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                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

               Wednesday, August 23, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 167


                            Headlines



B R A Z I L

ABENGOA SA: Unit Gets OK From Creditors for Restructuring Plan
BANCO DE BRASILIA: Fitch Affirms BB- IDR; Outlook Remains Negative
BANCO DO ESTADO: Fitch Affirms B- LT IDR; Outlook Now Stable
BANCO ORIGINAL: Moody's Withdraws B2 LT Deposit Rating
BANCO PINE: Moody's Withdraws B1 Long-Term Local Deposit Rating

BANESTES SA: Fitch Affirms 'B' Short-Term IDR
CENTRAIS ELETRICAS: Shares Jump on Privatization Plan
GERDAU SA: Explosion Kills Two at Steel Plant in Brazil
GERDAU SA: Moody's Revises Outlook to Stable; Affirms Ba3 CFR
SUL AMERICA: Fitch Affirms 'B' Short-Term IDR

* S&P Takes Various Actions on Three BR State-Owned Utilities
* S&P Takes Various Actions on Three Brazilian State-Owned Banks


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

CHINA MEDICAL: No Damages Award for Deutsches From Fidelity


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Gives Exporters a Tool for Regional Business


J A M A I C A

JAMAICA: JCTU President Says Wage Negotiations Could be Lengthy


P E R U

INKIA ENERGY: Fitch Affirms BB Long-Term IDR; Outlook Stable


T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O

TRINIDAD  & TOBAGO: Will Act on Eden Garden Deal


                            - - - - -


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B R A Z I L
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ABENGOA SA: Unit Gets OK From Creditors for Restructuring Plan
--------------------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that the Brazilian unit of struggling Spanish
energy and infrastructure group Abengoa SA obtained approval from
creditors for its in-court debt restructuring plan, said a lawyer
representing one of the creditors.

Abengoa has around BRL3.4 billion ($1.08 billion) in debt with
suppliers and banks in Brazil and has filed for court protection
against creditors last year, after stopping several projects for
lack of funding, according to Reuters.

Luciana Nogueira, a lawyer with Sao Paulo-based law firm
TozziniFreire Advogados, which represents one of those suppliers,
said a key factor behind the approval of the plan was a binding
proposal from Texas Pacific Group (TPG) to buy Abengoa's power
transmission lines in Brazil for BRL400 million in cash, the
report notes.

"That proposal would guarantee creditors will receive something
back this year," she said, the report relays.

The TPG offer would be a starting price for the assets in a
judicial auction to be organized in coming weeks, the report
discloses.  The final price for the lines could go up if more
companies decide to bid in the auction, the report notes.

TPG did not immediately return a request for comment.

Abengoa's plan presented to creditors during an assembly in Rio
included other actions to raise cash and pay back debt, the report
says.

The company said it would receive a credit of BRL76 million from
its local construction arm, Abengoa Construcao.  It also said it
would sell a stake it owns in a hospital in the northern Brazilian
state of Amazonas, for which it expects to fetch BRL143 million,
the report relays.

Abengoa also plans to sell licenses it currently holds to build
and operate power transmission lines in Brazil, but this sale
depends on litigation with the country's power regulator, Aneel,
the report discloses.  The watchdog is trying to cancel those
licenses due to delays in the construction, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
March 23, 2017, Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn all the
ratings of Abengoa S.A., including the company's Ca Corporate
Family Rating (CFR), Ca-PD Probability of Default Rating ("PDR"),
and the senior unsecured Ca ratings at Abengoa Finance, S.A.U.,
and Abengoa Greenfield, S.A. At the time of withdrawal, the
ratings carried negative outlooks.


BANCO DE BRASILIA: Fitch Affirms BB- IDR; Outlook Remains Negative
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the long-term Foreign and Local
Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) of BRB - Banco de Brasilia
S.A. (BRB) at 'BB-' and its long-term National Rating at
'A+(bra)'. Rating Outlooks on the long-term IDRs remain Negative,
while the Rating Outlook on the long-term National Rating is
Stable. Fitch also affirmed BRB's Viability Rating (VR) at 'b+'
and Support Rating (SR) at '3'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - IDRS, NATIONAL RATINGS

The affirmation of BRB's IDRs reflect Fitch's view that the bank
would receive support from its majority shareholder, the
Government of the Federal District (GDF), should the need arise.
The Negative Outlook on BRB's Long-Term IDRs ultimately mirrors
the Negative Outlook on Brazil's sovereign ratings and reflects
the pressures on GDF's ability to provide support.

Fitch believes BRB is strategically important for GDF, as it is
the local government's main financial agent, and it has a
meaningful market share in the state's loans and deposits. At
May 2017, BRB ranked fourth in lending and term deposits within
the Federal District with 6% and 10% market shares, respectively.
In addition to its commercial operations, BRB performs a policy
role for the region through lending operations that aim to promote
development and growth.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - VIABILITY RATING

The affirmation of BRB's VR mainly reflects its capitalization
ratios that are slightly lower than its peer averages, and it also
incorporates the volatility in its earnings over the past few
years and potential asset quality pressures on its loans to
companies. The VR also considers BRB's solid franchise in GDF and
stable and diversified retail-based funding structure.

BRB's Fitch core capital (FCC) and regulatory capital ratios are
slightly lower than the average of its three Fitch-rated peers. In
2016, the bank's recognition of an actuarial deficit for its
employees' pension fund (both for 2016 and retrospectively for
2015) and an increase in deductible deferred tax assets affected
its FCC ratio negatively, but the non-recurring gain and lower
RWAs offset this effect. Positively, as of March 2017, the FCC
ratio rose to 12.66% from 11.95% in 2016 and 11.11% in 2015.

BRB's asset quality indicators have deteriorated since 2015, in
line with sector and peer trends. Fitch expects BRB's asset
quality to remain under pressure in the short term, in line with
the sector outlook. BRB's payroll deductible portfolio, which made
up 43% of the total at March 2017, has continued to perform well.
Unlike a number of subnational governments, GDF has not reported
significant delays in salary payments to its employees.

The main pressure has been on the unsecured consumer loans and SME
loans, which, made up 38% and 12% of the total, respectively, at
March 2017. This drove the increase in BRB's NPLs over 90 days to
4.3% in 2015 and 4.4% in 2016, before going down to 4.1% at March
2017. BRB's loan loss reserve coverage of impaired loans remains
adequate (148% and 122% of NPLs, at March 2017 and 2016,
respectively).

BRB's profitability was negatively impacted in 2015, due to a
large increase in loan impairment charges, but in 2016, as
impairment charges fell to 61% of pre-impairment earnings,
operating profit recovered to a 2.02% of RWAs (0.41% in 2015). In
2016, the bank's overall net income was boosted by a non-recurring
gain of BRL118 million from the reversal of tax provisions. In the
first quarter of 2017, operating earnings increased slightly to
2.18% of RWAs. This was mainly due to a drop in non-interest
expenses that offset slightly higher loan impairment charges that
reached 69% of pre-impairment charges. Possible needs of
additional loan loss reserves for its loans to companies could
pressure 2017 earnings.

Funding and liquidity are positive drivers for BRB's VR. The bank
has a retail funding base, which is highly stable, diversified and
low cost. Deposits and deposit-like financial bills made up 83% of
total funding at March 2017. In the same period, gross loans
corresponded to a comfortable 105% of deposit and deposit-like
financial bills. The bank also has local subordinated financial
bills that are eligible as Tier 2 capital.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - SUPPORT RATING

The affirmation of BRB's SRs at '3' reflects the moderate
probability of support from GDF. Fitch believes GDF would have a
high willingness to support BRB in case of need; however, its
capacity to do so has fallen along with the deterioration in
Brazil's sovereign ratings.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - IDRS, NATIONAL RATINGS, SUPPORT RATING

Any changes in Fitch's assessment of GDF's ability and willingness
to provide support to BRB would affect the IDRs and SR of the
bank. The National Ratings of BRB would only be affected by
changes in local relativities among Brazilian banks.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - VIABILITY RATING

Negative triggers: BRB's VR could be downgraded if its FCC ratio
falls to less than 7% and if its operating ROAA remains below 0.5%
for a sustained period.

Positive triggers: An upgrade of BRB's VR would be conditional on
the maintenance of its operating profit/RWA above 1.25% and FCC
ratio above 12%, both for sustained periods.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

-- Long-term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'BB-', Outlook
    Negative;
-- Short-term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'B';
-- Long-term National Rating at 'A+(bra)', Outlook Stable;
-- Short-term National Rating at 'F1(bra)';
-- Support Rating at '3';
-- Viability Rating at 'b+'.


BANCO DO ESTADO: Fitch Affirms B- LT IDR; Outlook Now Stable
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings of Banco do Estado do Rio
Grande do Sul (Banrisul). The Outlooks for the Long-Term Foreign
and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) and National
Long-Term Rating were revised to Stable from Negative.

The revision of Banrisul's Outlook to Stable reflects the recent
stabilization of the credit profile of the state of Rio Grande do
Sul (ERS), the bank's main shareholder. This stabilization could
result in better asset quality prospects for Banrisul due to its
regional importance. Most of the bank's operations take place in
ERS, which has seen recent improvements to its economic and
operating environments.

KEY RATING DRIVERS
IDRs, VRs AND NATIONAL RATINGS

Banrisul's IDRs are driven by its Viability Rating (VR) and are
highly influenced by its operating environment due to the bank's
regional importance and concentration. Another factor is
Banrisul's asset quality, which showed some deterioration over the
past few years but could be stabilized by a less pressured
environment. The ratings also incorporate the bank's local
franchise, adequate capitalization, stable retail funding base and
profitability, and adequate liquidity metrics.

In the first half of 2017, Banrisul reported a slight improvement
in its capitalization metrics in relation to 2016, but results
continue to lag compared to previous years. The Fitch core capital
(FCC) was 13.5% in June 2017 and 13.3% in December 2016, versus
14.8% in December 2015. Regulatory capital was 15.7% in June 2017
and 17% in December 2016.

Banrisul operates as a commercial bank, targeting both companies
and to individuals. IT has a strong presence in Rio Grande do Sul,
with an 18% credit market share and 48% of term deposits in March
2017. Loans to ERS' public servants represent around 15% of the
bank's loan portfolio.

Fitch believes asset quality could stabilize due to improvments in
the state's environment. Non-performing Loans (NPLs) amounted to
4.7% of the portfolio in June 2017 (5% in 2016). Loans classified
in the 'D-H' risk range amounted to 12.3% in June 2017, versus 13%
in 2016. However, charge-offs increased to 3.5% from 3.00%.

Banrisul has a non-encumbering exclusive contract with ERS that
charged the bank and generated intangible assets in this contract,
which negatively impacted the bank's capitalization indicators in
2016. Loan leverage was acceptable at 4.7x the equity in June 2017
and December 2016 and 5.1x in 2015. The bank has distributed 40%
of its results in recent years.

Banrisul has a stable and varied funding base, with savings and
time deposit clients, which is one of its greatest strengths.
Total funding (including deposits, financial bills and
subordinated debt) increased by 7.7% in 2016 (increased 8.9% since
June of 2016 until June of 2016). Time deposits accounted for
around 76% of these deposits and remained fairly diversified and
growing. Operating profitability remained at an adequate level,
with a relative stabilization of the levels of provisions expenses
related to the bank's loan exposures, mainly of its corporate
portfolio.

Support Rating and Support Rating Floor
The Support Rating '4' and the Support Rating Floor 'B' reflect
the limited support probability provided by the Federal Government
under a stress scenario due to the bank's relatively low systemic
importance. In March 2017, Banrisul was the 10th biggest financial
institution in the country in terms of assets, and the sixth
regarding deposits. However, there are no explicit guarantees of
support from the federal government.

Debt Issuances

Subordinated Tier 2 USD Notes: Banrisul's subordinated notes ('B-
/RR6') due in January 2022 are two notches below the bank's VR of
'b+'. The notching includes one notch lower for loss severity
features and its subordinated status and a one-notch deduction due
to moderate non-performance risk.

RATING SENSITIVITIES
VR, IDRs, NATIONAL RATINGS AND DEBT ISSUANCES

Negative Rating Action: Banrisul's ratings are likely to be
downgraded if a major weakening of the assets quality indexes and
an increase of non-performing credits higher than 7% take place,
or if the Fitch Core Capital (FCC) falls below 11%. Moreover,
Banrisul's ratings may be impacted by any change of Fitch's
opinions regarding the operating and economics of the state of Rio
Grande do Sul due to the banks' strong presence in that state.

Positive Rating Action: Banrisul's Ratings could be upgraded if
the bank maintains adequate profitability, expressed by the
operating profit/risk weighted assets ratio above 4%, together
with good asset quality ratios, NPLs around 4% and substantial
improvements on FCC metrics coupled with the maintenance of Fitch
stable view of the state of Rio Grande do Sul.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

The SR is potentially sensitive to any change in assumptions
around the propensity or ability of the sovereign to provide
timely support to the bank

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

-- Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'B+'; Outlook
    revised to Stable from Negative;
-- Short-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'B';
-- Viability Rating at 'b+';
-- Support Rating at '4';
-- Support Rating Floor at 'B';
-- National long-term rating at 'A-(bra)'; Outlook revised to
    Stable from Negative;
-- National short-term rating at 'F2 (bra)';
-- Tier II Capital Subordinated Notes due in February 2022, at
    'B-/RR6'.



BANCO ORIGINAL: Moody's Withdraws B2 LT Deposit Rating
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn all ratings assigned to
Banco Original S.A. and Banco Original do Agronegocio S.A. (BOA),
including the long and short-term local and foreign currency
deposit ratings of B2 and Not Prime, respectively; the long and
short-term Brazilian national scale deposit ratings of Ba2.br and
BR-4, respectively. Moody's has also withdrawn the baseline credit
assessment (BCA) of b2; the adjusted BCA of b2; and the long- and
short-term counterparty risk assessments of B1(cr) and Not
Prime(cr). Before the withdrawal, the outlook on all ratings was
negative.

The following ratings were withdrawn:

Issuer: Banco Original S.A.

-- Long-Term Global Local Currency Deposit Rating, previously
    rated B2

-- Short-Term Global Local Currency Deposit Rating, previously
    rated Not Prime

-- Long-Term Foreign Currency Deposit Rating, previously rated B2

-- Short-Term Foreign Currency Deposit Rating, previously rated
    Not Prime

-- Long-Term Brazilian National Scale Deposit Rating, previously
    rated Ba2.br

-- Short-Term Brazilian National Scale Deposit Rating, previously
    rated BR-4

-- Baseline Credit Assessment, previously rated b2

-- Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, previously rated b2

-- Long-Term Counterparty Risk Assessment, previously rated
    B1(cr)

-- Short-Term Counterparty Risk Assessment, previously rated Not
    Prime(cr)

-- Outlook, Changed To Rating Withdrawn From Negative

Issuer: Banco Original do Agronegocio S.A.

-- Long-Term Global Local Currency Deposit Rating, previously
    rated B2

-- Short-Term Global Local Currency Deposit Rating, previously
    rated Not Prime

-- Long-Term Foreign Currency Deposit Rating, previously rated B2

-- Short-Term Foreign Currency Deposit Rating, previously rated
    Not Prime

-- Long-Term Brazilian National Scale Deposit Rating, previously
    rated Ba2.br

-- Short-Term Brazilian National Scale Deposit Rating, previously
    rated BR-4

-- Baseline Credit Assessment, previously rated b2

-- Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, previously rated b2

-- Long-Term Counterparty Risk Assessment, previously rated
    B1(cr)

-- Short-Term Counterparty Risk Assessment, previously rated Not
    Prime(cr)

-- Outlook, Changed To Rating Withdrawn From Negative

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has withdrawn the ratings for its own business reasons.

The last rating action on both Banco Original S.A. and Banco
Original do Agronegocio S.A. was on June 1, 2017, when Moody's
downgraded the bank's local and foreign currency deposit ratings
to B2, from B1, as well as the long- and short-term Brazilian
national scale ratings to Ba2.br and BR-4, from Baa1.br and BR-2,
respectively. The BCA and adjusted BCA was also downgraded to b2,
as well as the bank's counterparty risk assessment to B1(cr) for
long-term, from Ba3(cr). The short term deposit ratings were
affirmed at Not Prime.

Banco Original and Banco Original do Agronegocio are headquartered
in Sao Paulo and are part of Original Financial Conglomerate.
Original financial conglomerate had total assets of BRL 8,723
million ($ 2,680 million) and equity of BRL 2,225 million ($ 683.7
million) as of December 31, 2016.


BANCO PINE: Moody's Withdraws B1 Long-Term Local Deposit Rating
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn all ratings assigned to
Banco Pine S.A., including the long- and short-term local and
foreign currency deposit ratings of B1 and Not Prime,
respectively, as well as the long- and short-term Brazilian
national scale deposit ratings of Baa2.br and BR-3, respectively.
Moody's has also withdrawn the b1 baseline credit assessment
(BCA), the b1 adjusted baseline credit assessment (adjusted BCA)
and the counterparty risk assessments of Ba3(cr) and Not Prime(cr)
assigned to Pine. Before the withdrawal, the outlook on the global
local and foreign currency deposit ratings was stable.

The following ratings were withdrawn:

Issuer: Banco Pine S.A.

-- Long-Term Global Local Currency Deposit Rating, previously
    rated B1, outlook withdrawn

-- Short-Term Global Local Currency Deposit Rating, previously
    rated Not Prime

-- Long-Term Foreign Currency Deposit Rating, previously rated
    B1, outlook withdrawn

-- Short-Term Foreign Currency Deposit Rating, previously rated
    Not Prime

-- Long-Term Brazilian National Scale Deposit Rating, previously
    rated Baa2.br

-- Short-Term Brazilian National Scale Deposit Rating, previously
    rated BR-3

-- Baseline Credit Assessment, previously rated b1

-- Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, previously rated b1

-- Long-Term Counterparty Risk Assessment, previously rated
    Ba3(cr)

-- Short-Term Counterparty Risk Assessment, previously rated Not
    Prime(cr)

-- Outlook, Changed To Rating Withdrawn From Stable

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has withdrawn the ratings for its own business reasons.
Please refer to the Moody's Investors Service's Policy for Moody's
National Scale Credit Ratings (NSRs) are intended as relative
measures of creditworthiness among debt issues and issuers within
a country, enabling market participants to better differentiate
relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's global scale credit
ratings in that they are not globally comparable with the full
universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with NSRs for other
rated debt issues and issuers within the same country. NSRs are
designated by a ".nn" country modifier signifying the relevant
country, as in ".za" for South Africa. For further information on
Moody's approach to national scale credit ratings, please refer to
Moody's Credit rating Methodology published in May 2016 entitled
"Mapping National Scale Ratings from Global Scale Ratings". While
NSRs have no inherent absolute meaning in terms of default risk or
expected loss, a historical probability of default consistent with
a given NSR can be inferred from the GSR to which it maps back at
that particular point in time. For information on the historical
default rates associated with different global scale rating
categories over different investment horizons.

Banco Pine S.A. is headquartered in Sao Paulo, Brazil. As of 30
June 2017, the bank had total assets of approximately BRL8.97
billion ($2.7 billion) and equity of BRL1.13 billion ($340
million).


BANESTES SA: Fitch Affirms 'B' Short-Term IDR
----------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings of Banestes SA Banco do
Estado do Espirito Santo (Banestes).

KEY RATING DRIVERS
VR, IDRs and NATIONAL RATINGS

Banestes' Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) are driven by its 'bb-'
Viability Rating (VR), which mainly reflects the high influence of
the operating environment on the bank's performance and prospects
since it primarily operates in the State of Espirito Santo and due
to its regional importance. The ratings also consider the bank's
regional franchise and its adequate financial profile which
positively compare to those of the subnational-owned peers. Fitch
considers the bank's stable liquidity, relatively strong
capitalization and adequate sources of funding. The quality of the
bank's assets began to stabilize in early 2017.

The Rating Outlook for the bank's Long-Term IDR is Negative,
reflecting that, as a retail bank, its VR could be impacted by any
further deterioration in the operating environment. Additionally,
any change in Fitch's opinion of the creditworthiness of its main
shareholder, State of Espirito Santo, could impact the bank's VR,
since Fitch believes there is little room to position Banestes' VR
much above that of State of Espirito Santo.

Banestes' business model relies on lower-cost retail funding,
provided by its branch network, mainly in the State of Espirito
Santo. Furthermore, the bank has reasonably well-diversified
products, which makes it less dependent on revenues linked to
credit than its peers.

Banestes focuses its operations in the state of Espirito Santo,
where it maintains a good participation in deposits and credit
operations. As a state bank, a relevant part of its strategy
includes providing services and granting credit to state and
municipal public servants, as well as to companies that intend to
invest in the state. Through agreements and partnerships with
municipalities and the state government itself, the bank also
manages the financial resources of these entities, increasing the
capacity to expand its customer base.

Underwriting standards are in line with the practices of the
leading banks in the banking industry. Credit risk is the one that
consumes the most capital. The quality of credit remained
acceptable, indicators of NPLs of more than 90 days in the first
half of 2017 totaled 3% until June 2017 (3.6% in 2016, 4.8% in
2015 and 5.3% in 2014). As of March 2017, securities classified as
'D-H' stood at 15.6% of the portfolio and 15.5% in December 2016,
which show some deterioration from previous years (12.3% in
December 2015 and 10.1% in December 2014).

The bank shows good profitability, without great oscillations.
Operating profit on average assets was 1% as of the 1Q17,
presenting stability in recent years. Banestes has optimized
costs, implemented operational efficiency targets and has reviewed
all of its fixed cost contracts.

Fitch believes capitalization metrics are relatively strong and
positively compare to its closest peers. By management's policy,
the regulatory capitalization index must be at least 14%. In March
2017, it was 18.5%. The credit leverage was approximately 2.9
times the shareholders' equity in March 2017 (3.0 times in
December 2016 and 3.4 times in December 2015). Fitch deducted the
insurer's equity to calculate the Fitch Capital Core, which was
still at comfortable 16.4% in March 2017 (16.6% in December 2016,
17.3% in December 2015) and better on average than its peers.

Banestes presents a granular and low cost deposit base given its
retail profile. The bank holds about a third of the Espirito Santo
market. The concentration of the 20 largest depositors was about
20% of total in March 2017. The moderate percentage is explained
by the state's investments or by entities linked to it, as a large
part of governmental funds (and of its companies) is deposited in
Banestes. Fitch views Banestes' liquidity as adequate and its
minimum cash policy as conservative. The most liquid assets
accounted for about 50% of total deposits and comprised mainly
federal government securities.

SUPPORT RATING
The '4' Support Rating reflects the moderate probability of
support from its controlling shareholder, the State of Espirito
Santo. In Fitch's opinion, Banestes is strategically important to
the state, as it acts as the state's financial agent. In addition,
the bank provides services to public entities and grants credit to
their suppliers, as well as payroll deductible loans to public
employees, which together make up an important part of the bank's
business.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

VR, IDRs and National Ratings
Banestes' VR is sensitive to any change in Fitch's assumptions
regarding exposure to regional risk, capitalization and credit
quality. The VR may be downgraded if Banestes' NPL's (overdue for
more than 90 days) increase to more than 6% and / or if the FCC
falls to less than 10%.

Fitch's internal analysis of the state of Espirito Santo may
affect the bank's ratings. Thus, its ratings could be impacted by
any change in the financial profile of that state.

SUPPORT RATING

SR could be modified from any change on the strategic importance
of the bank or the propensity of support of the state of Espirito
Santo.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS:

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

Banestes S.A. - Bank of the State of Espirito Santo:

-- Long-term IDRs in Foreign and Local Currencies at 'BB-';
    Outlook Negative;
-- Short-term IDRs in Foreign and Local Currencies at 'B';
-- National Long-Term Rating at 'A + (bra)', Stable Outlook;
-- National short-term rating at 'F1 (bra)';
-- Support Rating at '4'.
-- Viability Rating at 'bb-'.


CENTRAIS ELETRICAS: Shares Jump on Privatization Plan
-----------------------------------------------------
Paulo Trevisani at The Wall Street Journal reports that shares of
Centrais Eletricas Brasileiras SA jumped 48% a day after Brazil's
cash-strapped government announced it would cut its controlling
stake in the power utility.

Eletrobras Chief Executive Wilson Ferreira Junior and Energy
Minister Fernando Coelho Filho said Aug. 22 they have yet to
decide whether the government will sell part of its holdings or
issue new shares to dilute its position Brazil's largest power
operator, according to The Wall Street Journal.

The officials said the move wasn't aimed at raising money to close
the country's budget deficit, equal to 9.5% of annual economic
output, but that they were instead to make the company more
efficient by freeing it from state control, the report notes.

"This is an indebted company whose market value is below its net
assets," Mr. Ferreira said to reporters, the report relays.
"Without the state bureaucracy it will be more efficient and
nimble to compete," he said, the report notes.

The report discloses that they said the plan was floated now to
avoid rumors that could shake financial markets as discussions
progressed within the government.

Both men declined to put a figure on the planned sale, which would
result in the country's largest privatization in decades, the
report says.

Mr. Coelho said the government still hasn't decided the fate of
large assets that the company likely won't be able to privatize,
the report notes.

One is Itaipu, the gargantuan 103 million megawatt/hour
hydroelectric dam whose ownership Brazil shares with the
government of Paraguay, the report relays.  The privatization of
its nuclear plants are also barred by the Constitution, the report
says.

"We certainly won't do anything that runs against the
Constitution," the minister said, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-June 2, 2017, Moody's
Investors Service has changed the outlook on Centrais Eletricas
Brasileiras SA-Eletrobras ratings to negative from stable and
affirmed the corporate family and senior unsecured ratings at Ba3.
The action follows Moody's May 26, 2017 rating action in which the
outlook for Brazil's government bond rating was revised to
negative from stable.



GERDAU SA: Explosion Kills Two at Steel Plant in Brazil
-------------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that an explosion at a Brazilian steel plant
operated by Gerdau SA killed two people and injured 10 others, the
company and local metalworkers union said.

The blast occurred at a coke oven at Gerdau's plant in the center-
south state of Minas Gerais, according to the Metalworking Union
of Ouro Branco (Sindob), the report notes.

It was the second major accident in less than a year at the steel
plant that employs roughly 2,000 people, according to the union,
reports Reuters.  A blast furnace explosion killed four in
November, the report relays.

The plant's operations were not affected, but Gerdau's preferred
shares dropped BRL2.1 percent to BRL10.97 by the close of trading
on Aug. 16, notes the report.

Sindob said it is preparing a protest at the plant, the report
relays.

"We attribute this (series of accidents) to the pure and simple
lack of maintenance of equipment . . . It has not had preventative
maintenance, we have been aware of this situation in the plant for
two years," said Sindob President Raimundo Nonato Roque de
Carvalho, the report discloses.

Gerdau said in a statement the plant's equipment was in adequate
condition and conformed with safety standards under current law.
The company was investigating the cause of the accident and
assisting the families of the victims, it said, the report adds.


GERDAU SA: Moody's Revises Outlook to Stable; Affirms Ba3 CFR
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed Gerdau S.A. Ba3 corporate
family rating and the Ba3 ratings of the debt issues of Gerdau
Trade Inc (guaranteed by Gerdau S.A. and its operating
subsidiaries in Brazil) and of GTL Trade Finance Inc (guaranteed
by Gerdau S.A. and its operating subsidiaries in Brazil), as well
as the industrial revenue bonds issued by Jacksonville Economic
Development Commission, FL (guaranteed by Gerdau S.A.) and the
solid waste disposal bonds issued by St. Paul Port Authority, MN
(guaranteed by Gerdau S.A.). The outlook was changed to stable
from negative.

Ratings actions:

Issuer: Gerdau S.A

LT Corporate Family Ratings: affirmed at Ba3

Issuer: Gerdau Trade Inc.:

USD 750 million senior unsecured notes due 2023: affirmed at Ba3

Issuer: GTL Trade Finance Inc.

USD 1,250 million senior unsecured notes due 2024: affirmed at Ba3

USD 500 million senior unsecured notes due 2044: affirmed at Ba3

Issuer: Jacksonville Economic Development Comm., FL

USD 23 million industrial revenue bonds due 2037: affirmed at Ba3

Issuer: St Paul (City of) MN, Port Authority

USD 51 million solid waste disposal revenue bonds due 2037:
affirmed at Ba3

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Gerdau S.A.

-- Outlook, Changed To Stable From Negative

Issuer: Gerdau Trade Inc.:

-- Outlook, Changed To Stable From Negative

Issuer: GTL Trade Finance Inc.

-- Outlook, Changed To Stable From Negative

RATINGS RATIONALE

The stable outlook reflects the resilience of Gerdau's operations
during 2016 and 1H2017 despite Brazil's market downturn, supported
by the initiatives taken by the company to reduce costs, and
Gerdau's financial discipline regarding capex and dividend
payments. Although Gerdau's main markets - namely Brazil and the
US -- continue weak the company's adjusted EBITDA margins have
slowly recovered in the past few quarters, and closed June 2017 at
11.4% (down from 13.5% in 2014, but an improvement over 10.7% in
2015).

Moody's does not expect any material recovery in the steel
industry in Brazil at least through 2018, as the main steel
consuming segments for long steel (construction, infrastructure)
will likely remain weak until there is a more evident recovery in
the economy and resumption of investments in infrastructure.
Despite that, declining inflation and interest rates should
support a gradual recovery in the commercial construction and
homebuilding segments compared to 2016 levels. In the US, Gerdau
will continue to face competition of imported steel through 2017,
while infrastructure investments will likely not resume at least
until 2018.

Despite the soft operating environment, Gerdau has generated
positive free cash flows since 2013, and was able to reduce debt
levels, partially with the proceeds from asset divestitures. The
company's liquidity remains solid and adequate to meet the debt
amortization schedule. As of June 30, 2017, Gerdau held close to
BRL 5.4 billion in cash and equivalents, and additional liquidity
sources under its USD 1.0 billion committed credit facility.
Moody's expects Gerdau to use part of cash balance to amortize
upcoming debt and reduce gross leverage. Moody's expects total
adjusted leverage, measured by total debt to EBITDA, to decline to
5.2x at the end of 2017 and 4.4x at the end of 2018, from 5.6x in
the last twelve months ended in June 2017.

Gerdau's Ba3 ratings are supported by the company's historically
solid cash generation, which reflects its strong market position
in the several markets where it operates, its good operational and
geographic diversity, its cost-driven management, as well as its
conservative financial policies. While Gerdau's variable cost
structure, high integration level and large scale provide good
operating flexibility, reducing downside risk, the economic
slowdown in Brazil should keep steel volumes and demand under
pressure at least through 2018.

Over the last couple of years, Gerdau's leverage substantially
increased (and remained between 5x and 6x total adjusted debt to
EBITDA) as a result of the EBITDA contraction, in particular in
Brazil, and interest coverage ratios, measured by EBIT to interest
expenses, also deteriorated, declining to levels close to 1x, much
weaker when compared to historical averages in the 3x-4x range.
The ratings reflect the continued weaknesses of the steel industry
in Brazil, a key market for Gerdau, and challenges in the US steel
market, and Moody's expectations that the company's credit
metrics, particularly margins, leverage and interest coverage will
remain pressured in the next 12-18 months. Leverage and interest
coverage remain exposed to exchange rate movements, and as the BRL
has depreciated since 2015, FX will continue to impact leverage
metrics given that about 80% of the company's debt is denominated
in foreign currencies.

The ratings could be upgraded if there is a more meaningful
recovery in Gerdau's operations, with sustainable improvements in
volumes and the company is able to improve profitability to levels
observed prior to 2015, with EBIT margins of at least 6% (4.8% in
LTM ended June 2017), while maintaining an adequate liquidity
profile and reduce debt levels, with total adjusted debt to Ebitda
below 3.5x (5.6x in the LTM ended in June 2017) and EBIT to
interest expense above 3.0x (1.1x in the LTM ended in June 2017)
on a sustained basis.

Negative pressure on the rating could result from weaker liquidity
or from persistently high leverage, with total debt to Ebitda
above 4.0x on a sustainable basis over the long-term. Further
deterioration in volumes and margins in Gerdau's main markets
(namely Brazil and the US), affecting its ability to generate
positive free cash flow or limited flexibility for capex reduction
could trigger a downgrade. A sharp deterioration in the
controlling shareholders' (Metal£rgica Gerdau) financial position
and an increase in dividends at levels such that the cash flow
from operations less dividends to debt ratio remains below 15%
(8.3% in the LTM ended in June 2017) for a prolonged period could
also precipitate a downgrade.

Based in Brazil, Gerdau S.A. is the leading producer of long steel
in the Americas , with total annual capacity of over 25.5 million
tons of crude steel. The group has operations in 12 countries with
relevant market shares in many of them, including Brazil, USA,
Canada, Chile, Peru, Uruguay, Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela and
India, and joint ventures in Colombia and the Dominican Republic.
In the last twelve months ended June 30, 2017, Gerdau reported
consolidated annual revenues of approximately BRL 34.9 billion
(USD 10.8 billion converted by the average exchange rate).

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global Steel
Industry published in October 2012.


SUL AMERICA: Fitch Affirms 'B' Short-Term IDR
---------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Sul America S.A.'s (SASA) ratings:

-- Long-Term Local and Foreign Currency Issuer Default Ratings
    (IDRs) at 'BB-';
-- Short-Term Local and Foreign Currency IDRs at 'B';
-- Long-term National Rating at 'AA-(bra)';
-- Short-term National Rating at 'F1+(bra)';
-- Long-term National Rating of its debentures due 2019, 2021 and
    2022 at 'A+(bra)'.

The Rating Outlook on SASA's Long-Term IDRs and National Rating is
Negative and mirrors the Negative Outlook of Brazil's sovereign
ratings (Long-Term IDR 'BB'/Outlook Negative).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmation of SASA's ratings reflects the resilience of its
technical results and other credit metrics to the challenging
economic environment in Brazil, its strong and stable franchise
led by a significant presence in the health and auto segments,
adequate liquidity and capitalization, and robust risk management
practices. The rating action also takes into account the
constraints posed by Brazil's sovereign ratings on SASA's IDRs
reflecting the full concentration of its operations in Brazil and
its large Brazilian government securities holdings (approximately
1.7 times its total capital at June 2017).

SASA's premium and contribution growth slowed down to 6% in 2016
from an average of 12% between 2013-2015, compared with sector
growth of 10% and 12%, respectively (both excluding the saving
bonds segment). It maintained its ranking as the third and fourth
largest insurer in health and auto insurance segments, with market
shares of 9.6% and 10%, respectively, at year-end 2016. In the
first half of 2017, SASA's growth was 7% on a year-on-year basis,
when strong growth in health offset the negative growth in auto.
Fitch believes that SASA will maintain its leadership in its key
businesses.

SASA's performance remained adequate and broadly stable through
June 2017, despite the severe recession of 2015 and 2016 and
modest economic recovery in the first half of 2017. Return on
average assets (ROAA) was 3.3% in 2016 and 1.9% at June 2017,
compared to an average of 3.5% in 2015 and 2014. This was a result
of both solid technical results (combined ratio was 99% and 101%,
respectively, in 2016 and June 2017) and meaningful financial
income. The slight deterioration in SASA's technical results in
first-half 2017, was due to both seasonal effects and a slight
increase in loss ratios.

SASA's leverage, measured by the net liabilities/equity ratio, and
operating leverage, measured by net earned premiums/equity, is
higher than peer averages in Latin America but has fallen slightly
since 2014, as a result of slower growth. At June 2017, these
stood at 3.1x and 3.2x, respectively, slightly lower than the
levels of a year ago, while financial leverage (debt-to-total
capital) remained broadly stable at 21% in June 2017. Fitch
expects leverage to stabilize at the existing levels, but any
continued increase could become a negative rating driver in the
future.

SASA's liquidity remained adequate at June 2017. Its liquid
assets/net technical reserves ratio was 1.17x, up from an average
of 1.16x in 2016-2015. In first-half 2017 and 2016, the interest
coverage ratio was 5.8x and 9.1x, respectively. The decline is
explained by the fall in the operating income that offset the
benefit of lower interest rates and inflation. Fitch does not
expect the ratio to fall below 3.0x, and views the current levels
compatible with SASA's ratings.

Exceptional notching for a ring-fenced regulatory environment was
applied between the implied insurance operating company ratings
and holding company IDRs. Notching was compressed by two relative
to standard notching, as sovereign-related risks have so far not
materially affected SASA's key credit metrics.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

In case of an additional downgrade to Brazil's sovereign ratings,
SASA's IDRs would be subject to a review that could result in a
range of rating actions from affirmation to a two notch downgrade
based on Fitch's insurance rating criteria that allows flexibility
on how sovereign considerations are factored into insurance rating
notching. The ultimate decision would be driven by the rationale
for the sovereign rating action and Fitch's view of how this
impacts SASA's operating environment, investment risk and overall
creditworthiness.

In addition, the ratings could be negative affected by:

-- A sustained and material deterioration in profitability,
    characterized by an ROA below 0.5%;
-- Deterioration of the liabilities/equity ratio to above 5.0x;
-- An increase in the financial leverage to above 25% for a
    sustained period;
-- A fall in the interest coverage ratio to below 3.0x.


* S&P Takes Various Actions on Three BR State-Owned Utilities
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings took several rating actions on government-
related entities linked to two Brazilian state governments. S&P
said, "We also removed the national scale ratings on these
entities from UCO, where we had placed them on August 14."

S&P said, "We affirmed the 'BB' global and 'brAA-' Brazil national
scale ratings on CESP -- Companhia Energetica de Sao Paulo and
Companhia de Saneamento Basico do Estado de Sao Paulo (Sabesp) and
removed the ratings from CreditWatch negative. These actions
followed the same rating action on the state of Sao Paulo. The
outlook on these entities is now negative. We also downgraded on
the Brazilian national scale Companhia Pernambucana de Saneamento
- Compesa to 'brA-' from 'brA'. The outlook on this rating is now
stable."

The ratings on the Brazilian states usually pose a limitation on
the entities they control. S&P said, "We believe states might
intervene by redirecting resources to the government and therefore
weakening the entities' credit quality, particularly amid
challenging fiscal conditions. Therefore, we took the same rating
actions on CESP and Sabesp as on the state. The outlooks on these
two utilities are now negative, mirroring the one on the state.

"The downgrade of Compesa reflects our view of a potential
intervention from its controlling shareholder, the state of
Pernambuco (not rated), amid current economic woes. The stable
outlook on Compesa reflects our belief that the state's economy,
although currently weak, won't deteriorate further in the next 12
months."


* S&P Takes Various Actions on Three Brazilian State-Owned Banks
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its long-term foreign and local
currency global scale ratings on BRB - Banco de Brasilia S.A.
(BRB) to 'B+' from 'BB-'. S&P said, "At the same time, we removed
them from CreditWatch. The outlook on these ratings is stable. We
also affirmed and removed from CreditWatch our 'brA-/brA-2'
national scale ratings on BRB."

S&P said, "Furthermore, we affirmed our 'BB-/B' foreign and local
currency global scale ratings on Banco do Estado do Para S.A.
(Banpara) and removed them from CreditWatch. In addition, we
raised our long-term national scale rating on Banpara to 'brA+'
from 'brA'. The outlook on both scale ratings is negative.

"We also affirmed our 'B-' foreign and local currency global scale
ratings on Banco de Desenvolvimento de Minas Gerais S.A. - BDMG
(BDMG). At the same time, we revised the outlook on these ratings
to stable from negative. We also raised our national scale ratings
on BDMG to 'brB+' from 'brB-'. The outlook on this rating is now
stable.

"Finally, we removed the under criteria observation (UCO)
identifier on the national ratings on all three banks."

The rating actions on these government-owned banks reflect our
reassessment of the institutional framework under which LRGs
operate in Brazil, as well as maintenance of our BICRA of Brazil
in group '6' and, consequently, the anchor for banks operating
only in Brazil at 'bb+'. The national scale rating actions on
banks also reflect the updated mapping table for national scale
ratings in the country.

S&P said, "We lowered our global scale ratings on BRB due to our
revision our evaluation of the Brazilian LRGs' institutional
framework, which weakened our view of the creditworthiness of the
bank's controller, the Federal District. Our current assessment on
the institutional framework reflects an intrinsically rigid
intergovernmental system, which has failed to address LRGs'
significant budgetary imbalances (see "Brazilian Local And
Regional Governments Ratings Affirmed And Off Watch Following
Similar Action On The Sovereign," published on Aug. 16, 2017). The
Federal District's weaker credit quality also reflects the slow
improvement in its fiscal performance, with payroll expenditures
still above the limit set by the Fiscal Responsibility Law.
Finally, the District's liquidity position remains weak, with free
cash covering less than 10% of next 12-month debt service.

"We have also reviewed BRB's capitalization due to the update in
our risk-adjusted criteria framework (RACF) criteria. The
application of the new RACF criteria didn't change the bank's
stand-alone credit profile, because we expect its risk-adjusted
capital ratio to average 5.4% over the next 18 months. We also
applied the new mapping table for Brazilian national scale
ratings, which resulted in an affirmation of the 'brA-' national
scale rating on the bank, despite the change of its global scale
ratings. After fully applying both updated criteria pieces, we
removed the UCO identifier on national scale rating on BRB.

"The global scale ratings on Banpar† and BDMG, on the other hand,
remained unchanged after our revision of the institutional
framework to a weaker category. Our 'BB-' ratings on Banpara
continue reflecting its narrow range of business lines, adequate
capitalization levels, and strong profitability metrics. In turn,
the 'B-' ratings on BDMG reflect the eroded fiscal position of the
state of Minas Gerais and its difficulties to implement tougher
cost-control measures to improve public finances. We also removed
the UCO identifier on the national scale ratings on Banpar† and
BDMG's after applying Brazil's revised mapping table, which
resulted in the upgrades on the national scale."



==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


CHINA MEDICAL: No Damages Award for Deutsches From Fidelity
-----------------------------------------------------------
Jon Hill, writing for Bankruptcy Law360, reports that a Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) arbitration panel did not
fully support William and Peter Deutsch's allegations that
Fidelity Brokerage LLC made them lose their chance of taking
control of China Medical Technologies Inc. through stock
purchases.

"Whatever Fidelity did or did not do would not have altered the
failure of claimants' investment because the events that doomed
the strategy were either external to Fidelity or internal to
[China Medical]," the panel said, Law360 cites.

Law360 relates that the Deutsches started purchasing China Medical
shares in 2011, grew their stake in the company to nearly 12
million shares by mid-2012, and eventually became interested in
acquiring a controlling interest in China Medical to be able to
make a deal with a strategic buyer and save the company from
liquidation.  The Deutsches said Fidelity foiled this effort when
it stopped accepting China Medical stock purchase orders from them
in July in the belief that they were "effectuating a short squeeze
in the stock," Law360 points out.

The panel did not agree with awarding damages to the Deutsches for
Fidelity's alleged misconduct; howeve, it agreed with the
Deutsches that Fidelity had botched its responsibilities in that
the brokerage failed to communicate effectively with the Deutsches
before cutting off their stock purchases, Law360 relays.

                       About China Medical

China Medical Technologies Inc., a maker of diagnostic products,
filed a Chapter 15 bankruptcy petition in New York to locate money
fraudulently transferred by its principals.

The Debtor, which has been taken over by a trustee, is undergoing
corporate winding-up proceedings before the Grand Court of the
Cayman Islands.  Kenneth M. Krys, the joint official liquidator,
wants U.S. courts to recognize the Cayman proceeding as the
"foreign main proceeding".  The liquidator filed a Chapter 15
petition for China Medical (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 12-13736) on
Aug. 31, 2012.  Curtis C. Mechling, Esq., at Stroock & Stroock &
Lavan, LLP, in New York, serves as counsel.

China Medical listed as much as $500 million in assets and debt.

Cosimo Borrelli and Yuen Lai Yee (Liz) on Nov. 29, 2012, were
appointed as liquidators of China Medical Technologies Inc.

The liquidators may be reached at:

          Cosimo Borrelli
          Yuen Lai Yee (Liz)
          Level 17, Tower 1
          Admiralty Centre
          18 Harcourt Road
          Hong Kong



===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Gives Exporters a Tool for Regional Business
----------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that the Dominican Government, through the
National Competitiveness Council, provided exporters with a
catalog with key information on the main routes, ports, agents and
commercial operators between the Dominican Republic and the
Caribbean.

Competitiveness director Rafael Paz said the catalog "shows the
main trade routes between the Dominican Republic and the
Caribbean, according to Dominican Today.  The compendium covers
key information for all companies wishing to export to the
Caribbean and constitutes a first contribution of the plan for a
better use of the Caribbean market," the report relays.

The catalog includes information on the main routes, ports,
agents, logistics operators, contact numbers of maritime and air
service providers as well as routes frequency, the report notes.

The tool was developed as part of the Caribbean Export Promotion
Board coordinated by the Presidency's Administrative Ministry,
which includes the Export and Investment Center (CEI-RD); the
National Exports Bank (Bandex); the National Business Council
(Conep), the Industries Association (AIRD); the Dominican
Exporters Association (Adoexpo); the Dominican Agribusiness Board
(JAD), and the Dominican Port Authority (Apordom), the report
adds.

As reported in Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on July 24,
2017, Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the Dominican
Republic's long term issuer and debt ratings to Ba3 from B1 and
changed the outlook to stable from positive, based on the
following key drivers:

(1)  The Dominican Republic's continued robust growth outlook
     compared to rating peers, coupled with a reduction in
     external risks as current account deficits have declined and
     international reserves have increased.

(2)  The reduction in fiscal deficits over the last four years and
     Moody's expectation that fiscal deficits will remain shy of
     3% of GDP, supported by fiscal restraint and reduced
     transfers to the electricity sector.


=============
J A M A I C A
=============


JAMAICA: JCTU President Says Wage Negotiations Could be Lengthy
----------------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that President of the Jamaica Confederation of
Trade Unions (JCTU) Helene Davis Whyte said public sector workers
might have to wait until next year to get a new wage agreement.

According to the JCTU President, the wage negotiations could be
lengthy, the report notes.

"We have for the last several years been negotiating where we are
focusing on what is called interest based bargaining as our
approach where it's not just about putting figures on the table,
but really looking at the interest of each party and trying to
come to some understanding based on that.  This is one of the
reasons why we are saying that we will not arrive at an agreement
but we do know that the offers that we will get initially -- our
members will not be happy," the report quoted Ms. Whyte as saying.

She, however, said it is hoped that the negotiations will be
concluded as quickly as possible, according to RJR News.

"Hopefully we can conclude by the end of the year, but as things
look right now - that might not be possible," she added.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Feb. 9, 2017, Fitch Ratings affirmed Jamaica's Long-Term Foreign
and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'B' with a
Stable Outlook. The issue ratings on Jamaica's senior unsecured
Foreign and Local Currency bonds are also affirmed at 'B'. The
Outlooks on the Long-Term IDRs are Stable. The Country Ceiling is
affirmed at 'B' and the Short-Term Foreign Currency and Local
Currency IDRs at 'B'.


=======
P E R U
=======


INKIA ENERGY: Fitch Affirms BB Long-Term IDR; Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Inkia Energy Ltd.'s Long-Term Foreign
and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB'. The
rating action affects USD450 million of notes outstanding due
2021. The Rating Outlook is Stable.

Inkia's ratings are supported by its strong competitive position
in the Peruvian electricity generation sector, as well as its
broad geographic footprint throughout Latin America. Its Peruvian
operations are primarily captured under its subsidiary Cerro del
Aguila S.A. ('BBB-' / Stable Outlook), which consists of a 545MW
base-load hydroelectric plant, and two thermal generation plants
with aggregate installed capacity of 1,063MW. In addition, Inkia's
ownership of the Energuate-branded distribution companies
Distribuidora de Electricidad del Oriente S.A. (DEORSA) and
Distribuidora de Electricidad del Occidente S.A. (DEOCSA) provides
Inkia with a broader geographic and business risk profile. Inkia's
ratings are constrained by its intense and ongoing expansion
strategy, which carries concomitant execution risks, and a weaker
capital structure driven by capex. Moreover, its ratings consider
a history of aggressive dividend demands from Inkia's parent
company.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Credit Profile Linked to Peruvian Operations:
Inkia's ratings are supported by the solid credit profile of its
most important subsidiary, Cerro del Aguila S.A. (CdA). CdA's
assets consist of a 545MW base-load hydroelectric plant, and two
thermal generation plants with aggregate installed capacity of
1,063MW. Inkia has a 74.9% participation in CdA which is expected
to provide approximately half of Inkia's consolidated EBITDA as
key power purchase agreements (PPAs) are activated over the next
12 months.

CdA pursues a contractual strategy that minimizes exposure to the
spot market. Its hydroelectric plant has signed PPAs for 483 MW
out of an installed capacity of 545 MW. Of these contracts, 200 MW
are currently in effect, and, by the beginning of 2018, nearly 75%
of its firm capacity will be under active contracts with high
credit quality offtakers. As of 2016, approximately 96% of thermal
energy sales were contracted under U.S. dollar-denominated PPAs,
with an average life of 5.7 years. These PPAs support the
company's cash flow stability through USD-linked payments and
pass-through clauses related to potential increases in fuel costs
or other costs due to changes in the regulatory framework. The
combination of these distinct asset types will serve to offset
seasonal volatility in spot prices and increase contractual
flexibility, strengthening cashflow stability and improving CdA's
already-strong competitive position in Peru.

Leverage to Improve:
Inkia's stand-alone financial profile has historically been weak
for the rating category as the company adopted an aggressive
growth strategy. The company's consolidated leverage peaked at
8.5x in 2015 as a result of increasing debt to fund expansion
capex. Deleveraging in 2016 was slower than anticipated due to
attrition from Peru's regulated system by smaller industrial users
who instead negotiated bilateral PPAs directly with local
generators. The resulting EBITDA contraction at CdA's thermal
plant resulted contributed to Inkia's continued high leverage of
7.4x at YE16. Leverage is expected to decrease to around 5x in
2017 and around 4.5x in the medium term, as the staggered
activation of CdA's major contracts initially linked to the
completion of the hydroelectric plant will result in rapid EBTIDA
growth over the next 18 months. Additionally, in medium term,
Fitch expects CdA to see some benefit from increasing spot prices.

Positive Reversal in FCF Trend:
FCF has been negative in the last four years due to aggressive
capex. Total investments for Inkia's two largest power generation
projects in Peru accounted for USD1.3 billion. Cerro del Aguila's
(CdA) capex was USD959 million (62% debt funded) and USD380
million was invested in Samay I (80% debt funded). Although, the
Inkia has indicated its intention to increase investment in its
Guatemalan DisCos, and improve their technological and operational
efficiency, Fitch expects a material reduction in consolidated
capex for 2017, resulting in positive FCF. This should be further
supported by the full-year operations of CdA's hydroelectric plant
and Inkia's 632MW cold-reserve thermal plant, Samay I, which will
receive fixed capacity payments for 20 years. A moderate dividend
policy is expected in order to preserve positive FCF and allow for
leverage reduction.

Debt Structurally Subordinated:
Inkia's debt is structurally subordinated to debt at the operating
companies. Total debt at the subsidiary level amounted to
approximately USD2.1 billion, or 82.4% of total consolidated
adjusted debt as of December 2016. The bulk of this debt was
represented by bank debt to finance the company's projects and
acquisitions. Although, Inkia's HoldCo debt remains structurally
subordinated to OpCo debt, the refinancing of nearly USD1 billion
of project debt at the subsidiary level with international bonds
in 2017 has effectively eliminated onerous cash trapping
mechanisms that could negatively impact cash flow predictability
to the HoldCo. Inkia's cash flow depends on dividends received
from subsidiaries and associated companies, of which it received
USD147 million in YE2016.

Geographic and Business Diversification:
The company is focused on diversify its energy asset base in Latin
American markets where overall and per capita energy consumption
has a higher potential for growth compared to developed markets.
Inkia adopted an aggressive plant expansion strategy during the
last four years, while the Energuate acquisition provided further
geographic and business diversification in Guatemala and in the
electricity distribution sector. Energuate's EBITDA is expected to
be USD107 million in 2017. Operations in Peru (rated 'BBB+'
/Stable Outlook), which include CdA and Samay, should account for
57% of 2016 consolidated EBITDA, followed by Guatemala with 24%
('BB'). The remaining EBITDA (19%) should arise from assets
located mainly in Panama ('BBB' /Stable ), Bolivia ('BB-'/Stable
), Chile ('A' /Stable ), the Dominican Republic ('BB-' /Stable ),
El Salvador ('CCC') and Nicaragua ('B+' /Stable ).

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Locally, Inkia has limited peers, given its overall size and asset
diversification. In Peru, Fitch also rates Orazul Energy Egenor S.
en C. por A ('BB' / Stable). Orazul is expected to maintain gross
leverage of above 5.0x through the rating horizon. Although
lacking Inkia's geographical diversification, Orazul benefits from
asset mix locally similar to Inkia's subsidiary Cerro del Aguila
S.A. ('BBB-' /Stable), with both thermal and hydroelectric
generation, albeit on a smaller scale.

Inkia presents a generally weaker capital structure relative to
its large, multi-asset energy peers in the region. Its nearest
peer in this group is the Chilean generator, AES Gener ('BBB-'
/Negative Watch), which is also in the midst of a deleveraging
period. Prior to an announcement regarding delays and difficulties
surrounding the construction of AES Gener's Alto Maipo plant,
Fitch forecasts deleveraging from around 5x to below 4x over the
next 3 years. This puts the company at the upper limits of its
rating category. Following the announcement, Fitch placed AES
Gener on Negative Watch.

Colbun S.A. ('BBB' /Stable) and Engie Energia Chile S.A.
('BBB'/Stable) compare favorably to Inkia, with leverage
consistently at or below 3.0x, comfortably within the investment-
grade rating category.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within Fitch ratings case for the issuer
include:
- CdA (thermal): Southern Copper PPA fully recognized in 2018,
   GDP-linked demand growth;
- CdA (hydro): ~400MW of contracted capacity beginning in 2018;
   ~1,00 GWh of spot sales annually;
- Samay (cold-reserve): No Southern Gas Pipeline through rating
   horizon; load factor below 5%, fully passed through;
- Capacity payments annually adjusted by PPI;
- Peru: average energy spot price of $12/MWh until 2021;
- Energuate: demand growth generally in line with GDP forecast
   (~3.5%);
- ~USD460 million dividends over next 5 years;
- ~USD440 million in capex over next 5 years.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Positive Rating Action
- A positive rating action could be considered as a result of
   leverage reduction below 4x on a sustainable basis and/or
   consistently conservative cash flow management.

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Negative Rating Action
- A negative rating action could be triggered by a combination of
   the following: Consolidated gross leverage remains above 4.5x
   over the medium term following additional investment
   opportunities undertaken without an adequate amount of
   additional equity; reduction in cash flow generation due to
   adverse regulatory issues and deterioration of its contractual
   position; aggressive dividend policy; and/or Inkia's asset
   portfolio becomes more concentrated in countries with high
   political and economic risk.

LIQUIDITY

Inkia's liquidity primarily relies on cash on hand and readily
monetizable assets of USD173 million as of YE2016. The company has
historically benefitted from access to local capital markets to
finance investment projects at the subsidiary level. This year,
two of its subsidiaries have replaced nearly USD1 billion in
aggregate of syndicated loans with international bonds. In April,
Energuate Trust ('BB' / Stable ) issued USD330 million to replace
existing debt as well as a bridge loan of USD120 million used to
fund Inkia's 2016 acquisition of the Guatemalan DisCos. In early
August, CdA replaced the syndicated bank facility used during its
hydroelectric plant's construction phase with a USD650 million
international bond. Fitch estimates that over 90% of Inkia's
consolidate debt is scheduled to mature after 2020, including
Inkia's USD450 million bond.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

Inkia Energy Ltd
-- Long-term Foreign currency IDR at 'BB';
-- Long-Term Local Currency IDR at 'BB';
-- Senior unsecured notes at 'BB'.

The Rating Outlook is Stable.


================================
T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O
================================


TRINIDAD  & TOBAGO: Will Act on Eden Garden Deal
-------------------------------------------------
Trinidad Express reports that Trinidad and Tobago Government is
committed to following through on any reports of money laundering
that it receives as a result of the Eden Garden investigation and
litigation.

At a news conference on July 7, Minister in the Office of the
Attorney General, Stuart Young, said the Government had commenced
a civil suit against several former government officials over the
purchase of 50 acres of land at Eden Gardens for $175 million in
2012, according to Trinidad Express.

The land had been independently valued by property valuers Linden
Scott, who assessed the acreage at $52 million, the report notes.
However, a valuer attached to the Commissioner of Valuations
valued the 50-acre parcel at $180 million, the report relays.  The
land was then purchased by the Housing Development Corporation
(HDC) for $175 million, giving the impression of a $5 million
discount, the report notes.

At the news conference in July, Young said the Government's case
alleges that a $50,000 payment was made to an individual at the
Valuation Division of the Ministry of Finance, the report
discloses.  The payment is linked to a valuation that was
"substantially inflated," the report notes.

At last the post-Cabinet news conference, Young was asked if any
local commercial bank was in jeopardy as a result of the enquiries
into corruption involving the purchase of the large parcel of land
at Eden Gardens in Central Trinidad.

The report notes that Mr. Young said: "If in our continuing
investigations and developments we believe there has been any
breach of the law by any financial institution, we certainly will
bring it to the attention of the regulator," the report adds.


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

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delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
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856-381-8268.


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