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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

           Monday, October 16, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 205


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

ARGENTINA: Consumer Prices Rise by Higher-Than-Expected 1.9%


B R A Z I L

AZUL SA: Moody's Assigns First-Time Ba3 Corporate Family Rating
AZUL SA: S&P Assigns 'B+' Global Scale Corporate Rating
BANCO ABC: S&P Affirms BB/B Global Scale Rating, Outlook Neg.
CCB BRASIL: Moody's Puts Ba1 Issuer Rating on Review for Downgrade
CHINA CONSTRUCTION: Moody's Reviews for Downgrade Ba1 Rating

CONCESSIONARIA AUTO: Moody's Cuts CFR to B2; Outlook Remains Neg.
INVESTIMENTOS E PARTICIPACOES: Moody's Affirms B2 CFR
MARFRIG GLOBAL: Fitch Affirms BB- Long-Term IDR; Outlook Stable
ROTA DAS BANDEIRAS: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Corporate Family Rating
VERT COMPANHIA: Moody's Assigns Ba1 Rating to Agri Certificates


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

METAL 2017-1: Fitch to Assign 'Bsf' Rating on Series C-2 Notes
SIGNUM VERDE 2006-02: Fitch Ups Rating on CLP5.3BB Notes from BB+


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Red Tape Erodes Investor Confidence
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: 45% of Crops Lost to Pests, Blights


P E R U

UNIVERSIDAD DE SAN MARTIN: Moody's Rates $120MM Sr. Sec. Notes Ba2


P U E R T O   R I C O

PUERTO RICO: Moody's Cuts Bond Rating to Ca After Hurricane Maria


V E N E Z U E L A

VENEZUELA: Former AG Presenting Corruption Evidence to U.S.


X X X X X X X X X

LATAM: World Bank Says Region on Course for Modest Growth
* BOND PRICING: For the Week From Oct. 9 to Oct. 13, 2017


                            - - - - -


=================
A R G E N T I N A
=================


ARGENTINA: Consumer Prices Rise by Higher-Than-Expected 1.9%
------------------------------------------------------------
Taos Turner at The Wall Street Journal reports that consumer
prices in Argentina rose at a faster-than-expected pace in
September, renewing pressure on its central bank to crimp
inflation.

Prices jumped 1.9% from August, well above the 1.4% rate forecast
by economists, according to The Wall Street Journal.

The inflation rate, reported by the statistics agency, underscores
how hard it has been for President Mauricio Macri to fix a host of
economic problems inherited from his predecessor, Cristina
Kirchner, the report notes.

"You can't do everything at once," said Gabriel Caamano, an
economist at Consultora Ledesma, a research firm, noting the other
economic indicators are improving, the report relays.  "The
problem is that core inflation is not falling," he added.

Core inflation, which measures the price of goods and services
unaffected by seasonal factors or government regulations, rose
1.6% in September, the report notes.  That's up from 1.4% the
previous month, the report says.

The central bank had set an inflation target of 17% for 2017 but
prices are already up 17.6% this year, the report notes.
September's data makes it likely that annual inflation will likely
total closer to 22% or 23% this year, Mr. Camaano said, the report
relays.

Economists surveyed by the central bank expect consumer prices to
rise 15.8% in 2018 and 11% the following year, the report notes.

One reason Argentina is having such a tough time taming inflation
is that Mr. Macri is raising utility rates, which the Kirchner
administration kept artificially low for years, the report relays.
Capping those prices cost the government billions of dollars
annually, creating a fiscal deficit that Mr. Macri is trying to
reduce, the report discloses.

"We expect inflation to moderate slightly in coming months, but
are of the view that monetary policy needs to remain tight in
order to protect the integrity of the 2018 target," Goldman Sachs
economist Alberto Ramos said in a report, the WSJ notes.

Almost all other key indicators, including economic growth,
industrial production, poverty and employment, have been improving
in recent months, the report relays.  Pollsters say voters are
beginning to feel the benefits of Mr. Macri's economic policies
and that this could favor his candidates in a midterm election
later this month, the report adds.

                         *     *    *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
May 10, 2017, Fitch Ratings affirmed Argentina's Long-Term Foreign
and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'B' with a
Stable Outlook. The issue ratings on Argentina's senior unsecured
Foreign and Local Currency bonds are also affirmed at 'B'. The
Country Ceiling is affirmed at 'B' and the Short-Term Foreign and
Local Currency IDRs at 'B'.

On Jan. 30, 2017, the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America
reported that Moody's Investors Service has assigned a B3 rating
to the Government of Argentina's US$3.25 billion bond due 2022 and
the US$3.75 billion bond due 2027. The outlook on the Government
of Argentina's rating is stable.

As previously reported by the TCR-LA, Argentina defaulted on some
of its debt late July 30, 2014, after expiration of a 30-day grace
period on a US$539 million interest payment.  Earlier that day,
talks with a court-appointed mediator ended without resolving a
standoff between the country and a group of hedge funds seeking
full payment on bonds that the country had defaulted on in 2001.
A U.S. judge had ruled that the interest payment couldn't be made
unless the hedge funds led by Elliott Management Corp., got the
US$1.5 billion they claimed. The country hasn't been able to
access international credit markets since its US$95 billion
default 13 years ago.

On March 30, 2016, after more than 12 hours of debate in the
Senate, Argentina's Congress passed a bill that will allow the
government to repay holders of debt that the South American
country defaulted on in 2001, including a group of litigating
hedge funds that won judgments in a New York court. The bill
passed by a vote of 54-16.


===========
B R A Z I L
===========


AZUL SA: Moody's Assigns First-Time Ba3 Corporate Family Rating
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a first-time Ba3 corporate
family rating ("CFR") to Azul S.A. ("Azul"). At the same time,
Moody's assigned a B1 rating to its proposed up to USD500 million
senior unsecured notes to be issued by Azul Investments LLP and
guaranteed by Azul and Azul Linhas Aereas Brasileiras S.A.
Proceeds will be used for liability management and for other
general corporate purposes. The rating outlook is stable.

The rating of the proposed notes assumes that the final
transaction documents will not be materially different from draft
legal documentation reviewed by Moody's to date and assume that
these agreements are legally valid, binding and enforceable.

Ratings assigned:

Issuer: Azul S.A.

- Corporate Family Rating: Ba3

Issuer: Azul Investments LLP

- USD500 million senior unsecured notes due 2024: B1

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Azul S.A.

- Outlook: Stable

RATINGS RATIONALE

Azul's Ba3 corporate family rating reflects the company's unique
business position in Brazil as the only carrier in 73% of its
routes, resulting in lower competition and strong pricing power.
Azul's young modern fleet, higher margins and less volatile
results than its peers in the Brazilian airline market are
additional credit positives. The rating also takes into
consideration the company's superior network connectivity and
strategic partnerships with global players serving a client base
proximally 65% concentrated into corporate customers. As well, the
rating reflects the company's improving capital structure after
its IPO, conservative financial policies and adequate liquidity.
The rating also incorporates the benefits from its experienced
management team that responded quickly to the slowdown in the
Brazilian economy, and the ownership of its TudoAzul loyalty
program that contributes with a stable source of cash and could be
used as an alternative source of liquidity if needed.

On the other hand, the Ba3 rating is constrained by the company's
exposure to the BRL and fuel price volatility. Accordingly, 57% of
operating expenses and 80% of its total adjusted debt are
denominated in foreign currencies while fuel accounts for almost
30% of operating costs. The ratings also incorporate Azul's low
geographic diversity, with most of revenues generated in Brazil. A
slower than expected recovery or reversal in the Brazilian
economic activity are threats to the company's growth plans that
includes a substantial increase in its larger capacity A320 neo
fleet.

The B1 rating assigned for the unsecured notes stand one notch
lower than Azul's Ba3 corporate family rating (CFR) in order to
reflect the effective subordination of those unsecured creditors
to the company's other existing secured debt. Azul's consolidated
debt pro-forma for the proposed bond issuance will be mainly
composed of finance leases collateralized by aircraft,
representing about 50% of its total debt and the other 50% will be
comprised by the proposed unsecured bonds and other unsecured
debt. As such, the proposed unsecured notes will rank below all
the company's existing and future secured claims.

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that the company
will continue to increase its operating margins, expand internal
cash flow generation and reduce leverage going forward. The stable
outlook also assumes that the management will continue to timely
implement its refinancing strategy according to its demonstrated
conservative profile towards liquidity.

Positive pressure on Azul's rating could arise if the company is
able to show a track record of strong operating performance, lower
leverage and robust liquidity while executing its growth plan and
expand its fleet into larger aircraft. Quantitatively translated
into reducing leverage to below 3.0 times (4.3 times in the LTM
ended June 2017) total adjusted debt-to-EBITDA, increase interest
coverage to at least 5.0 times (Funds from Operations + Interest)
to Interest (2.0 times in the LTM ended June 2017) along with
maintaining a strong liquidity profile, as illustrated by a cash-
to-revenue higher than 20% (20.6% in the end of June 2017) for a
sustained period of time.

The rating could be downgraded if the company's liquidity is
strained due to a prolonged market downturn or continued revenue
frustration, which combined with its aircraft acquisition program
would lead to weaker free cash flow generation. Downward pressure
on the rating could occur if Azul's adjusted EBIT margins
deteriorates to below 10.0% (17.3% in the LTM ended June 2017) or
if its adjusted leverage remains above 5.0 times (4.3 times in the
LTM ended June 2017) for a sustained period of time.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Passenger Airlines published in May 2012.

Headquartered in Barueri near the city of Sao Paulo, Azul is a
Brazilian airline founded by David Neeleman in 2008. The company
is the largest airline in Brazil by number of cities and
departures serving 102 destinations with a fleet of 123 aircraft
and 739 daily flights. Azul is the third largest airline is Brazil
in terms of RPKs. The company also flies to select international
destinations, including Fort Lauderdale, Orlando, and Lisbon. Azul
is the wholly owner of loyalty program TudoAzul, a strategic
revenue generating asset, which had approximately 7.0 million
members as of December 31, 2016. In the LTM ended June 2017, Azul
generated BRL7.2 billion (USD2.2 billion) in net revenues and
carried almost 22 million passengers.


AZUL SA: S&P Assigns 'B+' Global Scale Corporate Rating
-------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings has assigned its 'B+' global scale and 'brA-'
Brazilian national scale corporate ratings to Azul S.A. The
outlook on the ratings is stable.

S&P said, "At the same time, we have assigned a 'B+' issue-level
rating to Azul's proposed senior unsecured notes due 2024. The
rating on the notes is the same as the corporate credit rating. We
also assigned the recovery rating of '4' to the notes, with an
average recovery expectation of 30%-50% (45%; rounded).

"The ratings on Azul reflect its market position as the third-
largest airline in Brazil, but with leading position in key routes
it operates. The company's fleet strategy is in line with its
focus on more regional destinations, allowing greater network
capillarity, while also cushioning Azul from competitors that
operate only larger aircraft. We expect that competitive advantage
to support Azul's above-average margins. Also, the company's fleet
expansion strategy will bolster cash generation. Azul has also
recently completed a R$2 billion IPO, out of which about R$1.3
billion is available to the company, and part of which we expect
Azul to use to repay more its expensive debt, fund capital
expenditures (capex) needs, and maintain improved liquidity
levels. Therefore, we expect Azul to quickly improve its financial
metrics in 2017 and 2018 as the company increases the number of
A320NEOs in its fleet and operates larger aircraft in some key
routes, capturing the benefits of a lower cost per seat and an
increased number of passengers."


BANCO ABC: S&P Affirms BB/B Global Scale Rating, Outlook Neg.
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB/B' global scale and 'brAA-
/brA-1+' national scale ratings on Banco ABC Brasil S.A. (ABC
Brasil). The outlook is negative.

The ratings on ABC Brasil reflect its 'bb' stand-alone credit
profile (SACP), which is based on its concentrated business lines
and small market-share, yet stable operating revenues. S&P said,
"We also incorporate on our analysis its forecasted risk-adjusted
capital [RAC] ratio of about 7.0% for the next two years,
alongside sound asset quality and conservative risk management.
Finally, we believe the bank still has a less diversified funding
base than the industry average and adequate liquidity.
Furthermore, we continue to view ABC Brasil as a strategically
important subsidiary for Arab Banking Corp B.S.C. (ABC). As of
June 2017, ABC Brasil represented around 50% of the group's
operating revenues, 28% of assets, and 59% of its profit before
tax. Although ABC Brasil is not one of the group's core
businesses, the Brazilian subsidiary is a profitable and
independent investment and we do not believe ABC is likely to sell
it."

The negative outlook for the next 12 months on Banco ABC Brasil
S.A. reflects that on Brazil. S&P rarely rates banks above the
sovereign ratings because it believes lenders' creditworthiness
couldn't withstand a sovereign default.


CCB BRASIL: Moody's Puts Ba1 Issuer Rating on Review for Downgrade
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina Ltda. (MAL) placed on review for downgrade
CCB Brasil Arrendamento Mercantil S.A.'s (CCB Brazil Leasing)
long-term global local-currency issuer rating of Ba1 and the long-
term Brazilian national scale issuer rating of Aaa.br. The Outlook
is changed to Rating Under Review From Negative.

The following ratings assigned to CCB Brasil Arrendamento
Mercantil S.A. were placed on review for downgrade:

Long-term global local-currency issuer rating of Ba1

Long-term Brazilian national scale issuer rating of Aaa.br

RATINGS RATIONALE

The review for downgrade of CCB Brazil Leasing's rating follows
the review for downgrade of its parent bank's ratings, China
Construction Bank (Brasil) S.A. (CCB Brazil), which in turn, is a
consequence of CCB Brazil's prolonged delay in publishing audited
financials for the six months ending June 2017, the resulting
opacity about CCB Brazil's recent financial performance, and
current capital position and credit risk. CCB Brazil Leasing's
ratings are aligned with those of its parent because the entity
has no staff of its own and its operations are entirely reliant on
CCB Brazil.

According to Central Bank regulations, CCB Brazil was required to
publish its financials no later than August 31, 2017. Following
three consecutive years of net losses, CCB Brazil's financial
statements showed a tier 1 capital ratio of just 5.17% in December
2016 - below the regulatory minimum of 6% - despite a capital
injection of BRL760 million that CCB Brazil received from its
parent in April 2016.

At the same time, Moody's preferred measure of capitalization,
tangible common equity, was negative because in addition to the
recurring net losses, CCB Brazil has substantial deferred tax
assets, a significant portion of which Moody's deducts from
capital because of their limited loss absorption capacity.

During the review period, Moody's will assess the bank's ability
to originate recurring revenues sufficient to ensure the
sustainability of its capital without the need of further capital
injections, as well as any impacts to the bank's funding that
result from the extended delay in the publication of its
financials.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING -- DOWN/UP

The review could result in a downgrade if Moody's determines that
CCB Brazil is likely to continue to have difficulty maintaining
the minimum capital levels required by authorities, which would
also have negative implications to CCB Brazil Leasing's ratings.
Specifically, an increase in CCB Brazil's problem loans and/or
continued net losses would maintain negative pressure on capital
and could lead to a downgrade.

While upward pressures on CCB Brazil Leasing's ratings is
unlikely, the ratings could be confirmed at current levels if CCB
Brazil's adjusted capital ratio stabilizes and if its revenue
generation strengthens in the current year.

METHODOLOGY USED

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in January 2016.

Moody's National Scale Credit Ratings (NSRs) are intended as
relative measures of creditworthiness among debt issues and
issuers within a country, enabling market participants to better
differentiate relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's global
scale credit ratings in that they are not globally comparable with
the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with NSRs
for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same country.
NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier signifying the
relevant country, as in ".za" for South Africa. For further
information on Moody's approach to national scale credit ratings,
please refer to Moody's Credit rating Methodology published in May
2016 entitled "Mapping National Scale Ratings from Global Scale
Ratings". While NSRs have no inherent absolute meaning in terms of
default risk or expected loss, a historical probability of default
consistent with a given NSR can be inferred from the GSR to which
it maps back at that particular point in time. For information on
the historical default rates associated with different global
scale rating categories over different investment horizons.


CHINA CONSTRUCTION: Moody's Reviews for Downgrade Ba1 Rating
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed on review for downgrade China
Construction Bank (Brasil) S.A.'s (CCB Brazil) long-term global
local and foreign-currency deposit ratings of Ba1 and Ba3 and
Brazilian national scale deposit ratings of Aaa.br and BR-1, long-
and short-term respectively. Moody's also placed on review for
downgrade CCB Brazil's senior unsecured MTN program rating of
(P)Ba1 and subordinated debt rating of Ba2. The baseline credit
assessment (BCA) of b2 and adjusted BCA of ba1, as well as the
counterparty risk assessment (CRA) of Baa3(cr) and Prime-3(cr),
long- and short-term respectively, were also placed on review. The
bank's other ratings were not affected by this action. The Outlook
is changed to Rating Under Review from Negative(m).

At the same time, Moody's also placed on review for downgrade the
long-term foreign-currency senior unsecured debt and MTN program
ratings of Ba1 and (P)Ba1 respectively, and CRAs of Baa3(cr) and
Prime-3(cr), long- and short-term respectively, assigned to China
Construction Bank (Brasil) S.A., Cayman. The Outlook is changed to
Rating Under Review from Negative.

The following ratings and assessments assigned to China
Construction Bank (Brasil) S.A. were placed on review for
downgrade:

Long-term global local-currency deposit rating of Ba1

Long-term global foreign-currency deposit rating of Ba3

Long-term senior unsecured MTN program rating of (P)Ba1

Long-term subordinate debt rating of Ba2

Long-term Brazilian national scale deposit rating of Aaa.br

Short-term Brazilian national scale deposit rating of BR-1

Baseline credit assessment of b2

Adjusted baseline credit assessment of ba1

Long-term counterparty risk assessment of Baa3(cr)

Short-term counterparty risk assessment of Prime-3(cr)

The following ratings assigned to China Construction Bank (Brasil)
S.A. were not affected:

Short-term global local-currency deposit rating of Not Prime

Short-term global foreign-currency deposit rating of Not Prime

The following ratings and assessments assigned to China
Construction Bank (Brasil) S.A., Cayman were placed on review for
downgrade:

Long-term senior unsecured debt rating of Ba1

Long-term senior unsecured MTN program rating of (P)Ba1

Long-term counterparty risk assessment of Baa3(cr)

Short-term counterparty risk assessment of Prime-3(cr)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's decision to place CCB Brazil's ratings under review for
downgrade is a consequence of the bank's prolonged delay in
publishing audited financials for the six months ending June 2017,
and resulting opacity about the bank's recent financial
performance, and current capital position and credit risk.
According to Central Bank regulations, the bank was required to
publish its financials no later than August 31, 2017. Following
three consecutive years of net losses, CCB Brazil's financial
statements showed a tier 1 capital ratio of just 5.17% in December
2016 - below the regulatory minimum of 6% - despite a capital
injection of BRL760 million that the bank received from its parent
in April 2016.

At the same time, Moody's preferred measure of capitalization,
tangible common equity, was negative because in addition to the
recurring net losses, the bank has substantial deferred tax
assets, a significant portion of which Moody's deducts from
capital because of their limited loss absorption capacity.

During the review period, Moody's will assess the bank's ability
to originate recurring revenues sufficient to ensure the
sustainability of its capital without the need of further capital
injections, as well as any impacts to the bank's funding that
result from the extended delay in the publication of its
financials.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING -- DOWN/UP

The review could result in a downgrade if Moody's determines that
the bank is likely to continue to have difficulty maintaining the
minimum capital levels required by authorities. Specifically, an
increase in problem loans and/or continued net losses would
maintain negative pressure on capital and could lead to a
downgrade.

While upward pressures on CCB Brazil's ratings is unlikely, the
ratings could be confirmed at current levels if the bank's
adjusted capital ratio stabilizes and if revenue generation
strengthens in the current year.

METHODOLOGY USED

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in September 2017.

China Construction Bank (Brasil) S.A. is headquartered in Sao
Paulo, Brazil, with assets of BRL21.8 billion and shareholders'
equity of BRL1.36 billion as of December 31, 2016.


CONCESSIONARIA AUTO: Moody's Cuts CFR to B2; Outlook Remains Neg.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina Ltda. has downgraded Concessionaria Auto
Raposo Tavares S.A. (CART) corporate family ratings to B2 from B1
on the global scale and to Ba2.br from Baa3.br on the Brazilian
national scale. At the same time, Moody's downgraded to B2/Ba2.br
from B1/Baa3.br the ratings assigned to CART's BRL750 million
senior secured debentures due in 2024. The outlook for all the
ratings remains negative. Moody's will withdraw the ratings of
CART on the next business day.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade reflects CART's deteriorated credit quality
resulting from weaker than anticipated tolled traffic performance
through June 30 2017, due to the country's economic contraction
and increased competition from alternative routes in its the
service area. The still large capital investment program for road
improvements and expansion through December 2018 and the limited
financial flexibility provided by the terms of the existing
project finance structure, also weights on the downgrade.

The negative outlook reflects the uncertainty on the outcome of
the ongoing arbitral proceeding of BRL450 million to settle the
disputes derived from a construction work contract signed by CART
and OAS S.A. It also reflects a more challenging regulatory
environment in the state of Sao Paulo for toll road concessions to
negotiate extraordinary compensation in case of adverse changes in
business conditions.

CART's credit profile remains supported by its long term
concession with attractive location and strong asset features,
that includes annual tariff adjustments with pass-through for
inflation. Also reflected in the ratings is the track record of
strong financial support from its shareholder, Investimentos e
Participacoes em Infraestrutura S.A. - INVEPAR, in the form of
BRL465 million equity injections since 2014.

Moody's has decided to withdraw the ratings because of inadequate
information to monitor the ratings, due to the issuer decision to
cease participation in the rating process. Please refer to the
Moody's Investors Service's Policy for Withdrawal of Credit
Ratings, available on its website, www.moodys.com.br.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was the Privately
Managed Toll Roads methodology, published in May 2014.

Moody's National Scale Credit Ratings (NSRs) are intended as
relative measures of creditworthiness among debt issues and
issuers within a country, enabling market participants to better
differentiate relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's global
scale credit ratings in that they are not globally comparable with
the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with NSRs
for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same country.
NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier signifying the
relevant country, as in ".za" for South Africa. For further
information on Moody's approach to national scale credit ratings,
please refer to Moody's Credit rating Methodology published in May
2016 entitled "Mapping National Scale Ratings from Global Scale
Ratings". While NSRs have no inherent absolute meaning in terms of
default risk or expected loss, a historical probability of default
consistent with a given NSR can be inferred from the GSR to which
it maps back at that particular point in time. For information on
the historical default rates associated with different global
scale rating categories over different investment horizons.

Concessionaria Auto Raposo Tavares S.A. (CART) holds a 30-year
toll road concession granted by the state regulator ARTESP in
March 2009 to expand, operate and maintain a 444 km toll road
system composed by three roads: SP 270 (Rodovia Raposo Tavares),
SP 225 (Rodovia Joao Renno), and SP 327 (Rodovia Orlando
Quagliato) connecting 27 municipalities between the cities of
Bauru and Presidente Epitacio. CART's toll road system connects
the state of Sao Paulo to a prosperous agricultural region in the
state of Mato Grosso do Sul, centered primarily around grain
production (soybeans, corn) and cattle raising.

CART is wholly owned by Investimentos e Participacoes em
Infraestrutura S.A. - INVEPAR (B2/Ba2.br; stable), one of Brazil's
largest groups operating in the infrastructure sector, which is
controlled by the largest Brazilian pension funds (PREVI, FUNCEF
and PETROS) as well as the construction company OAS S.A (unrated).
In the last twelve months ended June 2017, CART reported BRL 300
million in net revenues (excluding construction revenues) and net
losses of BRL97 million.


INVESTIMENTOS E PARTICIPACOES: Moody's Affirms B2 CFR
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina Ltda., has affirmed Investimentos e
Participacoes em Infraestrutura S.A. -- INVEPAR's corporate family
ratings at B2 on the global scale and Ba2.br on the Brazilian
national scale. The outlook for all the ratings was revised to
stable from negative. Moody's will withdraw the ratings of INVEPAR
on the next business day.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The B2/Ba2.br ratings reflect INVEPAR's position as the parent
company of one of Brazil's largest infrastructure groups. Its
credit profile benefits from: (i) the predictable operating cash
flows stemming from its large portfolio of long-term
infrastructure concessions in Brazil (Ba2, negative), mainly in
the transportation sector, (ii) the regulatory framework for its
investments with predicable rate setting mechanisms, and (iii) the
ownership structure with a track record of financial support to
the company's businesses. Tempering INVEPAR's credit profile is
its high leveraged capital structure and evolving liquidity
position.

The stable outlook reflects the gradual but consistent improvement
in the company's credit profile, resulting from the ramp-up of its
greenfield investments that achieved operating status in 2016,
which will to contribute with future revenues. The change in
outlook also incorporates the recent developments of INVEPAR's
investment strategy aiming at improve the internal cash generation
and reduce the company's leverage through asset sales and contract
renegotiations.

In the last twelve months ended June 30, 2017, INVEPAR's
consolidated Funds from Operations (FFO)-to-Debt ratio, as per
Moody's standard adjustments, reached 5.5% up from 3.2% in fiscal
year 2016 and 2.3% in fiscal year 2015, while the Cash Interest
Coverage improved to at 1.9x from 1.4x in 2016 and 1.5x in 2015.
Nevertheless, the company's Net Debt-to-EBITDA remained high, at
approximately 10.6x.

Moody's has decided to withdraw the ratings because of inadequate
information to monitor the ratings, due to the issuer decision to
cease participation in the rating process. Please refer to the
Moody's Investors Service's Policy for Withdrawal of Credit
Ratings, available on its website, www.moodys.com.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was the Privately
Managed Toll Roads methodology, published in May 2014.

Moody's National Scale Credit Ratings (NSRs) are intended as
relative measures of creditworthiness among debt issues and
issuers within a country, enabling market participants to better
differentiate relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's global
scale credit ratings in that they are not globally comparable with
the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with NSRs
for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same country.
NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier signifying the
relevant country, as in ".za" for South Africa. For further
information on Moody's approach to national scale credit ratings,
please refer to Moody's Credit rating Methodology published in May
2016 entitled "Mapping National Scale Ratings from Global Scale
Ratings". While NSRs have no inherent absolute meaning in terms of
default risk or expected loss, a historical probability of default
consistent with a given NSR can be inferred from the GSR to which
it maps back at that particular point in time. For information on
the historical default rates associated with different global
scale rating categories over different investment horizons.

INVEPAR is a parent holding company controlled by the three
largest Brazilian pension funds (Caixa de Previdància dos
Funcion†rios do Banco do Brasil, Fundaáao dos Economi†rios
Federais and Fundaáao Petrobras de Seguridade Social) and by Group
OAS (not rated) which filed for court protection for judicial
reorganization in 2015. In the last twelve months ended on
June 30, 2017, INVEPAR reported consolidated net revenues
(excluding construction revenues) of BRL3.6 billion and net losses
of BRL561 million.

INVEPAR's holds the control on a portfolio of infrastructure
concessions that consists of (i) urban mobility projects Concessao
Metroviaria do Rio de Janeiro S/A - Metro Rio (Ba2/ Aa2.br,
negative), MetroBarra (unrated) in the city of Rio de Janeiro,
(ii) regional toll roads: Linha Amarela S.A. - LAMSA
(Ba2/Aa2.br,negative) in the city of Rio de Janeiro,
Concession†ria Auto Raposo Tavares S.A. (B2/Ba2.br, negative) in
the Sao Paulo state, CLN (unrated) in the State of Bahia, and
Concessionaria BR-040 S.A -- Via 040 (unrated), a federal
concession which links the state of Minas Gerais to the federal
district of Brasilia and (iii) the Guarulhos airport concession
(GRU). INVEPAR also shares the control with Odebretch Transport
S.A (unrated) of Concessionaria Bahia Norte S.A -- CBN (B1/Baa2.br
stable), in the state of Bahia and Concessionaria Rota do
Atlantico - CRA (unrated) in Pernambuco state. INVEPAR has
minority participation on Concessionaria Rio Teresopolis S.A
(unrated), a toll road concession in Rio de Janeiro state,
Concessionaria ViaRio S.A (unrated), a toll road concession and
VLT tramway (unrated), both located at Rio de Janeiro city.


MARFRIG GLOBAL: Fitch Affirms BB- Long-Term IDR; Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Marfrig Global Foods S.A.'s (Marfrig)
Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs)
at 'BB-' and its National Scale rating at 'A(bra).' Fitch has also
affirmed Marfrig Holdings (Europe) and MARB BondCo PLC's senior
unsecured notes at 'BB-'. The Rating Outlook is Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Robust Business Position: Marfrig's ratings incorporate the
company's broad product and geographic diversification in the
volatile protein commodity industry. The geographic and product
diversification help to reduce risks related to disease, trade
restrictions and currency fluctuation. The company is structured
in two business units: (i) Marfrig Beef (45% of EBITDA in 2016),
one of the world's largest beef producers, and (ii) Keystone Foods
(55% of EBITDA in 2016), a global supplier to foodservice
restaurant chains (McDonald's represented about 56% of Keystone's
sales in 2016. Marfrig's competitive advantages stem from a
favorable environment to raise cattle in Brazil, large scale of
operations in the beef and poultry industries, and long-term
relationship with farmers, customers, and distributors. Marfrig's
rating is tempered by the volatility of cash flow generation in
the beef commodity business.

Delayed Deleveraging Trajectory: Fitch expects Marfrig's net
leverage to remain high at about 4.3x by the end of 2017, which
negatively compares to 3.9x at end-2016, barring Keystone IPO. The
delay in its deleveraging trajectory is a result of the additional
working capital investments related to the reopening of its three
plants in Brazil. Should Keystone's IPO take place in 2018, Fitch
estimates that the company's net debt/ EBITDA could improve by
1.0x-1.5x if proceeds are used to repay debt. Marfrig's near-term
net leverage target is 2.5x, but Fitch believes that the company
could aggressively pursue Keystone's growth, or adopt a higher
level of shareholder distribution policy if its credit metrics
materially improve following the IPO.

Gradual FCF Recovery: Fitch forecasts Marfrig to improve free cash
flow (FCF) from 2018 supported by the increased slaughtering
capacity in the Marfrig Beef division, sustained organic growth
and profitability improvement of Keystone division, and lower
interest expenses following the company's liability management and
the conversion of the convertible bond by BNDES into equity in
2017. Marfrig's FCF is forecast to remain negative at around
BRL830 million in 2017 due to an increase in working capital
outflow due to the reopening of the slaughtering facilities in
Brazil, high interest expense, and slow domestic market recovery
in Brazil.

Potential Keystone IPO Neutral to Credit: Fitch views the
potential IPO of Keystone in the coming months as neutral for the
ratings, based on the assumption that the company retains the
control of its subsidiary. The introduction of minority
shareholders and a resultant reduction in the company's
flexibility in cash flow transfer within the group should dilute
the positive impact from the IPO on the group's financial metrics
and additional resources to support the Keystone growth.

Favourable Beef Outlook: Global beef fundamentals are expected to
remain positive in the next few years for Brazilian producers due
to an expected improvement in the consumer environment in Brazil,
steady global demand, limited global beef supply and ample
livestock supply in Brazil which should reduce raw material costs.
The domestic market is expected to slowly rebound as the
purchasing power of Brazilian consumers gently improves, and the
uncertainty about political risk clears up. As of the latest 12
months (LTM) ended June 30, 2017, Marfrig beef exports represented
43% of beef revenues at BRL3.7 billion. Among the significant
industry risks are a downturn in the economy of a given export
market, the imposition of increased tariffs or sanitary barriers,
and strikes or other events that may affect the availability of
ports and transportation.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Marfrig is well positioned to compete in the global protein
industry. The ratings reflect company's product and geographic
diversification, with its beef business in the South America
(notably Brazil) and Keystone's processed poultry business in the
U.S. and Asia. This compares well to its regional peer Minerva
S.A. (BB-/Stable), which is mainly a beef processor in South
America. This strength is offset by Minerva's higher EBITDA margin
than that of Marfrig thanks to its export-driven model. JBS S.A.
(BB/Rating Watch Negative) boasts a higher level of scale of
operations and diversification than Marfrig, which mitigates its
weaker liquidity compared to Marfrig. In terms of leverage, the
three companies operate with similar capital structures. There is
no parent-subsidiary linkage, and no Country Ceiling constraint
and operating environment influence were in effect for the
ratings.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within our rating case for the issuer
include:

Marfrig Beef:
-- Double digit volume growth for beef in 2018 as a result of
    increased capacity in Brazil;
-- EBITDA margin stabilizes below 9%.

Keystone:
-- Volume sales increasing by mid-single digits over the medium
    term;
-- EBITDA margin stabilizes at around 9.6% starting in 2017.

Consolidated:
-- Annual Capex/Revenues of 3.1% in the next four years;
-- Lower interest paid after 2017 reflecting the conversion of
    the convertible bond in January 2017;
-- No dividend payments.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Positive Rating Action
-- Sustainable and positive FCF;
-- Improved and resilient operating margins in Marfrig Beef;
-- Substantial decrease in gross and net leverage to below 4.5x
    and 3.0x, respectively, on a sustained basis.

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Negative Rating Action
-- Negative FCF on a sustained basis;
-- Net leverage above 4.5x on a sustainable basis.

LIQUIDITY

Strong Liquidity: Marfrig enjoys a strong liquidity position. The
liquidity was reinforced by the divestment of Moy Park and its
liability management. The company's liquidity benefits from its
comfortable cash on hand and debt amortization profile. As of the
LTM ended June 30, 2017, the group held BRL5.4 billion of cash and
marketable securities against its short-term debt of BRL1.5
billion. The company continues to be actively engaged in liability
management to reduce debt and interest expense. As of June 30,
2017, around 97% of the company's debt is in U.S. dollars and
foreign currencies (excluding the real) while around 75%-80% of
its LTM EBITDA (57% Keystone) is pegged to currencies other than
the Brazilian Real.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

Marfrig Global Foods S.A.
-- Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDR at 'BB-'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- National Long-Term Rating at 'A(bra)'; Outlook Stable.

Marfrig Holdings (Europe) B.V.
-- Senior unsecured notes due 2018, 2019, 2021, 2023 at 'BB-'.

MARB BondCo PLC
-- Senior unsecured notes due 2024 at 'BB-'.


ROTA DAS BANDEIRAS: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Corporate Family Rating
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina has affirmed the corporate family ratings
and senior secured ratings assigned to the BRL1.1 billion
debentures due 2024 of Rota das Bandeiras S.A. at Ba3/A3.br. The
outlook has been revised to negative from stable.

The ratings affirmation reflects (i) the long-tenor of the
concession which provides for a long tail to support additional
debt; (ii) strong asset profile; (iii) the still attractive
fundamentals of the concession due to its location in an
economically robust area in the state of Sao Paulo; and (iv) the
current credit metrics, which are commensurate with higher rating
levels. The rating is tempered by the sizeable expansion capital
investment program, as established in the original concession
agreement, and the limited flexibility to obtain sànior secured
additional financing given the terms of the existing project
finance structure.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The negative outlook reflects the challenges that lie ahead to
secure the appropriate financing and/or close on financing sources
at adequate terms on a timely fashion to avoid deterioration of
the company's credit quality. The outlook considers that the
company's healthy cash balance of BRL300 million as of June 2017
will decline significantly over the next two years, decreasing the
liquidity cushion available to honor the growing amortization
schedule while complying with capex obligations. In the Moody's
base case, which assumes a 50% dividend payout ratio, the company
breaches DSCR and debt service reserve covenants, and can
potentially run out of cash prior to full debt maturity in 2025 in
case no additional debt or equity is closed upon, depending on (i)
how traffic volumes recover in the mid-to-long term; (ii) how much
is distributed in dividends prior to 2021, period in which the
company comfortably complies with its DSCR covenants; and (iii)
actual capex plan execution in terms of timing and overall costs.

Factored into the ratings are the strong asset features including
its service area, providing important transport links between
Campinas and the Paraiba Valley on the north-end and a link to the
port of Sao Sebastiao on the south-end. Competition is restricted
to the north-end, with alternative routes in key cities provided
by both tolled and non-tolled roads. Despite strong asset
features, traffic has declined by 5% a year in 2015 and 2016, more
than national GDP, and more elastic than other toll roads as
measured by the ABCR indexes. This may be explained by the less
mature nature of the asset, which is still undergoing substantial
expansion. Traffic performance since June 2017 shows slight
improvement, with Moody's expecting traffic growth of
approximately 1% in 2017 and 3% in the medium term.

The capital expenditure program is mandatory and defined in the
original concession agreement. In present value terms, it is
estimated at around BRL880 million, or 35% of outstanding
financial debt composed of BNDES loans and debentures structured
on a project-finance basis, totaling BRL2.5 billion.

Long-term key credit metrics remain relatively healthy relative to
the rating level, with FFO/Debt and interest coverage ratios
averaging 11% and 2.3x respectively, over the past three years.
Debt service coverage ratios (DSCRs) as measured through cash flow
available for debt service (CFADS) over scheduled principal and
interest has averaged above 1.40x over the past three years, but
is expected to decline to levels closer to 1.00x in 2023-2025
given the growing debt service schedule. That is explained by the
short tenor of the existing debt, maturing completely in 2025,
despite the concession having a long-tenor, maturing in 2039.
Moody's estimates a Concession Life Coverage Ratio (CLCR) of
approximately 2.4x as of year-end 2017. These metrics show the
project's capacity to take on additional debt while still
maintaining healthy credit metrics. Nonetheless, the restrictions
to obtain additional pari-passu debt based on the existing debt
project finance structure and the limited depth of the Brazilian
market for subordinated indebtness in practice provide
difficulties for the issuer to secure the additional financing it
needs and is capable to undertake. The Issuer states it has
alternative financing options and has presented a plan, although
options remain subject to structural considerations and conditions
precedent.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

The outlook may be revised to stable upon the Issuer successfully
achieving financial close on funding alternatives at adequate
tenors which allow them to comply with its expansion capital
investment program while maintaining adequate levels of liquidity,
and/or if traffic recovers at higher than expected rates.

On the other hand, the rating could be downgraded if (i) the
company is not able to secure additional funding to comply with
its expansion capital investment program over the next twelve to
eighteen months; (ii) traffic recovery shows to be lower than
Moody's expectations of 1% in 2017 and 3% in 2018; (iii) the capex
program shows cost overruns or delays lead the regulator to apply
penalties; or (iv) the company distributes dividends prior to
securing all the sources needed to honor capex and debt service,
further deteriorating its liquidity position.

Rota das Bandeiras is a privately managed toll road and an
indirect subsidiary of the family-owned investment holding company
Odebrecht S.A. (Odebrecht, unrated). The concession includes five
adjacent roads of the Dom Pedro I corridor, one intersection and
three connecting local roads with a total extension of 297
kilometers. The concession grantor is the State of Sao Paulo, and
performance according to concession terms is regulated by the
state agency ARTESP. The concession was awarded in April 2009 for
a period of 30 years, expiring therefore in 2039 (21-year tail).
Completion of the expansion capital investment program is
mandatory as per the concession agreement, and in present value
terms, the 2017-2025 investment is of the order of BRL880 million.


VERT COMPANHIA: Moody's Assigns Ba1 Rating to Agri Certificates
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina Ltda. has assigned definitive ratings of
Ba1 (global scale, local currency) and Aaa.br (national scale) to
the 1st and 2nd series of agribusiness certificates ("certificados
de recebiveis do agronegocio" or CRA) issued by Vert Companhia
Securitizadora (Vert, the Issuer or the Securitizadora) and backed
by two series of a debentures issued by Ipiranga Produtos de
Petroleo S.A. (Ipiranga), which is guaranteed by Ultrapar
Participacoes S.A. (Ultrapar). The proceeds will be directed to
finance purchases of ethanol.

Issuer: Vert Companhia Securitizadora

1st and 2nd Series of the 14th issuance -- Ba1 (global scale,
local currency) / Aaa.br (national scale)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The Ba1 (global scale, local currency) and Aaa.br (national scale)
ratings assigned to the CRA are primarily based on the willingness
and ability of Ultrapar (as guarantor) to honor the payments
defined in transaction documents, reflecting the Ba1/Aaa.br senior
unsecured ratings of the underlying debenture backing the CRA
issuances. Any change in the ratings of the debenture will lead to
a change in the ratings of the CRA.

Each CRA series issued by Vert is backed by a series of debentures
issued by Ipiranga and guaranteed by Ultrapar. The underlying
debentures are rated Ba1 (global scale, local currency) Aaa.br
(national scale). Ipiranga and Ultrapar will be responsible to
cover all transaction expenses.

The 1st series of CRA are floating rate notes, indexed to 95% of
the DI (interbank deposit rate). The total issuance amount of the
series is BRL 730.384 million. Interest will be paid on a
semiannual basis, followed by a balloon payment of principal at
the legal final maturity in October 2022.

The 2nd series of CRA the principal balance is adjusted by the
IPCA (Extended National Consumer Price Index) inflation index and
will pay an annual fixed spread of 4.3358%. The total issuance
amount of the series is BRL 213.693 million. Interests will be
paid on an annual basis, followed by a balloon payment of
principal at the legal final maturity in October 2024.

The sum of the two series equals to BRL 944.077 million

The definitive ratings on the CRA are based on a number of
factors, among them the following:

- The willingness and ability of Ultrapar (as guarantor) to make
payments on each series of the underlying debentures, rated
Ba1/Aaa.br.

- Pass through structure; interest risk mitigated: the payment
schedule of each series of CRA replicates the scheduled cash flow
of the underlying debentures, with a one-day lag, which allows
adequate timing to make payments on the CRA. The CRA will make
payments that match the payments to be made by the underlying
debentures. The floating rate of DI to be paid under the 1st
series has been determined using the same DI period under the
underlying debenture. The principal balance of the CRA 2nd series
will be adjusted by the same IPCA index used to adjust the
underlying debentures. Also, the coupon is calculated considering
the same business days.

- The event of default (EOD) on the CRA are matched to the EOD on
the underlying debentures. Therefore, the risk of having an EOD on
the certificates while the underlying assets are current is
mitigated. In addition, EOD on the underlying debentures will
trigger and EOD on the CRA.

- Ipiranga or Ultrapar, in the last instance, will pay the CRA
expenses: Ipiranga or Ultrapar will be responsible, under the
transaction documents, for all CRA expenses. Nonetheless, the
transaction have recourse back to Ultrapar, in case Ipiranga miss
any payment of expenses.

- Ipiranga's payment obligations, as well as Ultrapar's guarantee
under the debentures, assignment agreement and the trust expenses
related to the CRA issuance also benefits from a guarantee
provided by Ultrapar, which is the holding company from Ipiranga.
The senior unsecured ratings assigned to the underlying debentures
issued by Ipiranga (as debtor) reflect the profile of the
guarantor's senior unsecured debt.

- No commingling risk: Ipiranga commits to make the payments due
on the two series of debentures directly to the respective
accounts of each series of CRA held at Itau Unibanco S.A. (Ba2
negative). Also, Ultrapar commits to make the payment to the
transaction bank account, in case requested upon Ipiranga's
default.

- Segregated assets: The CRA benefit from a fiduciary regime
("regime fiduci†rio") whereby the assets backing each series of
CRA are segregated. These segregated assets are destined
exclusively for payments on the CRA as well as certain fees and
expenses, and will be segregated from all of the other assets on
the issuer's balance sheet. However, the transaction is subject to
residual legal risk because Vert agribusiness credits can be
affected by the securitization company's tax, labor and pension
creditors.

Ultrapar Participacoes S.A. ("Ultrapar"), headquartered in Sao
Paulo, Brazil, is engaged in fuel (Ipiranga) and liquefied
petroleum gas (Ultragaz) distribution, specialty chemicals
production (Oxiteno), storage for liquid bulk (Ultracargo) and
retail drugstore (Extrafarma). In the last twelve months ended
June 30, 2017, Ultrapar reported consolidated net revenues of BRL
76.4 billion (about USD23.7 billion). Ipiranga is the group's
largest business segment, representing 86% of consolidated net
revenues and 75% of EBITDA in the same period.

Ultrapar's ratings reflect primarily the company's solid business
model, low risk profile, stable cash flows and leading position in
different segments. Over the past few years the company
demonstrated its ability to post robust growth across all business
lines and to sustain conservative credit metrics and strong cash
generation even under adverse market conditions and sizable
investment plan.

On the other hand, the ratings are primarily constrained by
Brazil's sovereign government bond rating. The company's
acquisitive growth strategy and its dependence on a few key
suppliers for raw materials are additional negative rating
considerations. To a lesser extent, the more cyclical nature of
its specialty chemicals business is also viewed as credit
negative.

Ultrapar's Ba1/Aaa.br Corporate Family Rating ratings stand one
notch above Brazil's government bond rating of Ba2. Granted only
on an exceptional basis, the notching represents a fundamental
corporate profile that is stronger than the sovereign's government
bond rating. This is evidenced by the resilient nature of
Ultrapar's cash flows and financial flexibility, which allow it to
withstand Brazil's weakened economic and fiscal condition.

Vert was established since 2016 and headquartered in Sao Paulo.
The securitization company is focused on structuring CRA with
large and renowned sponsors of the agricultural industry. Vert is
audited by Grant Thornton and since the beginning of its
operations, the securitization company has issued 9 different
securitizations totaling R$ 2.975 billion, currently with a total
CRA outstanding of R$2.968 billion.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Any changes in the senior unsecured ratings of the underlying
debentures will lead to a change in the ratings on the CRA.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities" published in June 2015.


==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


METAL 2017-1: Fitch to Assign 'Bsf' Rating on Series C-2 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to assign the following ratings and Outlooks
to notes co-issued by METAL 2017-1 Limited (METAL Cayman) and
METAL 2017-1 USA LLC (METAL USA), collectively METAL 2017-1:

-- $430,028,000 series A 2017-1 notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $86,006,000 series B 2017-1 notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $55,044,000 series C-1 2017-1 notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $34,402,000 series C-2 2017-1 notes 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

METAL 2017-1 is the first aircraft ABS to be serviced and
sponsored by Aergo Capital Holdings Limited (Aergo). Aergo,
through affiliates, will retain equity E and S certificates issued
by METAL Cayman, thereby retaining an economic interest in the
transaction outside of merely collecting servicing fees. Fitch
views this as a positive since Aergo has a significant interest in
generating positive cash flows through management and servicing of
the assets over the life of the transaction. The transaction is
being issued for general funding purposes.

Ownerships interests in the aircraft owning entities will be sold
from the sellers to the co-issuers during the novation period
which will end 270 days after transaction closing (the purchase
period). If ownership of the initial or substitute aircraft is not
transferred within the purchase period, the applicable amount
attributable to each aircraft not transferred will be utilized to
prepay the notes without premium, consistent with other aircraft
ABS.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. will act as security trustee, indenture
trustee, and operating bank and Phoenix American Financial
Services will act as administrative agent. Natixis, S.A. is the
provider of the initial liquidity facility.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Very Conservative Asset Assumptions Applied: Fitch utilized more
conservative asset assumptions than recently rated transactions
given the pool's higher exposure to weaker airline credits in
emerging markets. The most impactful is a 'CCC' assumption for
unrated lessees versus 'B' for all prior transactions. Other more
conservative assumptions include high repossession costs,
stressful remarketing downtime probability curves, low lease
extension rate and shorter new lease terms.

High Exposure of Weaker Emerging Market Lessees: 97.7% of the pool
is leased to weak emerging market airline credits, a high
concentration versus recent aircraft ABS. The largest aircraft is
leased to South Africa Airlines (SAA) who is in financial distress
requiring government intervention to continue operations.

Asset Quality: The pool is young with a weighted average (WA) age
of 5.3 years, largely comprised of Tier 1 A320 current engine
option (ceo) and B737 next generation (NG) aircraft. However, Tier
2 aircraft account for 24.5% of the pool. The pool's strong WA
remaining term of 7.8 years and high lease rate factors (LRFs)
should give strong support to future cash flows.

Technological Replacement Risk Exists: The A320ceo and B737 NG
both face replacement from the neo and MAX. Additionally, Airbus
plans to introduce the A330neo to replace the A330. Each aircraft
is expected to come under pressure as a result of new variant
introductions over the next decade. However, various mitigants
exist, such as long lead time for replacement.

Structural Features Support Ratings: The structure is consistent
with recent aircraft ABS, albeit with lower LTVs, quicker
amortization and tighter triggers. The structure allows for the
repayment of the notes when applying stressed asset flows
commensurate with the expected ratings.

Adequate Servicing Capability: The transaction will depend heavily
on Aergo's ability to monitor lessees, place aircraft on lease and
protect asset values. Fitch believes Aergo is a capable servicer,
as evidenced by the leasing activities and managed portfolio
servicing since the company's founding in 1999. Aergo also
benefits from the support of CarVal, its majority owner.

Commercial Aviation Cyclicality: The aviation industry has
historically been subject to significant cyclicality due to
macroeconomic and geopolitical events. Downturns are typically
marked by lower utilization, values and lease rates in addition to
deteriorating credit quality. Fitch assumes multiple recessionary
periods over the transaction's life.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The performance of aircraft operating lease ABS can be affected by
various factors, which, in turn, could have an impact on the
assigned ratings. Fitch conducted sensitivity analyses to evaluate
the impact of changes to a number of the variables in the
analysis. These sensitivity scenarios were considered in
determining Fitch's expected ratings.

For the first sensitivity, the technological cliff scenario, Fitch
assumed the first recession would occur in three years, at which
point all aircraft would be subjected to recessionary value
decline stresses 10% higher than those assumed in primary
scenarios. Further, once aircraft are assumed to be sold, proceeds
represented 25% of the future stressed value, down from 50% in
primary scenarios.

This sensitivity is meant to reflect a scenario in which incoming
technological replacements gain market share at a far quicker pace
than anticipated. Under this scenario, Airbus and Boeing
production rates would surpass their current aggressive schedules
and disposition events would result in lower residual proceeds for
the aircraft. This scenario is also meant to consider a
significant rise in fuel costs, leading airlines and lessors to
opt for the more fuel-efficient neo or MAX aircraft.

Under this scenario, the cash flows are negatively impacted in
relation to the primary cash flow runs. The class A notes fail the
'Asf' stress but all subordinate classes pay in full in scenarios
commensurate with their expected ratings. Therefore, this scenario
would likely result in a downgrade of one to two notches to the
class A notes.

In the second scenario, the shorter useful life scenario, Fitch
decreased the assumed useful life by five years for all aircraft
in the portfolio. This sensitivity is intended to address a
situation where aircraft need to be sold earlier either due to
pressure from replacement technology or a change in Aergo's
disposition strategy.

As a result of less lease cash flow, total cash received by the
trust declines approximately $47 million to $106 million across
the rating scenarios when compared to the primary runs. However, a
greater portion of the cash received is from dispositions, as
aircraft are sold earlier and thus subjected to less depreciation
and recessionary value shocks. While cash declines from the
primary runs, all classes are still able to pass scenarios
commensurate with their expected ratings with the exception of
series C-2. Given its subordinate position in the structure, it is
negatively impacted by the decreased cash flow. Therefore, the
shorter useful life scenario is likely to result in a downgrade to
the class C-2 notes.

The third scenario addresses the potential default of Lion Air
Group (LAG), which owns three airlines represented in the METAL
portfolio: Thai Lion, Lion Air and Malindo Air. Together, these
airlines represent 28.0% of the portfolio, which would be the
largest exposure, when considered in aggregate. In these runs, the
first recession was assumed to occur after one year. The LAG
airlines were always assumed to default in the first recession,
but never prior.

Under these sensitivities, the class A notes fail the 'Asf'
scenario while all subordinate classes are able to pass scenarios
commensurate with their expected ratings. The disruption in cash
flow resulting from the LAG default scenario would likely result
in a downgrade of one to two notches for the class A notes.


SIGNUM VERDE 2006-02: Fitch Ups Rating on CLP5.3BB Notes from BB+
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded the following Signum Verde Limited
2006-02 notes:

-- CLP5,300,000,000 credit-linked notes to 'BBB-sf' from 'BB+sf'.

The Rating Outlook has been revised to Stable from Negative.

KEY RATING DRIVERS
This rating action follows Fitch's upgrade of the reference
entity, Vale S.A. Fitch monitors the performance of the underlying
risk-presenting entities and adjusts the rating accordingly
through application of its credit-linked note (CLN) criteria,
"Single- and Multi-name Credit-Linked Notes Rating Criteria."

The rating considers the credit quality of Vale S.A.'s current
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) of 'BBB+'/Stable as the reference
entity and Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.'s 'A' IDR/Stable as the swap
counterparty and issuer of the qualified investment.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The rating remains sensitive to rating migration of each risk-
presenting entity. A downgrade of Vale S.A. would likely result in
a downgrade to the notes.

Signum Verde 2006-02 is a single-name credit-linked note linked to
the credit risk of Vale, S.A. as the underlying reference entity
and to the Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. as issuer of the collateral
and as guarantor to the swap counterparty. At closing, the issuer
entered into an interest rate and credit default swap with the
swap counterparty, and used the CLP5.3 billion proceeds from the
sale of the notes to purchase approximately USD10 million of
collateral to fund the swaps. The collateral is senior unsecured
floating-rate notes issued by the Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., and
due in 2034.


===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Red Tape Erodes Investor Confidence
-------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that red tape in the Dominican Republic
leaves a negative perception and eroded confidence on foreigners
looking to invest in the country, because administrative
procedures delay the development of major projects.

Monte Plata Solar plant business manager, Arnaldo Bisono affirmed
that bureaucracy makes progress in the country very slowly, which
leads to higher costs for the project's second phase, located in
Monte Plata (east), according to Dominican Today.

"We're waiting for the Electricity Superintendence and the
National Energy Commission to issue the definitive concession for
the second phase of Monte Plata Solar.  Currently we have eight
Megawatts stored in the Port of Haina that imply a monthly cost of
25,000 dollars. A lot of money has also been spent hiring lawyers
and in other procedures to complete documents required by the SIE
and CNE," the report quoted Mr. Bisono as saying.

He said over 30,000 families are benefiting from the facility in
Monte Plata, noting that the province consumes nearly 100% of its
output, the report relays.

He called on the govt. agencies to continue their support to
obtain the permits as soon as possible, the report notes.

With Monte Plata Solar phase 2, the Taiwanese company General
Energy Solutions, plans to complete its US $110 million
investment, of which only US$50.0 million remains to complete the
69 MW announced at the project's onset, the report says.

The executive added that construction of Phase 2 is expected to
start next January, "if we get the permits," the report adds.


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: 45% of Crops Lost to Pests, Blights
-------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that Dominican Republic's pesticides and
herbicides manufacturers and importers grouped in Afipa said pests
sand blights account for the loss of as much as 45% of the
country's crops.

Speaking an activity to mark its 45th anniversary, Afipa
president, Julio Lee, stressed the importance that farmers use
those products rationality, and according to instructions, reports
Dominican Today.

"There are times that producers have a problem and desperately
apply more doses than needed and then in the end what they cause
is problems of resistance and misuse of the products. Or sometimes
to save money use less doses and are also misusing the products,"
said the business leader, who stressed the need for continued
training, the report notes.

He reiterated that despite the lack of statistics on how many
farmers or farms use crop the products correctly, "what is clear
is that more training is needed," the report relays.

"What I would say is that a lot of work is being done to keep the
products safe, that is, with the least amount of residues allowed
in international markets, which mango, peppers, peppers, all
products that may have global standards can have," Lee said,
quoted by diariolibre.com, the report adds.


=======
P E R U
=======


UNIVERSIDAD DE SAN MARTIN: Moody's Rates $120MM Sr. Sec. Notes Ba2
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a rating of Ba2 to the
Universidad de San Martin de Porres' anticipated $120 million
senior secured notes. The outlook on the rating is stable.

USMP plans to issue up to $120 million Senior Secured Notes with a
10 year tenor. The Notes will be paid through a trust structure to
which the Issuer will pledge 100% of tuition revenues. During the
first 7 years, the Issuer will have a grace period of principal
payments and the Notes will pay semiannual fixed interest rate
payments. Starting on December 2024, a principal amount of $10
million will also be payable on each semiannual payment date, with
the remaining $60 million of principal balance payable at
maturity. USMP will use the proceeds to refinance outstanding
debt, fund expansion projects, fund the reserve account, pay
transaction fees and expenses and improve working capital.

The Ba2 rating is based on the assumption that the final
transaction and financing documents will be in accordance with
Moody's current understanding of the transaction based on
documentation reviewed as of the date of this report.

RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR DEBT RATING

The Ba2 rating assigned to the Notes reflects Moody's opinion on
the underlying creditworthiness of UMSP in addition to the
following legal and credit factors embedded in the Notes:

- Strong trust structure serving as a mechanism for paying
   interest payments;

- Very strong debt service payment coverage, anticipated to
   exceed 10x during the life of the Notes under a Moody's stress
   case scenario; and

- 6-month Debt Service Reserve Account

Primarily located in Lima, Peru, with campuses also in Chiclayo
and Arequipa, the Issuer is one of the largest private
universities in Peru. Having gained university status in 1962, it
has shown strong enrolment and tuition growth in recent years, and
now registers roughly 31,000 full-time equivalent (FTE) students.
Per the revised regulations on higher education in the country of
2014, public and private universities in Peru have to comply with
several requirements that enhance their academic programs. USMP is
one of only 14 universities, out of more than 140, to have
obtained the required license by the relatively new higher
education authority SUNEDU (Superintendencia Nacional de Educacion
Superior Universitaria).

Moody's expects the university will sustain strong revenue growth
based on its growing enrollment and tuition revenue. This strong
growth will continue to drive consistently positive cash flow
generation. Despite positive cash flow, liquidity will remain
relatively low as the university continues to invest in programs
and infrastructure, one of USMP's main credit challenges.

The rating is also underpinned by features embedded in the
transaction. Per the indenture reviewed by Moody's, USMP is
limited in its ability to make any material change to the nature
of its current businesses or enter into new or alternative lines
of business. Moreover, the issuer has to sell assets within the
next 2 years of at least $27 million, which in Moody's view will
support USMP's liquidity metrics. USMP currently distinguishes
itself from other Moody's-rated universities by means of its
various investments in non-academic activities.

Furthermore, USMP cannot issue additional Notes under the
indenture for at least three years. After this point to the
maturity of the Notes, the maximum amount that USMP can issue,
combined with the outstanding principal amount of the Notes,
cannot exceed $170 million. The Issuer has to maintain additional
financial covenants, including a Net Debt/EBITDA ratio of not more
than 6x in 2018, 5.0x for 2019 and 2020, 4.5x for 2021, 4x for
2022 and 2023, 3.5x for 2024 and 3x going forward to maturity.

Additionally, the aggregate cash flows deposited in the Local
Trust Accounts during two payment periods have to provide at least
a 10x debt service coverage ratio to the amount of the scheduled
payment due on the next ensuing payment date. Non complying with
this covenant could trigger the retention of additional cash
flows.

Moody's notes that USMP is exposed to foreign exchange risk given
that tuition related revenues are collected in Peruvian Soles
while the debt service will be paid in USD. However, in Moody's
opinion this risk is mitigated as the local trust will retain
revenues equivalent to 5% of total interest payment on a weekly
basis converting such amount into USD until retaining sufficient
funds for the next interest payment.

RATIONALE FOR THE STABLE OUTLOOK

The stable outlook reflects Moody's opinion that the flows to the
Local Trust Accounts will continue to be sufficient to meet all
requirements of the indenture including the high debt service
coverage. Moody's anticipates that USMP will continue to record a
positive trend of tuition revenues as a result of its policy to
increase fees on a yearly basis and its expansion of its
infrastructure program across the medium will aid in the
university's efforts to reverse a declining trend of student
enrolment.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

An improvement in the underlying creditworthiness of USMP as a
result of growing tuition revenues leading to greater financial
flexibility, along with a reduction in the university's debt
burden and a significant and sustainable increase in spendable
cash and investments could lead to an upgrade of the notes rating.
Conversely, a deterioration on USMP's creditworthiness triggered
by a sustained decline in financial performance and a material
increase in the debt burden or significantly lower levels of
spendable cash and investments could lead to a downgrade in the
rating. In addition, the rating could face downward pressure if
debt service coverage levels fall materially below Moody's
expectations.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Global Higher
Education published in November 2015.


=====================
P U E R T O   R I C O
=====================


PUERTO RICO: Moody's Cuts Bond Rating to Ca After Hurricane Maria
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico's general obligation bonds to Ca from Caa3, in view of
the protracted economic and revenue disruptions caused by
Hurricane Maria, which hit the US territory on September 20. Among
the eight other security types affected are the senior bonds
issued by the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation (COFINA)
and the Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority, both of which
were also downgraded to Ca from Caa3. University of Puerto Rico
bonds were downgraded to C from Ca. The outlook for all affected
securities, which have combined par value of about $31 billion,
remains negative.

Debt Affected by Post-Maria Action Includes GO and Senior COFINA
bonds.

Debt Type - From - To - Par Amt (Billions)

General Obligation - Caa3 - Ca - $13.3

GO-Guaranteed Bonds - Caa3 - Ca - $4.8

COFINA Senior - Caa3 - Ca - $7.6

Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority - Caa3 - Ca - $3.3

Puerto Rico Industrial Development Co. - Ca - C -$0.2

Municipal Finance Agency - Ca - C - $0.6

Highways and Transportation Authority, 1968 Resolution bonds - Ca
- C - $0.8

University of Puerto Rico - System Revenue Bonds - Ca - C - $0.4

University of Puerto Rico - Facilities Revenue Bonds - Ca - C -
$0.1

Total - $31.0

The lower ratings are aligned with Moody's estimates of Puerto
Rico's reduced debt servicing capacity given extensive damage from
Hurricane Maria. Puerto Rico faces almost total economic and
revenue disruption in the near term and diminished output and
revenue probably through the end of the current fiscal year and
maybe well into the next. The weaker trajectory will undercut the
government's ability to repay its debt, a matter now being weighed
in a bankruptcy-like proceeding authorized by the Puerto Rico
Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA). For
the University of Puerto Rico, the downgrade factors in expected
pressure on enrollment-linked revenue and on funding from the
Puerto Rican government.

With 155 mile-an-hour winds and a path that cut diagonally across
the island, Hurricane Maria was the most destructive storm to hit
Puerto Rico in almost 90 years. It knocked out all electric power,
destroyed more than 100,000 homes, and ruptured bridges and other
public infrastructure. Beyond the disruption of the immediate
aftermath, the potential long-term repercussions may be somewhat
mixed, however. On one hand, a massive exodus of residents
relocating to the mainland, rather than rebuilding on the island,
could further erode Puerto Rico's economic base. On the other, an
infusion of federal relief and rebuilding funds could spur the
economic growth and infrastructure replacement that, under normal
conditions, has eluded Puerto Rico. Moody's nevertheless views the
economic impact overall as a substantial negative that has
weakened the commonwealth's ability to repay creditors.

Rating Outlook

The negative outlook is consistent with ongoing economic
pressures, which will weigh on the commonwealth's capacity to meet
debt and other funding obligations, potentially driving bondholder
recovery rates lower as restructuring of the commonwealth's debt
burden unfolds.

Factors that Could Lead to an Upgrade

Any action in the PROMESA debt restructuring process that points
to stronger-than-anticipated bondholder recoveries

Factors that Could Lead to a Downgrade

Lower repayment capacity based on growth in essential service
spending or reduction in revenue

Legal Security

Various, including the commonwealth's general obligation and
pledges of specific taxes and other revenue sources

Use of Proceeds

Not applicable

Obligor Profile

Puerto Rico is a self-governing territory of the United States. It
operates under a constitution approved in 1952. The island's
population, now 3.4 million, has been declining as Puerto Ricans
in increasing numbers have moved to the mainland US in search of
work. The nature of Puerto Rico's relationship with the US -
whether to retain its current status as a commonwealth or to
become a state - is a central political issue on the island. The
two dominant Puerto Rican political parties are defined by their
views on statehood: the Partido Nuevo Progresista (PNP) advocates
statehood, while the Partido Popular Democratico is in favor of
continued commonwealth status. A smaller, third party favors
independence. Moody's ratings do not contemplate a change in the
island's relationship with the US.

Methodology

The principal methodology used in rating the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, Puerto Rico Municipal Finance Agency, Puerto Rico
Highways & Transportation Authority, Puerto Rico Aqueduct and
Sewer Authority, Puerto Rico Industrial Development Company, and
Puerto Rico Public Sales Tax Financing Corp. debt was US States
Rating Methodology published in April 2013. The principal
methodology used in rating the University of Puerto Rico was
Global Higher Education published in November 2015.


=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================


VENEZUELA: Former AG Presenting Corruption Evidence to U.S.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Juan Forero, Luciana Magalhaes and Anatoly Kurmanaev at The Wall
Street Journal report that the former Venezuelan attorney general
in exile, Luisa Ortega, has been presenting evidence of corruption
to the U.S. Justice Department, a person close to her said after
her latest, explosive public release about her former cohorts in
President Nicolas Maduro's administration.

She posted a video on her website in which a Brazilian executive
says he funneled $35 million to Mr. Maduro's 2013 presidential
campaign to ensure Brazilian construction projects were
prioritized, according to The Wall Street Journal.

"Yes, there has been collaboration with the U.S.," said one person
familiar with Ms. Ortega's work, saying there have been recent
meetings in the Colombian capital, Bogota, the report relays.  Ms.
Ortega has made Bogota her new base since she fled Venezuela in
August after breaking with Mr. Maduro's government over its
alleged rights abuses and growing authoritarian tendencies, the
report notes.

The office of Mr. Maduro and the Information Ministry didn't
return calls seeking comment about the video and other
allegations, the report discloses.

From Brazil to Mexico, Ms. Ortega has been publicly speaking about
alleged corruption in Venezuela's government, angering Mr. Maduro
and his ministers. But her release of the video was particularly
hard-hitting, the report notes.

In it, Euzenando Azevedo, the former head of the construction
giant Odebrecht in Venezuela, tells prosecutors in a deposition
taken in Brazil in December that an emissary of Mr. Maduro came to
him seeking money, the report says.

"I asked him if the president or candidate won, that our projects
remain a priority for his government," Mr. Azevedo said in the
video, the report discloses.  "He gave me a guarantee that if
President Maduro won he would continue making Odebrecht projects a
priority," he added.

He added that the money was released and "Maduro won the elections
by a tight margin," defeating Henrique Capriles, the report
relays.

Mr. Azevedo declined to comment.

"That contribution was to prioritize payments to Odebrecht and to
continue contracting projects," a second person close to Ms.
Ortega said, the report notes.  "That is corruption," he added.

The U.S. State Department didn't immediately comment, and the U.S.
Justice Department declined to comment.  But the U.S. has leveled
a range of sanctions against high-ranking Venezuelan government
officials for alleged corruption and rights abuses, including Mr.
Maduro, the report relays.

The repercussions from the video were felt as far as Brasilia and
as near as the seat of Venezuelan power here in Caracas, with the
two governments offering divergent views on what it meant for
Odebrecht and the company's future in this country, the report
relays.  The conglomerate in December signed a plea deal with the
U.S. Justice Department, admitting to having paid $98 million to
secure contracts in Venezuela, the report notes.

Odebrecht is owed more than $1 billion by Venezuela and has
uncompleted projects here, which it would like to complete, a
former company executive said, the report discloses.  The company
is negotiating a leniency deal with the new Venezuelan attorney
general, Tarek William Saab, to resume work, people familiar with
the company said on condition of anonymity, the report says.

"Odebrecht wants to stay there, needs to stay there," said the
former company official in an interview earlier this year, the
report notes.  "Working for the subway in Caracas is very
important for us," he added.

Odebrecht said in a statement it considered the release of the
video a crime that threatens the sanctity of plea bargains and
leniency agreements that prosecutors have worked out with people
who are aiding investigations into the company's bribery scandals,
the report says.  Odebrecht said it is cooperating with
investigations into corruption in Brazil and elsewhere, the report
notes.

On Oct. 6, Odebrecht representatives met with Mr. Saab to hand
over copies of bribery declarations made to Brazilian authorities,
people familiar with the matter said, the report discloses.  Mr.
Saab had previously said he had met with company officials several
times in recent months and that Odebrecht has offered to cooperate
with Venezuelan authorities, the report relays.  He declined to
comment on the dates and contents of the meetings and on the video
released by Ms. Ortega, the report notes.

However, Mr. Saab accused Ms. Ortega of running an extortion ring
at the attorney general's office. He said Odebrecht paid $3
million to a lawyer close to Ms. Ortega to get her prosecutors to
lift arrest warrants for three of the company's managers. She has
denied accusations of corruption leveled at her by Mr. Saab and
other Maduro administration officials.

Mr. Saab called on Mr. Azevedo, the former Odebrecht executive in
the video, to "come here to declare to a Venezuelan court" about
corruption allegations.

Meanwhile, Ms. Ortega was in Geneva, where she met with Zeid Ra'ad
al-Hussein, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, whose
office has documented extensive alleged rights violations in
Venezuela. After leaving, she told reporters about the meetings
with U.S. officials.

"We have supplied them with a mix of evidence that compromises
high-level government officials," she said.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Sept. 28, 2017, S&P Global Ratings suspended its 'CCC-' local
currency issue ratings on four of the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela's local currency-denominated debt issues. S&P said, "At
the same time, S&P affirmed our 'CCC-' long-term foreign and local
currency sovereign issuer credit ratings. The outlook on the long-
term ratings is negative. In addition, we affirmed our 'C' short-
term foreign and local currency sovereign issuer credit ratings.
The transfer and convertibility assessment remains 'CCC-'."


=================
X X X X X X X X X
=================


LATAM: World Bank Says Region on Course for Modest Growth
---------------------------------------------------------
Caribbean360.com reports that despite the recent impact of natural
disasters, the World Bank says the Latin American and Caribbean
region remains on course to record modest economic growth for the
first time in six years.

The bank's Chief Economist for Latin America and the Caribbean
Carlos A. Vegh issued the projection in the wake of two powerful
category 5 storms, Irma and Maria, which devastated Anguilla,
Barbuda, the British Virgin Islands, Dominica and St Martin last
month, according to Caribbean360.com.

The report notes that with these islands currently struggling to
get back on their feet, he said the Bank was still anticipating
regional growth for 2017.

"After a growth slowdown that lasted six years (including a
contraction of 1.3 per cent last year), the Latin American and
Caribbean region is finally expected to resume positive growth in
2017, with market analysts forecasting real GDP (Gross Domestic
Product) growth of 1.2 per cent for 2017 and 2.3 per cent for
2018," Vegh said in his presentation, entitled 'Between A Rock and
A Hard Place', to the annual general meetings of the World Bank
and International Monetary Fund in Washington DC, the report
relays.

However, he noted that the resumption of positive growth was
mainly due to the recovery in South America, which is expected to
grow by 0.6 per cent in 2017 and 2.2 in 2018 after two consecutive
years of negative growth in which real GDP fell by 1.2 per cent in
2015 and 2.9 per cent in 2016, the report notes.

"The region would not have the benefits of favourable external
factors such as a buoyant global economy or a great demand for raw
materials. This means that Latin America must boost its own growth
and put its house in order - in some cases with difficult public
spending and money management decisions," he added, notes
Caribbean360.com.

The World Bank official also touched on the financial
institution's response to last month's hurricane devastation. He
revealed that the bank was in the process of finalizing assistance
packages for Barbuda and Dominica which were hardest-hit, the
report says.

In the meantime, Vegh said the bank had disbursed US$23 million,
US$20 million of which had gone to the relief efforts in Roseau,
the report adds.


* BOND PRICING: For the Week From Oct. 9 to Oct. 13, 2017
---------------------------------------------------------

Issuer Name               Cpn     Price   Maturity  Country  Curr
-----------               ---     -----   --------  -------   ---

BA-CA Finance Cayman Lt   0.518    62.07               KY    EUR
AES Tiete Energia SA      6.7842   1.109  4/15/2024    BR    BRL
Argentina Bogar Bonds     2       39.36   2/4/2018     AR    ARS
Automotores Gildemeister  8.25    73.25   5/24/2021    CL    USD
Automotores Gildemeister  6.75    67      1/15/2023    CL    USD
Automotores Gildemeister  8.25    73.25   5/24/2021    CL    USD
Automotores Gildemeister  6.75    65.5    1/15/2023    CL    USD
CA La Electricidad        8.5     63.664  4/10/2018    VE    USD
Caixa Geral De Depositos  1.439   63.167               KY    EUR
Caixa Geral De Depositos  1.469                        KY    EUR
CSN Islands XII Corp      7       68                   BR    USD
CSN Islands XII Corp      7       66.266               BR    USD
Decimo Primer Fideicomiso 6       53.225 10/25/2041    PA    USD
Decimo Primer             4.54    43.127 10/25/2041    PA    USD
Dolomite Capital         13.217   73.108 12/20/2019    CN    ZAR
Enel Americas SA          5.75    56.172  6/15/2022    CL    CLP
Gol Linhas Aereas SA     10.75    35.861  2/12/2023    BR    USD
Gol Linhas Aereas SA     10.75    35.601  2/12/2023    BR    USD
Inversora Electrica       6.5     67.625  9/26/2017    AR    USD
Inversora Electrica       6.5     67.625  9/26/2017    AR    USD
MIE Holdings Corp         7.5     64.78   4/25/2019    HK    USD
MIE Holdings Corp         7.5     64.982  4/25/2019    HK    USD
NB Finance Ltd            3.88    61.816  2/7/2035     KY    EUR
Noble Holding             7.7     74.433  4/1/2025     KY    USD
Noble Holding             5.25    56.279  3/15/2042    KY    USD
Noble Holding             8.7     71.881  4/1/2045     KY    USD
Noble Holding             6.2     60.129  8/1/2040     KY    USD
Noble Holding             6.05    58.38   3/1/2041     KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.5     42.5                 KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.125   56.938  6/26/2022    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7       68.053  4/21/2020    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.125   41.366  6/26/2042    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     4.375   40.002  4/25/2025    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.25    39.211  6/27/2029    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     6       44.75   4/5/2023     KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.25    39.018  6/27/2029    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.5     42.95                KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     4.375   40.363  4/25/2025    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.125   41.635  6/26/2042    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     6       52.625  4/5/2023     KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.125   55.873  6/26/2022    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7       67.368  4/21/2020    KY    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    8.5     74.5   10/27/2020    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6       30.458  5/16/2024    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6       30.517 11/15/2026    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    9.75    35.677  5/17/2035    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    9       39.279 11/17/2021    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    5.375   30.267  4/12/2027    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    8.5     72.5   10/27/2020    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela   12.75    45.278  2/17/2022    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6       30.367  5/16/2024    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6       30.387 11/15/2026    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    9       39.316 11/17/2021    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    9.75    35.893  5/17/2035    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6       28.346 10/28/2022    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    5.5     30.123  4/12/2037    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela   12.75    45.23   2/17/2022    VE    USD
Polarcus Ltd              5.6     75      3/30/2022    AE    USD
Provincia del Chubut      4              10/21/2019    AR    USD
Siem Offshore Inc         4.04527 69.5   10/30/2020    NO    NOK
Siem Offshore             3.75176 65.75  12/28/2021    NO    NOK
STB Finance               2.05771 56.243               KY    JPY
Sylph Ltd                 2.367   64.438  9/25/2036    KY    USD
US Capital                1.63611 54.774 12/1/2039     KY    USD
US Capital                1.63611 54.774 12/1/2039     KY    USD
USJ Acucar                9.875   67     11/9/2019     BR    USD
USJ Acucar                9.875   67     11/9/2019     BR    USD
Venezuela                13.625   68.25   8/15/2018    VE    USD
Venezuela                 7.75    44.065 10/13/2019    VE    USD
Venezuela                11.95    40.785  8/5/2031     VE    USD
Venezuela                12.75    45.19   8/23/2022    VE    USD
Venezuela                 9.25    39.645  9/15/2027    VE    USD
Venezuela                11.75    40.005 10/21/2026    VE    USD
Venezuela                 9       36.285  5/7/2023     VE    USD
Venezuela                 9.375   37.69   1/13/2034    VE    USD
Venezuela                13.625   72.25   8/15/2018    VE    USD
Venezuela                 7       34.23   3/31/2038    VE    USD
Venezuela                 7       59.19  12/1/2018     VE    USD



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Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Joseph Cardillo at
856-381-8268.


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