/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/171024.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

               Tuesday, October 24, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 211


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

AES ARGENTINA: S&P Affirms 'B' Local and Foreign Currency Ratings
PROVINCE OF LA RIOJA: S&P Affirms 'B' Longterm Issuer Ratings


B E R M U D A

PETRA DIAMONDS: Moody's Rates US$600MM 2nd Lien Secured Notes B2


B R A Z I L

OI SA: Judge Gives Creditors More Time to Work Out Restructuring
OI SA: Anatel to Meet on Oi Fine-For-Investment Swap


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

OCEAN RIG: Moody's Hikes CFR to Caa1, Outlook Stable


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Coconut Cream Leads World But Challenges Loom
* DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Medina Submitted Complete Finc'l. Statement


E L  S A L V A D O R

LA HIPOTECARIA TRUST: Fitch Hikes $37.8MM Ser. A Notes Rating to B


J A M A I C A

JAMAICA: Parliament Approved Agricultural Loan Bill


M E X I C O

FINCOMUN SERVICIOS: S&P Affirms 'B+/B' Issuer Credit Ratings


P U E R T O    R I C O

BAILEY'S EXPRESS: Bayshore Ford Buying 23 Trucks for $145K
MAC ACQUISITION: Hires Donlin Recano as Claims and Noticing Agent
UNIVERSITY OF THE SACRED HEART: Moody's Puts Ba3 Rating on Review
* S&P Revises Outlook on Three Puerto Rican Banks to Negative


V E N E Z U E L A

PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: S&P Places 'CCC-' CCR on Watch Negative
VENEZUELA: Opposition Calls for Debt Refinancing


                            - - - - -



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A R G E N T I N A
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AES ARGENTINA: S&P Affirms 'B' Local and Foreign Currency Ratings
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B' local and foreign currency
ratings on AES Argentina Generacion S.A. (AES Argentina). The
outlook remains stable. In addition, S&P is keeping the company's
SACP at 'bb-'.

S&P said, "The ratings on AES Argentina reflects our expectation
that despite its stable current and projected EBITDA and debt
levels and adequate liquidity position, the 'B' sovereign rating
on Argentina continues to limit AES Argentina's credit quality
because the company wouldn't be able to withstand a sovereign
stress scenario. The sovereign stress scenario includes high
inflation, sharp currency devaluation, a severe decrease in GDP,
and frozen tariffs for Utilities."


PROVINCE OF LA RIOJA: S&P Affirms 'B' Longterm Issuer Ratings
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings, on Oct. 20, 2017, affirmed its 'B' foreign and
local currency long-term issuer ratings on the Argentine province
of La Rioja. The outlook remains stable.

OUTLOOK

S&P said, "The stable outlook on La Rioja reflects our expectation
that La Rioja's operating balances will remain above 5% of
operating revenues, although it will post moderate deficits after
capex until 2019 due to increasing infrastructure spending. We
expect moderate debt levels and contingent liabilities to continue
to be high. The outlook also incorporates our view of an
increasing dialogue between LRGs and the federal government to
address various fiscal and economic challenges that are expected
to persist in the short to medium term."

Downside scenario

S&P said, "We could lower our ratings on La Rioja during the next
12 months, if its budgetary performance deterioriates sharply in
the form of operating deficits and high deficits after capex.
Under this scenario, we would perceive a weakening in the
province's liquidity. Also, a downgrade of the sovereign ratings
would lower the provinces rating."

Upside scenario

S&P said, "Because S&P Global Ratings does not believe that La
Rioja meets the conditions to be rated above the sovereign, we
would only consider raising our ratings on the province during the
next 12 months if we were to raise our sovereign ratings on
Argentina. We believe ongoing structural improvements in the
institutional framework in which the province operates could
improve the province's creditworthiness. Additionally, longer
term-capital and financial management and lower risk stemming from
contingent liabilities, with a continuation of fiscal prudence,
could also trigger an upgrade."

RATIONALE

The 'B' ratings on La Rioja reflect its individual credit profile
and the institutional framework in which it operates. La Rioja,
like all local and regional governments (LRGs) in Argentina,
operates under an institutional framework that has strengthened
but remains very volatile and underfunded, in our view. S&P said,
"At the same time, we expect the gradual macroeconomic recovery in
Argentina to help improve La Rioja's operating balance, while
increased infrastructure spending will result in deficits after
capex. We also expect debt levels to remain moderate at around 45%
of operating revenues. On the other hand, the province's very weak
economy and inflexible budget structure, with rigid operating
expenditures and high reliance on national government transfers,
will remain key rating constraints.

"A continuation of management policies despite structural
constraints in the economy La Rioja, like all LRGs in Argentina,
still operates under a very volatile and underfunded institutional
framework, in our view. Nevertheless, we see a positive trend in
predictability from the outcome of potential reforms and the pace
of their implementation and we consider the constructive dialogue
between the federal and subnational governments as a positive
credit development."

Sergio Casas, formerly vice-governor, took office as governor in
December 2015 for a four-year term. The Partido Justicialista has
governed the province for more than two decades and it has
absolute majority in the legislature. Thus, S&P expects a
continuation in provincial policies over the next several years.
La Rioja's management has maintained relatively prudent debt and
liquidity management, although policies are generally self-imposed
and informal. Budgets have been passed on time, though the lack of
predictability of economic variables and high dependence on
national transfers limit the provinces medium- to long-term
planning.

S&P said, "La Rioja's very weak economy is a key rating
constraint; we estimate that GDP per capita reached $5,583 in
2016, compared with a national income of $12,514. At the same
time, growth prospects are limited. During the last few years,
public spending expanded to compensate for the lack of private
sector investments; however, S&P believes that the government has
nearly reached its full production capacity. We expect investments
in the energy sector, executed by Parque Arauco, will have a
positive impact on the economy. Yet we don't believe that this
expansion will be enough to compensate for economic weaknesses.

"Solid fiscal performance that's dependent on transfers from the
government La Rioja should continue posting a relatively high
operating surplus, averaging 7.3% in the next three years, and
moderate deficits after capex, averaging 3.6%. Although operating
balances contracted in 2016 in the context of an economic
recession, in the future, we expect them to go back to historical
levels as the economy recovers and the province receives
additional funds from the gradual elimination of the 15% ANSES
(social security administration) retention. Nevertheless, fiscal
performance will remain exposed to volatility due to the high
reliance on the extraordinary transfers from the central
government and still relatively high inflation.

"We consider La Rioja's budgetary flexibility to be very weak. The
province collects only 14.5% of its operating revenues and we
don't expect any significant change over the next three years.
Latest conversations on the Fiscal Responsibility Law indicate
that the province will not be able to increase their tax pressure,
and its ability to increase its tax base is constrained by its low
GDP per capita. At the same time, La Rioja faces expenditure
rigidities stemming from personnel and interest payments as well
as high infrastructure needs. We expect inflation will continue to
strain the province's budgetary performance through spending
increasing above inflation, but yet staying below nominal national
GDP growth. In terms of capital expenditures (capex), we expect an
expansion in 2017 as the province utilizes the majority of the
proceeds from the February 2017 $200 million international bond
issuance. Nevertheless, for the next two years, we believe capex
will average 14.5% and be difficult to cut; over 60% corresponds
to earmarked transfers to cover important infrastructure needs.

"We expect tax-supported debt to represent 45% of the province's
operating revenue in 2017-2019. In February 2017, the Province
issued its first international bond for $200 million, of which
$170 million is being used to finance the development of a wind
farm. Looking forward, we expect the province will obtain
borrowings according to its financing needs, benefiting from
greater access to international markets to finance its public
works. Consequently, its exposure to exchange rate risk could be
increasing. By the end of 2017, we expect 75% of the debt stock
will be denominated in foreign currency, highlighting its currency
risk.

"In our view, La Rioja's contingent liabilities are high. The
government has played an important role in its local economy
through its government related entities (GREs). There are thirty-
four public companies that are not consolidated in the budget,
covering a wide range of sectors, including financial services,
agroindustry, mining, wine production, industry, energy, water,
construction, and textiles. Banco La Rioja is the largest entity
in the province and we consider it to be self-supporting. It's a
profitable bank that doesn't need financial support from the
province and is unlikely to receive support in the future. We
estimate its creditworthiness to be at the same level as the
province. Unlike the bank, other companies in the province require
support through loans, transfers, and capital injections. Although
we don't have updated information of all the organizations that
are majority state-funded (Sociedad Anonima con Participacion
Estatal Mayoritaria-SAPEMs, its Spanish acronym), we estimate that
total liabilities reached Argentine peso (ARP) 2,500 million as of
December 2016, 16% of the operating revenues.

"In our opinion, La Rioja's liquidity position remains adequate.
We estimate that La Rioja's free cash and liquid assets will cover
more than the province's 2018 debt service, which we estimate at
ARP1.1 billion. Our free cash estimate includes the funds
deposited into an account created to manage financing proceeds.
These funds also include the loans from the Fondo de Garant°a y
Sustentabilidad, which La Rioja plans to use to meet its future
debt service payments. Nevertheless, La Rioja's access to external
liquidity is still uncertain, given the country's weak banking
system, which is in group '9' in our Banking Industry Country Risk
Assessment (BICRA). At the same time, the national government's
authorization is required to issue new debt, according to the
current Fiscal Responsibility Law."

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by
the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and
was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot above.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.

  RATINGS LIST

  Ratings Affirmed

  La Rioja (Province of)
   Issuer Credit Rating        Stable/--
     Senior Unsecured          B



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B E R M U D A
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PETRA DIAMONDS: Moody's Rates US$600MM 2nd Lien Secured Notes B2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a B2 rating to Petra Diamonds
Limited's (Petra) $600 million Second Lien Secured Notes due
2022, issued by Petra Diamonds US$ Treasury Plc.

At the same time, Moody's affirmed Petra's B1 Corporate Family
Rating (CFR), B1-PD Probability of Default Rating (PDR). The
ratings outlook was changed to positive from stable. This
reflects the expected deleveraging and de-risking of Petra's
business and credit profile along with a strengthened liquidity
position.

An increasingly higher $ per carat grade mix attributed to a
ramp-up in production from new mining areas at Cullinan and
Finsch will improve margins and volumes leading to higher EBITDA.
Higher EBITDA levels, assisted further by the commissioning of
the new Cullinan mill improving recoveries of higher value
diamonds, will drive Petra's net debt/EBITDA levels below 1.5x in
the next 18 months. Petra's debt maturity will also be extended
primarily out to 2022 with approximately $67.1 million in cash
added to the balance sheet.

The ratings and positive outlook assume successful placement of
the $600 million notes and that the proceeds are deployed as set
out in the offering prospectus. Namely that they will be used to
fund the early redemption of the outstanding $300 million 8.25%
Second Lien Secured Notes due 2020 along with all drawings on its
bank facilities.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Petra's B1 CFR and B1-PD PDR, respectively, reflect (1) the
strong medium to long-term fundamental forecasts for the diamond
market where Moody's expects demand to exceed supply, supporting
robust long-term diamond prices; (2) its competitive cost
positioning with predominantly long-life, well-prospected
underground mines producing diamonds at costs on a par with
cheaper open-pit mines; and (3) conservative financial policies
and a strong financial profile, which will improve as undiluted
ore contributes more significantly to the production of high-
value diamonds with low execution risks.

However, the ratings are constrained by (1) Petra's scale as a
mid-tier diamond producer, with revenues of $505 for the last
twelve months (LTM) to December 31, 2016, and with four mines in
South Africa (Baa2 negative), including extensive tailings
operations in Kimberley via its 75.9% interest in the Kimberley
Ekapa Mining joint venture, one mine in Tanzania (unrated), and
exploratory land in Botswana (A2 stable); (2) the company's
elevated operational risk, as more than 80% of its EBITDA comes
from the Cullinan and Finsch mines in South Africa; and (3) its
business profile as a single commodity producer, with full
exposure to volatility in diamond prices and the ZAR/USD exchange
rate, noting however the favourable interplay on credit metrics
of these two drivers to date.

STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS

Petra's $600 million notes due in 2022 are senior to certain
subordinated obligations of the company, supporting Moody's loss
given default assessment while also benefiting from a second lien
position relative to guarantees and collateral provided to other
senior lenders through a security SPV structure. Senior
facilities along with the approximate $89 million Black Economic
Empowerment (BEE) refinancing loan obligation by BEE stakeholder
to Petra's senior lenders are supported by guarantees on a first
lien basis from Petra's major operating subsidiaries, including
additional collateral of their shares and bank accounts which,
all together, are part of the security SPV structure. Moody's
reflects the BEE refinancing loan guarantee obligation as part of
the first lien creditor class, given that the guarantee would
more than likely be called upon in the event of default. Senior
debt facilities, including the BEE refinancing loan guarantee
obligation, are therefore a larger input versus subordinated
obligations into the debt capital structure, thereby leading to
the B2 rating on the notes relative to the B1 CFR.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

The CFR could be upgraded to Ba3 if Petra is able to maintain net
debt/EBITDA sustainably below 1.5x and EBIT/Interest trending
sustainably above 4x.

The CFR could be downgraded to B2 if for more than 18 months
Petra's net debt/EBITDA is sustained above 2x and EBIT/interest
expense is sustained below 4x. Similar downward pressure could
result if Petra were to face (1) long-term challenges in
accessing undiluted ore at its Cullinan and Finsch mines; or (2)
a deterioration of its liquidity profile.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global Mining
Industry published in August 2014.

Petra is a rough diamond producer listed on the Main Market of
the London Stock Exchange, registered in Bermuda and domiciled in
Jersey. The company has controlling interests in five mines (four
in South Africa and one in Tanzania), extensive tailings
operations in Kimberley (via its 75.9% interest in the Kimberley
Mines), and an exploration programme in Botswana. For the LTM to
31 December 2016, Petra produced 4.1 million carats (Mcts) of
diamonds, accounting for approximately 2.9% of the world's
production by volume and 3.1% by value as of June 30, 2016.

Petra generated $505 million in revenues and Moody's-adjusted
EBITDA of $206 million for the LTM to December 31, 2016. As of
March 28, 2017, the company had a market cap of GBP675 million
($848 million).



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B R A Z I L
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OI SA: Judge Gives Creditors More Time to Work Out Restructuring
----------------------------------------------------------------
Tatiana Bautzer and Gram Slattery at Reuters report that the judge
overseeing phone carrier Oi SA's bankruptcy case agreed to give
creditors and the company more time to reconcile competing
restructuring proposals, 16 months into Brazil's largest in-court
reorganization.

The judge, Fernando Viana, acted on a request filed by several
creditor groups including state-owned banks and bondholders, court
documents showed, according to Reuters.

A creditors' meeting to vote on a Oi restructuring plan had been
scheduled, but Viana postponed it until Nov. 6, Reuters notes.  If
the quorum is insufficient on that date, the meeting will be
rescheduled for Nov. 27, according to the documents, the report
relays.

The International Bondholders Committee was among those who asked
the delay. Others, all holding claims on debt-laden Oi, included
the Ad Hoc Group of Oi Bondholders, Banco do Brasil, state
development bank BNDES and Caixa Economica Federal, Reuters cites.

The report relays that Oi Chief Executive Officer Marco Schroeder
told journalists in Brasilia the carrier would take advantage of
any additional time to continue negotiations.

Oi wants to restructure BRL65.4 billion (US$20.5 billion) in debt
by offering bondholders a 25 percent equity stake, a move that
would imply a 73 percent haircut for creditors, according to an
independent analysis by Banco Itau BBA, Reuters notes.

Major bondholder groups represented by restructuring firms G5
Evercore and Moelis & Co, which hold about BRL22 billion in Oi's
debt, have put forth a counter-offer which would give them 88
percent of Oi's equity, the report says.

While bondholders have publicly condemned Oi's offer, they are
also trying to avoid a liquidation at all costs, according to two
people with knowledge of the situation, the report notes.

Oi's assets are worth BRL40.8 billion, according to independent
auditor Ernst & Young.  That amount could drop to BRL17.9 billion,
or less than 30 percent of the value of debt under renegotiation,
in a forced sale, according to the auditor, Reuters cites.

As a class of creditors, bondholders are ranked behind workers and
BNDES, so they would stand to lose more in a liquidation than if
the company's terms were accepted, the people said, the report
says.

Oi said in a statement that 33,000 small creditors had accepted
the company's offer to restructure individual debts of less than
BRL50,000 (US$15,685), the report adds.

                          About Oi SA

Headquartered in Rio de Janeiro, and operating almost exclusively
within Brazil, the Oi Group provides services like fixed-line data
transmission and network usage for phones, internet, and cable,
Wi-Fi hot-spots in public areas, and mobile phone and data
services, and employs approximately 142,000 direct and indirect
employees.

On June 20, 2016, pursuant to Brazilian Law No. 11.101/05 (the
"Brazilian Bankruptcy Law"), Oi S.A. and certain of its
subsidiaries filed for recuperao judicial (judicial
reorganization) in Brazil.

On June 21, 2016, OI SA and its affiliates Telemar Norte Leste
S.A. and Oi Brasil Holdings Cooperatief U.A. commenced Chapter 15
proceedings (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Lead Case No. 16-11791).  Ojas N.
Shah, as foreign representative, signed the petitions.

Coop and PTIF are also subject to proceedings in the Netherlands.

The Chapter 15 cases are assigned to Judge Sean H. Lane.

In the Chapter 15 cases, the Debtors are represented by John K.
Cunningham, Esq., and Mark P. Franke, Esq., at White & Case LLP,
in New York; and Jason N. Zakia, Esq., Richard S. Kebrdle, Esq.,
and Laura L. Femino, Esq., at White & Case LLP, in Miami, Florida.

On July 22, 2016, the New York Court recognized the Brazilian
Proceedings as foreign main proceedings with respect to the
Chapter 15 Debtors, and granted certain additional related relief.


OI SA: Anatel to Meet on Oi Fine-For-Investment Swap
----------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that the board of Brazilian telecoms regulator
Anatel will meet to analyze a request by indebted carrier Oi SA to
swap billions of reais in regulatory fines for new investments, a
source with knowledge of the situation said Thursday.

The board will decide on the fate of almost BRL5 billion ($1.58
billion) in fines the company has accumulated, said the source,
who requested anonymity as the matter is private, according to
Reuters.

The board of Anatel was originally due to meet on the proposed
fine-for-investment swap earlier in the month, but delayed the
decision at the request of Anatel councilor Igor de Freitas, the
report notes.

The meeting is scheduled on the same day as an Oi creditors'
assembly in Rio de Janeiro, in which creditors will have the
opportunity to vote on a restructuring plan put forth by the
troubled company that aims to take the carrier out of bankruptcy
protection, the report relays.

In September, a Brazilian court authorized a proposal by Oi
competitor Telefonica Brasil to swap BRL2 billion in regulatory
fines for new investments, the report adds.

                          About Oi SA

Headquartered in Rio de Janeiro, and operating almost exclusively
within Brazil, the Oi Group provides services like fixed-line data
transmission and network usage for phones, internet, and cable,
Wi-Fi hot-spots in public areas, and mobile phone and data
services, and employs approximately 142,000 direct and indirect
employees.

On June 20, 2016, pursuant to Brazilian Law No. 11.101/05 (the
"Brazilian Bankruptcy Law"), Oi S.A. and certain of its
subsidiaries filed for recuperao judicial (judicial
reorganization) in Brazil.

On June 21, 2016, OI SA and its affiliates Telemar Norte Leste
S.A. and Oi Brasil Holdings Cooperatief U.A. commenced Chapter 15
proceedings (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Lead Case No. 16-11791).  Ojas N.
Shah, as foreign representative, signed the petitions.

Coop and PTIF are also subject to proceedings in the Netherlands.

The Chapter 15 cases are assigned to Judge Sean H. Lane.

In the Chapter 15 cases, the Debtors are represented by John K.
Cunningham, Esq., and Mark P. Franke, Esq., at White & Case LLP,
in New York; and Jason N. Zakia, Esq., Richard S. Kebrdle, Esq.,
and Laura L. Femino, Esq., at White & Case LLP, in Miami, Florida.

On July 22, 2016, the New York Court recognized the Brazilian
Proceedings as foreign main proceedings with respect to the
Chapter 15 Debtors, and granted certain additional related relief.



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C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
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OCEAN RIG: Moody's Hikes CFR to Caa1, Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded Ocean Rig UDW Inc.'s Corporate
Family Rating (CFR) to Caa1 from Ca and Probability of Default
Rating (PDR) to Caa1-PD from D-PD. Moody's also assigned a Caa1
rating to the new $450 million senior secured facility jointly
issued by Drillships Financing Holding Inc., Drill Rigs Holdings
Inc., Drillships Ocean Ventures Inc. and several other holding
companies owning the rigs. All these entities are subsidiaries of
Ocean Rig. This facility is jointlyguaranteed by Ocean Rig UDW
Inc. and several other holding and operating companies. The
outlook on all ratings was changed to stable from negative. The
ratings on all existing old debt are withdrawn as the obligation
is no longer outstanding as a result of the debt restructuring.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrade of the CFR to Caa1 from Ca reflects the successful
completion of the debt restructuring process on Sept. 22, 2017,
after all the conditions pre-requisite for the restructuring were
satisfied. The restructuring has resulted in an exchange of
around $3.7 billion of debt for new equity of $1.8 billion, cash
consideration of approximately $288 million and new secured
facility due 2024 totaling $450 million. This has resulted in
total gross adjusted debt/EBITDA as of LTM June 2017 to fall to
around 0.7x pro-forma for the transaction from 4.4x.

Successful restructuring of the debt has also improved the
liquidity profile of the company with non-restricted cash balance
of $616 million as of June 2017 pro-forma for the transaction, no
debt repayments until 2024, lower annual cash interest payments
of around $37 million going forward compared to $250 million
historically and minimal capex requirements. Moody's expects the
company to generate positive free cash flow (FCF) of around $350-
400 million in 2017, remain marginally FCF positive in 2018 and
turn negative in 2019-20.

The rating also reflects that the company's operational activity
is expected to remain low over the next 3 years, with no real
market recovery expected before 2020, with only 5 out of 11 rigs
currently operational. There is a high level of uncertainty
around the amount of capex to be spent by oil companies in deep
water exploration with the risk that new exploration would not
materialize or day-rates remain depressed given the overcapacity
situation in the market. This results in no visibility on
revenues beyond 2018, as 4 out of 5 existing firm contracts
expire by H1 2018, with heavy reliance on one contract with Total
S.A. (Aa3, stable) which expires in 2021.

Moody's anticipates the company's credit metrics will deteriorate
in 2018 and 2019 as the existing contracts roll-off resulting in
declining EBITDA. These rigs will either be stacked if no new
contracts are found or in the best case, re-contracted likely at
significantly lower day-rates. A steady supply of new builds will
depress day-rates and maintain significant stress on the sector.
Moody's expects adjusted gross debt/EBITDA to increase to above
3.0x in 2018 from around 1.0x in 2017, and increase further in
2019-20. EBITDA generation in 2019-20 is expected to drop
materially, closer to zero, given the low visibility on revenues,
resulting in peaking leverage. As a result, negative FCF
generation is expected, however, given the high cash balance and
no material funding needs, the company should be able to sustain
for the coming 3-4 years.

More positively, the rating reflects (1) the young and
technologically advanced fleet, with all drillships built within
the last six years, (2) industry leading operating performance
with quarterly contracted operating efficiency of 95% or above
historically, (3) improved fleet average operating expenses, and
(4) scope for recovery when new contracts are signed, even if at
lower day rates, as the debt burden has substantially reduced.

RATING OUTLOOK

The stable outlook mainly reflects the severe industry conditions
for the deep offshore drilling market balanced by improved
liquidity position of the company supported by high cash
balances. The stable outlook also reflects the company's
continuing decline in contracted revenues in 2018-19, with
existing contracts winding up and no visibility of return to
better market conditions.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Moody's could downgrade the ratings if there is no recovery in
the market conditions resulting in continued deterioration of the
operating performance and/or weakening liquidity position.

Moody's could consider an upgrade of the CFR if market conditions
recover with revenue visibility resulting in improved operating
performance and strengthening of the liquidity position.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Oilfield Services Industry Rating Methodology published in May
2017.

Ocean Rig is an international offshore drilling contractor
providing oilfield services for offshore oil and gas exploration,
development and production drilling, and specializing in the
ultra-deepwater and harsh-environment segment of the offshore
drilling industry.

Ocean Rig is listed on the NASDAQ and its market capitalisation
was $2.4 billion as of October 17, 2017. Current largest
shareholders include George Economou, Ocean Rig's Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer and institutional funds.



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D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Coconut Cream Leads World But Challenges Loom
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that the Dominican Republic has
specialized in coconut cream to the point of being the world's
largest producer, with sales of more than $15 million, according
to coconut production specialist, Horacio Lomba.

He said coconut water is a healthy and low calorie alternative,
while the increasing use of its virgin oil and coconut sugar
consumption by diabetics are some of the reasons behind the
product's "claim to fame," according to Dominican Today.

"New trends in consumption of vegetable extracts as substitutes
for animal milk, the use of coconut substrate as an inert material
in vegetables and greenhouses ensure that the consumption of
coconut derivatives will be maintained for many years, which
should increase our country's interest for this crop," the report
quoted Mr. Lomba as saying.

Mr. Lomba said coconut water, it is the fastest growing beverage
in the US market and is considered the "juice" star in the world
market due to its taste, low sugar content and diuretic
properties, the report notes.

Virgin coconut oil is becoming increasingly popular for reasons of
health, aesthetics or cultural motivations, the report relays.

                               Problem

Lomba however notes that while demand for coconut grows, Dominican
Republic's plantations decline due to age, lack of titling, which
halts access to credit; pests; the use of low yield plant
varieties and the high cost of land in traditional planting
regions, which today are mostly set aside for tourism, the report
notes.

As reported in Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on July 24,
2017, Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the Dominican
Republic's long term issuer and debt ratings to Ba3 from B1 and
changed the outlook to stable from positive, based on the
following key drivers:

(1)  The Dominican Republic's continued robust growth outlook
     compared to rating peers, coupled with a reduction in
     external risks as current account deficits have declined and
     international reserves have increased.

(2)  The reduction in fiscal deficits over the last four years and
     Moody's expectation that fiscal deficits will remain shy of
     3% of GDP, supported by fiscal restraint and reduced
     transfers to the electricity sector.


* DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Medina Submitted Complete Finc'l. Statement
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that presidency legal advisor Flavio Dario
Espinal refuted reports that President Danilo Medina had failed to
submit a complete financial statement at the start of his second
term in office.

He said as far as he knows, Medina filed his tax withholding
certification through the Presidency, according to Dominican
Today.

He noted that since Medina has only one source of income, he
doesn't have to submit a certification of taxes and the
institution that pays him, in this case the Ministry of the
Presidency, makes the retention, the report notes.

"The President of the Republic complied with the law by filing the
tax withholding certification made by the Ministry of the
Presidency, which is the entity that makes the payment," said
Espinal, when asked about the date of his payment, the report
relays.

The official responded to information in a report by the
Pontifical Catholic University Pucmm, the report adds.

As reported in Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on July 24,
2017, Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the Dominican
Republic's long term issuer and debt ratings to Ba3 from B1 and
changed the outlook to stable from positive, based on the
following key drivers:

(1)  The Dominican Republic's continued robust growth outlook
     compared to rating peers, coupled with a reduction in
     external risks as current account deficits have declined and
     international reserves have increased.

(2)  The reduction in fiscal deficits over the last four years and
     Moody's expectation that fiscal deficits will remain shy of
     3% of GDP, supported by fiscal restraint and reduced
     transfers to the electricity sector.



====================
E L  S A L V A D O R
====================


LA HIPOTECARIA TRUST: Fitch Hikes $37.8MM Ser. A Notes Rating to B
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded the ratings for the series A notes on
La Hipotecaria Eleventh Mortgage-Backed Notes Trust and La
Hipotecaria Thirteenth Mortgage-Backed Notes Trust. Fitch has also
revised the Rating Outlook to Stable from Negative mirroring the
Stable Outlook on El Salvador's sovereign ratings and also
reflecting asset performance.

In addition, Fitch has affirmed the ratings for La Hipotecaria El
Salvadorian Mortgage Trust 2013-1 certificates and for La
Hipotecaria El Salvadorian Mortgage Trust 2016-1 certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Credit Quality of the Sovereign: On Oct. 6, 2017, Fitch upgraded
El Salvador's Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (FC
IDRs) to 'B-' and its country ceiling to 'B'. According to Fitch's
'Structured Finance and Covered Bonds Country Risk Rating
Criteria' (September 2017), the ratings of Structured Finance
notes cannot exceed the country ceiling of the country of the
assets, unless the transfer and convertibility (T&C) risk is
mitigated. While the transactions have sufficient credit
enhancement to be rated above the country's FC IDR, the ratings
remain constrained by the country ceiling and are ultimately
linked to the ratings of El Salvador given the lack of mitigants
to T&C risk.

Performance of the Underlying Assets: Delinquencies within the
underlying portfolios have performed in line with Fitch's
expectations. Such low delinquency levels can be partly explained
by the fact that the vast majority of the securitized loans
benefit from a direct deduction payment mechanism, which helps
mitigate willingness to pay risk. Cumulative +180-day
delinquencies represent 1.4% of the original pool balance in the
case of La Hipotecaria Eleventh Mortgage-Backed Notes Trust and
0.3% in the case of La Hipotecaria Thirteenth Mortgage-Backed
Notes Trust mainly due to its short history.

Increased Credit Enhancement: Credit Enhancement has built due to
the sequential nature of the structures. As of September 2017, it
has increased to 26.2% up from 23.3% observed during the same
month of last year in the case of La Hipotecaria Eleventh
Mortgage-Backed Notes Trust, while as of August 2017, it has
increased to 12.8% up from 12.0% observed at its inception in the
case of La Hipotecaria Thirteenth Mortgage-Backed Notes Trust.
Stability on excess spread provides additional enhancement.

Recoveries: As of September 2017, 33 loans reached 180+ days in
the case of La Hipotecaria Eleventh Mortgage-Backed Notes Trust.
Of those, eight have been foreclosed with a recovery of almost
100%. In the case of La Hipotecaria Thirteenth Mortgage-Backed
Notes Trust, as of August 2017, there are four loans with
delinquencies higher than 180 days, but none of those have been
recovered yet.

Credit Quality of Guaranty Provider: La Hipotecaria El Salvadorian
Mortgage Trust 2013-1 and La Hipotecaria El Salvadorian Mortgage
Trust 2016-1 certificates benefit from a payment guarantee by
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) in the event funds
are insufficient to cover the monthly interest and final principal
payment of the notes. OPIC is backed by the full faith and credit
of the United States of America (AAA/Stable).

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The ratings of the series A notes in both La Hipotecaria Eleventh
Mortgage-Backed Notes Trust and La Hipotecaria Thirteenth
Mortgage-Backed Notes Trust are sensitive to changes in the credit
quality of El Salvador. An upgrade or downgrade of El Salvador's
ratings, specifically its country ceiling, would lead to an
upgrade or downgrade on the notes. In addition, severe increases
in foreclosure frequency and prepayments as well as reductions in
recovery rates could lead to a downgrade of the notes.

The rating of series 2013-1 and 2016-1 certificates are sensitive
to changes in the credit quality of the U.S. sovereign as OPIC is
an agency of the U.S.

Fitch has taken the following actions:

La Hipotecaria Eleventh Mortgage-Backed Notes Trust

-- $37.8 million series A notes upgraded to 'Bsf' from 'B-sf';
    Outlook revised to Stable.

La Hipotecaria El Salvadorian Mortgage Trust 2013-1

-- $33.75 million series 2013-1 certificates affirmed at 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable.

La Hipotecaria Thirteenth Mortgage-Backed Notes Trust

-- $39.6 million series A notes upgraded to 'Bsf' from 'B-sf';
    Outlook revised to Stable.

La Hipotecaria El Salvadorian Mortgage Trust 2016-1

-- $33.75 million series 2016-1 certificates affirmed at 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable.



=============
J A M A I C A
=============


JAMAICA: Parliament Approved Agricultural Loan Bill
---------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that parliament has passed the Agricultural Loan
Societies and Approved Organizations Bill, which seeks to
modernize the agricultural sector to meet the nation's growing
demands of food security and productivity.

The Agricultural Loan Societies and Approved Organizations Act
also facilitates the dissolution of the Agricultural Credit Board
(ACB) and transfers the Board's monitoring and regulatory
functions to the Registrar of Co-operative and Friendly Societies,
according to RJR News.

The Bill repeals the Agricultural Credit Board act.

It also establishes the Agricultural Appeal Tribunal and provides
for the registration and regulation of the agricultural loan
societies by or under the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, the
report notes.

The bill was passed in the Lower House on October 17 following
passage in the Senate with 69 amendments on October 6, the report
relays.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America,
S&P Global Ratings affirmed on Sept. 25, 2017, its 'B' long- and
short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on
Jamaica. The outlook on the long-term rating remains stable. At
the same time, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B+' transfer and
convertibility assessment on the country.



===========
M E X I C O
===========


FINCOMUN SERVICIOS: S&P Affirms 'B+/B' Issuer Credit Ratings
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B+' long-term and 'B' short-term
global scale issuer credit ratings (ICR) on FinComun Servicios
Financieros Comunitarios S.A. de C.V. Sociedad Financiera Popular
(FinComun). S&P also affirmed its 'mxBBB-/mxA-3' long- and short-
term national scale ratings. The outlook on the ratings remains
negative.

The ICR on FinComun continue to reflect the variability and
disappointing execution of its corporate strategy in recent years
that increased the company's risk appetite. This strategy was
illustrated by the significant growth of a non-core business
product (payroll loans to government employees) and led to an
ongoing reorganization of the company. S&P said, "The ratings also
incorporate that FinComun's revenue stream is only from two
business lines, which leaves its revenue base more susceptible, in
our view, to a downturn in either of them. We view Fincomun's
capital and earnings as a credit strength; with a projected risk-
adjusted capital (RAC) ratio around 9.7% on average for 2017-2018.
Our assessment also reflects stable capital metrics, supported by
the initiatives from the Mexican regulator under the correction
plan established for FinComun.  On the other hand, FinComun's
weaker-than-average asset quality metrics and significantly low
reserve coverage (measured by reserves to nonperforming assets)
compared to its peers limit the company's risk position. We also
incorporate our assessment of FinComun's funding as below average,
given its lack of access to the central bank. Additionally, we
consider that it has sufficient liquidity to fully cover its
short-term obligations due to the short-term nature of its loan
portfolio, which we believe FinComun could relatively quickly turn
into cash. Its stand-alone credit profile (SACP) remains at 'b+'.
The long-term global scale credit rating on FinComun is the same
as its SACP because the latter doesn't factor in external support
either from the government or parent.

"We believe the 'mxBBB-' national scale rating is commensurate
with other Mexican issuers that are rated similarly, accounting
for FinComun's size, business diversification, deteriorating asset
quality metrics, and the challenges it will face over the next 12
months."



======================
P U E R T O    R I C O
======================


BAILEY'S EXPRESS: Bayshore Ford Buying 23 Trucks for $145K
----------------------------------------------------------
Bailey's Express, Inc., asks the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Connecticut to authorize the sale of 23 trucks to
Bayshore Ford Truck Sales, LLC, for $145,000, subject to higher
and better offers.

Bailey's was in business since 1920 and until recent years has
been financially sound but because of the downturn in the economy,
the increased costs of doing business and the new competition from
businesses like Walmart and Amazon, which are now providing their
own direct shipping services, it suffered substantial losses.  It
was unable to pay its debts as they come due and had to suspend
shipping services.  Bailey's sought protection under Chapter 11
for the purposes of working through its financial difficulties,
restoring services and reorganizing the business.

Since the Petition Date, the Debtor explored three opportunities
to restart the business but despite the its best efforts, the
Debtor has determined that there is no realistic opportunity for a
successful restart of the operations.  Once it determined that
there was no viable restart program that could be implemented in a
reasonable period of time, it immediately turned its attention to
a liquidation process to maximize value for the Estate and
minimize expenses.

The Debtor has been actively engaged in discussions with two
separate potential stalking horse bidders for the sale of the 23
trucks it owned.  After considering the alternatives, the Debtor
has determined that it is of the best interests of the creditors
to enter into a certain Purchase Agreement dated Oct. 17, 2017
(together with related documents, agreements and instruments) for
the sale of the Trucks owned by the Debtor as set forth in the
Purchase Agreement to the Purchaser for a purchase price of
$145,000.

The salient terms of the Purchase Agreement are:

     a. Seller: Bailey's Express, Inc.

     b. Purchaser: Bayshore Ford Truck Sales, LLC

     c. Purchase Price: $145,000

     d. Purchased Assets: 23 trucks

     e. Price: $145,000

     f. Deposit: $14,500 or 10% of the Purchase Price

     g. Administrative Expense Claim: (i) a break-up fee of $4,350
        plus (ii) reimbursement of the actual out-of-pocket
        expenses incurred by the Purchaser in connection with the
        transactions contemplated in an amount not to exceed
        $3,750.

     h. Final Sale Order/Closing: Nov. 30, 2017

A copy of the Purchase Agreement and the list of Trucks to be sold
attached to the Motion is available for free at:

      http://bankrupt.com/misc/Baileys_Express_141_Sales.pdf

As of the Petition Date, Bankwell held a secured claim against the
Debtor in the approximate amount of $11,000.  Bankwell holds a
security interest in all of the DIP Collateral which includes the
Trucks.

SAIA, Inc., interposed an objection to the Debtor's use of cash
collateral in which SAIA asserted that the Debtor was holding cash
in trust on behalf of SAIA pursuant to an interline trust doctrine
theory.  To resolve the objection, the Debtor agreed to provide
adequate protection to SAIA in the form of a lien, subordinate to
the security interest held by Bankwell on the DIP collateral, but
only to the extent that SAIA successfully establishes that SAIA is
entitled to interpose an Interline Trust on cash selected by the
Debtor ("SAIA Conditional Lien").  SAIA asserts that it holds a
claim in the amount of $846,808.

The Debtor has further determined that it is in the best interests
of the estate to conduct an auction to solicit higher and better
bids for the Trucks on terms substantially similar to those
contained in the Purchase Agreement.  It proposes to sell the
Trucks to the Purchaser or to the maker of the Winning Bid, other
than in the ordinary course of business, free and clear of liens,
claims, encumbrances and interests.  The Trucks will be sold
pursuant to the procedures to be established by the Court pursuant
to its Sale Procedures Order.

The Sale as set forth in the Purchase Agreement is in the best
interests of the Debtor's bankruptcy estate, creditors and other
parties in interest since the sale will maximize the value
received for the Trucks.

The Debtor respectfully asks the Court to waive the 14-day stay
periods to the minimum amount of time needed by any objecting
party to file its appeal to allow the Sale to close as provided
pursuant to the terms of the Purchase Agreement.

The Purchaser is:

         John Centrella
         Bayshore Ford Consultant
         BAYSHORE FORD TRUCK SALES, LLC
         2217 N. Dupont Hwy.
         New Castle, DE 19720
         Facsimile: (302) 652-5358

                    About Bailey's Express

Headquartered in Middletown, Connecticut, Bailey's Express --
http://www.baileysxpress.com/-- is a Connecticut-based less than
truckload carrier.  It provides service across the nation and is
dedicated in helping Connecticut, Massachusetts and Rhode Island
companies market their products throughout the U.S. including
Hawaii and Alaska.  It has distribution points in Charlotte,
Dallas, Denver, Easton, Fontana, Indianapolis, Jacksonville,
Memphis, Neenah, Phoenix, Salt Lake City and Toledo.  It also
provides service to Mexico, Puerto Rico & Canada.

Bailey's Express filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection
(Bankr. D. Conn. Case No. 17-31042) on July 13, 2017, estimating
its assets and liabilities at between $1 million and $10 million.
The petition was signed by David Allen, chief financial officer.

Judge Ann M. Nevins presides over the case.

Elizabeth J. Austin, Esq., and Jessica Grossarth Kennedy, Esq., at
Pullman & Comley, LLC, serves as the Debtor's bankruptcy counsel.

No creditors' committee has yet been appointed in the case.


MAC ACQUISITION: Hires Donlin Recano as Claims and Noticing Agent
------------------------------------------------------------------
Mac Acquisition LLC, and its debtor-affiliates seek authority from
the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware to employ
Donlin Recano & Company, Inc., as their claims and noticing agent.

Mac Acquisition requires Donlin Recano to:

   a. prepare and serve required notices and documents in the
      bankruptcy case in accordance with the Bankruptcy Code and
      the Bankruptcy Rules in the form and manner directed by the
      Debtor and the Court, including (i) notice of the
      commencement of the case and the Chapter 11 case and the
      initial meeting of creditors under the Bankruptcy Code,
      (ii) notice of any claims bar date, (iii) notices of
      transfer of claims, (iv) notices of objections to claims
      and objections to transfers of claims, (v) notices of any
      hearings on a disclosure statement and confirmation of the
      Debtor's plan or plans of reorganization, including under
      Bankruptcy Rule 3017(d), (vi) notice of the effective date
      of any plan and (vii) all other notices, orders, pleadings,
      publications and other documents as the Debtor or Court may
      deem necessary or appropriate for an orderly administration
      of the Chapter 11 case;

   b. maintain an official copy of the Debtor's schedules of
      assets and liabilities and statement of financial affairs,
      listing the Debtor's known creditors and the amounts owed
      thereto;

   c. maintain (i) a list of all potential creditors, equity
      holders and other parties-in-interest and (ii) a core
      mailing list consisting of all parties described in
      sections 2002(i), (j) and (k) and those parties that have
      filed a notice of appearance pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule
      9010; updated said lists and make said lists available upon
      request by a party-in-interest or the Clerk;

   d. furnish a notice to all potential creditors of the last
      date for the filing of proofs of claim and a form for the
      filing of a proof of claim, after such notice and form are
      approved by the bankruptcy Court, and notify said potential
      creditors of the existence, amount and classification of
      their respective claims as set forth in the Schedules,
      which may be effected by inclusion of such information on a
      customized proof of claim form provided to potential
      creditors;

   e. maintain a post office box or address for the purpose of
      receiving claims and returned mail, and process all mail
      received;

   f. prepare and file or cause to be filed with the Clerk an
      affidavit or certificate of service for all notices,
      motions, orders, and other pleadings or documents served
      within seven business days of service that includes
      (i) either a copy of the notice served or the docket
      numbers(s) and titles of the pleading served, (ii) a list
      of persons to whom it was mailed (in alphabetical order)
      with their addresses, (iii) the manner of service, and
     (iv) the date served;

   g. process all proofs of claim received, including those
      received by the Clerk's Office, and check said processing
      for accuracy, and maintain the original proofs of claim in
      a secure area;

   h. maintain the official claims register for the Debtor on
      behalf of the Clerk; upon the Clerk's request, provide the
      Clerk with certified, duplicate unofficial Claims Register;
      and specify in the Claims Registers the following
      information for each claim docketed (i) the claim number
      assigned, (ii) the date received, (iii) the name and
      address of the claimant and agent, if applicable, who filed
      the claim, (iv) the amount asserted, (v) the asserted
      classifications of the claim, (vi) the applicable Debtor,
      and (vii) any disposition of the claim;

   i. implement necessary security measures to ensure the
      completeness and integrity of the Claims Registers and the
      safekeeping of the original claims;

   j. record all transfers of claims and provide any notices of
      such transfers as required by Bankruptcy Rule 3001(e);

   k. relocate, by messenger or overnight delivery, all of the
      court-filed proofs of claim to the offices of Kurtzman, not
      less than weekly;

   l. upon completion of the docketing process for all claims
      received to date for each case, turn over to the Clerk
      copies of the claims register for the Clerk's review;

   m. monitor the Court's docket for all notices of appearance,
      address changes, and claims-related pleadings and orders
      filed and make necessary notations on and changes to the
      claims register;

   n. assist in the dissemination of information to the public
      and respond to requests for administrative information
      regarding the case as directed by the Debtor or the Court,
      including through the use of a case website and call
      center;

   o. if the Chapter 11 case is converted to Chapter 7 of the
      Bankruptcy Code, contact the Clerk's Office within three
      (3) days of the notice to Donlin Recano of entry of the
      order converting the case;

   p. thirty (30) days prior to the close of the bankruptcy case,
      request the Debtor submits to the Court a proposed Order
      dismissing Donlin Recano as Claims and Noticing Agent and
      terminating the services in such capacity upon completion
      of its duties and responsibilities and upon the closing of
      the Chapter 11 case;

   q. within seven (7) days of notice to Donlin Recano of entry
      of an order closing the Chapter 11 case, provide to the
      bankruptcy Court the final version of the claims register
      as of the date immediately before the close of the case;
      and

   r. at the close of the Chapter 11 Cases, box and transport all
      original documents, in proper format, as provided by the
      Clerk's office, to (i) the Federal Archives Record
      Administration, located at 14700 Townsend Road,
      Philadelphia, PA 19154-1096, or (ii) any other location
      Requested by the Clerk's office.

Donlin Recano will be paid at these hourly rates:

     Senior Bankruptcy Consultant             $140
     Case Manager                             $112
     Technology/Programming Consultant        $88
     Consultant/Analyst                       $72
     Clerical                                 $45

Donlin Recano will be paid a retainer in the amount of $15,000.

Donlin Recano will also be reimbursed for reasonable out-of-pocket
expenses incurred.

Alexander T. Leventhal, president and chief executive officer of
Donlin Recano & Company, Inc., assured the Court that the firm is
a "disinterested person" as the term is defined in Section 101(14)
of the Bankruptcy Code and does not represent any interest adverse
to the Debtors and their estates.

Donlin Recano can be reached at:

     Alexander T. Leventhal
     DONLIN RECANO & COMPANY, INC.
     6201 15th Avenue
     Brooklyn, NY 11219
     Tel: (888) 629-2235

                   About Mac Acquisition LLC

Mac Acquisition LLC, et al. -- https://www.macaronigrill.com/ --
operate full-service casual dining restaurants under the trade
name, "Romano's Macaroni Grill."  As of Oct. 18, 2017, the company
operates 93 company-owned restaurants located in 23 states, with a
workforce of approximately 4,600 employees. Non-debtor affiliate
RMG Development franchises an additional 23 restaurants in
Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Texas, Puerto Rico, Mexico, Bahrain,
Egypt, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Germany, and Saudi
Arabia.

During 2016, Mac Acquisition and RMG generated gross revenues
through restaurant sales and franchisee payments of approximately
$230 million.

On Oct. 18, 2017, Mac Acquisition LLC, and eight affiliates sought
Chapter 11 protection (Bankr. D. Del. Lead Case No. 17-12224).
Mac Acquisition's estimated assets of $10 million to $50 million
and debt at $50 million to $100 million.

The Hon. Mary F. Walrath is the case judge.

The Debtors tapped Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor, LLP, as
Delaware bankruptcy counsel; Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, as
general bankruptcy counsel; Mackinac Partners, LLC, and financial
advisor. Donlin, Recano & Company, Inc., is the claims agent, and
maintains the Web site at https://www.donlinrecano.com/mg


UNIVERSITY OF THE SACRED HEART: Moody's Puts Ba3 Rating on Review
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed the Ba3 rating on University
of the Sacred Heart's (Universidad del Sagrado Corazon or Sagrado)
General Revenue and Refunding Bonds, 2012A on review for
downgrade. The bonds, with $19.5 million outstanding, were issued
through the Puerto Rico Industrial, Tourist, Educational, Medical
and Environmental Pollution Control Facilities Financing
Authority.

The review is prompted by uncertainty regarding the impact on
enrollment, operations, and liquidity for the university in the
aftermath of Hurricane Maria.

Notably, Sagrado recently reopened for classes. However, due to a
lack of electricity, it is holding day classes only, including on
weekends for graduate and evening students. Sagrado has power
generators for several campus structures, including its student
residences. It has network and internet connectivity and is
providing online courses for students unable to reach campus.
Currently, Sagrado expects it will complete the fall semester
before Christmas and start the spring 2018 semester the third week
of January as originally scheduled. It reports the campus suffered
no major damage, with essentially all space usable.

Although Sagrado accomplished a significant feat by resumption of
classes, it is uncertain what the hurricane's ultimate financial
impact will be. Moody's reviews will include Sagrado's expected
fall 2017 enrollment and tuition revenue for the semester, as well
as projections for the spring 2018 semester. It will also include
the university's expenditures for recovery, reimbursement from
insurance proceeds, and its operating cash forecast. The review
will also focus on the university's longer term strategies to
adjust to the island's accelerating population declines.

Methodology

The principal methodology used in this rating was Global Higher
Education published in November 2015.


* S&P Revises Outlook on Three Puerto Rican Banks to Negative
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings, on Oct. 20, 2017, revised its outlooks on
FirstBank Puerto Rico, OFG Bancorp, and Popular Inc. to negative
from stable. At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on these
banks. S&P also revised its outlooks on main bank subsidiaries
Oriental Bank and Banco Popular de Puerto Rico to negative from
stable and affirmed its ratings on these banks.

RATIONALE

S&P said, "The outlook revisions primarily result from the
heightened uncertainties for the Puerto Rican economy following
substantial damage to the island from Hurricane Maria, which could
have a more severe macro impact and lead to worse loan performance
over the next year than we currently incorporate in the ratings.
While progress on rebuilding continues, we believe a full recovery
could take several months since the pace has been quite slow. For
example, only a few of the 1,300 schools on the island are
functioning, prompting concerns about accelerated outmigration.

"The precise impact of the hurricane on the local economy is
presently unclear since an inflow of insurance proceeds, federal
grants, and loans is expected to partially offset some of the
storm-induced economic weakness. Nevertheless, given the slow pace
of rebuilding, the island's economic activity could contract more
than we expected because of disruptions in small-business
operations, elevated outmigration, and weakness in the tourism,
manufacturing, and agriculture sectors. As of today, roughly 82%
of the island is still without power, with an estimated several
months to full recovery.

"We believe revenues will decline, at least in the near term, as
Puerto Rico's banks have given 90-day moratoriums on mortgage
payments to consumer and commercial borrowers and waived late
payment charges and other fees based on regulatory guidance. Given
these measures, we believe the financial condition of borrowers
could be somewhat less apparent in the near term, potentially
delaying the recognition and disclosure of nonperforming loans.
Furthermore, operational expenses could rise as banks struggle to
attain full functionality at branches, approximately 71% of which
were operational as of today, according to the Office of the
Commissioner of Financial Institutions of Puerto Rico (OCIF).

"Although our ratings already incorporated our expectation for
conservative credit losses -- given the deep local economic
downturn and fiscal austerity -- the revision of our outlooks to
negative indicate that net charge-offs and loan loss provisions
could rise even more than we previously anticipated. While banks
generally require residential borrowers with mortgages to have
insurance coverage and most commercial buildings typically have
high coverage, the extent of damage and loan losses could still be
very high, given insurance deductibles and caps. For example,
according to catastrophe-risk-modeling firm AIR Worldwide, about
50% of houses in Puerto Rico have policies that protect against
wind damage, a lower proportion than is typical across the U.S.
Also, most standard homeowner insurance policies do not cover
flood damage.

"Further, banks' exposures to local municipalities, which are
quite substantial, could deteriorate because those obligations are
typically backed by property taxes, municipal excise taxes, and
proceeds from sales and use tax, all of which could weaken in the
storm's aftermath. Most of this exposure is likely concentrated in
the largest and highest-density municipalities of San Juan,
Carolina, Guaynabo, and Bayamon -- which tend to have somewhat
better debt serviceability given better tax-collection prospects.

"We affirmed our ratings on the three banks because they have
substantially reduced their loan exposures to the central local
government and its instrumentalities, built capital balances, and
reduced troubled loans in recent years."

FIRSTBANK PUERTO RICO

The negative outlook on FirstBank Puerto Rico reflects potentially
weaker credit metrics and a prolonged disruption in normal
business operations following the damage to infrastructure in
Puerto Rico from Hurricane Maria. S&P said, "We expect the bank's
strong capitalization to withstand a substantial increase in
credit losses, but we now think economic recovery on the island
will take much longer post the hurricane, existing problems like
real estate price deterioration and unemployment could weaken
further, outmigration could worsen, and the bank's municipal
exposures could pose new risks.

"We may lower the ratings in the next 12 months if loan losses
substantially exceed our expectations, or if the local economy
deteriorates more than we currently expect. Alternatively, we may
revise the outlook to stable if we see the bank is able to contain
the growth in charge-offs and stabilize its nonperforming loans
(particularly in the residential mortgage and unsecured consumer
portfolios) relative to its preprovision earnings and reserves.

"We affirmed our ratings on FirstBank Puerto Rico largely because
of the strength in the bank's capitalization, modestly improving
core profitability, and steady market position in Puerto Rico.
However, this is balanced by the bank's higher-than-peer exposure
to the Commonwealth and its public entities and heavy reliance on
brokered deposit funding."

OFG BANCORP

The negative outlook on OFG Bancorp reflects the potential for
substantial deterioration in the bank's credit performance
following the damage to infrastructure in Puerto Rico from
Hurricane Maria. Nearly all of OFG's loans are concentrated in
Puerto Rico. S&P said, "While we expect the bank's strong
capitalization to absorb significant credit losses, we now think
economic recovery on the island will take much longer post the
hurricane, existing problems like real estate price deterioration
and unemployment could weaken further, structural outmigration
could worsen, and the bank's municipal exposures could pose new
risks.

"We may lower the ratings if loan performance deteriorates
substantially more than we expect over the next year. Conversely,
we could revise the outlook to stable should loan losses remain
within acceptable levels relative to the bank's preprovision
earnings, reserve levels, and capital.

"Our affirmation of the ratings mainly reflects the substantial
reduction in the bank's direct exposure to the Puerto Rican
government, improvement in its problem asset metrics in the last
two years, and the increase in its capital ratios, which we expect
will remain strong."

POPULAR INC.

S&P said, "The outlook on Popular Inc. is negative, reflecting the
potential that the bank's loan performance could deteriorate
substantially more than we previously anticipated following
Hurricane Maria. Our capital and earnings assessment already
reflects large loan provisions and loan losses because of a
weakening local economy and continued infrastructure issues in
Puerto Rico. However, we could lower the rating in the next 12
months if loan performance or the local economy deteriorates more
than we currently expect. Conversely, we could revise the outlook
to stable should loan losses remain within acceptable levels
relative to the bank's preprovision earnings, reserve levels, and
capital.

"Despite significant near-term challenges, Popular is perhaps the
best-positioned bank in Puerto Rico to weather the local economic
downturn and fiscal austerity for several reasons. First, Popular
has the lowest nonperforming assets ratios among its local peers
and rising capital ratios. Second, the company has fairly
significant businesses outside the island, which helps diversify
its revenues somewhat. For example, roughly 26% of its loans were
outside Puerto Rico as of Dec. 31, 2016 (23% in the mainland U.S.
and 3% in the Virgin Islands). Finally, the bank has been
consistently profitable in recent years (excluding various
nonrecurring items)."

  RATINGS LIST

  Ratings Affirmed; Outlooks Revised
                                 To                From
  FirstBank Puerto Rico
   Issuer Credit Rating            B+/Negative/--    B+/Stable/--

  OFG Bancorp
   Issuer Credit Rating            B/Negative/--     B/Stable/--

  Oriental Bank
   Issuer Credit Rating            BB-/Negative/--   BB-/Stable/--

  Popular Inc.
   Issuer Credit Rating            BB-/Negative/B    BB-/Stable/B

  Banco Popular de Puerto Rico
   Issuer Credit Rating            BB+/Negative/B    BB+/Stable/B

  Popular North America Inc.
   Issuer Credit Rating            BB-/Negative/B    BB-/Stable/B

  Popular International Bank Inc.
   Issuer Credit Rating            BB-/Negative/--   BB-/Stable/--



=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================


PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: S&P Places 'CCC-' CCR on Watch Negative
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings placed its ratings on Petroleos de Venezuela
S.A. (PDVSA) on CreditWatch with negative implications, including
its 'CCC-' corporate credit ratings.

The CreditWatch placement reflects the uncertainty about the
company's ability to pay its upcoming debt maturity on its 2020
senior unsecured notes scheduled to be covered on Oct. 27, 2017
for about $1.0 billion and the maturity of its 2017 senior
unsecured notes scheduled to be covered on Nov. 2, 2017 for about
$1.2 billion, given PDVSA's current sanctions and its already
pressured liquidity position.

The CreditWatch negative listing means the ratings could be
lowered or affirmed in the next week. S&P expects to resolve the
CreditWatch listing once the company either fails to pay its
upcoming debt maturities on the scheduled date, or if it pays them
down. If the company is unable to pay its maturities, the
corporate rating will be lowered to 'SD', the rating on the 2017
and 2020 notes will be lowered to 'D', and the remaining current
outstanding debt will be affirmed at 'CCC-'. If the company
announces a general default, all of the ratings will be lowered to
'D'.


VENEZUELA: Opposition Calls for Debt Refinancing
------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that the Venezuelan opposition asked the Nicolas
Maduro government to refinance the country's foreign debt to
prevent the public from being hurt by a cutback in already-scarce
imports that would otherwise be necessary to pay the $3.5 billion
debt load coming due in October and November.

"It's a proposal we're making today so that . . . .  the debt can
be refinanced and Venezuelans will not be hurt," said the head of
the opposition-controlled Parliament, Julio Borges, at a press
conference, according to EFE News.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Sept. 28, 2017, S&P Global Ratings suspended its 'CCC-' local
currency issue ratings on four of the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela's local currency-denominated debt issues. At the same
time, S&P affirmed its 'CCC-' long-term foreign and local
currency sovereign issuer credit ratings. The outlook on the long-
term ratings is negative. In addition, S&P affirmed its 'C' short-
term foreign and local currency sovereign issuer credit ratings.
The transfer and convertibility assessment remains 'CCC-'.


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Joseph Cardillo at
856-381-8268.


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