.

JBS reported weaker-than-expected net income in the second
quarter, although strong results in North America and Australia
helped the company's operating profit beat expectations, the
report says.

Reuters reported in June that minority shareholders aligned with
BNDESPar want the Batistas to compensate them for a recent plunge
in shares of JBS, on the grounds that the company's image and
reputation have been hurt by their actions.

At BNDESPar's request, JBS called a shareholder meeting in July to
discuss potential changes to its management and board, the report
relays.

BNDESPar will also vote in favor of nominating Gilberto Xando,
currently CEO of J&F's dairy company Fabrica de Produtos
Aliment°cios Vigor SA, to JBS's board, the statement said, the
report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
July 31, 2017, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B+' global scale
corporate credit ratings on JBS S.A. and JBS USA and its 'brBBB-'
national scale rating on JBS. S&P also affirmed the 'B+' senior
unsecured debt ratings on JBS and JBS USA and the 'BB' senior
secured debt ratings on JBS USA. At the same time, S&P removed all
ratings from CreditWatch. The outlook is negative.


JBS SA: Misses Estimates as Financial Expenses Soar
---------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that the world's largest meatpacker JBS SA
reported net income of BRL309.8 million ($97.16 million) in the
second quarter, below a consensus estimate of BRL603 million,
reflecting higher net financial expenses and the challenges faced
by its Brazilian and South American divisions, according to a
statement.

Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization
(EBITDA), a gauge of operating profitability, came in at BRL3.7
billion, above a consensus estimate of BRL3.4 billion, reflecting
the good results of its United States, Australia and Canadian
operations, according to Reuters.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
July 31, 2017, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B+' global scale
corporate credit ratings on JBS S.A. and JBS USA and its 'brBBB-'
national scale rating on JBS. S&P also affirmed the 'B+' senior
unsecured debt ratings on JBS and JBS USA and the 'BB' senior
secured debt ratings on JBS USA. At the same time, S&P removed all
ratings from CreditWatch. The outlook is negative.


JBS SA: CEO May Oppose Calls to Step Down in Brazil
---------------------------------------------------
Luciana Magalhaes and Paul Kiernan at The Wall Street Journal
report that the chief executive of Brazilian meat giant JBS SA
signaled he may resist calls to step down even after admitting to
participating in a multimillion-dollar scheme to bribe politicians
and government officials.

In JBS's first conference call since the corruption scandal
erupted in May, JBS CEO Wesley Batista presented investors with an
optimistic plan to reduce debt and issue shares in the U.S. next
year, according to The Wall Street Journal.  Little mention was
made of a plea deal in which Mr. Batista and his brother, former
JBS Chairman Joesley Batista, told prosecutors they bribed nearly
2,000 Brazilian politicians while growing their company into the
world's biggest meatpacker, the report notes.

The conference call took place as JBS's No. 2 shareholder,
Brazilian national development bank BNDES, said it wants the
company to sue Mr. Batista for losses "caused to its patrimony as
a result of the illicit acts," the report relays.  BNDES said it
plans to propose the lawsuit at a Sept. 1 shareholders' meeting
and that it will seek, as part of the proposed lawsuit, to ban Mr.
Batista and other executives from JBS management, the report says.

Asked by an analyst about the meeting, Mr. Batista said it
represents "an opportunity for management" to present what he said
are positive results since the scandal emerged, the report notes.

"The company and its administration are looking forward to the
meeting to have the opportunity to show and demonstrate to
shareholders all advancements and progress made in this short time
frame," the report quoted Mr. Batista as saying.  "I'm sure
shareholders will focus. . . . on the best interests of the
company."

In a note, JBS said it wouldn't comment on any shareholder's
opinion ahead of the meeting, says the report.

The exchange underscored the bitter rift between two of JBS's top
shareholders: the Batistas, who founded the company and control it
via their J&F Investimentos holding firm, and the Brazilian
government, which financed JBS's expansion and owns a 21% stake in
the meatpacker via BNDES, the report relays.

The two sides have been at odds since mid-May, when courts
released an audio recording Joesley Batista made of a conversation
with President Michel Temer in which the two apparently discussed
bribe payments, the report notes.

Joesley Batista subsequently stepped down as JBS chairman. J&F
agreed to pay BRL10.3 billion Brazilian ($3.23 billion) in
penalties as part of a settlement with prosecutors that precluded
jail time for either of the Batista brothers, the report notes.
Mr. Temer, who denies wrongdoing, has been fighting corruption
charges and calls to resign amid the ensuing scandal, the report
relays.

But Wesley Batista remained in place as CEO, and the direct impact
of the scandal on JBS remains unclear, the report notes.  The
meatpacker has sought to portray the legal troubles as pertaining
exclusively to J&F, even though it accounts for the majority of
the holding company's sales, the report discloses.

In its financial statements, JBS said it "was not able to measure
the impact of the allegations . . . quickly enough to make a
timely release of its second-quarter earnings," the report relays.

And in the conference call, Mr. Batista attributed an 80% drop in
JBS's second-quarter net profit, to BRL309.8 million, largely to
currency fluctuations, the report notes.

Still, JBS has been forced to raise cash, the report says.  It has
moved to sell around BRL6 billion in assets, the report relays.
Last month, JBS reached a deal to renegotiate about BRL20.5
billion in debt with banks, the report adds.

The BNDES's investment arm said it called the Sept. 1 shareholder
meeting to discuss "the measures to be taken by [JBS] in order to
defend its rights and interests with relation to the
responsibility for losses caused by administrators, ex-
administrators and controlling [shareholders] involved in
confessed illicit acts," the report relays.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
July 31, 2017, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B+' global scale
corporate credit ratings on JBS S.A. and JBS USA and its 'brBBB-'
national scale rating on JBS. S&P also affirmed the 'B+' senior
unsecured debt ratings on JBS and JBS USA and the 'BB' senior
secured debt ratings on JBS USA. At the same time, S&P removed all
ratings from CreditWatch. The outlook is negative.


RB CAPITAL: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Real Estate Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina Ltda. affirms the B1 (global scale, local
currency) and Baa1.br (national scale) ratings of the 3rd, 4th and
42nd Series of real estate certificates (certificados de
recebiveis imobiliarios, CRI) issued by RB Capital Securitizadora
S.A. (RB Capital, NR) and changes the applicable rating
methodology. The three series of CRI issued by RB Capital
Securitizadora S.A. are backed by build-to-suit lease agreements
with Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. -- Petrobras (B1 positive outlook).

The full rating action is:

Issuer: RB Capital Securitizadora S.A.

3rd series CRI backed by a built-to-suit lease agreement: --
Affirmed B1 (global scale, local currency) / Baa1.br (national
scale) ratings

4th series CRI backed by a built-to-suit lease agreement: --
Affirmed B1 (global scale, local currency) / Baa1.br (national
scale) ratings

42nd series CRI backed by a built-to-suit lease agreement: --
Affirmed B1 (global scale, local currency) / Baa1.br (national
scale) ratings

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's views the certificates as being full pass through of
Petrobras' senior unsecured credit risk under the build-to-suit
lease agreements.

The B1 / Baa1.br ratings of the 3rd, 4th and 42nd series of
certificates issued by RB Capital are primarily based on
Petrobras' ability to make payments under the underlying lease
agreements. Also, Petrobras covers any trust expenses. Finally, a
termination event under the lease agreements would result in a
call under the rated certificates.

Moody's has changed the applicable rating methodology from "Rating
Transactions Based on the Credit Substitution Approach: Letter of
Credit-backed, Insured and Guaranteed Debt " to "Moody's Approach
to Rating Repackaged Securities". This change did not result in
additional credit issues for the transactions.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Any future changes to the senior unsecured debt rating of
Petrobras will lead to a change in the ratings assigned to the
certificates.

RATING METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities" published in June 2015.
Please see the Rating Methodologies page on www.moodys.com.br for
a copy of this methodology.



===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================


LUZ Y FUERZA: Ordered to Cease Operations in Samana
---------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that the Electricity Superintendence
ordered the electric utility Luz y Fuerza to cease operations in
Las Terrenas, Samana and called on users to obtain service from
the competitor company El Progreso del Limon.

SIE Resolution 051-2017-MEMI puts an end to the conflict pitting
Luz y Fuerza and El Progreso for more than a decade, according to
Dominican Today.

The Superintendence said it will regularize both concessions to
benefit customers in several localities in Samana Province, the
report notes.

"Consequently, the Luz y Fuerza company of Las Terrenas must
proceed to disconnect and withdraw its electricity grids and users
within these areas and currently have the services of said
company, should proceed to regularize with the company El Progreso
del Limon, which is the electric power distributor that must
legally offer the service to these communities," the agency said,
the report adds.


=============
J A M A I C A
=============


JAMAICA: Economy Still Reeling From May's Flood Rains
-----------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that the Jamaican economy is still feeling the
effects of May's flood rains.

According to the Bank of Jamaica's Short-term Inflation Analysis
and Forecast, inflation for July is expected to mainly reflect
higher prices for Food and Non-Alcoholic Beverages due to the
continued lagged impact of the flood rains on food prices, the
report notes.

Upward inflationary impulses are expected to be partly offset by a
decline in the Housing, Water, Electricity, Gas & Other Fuels
categories as a result of lower electricity rates, according to
RJR News.

               Inflation to Reflect Increases
                in Non-Processed Food Prices

Meanwhile, the Central Bank says inflation this month is
anticipated to mainly reflect increases in non-processed food
prices and electricity rates, the report relays.

Additionally, inflationary impulses should reflect a rise in
seasonal demand associated with holidays and back to school
preparation, the report discloses.

The BOJ said inflation in September is expected to primarily
reflect increases in non-processed food prices, according to RJR
News.

In addition, a rise in text book prices as well as general demand
associated with back to school preparations should result in
further upward pressure on inflation, the report notes.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Feb. 9, 2017, Fitch Ratings affirmed Jamaica's Long-Term Foreign
and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'B' with a
Stable Outlook. The issue ratings on Jamaica's senior unsecured
Foreign and Local Currency bonds are also affirmed at 'B'. The
Outlooks on the Long-Term IDRs are Stable. The Country Ceiling is
affirmed at 'B' and the Short-Term Foreign Currency and Local
Currency IDRs at 'B'.



=======
P E R U
=======


ANDINO INVESTMENT: S&P Lowers CCR to 'CCC+', Outlook Negative
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its long-term corporate credit and
issue level ratings on Andino Investment Holding S.A.A. (AIH) to
'CCC+' from 'B'. At the same time, S&P maintained the negative
outlook on the corporate credit rating.

S&P said, "The downgrade of AIH reflects our view of an
unsustainable capital structure in the long term, as seen in debt
to EBITDA of 17.6x in the 12 months ended June 30, 2017. AIH's
operating performance suffered in 2016 due to the loss of large
clients with profitable contracts, such as Hapag-Lloyd
(B+/Negative/--). This forced AIH to lower its rates to attract
new clients, which depressed its EBITDA to about PEN26 million
(with a 4% EBITDA margin) in 2016 from PEN74 million (a 11% EBITDA
margin) in 2015. In response, AIH has maintained its liquidity
position with asset sales in the past 12-18 months, given that its
cash position and cash flow generation were insufficient to fund
investments, interest payments, and debt amortization. Our base-
case scenario assumes that the company's operating performance
will improve, despite its currently weak liquidity, which will
allow AIH to cover its debt service. Nevertheless, in 2020, the
company has to comply with a sizeable $115 million bullet maturity
of its bond, which would require a large refinancing effort. We
understand that AIH has real estate assets that it could
eventually sell to address the upcoming bond maturity, but we
don't consider potential assets sales as those depend on the
company's willingness to sell them, while the timeliness of the
potential sales is uncertain.

"AIH has been able to partly recover its EBITDA margins in the
first half of 2017 due to a reduction of its selling and
administrative expenses as a result of the synergies yielded from
the merger between Cosmos and Neptunia, two of its largest
subsidiaries. We expect EBITDA margins to continue to converge to
historical levels and the leverage metric to decrease to a level
of 7.0x-7.5x by the end of 2017 and 6.0x-6.5x by the end of 2018."



======================
P U E R T O    R I C O
======================


HAIRLAND CORP: Court Okays Disclosures, Confirms Plan
-----------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Enrique S. Lamoutte Inclan of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court
for the District of Puerto Rico has approved Hairland
Corporation's disclosure statement dated June 27, 2017, and
confirmed the Debtor's plan of reorganization dated June 27, 2017.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter on July 12, 2017, the
Debtor filed a plan dated June 27, 2017, proposing that unsecured
creditors be paid 3% of their claims under the Debtor's proposed
plan to exit Chapter 11 protection.

                   About Hairland Corporation

Headquartered at San Juan, Puerto Rico, Hairland Corporation
manages a barbershop.  The Debtor filed a petition for relief
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No.
17-00286) on Jan. 23, 2017.  The Debtor is represented by Emily
Darice Davila Rivera, Esq., at the Law Office of Emily D. Davila
Rivera.


ROJESIE INC: Plan Outline Okayed; Plan Hearing on Oct. 4
--------------------------------------------------------
Rojesie Inc. is now a step closer to emerging from Chapter 11
protection after a bankruptcy judge approved the outline of its
plan of reorganization.

Judge Edward Godoy of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District
of Puerto Rico on August 10 gave the thumbs-up to the disclosure
statement after finding that it contains "adequate information."

A court hearing to consider confirmation of the plan is scheduled
for October 4.  Objections and votes accepting or rejecting the
plan must be filed no later than 14 days prior to the hearing.

Under the restructuring plan, general unsecured creditors will
receive 25.88% of their claims or $48,000, to be paid pro rata.
Payments will start on October 15, 2021, according to court
filings.

                       About Rojesie Inc.

Adjuntas, P.R.-based Rojesie, Inc., d/b/a Parador Villas
Sotomayor, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection (Bankr.
D.P.R. Case No. 16-08296) on Oct. 17, 2016, estimating assets and
liabilities between $1 million and $10 million.

The petition was signed by Jesus R. Ramos Puente, president.
Judge Edward A. Godoy presides over the case.  The Debtor is
represented by Justiniano Law Offices.

On June 21, 2017, the Debtor filed its proposed Chapter 11 plan of
reorganization and disclosure statement.


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Joseph Cardillo at
856-381-8268.


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