TCRLA_Public/170825.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

               Friday, August 25, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 169



PROVINCE OF SALTA: S&P Affirms 'B' Foreign & Local Currency Rating


BANCO PINE: Fitch Lowers IDR to 'B+', Outlook Negative
CPFL ENERGIA: Moody's Puts 'Ba1' Global Scale Corp. Family Rating
CENTRAIS ELETRICAS: Investors Welcome Gov't Plans to Privatize
OMEGA ENERGIA: Moody's Rates BRL220MM Senior Sec. Debentures Ba2

C O S T A   R I C A

BANCO DAVIVIENDA: Fitch Affirms BB+ Long-Term IDR; Outlook Stable

D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REP: Firms Concerned w/ Competitiveness Agency's 'Bias'
GOLDQUEST: Despite Scolding, Upbeat on Permit for Western Mine


JAMAICA: BOJ Reports Ease in Credit Conditions


DEUTSCHE BANK: Moody's Keeps Ba1 Rating on Review for Downgrade
MEXICO: US's Threat to Pull Out of NAFTA a Negotiating Ploy
MEXICO: Inflation Reaches New High for the Year


NICARAGUA: Fitch Affirms B+ Long-term Foreign Currency IDR

P U E R T O    R I C O

RFI MANAGEMENT: May Use Cash Collateral Until Oct. 5

                            - - - - -


PROVINCE OF SALTA: S&P Affirms 'B' Foreign & Local Currency Rating
On Aug. 23, 2017, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B' foreign and
local currency ratings on the province of Salta. The outlook
remains stable. S&P also affirmed the 'B' issue-level ratings on
the province's rated secured and unsecured notes.


S&P said, "The stable outlook on Salta reflects our expectation of
a gradual improvement in its budgetary performance in the next 12-
18 months as the economy recovers. The outlook also reflects
Salta's debt to remain at a moderate level, while we still expect
structural limitations stemming from the limited budgetary
flexibility and low GDP per capita. It also reflects our view of
an increasing dialogue between the Argentine local and regional
governments (LRGs) and the federal government to address various
fiscal and economic challenges that are expected to remain in the
short to medium term."

Downside scenario

S&P saidm "We could downgrade Salta if Argentina's economic
performance deteriorates consistently over the next couple of
years, eroding the province's revenue base hurting Salta's
budgetary performance, and/or if Salta's financial management
weakens. Also, failure to refinance existing debt in foreign and
local currency as well as unwillingness to service debt
obligations could prompt us to lower ratings in the next 12-18
months. We could also lower our ratings on Salta if we were to
lower the sovereign local or foreign currency ratings."

Upside scenario

S&P said, "We could only raise our ratings on Salta if we were to
raise the local and foreign currency ratings on the sovereign.
Such an upgrade would have to be accompanied by continued
strengthening in Argentina's institutional framework for LRGs as
well as improvement in Salta's financial management and budgetary
performance beyond our current expectations, with average
operating surpluses above 5%, or surpluses after capex, and/or a
decrease in the debt burden to levels below 30% of operating
revenue or an improvement in our assessment of contingent
liabilities. However, under our base-case scenario, such a
scenario isn't likely in the next 12-18 months."


The 'B' ratings and 'b' stand-alone credit profile (SACP) reflect
the province's individual credit profile and the institutional
framework (SACP is a means of assessing the intrinsic
creditworthiness of Salta under the assumption that there's no
rating cap). Like all LRGs in Argentina, Salta operates under an
institutional framework, which has recently strengthened, but
remains very volatile and underfunded, in S&P's view. At the same
time, ratings on Salta are constrained by its low GDP per capita,
which results in a weak revenue base and high infrastructure needs
in the province. This, together with Salta's rigid expenditure
structure given that salaries and interest payment account for
around 65% of total expenses, highlights the government's
budgetary constraints. A stabilizing though still volatile economy
supports S&P's expectation for an improvement in the province's
budgetary performance; it expects operating deficit to decline to
3.9% in 2017 from 6.4% in 2016. Salta's financial management has
shown continuity but still lacks planning capacity. On the other
hand, the province's debt burden rose in 2016 with increased
access to funding, but remains at a moderate level. The latter and
low contingent liabilities support Salta's creditworthiness.

Financial management continuity, although still lacking planning
capacity, while low GDP per capita remains a key constraint

S&P said, "We still view the institutional framework for Argentine
LRGs as very volatile and underfunded. However, we believe that
there's a positive trend in the predictability of the outcome of
potential reforms and pace of implementation amid an increasing
dialogue between LRGs and the national government to address
various fiscal and economic challenges that are expected to remain
in the short to medium term.

Juan Manuel Urtubey is the governor of Salta until 2019. Since
President Mauricio Macri took office in December 2015, Mr. Urtubey
has supported several of the national government's measures and
has shown willingness to participate in a constructive political
opposition. We expect continuity in the province's policies given
Mr. Urtubey's re-election in 2015 and his administration's stable
relationship with the national government for the next three
years. Similar to other Argentine LRGs, macroeconomic volatility,
though diminishing, still limits the province's financial planning
capacity and quality of budgetary targets.

Salta's low per capita GDP is a key rating constraint. According
to our estimates, it was $4,245 in 2016, which is around only one-
third of the estimated national level for the same year ($12,523)
and is lower than those of national peers such as the provinces of
Cordoba ($8,220) and Neuquen ($16,665). Salta's economy represents
only about 1% of national GDP and is fairly diverse, although not
more so than those of other provinces. The main sectors of Salta's
economy are public services (including education, social and
health services), which make up 32%; agriculture (12.1%), commerce
(11.0%), and construction (10.0%).

Budgetary performance to improve as the economy recovers, with
debt remaining at a moderate level, although the liquidity
position to remain weak

S&P said, "Following the deterioration in budgetary performance in
2016, we expect Salta's fiscal accounts to begin improving in the
next couple of years as the economy recovers and LRGs in Argentina
continue to receive support from the national government in the
form of transfers and greater access to borrowings. We expect the
province to post a surplus of 5.6% of operating revenue by 2019,
compared with the 6.4% deficit in 2016. Therefore, we believe that
Salta's fiscal balances will gradually recover to historical
levels. A stressed economy, low investment, and high inflation in
recent years resulted in declining operating surpluses in 2014 and
2015 and an operating deficit in 2016. We believe that Salta will
largely finance the expected deficit after borrowings in 2017 with
funds from the 2016 debt issuance and potentially debt with
suppliers. Budgetary performance will still be subject to
volatility stemming from high inflation, which we believe will
continue to pressure Salta's fiscal balance in 2017-2019."

Salta receives most of its revenue from the national government,
which limits the province's budgetary flexibility. S&P said, "We
expect locally generated revenue to remain at around 24% of total
revenue in 2017-2019. Salta also has limited ability to cut its
expenditure. We expect capex to increase to 13.4% of total
spending in next three years from 9.4% in 2016, given the
increased access to funding, but still remaining at levels we
consider as moderate. In addition to its significant
infrastructure needs, due to high inflation in Argentina, the
province has to keep negotiating wage increases with the public-
sector unions; total provincial payroll and interest payment
spending represents around 65% of Salta's operating expenditure.

"We believe that the province's debt will remain at a moderate
level, averaging 39% of operating revenue in 2017-2019, and we
assume that Salta will obtain borrowings according to its needs in
the next two years. Salta's debt rose to ARP15.2 billion in June
2017, or to 39.3% of our estimated operating revenue for that
year, from 21% at the end of 2015. The increase mainly resulted
from additional borrowing, including the issuance of $350 million
in the international capital markets in 2016, ARP800 million from
a national Trust Fund and Fondo Fiduciario Federal de
Infraestructura Regional--both of which are for infrastructure
projects--as well as the ARP1.6 billion credit line from National
Social Security Agency fund (Fondo de Garant°a de
Sustentabilidad). In addition, the province recently recognized
that it owes around ARP2.7 billion in debt to the national
government, which stemmed from differences beginning in July 2001
in the 10.17% rate that the province contributed to the national
pension system, ANSES, and the 16% rate for public-sector
employees at the national level. The debt will be repaid with
funds from contributions and the province's contribution rate will
only begin converging to the national rate in 2026. As of June
2017, 57% of Salta's debt was denominated in dollars, highlighting
potential currency risk. Even though the percentage of Salta's
debt denominated in foreign currency is lower than that of
domestic peers such as the city of Buenos Aires, steeper-than-
expected depreciation in the currency could exacerbate this risk."

On March 16, 2012, Salta issued $185 million in the capital
markets for long-term infrastructure investments in the province
through the issuance of structured notes. S&P said, "We rate these
notes as any other direct, general, unconditional, and
unsubordinated obligations of the province, given that we believe
their creditworthiness is directly linked to that of the province.
The notes are secured by oil and royalties that the province
receives from various oil and gas producers ("the dedicated
concessionaires"). These royalties represent 12% of the oil and
gas production value at the wellhead of the dedicated

"In our view, Salta's liquidity position is weak, given that its
free cash and reserves are insufficient to cover the 2017
projected debt service, which is likely to reach ARP2.5 billion.
Access to funding for Argentine LRGs has increased following the
May 2016 curing of the sovereign default, and several subnational
governments have been able to issue debt in the international
market. However, we view overall access to external liquidity as
still uncertain given the country's weak banking system, which our
Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment (BICRA) scores at group
'9', and legal restrictions imposed by the national Fiscal
Responsibility Law (FRL) on the use of debt, which bans its use
for operating expenditures and requires the national government's
authorization for provinces to issue new debt. (Our BICRAs, which
evaluate and compare global banking systems, are grouped on a
scale from '1' to '10', ranging from what we view as the lowest-
risk banking systems [group '1'] to the highest-risk [group
'10']). As of June 2017, the province had ARP2.4 billion available
from the 2016 international bond issuance, Plan Bicentenario,
which the province has been investing in low-risk assets, and
which will ultimately be used for capital investments in
municipalities as well as for hospitals and roadworks in the
province, among other projects. Salta's debt service profile is
relatively smooth, so we don't expect much volatility in the ratio
in the next 12-36 months."

In terms of contingent liabilities, the government-related
entities' (GREs') debt, which Salta guarantees, is included in its
debt stock. S&P said, "Therefore, we incorporate it in our debt
burden assessment. We believe the province's overall exposure to
GREs is of modest size. The two main public companies in Salta are
SAETA, a transportation enterprise, and CoSAySA, a water and
sanitation company. The province provides support to both
companies in the form of subsidies to balance their accounts.
Therefore, we consider these two companies as non-self-supporting.
However, only CoSAySA holds long-term debt as of December 2015,
from a leasing contract for a very small amount. In addition, the
province has other 19 GREs, which include public hospitals, a
provincial university, regulatory agencies, and a health
institute. To our knowledge, none of these other GREs have debt.

"In accordance with our relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable (see 'Related Criteria And Research')." At
the onset of the committee, the chair confirmed that the
information provided to the Rating Committee by the primary
analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and was sufficient
for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot above.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook. The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating action
(see 'Related Criteria And Research').

  Ratings Affirmed

  Salta (Province of)
   Issuer Credit Rating                   B/Stable/--

   Senior Secured
    Global Scale                          B
    National Scale                        raA
   Senior Unsecured                       B


BANCO PINE: Fitch Lowers IDR to 'B+', Outlook Negative
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Banco Pine S.A.'s (Pine) Viability
Rating (VR) to 'b+' from 'bb-', which in turn drives a downgrade
of its Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings
(IDRs) to 'B+' from 'BB-', with a Negative Rating Outlook. At the
same time, the Long-Term and Short-Term National Ratings were
downgraded to 'BBB+(bra)'/'F2(bra)' from 'A(bra)'/'F1(bra)',
Outlook Negative.


Fitch's downgrade of Pine's Ratings reflects Fitch's assessment of
the bank's relatively weaker company profile, along with its
continued weak profitability and worsened asset quality, all
factors being still impacted by the still difficult operating
environment and the bank's concentrated credit portfolio.

This environment has further challenged the bank's aim to improve
its weak profitability. The downgrade reveals Pine's weaker
competitive position when compared to its local competitors, who
have been slightly more conservative in the management of their
credit portfolios, and partially more resilient to the tough
environment. In Fitch's view, these deteriorations contributed to
the lower VR, and in turn impacted also the IDRs and National
Ratings, the latter being an assessment of credit quality relative
only to local peers. The Negative Outlooks on both the IDR and
National ratings were maintained as it reflects Fitch's view that
Pine's key credit metrics still show downside risk under the
current operating environment.

Pine's VR and IDR also take into account the bank's relatively
good and stable capitalization, and improving liquidity and
funding profiles arising from the bank's recent lower growth
appetite. The bank maintains a comfortable Fitch Core Capital
ratio (FCC) of nearly 14% which although below remains in line
with some of its peers. However, the bank's aim to resume loan
growth highlights the need to materially improve internally
generated capital.

Pine's relatively large asset concentration - especially of
corporate names in the loan portfolio - resulted in asset-quality
pressure due mainly to the impact of the decelerating economy. The
bank's impaired loans (BACEN D-H)-to-total loans saw a material
deterioration during the past two years to 13.7% at the first half
of 2017 (1H17) having risen from only 5% at year-end (YE) 2014.
Other causes of the deterioration included loans to certain
borrowers named in the Lava Jato scandal, which also impacted some
of Pine's peers, and along with the effect on the ratio of the
significant decrease in credit exposure over the last two years.

The weak operating environment and certain non-performing credit
exposures contributed to the growth in the level of loan
impairments including a relevant increase during the second
quarter 2017 (2Q17) of the over 90 day non-performing loan ratio
to 3.7%. Despite this increase, which was mostly related to a
specific client, the level of the bank's impaired loans (D-H) was
relatively unchanged from the nearly 13.7% reported at Dec. 31,
2016. Charge-offs for the 1H17 were only 0.3%. Loan loss
provisions for this specific client enhanced the coverage of the
bank's total impaired loans to nearly 52% while the collateral
held by the bank related to that specific client is expected to
largely offset any potential credit loss. However, the specific
provisioning resulted in a BRL21 million net loss as of June 30,

Fitch notes that the repositioning of Pine's lending activities
towards lower-risk segments, the preference for shorter tenors and
smaller disbursements should result in lower credit costs in the
medium term. The bank has limited its sector exposures so that no
sector currently accounts for more than 12% of the expanded loan
portfolio. In addition, the average credit ticket amount has
reduced to BRL17.7 million at 2Q17 down from BRL25.9 million three
years earlier. With regard to new operations, 91% are currently
classified under Bacen Res. 2,682 between 'AA' - 'B' and 9% as
'C'. Should this trend continue the overall quality of the credit
portfolio could gradually improve and reduce the need for large
loan loss provisions. Despite the expected reduction of credit
provisions and other costs, profitability is expected to remain
weak in the medium term in view of management's continued low risk
appetite and continued lower demand from credit-worthy borrowers.

As in the past few years, Pine's management expects to continue
its focus on cost controls in order to increase efficiencies and
position the bank for renewed credit portfolio expansion during
the remainder of this year and in 2018 when the economy is
expected to improve. During the past 12 months the bank has been
focusing on lowering its funding costs in order to offset lower
margins earned from lower risk borrowers.

Pine has been successful in increasing and diversifying funding
from via time deposits from individuals which rose sharply from
BRL1.9 billion as of June 30 2016 to BRL3.9 billion as of June 30,
2017 (with 80% of the deposit amounts at or below BRL100,000.
Total funding rose by 10% from the end of 1Q17 to the end of 2Q17
and more funding diversification is expected to partially come
from its recently-launched digital investment funding platform
"Pine Online". Other main sources of funding come from
institutional time deposits, corporate (PJ) time deposits and
multilateral development agencies. In the recent past, the bank
used its excess liquidity to significantly reduce the level of its
higher cost funding. As of June 30, 2017, the bank continues to be
very liquid with nearly BRL1.4 billion in highly liquid assets

Pine's SR and SRF are based on Fitch's view that Pine is not
considered to be a domestically important financial institution
due to the size of its deposit and loan market share. As such, it
is unlikely to receive external support from the Brazilian


Pine's ratings could be downgraded in case of further
deterioration in its performance, such as a continued negative
operating profit, weak asset quality (non-performing loans over 90
days consistently remaining above 3%) and/or capitalization (FCC
falling below 13%). A revision in the Outlook to Stable is
contingent on significant improvements in operational
profitability and the impaired loan ratio, which largely depends
on a more stable operating environment.

Fitch has taken the following rating actions:

Banco Pine S.A.
-- Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs downgraded to 'B+'
    from 'BB-'; Outlook Negative;
-- Short-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs affirmed at 'B';
-- Viability Rating downgraded to 'b+' from 'bb-';
-- Support Rating affirmed at '5';
-- Support Rating Floor affirmed at 'NF';
-- Long-Term National rating downgraded to 'BBB+(bra)' from
    'A(bra)'; Outlook Negative;
-- Short-Term National rating downgraded to 'F2(bra)' from

CPFL ENERGIA: Moody's Puts 'Ba1' Global Scale Corp. Family Rating
Moody's America Latina has assigned 'Ba1' global scale and
'' national scale Corporate Family ratings to CPFL Energia
S.A. At the same time, Moody's assigned 'Ba1' global scale and
'' national scale ratings to Companhia Paulista de Forca e
Luz (CPFL Paulista)'s BRL700 million 8th issuance of debentures
and RGE Sul Distribuidora de Energia S.A. (RGE Sul)'s BRL300
million 5th issuance of debentures. The outlook on the ratings is
negative, reflective of the outlook on Brazil's sovereign bond
rating (Ba2 negative). CPFL Paulista and RGE Sul are 100%
operating subsidiaries of CPFL Energia, which guarantees the
proposed issuances. The debentures will each be issued in three
series, maturing in five, seven, and ten years, respectively.

Proceeds of the issuances will be used to support the capital
investments program aimed at expanding and improving the
distribution network of their respective concessions as filed with
the federal electricity regulator -- Agencia Nacional de Energia
Eletrica (Aneel). The investment plans are to be given priority
status by the Ministry of Energy and Mining (MME), allowing the
issuances to be classified as infrastructure debentures pursuant
to Law 12.431.

CPFL Energia S.A. is a non-operational holding company with
controlling and non-controlling interests in companies operating
in the distribution, generation, and transmission sectors in
Brazil. It is the country's largest private energy company,
serving 9.2 million distribution clients in 679 cities (2016)
through its nine distribution concessions in the states of Sao
Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul, and with more than 3.3 GW of pro-
forma generation installed capacity. In January 2017, State Grid
International Development Limited (SGID, A2 negative), through its
subsidiary State Grid Brazil Power Participacoes S.A., acquired
control of CPFL Energia through the acquisition of a 54.6% share.
The acquisition triggered the regulatory requirement to offer the
acquisition to minority shareholders, a process which is expected
to be completed by year-end and likely increasing its overall


The 'Ba1' global scale rating incorporates a one-notch uplift from
CPFL Energia's standalone credit profile, reflective of a moderate
likelihood of support from SGID as controlling shareholder. The
uplift reflects (i) the strategic importance of CPFL Energia to
SGID, given it represents 33% of its asset base; (ii) a financial
policy targeting minimal dividend payout aimed at supporting the
company's deleveraging; (iii) structural incentives to support the
company in case of financial distress given cross-default clauses
at SGID bond indentures related to bankruptcy of any subsidiary
where it holds +50% interest; and (v) SGID's track record of
providing support to other subsidiaries globally.

CPFL Energia's standalone consolidated credit profile reflects its
relatively diversified business portfolio, with large scale
operations in the distribution (9.2 million clients) and
generation segments (3.3 GW of installed capacity). It further
reflects the company's track record of obtaining adequate and
timely annual and periodic tariff adjustments within its
distribution business, which have recognized investments made, as
well as the volatility in non-manageable costs, such as changes in
regulatory charges and the cost of acquiring energy. Management
has also been successful in minimizing over-contraction of energy
acquisition by entering into regulated auctions for
surplus/deficit settlements.

Within its generation business, in addition to a relatively
diversified mix (hydro: 68%; wind: 21%), the company has been able
to minimize its exposure to low hydrology by securing insurance
products to 100% of its regulated power purchase agreement (PPA)
exposure. Considering the balance of unregulated PPAs, overall
exposure is limited to 12% of its assured energy. The project
pipeline under development is concentrated in wind (2.0 GW of new
installed capacity), with the mix is expected to further
diversify. Supporting the generation revenue profile is the
average contractual life of 12.5 years set at fixed prices
adjusted by inflation.

On a consolidated basis, 44% of Ebitda relates to the distribution
business and 50% to generation. When adjusted to incorporate CPFL
Energia's ownership share of each operating subsidiary, the
distribution segment represents a larger share of the business.

CPFL Energia has been able to record stable leverage metrics over
the past three years, despite maintaining consistent levels of
improving and maintenance capital investments, as well as
important acquisitions (RGE Sul: BRL1.7 billion, 2016). As of June
2017, the company held total consolidated debt of approximately
BRL23 billion, the equivalent of which BRL5.3 billion is
denominated in USD, although fully swapped to local currency and
linked the CDI rate. The company maintains a comfortable cash
position, equivalent to 1.10x short term debt obligations, and
approximately 1.0x annual Ebitda.

In terms of leverage, LTM June 2017 Net Debt / Ebitda sits at
3.3x, virtually the same as the past three years, which speaks to
a prudent financial policy and management quality throughout the
recessionary period of 2015-2016. Cash-flow based metrics have
begun to show some improvement in light of recent tariff reviews,
decrease in base interest rates, and volume growth (although only
slightly), with CFO pre W/C to debt reaching 17.1% in June 2017 in
contrast to the last three year average of 14.0%. This metric is
expected to further improve to above 20% as of 2019 largely based
on three factors: additional tariff reviews in 2018, mild growth
in distribution volumes, and the significant reduction in the
dividend payout ratio aligned to SGID's strategy to decrease
leverage given high costs of debt in contrast to their cost of

The alignment of CPFL Paulista's and RGE Sul's ratings to the
corporate family rating assigned to CPFL Energia is based on the
guarantee and cross default clauses embedded in the various debts
issued across the corporate family and the centralized cash
management structure utilized by the group. Over 97% of the debt
is held under the operating subsidiaries, with over 90% guaranteed
by the HoldCo. The debt structures do not include limitations on
dividend distributions, aside from acceleration covenants which
are based on CPFL Energia's pro-forma consolidated Net Debt /
Ebitda and Ebitda / Financial Result. These arguments justify the
assignment of senior unsecured ratings for the proposed debt
issuances at the same level as the Corporate Family rating.

CPFL Energia's standalone credit quality ultimately reflects the
operating environment in Brazil, the highly regulated nature of
the energy sector, and continuous necessity to access debt capital
markets for the refinancing needs of its short-tenored debt
profile (2.7 years), and as such is constrained by the sovereign
rating. The one-notch uplift, leading to a global scale rating
above that of the sovereign, reflects the likelihood of support
from a much stronger rated parent with a globally diversified


The rating could be upgraded should the perception of support from
SGID become more evident and/or formalized in debt guarantees.
Given the intrinsic linkages of CPFL's standalone credit quality
to that of the Brazilian sovereign, positive rating actions in the
sovereign rating can cause upward pressure to the global scale

On the other hand, the ratings could face downward pressure if the
stability and transparency of the regulatory regime for the
distribution and generation segments is weakened, ultimately
resulting in a perception of more volatility or decrease of the
cash flow base, causing sustainable declines in CFO pre WC to Debt
and/or Interest Coverage Ratio to levels below 12.0% and 2.0x,
respectively. The global scale ratings can also be downgraded upon
a similar rating action on the sovereign rating.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Regulated
Electric and Gas Utilities published in June 2017.

Moody's National Scale Credit Ratings (NSRs) are intended as
relative measures of creditworthiness among debt issues and
issuers within a country, enabling market participants to better
differentiate relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's global
scale credit ratings in that they are not globally comparable with
the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with NSRs
for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same country.
NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier signifying the
relevant country, as in ".za" for South Africa. For further
information on Moody's approach to national scale credit ratings,
please refer to Moody's Credit rating Methodology published in May
2016 entitled "Mapping National Scale Ratings from Global Scale
Ratings". While NSRs have no inherent absolute meaning in terms of
default risk or expected loss, a historical probability of default
consistent with a given NSR can be inferred from the GSR to which
it maps back at that particular point in time. For information on
the historical default rates associated with different global
scale rating categories over different investment horizons.

CENTRAIS ELETRICAS: Investors Welcome Gov't Plans to Privatize
EFE News reports that investors welcomed the government's proposal
to privatize Eletrobras, Brazil's largest energy company, in an
effort to reduce the budget deficit.

The Energy and Mines Ministry said it planned to sell the
government's controlling stake in Eletrobras, a move that could
pump some BRL20 billion (about $6.34 billion) into the Treasury
and help ease the strain on public finances, according to EFE

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter - Latin America on
June 2, 2017, Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook on
Centrais Eletricas Brasileiras SA-Eletrobras ratings to negative
from stable and affirmed the corporate family and senior unsecured
ratings at Ba3.  The action follows Moody's May 26, 2017 rating
action in which the outlook for Brazil's government bond rating
was revised to negative from stable.

OMEGA ENERGIA: Moody's Rates BRL220MM Senior Sec. Debentures Ba2
Moody's America Latina assigned a Ba2 global scale rating and a national scale rating to Omega Energia e Implantacao 2
S.A.'s BRL220 million senior secured 2nd issuance of debentures
due 2029, to be issued in the form of infrastructure debentures
pursuant to Law 12,431. The outlook is negative, reflective of the
outlook on Brazil's sovereign bond rating (Ba2 negative).

Proceeds of the issuance will be used to pay down the 1st issuance
of debentures issued in March 2017, of which the proceeds were
exclusively used to fund the project's construction. Additional
pari-passu debt includes long-term loans granted by Banco Nacional
de Desenvolvimento Economico e Social (BNDES, Ba2 / /
negative) in total amount of BRL953 million, with final maturity
in 2034.

The issuer is a non-operational subholding company owner of 8 SPVs
authorized by Aneel/Ministry of Energy and Mining to operate as
wind farm energy producers, forming the Delta 3 wind complex. The
project is located in the cities of Barreirinhas and Paulino
Neves, in the Northeastern State of Maranhao, and has total
installed capacity of 221 MW, composed of 96 wind turbine
generators (WTGs) supplied by GE Water and Process Technologies do
Brasil Ltda. (GE Brazil) of 2.3 MW (Model 2.3-116) each. The
project is currently undergoing the final stages of turbine
commissioning, with official commercial operations date for 100%
of the project expected by the end of August 2017. The project is
sponsored by the Omega Group, with operations in the hydro and
wind sectors in Brazil.

Moody's anticipates that the debentures will be issued by mid-
September. The assigned ratings are based on preliminary
documentation received by Moody's as of the rating assignment
date. Moody's does not expect changes to the documentation
reviewed over this period or changes in the main conditions that
the debentures will carry. Should issuance conditions and/or final
documentation deviate from drafts submitted and reviewed by the
rating agency, Moody's will assess the impact that these
differences may have on the ratings and act accordingly.


The Ba2 / rating assigned reflects the project's revenue
profile, composed of a combination of long-term New Energy Auction
PPAs (72%), Reserve Energy Auction PPAs (12%) and Free Market PPAs
(12%), which allow eventual surplus and/or deficits in generation
within a specific year to be compensated within a four-year period
prior to revenue deductions. It further considers the strong track
record and overall quality of GE as wind turbine supplier and the
fixed-priced full service O&M agreement signed with GE for a
period of 10-Years.

The debt structure is fully amortizing, and benefits from a
standard project finance security package, including a 6-month
DSRA and a 3-month O&M reserve, as well as unconditional and
irrevocable financial guarantees provided by Ba2-rated banks until
the project achieves LTM P90 generation and 1.30x DSCRs. Further
supporting the rating is a robust DSCR profile, with minimum and
average levels of 1.31x and 1.49x under base case (virtually 1-YR
P90 generation), further supported by a break-even generation
level equivalent to 85% of 1-YR P90 estimates under a stressed
spot price assumption of BRL300/MWh. The Ba2/ ratings are
tempered by the project's offtake base, which although
diversified, is composed of distribution companies and agents of
the federal energy regulator with strong linkages to the Brazilian
sovereign (Ba2, negative).

Rating Outlook

The negative outlook reflects the highly regulated nature of the
energy sector and the overall linkages in credit quality that the
vast majority of the offtakers possess in relation to the
sovereign. The negative outlook assigned to the project's ratings
reflect that of the outlook on the Brazilian sovereign.

What Could Change the Rating - Up /Down

In light of the negative outlook, Moody's does not expects upward
rating pressure in the short to medium term. The outlook could be
revised to stable upon a similar action to that of the sovereign.

The rating could be downgraded if, after achieving financial
completion/release of the bank guarantees, the project generates
energy levels which are below 1-YR P90 on a sustainable basis,
bringing DSCR metrics below 1.25x. Deterioration in Brazil's
sovereign credit quality could also trigger a rating action.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Power
Generation Projects published in May 2017.

Moody's National Scale Credit Ratings (NSRs) are intended as
relative measures of creditworthiness among debt issues and
issuers within a country, enabling market participants to better
differentiate relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's global
scale credit ratings in that they are not globally comparable with
the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with NSRs
for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same country.
NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier signifying the
relevant country, as in ".za" for South Africa. For further
information on Moody's approach to national scale credit ratings,
please refer to Moody's Credit rating Methodology published in May
2016 entitled "Mapping National Scale Ratings from Global Scale
Ratings". While NSRs have no inherent absolute meaning in terms of
default risk or expected loss, a historical probability of default
consistent with a given NSR can be inferred from the GSR to which
it maps back at that particular point in time. For information on
the historical default rates associated with different global
scale rating categories over different investment horizons.

C O S T A   R I C A

BANCO DAVIVIENDA: Fitch Affirms BB+ Long-Term IDR; Outlook Stable
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings for Banco Davivienda, S.A.
(Davivienda CR), including the Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB+' and Long-Term Local Currency IDR at


The bank's IDRs, National ratings and Senior Debt are driven by
the support it would receive from its parent, Banco Davivienda
('BBB/F3'/Outlook Stable), if needed. Fitch's opinion on the
support is based on the significant reputational risk that
Davivienda CR's default would pose to its parent as well as its
relevant role on its parent's regional strategy.

Fitch views Davivienda CR as a core subsidiary to its parent since
this entity accounts for roughly 8% of the parent's consolidated
assets. Davivienda continues to expand and diversify in Central
America and is implementing a well-balanced business plan that
would help it to consolidate its operations abroad. Fitch expects
the Central American subsidiaries to provide recurring revenues to
the consolidated entity over the medium term.

Davivienda CR's local senior debt rating is equivalent to the
bank's issuer national rating as the debt is senior unsecured.

The Stable Outlook reflects Fitch's view that the ratings will
remain unchanged in the foreseeable future.


The bank's VR mainly reflects its moderate franchise across the
Costa Rican banking system in respect to other national and
internationally rated peers. In addition, it considers the bank's
solid asset quality, good funding and liquidity, moderate
profitability, and moderate capital position.

Davivienda CR has a moderate franchise within the Costa Rican
banking system, being the sixth-largest bank in terms of assets.
Its market share has been increasing over the past few years at
6.1% of total assets as of March 2017. The bank has a well-
developed universal bank business model with the main credit
segments focused on commercial banking and is well-diversified in
terms of economic sector.

The bank exhibits solid asset quality, reflected in a low non-
preforming loans (NPL) ratio (+90 days overdue: 1.0%). In
addition, the bank's 20 largest borrowers represent a moderate
24.2% of the total loan portfolio, or 1.8x equity. Loan charge-
offs make up 1.0% and restructured loans 1.9% of total loans,
which is considered adequate for the portfolio's target segments.

The bank's funding base is fairly diversified, with most of its
financing stemming from client deposits (March 2017: 62.6% of
total funding). However, the bank's institutional funding
participation results in high loans to deposits ratio (124.3% as
of March 2017). The concentration of its 20 largest depositors is
moderate as it represents 28.3% of total deposits, which is
similar to of previous years. Fitch considers the entity's
liquidity position to be solid, with liquid assets comprising
29.5% of total assets and covering 52.8% of total deposits.

The bank's profitability is moderate and slightly below its peers
(Operating ROAA: 0.5%; system: 0.8%). Operating profits have been
decreasing since 2014, affected by narrowing Net Interest Margin
(NIM) due to lower loans interest rates and recently marked by a
steep build-up in loan loss provisions because of new regulatory
requirements. The bank's NIM is lower than the system's average,
due to its commercial focus and the high dollarization of its
corporate loans.

Davivienda CR has a moderate capital position, which has shown a
steady downward trend since 2013 because of its strong loan
portfolio expansion. The bank's Fitch Core Capital to Risk-
Weighted Assets (FCC/RWA) ratio was 10.1% as of March 2017
(December 2013: 14.8%). Balance sheet growth has exceeded the
bank's internal capital generation, and has led to a decline in
capitalization metrics over the past few years. However, the bank
is considering an additional contribution to 2017.


The bank's Support Rating of '3' reflects its parent's moderate
probability to provide support, if required. The change in these
banks' SRs is mostly driven by the lower country ceiling.


Davivienda CR's IDRs and SR could be downgraded if Costa Rica's
sovereign rating and country ceiling are downgraded, although this
is not Fitch's baseline scenario since the sovereign Rating
Outlook is currently Stable. Davivienda CR's IDRs and National
Ratings could change if Fitch's assessment of their parents'
ability or willingness to support its subsidiary changes. However,
further sovereign rating actions could also affect this bank's
IDRs, since they are already at the typical maximum uplift for
banks with external institutional support, two notches above the

Davivienda CR's senior unsecured debt would mirror any potential
downgrade on the bank's National Scale Ratings.]

Davivienda CR's VR could be downgraded in a scenario of
significant deterioration of the bank's profitability and asset
quality that erodes its capital and reserves cushion.
Alternatively, the VR could be upgraded following a sustained
increase in profitability metrics that strengthens the internal
capital generation and the bank's equity levels.


The SR is potentially sensitive to any change in assumptions
around the propensity or ability of Banco Davivienda to provide
timely support to the bank. In addition, any change in Fitch's
perception towards the strategic importance of this bank to its
parent may trigger a review of their Support Rating.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

Davivienda CR
-- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR at 'BB+'; Outlook Stable;
-- Short-Term Foreign Currency IDR 'B';
-- Long-Term Local Currency IDR 'BBB-'; Outlook Stable;
-- Short-Term Local Currency IDR 'F3';
-- Support rating '3';
-- Viability Rating at 'bb-';
-- National Long-Term Rating at 'AAA(cri)' Outlook Stable;;
-- National Short-Term Rating at 'F1+(cri)';
-- Senior Unsecured National Rating at 'AAA(cri)'.

D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REP: Firms Concerned w/ Competitiveness Agency's 'Bias'
Dominican Today reports that the Dominican Republic Industries
Association (AIRD) expressed its concern with the reports by the
Observatory of Conditions of Competition in Markets published by
the regulator Procompetencia, which in its view notes "a certain
bias in the monitoring of the market of goods of national
production, without taking into account the incidence of imports
of goods from other markets that benefit from equal or better
market conditions, which harms those locally manufactured goods."

In a missive sent to National Competition Defense Commission
president, Yolanda Martinez, the industrialists point out that
within the observatory "only the local manufacturing area is
sectorized and not the counterparts of imported products in the
commercial areas," according to Dominican Today.

According to the AIRD, "both the first and the second report are
concentrated in certain branches of the goods market, which would
be monitored quarterly," which the AIRD considers it a concern,
the report notes.

While the Observatory's overall objective is to monitor the
conditions of competition in the markets, "its results by the
methodology followed can generate a negative bias and undermine
the positioning and effort of the different sectors of the
national economy," the report relays.

In the missive sent to Procompetencia, AIRD vice president Circe
Almanzar explains that recurrent publications around certain
products can generate "negative connotations in the perception of
the market," the report discloses.

In response to the first report last February, the industrialists
had already sent a communication to Martinez, expressing similar
concerns, the report says.

However, despite the industrialists' concern, Procomptencia issued
a second report in terms similar to the first, the report adds.

As reported in Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on July 24,
2017, Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the Dominican
Republic's long term issuer and debt ratings to Ba3 from B1 and
changed the outlook to stable from positive, based on the
following key drivers:

(1)  The Dominican Republic's continued robust growth outlook
     compared to rating peers, coupled with a reduction in
     external risks as current account deficits have declined and
     international reserves have increased.

(2)  The reduction in fiscal deficits over the last four years and
     Moody's expectation that fiscal deficits will remain shy of
     3% of GDP, supported by fiscal restraint and reduced
     transfers to the electricity sector.

GOLDQUEST: Despite Scolding, Upbeat on Permit for Western Mine
Dominican Today reports that the miner GoldQuest said it's
confident that the Energy and Mines Ministry will issue the
extraction permit for the Romero mining project, in western San
Juan province.

The miner's upbeat stance comes just days after Energy and Mines
minister Antonio Isa Conde warned that he "won't be rushed" to
issue the extraction permit, according to Dominican Today.

Julio Espaillat, CEO of the Canadian company, said the project
won't affect the surface, the forests or surrounding areas, since
neither cyanide nor other contaminants will be used, and efficient
water recirculation and collected rainwater will be used in the
project instead, the report notes.

He said the water of the San Juan River won't be touched.

In a visit to El Nuevo Diario editor-in-chief, Persio Maldonado
and newsroom director Luis Brito, the executive said the company
is committed to implementing sustainable environmental practices,
the report relays.

He said GoldQuest, "will actively participate in the sustainable
economic development of the area," and reiterated its commitment
to the safety and health of employees and communities. "We will
operate transparently and hand-in-hand with the Central Government
and the local governments of the province," the report adds.


JAMAICA: BOJ Reports Ease in Credit Conditions
RJR News reports that a Bank of Jamaica's survey has indicated
that credit conditions in the financial system continued to ease
during the March 2017 quarter, relative to the previous three

This easing was partly driven by increased competition in the
banking sector emanating from the entry of JN in February,
according to RJR News.

According to the Central Bank's quarterly monetary policy report,
the increased competition had the effect of lowering the weighted
average lending rate to 14.98 percent from 16.21 percent in the
December 2016 quarter, the report notes.

Lenders also offered more competitive rates in an effort to
maintain and possibly increase market share, the report relays.

The Bank of Jamaica said without the impact of the new entrant,
the weighted average lending rate would be 16.1 percent as at
March 2017, the report notes.

Meanwhile, in addition to lower lending rates in the system, other
credit terms also improved as lenders tried to increase their
market share while maintaining the quality of their loan
portfolios in the more competitive market, the report says.

             Improvement in Other Credit Terms

Notwithstanding the overall improvement in credit conditions, the
moderation in credit terms relative to the December 2016 quarter
reflected the impact of weaker credit demand, particularly for
secured credit, the report relays.

However, this tepid demand for credit is expected to be short-
lived as March quarters are generally characterised by borrowers
exercising caution in undertaking additional credit as they await
the annual budget presentation, the report discloses.

The outlook for the June quarter is for continued easing in credit
conditions, albeit at a slower pace, relative to the January to
March period, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Feb. 9, 2017, Fitch Ratings affirmed Jamaica's Long-Term Foreign
and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'B' with a
Stable Outlook. The issue ratings on Jamaica's senior unsecured
Foreign and Local Currency bonds are also affirmed at 'B'. The
Outlooks on the Long-Term IDRs are Stable. The Country Ceiling is
affirmed at 'B' and the Short-Term Foreign Currency and Local
Currency IDRs at 'B'.


DEUTSCHE BANK: Moody's Keeps Ba1 Rating on Review for Downgrade
Moody's de Mexico said that the ratings of Deutsche Bank Mexico,
S.A. (Deutsche Bank Mexico) and of Deutsche Securities, S.A. de
C.V., Casa de Bolsa (Deutsche Securities Mexico, S.A. de C.V.)
remain under review for downgrade pending regulatory approval of
the sale of these entities to Mexico's Investa Bank, S.A.
(Investabank, unrated). The review was initiated on November 4,

The following ratings remain on review for downgrade:

Deutsche Bank Mexico, S.A.:

-- Baseline credit assessment of ba2

-- Adjusted baseline credit assessment of ba1

-- Long-term global local currency deposit rating of Ba1

-- Long-term global foreign currency deposit rating of Ba1

-- Long-term Mexican National Scale deposit rating of

-- Short-term Mexican National Scale deposit rating of MX-1

-- Long and short term Counterparty Risk Assessments of Baa3(cr)
    and Prime-3(cr)

Deutsche Securities, S.A. de C.V., Casa de Bolsa:

-- Long-term global local currency issuer rating of Ba1

-- Long-term Mexican National Scale issuer rating of

-- Short-term Mexican National Scale issuer rating of MX-1


The ratings of Deutsche Bank Mexico and Deutsche Securities Mexico
were placed under review following the signing of an agreement by
the companies' ultimate parent, Deutsche Bank AG (Deutsche AG,
baseline credit assessment of ba1), to sell these operations to
Investabank as part of a broader scaling back of its global
operations pursuant to its 2020 strategic plan.

Barring a significant deterioration in the entities' standalone
creditworthiness prior to the closing of the sale, the conclusion
of the reviews is dependent upon receipt of regulatory approval of
the deal. Once the transaction closes, Deutsche Bank Mexico and
Deutsche Securities Mexico will no longer benefit from support
from Deutsche AG. Despite the marginal business importance of the
Mexican bank to its parent, Moody's assesses a high likelihood of
parent support given their shared brand name, which results in one
notch of ratings uplift from Deutsche Bank Mexico's baseline
credit assessment. In turn, as a highly integrated and harmonized
entity, Deutsche Secutities' ratings are in line with those of
Deutsche Bank Mexico.

Until regulatory approval is received, the reviews for downgrade
will also consider the impact on the two entities'
creditworthiness of the progressive decrease in earnings
generation and business diversification that is already occurring
as the entities continue to wind down business that will not be
part of the sale, and their balance sheets continue to shrink
through the transaction's closing date. Moody's expects that at
the sale's closing, the business being acquired by Investabank
will largely consist of the trustee division of Deutsche Bank
Mexico. The companies have already begun to exit or transfer to
their parent certain operations that will not be sold to

As of June 2017, the bank's total assets had shrunk 71% vis-a-vis
December 2016 as the entity unwound its derivative positions.
While the bank posted a profit before taxes of about 0.8% of total
assets as of June 2017, it reported a net loss after taxes of 1%
of assets, or 2.2% of shareholders' equity, due to an increase in
effective taxes. Despite the sharp contraction of the balance
sheet and the reported net loss, however, the bank's ba2 baseline
credit assessment remains appropriate. As a result of the
deleveraging, the bank reported an adjusted tangible capital ratio
of above 100% as of June 2017. Currently, the bank's assets
largely consist of investments in securities and repurchase
agreements, while liabilities are mostly comprised of accounts

If the sale unexpectedly falls through, Moody's expects an orderly
wind down of the Mexican entities' remaining lines of business,
which are not currently under stress. Should their situation
suddenly deteriorate before the parent can finish winding them
down, however, Moody's expects that Deutsche Bank would provide
the necessary financial support to avoid a failure as the
reputational cost for Deutsche Bank's global business of allowing
these entities to fail would likely outweigh the costs of bailing
them out.


The ratings will likely be downgraded when the transaction reaches
financial close. They could be downgraded prior to financial close
if the companies' standalone credit profiles deteriorate
significantly as a result of preparations for their upcoming sale.
The ratings could be confirmed if the sale falls through and
Deutsche AG consequently retains ownership of the Mexican
subsidiaries until they are completely wound down, or until a sale
to another party is announced.

The long-term Mexican National Scale ratings of indicate
issuers or issues with above-average creditworthiness relative to
other domestic issuers. The short- term Mexican National Scale
ratings of issuers rated MX-1 indicate the strongest ability to
repay short-term senior unsecured debt obligations relative to
other domestic issuers.

The principal methodology used in rating Deutsche Bank Mexico,
S.A. was Banks published in January 2016. The principal
methodology used in rating Deutsche Securities, S.A. de C.V., Casa
de Bolsa was Securities Industry Market Makers published in
February 2017.

The period of time covered in the financial information used to
determine Deutsche Bank Mexico, S.A. and Deutsche Securities, S.A.
de C.V., Casa de Bolsa's rating is between 01/01/2012 and
30/06/2017 (source: Moody's, Deutsche Bank Mexico and Deutsche
Securities Mexico).

The sources and items of information used to determine the rating
include 2017 interim financial statements (source: Moody's,
Deutsche Bank Mexico and Deutsche Securities Mexico); year-end
2014, 2015 and 2016 audited financial statements (source: Moody's,
Deutsche Bank Mexico and Deutsche Securities Mexico).

Deutsche Bank Mexico is headquartered in Mexico City, Mexico. As
of June 2017 it had total assets of Mx$8.4 billion and total
shareholder's equity of Mx$3.8 billion.

Deutsche Securities Mexico is headquartered in Mexico City,
Mexico. As of June 2017 it had total assets of Mx$1.5 billion and
total shareholder's equity of Mx$1.5 billion.

Moody's National Scale Credit Ratings (NSRs) are intended as
relative measures of creditworthiness among debt issues and
issuers within a country, enabling market participants to better
differentiate relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's global
scale credit ratings in that they are not globally comparable with
the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with NSRs
for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same country.
NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier signifying the
relevant country, as in ".za" for South Africa. For further
information on Moody's approach to national scale credit ratings,
please refer to Moody's Credit rating Methodology published in May
2016 entitled "Mapping National Scale Ratings from Global Scale
Ratings". While NSRs have no inherent absolute meaning in terms of
default risk or expected loss, a historical probability of default
consistent with a given NSR can be inferred from the GSR to which
it maps back at that particular point in time. For information on
the historical default rates associated with different global
scale rating categories over different investment horizons.

MEXICO: US's Threat to Pull Out of NAFTA a Negotiating Ploy
EFE News reports that President Donald Trump's remarks indicating
he would likely withdraw the United States from the North American
Free Trade Agreement at some point are a mere negotiating ploy and
unsurprising, Mexico's foreign relations secretary said.

"We see very clearly that it's a negotiating ploy. He's a man
who's been negotiating with a very peculiar style his whole life,"
Luis Videgaray said in an interview with Radio Formula, according
to EFE News.

MEXICO: Inflation Reaches New High for the Year
Anthony Harrup at The Wall Street Journal reports that Mexican
consumer prices rose more than expected in the first half of
August, pushing the annual inflation rate to a new multiyear high,
the National Statistics Institute said.

The consumer-price index rose 0.31% in the first two weeks of the
month against expectations of a 0.21% increase, and the annual
rate was 6.59% compared with 6.44% at the end of July, according
to The Wall Street Journal.  Core CPI, which excludes energy and
fresh fruit and vegetables, rose 0.20% for an annual rate of 5.02%
versus 4.94% in July, the report notes.

Annual inflation this year has reached its highest level since
mid-2001, and is slightly above the 6.56% reached in mid-December
2008 at the height of the global financial crisis, the report
relays.  A jump in gasoline prices at the beginning of this year,
and the effect on some prices of the peso's depreciation since
late 2014, were the main causes of the increase, the report notes.

The Bank of Mexico earlier this month left its overnight interest
rate target at 7%, pausing after raising the rate at seven
consecutive meetings, the report discloses.  Although inflation is
expected to stay above 6% in coming months, the annual rate
appears to be reaching a peak, the bank said, the report says.

The central bank expects inflation to return to its 3% target at
the end of 2018, the report relays.

In the first half of August, a decline in the cost of tourism
packages and airfares after the high season was offset by higher
school fees as the fall term started at universities and high
schools. Gasoline and propane gas prices rose, while electricity
rates were lower, the report notes.

Volatile fresh fruit and vegetable prices rose 1.64% and were up
more than 27% from a year earlier, the report discloses.

Transportation and food are the main causes of the higher cost of
living, rising an annual 10.8% and 10.4%, respectively, from mid-
August 2016, the report relays.

Food items will take on greater weight in the consumer-price index
under an update that will be used starting in August of 2018, the
statistics institute said, the report notes.  The update, based on
more recent information on consumer spending habits, will raise
the importance of goods in the core index while reducing the
weight of services, the report discloses.  It will also include
greater geographical coverage, the report adds.


NICARAGUA: Fitch Affirms B+ Long-term Foreign Currency IDR
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Nicaragua's Long-term foreign currency
Issuer Default Ratings at 'B+' with a Stable Outlook.


Nicaragua's credit ratings reflect its macroeconomic stability,
economic performance and prudent public financial management
relative to the 'B' median. The ratings are constrained by the
sovereign's large external vulnerabilities and structural
weaknesses including low per capita income, shallow domestic
capital market, social and governance indicators.

Nicaragua's macroeconomic performance is robust with decreased
inflation. The economy has expanded at an average annual rate of
5.2% over the past five years, higher than the 'B' median of 3.5%.
External factors (U.S. export demand, low international oil
prices, foreign investment receipts and access to external
financing) remain broadly supportive for growth. Fitch expects
economic growth to moderate slightly toward its 4.5% potential
rate in 2017-2018, reflecting reduced investment and consumption
stimulus from Venezuela's PetroCaribe programme.

Consumer price inflation has converged with the 'B' median.
Inflation, which averaged 3.5% in 2016 and was 3.1% yoy in July,
has been subdued by low, stable fuel import prices in the context
of the predictable crawling peg currency regime.

Nicaragua's recent fiscal performance has supported its credit
profile relative to peers. The general government debt and
interest burdens are moderate at 41.9% of GDP in 2016 and 4% of
revenues in 2017, respectively, and below the 'B' median. The
central government has a track record of running the budget with a
zero primary balance.

However, Fitch expects larger general government deficits to
gradually increase the debt trajectory beginning in 2019,
reversing the previous trend of falling debt levels. Fitch also
expects the general government deficit to increase to 1.8% of GDP
in 2017, up from 1.6% of GDP in 2016, driven by a step-up in
infrastructure outlays and the social security institute (INSS)
operational deficit. The fund's operational deficit has increased
in recent years to 0.4% of GDP in 2016 and is currently financed
from the scheme's reserves (estimated by the IMF to be depleted in
2019), limiting immediate pressure on the debt trajectory. Fitch
expects that structural reforms will be required to balance the
INSS fund and that the earliest political window for passage of
reforms may not occur until 2018 (after the November 2017
municipal elections).

Fitch expects the government will continue to meet its financing
needs, USD356 million in 2017, with close to USD100 million
domestic issuance and multilateral credits. Fitch expects that the
financial and external risks from the U.S. congressional NICA Act
bill, if passed, would be muted by the limited size of the U.S.
voting shares in the affected multilateral lenders.

PetroCaribe risks to public and external finances appear
manageable. The Venezuelan PetroCaribe programme, which provided
FDI and external loans with concessional terms to the Nicaraguan
private sector, is winding down. Private external debt to
Venezuela totalled USD3.2 billion or 24.8% of GDP in 2016. At
current oil prices, Fitch expects a net outflow of funds in 2017
as private borrowers begin repaying close to USD200 million per
year during 2017-2019. The government has already absorbed into
the budget 0.4% of GDP in related social programmes. The balance-
of-payments risks are reduced by PetroCaribe's concessional debt
service terms, the central bank's external liquidity (USD2.6
billion net international reserves and a USD200 million contingent
line), and moderating import demand.

Nicaragua remains vulnerable to other shocks. More than 80% of
government debt is foreign-currency denominated and so is exposed
to exchange-rate risk. The government has less financing
flexibility relative to some 'B' and 'BB' rated peers, reflecting
the underdeveloped domestic capital market and a preference for
lower-interest official credits for its external financing needs.

Nicaragua has large external vulnerabilities. The current account
deficit, forecast at 8.4% of GDP in 2017, is large relative to the
'B' median of 5.5% of GDP and those of its Central American
neighbors, although FDI finances three-quarters. Its exports,
although diversifying, are comparatively intense in agricultural
commodities while fuel imports are substantial. The financial
system and financial contracts are highly dollarized, driven in
part by the stabilized currency arrangement. Net external debt,
91.5% of current external receipts (CXR) in 2016, surpasses the
'B' median of 68.2%.

The central bank maintains external liquidity and contingent
credit lines from multilateral banks to offset shocks. Net
international reserves cover 3.6 months of current external
payments and support Nicaragua's international liquidity ratio at
200% of current external debt service and short-term external
liabilities. Nicaragua's external debt service is low at 10.7% of
CXR in 2017.

The Ortega administration maintains a stable macroeconomic policy
environment supported by private-sector consultation on economic
policy. However, Nicaragua's governance indicators are in line
with the 'B' median. The 2016 national elections further
centralized political institutions as President Ortega of the FSLN
Party won his third consecutive term since 2006, the first lady
won the vice presidency, and the FSLN enlarged its legislative

Fitch's proprietary SRM assigns Nicaragua a score equivalent to a
rating of 'B' on the Long-term FC IDR scale.

Fitch's sovereign rating committee adjusted the output from the
SRM to arrive at the final LT FC IDR by applying its QO, relative
to rated peers, as follows:

-- Public finances: +1 notch, reflecting that Nicaragua has a
track record of prudent public financial management, which has
supported improving macro stability and domestic debt reduction.
External debt relief has also lowered general government debt.

Fitch's SRM is the agency's proprietary multiple regression rating
model that employs 18 variables based on three year centred
averages, including one year of forecasts, to produce a score
equivalent to a LT FC IDR. Fitch's QO is a forward-looking
qualitative framework designed to allow for adjustment to the SRM
output to assign the final rating, reflecting factors within Fitch
criterias that are not fully quantifiable and/or not fully
reflected in the SRM.

The Stable Outlook reflects Fitch's view that upside and downside
risks to the rating are broadly balanced. The main risk factors
that, individually or collectively, could trigger a rating action

-- Sustained economic growth that reduces Nicaragua's per-capita
    income gap relative to peers;
-- Reduction of external vulnerabilities;
-- Sustained improvement in structural weaknesses, including
    stronger governance and social indicators.

-- Weakening of the external balance sheet or external liquidity;
-- Deterioration of public finances and debt dynamics;
-- Emergence of increased macroeconomic imbalances or financial

-- Fitch assumes that Nicaragua's economy and balance of payments
    will continue to benefit from relatively low oil prices
    (USD52.5/bl in 2017, USD55.0/bl in 2018, and USD60.0/bl) and
    supportive U.S. economic growth rates (2.1% in 2017, 2.6% in
    2018, and 2.2% in 2019).

Fitch has affirmed Nicaragua's ratings as follows:

-- Long-term foreign-currency IDR at 'B+'; Outlook Stable;
-- Long-term local-currency IDR at 'B+'; Outlook Stable;
-- Short-term foreign-currency IDR at 'B';
-- Short-term local-currency IDR at 'B';
-- Country Ceiling at 'B+'.

P U E R T O    R I C O

RFI MANAGEMENT: May Use Cash Collateral Until Oct. 5
The Hon. Benjamin A. Kahn of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
Middle District of North Carolina has entered a third interim
consent order authorizing RFI Management, Inc., to use cash
collateral until Oct. 5, 2017.

A further hearing on the cash collateral use will be held at 11:00
a.m. on Oct. 5, 2017.

Swift Financial Corporation will have a continuing postpetition
lien and security interest in all property and categories of
property of the Debtor in which and of the same priority as it
held a similar, unavoidable security interest as of the Petition
Date, and the proceeds thereof, whether acquired prepetition or
postpetition, equivalent to a lien granted under Sections
364(c)(2) and (3) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, but only to the
extent of cash collateral used for purposes other than adequate
protection payments to Swift Capital.

Swift Financial contends that it is the owner of the Debtor's
future receivables.  It also contends that it has a security
interest in the Debtor's present and future accounts, receivables,
chattel paper, deposit accounts, personal property, assets and
fixtures, general intangibles, instruments, equipment and
inventory, which constitutes cash collateral.

The validity, enforceability, and perfection of the post-petition
liens on the post-petition collateral will not depend upon filing,
recordation, or any other act required under applicable state or
federal law, rule, or regulation.

The Debtor will not use cash collateral except to pay its
ordinary, necessary and reasonable post-petition operating expense
and administrative expenses necessary for the administration of
this estate, including the Debtor's reasonable attorneys' fees as
approved by the Court and quarterly fees.

The Debtor will maintain debtor-in-possession bank accounts into
which it will deposit all income.  The Debtor will open and
maintain a separate DIP Account for each project on which it is
serving as a subcontractor, and all income and expenses for that
project must be paid from the project's respective DIP Account.
Transfers may only be made between DIP Accounts if those transfers
are necessary to pay expenses set out in the budget or if they are
approved in writing by Swift Capital.

The Debtor may request in writing that Swift Capital approve an
amended budget should it become apparent that there are valid
expenses what were not foreseen at this time.  To the extent Swift
Capital declines any request by the Debtor to amend the budget,
the Debtor reserves the right to file an additional motion to use
cash collateral and seek an expedited hearing of it so long as all
creditors in this proceeding receive at least five business days

The Debtor will pay as adequate protection to Swift Capital the
sum of $6,800 to be paid on Aug. 17, 2017, and Sept. 17, 2017.

This court order will be effective nunc pro tunc from July 20,
2017, and will remain in full force and effect and the Debtor will
be authorized to use cash collateral until the earlier of (i)
entry of a court order modifying the terms of the use of cash
collateral or the adequate protection provided to Swift Capital;
(ii) entry of a court order terminating this Order for cause,
including but not limited to breach of its terms and conditions;
(iii) upon filing of a notice of default as provided in this court
order; or (iv) Oct. 5, 2017.

A copy of the Order is available at:

                      About RFI Management

RFI Management, Inc., works as a subcontractor installing flooring
products and wall materials, principally in hotel properties
across the United States and in Puerto Rico.

RFI Management filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition (Bankr.
M.D.N.C. Case No. 17-80247) on March 29, 2017.  Edward Rosa,
President, signed the petition.  At the time of filing, the Debtor
estimated assets and liabilities between $100,000 and $500,000.

James C. White, Esq. and Michelle M. Walker, Esq., at Parry
Tyndall White, serve as counsel to the Debtor.  Padgett Business
Services of NC is the Debtor's accountant.

No official committee of unsecured creditors has been appointed in
the Chapter 11 case.


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
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