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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

            Monday, October 23, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 210


                            Headlines



A N T I G U A  & B A R B U D A

LIAT: Secures CDB Loan After Finances Take Hit From Hurricanes


B R A Z I L

BANCO DO BRASIL: S&P Rates New Senior Unsecured Notes 'BB'
BANCO HIPOTECARIO: Moody's Rates $400MM Class XLVIII Notes 'B3'
COSAN SA: Increased Stake in Comgas Rating Neutral, Fitch Says
JBS SA: Judge Reverses Expansion of Asset Freeze Affecting Owners
JBS SA: Moody's Cuts Corp. Family Rating to B3; Outlook Negative

RB CAPITAL: Moody's Ups Ratings on 3 Note Series to Ba3
USINAS SIDERURGICAS: Fitch Raises IDR to B; Outlook Stable


C H I L E

CORPORACION NACIONAL: Moody's Hikes BCA Rating to Ba1


C O S T A   R I C A

BANCO DE COSTA: Fitch Cuts Viability Rating to bb-; On Watch Neg.
BICSA: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Longterm Issuer Default Rating


E C U A D O R

ECUADOR: To Seek Exemption if OPEC Mandates Production Cuts
ECUADOR: S&P Rates US$2.5BB Senior Unsecured Notes 'B-'


G U A T E M A L A

GUATEMALA: S&P Lowers For. Curr. Sovereign Credit Rating to BB-
* S&P Lowers Long-Term ICRs of Three Guatemalan Banks to 'BB-'


M E X I C O

CEMENTOS PROGRESO: S&P Lowers CCR & ICR to 'BB-', Outlook Stable


V E N E Z U E L A

PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: Late on Bond Payments
VENEZUELA: Maduro Threatens to Repeat Regional Polls


X X X X X X X X X

* BOND PRICING: For the Week From Oct. 16 to Oct. 20, 2017


                            - - - - -


==============================
A N T I G U A  & B A R B U D A
==============================


LIAT: Secures CDB Loan After Finances Take Hit From Hurricanes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Caribbean360.com reports that regional carrier LIAT, operating as
Leeward Islands Air Transport, is on course to get some relief
from its shareholder governments after Hurricanes Irma and Maria
left a deeper hole in its finances.

The Antigua-based airline is soon to receive a US$7 million loan
secured by the governments of Barbados, Antigua and Barbuda and St
Vincent and the Grenadines, according to Caribbean360.com.

Chairman of LIAT's shareholder governments, Dr. Ralph Gonsalves
told journalists at a news conference that LIAT had to cancel 408
flights since it could not provide services to Dominica, St
Martin, Tortola and Puerto Rico which were significantly affected
by the Category 5 hurricanes last month, the report relays.

"These markets account for 30 per cent of the total flights and 35
per cent of total revenue," Dr. Gonsalves said, adding that this
translated into "revenue loss of EC$5 million (US$1.8 million),"
the report relays.

Dr. Gonsalves, who revealed that shareholders governments met,
said they were told that the financial impact of weather systems
this hurricane season would amount to EC$6.5 million (US$2.4
million) and market recovery would take as long as 12 months, the
report relays.

"Continuing, we will lose about US$780,000 on the St. Martin
route, about US$1.3 million on the Puerto Rico route, and about
US$950,000 on other route with the depression of the market," he
said, the report notes.

The Vincentian leader disclosed that LIAT was initially expected
to make an EC$2.8 million (US$1 million) operating profit this
year, the report says.

"But it is going to turn out that we are going to have a loss of
about EC$35.6 million (US$13.2 million). That is what is
forecast," he added.

As a result, a 15-year loan from the Caribbean Development Bank
was secured, the report discloses.

Antigua and Barbuda will be responsible for US$2.4 million;
Barbados, US$3.72 million; and St Vincent and the Grenadines,
US$840,000, the report cites.

                       About LIAT

LIAT, operating as Leeward Islands Air Transport, is an airline
headquartered on the grounds of V. C. Bird International Airport
in Antigua.  It operates high-frequency inter-island scheduled
services serving 21 destinations in the Caribbean.  The airline's
main base is VC Bird International Airport, Antigua and Barbuda,
with bases at Grantley Adams International Airport, Barbados and
Piarco International Airport, Trinidad and Tobago.

                         *     *     *

The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America, citing Trinidad
Express, on November 24, 2016, reported that the Barbados
government defended the operations of the cash-strapped regional
airline, LIAT, even as opposition legislators called for it to be
stop being a financial burden on the island. Both Prime Minister
Freundel Stuart and his Finance Minister, Chris Sinckler, defended
the airline, whose major shareholders are Antigua and Barbuda,
Barbados, Dominica and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. Mr. Stuart,
speaking in Parliament, said despite the criticism the value of
the airline should not be underestimated that the Antigua-based
LIAT remains "important to Barbados.

According to the TCR-LA in May 8, 2015, the Daily Observer said
that LIAT was attempting to lose excess baggage as part of
measures to make the carrier "a smaller airline in 2015."  In a
document, signed by Director of Human Resources Ilean Ramsey,
eligible employees were asked to opt to apply for voluntary
separation or early retirement packages to avoid being
made redundant, according to The Daily Observer.

TCRLA reported on Dec. 2, 2014, citing Caribbean360.com, that
chairman of the shareholder governments of the financially
troubled regional airline LIAT, Dr. Ralph Gonsalves said while he
is unaware of the details regarding any possible retrenchment of
employees, the airline needs to deal with its high cost of
operations.

The TCR-LA on March 10, 2014, citing Caribbean360.com, reported
that LIAT said it will take "decisive action" to deal with
unprofitable routes as the Antigua-based airline seeks to make its
operations financially viable.

On Sept. 23, 2013, the TCRLA, citing Trinidad and Tobago Newsday,
reported that there's much upheaval at the highest levels of
LIAT -- the Board and the Executive. Following the sudden
resignation of Chief Executive Officer Captain Ian Brunton, David
Evans replaced Mr. Brunton as chief executive officer.



===========
B R A Z I L
===========


BANCO DO BRASIL: S&P Rates New Senior Unsecured Notes 'BB'
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it has assigned its 'BB' issue rating
to Banco do Brasil S.A.'s (BdB; BB/Negative/B) proposed senior
unsecured notes.

"The rating reflects the notes' pari passu ranking with the bank's
other senior unsecured debt obligations, and as a result, they
have the same rating as the long-term issuer credit rating on the
bank," said S&P Global Ratings credit analyst Edgard Dias.
The notes should represent less than 1% of BdB's total funding
base, even though the amount is yet to be defined. Therefore, S&P
doesn't expect this issuance to change its view of the bank's
funding as above average. BdB will use the proceeds for general
financing.

S&P said, "The long-term issuer credit rating on BdB is two
notches lower than its stand-alone credit profile (SACP) and is at
the same level as our long-term foreign currency rating on Brazil.
Under our criteria, it's unlikely that we'd assign an issuer
credit rating to a Brazilian bank above that on the sovereign
because the bank would have to demonstrate a capacity to maintain
sufficient capital and liquidity to cover the significant stress
of a sovereign default. Additionally, BdB has significant asset
exposure to the sovereign because its liquid assets are largely
invested in sovereign bonds.

"We consider BdB a government-related entity (GRE) because the
Federative Republic of Brazil (BB/Negative/B) is the bank's
majority owner. We believe there is a very high likelihood that
the government would provide timely and sufficient extraordinary
support to BdB if needed, as it has done in the past."

BdB is the largest bank in Latin America. It continues to face
performance pressure due to deteriorating asset quality, but it
has prevented larger losses in 2016 and 2017 using the risky
strategy of renegotiating souring loans amid Brazil's recession.
S&P's concerned that more asset quality problems may arise or
that, at some point, the bank's loan-renegotiating strategy will
start jeopardizing its accrual from credit operations and its
profits. However, a key mitigating factor is that BdB had very
high profitability before Brazil's recession, helping the bank to
cope with asset quality pressure.

RATINGS LIST

  Rating Assigned

  Banco do Brasil S.A.
    Senior unsecured              BB


BANCO HIPOTECARIO: Moody's Rates $400MM Class XLVIII Notes 'B3'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a B3 global scale foreign
currency debt rating to Banco Hipotecario S.A.'s Class XLVIII
notes for a total amount of up to $400 million peso equivalent,
which will be due in 2022. The notes will be denominated in
Argentine Pesos, but subscribed and payable in US dollars at the
specified exchange rate. The notes, which will be offered in the
local and foreign capital markets, are governed by New York law.

The global ratings have positive outlook in line with the positive
outlook on the B3 Argentine Government Bond Rating.

The following rating was assigned to Banco Hipotecario S.A.:

  Class XLVIII notes in pesos equivalent for up to $400 million -
  B3 Global Foreign Currency Debt Rating

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating reflects Hipotecario's well diversified lending mix,
which supports improving profitability and good asset quality, as
well as its sound capitalization. However, these credit strengths
are offset by the bank's increasing reliance on market funds and
risks associated with the ongoing transition to a more normalized
operating environment.

Although Hipotecario remains being one of the market leaders in
the mortgage segment and this continues to constitute a
significant share of the bank's loan book, in recent years it has
grown more in consumer and corporate lending, generating a more
diversified revenue mix. In the first six months of 2017, net
income nearly doubled to 2.5% of tangible assets on an annualized
basis, after bottoming out at 1.3% in 2016 due in large part to
the bank's increasing reliance on more expensive market funding.
The rebound in profitability has been supported by strong growth
in non-interest income (mainly insurance services and credit card
fees) and strict cost control, which led to a decrease in
inflation-adjusted expenses.

Asset risk remains moderate, with a nonperforming loan ratio of
just 1.8% and a loan loss reserves of 100.5% of non-performing
loans as of June 2017, and capitalization is relatively strong,
with tangible common equity equal to 12% of risk weighted assets
ratio as of June 2017.

Due to a reduction in deposits from the Argentine government,
however, Hipotecario has become increasingly dependent on less
reliable market funds, which in addition to increasing the bank's
funding costs, exposes it to refinancing risk. Moody's estimates
that its market funds could potentially reach 45% of tangible
banking assets after the new notes issuance.

The bank will also face challenges as the country's operating
environment continues to normalize, including downward pressure on
lending spreads, capitalization, and asset quality. Nevertheless,
the outlook is positive, in line with the positive outlook on
Argentina's B3 sovereign rating, as the bank's ratings are
constrained by its strong credit interlinkages with the sovereign.
The outlook also considers the expected impact of market-friendly
policy reforms implemented by the current administration. These
reforms are resulting in a return to economic growth and a
continued decline in inflation this year, which in turn is
expected to drive a significant increase in lending opportunities,
particularly in the mortgage market.

What could move the rating up or down

An upgrade of the Argentine sovereign would put upward pressure on
Hipotecario's ratings, provided the bank continues to demonstrate
sound operating performance. While the bank does not face
downwards ratings pressure at this time, the outlook would likely
stabilize at the current rating level if the sovereign outlook
returns to stable.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Banks published
in September 2017.


COSAN SA: Increased Stake in Comgas Rating Neutral, Fitch Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
In Fitch Ratings' view, Cosan S.A. Industria e Comercio's (Cosan)
acquisition of a 16.77% stake in Companhia de Gas de Sao Paulo
(Comgas) is neutral for Cosan and Cosan Limited's ratings. The
deal follows the announcement that Shell Gas B.V, Integral
Investments B.V., and Shell Brazil Holding B.V. (jointly Shell)
exercised their put option on Comgas' shares against Cosan
Limited. Subsequently, Cosan will acquire the shares from Cosan
Limited.

According to transaction terms, Cosan Limited would pay the BRL1.1
billion put option through a combination of 4.99% of Cosan shares
and BRL423 million in cash: BRL209 million at the closing, and
BRL215 million one year later. As Cosan Limited will immediately
sell Comgas' shares to Cosan for the same amount, Cosan Limited
will receive sufficient cash to meet the BRL423 million
disbursement in two tranches plus BRL733 million, which will
provide additional liquidity to Cosan Limited. Fitch believes,
however, that Cosan Limited may use this amount for different
purposes, and will receive less in dividends from Cosan in the
future. Fitch forecasts Cosan Limited will report cash and total
debt of BRL1.6 billion and no short-term debt at year-end 2017,
when the Comgas-share deal is factored into the numbers without
any use of the proceeds received.

In Fitch's views, Cosan has sufficient cash to make the
acquisition payments as scheduled without pressuring its debt
service coverage ratios on a standalone basis and that no
additional debt should be required. In addition, Cosan's stake in
Comgas would increase to around 79% from 62%, which should be
credit-positive over the medium term. Fitch expects Cosan to
receive dividends of BRL580 million from Comgas in 2018, which
compares favorably with BRL450 million prior to the Comgas shares
acquisition.

Following payment of the first tranche scheduled for 2017, Fitch
projects Cosan will report a cash position of BRL500 million,
total debt of BRL5.7 billion, and short-term debt of BRL160
million as of Dec. 31, 2017. For 2018, Fitch expects Cosan to
report cash of over BRL950 million after the remaining
disbursement of BRL215 million for the acquisition. No material
debt repayments for 2019 are expected and the BRL501 million-
standby credit facility with three Brazilian banks also
strengthens the company's liquidity profile.

Fitch currently rates the companies as follows:

Cosan S.A. Industria e Comercio:

-- Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs)
    at 'BB+';

-- National scale long-term rating at 'AA+(bra)'.

The Rating Outlook for the FC IDR is Negative following the
Outlook for Brazil's sovereign rating, and Stable for the LC IDR
and National scale rating.

The rating on all related debt is 'BB+', as it is unconditionally
and irrevocably guaranteed by Cosan.

Cosan Limited

-- Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'BB' / Stable Outlook;
-- USD500 million senior unsecured global notes due 2024 at 'BB'.


JBS SA: Judge Reverses Expansion of Asset Freeze Affecting Owners
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Latin America Herald reports that a Brazilian judge overturned
a decision to expand an asset freeze affecting the jailed owners
of Sao Paulo-based meatpacking giant JBS and some of their family
members, officials said.

Judge Olindo Menezes overturned a ruling handed down two weeks ago
by a lower-court judge that increased the value of the embargo on
the assets of brothers Joesley and Wesley Batista and also allowed
that measure to be extended to their father, Jose Batista
Sobrinho, JBS's chief executive officer since his sons' arrest,
and other relatives, according to The Latin America Herald.

He found there were insufficient grounds for expanding the freeze
on the Batistas' assets while some of their legal proceedings are
still pending in higher courts, the report notes.

But since his ruling only halts the expansion of the embargo,
assets valued at BRL60 million (some US$19 million) that were
frozen in the first half of the year remain blocked, the report
notes.

The asset-freeze case is part of a wider investigation into
alleged favoritism on the part of state development bank BNDES in
the granting of loans to J&F Investimentos, the holding company
behind JBS, the world's largest meatpacker, the report discloses.

Prosecutors estimate that those purported irregularities cost
taxpayers at least BRL1.2 billion ($378 million), the report
notes.

The Batista brothers signed a plea deal earlier this year in which
they confessed to having paid bribes to hundreds of politicians,
including President Michel Temer, in exchange for favors for JBS
SA, the report relays.

That testimony led prosecutors to file bribery, obstruction of
justice and criminal conspiracy charges against Temer, the report
discloses.

In August, Temer's allies in Brazil's lower house of Congress
voted not to put him on trial for allegedly receiving bribes from
JBS dating back to 2010, the report relays.

The Chamber of Deputies is due to vote as early as next week on
whether to put the president on trial on obstruction of justice
charges, although he is once again expected to avoid prosecution
before the Supreme Court, the report notes.

The report relays that Joesley Batista, meanwhile, was taken into
custody on Sept. 10 for allegedly omitting or falsifying
information provided to prosecutors as part of his plea deal,
although the evidence he and his brother presented remains valid.

Wesley Batista was subsequently arrested three days later for
alleged insider trading related to the JBS owners' explosive
revelations to prosecutors, the report adds.


JBS SA: Moody's Cuts Corp. Family Rating to B3; Outlook Negative
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded JBS S.A. corporate family
rating to B3 from B2, senior unsecured ratings of its wholly-owned
subsidiary JBS USA Lux S.A. ("JBS USA") to B2 from B1 and JBS USA
senior secured ratings to B1 from Ba3. The outlook for all ratings
is negative. This concludes the review for downgrade initiated on
May 22, 2017 after executives of JBS S.A. and its controlling
entity, J&F Investimentos, entered into a plea bargain agreement
with the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office concerning allegations
of corruption.

Ratings downgraded:

Issuer: JBS S.A.

  LT Corporate Family Ratings: to B3 from B2

Issuer: JBS USA Lux S.A.

  $700 million GTD GLOBAL NOTES due 2020: to B2 from B1

  $1150 million GTD GLOBAL NOTES due 2021: to B2 from B1

  $2800 million GTD SR SEC TERM LOAN due 2022: to B1 from Ba3

  $750 million SR GLOBAL NOTES due 2024: to B2 from B1

  $900 million GTD GLOBAL NOTES due 2025: to B2 from B1

The outlook for all ratings is negative.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade incorporates Moody's view that the risks related to
judicial processes and investigations involving JBS's shareholders
and its executives remain high. The aforementioned processes
include an investigation by the Brazilian Attorney General on
possible breaches of the terms agreed in the Leniency Agreement of
J&F, investigations by CVM (Brazilian Securities and Exchange
Commission), possible US Department of Justice fines, and other
inquiries. Accordingly, uncertainty resurfaced following the new
audio recording of a conversation between Mr. Joesley Batista and
Mr. Ricardo Saud made public on September 4, which lead to the
revision of their benefits under the plea bargain agreement and
increased disputes among shareholders. Currently, the validity and
effects of the leniency agreement still hold, but Moody's believes
that the revision creates overhang, which could difficult future
asset sales and debt renegotiation with banks.

The stabilization agreement with banks was an important
development and reduced immediate liquidity concerns, still, JBS
continues largely dependent on the rolling over of short-term and
avoiding a concentration of maturities in mid-2018 is critical for
the credit. By the end of June 2017, the company had BRL11.3
billion in cash and the equivalent to BRL 2.8 billion (or USD848
billion) under revolving credit facilities available in the US,
which compares to BRL 18.3 billion in short-term debt. Moody's
does expect the absolute amount of short-term debt will gradually
reduce in the next few months with amortizations of at least BRL
4.6 billion, including amortizations under the stabilization
agreement (4 amortizations of 2.5% quarterly, as announced by the
company), for which the company could use proceeds from the sale
of farms in Uruguay, Paraguay and Argentina, for USD300 million,
and the use of 80% from the proceeds of the sale of Moy Park to
Pilgrim's Pride (~USD850 million), and strong cash flow
generation. Also further proceeds can come from the potential sale
of the Five Rivers cattle feedlot operation and its stake in
Vigor.

Corporate governance also remains a concern given increased
disputes between controlling shareholders and BNDES, mainly with
regards to company's leadership. Also, with the arrest of JBS's
CEO, a quick succession process needed to be executed. Both these
elements bring uncertainties on decision making and strategic
drivers for the longer run.

JBS S.A's B3 ratings incorporate risks regarding a series of
judicial processes and investigations, which can directly or
indirectly involve JBS, and its executives, and the extent to
which these developments could harm the company's liquidity and
market access. It also incorporates the strong reliance on banks
to roll-over short-term debt. Additionally it considers the
inherent volatility of the protein industry, which is subject to
risk factors such as weather conditions, diseases, supply
imbalances, and global trade variables, along with a history of
aggressive growth via acquisitions.

JBS's ratings continue to be supported by the strength of its
global operations as the world's largest protein producer and its
high diversification of protein products, raw material sourcing
and sales. The company's strategy to increase its global footprint
in higher value added and processed food segments has improved its
business profile and should support higher and more stable margins
over time and cash-flow over time.

The B2 senior unsecured ratings of JBS USA Lux are one notch
higher than the B3 Corporate Family Rating of JBS S.A reflecting
the majority proportion of total EBITDA (78%) generated by the US
operations compared to a lower proportion of total debt (51%). In
addition, debt holders of JBS USA enjoy a downstream guarantee
from parent JBS S.A. There are no upstream guarantees. The B1
secured debt instrument ratings of JBS USA Lux are notched above
its senior unsecured debt ratings, reflecting higher priority
claims of secured creditors.

The negative outlook incorporates the uncertainties on the
outcomes of judicial processes and investigations underway, along
with potential impacts to the group's liquidity and operations.

Ratings could be downgraded in case the rolling-over of short-term
debt proves unlikely, or if events that further undermine
liquidity are observed. Quantitatively, a downgrade could occur if
debt-to-EBITDA is sustained above 5.5x (4.9x in the LTM June
2017), EBITA/interest below 1.0x (2.0x in the LTM ended June 2017)
or CFO to net debt below 10% (11.5% in the LTM ended June 2017).
All credit metrics are adjusted according to Moody's standard
adjustments and definitions.

The ratings could be upgraded if reputational and event risks
(including legal) reduce considerably and JBS is able to improve
its liquidity profile with a cash cushion that consistently
exceeds its short-term maturities, while maintaining its operating
margins and positive free cash flow generation. An upgrade would
also require consistent healthy free cash flow, while maintaining
CFO to net debt above 15% (11.5% in the LTM June 2017) and debt-
to-EBITDA below 5.0x (4.9x in the LTM June 2017) on a sustained
basis.

Headquartered in Sao Paulo, Brazil, JBS S.A. ("JBS") is the
world's largest protein producer in terms of revenues, slaughter
capacity and production. It is the leader in beef, chicken and
leather and one of the leading lamb producers on a global basis,
and the second largest pork producer in the USA. The company has
large scale and diversification, with presence in more than 100
countries.

In the LTM ended June 2017, the company reported consolidated net
revenues of BRL 162 billion (USD50.2 billion), with adjusted
EBITDA margin of 8.1%. JBS USA beef, which represents the beef and
lamb operations in the US, Canada and Australia, is the largest
business segment, accounting for 42% of total revenues, JBS
Chicken USA (Pilgrim's Pride including Moy Park), accounts for
20%, while the US pork business contributes to 11%. JBS Mercosul,
which combines the beef operations in South America, represents
16% of total revenues. Brazil based Seara, comprises poultry, pork
and processed foods operations, and is responsible for 11% of
revenues.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global Protein
and Agriculture Industry published in June 2017.


RB CAPITAL: Moody's Ups Ratings on 3 Note Series to Ba3
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina Ltda. has upgraded to Ba3 from B1 (global
scale, local currency) and to A2.br from Baa1.br (national scale)
the ratings of 3rd series of certificates of RB Capital
Securitizadora S.A., the 4th series of certificates of RB Capital
Securitizadora S.A and the 42nd series of certificates of RB
Capital Securitizadora S.A. These three series of real estate
certificates (CRI) issued by RB Capital Securitizadora S.A. are
backed by built-to-suit lease agreements with Petroleo Brasileiro
S.A. -- Petrobras (Ba3 stable outlook).

The rating action follows Moody's decision to upgrade Petrobras'
ratings on October 17, 2017.

The full rating action is:

Issuer: RB Capital Securitizadora S.A.

  3rd series CRI backed by a built-to-suit lease agreement:
  Upgraded to Ba3 from B1 (global scale, local currency); Upgraded
  to A2.br from Baa1.br (national scale); and

  4th series CRI backed by a built-to-suit lease agreement:
  Upgraded to Ba3 from B1 (global scale, local currency); Upgraded
  to A2.br from Baa1.br (national scale); and

  42nd series CRI backed by a built-to-suit lease agreement:
  Upgraded to Ba3 from B1 (global scale, local currency); Upgraded
  to A2.br from Baa1.br (national scale);

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's views the certificates as being full pass through of
Petrobras' senior unsecured credit risk under the built-to-suit
lease agreements.

The Ba3 / A2.br ratings of the 3rd, 4th and 42nd series of
certificates issued by RB Capital Securitizadora S.A. are
primarily based on Petrobras' ability to make payments under the
underlying lease agreements. Also, Petrobras covers any trust
expenses. Finally, a termination event under the lease agreements
would result in a call under the rated certificates.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Any future changes on Petrobras' ratings will lead to a change in
the ratings assigned to the certificates.

RATING METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities" published in June 2015.


USINAS SIDERURGICAS: Fitch Raises IDR to B; Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Usinas Siderurgicas de Minas Gerais
S.A.'s (Usiminas) Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency Issuer
Default Ratings (IDRs) to 'B' from 'CCC' and National Scale rating
to 'BBB-(bra)' from 'CCC(bra)'. Fitch has also upgraded Usiminas'
senior unsecured notes to 'B /RR4' from 'CCC/RR4'. The corporate
ratings have been assigned a Stable Outlook.

The upgrade reflects the significant improvement in Usiminas'
credit risk profile, supported by a deleveraging trend and
manageable refinancing risks. It follows the final settlement of
its debt restructuring plan, including capital injection (BRL1
billion) and the upstreaming of cash from its jointly-controlled
iron ore subsidiary (BRL700 million). Usiminas' operating
performance has been showing significant improvement due to
temporary closing of a mill and several cost reduction
initiatives. The strong performance has also been mostly supported
by improved product mix, rising steel prices and some recovery of
flat steel demand in the Brazilian domestic market.

Usiminas needs to continue to improve its operating cash flow
(CFFO), which would allow its free cash flow to grow to and
consequently to enhance the company's liquidity position, for
further positive rating considerations. The ongoing shareholder
disputes continue to negatively overhang Usiminas' ratings.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Sustainability of Volumes are Key: After three years of sales
volume declines, Fitch expects flat steel volumes in Brazil to
show a modest recovery during 2017, around 5%, mostly supported by
an increase in exports from the automotive industry. Continued
recovery of flat steel volumes will likely occur during 2018, but
the speed and sustainability of this recovery remains highly
uncertain. The Brazilian flat steel apparent demand declined
approximately 11% to 10.3 million tons in 2016 from 11.5 million
in 2015 and 13.1 million tons in 2014 during the country's
economic recession.

Growing EBITDA: Usiminas' strategy to resize its operation to the
new reality of the Brazilian flat steel market and to avoid the
non-profitable export market, while improving its cost structure
has improved operating margins and reduced its capex requirements.
These initiatives together with improving product mix (focus on
galvanized products), ongoing price increases and some local
demand recovery in the flat steel market have boost Usiminas'
EBITDA generation. Fitch's base case projects EBITDA generation of
around BRL2 billion in 2017, a significant improvement from BRL437
million during 2016 and BRL200 million in 2015.

Modest FCF Growth: High interest expenses and growing working
capital requirements have pressured CFFO and have resulted in
negative free cash flow (FCF). During 2016, Usiminas' CFFO was
BRL186 million, and during the latest-12-month (LTM) period ended
on June 30 2017, it was negative in BRL124 million. For 2017,
Fitch expects CFFO to reach BRL1.3 billion while FCF should climb
to BRL90 million, after BRL220 million of capex. For 2018, Fitch
expects CFFO to benefit from lower interest payments due to
declining local interest rates and more normalized working capital
requirements. With capex projected to be around BRL350 million in
2018, FCF should be around BRL550 million.

Improved Capital Structure: Usiminas has successfully completed
all stages of its debt restructuring plan. Over the last 15
months, the company received a BRL1 billion capital injection,
upstreamed BRL700 million of cash from its jointly-controlled iron
ore subsidiary and extended 92% of its debt maturities for 10
years, with a three-year principal grace period. Per Fitch's
criteria, Usiminas' total debt was BRL7.3 billion as of June 30
2017 and net leverage, measured by Net Adjusted Debt/EBITDA was
3.4x, a significant improvement from the 9.4x reported one year
before. Fitch expects Usiminas' net leverage to be around 2.5x and
2.2x during 2017 and 2018, respectively.

Ongoing Shareholders Disputes: The extended legal disputes between
Usiminas' shareholders continue to elevate the company's business
risks. The lack of agreement regarding business strategy and the
recurring changes in management tends to slow down the decision
making process and provide little strategic clarity. Thus, this
issue continues to be a drag on Usiminas' ratings.

Business Position Hampered by Recession: Usiminas is the leading
flat steel producer in Brazil, with a 34% market-share. The
company has operations in multiple segments of the steel value
chain including mining, capital goods, services and distribution
centers. Usiminas' strategy was to operate under a vertical
integration model into iron ore and energy. Nevertheless, due to
the severe deterioration of the local steel industry in the last
years, the company has changed its business model to adjust to
current environment. The company has halted the primary operations
of one of its mill (Cubatao), maintaining only the rolling
operations, which are supplied by third parties' input. The
company is operating at around 70% to 75% of its capacity
utilization, per Fitch's calculation.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Usiminas has relatively similar business risk to its peer
Companhia Siderurgica Nacional (CSN; B-) in that both companies
are highly exposed to the local steel industry in Brazil. While
CSN shows greater business diversification with larger mining
operations and operations in the cement industry as well, Usiminas
robust business position in its niche markets and strong operating
margins are a competitive advantage. Both players show much weaker
business position compared to the other Brazilian steel producer
Gerdau S.A (Gerdau; BBB-), that has a diversified footprint of
operations with important operating cash flow generated from its
assets abroad, mainly in US, and flexible business model that
allow it to better withstand economic and commodities cycles.

From a financial risk perspective, Usiminas and CSN are far weaker
than Gerdau, which has been able to maintain positive free cash
flow generation, strong liquidity and no refinancing risks over
the last few years. CSN's lack of financial statements is a major
concern and its faces elevated refinancing risks in the medium to
long term. In contrast, after concluding its debt restructuring,
Usiminas has a more manageable debt schedule amortization.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within its ratings case for the issuer
include:

-- 5% increase in steel volumes in 2017 and limited recovery from
    2018 on;

-- Mid double-digit increase in domestic prices in 2017 and
    stable prices in 2018;

-- BRL250 million in capex in 2017 and BRL350 million in 2018;

KEY RECOVERY RATING ASSUMPTIONS

The recovery analysis assumes that Usiminas would be considered a
going concern in bankruptcy and that the company would be
reorganised rather than liquidated. Fitch has assumed a 10%
administrative claim.

Going-Concern Approach: Usiminas's going concern EBITDA is based
on June 2017 LTM EBITDA. The going-concern EBITDA estimate
reflects Fitch's view of a sustainable, post-reorganisation EBITDA
level upon which Fitch base the valuation of the company.

The going-concern EBITDA is 10% below June 2017 LTM EBITDA to
reflect further volatilities in the steel industry, in terms of
volume and prices, despite the already stressed EBITDA generation
of the company. The EV/EBITDA multiple applied is 5.5x, reflecting
Usiminas'strong market share in the flat steel market and it also
reflects a mid-cycle multiple.

Fitch applies a waterfall analysis to the post-default enterprise
value (EV) based on the relative claims of the debt in the capital
structure. Fitch debt waterfall assumptions take into account debt
at 31 December 2016. The waterfall results in a 37%/'RR4' Recovery
Rating for senior unsecured debt. Therefore, the senior unsecured
notes due 2018 are 'B'/'RR4'.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Positive Rating Action

-- Sustained turnaround in Usiminas' operating cash flow
    generation that drives positive FCF;

-- Maintenance of adequate liquidity position to avoid exposure
    to refinancing risks;

-- Faster than expected recovery of the local steel industry in
    Brazil;

-- Positive resolution of shareholder disputes.

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Negative Rating Action

-- Maintenance of net leverage ratio to levels above 4.5x during
    2018;

-- Inability to restore adequate liquidity after the payment of
    USD90 milllion in December 2017 and the bond (USD180 million)
    in January 2018

-- Recurring shareholders disputes that delay the expected
    positive trend in cash flow

LIQUIDITY

Usiminas' cash and marketable securities as of June 30, 2017 were
BRL1.9 billion, but Fitch believes readily available cash to
Usiminas to be only around BRL1.3 billion. This cash position is
tight to support operating cash volatilities in the short term and
debt maturities of BRL1.2 billion up to the end of 2018 (this
includes USD90 million to be paid do creditors in December 2017,
USD180 million of the 2018 unsecured bond and BRL327 million of
forfaiting transaction). As of June 30, 2017 Usiminas total
consolidated debt was BRL7.3 billion and BRL952 million was due in
the short term. Around 99% of the consolidated debt was at the
holding level.

On July 12, 2017, the subsidiary Mineracao Usiminas S.A.(Musa)
received BRL205 million from Porto Sudeste do Brasil S.A. from the
agreement to terminate the arbitration proceedings. At this point,
Fitch does not consider that Usiminas would be able to access this
cash or that another capital reduction at Musa is planned.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has upgraded Usiminas' ratings as follows:

-- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR to 'B' from 'CCC';
-- Long-Term Local Currency IDR to 'B' from 'CCC';
-- National Scale rating to 'BBB-(bra)' from 'CCC(bra)';
-- US$400 million notes due 2018 to 'B/RR4' from 'CCC/RR4'.

Fitch has assigned the corporate ratings a Stable Outlook.



=========
C H I L E
=========


CORPORACION NACIONAL: Moody's Hikes BCA Rating to Ba1
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed Corporacion Nacional del Cobre
de Chile's A3 long-term senior unsecured ratings and changed the
outlook to stable from negative. At the same time, Moody's raised
CODELCO's baseline credit assessment (BCA) to ba1 from ba2.

Ratings Actions:

Issuer: Corporacion Nacional del Cobre de Chile

Outlook, changed to stable from negative

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture due 2019, affirmed at
    A3

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture due 2020, affirmed at
    A3

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture due 2021, affirmed at
    A3

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture due 2022, affirmed at
    A3

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture due 2023, affirmed at
    A3

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture due 2024, affirmed at
    A3

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture due 2025, affirmed at
    A3

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture due 2027, affirmed at
    A3

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture due 2035, affirmed at
    A3

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture due 2036, affirmed at
    A3

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture due 2042, affirmed at
    A3

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture due 2043, affirmed at
    A3

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture due 2044, affirmed at
    A3

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture due 2047, affirmed at
    A3

RATINGS RATIONALE

The change in outlook to stable from negative on CODELCO's ratings
and the higher BCA reflect sustained improvement in the company's
credit profile due to strengthening operating performance, and a
more robust liquidity position.

CODELCO has benefited from the recovery in copper prices in the
past 12 months, but also from cost-reduction initiatives in
combination with operational adjustments. The company's more
efficient operational profile is further complemented by a limited
risk of a market downturn in the near term. Lower copper supply
levels should keep supply-demand in balance with the potential for
a small deficit, promoting longer-term operating stability. Credit
challenges related to high capital spending needs to maintain
production volumes and market volatility remain. However, both the
ongoing capitalization from the government and a greater capacity
to direct cash flows toward capex following recent liability
management initiatives will promote operating stability even in a
scenario leading to a weaker pricing environment.

Through 2019, Moody's expects the government to continue providing
substantial financial support primarily through capital injections
as part of the approved capitalization bill. Also, the stress
scenario presented in 2015/16 already underscored CODELCO's
resilience, reinforcing the government's capacity and willingness
to provide support in a weak operating environment. In the same
way, Moody's recognizes CODELCO's strong capacity to withstand
future stress scenarios and a very high likelihood of strong
government support. While government support will help mitigate
the degree of direct financing that CODELCO needs to raise over
the next few years, Moody's still expects the company to fund part
of its upcoming capital spending requirements with incremental
debt, keeping leverage above 3.0x.

CODELCO's ba1 BCA reflects its position as the world's largest
copper producer (approximately 1.77 million metric tons for the
twelve months ended June 2017 including its share of El Abra and
Anglo American Sur) and the second largest molybdenum producer,
its competitive cost position (currently positioned within the
second industry quartile) and its substantial reserve base. The
company's multiple-mine operating profile, which reduces the
degree of operational risk, together with its vertical
integration, which encompasses SX/EW and conventional smelting
facilities, further support its BCA ranking. This footprint
contributes to robust operating performance in a strong copper
market and acceptable performance during cyclical downturns.

The BCA also incorporates the ongoing large investment
requirements to increase production and improve falling ore
grades, requiring the issuance of incremental debt while
generating sustained negative free cash flow.

At the same time, CODELCO's A3 rating reflects its status as a
government related issuer ("GRI") and is based upon the following
inputs: (i) the company's baseline credit assessment (BCA) at ba1,
a measure of its intrinsic risk regardless of its controlling
entity; (ii) the Chilean Government's Aa3 bond rating; and (iii)
Moody's assumptions of high support from the government of Chile
and high dependence between CODELCO and the government. The
government's high level of support provides four notches of uplift
to CODELCO's BCA.

The capitalization law enacted in October 2014 by the Chilean
Congress is a USD4 billion plan which includes USD3billion in
direct capital injections of which the remaining USD1.9bn will
likely be dispersed through 2019. Moody's estimates annual capital
expenditures ranging between USD3.5 billion and USD4.5 billion
annually over the 2017-19 period, mostly directed to key
structural projects, namely Chuquicamata, El Teniente and Andina.
The company's current investment plans, combined with a
competitive cost position and stable production levels, will be
key to a strengthening credit profile.

Positive pressure on CODELCO's ratings or outlook could arise if
copper prices improve significantly and are sustained at higher
levels, leading to stronger cash flow, more robust liquidity and a
lighter debt burden. CODELCO's BCA could be raised with stronger
credit metrics such that leverage (adjusted gross debt to EBITDA)
remains below 3.0x, with interest coverage (adjusted EBIT/Interest
expense) maintained above 4.0x and adjusted EBIT margins sustained
above 8%.

The ratings or outlook could suffer negative pressure should
earnings contract for a prolonged period or if CODELCO is unable
to maintain costs within the second quartile of the industry. A
lower BCA could be considered if its leverage ratio (adjusted
gross debt to EBITDA) does not trend back towards 3.5x, and
interest coverage (adjusted EBIT/interest expense) remains below
3.5x or if EBIT margins falls to levels below 7%, all on a
sustainable basis. A marked deterioration in the company's
liquidity position could also precipitate a downgrade. Any
indication of a decline in the level of support from the
government of Chile would also put downward pressure on the
company's ratings.

The methodologies used in these ratings were Global Mining
Industry published in August 2014, and Government-Related Issuers
published in August 2017.

Headquartered in Santiago, Chile, Corporacion Nacional del Cobre
de Chile (CODELCO) is 100% owned by the Chilean State and is the
largest producer of copper globally, holding an approximate 9%
share of mined copper production. The company also ranks as one of
the top two global molybdenum (moly) producers (as a by-product of
copper production) with a market share of approximately 10%.
Operating through seven mining divisions, Chuquicamata, Radomiro
Tomic, Ministro Hales, Andina, El Teniente, Salvador, Gabriela
Mistral, and Ventanas (refinery), CODELCO's operations include
several world class mines from a reserve, production capacity, and
cost perspective, as well as smelting and refining capability. In
addition, CODELCO owns 49% of the El Abra mining operation in
Chile and is part of a joint venture with Mitsui & Co. Ltd that
owns a 29.5% interest in Anglo American Sur - and CODELCO owns,
through this joint venture, 20% of Anglo American Sur. Revenues
for the 12 months ending June 30, 2017 were around USD12.1
billion.



===================
C O S T A   R I C A
===================


BANCO DE COSTA: Fitch Cuts Viability Rating to bb-; On Watch Neg.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Banco de Costa Rica's (BCR) Viability
Rating (VR) to 'bb-' from 'bb' and simultaneously placed it on
Rating Watch Negative. Fitch has also affirmed BCR's Long-Term
Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) at 'BB' with a Stable Outlook, since
these ratings are support driven and not currently influenced by
the VR.

Fitch downgraded BCR's VR based on a reassessment of the bank's
management and risk appetite after two board members resigned and
the remaining members were temporarily suspended in the initial
stages of a sanctions process by the Costa Rican government. The
sanctions are in response to a scandal over loans made to a
company accused of influence peddling and other failures of
oversight by BCR's board. Fitch's VRs are opinions on the
standalone business and financial profile of a bank and do not
factor in any extraordinary support that the bank could
potentially receive if needed.

The government has appointed a new board of directors, and so far
reputational risk has not materially affected the bank's financial
performance or the stability of its deposits. However, Fitch
believes these events illustrate significant weaknesses in the
bank's corporate governance framework that have deteriorated the
protection of stakeholder's interest, while challenging and
testing the quality of its risk controls and distracting the
bank's executive bodies from their usual strategic objectives.

The Rating Watch Negative reflects that the VR could be further
downgraded if there are additional corporate governance events
that potentially weaken the bank's funding profile and management
quality. According to Fitch's criteria, a bank's ratings may
experience considerable downward pressure from significant
governance weaknesses or failings that are not adequately
mitigated.

The affirmation of BCR's IDRs, senior debt ratings, and National-
scale ratings reflects the support that the bank would likely
receive from the government, if needed. In Fitch's opinion,
despite the aforementioned events, the government's willingness to
collaborate financially with BCR has not deteriorated, in addition
to the explicit guarantee that benefits the bank.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - IDRs, SENIOR DEBT, AND NATIONAL RATINGS

The bank's IDRs, senior debt ratings, and National ratings are
driven by the potential support of the Costa Rican government
(BB/Stable), as stated in the National Banking System Law.
According to this law, all state-owned banks have the guarantee
and full collaboration of the state. The explicit guarantee allows
BCR's Long-Term IDRs, senior debt ratings and Outlooks to be
aligned with the sovereign rating.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - VR

BCR's VR is highly influenced by its risk appetite and risk
controls which have weakened materially as a result of the recent
corporate governance events. This rating also reflects the
stability and diversification of its deposit base, which has been
resilient. Fitch also considers the bank's strong franchise,
operating environment's big influence on its performance,
consistent asset quality and moderate profitability and
capitalization.

BCR benefits from granular and stable base deposits due to the
explicit guarantee of the state. BCR with the rest of Costa Rican
state-owned banks lead the local currency deposits market. Also,
the entity has developed and maintained a diversified funding mix.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - SUPPORT RATING, SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

BCR's Support Rating (SR) of '3' reflects Fitch's opinion that
there is a moderate probability of support from the state. In
addition, the bank has a clear policy role and the explicit
support of the state. The Support rating level is limited by the
sovereign rating. The bank's Support Rating Floor (SRF) is
equalized to the sovereign rating, given the explicit guarantee
from the government toward the bank, and its systemic importance.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - IDRs, VR, NATIONAL RATINGS, SR, SRF AND
SENIOR DEBT

Changes in Costa Rica's sovereign rating may trigger similar
changes in BCR's IDRs, SR, SRF, and senior debt ratings.

The VR could be downgraded if the bank's credit fundamentals
materially weaken further as a result of additional corporate
governance events. Material negative implications in its yet
strong liquidity and funding profile could result in a downgrade
of its VR, although this is not Fitch's baseline scenario.
Conversely, the VR could be affirmed and removed from Negative
Watch if the bank's corporate governance standards and its
management framework are normalized over a short timeframe, so
that no material negative implications arise on its business and
financial profile.

BCR's national ratings are less likely to change, as the
government will continue to guarantee the bank's senior
obligations, and Fitch does not expect a change in the bank's
relative creditworthiness as compared to other local peers.

Fitch has downgraded BCR's ratings as follows:

-- Viability Rating to 'bb-' from 'bb'; placed on Rating Watch
    Negative.

Fitch has affirmed BCR's ratings as follows:

-- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR at 'BB'; Outlook Stable;
-- Short-Term Foreign Currency IDR at 'B';
-- Long-Term Local Currency IDR at 'BB'; Outlook Stable;
-- Short-Term Local Currency IDR at 'B';
-- Long-term senior unsecured bonds at 'BB';
-- Support Rating at '3';
-- Support Rating Floor at 'BB';
-- Long-term National Rating at 'AA+(cri)'; Outlook Stable;
-- Short-term National Rating at 'F1+(cri)';
-- Programa de Emisiones de Bonos Estandarizados del Banco de
    Costa Rica 2012 at 'AA+(cri)';
-- Programa de Emisiones de Papel Comercial del Banco de Costa
    Rica 2012 at 'F1+(cri)'.
-- Programa de Emisiones de Bonos Estandarizados Dolares-BCR 2016
    at 'AA+(cri)';
-- Programa de Emisiones de Bonos Estandarizados Colones-BCR 2016
    at 'AA+(cri)';
-- Programa de Emisiones de Papel Comercial Dolares-BCR 2016 at
    'F1+(cri)';
-- Programa de Emisiones de Papel Comercial Colones-BCR 2016 at
    'F1+(cri)'.


BICSA: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Longterm Issuer Default Rating
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Banco Internacional de Costa Rica,
S.A.'s (BICSA) Long- and Short-Term Foreign Currency Issuer
Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB' and 'B', respectively, following
the downgrade of Banco de Costa Rica's (BCR; BICSA's main
shareholder) Viability Rating (VR) and the affirmation of its
support-driven IDRs. The Rating Outlook of the long-term ratings
is Stable. BICSA's National scale and support ratings were also
affirmed, while no rating action has been taken on the VR.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS, National-Scale and Support Ratings

BICSA's IDRs are driven by the support it would receive, if
needed, from its shareholders. BICSA is a subsidiary of both BCR
and Banco Nacional de Costa Rica (BNCR), which own 51% and 49% of
BICSA, respectively. Fitch believes that BICSA is core to its
parents given the significant role that the bank plays to its
owners' regional objectives, and the shared reputational risk
given their integration. Therefore, the ratings of BICSA are
equalized with its parents'. The affirmation of the bank's Support
Rating reflects Fitch's view that the probability of support
remains unchanged.

BCR's and BNCR's long-term IDRs of 'BB'/Outlook Stable are
support-driven an equalized to the Costa Rican sovereign in view
of an explicit guarantee. Fitch believes that the parent's IDRs
reflect their ability to support BICSA.

In 2016, BICSA received support from both BCR and BNCR to face
liquidity concerns at that time, in the form of temporary deposits
and asset sales. Also, both banks have active representatives in
BICSA's board of directors and other operative committees.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRS, National-Scale and Support Ratings

As the IDRs, Support, and national-scale ratings are driven by the
support of BCR and BNCR, any changes in the ratings of its parents
would result in similar actions to BICSA's respective ratings. The
IDRs and support ratings could be downgraded if Fitch perceives a
diminished strategic importance of the bank to its parents, or if
the capacity or willingness for support changes. National-scale
ratings are local relativities of creditworthiness and, therefore,
could potentially change depending on how BICSA's IDRs compare to
other rated entities in Panama.

The rating actions are as follows:

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

-- Foreign currency Long-Term IDR at 'BB'; Outlook Stable;

-- Foreign currency Short-Term IDR at 'B';

-- Support Rating at '3';

-- National Long-Term Rating at 'A+(pan)'; Outlook Stable;

-- National Short-Term Rating at 'F1(pan)';

-- Senior unsecured debt National Long-Term Rating at 'A+(pan)';

-- Senior unsecured debt National Short-Term Rating at 'F1(pan)'.

No action was taken on the following ratings:

-- Viability Rating of 'b+'.



=============
E C U A D O R
=============


ECUADOR: To Seek Exemption if OPEC Mandates Production Cuts
-----------------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that Ecuador will request an exemption if its
partners in the Organization of Oil-Exporting Countries decide to
cut output further in a bid to boost the price of crude, the
Andean nation's minister of hydrocarbons said.

"I go to OPEC in Vienna at the end of November and Ecuador's
argument will be to request the possibility of not complying with
the (production) targets established by OPEC," Carlos Perez told
reporters who accompanied him on a visit to the Block 43 oilfields
in the eastern province of Orellana, according to EFE News.

Ecuador needs to boost petroleum production to address its budget
deficit, the minister said, the report notes.

Even so, he said that President Lenin Moreno's government supports
the overall OPEC strategy, the report relays.

Earlier this year, OPEC asked member-states to reduce output in a
bid to keep prices from falling any further, the report discloses.
In the case of Ecuador, the cartel's smallest producer, the
guidelines called for a cut of 25,600 barrels per day, the report
relays.

Mr. Perez acknowledged that while Quito initially reduced
production by 80 percent of the specified amount, compliance has
since slipped to 60 percent, the report relays.

The production quotas are due to be reviewed next March, the
minister said, pointing out that much larger producers than
Ecuador have sought and received exemptions in the past, EFE
notes.

"We have to increase production by around 50,000 additional
barrels, to 580,000 barrels (per day) in 2018," Mr. Perez said,
adding that the expansion would generate an additional $2 billion
for the treasury, the report relays.

In response to a question, Perez said OPEC will not punish Ecuador
for exceeding its quota and that the government is requesting the
exemption because it "wishes to follow the correct path," the
report relays.

"But nobody forces us to comply with this," he said, the report
adds.


ECUADOR: S&P Rates US$2.5BB Senior Unsecured Notes 'B-'
-------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its 'B-' issue rating on the Republic
of Ecuador's senior unsecured notes for a total amount of US$2.5
billion. The notes are due in October 2027 and have a coupon of
8.875%. The rating on the notes is the same as the long-term
foreign currency sovereign credit rating on Ecuador.

RATINGS LIST

  Republic of Ecuador
   Sovereign Credit Rating        B-/Stable/B

  New Rating

  Republic of Ecuador
   Senior Unsecured
    Notes due 2027                B-



=================
G U A T E M A L A
=================


GUATEMALA: S&P Lowers For. Curr. Sovereign Credit Rating to BB-
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings, on Oct. 18, 2017, lowered its long-term
foreign currency sovereign credit rating on the Republic of
Guatemala to 'BB-' from 'BB' and its long-term local currency
sovereign credit rating to 'BB' from 'BB+'. The outlook is stable.
S&P also affirmed its 'B' short-term foreign and local currency
sovereign credit ratings on Guatemala. At the same time, S&P
lowered the transfer and convertibility assessment to 'BB+' from
'BBB-'.

OUTLOOK

S&P said, "The stable outlook balances the economic and political
challenges of the country with our expectation of low fiscal and
low external deficits, stable debt level, and the country's sound
monetary policy.

"We could lower the ratings over the next 12-24 months if
political conflict escalates to a degree that it further affects
not only economic growth prospects but also sustainable public
finances. Our debt assessment could worsen and affect the ratings
if interest payments surpass 15% of general government revenues.

"Over the same period, we could raise the ratings if the
government is able to propose and implement a reform agenda that
strengthens Guatemala's governability and public institutions,
increases its revenue, and bolsters its GDP growth prospects."

RATIONALE

The downgrade reflects the deceleration in Guatemala's economic
growth that S&P expects to persist over the next two years, which
is related to the country's recurrent political instability and
weak government institutions. Ratings incorporate Guatemala's
improved external position driven by high remittances growth,
stable debt to GDP as fiscal deficits have been declining, and
sound monetary policy that has kept inflation under control.

Institutional and economic profile: Political instability and weak
government institutions are affecting the sovereign's ability to
promote economic growth

-- Political instability has resumed, now involving not only the
    executive, but also the legislative, branch of government,
    which affects investors' confidence.

-- The government's inability to speed up public infrastructure
    investment and to approve and implement structural reforms
    continues affecting economic growth prospects.

-- High remittances growth is precluding further economic growth
    deterioration, but this might be temporary.

An accusation by the International Commission Against Impunity in
Guatemala (CICIG) that President Jimmy Morales received illegal
financing during his campaign created political instability again
this year. This was exacerbated as the president unsuccessfully
tried to expel CICIG's commissioner and Congress approved reforms
to the penal code to abrogate such felonies--several members of
Congress face similar accusations. Reforms were later rejected
given popular pressure.

Regardless of when and how these judicial processes end, current
political instability signals the weak checks and balances between
institutions. In addition, unlike previous political crises,
congressional and presidential elections are not happening soon --
they're scheduled for June 2019 -- which could extend political
instability and create obstacles for the approval of highly needed
reforms. This scandal severely damaged the president's legitimacy
to promote a comprehensive fiscal reform.

The political instability further limits the government's already
weak capacity to execute public infrastructure investment and
could have an impact on its already low revenue collection.

S&P forecasts Guatemala's real per capita GDP growth to average
0.9% in 2017-2019, below the 1.4% of the previous three years,
which leads it to apply a negative adjustment in its economic
assessment for below-average economic growth. This slower growth
rate will continue to be insufficient to reverse the country's
increasing poverty levels and to significantly increase its low
GDP per capita, at US$4,200 in 2016.

In 2016, economic growth decelerated to 3% from 4.15% in 2015,
reflecting the lowest gross domestic investment as a share of GDP
since 2010, and a goods and services exports decline of 1.8%.
Further economic growth deceleration was precluded by a 13.4%
surge in remittances that supported real domestic demand growth of
4.5%. While remittances growth of 16% as of August 2017 would
continue supporting Guatemala's economic growth this year, S&P
believes that double-digit increases in remittances could be
temporary, which could affect real domestic demand and economic
growth in the coming years.

Flexibility and performance profile: Macroeconomic stability
benefits from low fiscal deficits, an improved external position,
and a sound monetary policy that keeps inflation within target.

-- Fiscal deficits will remain low, despite low general
    government revenues.

-- S&P expects the net general government debt level to stay
    stable, around 18% of GDP over the next three years, though
    still at a high 163% compared with government revenues.

-- S&P expects Guatemala's external position to continue
    improving, reflecting lower trade deficits and a surge in
    remittances.

-- Monetary policy remains sound, and overall contingent
    liabilities are low.

Since 2014, general government expenditure has been decelerating,
affecting infrastructure investment and explaining the reduction
in the general government deficit to 1.08% of GDP in 2016. More so
than a prudent fiscal policy, a declining fiscal deficit reflects
the government's institutional weaknesses. Budget under-execution
remains high in 2017, which makes it difficult for the government
to justify an increased deficit in the 2018 budget.

Fiscal results also show the highly limited ability of the
sovereign to increase its revenues that have remained below 11% of
GDP over the last two years. Without fiscal reform, it is highly
unlikely that these revenues could surpass 12% of GDP over the
next years, especially considering the technological and personnel
limitations of the revenue collection authority (SAT).

Following low general government deficits, we expect net general
government to stay around 18% of GDP over the next two years.
However, debt remains high compared with government revenue, at
163%. Interest payments would remain below 15% of general
government revenues over the same period. If interest payments are
above this threshold in coming years, our debt assessment could
worsen.

As of August 2017, 51% of its debt is denominated in U.S. dollars,
which exposes the sovereign to a sudden quetzal depreciation.
Although, this ratio is down from 58% in 2012. Balancing this
exposure is that 74% of its debt is under a fixed interest rate,
and its maturity profile is stable over the next three years. In
addition, most of its external debt--which represented 46% of
total debt as of August 2017--is with multilateral institutions.

Externally, the country continues to benefit from low oil prices,
an improved trade deficit, and remittances growth. Guatemala
posted a surplus in the current account in 2016 that could be seen
again this year as growth in remittances stays strong. We expect
that toward 2020, remittances growth will return to the single
digits, which could push the current account to deficit territory
again.

Accordingly, S&P forecasts Guatemala's narrow net external debt to
drop to 25% of current account receipts this year and hover around
20% during 2018-2020, while its gross external financing needs
would average 83% of current account receipts and usable reserves
over the same period. Net foreign direct investment has declined
consistently since 2012, to 1.54% of GDP in 2016. Nevertheless, it
should continue to be enough to cover future current account
deficits.

Guatemala's concentration in trade with the U.S.--34% of its
exports go to that market--remains a source of vulnerability,
despite improving diversification. Along with this, close to 80%
of remittances comes from the U.S. Both expose the sovereign to
sudden changes in U.S. trade and immigration policies. While the
country's external data still show shortcomings, relevant
improvements in errors and omissions and overall consistency of
external data led S&P to remove the negative adjustment for
material data inconsistency that we previously factored into its
analysis.

Monetary policy continues to reflect the central bank's mandate to
control inflation, as well as its operational independence,
despite recurrent political instability. Low inflation also
reflects the decline in oil prices and overall currency stability
over the last years. S&P estimates inflation will stay within the
central bank's target of 4% (plus/minus 1%) and the monetary
policy rate will remain stable in the coming two years.

The Guatemalan banking system remains stable. However, the credit
growth rate has been decreasing in the past 18 months, reflecting
low public and private investment dynamism. Nonperforming assets
have been consistently below 3% of total lending in the past five
years, though in 2016, this ratio increased to 2.79% at year-end
from 1.9% at the end of 2015. On the other hand, credit losses
have been less than 1%. Lending in foreign currency was 39.9% of
total lending as of August 2017--up from 30% at year-end 2010--
which is a source of vulnerability to external shocks.

The banking system's compound annual growth rate over the past
four years was 10.5%, and the credit-to-GDP ratio is estimated at
about 37% at year-end 2017 and 2018, up from 30% in 2010. S&P
Global Ratings classifies the banking sector of Guatemala in group
'6' under its Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment (BICRA).
BICRAs are grouped on a scale from '1' to '10', ranging from what
we view as the lowest-risk banking systems (group '1') to the
highest-risk (group '10').

Other contingent liabilities are low. Guarantee debt to the
nonfinancial public sector is limited. External debt service
payments from the rest of the public sector account for less than
1% of total sovereign debt service in 2018 and 2019, while
transfers from the central government to its main government-
related entities (electricity company, telecommunication company,
port companies, and railway company) for operating and capital
expenditures accounted for only Guatemalan quetzal (GTQ) 280
million in 2016 (0.05% of GDP).

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable (see 'Related Criteria And Research'). At
the onset of the committee, the chair confirmed that the
information provided to the Rating Committee by the primary
analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and was sufficient
for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee agreed that the "economic assessment" had
deteriorated and that the "external assessment" had improved. All
other key rating factors were unchanged.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.

RATINGS LIST

  Downgraded; Ratings Affirmed
                                     To            From
  Guatemala (Republic of)
   Sovereign Credit Rating
    Foreign Currency                 BB-/Stable/B  BB/Negative/B
    Local Currency                   BB/Stable/B   BB+/Negative/B

  Downgraded
                                          To            From
  Guatemala (Republic of)
   Senior Unsecured                       BB-           BB
   Transfer & Convertibility Assessment   BB+           BBB-


* S&P Lowers Long-Term ICRs of Three Guatemalan Banks to 'BB-'
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its long-term ICRs on Banco Industrial
S.A. (BI), Banco G&T Continental S.A. (Banco G&TC), and Banco
Agromercantil de Guatemala S.A. (BAM) to 'BB-' from 'BB'. At the
same time, S&P affirmed its short-term ICRs on the banks at 'B'.
S&P's also lowering its issue-level rating on Intertrust SPV
(Cayman) Ltd.'s $300 million senior notes due April 10, 2019 ,
which BAM guarantees, to 'BB-' from 'BB'. The outlook on BI, Banco
G&TC, and BAM is now stable.

S&P said, "We revised our BICRA score on Guatemala (BB-/Stable/B)
to group '7' from '6' as a result of our revision of the economic
risk score to '8' from '7'. The latter reflects our perception of
weaker economic resilience and increasing economic imbalances,
which lower the Guatemalan banks' ability to withstand external
shocks. As a result of a weaker economic risk along with an
unchanged industry risk score at '5', we revised the anchor for
banks operating in Guatemala to 'bb' from 'bb+'. The trend on
economic and industry risks remains stable.

"We perceive higher economic risk in the Guatemalan banking system
given that persistent political instability has continued to
pressure the country's economic growth. This slower real GDP
growth rate--projected at about 3.3% in 2018 and 2019--will
continue to be insufficient to reverse the country's rising
poverty level and to significantly increase its low GDP per
capita, at $4,200 in 2016. Growth in remittances was in double
digits in 2016 and 2017, offsetting additional pressure in the
economy from the low public- and private-sector investment.
However, robust remittance flows could be temporary because they
depend on the U.S. immigration policy. An adverse shift in the
latter could crimp real demand and economic growth in Guatemala in
a short-term period. Moreover, the slower economic growth in
Guatemala has put a lid on the banking system's credit expansion.
In real terms, credit to the private sector expanded at around 2%
during 2016 and 2017, and we expect similar growth in 2018 and
2019. Therefore, we believe that the banking system is going
through a correction phase, increasing economic imbalances. So
far, the correction phase hasn't caused higher credit losses for
domestic banks. However, if economic conditions remain unchanged,
credit growth will remain subdued. Under such a scenario,
Guatemalan banks' nonperforming assets could climb to around 3% in
2018, denting profitability (through higher provisioning
requirements) and capitalization metrics. The trend on economic
risk remains stable.

"Our opinion about Guatemala's industry risk remains unchanged. We
recognize that Guatemala has a weak regulatory track record,
although some improvements have strengthened the regulatory
framework and the scope of supervision. Nonetheless, the current
regulatory framework still lags international standards, such as
the adoption and implementation of Basel III, which Guatemala will
complete doing so by 2021. Conversely, the competitive dynamics
risks remain moderate thanks to the banking sector's sound
profitability, focus on simple banking products, and absence of
significant market distortions. Nonbank financial institutions'
market share has remained low, below 4%. Guatemala's banking
system has a historically stable core customer deposit base and
access to credit lines from multilateral lending agencies.
However, the small and underdeveloped domestic capital market
still prevents diversification of funding sources and limits
financial flexibility. The trend on industry risk remains stable.

"As a result of a lower anchor for banks operating in Guatemala,
we revised the SACP on Banco Industrial and Banco G&T Continental
to 'bb' from 'bb+', and on BAM to 'bb-' from 'bb'. We also lowered
the long-term ICRs on these banks to 'BB- ' from 'BB', following
the sovereign's rating action.

"Our ICRs on BI continue to reflect our view of its solid market
position, mainly in the commercial segment as the largest
financial institution in the country. They also reflect the bank's
projected risk-adjusted capital (RAC) ratio of 5% for the next 12
months, reflecting its internal capital generation capacity. Our
assessment also takes into account above-average dollarization in
BI's balance sheet and its stable funding base that relies on
retail deposits. BI has manageable short-term obligations.

"Our ICRs on Banco G&TC reflect its large market share as one of
the top financial institutions in the country. The capital and
earnings assessment on the bank remains moderate based on a
projected RAC ratio at around 5% for the next 12 months. Our
assessment also takes into account of the bank's highly dollarized
balance sheet and stable funding base, relying on retail deposits
with manageable short-term obligations.

"The ratings on Guatemala limit those on BI and Banco G&TC because
we don't believe these entities would withstand a stress scenario
for capital and liquidity, given their significant exposure to the
sovereign, in terms of government bonds and loans to local
enterprises. This is because we rarely rate financial institutions
above the long-term sovereign rating given that, during sovereign
stress, the latter's regulatory and supervisory powers may
restrict a bank's or financial system's flexibility, and because
banks are affected by many of the same economic factors that cause
sovereign stress."

The ICRs on BAM reflect its solid market share in the Guatemalan
banking industry and business diversification. The ratings also
incorporate our forecasted average RAC ratio of 5.63% for 2017 and
2018. Although the exchange rate of Guatemalan quetzals to dollars
has remained stable and appreciating, one of the bank's main risks
is its still high dollar-denominated loan portfolio compared to
the system average. Deposits remain BAM's primary source of
funding, providing enough liquidity to face its short-term
obligations.

BAM is a core subsidiary of Bancolombia, S. A. y Companias
Subordinadas (BBB-/Negative/A-3). Nevertheless, the foreign-
currency rating on Guatemala limits the rating on BAM given that
it's fully exposed to Guatemalan economy.



===========
M E X I C O
===========


CEMENTOS PROGRESO: S&P Lowers CCR & ICR to 'BB-', Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its long-term corporate credit and
issue-level ratings on Cementos Progreso S.A. (CemPro) to 'BB-'
from 'BB' to parallel our long-term sovereign foreign currency
rating on the Republic of Guatemala. At the same time, S&P revised
its outlook on CemPro to stable from negative.

The downgrade of CemPro follows a similar rating action on the
Republic of Guatemala (see "Guatemala Long-Term Foreign Currency
Rating Lowered To 'BB-' On Weaker Growth Prospects And Political
Instability," published Oct. 18, 2017). S&P said, "We believe it's
unlikely that CemPro would overcome a sovereign default, which
prevents us from rating the company above its sovereign's long-
term foreign currency rating. Ultimately, if the sovereign's
foreign currency default occurs, there is a high likelihood that
CemPro would default as well, reflecting our view that the
company's operations are highly correlated to Guatemala's
macroeconomic conditions."



=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================


PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: Late on Bond Payments
---------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that one week before Venezuela faces a critical
debt payment, the distressed petro-state is already late on a
series of smaller bills.

The nation's state-owned oil giant PDVSA, has two major bond
payments totaling about $2 billion due in the next weeks,
according to RJR News.

While the market expects the company to avoid default, the missed
payments have rattled investors and raised fresh questions about
how long embattled President Nicolas Maduro's regime might last,
the report notes.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Nov. 22, 2016, Moody's Investors Service assigned a Caa3 rating to
Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA)'s 8.5% $3.4 billion in senior
secured notes due 2020.  The outlook on the rating in negative.

On Oct. 28, 2016, PDVSA exchanged its 5.250% senior notes due 2017
and 8.50% senior notes due 2017 for 8.50% $3,367,529,000 senior
secured notes due in October 2020.  The 2020 notes will be
amortized in four equal installments, starting in 2017.  The 2020
notes are secured by a first-priority security interest on 50.1%
of the capital stock of CITGO Holding, Inc. (Caa1 stable) and are
unconditionally and irrevocably guaranteed by PDVSA Petroleo, S.A.
(unrated).


VENEZUELA: Maduro Threatens to Repeat Regional Polls
----------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro
threatened to repeat regional elections in states where the ruling
National Constituent Assembly (ANC) is not recognized, referring
to the five elected governors-elect who have refused to swear
before this power.

"Anyone who wants to be governor will have to recognize the
National Constituent Assembly but elections will be repeated in
states where the Constituent Assembly is not recognized," Mr.
Maduro insisted on a mandatory radio and television channel,
according to EFE News.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Sept. 28, 2017, S&P Global Ratings suspended its 'CCC-' local
currency issue ratings on four of the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela's local currency-denominated debt issues. S&P said, "At
the same time, S&P affirmed our 'CCC-' long-term foreign and local
currency sovereign issuer credit ratings. The outlook on the long-
term ratings is negative. In addition, we affirmed our 'C' short-
term foreign and local currency sovereign issuer credit ratings.
The transfer and convertibility assessment remains 'CCC-'."



=================
X X X X X X X X X
=================


* BOND PRICING: For the Week From Oct. 16 to Oct. 20, 2017
---------------------------------------------------------

Issuer Name               Cpn     Price   Maturity  Country  Curr
-----------               ---     -----   --------  -------   ---

BA-CA Finance Cayman Lt   0.518    62.07               KY    EUR
AES Tiete Energia SA      6.7842   1.109  4/15/2024    BR    BRL
Argentina Bogar Bonds     2       39.36   2/4/2018     AR    ARS
Automotores Gildemeister  8.25    73.25   5/24/2021    CL    USD
Automotores Gildemeister  6.75    67      1/15/2023    CL    USD
Automotores Gildemeister  8.25    73.25   5/24/2021    CL    USD
Automotores Gildemeister  6.75    65.5    1/15/2023    CL    USD
CA La Electricidad        8.5     63.664  4/10/2018    VE    USD
Caixa Geral De Depositos  1.439   63.167               KY    EUR
Caixa Geral De Depositos  1.469                        KY    EUR
CSN Islands XII Corp      7       68                   BR    USD
CSN Islands XII Corp      7       66.266               BR    USD
Decimo Primer Fideicomiso 6       53.225 10/25/2041    PA    USD
Decimo Primer             4.54    43.127 10/25/2041    PA    USD
Dolomite Capital         13.217   73.108 12/20/2019    CN    ZAR
Enel Americas SA          5.75    56.172  6/15/2022    CL    CLP
Gol Linhas Aereas SA     10.75    35.861  2/12/2023    BR    USD
Gol Linhas Aereas SA     10.75    35.601  2/12/2023    BR    USD
Inversora Electrica       6.5     67.625  9/26/2017    AR    USD
Inversora Electrica       6.5     67.625  9/26/2017    AR    USD
MIE Holdings Corp         7.5     64.78   4/25/2019    HK    USD
MIE Holdings Corp         7.5     64.982  4/25/2019    HK    USD
NB Finance Ltd            3.88    61.816  2/7/2035     KY    EUR
Noble Holding             7.7     74.433  4/1/2025     KY    USD
Noble Holding             5.25    56.279  3/15/2042    KY    USD
Noble Holding             8.7     71.881  4/1/2045     KY    USD
Noble Holding             6.2     60.129  8/1/2040     KY    USD
Noble Holding             6.05    58.38   3/1/2041     KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.5     42.5                 KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.125   56.938  6/26/2022    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7       68.053  4/21/2020    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.125   41.366  6/26/2042    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     4.375   40.002  4/25/2025    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.25    39.211  6/27/2029    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     6       44.75   4/5/2023     KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.25    39.018  6/27/2029    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.5     42.95                KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     4.375   40.363  4/25/2025    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.125   41.635  6/26/2042    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     6       52.625  4/5/2023     KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.125   55.873  6/26/2022    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7       67.368  4/21/2020    KY    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    8.5     74.5   10/27/2020    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6       30.458  5/16/2024    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6       30.517 11/15/2026    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    9.75    35.677  5/17/2035    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    9       39.279 11/17/2021    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    5.375   30.267  4/12/2027    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    8.5     72.5   10/27/2020    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela   12.75    45.278  2/17/2022    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6       30.367  5/16/2024    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6       30.387 11/15/2026    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    9       39.316 11/17/2021    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    9.75    35.893  5/17/2035    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6       28.346 10/28/2022    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    5.5     30.123  4/12/2037    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela   12.75    45.23   2/17/2022    VE    USD
Polarcus Ltd              5.6     75      3/30/2022    AE    USD
Provincia del Chubut      4              10/21/2019    AR    USD
Siem Offshore Inc         4.04527 69.5   10/30/2020    NO    NOK
Siem Offshore             3.75176 65.75  12/28/2021    NO    NOK
STB Finance               2.05771 56.243               KY    JPY
Sylph Ltd                 2.367   64.438  9/25/2036    KY    USD
US Capital                1.63611 54.774 12/1/2039     KY    USD
US Capital                1.63611 54.774 12/1/2039     KY    USD
USJ Acucar                9.875   67     11/9/2019     BR    USD
USJ Acucar                9.875   67     11/9/2019     BR    USD
Venezuela                13.625   68.25   8/15/2018    VE    USD
Venezuela                 7.75    44.065 10/13/2019    VE    USD
Venezuela                11.95    40.785  8/5/2031     VE    USD
Venezuela                12.75    45.19   8/23/2022    VE    USD
Venezuela                 9.25    39.645  9/15/2027    VE    USD
Venezuela                11.75    40.005 10/21/2026    VE    USD
Venezuela                 9       36.285  5/7/2023     VE    USD
Venezuela                 9.375   37.69   1/13/2034    VE    USD
Venezuela                13.625   72.25   8/15/2018    VE    USD
Venezuela                 7       34.23   3/31/2038    VE    USD
Venezuela                 7       59.19  12/1/2018     VE    USD


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Joseph Cardillo at
856-381-8268.


                   * * * End of Transmission * * *