/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/171102.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

               Thursday, November 2, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 218


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

ARGENTINA: Plans Overhaul of Tax Code
BANCO DE CHUBUT: Moody's Withdraws B3 Long-Term Deposit Rating


B R A Z I L

AB CONCESSOES: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Corporate Family Rating
COMPANHIA ENERGETICA: Moody's Lowers Corporate Family Rating to B3


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

OCEAN RIG: S&P Raises LT CCR to 'B-', Outlook Stable


J A M A I C A

JAMAICA: To Intensify Agricultural "Push Start Program"


M E X I C O

GFINTERACCIONES: Fitch Ratings on Watch Neg. Amid Merger Deal
MEXICO: GDP Contracted in Third Quarter as Disasters Took Toll


P U E R T O    R I C O

PUERTO RICO ELECTRIC: Oversight Board Proposes New PREPA Chief
PUERTO RICO ELECTRIC: Committee to Probe of $300M Whitefish Deal
PUERTO RICO: Revising Plan to End Debt Crisis After Hurricanes
PUERTO RICO: COFINA Senior Bondholders' Coalition Update Holdings
PUERTO RICO: FGIC Bid for 90-Day Stay of Suits Facing Objections


V E N E Z U E L A

VENEZUELA: Investors Brace for Default as Debt Comes Due
VENEZUELA: Ends Ban on Opposition Leader Holding Public Office


                            - - - - -



=================
A R G E N T I N A
=================


ARGENTINA: Plans Overhaul of Tax Code
------------------------------------
Taos Turner at The Wall Street Journal reports that Argentina's
government plans to substantially overhaul its tax code to boost
economic growth and reduce inequality, Treasury Minister Nicolas
Dujovne said.

The government aims to cut corporate income taxes to 25% from 35%
within five years, reduce social security taxes on employers and
eliminate taxes on certain bank transactions, according to The
Wall Street Journal.  Federal officials also plan to work with
provincial governors to lower so-called gross income taxes on
goods, Mr. Dujovne said, the report relays.

President Mauricio Macri will send the proposals to Congress
within two weeks, Mr. Dujovne said, adding that he expects
Congress to approve them, the report discloses.

"We're going to move toward a more normal tax system, more like
what other countries have," Mr. Dujovne said at a news conference,
the report relays.

Argentina ranked dead last out of 137 countries in a recent survey
on tax-rate competitiveness by the World Economic Forum, the
report notes.  Mr. Dujovne said the Macri administration plans to
reduce key taxes to help companies become more competitive, the
report says.

"We have a problem, and we need to recognize it," he said, the
report adds.

The announcement comes a week after Mr. Macri won widespread
backing from Argentines in a midterm congressional election, the
report notes.  And it is part of about 40 new policy proposals
that Mr. Macri aims to implement over the next year, officials
have said, the report relays.

The government also plans to create a 15% capital-gains tax on
certain financial transactions, the report discloses.  Mr. Dujovne
said Argentina is currently the only large country in Latin
America that doesn't collect such a tax, the report notes.  He
said he doesn't expect it to have any effect on the country's
comparatively small capital market, the report relays.

The treasury minister said the government will enact the changes
gradually over a period of five years, noting that both Chile and
Uruguay similarly overhauled their tax systems, the report notes.

In addition, the government plans to eliminate a 17% tax on
cellphones, televisions and monitors and ditch a 10% tax on high-
end cars, the report relates.  Meanwhile, it will double taxes on
private airplanes and expensive boats and motorcycles, the report
says.

The decision to cut taxes on consumer electronics items is certain
to prove popular with middle-class Argentines, many of whom
frequently complain that smartphones, TVs and other items cost far
more in Argentina than in other countries, the report notes.

In a move that may be less popular, the government will slap a 10%
tax on wine and a 17% duty on champagne, the report discloses.  It
will also raise taxes on sugared sodas and double the tax on beer
to 17%, the report relays.

The fiscal cost for the tax overhauls will be nearly neutral,
amounting to about 0.3% of total economic output within five
years, Mr. Dujovne said, the report says.

"We have two goals that compete against each other, which is to
cut spending and to lower the deficit," Mr. Dujovne said.  "So we
have to lower taxes gradually to take care of the deficit. That's
why we're taking a gradual, five-year path with this," he added.

                           *     *    *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America, S&P
Global Ratings, on Oct. 30, 2017, raised its long-term sovereign
credit ratings on the Republic of Argentina to 'B+' from 'B'. The
outlook on the long-term ratings is stable. S&P also affirmed its
short-term sovereign credit ratings on Argentina at 'B'. At the
same time, S&P raised its national scale ratings to 'raAA' from
'raA+'. In addition, S&P raised its transfer and convertibility
assessment to 'BB-' from 'B+', in line with its assessment of
sustained local access to foreign exchange.

In May 2017, Fitch Ratings affirmed Argentina's Long-Term Foreign
and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'B' with a
Stable Outlook. The issue ratings on Argentina's senior unsecured
Foreign and Local Currency bonds are also affirmed at 'B'. The
Country Ceiling is affirmed at 'B' and the Short-Term Foreign and
Local Currency IDRs at 'B'.  The Stable Outlook reflects Fitch's
expectation that macroeconomic variables will improve gradually
over the forecast horizon, but that the political environment
continues to pose relevant risks, as the policy shift underway
under the Macri administration does not count on broad-based
social and political support to ensure its resilience through
economic and electoral cycles.

In January 2017, Moody's Investors Service assigned a B3 rating
to the Government of Argentina's US$3.25 billion bond due 2022 and
the US$3.75 billion bond due 2027. The outlook on the Government
of Argentina's rating is stable. By March 2017, Moody's affirmed
Argentina's B3 issuer rating and changed the ratings outlook to
positive from stable. In a late September 2017 release, Moody's
said it expects the Argentine economy to grow by 3% in 2017 and by
3.5% in 2018.



BANCO DE CHUBUT: Moody's Withdraws B3 Long-Term Deposit Rating
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo announced
that it has withdrawn all of its ratings for Banco de Chubut S.A.
for business reasons.

The following ratings of Banco del Chubut S.A. were withdrawn:

- Long-term global local currency deposit rating, previously
   rated B3 with stable outlook

- Short-term global local currency deposit rating, previously
    rated Not Prime

- Long-term global foreign currency deposit rating, previously
   rated Caa1 with stable outlook

- Short-term foreign currency deposit rating, previously rated
   Not Prime

- Argentinean long-term national scale local currency deposit
   rating, previously rated Baa1.ar with stable outlook

- Argentinean long-term national scale foreign currency deposit
   rating, previously rated Ba1.ar with stable outlook

- Baseline credit assessment, previously rated b3

- Adjusted baseline credit assessment, previously rated b3

- Long-term counterparty risk assessment, previously rated B2(cr)

- Short-term counterparty risk assessment, previously rated Not
   Prime(cr)

- Outlook, Changed To Rating Withdrawn From Stable

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has decided to withdraw the ratings for its own business
reasons.

Banco del Chubut S.A. is headquartered in Chubut, Argentina, and
as of June 2017 it had Ars 15,854.7 million ($921.6 million) in
assets and Ars 1,828 million ($106 million) in shareholders'
equity.



===========
B R A Z I L
===========


AB CONCESSOES: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Corporate Family Rating
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina assigned Corporate Family Ratings (CFR) of
Ba3 (Global Scale) A3.br (Brazil National Scale, NSR) to AB
Concessoes S.A.. At the same time, Moody's assigned Ba3/A3.br
issuer ratings to Rodovias das Colinas S.A. ("Colinas") and to
TriÉngulo do Sol Auto-Estradas S/A ("TDS"), two operating
companies of AB Concessoes. The outlook is stable. This is the
first time that Moody's has rated these companies.

AB Concessoes is one of the five largest toll road operators in
Brazil. In addition to Colinas and TDS, the company also controls
Concessionaria da Rodovia MG-050 S.A. ("Nascentes das Gerais", not
rated) and has a participation in Concessionaria Rodovias do Tietà
(Caa2 negative). AB Concessoes' shareholders are Atlantia S.p.A.
(Baa2 negative), with a controlling stake of 50% + 1 shares, while
Bertin Group (not rated) holds the remaining participation.
Colinas and TDS are the two main toll road concessionaires of the
AB Concessoes group, responding for around 90% of the consolidated
revenues. They are mature toll roads located in the State of Sao
Paulo (Ba2 negative), with concession contracts expiring in 2028
and 2021, respectively.

RATINGS RATIONALE

AB Concessoes operates through an overall centralized cash
management structure with some cross default provisions across the
group. The credit quality of Colinas and TDS is somewhat
constrained by the significant cash needs of the parent company as
they up-stream dividends and intercompany loans to fund the parent
investment activity. Consequently, Colinas and TDS ratings are
aligned with the group's overall credit quality which reflects
some key risks among others (i) potential for additional cash
transfers within the group from Nascentes das Gerais financial
needs (ii) traffic rebound slower or below expectation of upwards
3% up to 2018 (iii) capex cost overruns (iv) significant debt
refinancing in the five year projected period (v) judicial dispute
with ARTESP regarding the 2006 contract extension granted to
Colinas and TDS. The ratings don't consider the group will execute
the option to incorporate Concessionaria SPMAR S.A. in the current
asset base or will be involved in M&A activity that could further
pressure leverage and Moody's projected investment needs.

The ultimate shareholders have shown support to the
concessionaires where they hold controlling stakes and Moody's
understand they will continue to actively support the group's
credit quality and liquidity in case of need. Moody's also expects
the group will maintain its sound access to the banking and
capital markets and will prudently manage its leverage and
liquidity. Colinas and TDS reported Net Debt to Ebitda of 2.7x and
1.9x in the LTM ended June 2017 compared to the 3.5x covenant
threshold.

The ratings also reflect Colinas and TDS overall stable and strong
cash flows as they are mature toll roads with relative low capex
needs and leverage. The concessionaires have a long track record
of traffic performance, serving areas that are economically
diversified but with more exposure to agribusiness. The ratings
also take into account the adequate balancing of the significant
intercompany loan the parent owns to Colinas and TDS versus their
dividends policy such they can meet their upcoming obligations.

On the other hand, the ratings of the operating companies are
tempered by (i) traffic profile concentrated on heavy vehicles
(around 51% for Colinas and 64% for TDS), which are more volatile
and highly correlated with GDP performance and Brazil's sovereign
rating; (ii) relatively short remaining concession life of TDS
which responds for almost half of the group's revenues (iii) still
significant amount of intercompany loans to be received from AB
Concessoes and track record of high dividend distributions.

Brazil's sovereign rating is also a relevant consideration for the
ratings given the domestic nature of the company's operation, and
consequently its linkages to the local economic/regulatory
environment and ultimate credit quality.

What Could Change the Rating - Up /Down

Traffic performance above Moody's expectations on sustainable
basis could cause upward pressure to the ratings as would a lower
potential contagion risk of the group's credit quality arising
from Nascentes das Gerais investment and refinancing needs or
stronger debt profile. Stronger financial policy and ring-fencing
provisions among Colinas and TDS standalone credit quality
relative to the group's could also positively impact the ratings
of the operating companies.

Given the intrinsic linkages of the group with the Brazilian
sovereign, deterioration in the sovereign's credit quality could
exert downward pressure on the group's ratings as well as Moody's
assessment of weaker shareholders support. The ratings could also
be downgraded if there is a significant and sustained
deterioration in the companies' leverage and liquidity or any
challenges in addressing the group's upcoming refinancing needs.

Downward pressure could also arise if there are material delays or
costs overruns on the parent's capital investment program as well
as if traffic volumes stay consistently below Moody's forecast.
Potential contagion risk from Nascentes das Gerais weaker credit
profile could also affect the ratings. Quantitatively, the ratings
could be downgraded if FFO to Debt stays below 8%, cash interest
coverage below 1.5x and retained cash flow over capex below 1x on
a sustainable basis. A negative outcome of the ongoing judicial
dispute with ARTESP could also weigh on the ratings.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Privately
Managed Toll Roads published in October 2017.


COMPANHIA ENERGETICA: Moody's Lowers Corporate Family Rating to B3
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina has downgraded to B3/B2.br (Global Scale
and Brazil National Scale, respectively) from B2/Ba1.br the
ratings assigned to Companhia Energetica de Minas Gerais -- CEMIG
("Cemig" or the Company) and its subsidiaries Cemig Geracao e
Transmissao S.A ("Cemig GT") and Cemig Distribuicao S.A ("Cemig
D"). The ratings have been placed under review for downgrade.

ISSUERS AND RATINGS AFFECTED

Companhia Energetica de Minas Gerais -- CEMIG

-- Corporate Family Ratings downgraded to B3 from B2 (Global
    Scale) and B2.br from Ba1.br (Brazil National Scale)

-- Ratings under review for downgrade

Cemig Geracao e Transmissao S.A.

-- Senior secured and unsecured debt ratings downgraded to
    B3/B2.br from B2/Ba1.br (Global Scale and Brazil National
    Scale, respectively)

-- Issuer Ratings downgraded to B3 from B2 (Global Scale) and
    B2.br from Ba1.br (Brazil National Scale)

-- Ratings under review for downgrade

Issuer: Cemig Distribuicao S.A.

-- Issuer Ratings and senior unsecured debt ratings downgraded to
    B3/B2.br from B2/Ba1.br (Global Scale and Brazil National
    Scale, respectively)

-- Ratings under review for downgrade.

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Companhia Energetica de Minas Gerais

-- Outlook, Changed To Rating Under Review for Downgrade From
    Negative

Issuer: Cemig Geracao e Transmissao S.A.

-- Outlook, Changed To Rating Under Review for Downgrade From
    Negative

Issuer: Cemig Distribuicao S.A

-- Outlook, Changed To Rating Under Review for Downgrade From
    Negative

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade reflects the limited progress on execution/
formalization of its refinancing plan, including the proposed
USD1.0 billion Eurobond issuance, in light of debt maturities in
the amount of BRL3.3 billion by December 2017. The company's
liquidity position has deteriorated, as exemplified by the 60-day
postponement of debt balances in the amount of BRL549 million due
in Oct. 2017 with Banco do Brasil, subject to increased financial
costs and more stringent financial covenants. The ratings consider
however, the still solid market position and asset portfolio, as
well as capital structure and leverage levels which provide the
basis for execution of its refinancing plan.

The placement of the ratings under review for downgrade, reflects
the potential for further negative rating action upon the
frustration or delay in execution of the abovementioned plan,
which can lead to full or partial default on the BRL3.3 billion of
debt due by Dec. 15, 2017.

The company continues to engage in discussions with a syndicate of
creditor banks to refinance approximately BRL3.6 billion of debt.
On October 16, 2017, the company announced it postponed for 60
days the payment of BRL549.1 million of debts due by Cemig GT on
October 24th, 26th, and 30th with Banco do Brasil S.A. The
postponement was accompanied by a substantial increase in interest
rates and on a fee charge of 0.5% over a BRL150 million
installment, as well as stringent financial covenants,
exemplifying the company's dire liquidity needs. The postponement
aims to provide additional time for the full syndicate to formally
close on commercial conditions.

Negotiations to partially postpone an additional obligation of
approximately BRL1.6 billion due in November 2017 with local
banks, related to the put option contract on electricity utility
Light S.A. (B1/Baa1.br positive) are ongoing, with an amount of at
least BRL600 million to be paid upon the sale of company assets.

In recognition of liquidity constraints and necessity to decrease
leverage to comply with bylaws, on October 26, 2017, the company
announced the board of directors approved an equity capital
increase that can raise up to BRL1.3 billion. In an effort to
avoid current shareholder dilution, the offer is first extended to
current shareholders, and if not fully subscribed, extended to the
market. The company's expectation is that the process will
complete in the beginning of December 2017.

The divestment plan announced earlier this year, which is expected
by the company to raise approximately BRL8.0 billion is
progressing, particularly as what relates to the sale of Light
Serviáos de Eletricidade S.A. (B1/Baa1.br positive) and the sale
of Transmissora Alianca de Energia Eletrica S.A. (TAESA,
Ba2/Aa1.br stable), but financial resources expected prior to
December 2017 are limited. That being said, progress on the
divestment plan increases the likelihood that the company executes
the refinancing plan with banks and closes on the Eurobond
issuance.

The current ratings remain supported by Cemig's solid market
position and economic relevance as one of the largest integrated
energy utility companies in Brazil and 5.5 GW of generation
installed capacity. Operating performance during the first half
2017 is improving, with revenues and EBITDA (as per Moody's
standard adjustments) increasing by 11% and 31%, respectively in
contrast to first half 2016. Overall leverage metrics as measured
by Debt / Ebitda and CFO pre W/C to Debt of 3.1x and 18.7% as of
June 2017 (as per Moody's standard adjustements), respectively,
remain depressed in constrast to 2015, but are expected to improve
as a function of operating performance and deleveraging from the
asset divestment plan.

The B3/B2.br CFR assigned to Cemig reflects the application of
Moody's joint default analysis (JDA) framework for government
related issuers (GRI). The state of Minas Gerais is the
shareholder with majority control. Moody's GRI rating methodology
considers the following four input factors (i) a moderate-level
probability of extraordinary support from the state should Cemig
face financial distress, (ii) Moody's estimates of a high level of
dependence between the company and the state, (iii) Moody's rating
of the State of Minas Gerais (B1, negative) as well as (iv)
Cemig's intrinsic credit profile as captured in the Moody's
Baseline Credit Assessment (BCA) of caa1.

The ratings assigned to Cemig GT and Cemig D reflect the
guarantees provided by the holding company as well as cross-
default clauses embedded in the various debt documents across the
corporate family.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

The ratings can be downgraded further upon frustration or delay on
execution of the abovementioned plans, ultimately leading to a
view of increased likelihood of default on the BRL3.3 billion Dec.
2017 maturities or announcement of a formal debt restructuring
plan.

Positive rating pressure can result from the company formally
executing in full its refinancing plan, including refinancing with
banks of BRL3.6 billion, the closing of the USD1.0 billion
Eurobond, and the capital increase of BRL1.3 billion prior to
maturity of the December 2017 debts, which in combination resolve
the company's dire liquidity issues and will allow the ratings to
reflect its capital structure and leverage level.

Headquartered in Belo Horizonte in the state of Minas Gerais,
Cemig is a leading Brazilian integrated utility operating in the
sectors of electricity distribution, generation and transmission
with 5,500MW in installed capacity and approximately 8,200km of
transmission lines across the country. The company also owns
controlling equity participation in the electricity utility Light
S.A (B1/Baa1.br positive) and the transmission company
Transmissora Alianca de Energia Eletrica (Ba2/Aa1.br stable).
Cemig is controlled by the state of Minas Gerais (B1 negative)
which owns 50.69% of Cemig's voting capital. As of June 2017,
Cemig reported last twelve month net revenues and EBITDA of
BRL18.5 billion and BRL5.3 billion respectively, as per Moody's
standard adjustments.

The methodologies used in rating Companhia Energetica de Minas
Gerais - CEMIG were Regulated Electric and Gas Utilities published
in June 2017, and Government-Related Issuers published in August
2017. The principal methodology used in rating Cemig Geracao e
Transmissao S.A. was Unregulated Utilities and Unregulated Power
Companies published in May 2017. The principal methodology used in
rating Cemig Distribuicao S.A. was Regulated Electric and Gas
Utilities published in June 2017.



==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


OCEAN RIG: S&P Raises LT CCR to 'B-', Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its long-term corporate credit rating on
Cayman Islands-domiciled drilling company Ocean Rig UDW Inc. to
'B-' from 'D'. The outlook is stable.

S&P also assigned a 'B' rating to the new $450 million senior
secured term loan due in 2024. The recovery rating is '2',
indicating S&P's expectation of very high recovery prospects
(70%-90%; rounded estimate: 85%) in the event of a payment
default.

S&P withdrew the issue rating on the following instruments that
were exchanged:

-- Drillships Ocean Ventures Inc.'s $1.3 billion term loan B
     facility.

-- Drill Rigs Holdings Inc.'s $800 million senior secured notes.

-- Drillships Financing Holding Inc.'s $1.9 billion term loan B1
     facility.

-- Ocean Rig's $500 million senior unsecured notes due in 2019.

S&P said, "With the restructuring completed, Ocean Rig is now
well positioned to face the turbulent market conditions in
offshore drilling and the consequent poor operating and financial
performance that we anticipate for all players in the segment
over the next couple of years. With a cash balance close to $700
million (that we view as available for debt repayment) and a $450
million maturity in 2024, the company has ample leeway to
navigate through uncertain times in offshore markets, with
limited demand for rigs and drill ships leading to low dayrates.
As a result, we view the financial risk profile as being
significantly improved, with negative reported net debt and cash
interest charges of only $36 million per year, or about 7x less
than in 2016. However, we note that it is the strong cash balance
and low absolute debt that sustains the solid financial risk
assessment, rather than strong operating performance.

"We forecast funds from operations (FFO) and EBITDA to be weak
and we anticipate FOCF to be negative in 2019. Therefore, the
liquidity protection and maintenance of a high cash balance is
key to our assessment and for maintaining the rating at 'B-. As
such, we do not view the financial risk profile as fully
capturing the credit risks because of the high event risk that
could, in our view, result in a much weaker financial risk
profile if the company and its shareholders decided to engage in
aggressive growth strategies or shareholder-friendly actions. Our
assessment also incorporates the lack of clear financial policy
such as leverage targets, and the track record of the company's
management, which includes high leverage and risk appetite over
the past years, eventually resulting in financial distress and
the restructuring. Recently some of the largest shareholders have
urged the company to consider options regarding the strategy and
capital structure, which creates uncertainty over the longer
term. For those reasons, we have adjusted the rating on what we
view as financial policy weaknesses.

"The financial risk profile assessment is largely benefitting
from the cash balance (available for debt repayment) and the
consequent negative net debt. However, we note that coverage
ratios are weak, even with cash interests at much lower levels
than previously. This is because despite the restructuring, we
have not changed our view of the offshore drilling markets for
the coming years and EBITDA and FFO will remain weak, translating
to cash interest being high on a relative basis when compared
with what cash the business can generate over the next 12-24
months. We note, however, that the company could decide to prepay
the $450 million loan out of cash on hand prior to March 22,
2018, without penalty, which would lead to substantially
improving cash interest coverage."

The difficulties faced by offshore drillers also inform S&P's
business risk assessment. With very high concentration from a
customer and contract perspective, (about 80% of backlog is
related to the Ocean Rig Skyros contract with Total S.A. Angola,
at dayrates way above current market rates), the company is
vulnerable to cancellation risk as we have seen in previous
years. S&P said, "We also note that the fleet is of an overall
high quality with several drill ships from the latest generation
that should be better positioned to get employment in an improved
market environment. But six of those units are currently cold
stacked, which we view negatively because it will be more
difficult, and costly, to re-contract them. Furthermore, we view
the lack of diversification, into shallow or midwater drilling,
for example, as a negative factor because there is uncertainty as
to how deep and ultra-deepwater projects will play out in global
oil and gas production the next five years, leading to
uncertainty in the pace and magnitude of the segment's recovery.
Employment and dayrates for jack-ups have also been more stable
than for floaters. We still believe, however, that Ocean Rigs'
business position has improved following the restructuring
because the balance sheet puts it in a more favorable position in
oil-rig tenders. Not only does a strong balance sheet provide
assurance for potential customers, it also allows for more
competitive pricing, thus increasing chances of keeping the fleet
active."

S&P said, "The outlook is stable, reflecting our view that the
current significant cash balance provides protection over the
coming 12 months against underperformance of the business in the
current difficult market environment. As such, we anticipate
available cash to remain above $500 million and free operating
cash flow to be only modestly negative over the next two years.

"We could lower the rating in the next 12 months if the cash
balances are significantly reduced, such that available liquidity
would fall below $500 million. This would likely occur through
growth initiatives and/or shareholder distributions rather than
weaker-than-expected operating performance. However, we could
lower the ratings if the company were to face contract
cancellations or any other significant negative adverse event
impeding the long-term prospects of the business and the
sustainability of the capital structure.

"We could raise the rating on Ocean Rig in the coming 12 months
if the company was to substantially improve its contract backlog;
for example, by employing stacked rigs and diversifying its
revenue streams, alleviating some of the concentration risk. This
should translate into better EBITDA and cash flow generation than
we currently project and therefore support overall sustainability
of the company's business model. We believe this scenario could
materialize in case of significant improvement in market
conditions, which we do not anticipate in our base case scenario
over the next 12 months. A higher rating on Ocean Rig could also
hinge on a more predictable financial policy and if it uses cash
on hand to repay debt."



=============
J A M A I C A
=============


JAMAICA: To Intensify Agricultural "Push Start Program"
-------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that plans have been outlined to further reduce
the local demand for imported food crops.

J.C Hutchinson, Minister without portfolio in the Agriculture
Ministry, says the initiative to increase agricultural production
will be intensified in 2018, adding that this will increase the
local supply of food crops, according to RJR News.

The initiative is dubbed the Agricultural Push Start Program, the
report notes.

"This program is set to benefit all farmers throughout the island
for three crops as a pilot.  This will be a game changer for
agriculture in Jamaica.  Crops such as a tomatoes, carrots,
cantaloupe and others are being imported into the island.  Next
year I intend to bring some of these crops under the program so we
can eliminate the importation of most of them," the report quoted
J.C Hutchinson as saying.

According to Hutchinson, the ministry is also slated to receive
international assistance from the Netherlands to boost
agricultural production, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America,
S&P Global Ratings affirmed on Sept. 25, 2017, its 'B' long- and
short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on
Jamaica. The outlook on the long-term rating remains stable. At
the same time, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B+' transfer and
convertibility assessment on the country.



===========
M E X I C O
===========


GFINTERACCIONES: Fitch Ratings on Watch Neg. Amid Merger Deal
-------------------------------------------------------------
Following the recent announcement of a binding agreement to merge
Grupo Financiero Banorte, S.A.B. de C.V. (GFNorte) and Grupo
Financiero Interacciones, S.A.B. de C.V. (GFInteracciones), Fitch
has placed most of GFNorte's ratings, as well as those of its
subsidiaries, on Rating Watch Negative. In addition, Fitch has
placed the ratings of GFInteracciones subsidiaries Banco
Interacciones, S.A. (Interacciones) and Interacciones Casa de
Bolsa, S.A. de C.V. (Interacciones CB) on Watch Positive.

Once the respective approvals from both entities' assemblies and
the financial regulators are obtained, GFNorte and
GFInteracciones' subsidiaries will be integrated, following the
completion of the merger between the two financial groups.

The Negative Watch on GFNorte reflects that the ratings could be
downgraded or affirmed and removed from Watch once Fitch has
completed a thorough review of the business and financial
implications of the proposed merger. The Positive Watch on the
GFInteracciones subsidiaries' ratings reflects Fitch's expectation
that upon completion of the potential merger these ratings will
likely be upgraded to the level of GFNorte's or those of its main
operating subsidiary, Banco Mercantil del Norte, S.A. (Banorte).
Fitch expects to resolve the Watches on both entities
simultaneously and as soon as possible after the transaction has
been approved and confirmed. This could potentially take more than
the six-month period in which Rating Watches are usually solved.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

GFNorte and Subsidiaries' IDRs, VRs, National Scale, and Debt
Issue Ratings

Fitch has placed these ratings on Rating Watch Negative based on
the agency's initial assessment that there could potentially be
some moderate downside pressure on GFNorte's overall credit
profile, and therefore a rating downgrade cannot be ruled out at
this early stage of the deal.

Fitch considers that its assessment of GFNorte's risk appetite
could potentially weaken moderately, considering the entity's
willingness to grow inorganically in the segment of public sector
financing, which generally has a higher exposure per borrower and
a longer duration relative to Banorte's other lending businesses.
In addition, Fitch does not rule out that the deal could
potentially have mildly negative implications in more than one of
the financial elements that are factored in into GFNorte's
ratings. For instance, there could be moderate, although
potentially temporary, negative implications in terms of capital
adequacy and liquidity. The impact on earnings and overall
profitability is yet to be determined.

Fitch also believes that some mildly negative outcomes could arise
in terms of asset quality. While GFInteracciones would add a loan
portfolio with very low impairment levels, after the planned
merger, concentration in public sector loans would increase from
nearly 21% to almost 30% of GFNorte's total lending. While
effective credit losses in this business line are historically
very low due to the presence of good collateral and guarantee
structures, problems in the debtors' repayment capacity arise from
time to time, which could lead to loan restructurings and
additional challenges in terms of asset liability management.

However, in the event that a rating downgrade is triggered, Fitch
believes that the downside potential on GFNorte's international
ratings could be limited to one notch from the current levels.
National scale ratings are local relativities of creditworthiness,
and therefore there is no lineal relationship between
international scale and national ratings. However, Fitch believes
that if a one-notch downgrade occurs at GFNorte's global ratings,
the downside potential for its subsidiaries' national scale
ratings would be limited to no more than one or two notches.

The potential merger with GFInteracciones will likely increase
GFNorte's market share and competitive position (reaching or
consolidating as the second largest bank in Mexico per loans and
deposits), particularly in the few business lines in which
GFInteracciones would add a material contribution to GFNorte's
overall volumes especially in public sector and infrastructure
lending. However, Fitch does not expect an immediate improvement
in its assessment of GFNorte's company profile, since the business
model is not expected to change materially, while certain
business, revenue, and risk concentrations could potentially
exacerbate upon the potential merger of GFInteracciones.

GFNorte's and Banorte's Support Ratings (SR) and Support Rating
Floors (SRF) are not affected by these ratings actions and they
remain unaffected. The rationale for those ratings is not
materially influenced by the potential merger, and therefore their
respective drivers and sensitivities remain unchanged from Fitch's
previous press release on these entities.

Since AyF Banorte, Casa de Bolsa Banorte-Ixe and Almacenadora
Banorte's National Ratings are based on the likely support from
their ultimate parent, GFNorte's, whose creditworthiness is highly
associated with Banorte's, any rating action on the subsidiaries
is contingent on any actions taken on the bank's National Ratings.
As a result, these subsidiaries' national-scale ratings have also
been placed on Rating Watch Negative.

Interacciones and Interacciones CB's IDRs, VRs, National Scale,
and Debt Issue Ratings

The Rating Watch Positive on Interacciones and affiliates' ratings
reflects that they are likely to be upgraded and aligned to
Banorte's once the merger is approved and confirmed.

Interacciones' SR and SRF are not affected. Fitch believes those
ratings will likely to be upgraded and aligned to Banorte's once
the merger occurs and simultaneously withdrawn.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

GFNorte and Subsidiaries

GFNorte and Banorte's IDRs, VRs and national-scale ratings could
be affirmed and removed from Rating Watch Negative once the merger
with GFInteracciones is confirmed and when Fitch has completed a
thorough review of the financial and business implications of such
deal, in the event that no material negative implications arise
for the financial profile and risk appetite of these entities.

Alternatively, these ratings could be downgraded to the extent
previously indicated, if there are material negative financial or
business implications arising from this deal. In particular, if
Banorte's is exposed to higher credit losses as net charge-offs
rise above 3% of average gross loans; or if the operating profit-
to-RWAs ratio falls below 2% and/or the FCC ratio is consistently
below 11% of RWAs. Also, a material weakening of Fitch's
assessment on GFNorte's risk appetite, funding and/or liquidity
profile could also trigger a downgrade of these ratings.

Any downgrade to GFNorte's non-banking subsidiaries' (AyF Banorte,
Casa de Bolsa Banorte-Ixe and Almacenadora Banorte) national
ratings would be driven by a potential downgrade of the respective
Banorte's ratings, and considering the relativities of the latter
as compared to Mexico's sovereign rating.

Interacciones and Interacciones CB

The Rating Watch Positive on Interacciones and its affiliates'
ratings will be resolved once the transaction is confirmed. The
ratings of Interacciones and Interacciones CB are likely to be
upgraded and aligned to those of GFNorte and Banorte in order to
reflect the implicit support received from a higher rated holding
company. If these entities are to be merged into other of
GFNorte's current subsidiaries, the ratings of Interacciones and
Interacciones CB are likely to be eventually withdrawn, but only
after such potential mergers have been completed.

Fitch has placed the following ratings on Rating Watch Negative:

GFNorte:
-- Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs 'BBB+';
-- Viability rating 'bbb+';
-- Short-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDR 'F2';

Banorte:
-- Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs 'BBB+';
-- Viability rating 'bbb+';
-- Short-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDR 'F2';
-- USD500 million TIER 2 subordinated preferred capital notes
    'BB+';
-- USD120 million junior subordinated securities 'BB';
-- National scale long-term rating 'AAA(mex)';
-- National scale short-term rating 'F1+(mex)'.

Arrendadora y Factor Banorte, S.A. de C.V. SOFOM, E.R. (AyF
Banorte):
-- National scale long-term rating 'AAA(mex)';
-- National scale short-term rating 'F1+(mex)';
-- National scale long-term rating for local issues of senior
    unsecured debt 'AAA(mex)';
-- National scale short-term rating for local issues of senior
    unsecured debt 'F1+(mex)'.

Almacenadora Banorte S.A. de C.V., Organizacion Auxiliar de
Credito, Gpo Financiero Banorte (Almacenadora Banorte):
-- National scale long-term rating 'AAA(mex)';
-- National scale short-term rating 'F1+(mex)'.

Casa de Bolsa Banorte - Ixe, S.A de C.V., Grupo Financiero Banorte
(Banorte Ixe CB):
-- National scale long-term rating 'AAA(mex)';
-- National scale short-term rating 'F1+(mex)'.

Fitch has not taken a rating action on the following ratings:

GFNorte:
-- Support Rating '5';
-- Support Rating Floor 'NF'.

Banorte:
-- Support rating '2';
-- Support rating Floor 'BBB-'.

Fitch has placed the following ratings on Rating Watch Positive:

Interacciones:
-- Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs 'BB+';
-- Short-term foreign and local currency IDRs 'B';
-- Viability rating 'bb+';
-- National scale long-term rating 'A+(mex)';
-- National scale short-term rating 'F1(mex)';
-- National scale long-term rating for local senior unsecured
    debt issues 'A+(mex)';
-- National scale long-term rating for local subordinated debt
    issues 'BBB+(mex).

Interacciones CB:
-- National scale long-term rating 'A+(mex)';
-- National scale short-term rating 'F1(mex)'.

Fitch has not taken a rating action on the following ratings:

Interacciones:
-- Support rating '5';
-- Support Rating Floor 'NF'.


MEXICO: GDP Contracted in Third Quarter as Disasters Took Toll
--------------------------------------------------------------
Anthony Harrup at The Wall Street Journal reports that Mexico's
economic output declined in the third quarter, its first
contraction in 17 quarters as a series of natural disasters had a
negative impact on services and brought about further declines in
oil production.

Gross domestic product, a broad measure of output in goods and
services, was down 0.2% seasonally adjusted from the second
quarter, and rose 1.6% unadjusted from the year-earlier period,
the National Statistics Institute said, according to The Wall
Street Journal.

The decline from the second quarter-which translates into an
annualized drop of 0.8%-was led by a 0.5% contraction in
industrial output, the report notes.  Services slipped 0.1% and
agricultural production rose 0.5%, the report relays.  The
preliminary readings could change with the institute's next GDP
report on Nov. 24, the report discloses.

Mexico suffered two major earthquakes in September that left 471
people dead and damaged more than 180,000 homes, 16,000 schools
and 1,800 churches and other cultural buildings in Mexico City and
nine other states, the report says.  Several hundred schools and
churches, and more than 50,000 homes were destroyed or so badly
damaged that they have to be demolished, the report relays.

A number of economists said they expect the short-term impact of
the natural disasters to be offset in subsequent quarters by
reconstruction efforts, the report notes.

While manufacturing was largely unaffected by the earthquakes,
output at state oil company Petroleos Mexicanos took a hit, the
report notes.

Pemex cut oil production in September to about 1.73 million
barrels a day after a quake in southern Mexico led to the
temporary closure of its biggest refinery, and refinery outages on
the U.S. Gulf Coast following hurricane Harvey caused crude
shipments to be postponed, leaving Pemex's storage at full
capacity. Crude output was back at 1.94 million barrels a day in
early October, and company officials said they expect Pemex to
meet its full-year target of 1.944 million barrels a day, the
report says.

"Economic activity continued to suffer from weakness in oil
production and temporary factors such as the unfortunate natural
disasters, while the performance of manufacturing and services,
and expectations of a pickup in construction leads us to foresee
an improvement in the fourth quarter," Banco Santander said in a
report ahead of the GDP release, the report relays.

The third-quarter marked a slowdown from the first half of the
year, when gross domestic product expanded by 2.3%, the report
discloses.  Concerns about growth have also been increasing as
talks with the U.S. and Canada to rewrite the North American Free
Trade Agreement become more tense and disagreements emerge, the
report notes.

Fitch Ratings said that while it doesn't foresee a collapse of the
24-year-old trade pact, the extension of negotiations into 2018
and comments from government officials underline the growing
risks, the report relays.

If the U.S. withdrew from Nafta, Mexico's economy would face
significant uncertainty and near-term market volatility, the
ratings firm said in a report, the WSJ relays.

"Growth would slow through the medium term, from an already modest
base, as the initial disruption would likely result in lower
investment and trade dislocations with potentially sustained
effects on consumer confidence," Fitch added, the report notes.



======================
P U E R T O    R I C O
======================


PUERTO RICO ELECTRIC: Oversight Board Proposes New PREPA Chief
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico, as
the representative of the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority
("PREPA") in the Title III case pursuant to section 315(b) of the
Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act
("PROMESA"), on Oct. 26, 2017, submitted to the U.S. District
Court for the District of Puerto Rico an urgent motion for entry
of an order, confirming Noel Zamot as PREPA's Chief Transformation
Officer with all powers of a chief executive officer reporting to
the Oversight Board.

Martin J. Bienenstock, Esq., at Proskauer Rose LLP, lead counsel
to the Oversight Board, explains that even prior to Hurricane
Maria, the reliability and cost of power was the dominant
determinant of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico's ability to halt
its negative economic growth and to attain a sustainable economy.
The cost of power is a major cost of doing business and of living
in the Commonwealth.  To carry out its statutory missions of
returning the Commonwealth to fiscal responsibility and access to
the capital markets, the Oversight Board is determined to do
everything within its power to solve the current, prolonged power
outage, and to establish a modern, economically effective power
generation and transmission facility for the good of the
Commonwealth and all its stakeholders.

One month has passed since Hurricane Maria made landfall, yet
approximately 80% of PREPA's customers lack access to the electric
power grid.  Without electricity to power businesses on the
island, economic activity in numerous sectors has ground to a
halt. Similarly, many schools have yet to reopen.  The situation
is dire, and a concerted and coordinated effort is needed on all
fronts to make the right investments and to prevent missteps at
this critical juncture.

Ensuring that recovery efforts at PREPA are conducted efficiently,
with all requisite expertise, and in accordance with best
practices, will lay the groundwork for the island's post-hurricane
economic recovery and revitalization under any fiscal plan.
Existing PREPA management has taken certain independent steps in
response to the destruction and devastation of PREPA's power grid,
particularly its transmission and distribution systems.

Unfortunately, despite PREPA management's efforts, restoring
electricity efficiently and quickly to the island has not been
achieved.  Moreover, an emergency infusion of substantial capital
is required to fund these recovery efforts.  At least initially, a
significant portion of those funds will be provided by the federal
government, which makes active and effective coordination with the
appropriate federal agencies all the more important.  The
appointment of a CTO will enable a coordinated strategy for
contracting recovery projects and streamlining funding under the
direction of a seasoned professional with expertise in disaster
response and recovery.

By this Urgent Motion, the Oversight Board, as the sole
representative and trustee of PREPA, seeks to have the Court
confirm its appointment of Noel Zamot as PREPA's CTO, having the
powers of a chief executive officer and reporting to the Oversight
Board.

Among other things, the CTO will be charged by the Oversight Board
with developing a comprehensive and properly sequenced power
restoration plan, and will direct disaster recovery and rebuilding
efforts in conjunction with federal government agencies (including
FEMA, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of
Housing and Urban Development, and the Army Corps of Engineers)
and place PREPA on the path towards transformation.  The CTO will
also ensure PREPA is run in a manner compatible with the overall
recovery for Puerto Rico and will communicate to the Oversight
Board and the Government on behalf of management.  The CTO will be
ultimately responsible for implementing PREPA's long and short
term plans in a manner consistent with the PREPA's certified
fiscal plan (as will be amended when the Oversight Board has
better visibility into PREPA's future).

A protocol requiring the CTO to report directly to the Oversight
Board will further enhance access to funds by alleviating concerns
within the federal government regarding the direction of PREPA's
recovery and use of federal money.

              Qualifications of Noel Zamot as CTO

Mr. Zamot is a retired Air Force colonel who was born and raised
in Puerto Rico.  He is eminently qualified to lead the
transformation of PREPA to a more modern, efficient, and
resilient power utility having served for 25 years in active duty
with the U.S. Air Force, where, among other things, he managed
energy and infrastructure projects.  As a private sector
executive, he provided engineering expertise to the Department of
Defense, and launched and managed a successful business. Most
recently, the Oversight Board, in consultation with Governor
Rossello, designated Mr. Zamot to serve as the Revitalization
Coordinator to the Oversight Board.  He is a graduate of the
University of Michigan and MIT.

The Oversight Board will provide Mr. Zamot to serve as PREPA's CTO
pursuant to a secondment, whereby the Oversight Board will
continue to compensate Mr. Zamot.  He shall not receive additional
compensation from PREPA.

                      About Puerto Rico

Puerto Rico is a self-governing commonwealth in association with
the United States that's facing a massive bond debt of $70
billion, a 68% debt-to-GDP ratio and negative economic growth in
nine of the last 10 years.

The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has sought bankruptcy protection,
aiming to restructure its massive $74 billion debt-load and $49
billion in pension obligations.

The debt restructuring petition was filed by Puerto Rico's
financial oversight board in U.S. District Court in Puerto Rico
(Case No. 17-01578) on May 3, 2017, and was made under Title III
of 2016's U.S. Congressional rescue law known as the Puerto Rico
Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act ("PROMESA").

The Financial Oversight and Management Board later commenced Title
III cases for the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation
(COFINA) on May 5, 2017, and the Employees Retirement System (ERS)
and the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (HTA) on
May 21, 2017.  On July 2, 2017, a Title III case was commenced for
the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority ("PREPA").

U.S. Chief Justice John Roberts has appointed U.S. District Judge
Laura Taylor Swain to oversee the Title III cases.  The Honorable
Judith Dein, a United States Magistrate Judge for the District of
Massachusetts, has been designated to preside over matters that
may be referred to her by Judge Swain, including discovery
disputes, and management of other pretrial proceedings.

Joint administration of the Title III cases, under Lead Case No.
17-3283, was granted on June 29, 2017.

The Oversight Board has hired as advisors, Proskauer Rose LLP and
O'Neill & Borges LLC as legal counsel, McKinsey & Co. as strategic
consultant, Citigroup Global Markets, as municipal investment
banker, and Ernst & Young, as financial advisor.

Martin J. Bienenstock, Esq., Scott K. Rutsky, Esq., and Philip M.
Abelson, Esq., of Proskauer Rose; and Hermann D. Bauer, Esq., at
O'Neill & Borges are on-board as attorneys.

McKinsey & Co. is the Board's strategic consultant, Ernst & Young
is the Board's financial advisor, and Citigroup Global Markets
Inc. is the Board's municipal investment banker.

Prime Clerk LLC is the claims and noticing agent.  Prime Clerk
maintains a case web site at:

           https://cases.primeclerk.com/puertorico

Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC is the service agent for ERS, HTA,
and PREPA.

O'Melveny & Myers LLP is counsel to the Commonwealth's Puerto Rico
Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority (AAFAF), the agency
responsible for negotiations with bondholders.

The Oversight Board named Professor Nancy B. Rapoport as fee
examiner and to chair a committee to review professionals' fees.

                      Bondholders' Attorneys

Toro, Colon, Mullet, Rivera & Sifre, P.S.C. and Kramer Levin
Naftalis & Frankel LLP serve as counsel to the Mutual Fund Group,
comprised of mutual funds managed by Oppenheimer Funds, Inc.,
Franklin Advisers, Inc., and the First Puerto Rico Family of
Funds, which collectively hold over $3.5 billion in COFINA Bonds
and over $2.9 billion in other bonds issued by Puerto Rico and
other instrumentalities, including over $1.8 billion of Puerto
Rico general obligation bonds ("GO Bonds").

White & Case LLP and Lopez Sanchez & Pirillo LLC represent the UBS
Family of Funds and the Puerto Rico Family of Funds, which hold
$613.3 million in COFINA bonds.

Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, Robbins, Russell,
Englert, Orseck, Untereiner & Sauber LLP, and Jimenez, Graffam &
Lausell are co-counsel to the ad hoc group of General Obligation
Bondholders, comprised of Aurelius Capital Management, LP,
Autonomy Capital (Jersey) LP, FCO Advisors LP, Franklin Mutual
Advisers LLC, Monarch Alternative Capital LP, Senator Investment
Group LP, and Stone Lion Capital Partners L.P.

Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP and Reichard & Escalera are
co-counsel to the ad hoc coalition of holders of senior bonds
issued by COFINA, comprised of at least 30 institutional holders,
including Canyon Capital Advisors LLC and Varde Investment
Partners, L.P.

Correa Acevedo & Abesada Law Offices, P.S.C., is counsel to Canyon
Capital Advisors, LLC, River Canyon Fund Management, LLC, Davidson
Kempner Capital Management LP, OZ Management, LP, and OZ
Management II LP (the QTCB Noteholder Group).

                           Committees

The U.S. Trustee formed a nine-member Official Committee of
Retirees and a seven-member Official Committee of Unsecured
Creditors of the Commonwealth.  The Retiree Committee tapped
Jenner & Block LLP and Bennazar, Garcia & Milian, C.S.P., as its
attorneys.  The Creditors Committee tapped Paul Hastings LLP and
O'Neill & Gilmore LLC as counsel.


PUERTO RICO ELECTRIC: Committee to Probe of $300M Whitefish Deal
----------------------------------------------------------------
Pursuant to Rule 2004 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure, the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, et al., requests authorization to
pursue discovery with respect to the bidding, negotiation, and
engagement process used by the Puerto Rico Electric Power
Authority ("PREPA") to identify contractors for the repair of
Puerto Rico's utility system -- in particular, its engagement of
Whitefish Energy Holdings, LLC -- beginning with targeted document
requests to PREPA and Whitefish and depositions of relevant
individuals as may be identified.

In a motion filed with the U.S. District Court for the District of
Puerto Rico on Oct. 31, 2017, the Creditors Committee seeks
authority to investigate the following issues:

    * The process by which PREPA identified potential contracting
parties for utility construction and repair work in Puerto Rico;

    * The efforts PREPA made to evaluate the party or parties best
suited to the utility construction and repair work contemplated;

    * The process used to evaluate Whitefish and any other
potential contractors for the work contemplated;

    * The negotiation of the terms, conditions, and economic
provisions of the Whitefish Contract;

    * Any connections between Whitefish and government officials
or others or any potential lobbying efforts which may have
influenced the selection of Whitefish as a contractor or other
conflict of interest issues which may have affected the selection
of Whitefish and/or the negotiation of the Whitefish Contract;

    * Any evidence of Whitefish's actual incurred costs or cost
estimates bearing on the reasonableness of the services provided
by Whitefish;

    * Whether Whitefish was properly determined to be both
qualified to, and capable of, performing under the Whitefish
Contract;

    * Any discussions between PREPA, Whitefish, and other
government agencies (including but not limited to FEMA) and the
Oversight Board related to the execution of the Whitefish
Contract.

Counsel to the Committee, Luc A. Despins, Esq., at Paul Hastings
LLP, explains that as is well-known, the devastation caused by
Hurricanes Irma and Maria resulted in a natural disaster of vast
scale. The hurricanes swept through Puerto Rico in a span of
roughly two weeks, leaving thousands of families displaced and
crippling key infrastructure. As of Oct. 30, 2017, Puerto Rico's
power authority, PREPA, remains essentially offline -- with 73.8%
of electricity customers without power.

The situation entirely hobbles recovery efforts as the ability to
generate and deliver electricity is crucial to Puerto Rico's
economy and to its ability to recover economically and repay
creditors. Every day that passes without a coordinated and
efficient response to this power generation and distribution
crisis inhibits the ability of Puerto Rico's economy to rebound.

As a result of this devastation, and in order to speed up the
island's recovery, the President of the United States issued
emergency declarations pursuant to the Robert T. Stafford Disaster
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as Amended (the "Stafford
Act"), Title 42 U.S.C. Sec. 5170, 5170a, & 5170b, and Congress is
currently in the process of authorizing funding packages for the
President's signature.  A significant portion of that funding will
likely be dedicated to the repair of PREPA's electrical grid.  As
the Oversight Board noted in a recent filing, PREPA generates,
transmits, and distributes substantially all of the electric power
used in the Commonwealth, and ranks first in the United States
among municipal utilities in number of clients and revenues.

Therefore, PREPA's reconstruction and ability to provide reliable
power distribution at reasonable rates is essential not only to
PREPA's recovery, but also to the recovery of the Commonwealth and
its instrumentalities.  It is imperative for Puerto Rico's
residents and its creditors that this money is spent wisely and in
a manner that quickly and efficiently promotes the recovery on the
island.

                  Nature of Whitefish's Selection

Given the centrality of PREPA to Puerto Rico's recovery, the
Committee is concerned about PREPA's recent actions and the public
controversy those actions have created.  As has been widely
reported, on Oct. 17, 2017, PREPA's Executive Director Ricardo
Luis Ramos Rodriguez signed a $300 million contract with Whitefish
making Whitefish a central party to the repair and upgrade of the
Commonwealth's utility grid.

Unfortunately, the process behind the selection of Whitefish
appears to carry the risk that the natural disasters that befell
the Puerto Rico electrical grid will be followed by a man-made
disaster. Public reports and a review of the Whitefish Contract
suggest that:

   -- Whitefish lacked the qualifications and experience to
perform the tasks PREPA has assigned it;

   -- The Whitefish Contract contained numerous suspicious
provisions that do not work to PREPA's benefit, including what
appear to be grossly excessive fees (e.g., hourly rates
that appear to be multiples of prevailing market costs);

   -- PREPA represented, apparently incorrectly, that the
Oversight Board and the Federal Emergency Management Agency
("FEMA") approved the Whitefish Contract; and

   -- The selection of Whitefish may have been the result of
political favoritism rather than a choice of the best available
contractor.

In a news conference on Oct. 29, 2017, as a result of these
concerns, Governor Ricardo Rossello called for the Whitefish
Contract to be canceled "immediately."   Later that day, PREPA's
Executive Director Ricardo Ramos announced that the agreement
would be terminated once Whitefish completes all of its
outstanding work.

According to Mr. Ramos, the process of hiring (and then replacing)
Whitefish will likely have delayed work by 10 to 12 weeks, and
PREPA has already committed itself to pay Whitefish $21 million
for the work to date on top of at least $11 million to cancel the
agreement.

These serious questions around the Whitefish Contract highlight
the risk that PREPA may squander or otherwise compromise any
entitlement to much-needed federal funding, a result that would be
disastrous for PREPA, the Commonwealth, and its creditors.  These
questions also raise serious concerns around PREPA's core ability
to manage the critical tasks it must undertake.  The discovery
sought here is, therefore, warranted both to evaluate the
propriety of the original engagement of Whitefish and to evaluate
PREPA's ongoing ability to execute its responsibilities. Even
though PREPA apparently plans to cancel the Whitefish Contract,
discovery remains essential to understand the extent of any
potential gaps in procedures or controls that may have allowed the
Whitefish Contract to be signed, and to ensure the stakeholders in
these Title III Cases that such missteps have not already occurred
with other contracts and, at a minimum, will not be repeated.

                    Qualifications of Whitefish

According to the Committee, PREPA does not appear to have
undertaken any sort of open and competitive bidding process
related to the selection of Whitefish, nor does Whitefish appear
to have the background or experience required to helm the
rebuilding of the Commonwealth's electric utility infrastructure.

The Committee notes, among other things, that:

   * It appears that, at the time Hurricane Maria hit, Whitefish
had only two employees and was operated out of a one-story wooden
house in Whitefish, Montana.

   * Whitefish's only prior federal experience related to "two
small federal contracts in Arizona with the Department of Energy:
a $172,000 deal to replace metal poles and install 3 miles of
wiring, and a $1.3 million contract to revamp sections of a 4.8-
mile transmission line."

The Committee also points out that PREPA has failed to offer any
convincing justification for flatly refusing "mutual aid" offers
from the American Public Power Association ("APPA"), of which
PREPA is a member.  Those mutual aid arrangements, which were
utilized in Texas and Florida following Hurricanes Harvey and
Irma, were established in order to organize a network of state and
regional public power utilities to restore electricity quickly in
the event of emergencies like Hurricane Maria.  In fact, in
Florida, just one day after Hurricane Irma's departure from that
state, Florida Power & Light said that it had more than 20,000
workers from 30 states -- and even Canada -- deployed to restore
power.  Following its own recovery, Florida Power & Light further
stated that it had teams assembled as early as October 1, 2017
"ready to help Puerto Rico."  According to the Washington Post,
Florida Power & Light never received a response from PREPA's
management to the offer of assistance.

                 Provisions in Whitefish Contract

According to the Committee, the Whitefish Contract contains
numerous troubling provisions that call into question whether it
reflected a vigorous arms-length transaction.  Among other things,
the Contract:

    * sets forth eye-popping reimbursement rates of up to $330 per
hour for a site supervisor -- climbing to $462 for supervisors
hired by subcontractors, who will presumably make up much of
Whitefish's workforce.

    * provides that Whitefish would be paid $319.04 per hour
worked by a journeyman lineman, which is "almost 10 times the
average rate for a journeyman line worker in the United States,
according to the website Payscale.com."

Whether these rates reflect prevailing market conditions is open
to question given PREPA's failure to pursue competitive bidding of
any sort. Even more troubling is the fact that PREPA apparently
negotiated away audit rights --for itself and others -- to
evaluate these economic terms in the future.  The Whitefish
Contract provides that no agency or entity would ever be able to
audit these exorbitant charges: "[i]n no event shall PREPA, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the FEMA Administrator, the
Comptroller General of the United States [GAO], or any of their
authorized representatives have the right to audit or review the
cost and profit elements of the labor rates specified herein."  In
other words, PREPA surrendered the right to audit one of the most
significant cost components Whitefish is likely to charge.

     Potential Political Influence as to Choice of Whitefish

Given the various issues surrounding the Whitefish Contract, it is
not surprising that reports have surfaced suggesting the Whitefish
Contract was awarded not on the basis of merit but instead on the
basis of political favoritism. While the Committee has no present
ability to validate the troubling news stories available, it notes
with concern reports that:

   -- Whitefish CEO Andy Techmanski was from the same small town
(Whitefish, Montana) as Interior Secretary Ryan Zinke and further
that Messrs. Techmanski and Zinke are friends and that Mr. Zinke's
son worked with Whitefish this past summer.   Mr. Zinke has denied
that had he had any involvement in the selection of Whitefish;

   -- Elias Sanchez Sifonte, formerly the Governor's
representative to the Oversight Board and rumored to be a close
personal friend of the Governor, lobbied PREPA to hire Whitefish,
perhaps to benefit himself.  In fact, former Puerto Rico Governor
Anabel Acevedo Vila recently stated on a radio program that,
"instead of becoming a bona fide advisor to the Governor . . .
[Sanchez] saw it as a business opportunity"; and

   -- According to Eduardo Bhatia, the former president of the
Puerto Rico Senate and sitting Senate minority leader, both
Whitefish and the Office of the First Lady share the same director
of Public Relations.

                     Replacement of Whitefish

In a news conference on Sunday, October 29, 2017, Governor Ricardo
Rossello announced that he would seek the immediate cancellation
of the Whitefish Contract and had discussed the use of mutual aid
agreements with the governors of New York and Florida.   Just a
few hours later, PREPA director Ricardo Ramos announced that the
contract would be canceled once Whitefish had completed its
current work -- which would delay the repair of Puerto Rico's
electrical grid by 10 to 12 weeks.

According to the Committee, the situation remains fluid at the
moment, but one thing is clear: there is a need to ensure that
PREPA's bidding process is conducted transparently and that any
contractors selected by PREPA -- both now and in the future -- do
not put the Commonwealth or its instrumentalities at risk of
losing FEMA funds.

                          *     *     *

Judge Laura Taylor Swain, who presides over the Title III cases,
on Oct. 30, 2017, entered an order directing that the urgent
motion of the Committee be referred to Magistrate Judge Judith
Dein pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 636(b).

                      About Puerto Rico

Puerto Rico is a self-governing commonwealth in association with
the United States that's facing a massive bond debt of $70
billion, a 68% debt-to-GDP ratio and negative economic growth in
nine of the last 10 years.

The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has sought bankruptcy protection,
aiming to restructure its massive $74 billion debt-load and $49
billion in pension obligations.

The debt restructuring petition was filed by Puerto Rico's
financial oversight board in U.S. District Court in Puerto Rico
(Case No. 17-01578) on May 3, 2017, and was made under Title III
of 2016's U.S. Congressional rescue law known as the Puerto Rico
Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act ("PROMESA").

The Financial Oversight and Management Board later commenced Title
III cases for the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation
(COFINA) on May 5, 2017, and the Employees Retirement System (ERS)
and the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (HTA) on
May 21, 2017.  On July 2, 2017, a Title III case was commenced for
the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority ("PREPA").

U.S. Chief Justice John Roberts has appointed U.S. District Judge
Laura Taylor Swain to oversee the Title III cases.  The Honorable
Judith Dein, a United States Magistrate Judge for the District of
Massachusetts, has been designated to preside over matters that
may be referred to her by Judge Swain, including discovery
disputes, and management of other pretrial proceedings.

Joint administration of the Title III cases, under Lead Case No.
17-3283, was granted on June 29, 2017.

The Oversight Board has hired as advisors, Proskauer Rose LLP and
O'Neill & Borges LLC as legal counsel, McKinsey & Co. as strategic
consultant, Citigroup Global Markets, as municipal investment
banker, and Ernst & Young, as financial advisor.

Martin J. Bienenstock, Esq., Scott K. Rutsky, Esq., and Philip M.
Abelson, Esq., of Proskauer Rose; and Hermann D. Bauer, Esq., at
O'Neill & Borges are on-board as attorneys.

McKinsey & Co. is the Board's strategic consultant, Ernst & Young
is the Board's financial advisor, and Citigroup Global Markets
Inc. is the Board's municipal investment banker.

Prime Clerk LLC is the claims and noticing agent.  Prime Clerk
maintains a case web site at:

           https://cases.primeclerk.com/puertorico

Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC is the service agent for ERS, HTA,
and PREPA.

O'Melveny & Myers LLP is counsel to the Commonwealth's Puerto Rico
Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority (AAFAF), the agency
responsible for negotiations with bondholders.

The Oversight Board named Professor Nancy B. Rapoport as fee
examiner and to chair a committee to review professionals' fees.

                      Bondholders' Attorneys

Toro, Colon, Mullet, Rivera & Sifre, P.S.C. and Kramer Levin
Naftalis & Frankel LLP serve as counsel to the Mutual Fund Group,
comprised of mutual funds managed by Oppenheimer Funds, Inc.,
Franklin Advisers, Inc., and the First Puerto Rico Family of
Funds, which collectively hold over $3.5 billion in COFINA Bonds
and over $2.9 billion in other bonds issued by Puerto Rico and
other instrumentalities, including over $1.8 billion of Puerto
Rico general obligation bonds ("GO Bonds").

White & Case LLP and Lopez Sanchez & Pirillo LLC represent the UBS
Family of Funds and the Puerto Rico Family of Funds, which hold
$613.3 million in COFINA bonds.

Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, Robbins, Russell,
Englert, Orseck, Untereiner & Sauber LLP, and Jimenez, Graffam &
Lausell are co-counsel to the ad hoc group of General Obligation
Bondholders, comprised of Aurelius Capital Management, LP,
Autonomy Capital (Jersey) LP, FCO Advisors LP, Franklin Mutual
Advisers LLC, Monarch Alternative Capital LP, Senator Investment
Group LP, and Stone Lion Capital Partners L.P.

Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP and Reichard & Escalera are
co-counsel to the ad hoc coalition of holders of senior bonds
issued by COFINA, comprised of at least 30 institutional holders,
including Canyon Capital Advisors LLC and Varde Investment
Partners, L.P.

Correa Acevedo & Abesada Law Offices, P.S.C., is counsel to Canyon
Capital Advisors, LLC, River Canyon Fund Management, LLC, Davidson
Kempner Capital Management LP, OZ Management, LP, and OZ
Management II LP (the QTCB Noteholder Group).

                           Committees

The U.S. Trustee formed a nine-member Official Committee of
Retirees and a seven-member Official Committee of Unsecured
Creditors of the Commonwealth.  The Retiree Committee tapped
Jenner & Block LLP and Bennazar, Garcia & Milian, C.S.P., as its
attorneys.  The Creditors Committee tapped Paul Hastings LLP and
O'Neill & Gilmore LLC as counsel.


PUERTO RICO: Revising Plan to End Debt Crisis After Hurricanes
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico,
created by Congress under the bipartisan Puerto Rico Oversight,
Management and Economic Stability Act ("PROMESA"), on Oct. 31,
2017, announced the process toward a revised Fiscal Plan for
Puerto Rico, and its intent to certify the plan by Feb. 2, 2018.

In its 10th public Board meeting, Executive Director Natalie
Jaresko outlined the process for certifying a revised Fiscal Plan
with the Government. Several activities -- including an assessment
of the damages caused by Hurricane Maria, and renewed plans for
fiscal and structural reforms -- will inform the development of a
revised Commonwealth Fiscal Plan.  The Board will conduct
listening sessions through December with stakeholders.  Its review
of the revised Fiscal Plan will occur during the month of January.
The certification is expected on Feb. 2.  In addition to the
Commonwealth, timelines were established for PREPA, PRASA, HTA,
UPR and COSSEC to submit revised fiscal plans for certification by
the Board.

"The fiscal and structural reforms approved by the Board in the
Fiscal Plan certified March 13 were ambitious and would have
required unprecedented levels of effort by the Commonwealth, but
would have enabled Puerto Rico to achieve fiscal responsibility
and renewed access to capital markets," said Jaresko.  "Hurricanes
Maria and Irma have fundamentally changed Puerto Rico's reality
and the revised Fiscal Plan must take that new reality into
account.  The Board is fully aware that Puerto Rico's precarious
fiscal situation will mean a long road to recovery, and its
commitment to helping Puerto Rico during these difficult times is
stronger than ever."

Pursuant to Section 204(b) of PROMESA, the Board also adopted a
new government contract approval policy to ensure that Government
contracts "promote market competition" and "are not inconsistent
with the approved Fiscal Plan."

"The policy presented today is designed to safeguard these
principles for the benefit of the people of Puerto Rico and to
maintain our focus on assuring fiscal responsibility," added
Jaresko. "As we have said from the beginning, transparency is an
intrinsic component of PROMESA and a guiding principle for the
Board's efforts towards Puerto Rico's revitalization."

The Board meeting also included an update on the Special
Committee's independent investigation into Puerto Rico's debt, and
remarks by Noel Zamot, whose appointment as Chief Transformation
Officer for PREPA has been submitted to the court. The Board
remains committed to Puerto Rico's long-term recovery and ensuring
the Commonwealth has the resources needed.

"Recognizing the current and future challenges ahead, the Board
will continue working with Congress and the Trump Administration,"
said Jaresko.  "We will continue to work in support of the
Government to rebuild the Island's infrastructure, and lay an
orderly path forward with the goal of rebuilding Puerto Rico as
quickly as possible."

All relevant material of public interest will be posted on the
Oversight Board's website at the conclusion of the meeting.

                      About Puerto Rico

Puerto Rico is a self-governing commonwealth in association with
the United States that's facing a massive bond debt of $70
billion, a 68% debt-to-GDP ratio and negative economic growth in
nine of the last 10 years.

The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has sought bankruptcy protection,
aiming to restructure its massive $74 billion debt-load and $49
billion in pension obligations.

The debt restructuring petition was filed by Puerto Rico's
financial oversight board in U.S. District Court in Puerto Rico
(Case No. 17-01578) on May 3, 2017, and was made under Title III
of 2016's U.S. Congressional rescue law known as the Puerto Rico
Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act ("PROMESA").

The Financial Oversight and Management Board later commenced Title
III cases for the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation
(COFINA) on May 5, 2017, and the Employees Retirement System (ERS)
and the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (HTA) on
May 21, 2017.  On July 2, 2017, a Title III case was commenced for
the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority ("PREPA").

U.S. Chief Justice John Roberts has appointed U.S. District Judge
Laura Taylor Swain to oversee the Title III cases.  The Honorable
Judith Dein, a United States Magistrate Judge for the District of
Massachusetts, has been designated to preside over matters that
may be referred to her by Judge Swain, including discovery
disputes, and management of other pretrial proceedings.

Joint administration of the Title III cases, under Lead Case No.
17-3283, was granted on June 29, 2017.

The Oversight Board has hired as advisors, Proskauer Rose LLP and
O'Neill & Borges LLC as legal counsel, McKinsey & Co. as strategic
consultant, Citigroup Global Markets, as municipal investment
banker, and Ernst & Young, as financial advisor.

Martin J. Bienenstock, Esq., Scott K. Rutsky, Esq., and Philip M.
Abelson, Esq., of Proskauer Rose; and Hermann D. Bauer, Esq., at
O'Neill & Borges are on-board as attorneys.

McKinsey & Co. is the Board's strategic consultant, Ernst & Young
is the Board's financial advisor, and Citigroup Global Markets
Inc. is the Board's municipal investment banker.

Prime Clerk LLC is the claims and noticing agent.  Prime Clerk
maintains a case web site at:

           https://cases.primeclerk.com/puertorico

Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC is the service agent for ERS, HTA,
and PREPA.

O'Melveny & Myers LLP is counsel to the Commonwealth's Puerto Rico
Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority (AAFAF), the agency
responsible for negotiations with bondholders.

The Oversight Board named Professor Nancy B. Rapoport as fee
examiner and to chair a committee to review professionals' fees.

                      Bondholders' Attorneys

Toro, Colon, Mullet, Rivera & Sifre, P.S.C. and Kramer Levin
Naftalis & Frankel LLP serve as counsel to the Mutual Fund Group,
comprised of mutual funds managed by Oppenheimer Funds, Inc.,
Franklin Advisers, Inc., and the First Puerto Rico Family of
Funds, which collectively hold over $3.5 billion in COFINA Bonds
and over $2.9 billion in other bonds issued by Puerto Rico and
other instrumentalities, including over $1.8 billion of Puerto
Rico general obligation bonds ("GO Bonds").

White & Case LLP and Lopez Sanchez & Pirillo LLC represent the UBS
Family of Funds and the Puerto Rico Family of Funds, which hold
$613.3 million in COFINA bonds.

Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, Robbins, Russell,
Englert, Orseck, Untereiner & Sauber LLP, and Jimenez, Graffam &
Lausell are co-counsel to the ad hoc group of General Obligation
Bondholders, comprised of Aurelius Capital Management, LP,
Autonomy Capital (Jersey) LP, FCO Advisors LP, Franklin Mutual
Advisers LLC, Monarch Alternative Capital LP, Senator Investment
Group LP, and Stone Lion Capital Partners L.P.

Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP and Reichard & Escalera are
co-counsel to the ad hoc coalition of holders of senior bonds
issued by COFINA, comprised of at least 30 institutional holders,
including Canyon Capital Advisors LLC and Varde Investment
Partners, L.P.

Correa Acevedo & Abesada Law Offices, P.S.C., is counsel to Canyon
Capital Advisors, LLC, River Canyon Fund Management, LLC, Davidson
Kempner Capital Management LP, OZ Management, LP, and OZ
Management II LP (the QTCB Noteholder Group).

                           Committees

The U.S. Trustee formed a nine-member Official Committee of
Retirees and a seven-member Official Committee of Unsecured
Creditors of the Commonwealth.  The Retiree Committee tapped
Jenner & Block LLP and Bennazar, Garcia & Milian, C.S.P., as its
attorneys.  The Creditors Committee tapped Paul Hastings LLP and
O'Neill & Gilmore LLC as counsel.


PUERTO RICO: COFINA Senior Bondholders' Coalition Update Holdings
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The COFINA Senior Bondholders' Coalition, consisting of certain
individual members and certain institutions that hold and/or
manage funds, entities and/or accounts holding approximately 33%
of all senior bonds (the "Senior Bonds") issued by the Puerto Rico
Sales Tax Financing Corporation ("COFINA"), on Oct. 26, 2017,
submitted a second supplemental verified statement pursuant to
Rule 2019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the
"Bankruptcy Rules"), to update the disclosable economic interests
currently held by the Coalition.

Certain members of the COFINA Senior Bondholders' Coalition
initially retained Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP ("Quinn
Emanuel") in June 2015.  In August 2015, the COFINA Senior
Bondholders' Coalition retained Reichard & Escalera LLC (with
Quinn Emanuel, "Counsel").  From time to time thereafter, certain
additional holders of COFINA Senior Bonds have joined the COFINA
Senior Bondholders' Coalition.  Counsel appears in the Case on
behalf of the COFINA Senior Bondholders' Coalition.

On July 25, 2017, Counsel submitted the Verified Statement of the
COFINA Senior Bondholders' Coalition Pursuant to Federal Rule of
Bankruptcy Procedure 2019.

On August 18, 2017, Counsel submitted the First Supplemental
Verified Statement.

Counsel submitted the Second Supplemental Statement to update the
disclosable economic interests currently held by the COFINA Senior
Bondholders' Coalition.

The members of the COFINA Senior Bondholders' Coalition hold
disclosable economic interests, or act as investment advisors or
managers to funds, entities and/or accounts or their respective
affiliates that hold disclosable economic interests in relation to
COFINA.  The members of COFINA Senior Bondholders' Coalition hold,
or are the investment advisors or managers to funds, entities
and/or accounts that hold, approximately $2,585,880,950 in
aggregate amount of COFINA Senior Bonds (based on their accreted
value as of October 16, 2017) and approximately $708,744,510 in
aggregate amount of COFINA subordinate bonds (based on their
accreted value as of October 16, 2017):

    1. Jose F. Rodriguez
       PO Box 8848,
       San Juan, PR 00910

       * $250,000 Uninsured COFINA Senior Bonds

    2. Fideicomiso
       Plaza 131 Dorado Beach East,
       Dorado PR 00646

       * $1,210,000 Uninsured COFINA Senior Bonds

    3. Decagon Holdings 1, L.L.C.
       800 Boylston Street,
       Boston, MA 02199

       * $3,275,195 Insured COFINA Senior Bonds
       * $26,110,399 Uninsured COFINA Senior Bonds
       * $27,599,409 Uninsured COFINA Subordinate Bonds

    4. Decagon Holdings 2, L.L.C.
       800 Boylston Street, Boston, MA 02199

       * $4,321,078 Insured COFINA Senior Bonds
       * $33,980,291 Uninsured COFINA Senior Bonds
       * $35,002,710 Uninsured COFINA Subordinate Bonds

    5. Decagon Holdings 3, L.L.C.
       800 Boylston Street,
       Boston, MA 02199

       * $1,750,967 Insured COFINA Senior Bonds
       * $13,887,336 Uninsured COFINA Senior Bonds
       * $14,704,241 Uninsured COFINA Subordinate Bonds

    6. Decagon Holdings 4, L.L.C.
       800 Boylston Street, Boston, MA 02199

       * $17,152,073 Insured COFINA Senior Bonds
       * $141,074,331 Uninsured COFINA Senior Bonds
       * $146,170,718 Uninsured COFINA Subordinate Bonds

    7. Decagon Holdings 5, L.L.C.
       800 Boylston Street, Boston, MA 02199
       * $5,278,618 Insured COFINA Senior Bonds
       * $42,075,985 Uninsured COFINA Senior Bonds
       * $44,624,498 Uninsured COFINA Subordinate Bonds

    8. Decagon Holdings 6, L.L.C.
       800 Boylston Street,
       Boston, MA 02199

       * $1,999,395 Insured COFINA Senior Bonds
       * $15,890,556 Uninsured COFINA Senior Bonds
       * $16,113,852 Uninsured COFINA Subordinate Bonds

    9. Decagon Holdings 7, L.L.C.
       800 Boylston Street, Boston, MA 02199
       * $11,539,381 Insured COFINA Senior Bonds
       * $93,377,700 Uninsured COFINA Senior Bonds
       * $106,128,149 Uninsured COFINA Subordinate Bonds

   10. Decagon Holdings 8, L.L.C.
       800 Boylston Street, Boston, MA 02199
       * $3,251,234 Insured COFINA Senior Bonds
       * $27,764,920 Uninsured COFINA Senior Bonds
       * $30,046,076 Uninsured COFINA Subordinate Bonds

   11. Decagon Holdings 9, L.L.C.
       800 Boylston Street,
       Boston, MA 02199

       * $2,078,748 Insured COFINA Senior Bonds
       * $16,345,007 Uninsured COFINA Senior Bonds
       * $17,796,793 Uninsured COFINA Subordinate Bonds

   12. Decagon Holdings 10, L.L.C.
       800 Boylston Street, Boston, MA 02199
       * $1,497,379 Insured COFINA Senior Bonds
       * $11,751,906 Uninsured COFINA Senior Bonds
       * $12,783,735 Uninsured COFINA Subordinate Bonds

   13. Tilden Park Capital Management LP
       (on behalf of its participating clients)
       452 5th Ave, 28th Floor
       New York, NY 10018

      * $13,215,300 Insured COFINA Senior Bonds
      * $478,854,444 Uninsured COFINA Senior Bonds
      * $9,223,136 Uninsured COFINA Subordinate Bonds

  14. GoldenTree Asset Management LP
      (on behalf of its participating clients)
      300 Park Avenue 20th Floor
      New York, NY 10022

      * $153,121,027 Insured COFINA Senior Bonds
      * $466,427,273 Uninsured COFINA Senior Bonds
      * $233,030,249 Uninsured COFINA Subordinate Bonds

  15. Canyon Capital Advisors LLC
      (on behalf of its participating clients)
      2000 Avenue of the Stars
      11th Floor
      Los Angeles, CA 90067

      * $301,655,000 Uninsured COFINA Senior Bonds

  16. Old Bellows Partners LP
      (on behalf of its participating clients)
      660 Madison Ave, #20
      New York, NY 10065

      * $216,134,665 Uninsured COFINA Senior Bonds

  17. Scoggin Management LP
      (on behalf of its participating clients)
      660 Madison Ave, #20
      New York, NY 10065

      * $62,716,100 Uninsured COFINA Senior Bonds

  18. Whitebox Advisors LLC
      (on behalf of its participating clients)
      3033 Excelsior Boulevard, Suite 300
      Minneapolis, MN 55416

      * $97,196,735 Uninsured COFINA Senior Bonds
      * $2,863,709 Uninsured COFINA Subordinate Bonds

  19. Taconic Capital Advisors L.P.
      (on behalf of funds under management)
      280 Park Avenue, 5th Floor
      New York, NY 10017

      * $108,225,797 Insured COFINA Senior Bonds
      * $11,850,000 Uninsured COFINA Senior Bonds
      * $8,222,234 Uninsured COFINA Subordinate Bonds

  20. Cyrus Capital Partners, L.P.
      (on behalf of its participating clients)
      399 Park Avenue
      39th Floor
      New York, NY 10022

      * $94,157,137 Insured COFINA Senior Bonds

  21. Aristeia Capital, L.L.C.
      (on behalf of its participating clients)
      One Greenwich Plaza
      3rd Floor
      Greenwich, CT 06830

      * $107,925,000 Uninsured COFINA Senior Bonds
      * $4,435,000 Uninsured COFINA Subordinate Bonds

                      About Puerto Rico

Puerto Rico is a self-governing commonwealth in association with
the United States that's facing a massive bond debt of $70
billion, a 68% debt-to-GDP ratio and negative economic growth in
nine of the last 10 years.

The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has sought bankruptcy protection,
aiming to restructure its massive $74 billion debt-load and $49
billion in pension obligations.

The debt restructuring petition was filed by Puerto Rico's
financial oversight board in U.S. District Court in Puerto Rico
(Case No. 17-01578) on May 3, 2017, and was made under Title III
of 2016's U.S. Congressional rescue law known as the Puerto Rico
Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act ("PROMESA").

The Financial Oversight and Management Board later commenced Title
III cases for the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation
(COFINA) on May 5, 2017, and the Employees Retirement System (ERS)
and the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (HTA) on
May 21, 2017.  On July 2, 2017, a Title III case was commenced for
the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority ("PREPA").

U.S. Chief Justice John Roberts has appointed U.S. District Judge
Laura Taylor Swain to oversee the Title III cases.  The Honorable
Judith Dein, a United States Magistrate Judge for the District of
Massachusetts, has been designated to preside over matters that
may be referred to her by Judge Swain, including discovery
disputes, and management of other pretrial proceedings.

Joint administration of the Title III cases, under Lead Case No.
17-3283, was granted on June 29, 2017.

The Oversight Board has hired as advisors, Proskauer Rose LLP and
O'Neill & Borges LLC as legal counsel, McKinsey & Co. as strategic
consultant, Citigroup Global Markets, as municipal investment
banker, and Ernst & Young, as financial advisor.

Martin J. Bienenstock, Esq., Scott K. Rutsky, Esq., and Philip M.
Abelson, Esq., of Proskauer Rose; and Hermann D. Bauer, Esq., at
O'Neill & Borges are on-board as attorneys.

McKinsey & Co. is the Board's strategic consultant, Ernst & Young
is the Board's financial advisor, and Citigroup Global Markets
Inc. is the Board's municipal investment banker.

Prime Clerk LLC is the claims and noticing agent.  Prime Clerk
maintains a case web site at:

           https://cases.primeclerk.com/puertorico

Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC is the service agent for ERS, HTA,
and PREPA.

O'Melveny & Myers LLP is counsel to the Commonwealth's Puerto Rico
Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority (AAFAF), the agency
responsible for negotiations with bondholders. The Law offices of
Andres W. Lopez, P.S.C., is co-attorney to the AAFAF.

The Oversight Board named Professor Nancy B. Rapoport as fee
examiner and to chair a committee to review professionals' fees.

                      Bondholders' Attorneys

Toro, Colon, Mullet, Rivera & Sifre, P.S.C. and Kramer Levin
Naftalis & Frankel LLP serve as counsel to the Mutual Fund Group,
comprised of mutual funds managed by Oppenheimer Funds, Inc.,
Franklin Advisers, Inc., and the First Puerto Rico Family of
Funds, which collectively hold over $3.5 billion in COFINA Bonds
and over $2.9 billion in other bonds issued by Puerto Rico and
other instrumentalities, including over $1.8 billion of Puerto
Rico general obligation bonds ("GO Bonds").

White & Case LLP and Lopez Sanchez & Pirillo LLC represent the UBS
Family of Funds and the Puerto Rico Family of Funds, which hold
$613.3 million in COFINA bonds.

Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, Robbins, Russell,
Englert, Orseck, Untereiner & Sauber LLP, and Jimenez, Graffam &
Lausell are co-counsel to the ad hoc group of General Obligation
Bondholders, comprised of Aurelius Capital Management, LP,
Autonomy Capital (Jersey) LP, FCO Advisors LP, Franklin Mutual
Advisers LLC, Monarch Alternative Capital LP, Senator Investment
Group LP, and Stone Lion Capital Partners L.P.

Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP and Reichard & Escalera are
co-counsel to the ad hoc coalition of holders of senior bonds
issued by COFINA, comprised of at least 30 institutional holders,
including Canyon Capital Advisors LLC and Varde Investment
Partners, L.P.

Correa Acevedo & Abesada Law Offices, P.S.C., is counsel to Canyon
Capital Advisors, LLC, River Canyon Fund Management, LLC, Davidson
Kempner Capital Management LP, OZ Management, LP, and OZ
Management II LP (the QTCB Noteholder Group).

                           Committees

The U.S. Trustee formed a nine-member Official Committee of
Retirees and a seven-member Official Committee of Unsecured
Creditors of the Commonwealth.  The Retiree Committee tapped
Jenner & Block LLP and Bennazar, Garcia & Milian, C.S.P., as its
attorneys.  The Creditors Committee tapped Paul Hastings LLP and
O'Neill & Gilmore LLC as counsel.


PUERTO RICO: FGIC Bid for 90-Day Stay of Suits Facing Objections
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico, as
well as other parties, on Oct. 31, 2017, filed objections to the
urgent motion of Financial Guaranty Insurance Company regarding a
proposed 90-day stay of all litigation to facilitate the recovery
from hurricanes Irma and Maria.

Counsel to the Oversight Board, Martin J. Bienenstock, Esq., at
Proskauer Rose LLP, tells the U.S. District Court for the District
of Puerto Rico that over a month after Hurricane Maria, FGIC
propounds an urgent motion about the hurricane, attempting to
stall litigation in which it is not even a party.  The Oversight
Board opposes FGIC's requested "90-day stay of all pending
litigation in these Title III cases and all related adversary
proceedings."  The Board believes that such a stay would be
detrimental to Puerto Rico's recovery.

Mr. Bienenstock notes that the government has filed pleadings
urging the prompt continuation of all litigation because it raises
threshold issues requiring resolution before any restructuring can
be finalized.  A stay, he says, would hinder the Debtors' ongoing
efforts to formulate plans of adjustment ("Plans"). The Oversight
Board, the Debtors, the Puerto Rico Fiscal Agency and Financial
Advisory Authority ("AAFAF"), and many others are working
tirelessly to resolve threshold legal disputes, rebuild the
island's infrastructure after the devastation wrought by
Hurricanes Irma and Maria, and expeditiously set Puerto Rico back
on a prosperous path that is fiscally responsible with capital
market access.

"Delaying such progress by calling for an unnecessary "timeout"
will only retard the recovery and yield zero benefits.  We
understand some creditors desire to delay resolutions of the
treatment of existing debt for as long as possible," says Mr.
Biennestock.

The Official Committee of Retired Employees of the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico also raised an objection to the FGIC's motion.

"Movant stylizes its Motion and its request for a sweeping stay as
a chance to give "the government and the people of Puerto Rico
...time to recover from the impact of [Hurricane Irma and
Hurricane Maria]."  That proffered justification, however, is
little more than a smoke screen for the Movant's true purpose-to
stop these Title III Cases in their tracks except for the
Appointments Clause challenge to the constitutionality of
PROMESA," says Robert Gordon, Esq., at Jenner & Block LLP, counsel
to the Retired Employees Committee.

The Puerto Rico Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority
("AAFAF"), as the entity authorized to act on behalf of the Debtor
entities under its authority under the Enabling Act of the Fiscal
Agency and Financial Advisory Authority, Act 2-201, objects to any
blanket stay of the Title III cases and related litigation.

AAFAF desires to move forward with the Title III cases and related
litigation with minimal disruption.  While AAFAF appreciates
FGIC's expressed concern for Puerto Rico's recovery, the
democratically elected Government of Puerto Rico has determined
that it is in the best interest of the people of Puerto Rico that
these Title III cases continue as expeditiously as possible.

On Oct. 24, 2017, Financial Guaranty Insurance Company ("FGIC")
had filed the Motion requesting a 90-day stay of the Title III
cases and all related litigation.

In justifying the motion, the FGIC pointed out that roughly four
weeks after Hurricane Maria made landfall, approximately 80
percent of the Commonwealth is still without electricity, with
some residents having no power for the roughly 45 days since
Hurricane Irma skirted north of the island.  Governor Rossello
optimistically estimates power production will not be restored
until mid-December.  In addition, about 1 million residents are
still without running water.

"As a practical matter, prosecuting these Title III Litigations in
a vacuum-removed from any commercial considerations-is
counterproductive.  U.S. Representative Rob Bishop, Chairman of
the House Natural Resources Committee, recently acknowledged the
Commonwealth's fiscal plan will have to be completely overhauled:
"They have to start over again," Bishop said.  "This changes the
dynamics of that plan.  So they're gonna have to redo the overall
funding plan again,"" Martin A. Sosland, Esq., at Butler Snow LLP,
counsel to the FGIC, explains.

"Litigating based on facts and positions that existed as of May 3,
2017, when the first Title III case was commenced, would be
nonsensical on the part of the parties in interest and wasteful of
the Court's time and resources. Indeed, as this Court has already
seen, certain pending actions challenging the current fiscal plan
have or will be dismissed by those parties.  Other legal issues
may similarly become moot upon the certification of a new fiscal
plan that takes into account the post-Hurricanes Irma and Maria
landscape in the Commonwealth."

Attorneys for Financial Guaranty Insurance Company:

         REXACH & PICO, CSP
         Maria E. Pico
         802 Ave. Fernandez Juncos
         San Juan PR 00907-4315
         Telephone: (787) 723-8520
         Facsimile: (787) 724-7844
         E-mail: mpico@rexachpico.com

                 - and -

         BUTLER SNOW LLP
         Martin A. Sosland
         5430 LBJ Freeway, Suite 1200
         Dallas, TX 75240
         Telephone: (469) 680-5502
         Facsimile: (469) 680-5501
         E-mail: martin.sosland@butlersnow.com

         Stanford G. Ladner
         1700 Broadway, 41st Floor
         New York, NY 10019
         Telephone: (646) 606-3996
         Facsimile: (646) 606-3995
         E-mail: stan.ladner@butlersnow.com

         Christopher R. Maddux
         J. Mitchell Carrington
         1020 Highland Colony Parkway, Suite 1400
         Ridgeland, MS 39157
         Telephone: (601) 985-2200
         Facsimile: (601) 985-4500
         E-mail: chris.maddux@butlersnow.com
                 mitch.carrington@butlersnow.com

         Jason W. Callen
         150 3rd Avenue, South, Suite 1600
         Nashville, TN 37201
         Telephone: (615) 651-6774
         Facsimile: (615) 651-6701
         E-mail: jason.callen@butlersnow.com

Attorneys for the he Puerto Rico Fiscal Agency and Financial
Advisory Authority:

         John J. Rapisardi
         Suzzanne Uhland
         O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP
         7 Times Square
         New York, NY 10036
         Tel: (212) 326-2000
         Fax: (212) 326-2061

         Peter Friedman
         O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP
         1625 Eye Street, NW
         Washington, DC 20006
         Tel: (202) 383-5300
         Fax: (202) 383-5414

                 - and -

         Andres W. Lopez
         THE LAW OFFICES OF ANDRES W. LOPEZ, P.S.C.
         902 Fernandez Juncos Ave.
         San Juan, PR 00907
         Tel: (787) 294-9508
         Fax: (787) 294-9519

                      About Puerto Rico

Puerto Rico is a self-governing commonwealth in association with
the United States that's facing a massive bond debt of $70
billion, a 68% debt-to-GDP ratio and negative economic growth in
nine of the last 10 years.

The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has sought bankruptcy protection,
aiming to restructure its massive $74 billion debt-load and $49
billion in pension obligations.

The debt restructuring petition was filed by Puerto Rico's
financial oversight board in U.S. District Court in Puerto Rico
(Case No. 17-01578) on May 3, 2017, and was made under Title III
of 2016's U.S. Congressional rescue law known as the Puerto Rico
Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act ("PROMESA").

The Financial Oversight and Management Board later commenced Title
III cases for the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation
(COFINA) on May 5, 2017, and the Employees Retirement System (ERS)
and the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (HTA) on
May 21, 2017.  On July 2, 2017, a Title III case was commenced for
the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority ("PREPA").

U.S. Chief Justice John Roberts has appointed U.S. District Judge
Laura Taylor Swain to oversee the Title III cases.  The Honorable
Judith Dein, a United States Magistrate Judge for the District of
Massachusetts, has been designated to preside over matters that
may be referred to her by Judge Swain, including discovery
disputes, and management of other pretrial proceedings.

Joint administration of the Title III cases, under Lead Case No.
17-3283, was granted on June 29, 2017.

The Oversight Board has hired as advisors, Proskauer Rose LLP and
O'Neill & Borges LLC as legal counsel, McKinsey & Co. as strategic
consultant, Citigroup Global Markets, as municipal investment
banker, and Ernst & Young, as financial advisor.

Martin J. Bienenstock, Esq., Scott K. Rutsky, Esq., and Philip M.
Abelson, Esq., of Proskauer Rose; and Hermann D. Bauer, Esq., at
O'Neill & Borges are on-board as attorneys.

McKinsey & Co. is the Board's strategic consultant, Ernst & Young
is the Board's financial advisor, and Citigroup Global Markets
Inc. is the Board's municipal investment banker.

Prime Clerk LLC is the claims and noticing agent.  Prime Clerk
maintains a case web site at:

           https://cases.primeclerk.com/puertorico

Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC is the service agent for ERS, HTA,
and PREPA.

O'Melveny & Myers LLP is counsel to the Commonwealth's Puerto Rico
Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority (AAFAF), the agency
responsible for negotiations with bondholders. The Law offices of
Andres W. Lopez, P.S.C., is co-attorney to the AAFAF.

The Oversight Board named Professor Nancy B. Rapoport as fee
examiner and to chair a committee to review professionals' fees.

                      Bondholders' Attorneys

Toro, Colon, Mullet, Rivera & Sifre, P.S.C. and Kramer Levin
Naftalis & Frankel LLP serve as counsel to the Mutual Fund Group,
comprised of mutual funds managed by Oppenheimer Funds, Inc.,
Franklin Advisers, Inc., and the First Puerto Rico Family of
Funds, which collectively hold over $3.5 billion in COFINA Bonds
and over $2.9 billion in other bonds issued by Puerto Rico and
other instrumentalities, including over $1.8 billion of Puerto
Rico general obligation bonds ("GO Bonds").

White & Case LLP and Lopez Sanchez & Pirillo LLC represent the UBS
Family of Funds and the Puerto Rico Family of Funds, which hold
$613.3 million in COFINA bonds.

Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, Robbins, Russell,
Englert, Orseck, Untereiner & Sauber LLP, and Jimenez, Graffam &
Lausell are co-counsel to the ad hoc group of General Obligation
Bondholders, comprised of Aurelius Capital Management, LP,
Autonomy Capital (Jersey) LP, FCO Advisors LP, Franklin Mutual
Advisers LLC, Monarch Alternative Capital LP, Senator Investment
Group LP, and Stone Lion Capital Partners L.P.

Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP and Reichard & Escalera are
co-counsel to the ad hoc coalition of holders of senior bonds
issued by COFINA, comprised of at least 30 institutional holders,
including Canyon Capital Advisors LLC and Varde Investment
Partners, L.P.

Correa Acevedo & Abesada Law Offices, P.S.C., is counsel to Canyon
Capital Advisors, LLC, River Canyon Fund Management, LLC, Davidson
Kempner Capital Management LP, OZ Management, LP, and OZ
Management II LP (the QTCB Noteholder Group).

                           Committees

The U.S. Trustee formed a nine-member Official Committee of
Retirees and a seven-member Official Committee of Unsecured
Creditors of the Commonwealth.  The Retiree Committee tapped
Jenner & Block LLP and Bennazar, Garcia & Milian, C.S.P., as its
attorneys.  The Creditors Committee tapped Paul Hastings LLP and
O'Neill & Gilmore LLC as counsel.



=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================


VENEZUELA: Investors Brace for Default as Debt Comes Due
--------------------------------------------------------
Julie Wernau and Ana Rivas at The Wall Street Journal report that
Venezuela has sunk into a deep recession as it grapples with the
collapse of oil prices and the effects of years of economic
mismanagement.  Many analysts expect the country to default on its
debt, particularly as President Nicolas Maduro's increasingly
authoritarian government faces U.S. sanctions that aim to block
the government's ability to finance itself, according to The Wall
Street Journal.  Here's a look at the state of Venezuela's economy
and finances, the report notes.

Venezuela has the world's highest inflation, estimated by the
International Monetary Fund to reach 653% this year, the report
relays.  The country has been ravaged by shortages of food and
medicine, and months of protests that cost more than 120 lives,
the report notes.  As Mr. Maduro has consolidated power, the
opposition has been weakened and divided, the report says.

The government and state-owned oil company Petroleos de Venezuela
SA, or PdVSA, together owe billions of dollars in principal and
interest payments in the coming months, including $1.2 billion due
Nov. 3, the report relays.  Mr. Maduro and other Venezuelan
government officials have said they would pay off their debt, and
in recent years investors have been rewarded with some of the best
returns in emerging markets, the report discloses.

Venezuela's finances are somewhat of a mystery because the country
releases limited data, the report relays.  However, its foreign
reserves have been dwindling, the report notes.

That means Venezuela is dependent on oil exports to make up the
difference. But prices for oil, the country's main export, have
tumbled over the past three years, and production has fallen, the
report relays.

Mr. Maduro has blamed the country's economic crisis on the U.S.,
which he says orchestrated the oil-price collapse to aid its
economy, the report discloses.  The decline wiped out the majority
of Venezuela's national dollar revenue, hurting investment, the
government says, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Sept. 28, 2017, S&P Global Ratings suspended its 'CCC-' local
currency issue ratings on four of the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela's local currency-denominated debt issues. At the same
time, S&P affirmed its 'CCC-' long-term foreign and local
currency sovereign issuer credit ratings. The outlook on the long-
term ratings is negative. In addition, S&P affirmed its 'C' short-
term foreign and local currency sovereign issuer credit ratings.
The transfer and convertibility assessment remains 'CCC-'.


VENEZUELA: Ends Ban on Opposition Leader Holding Public Office
--------------------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that the Venezuelan Supreme Court of Justice
(TSJ) suspended the ban on opposition leader and former Zulia
state Gov. Manuel Rosales from holding public office, and so
annulled a decision imposed by the Comptroller's Office in 2014.

A ruling published on the TSJ Web site stated that the court
declared "appropriate" the former governor's plea for
precautionary protection, suspending the decision of the
Comptroller's Office that disqualified Rosales from holding office
for a period of seven years and six months, according to EFE News.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Sept. 28, 2017, S&P Global Ratings suspended its 'CCC-' local
currency issue ratings on four of the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela's local currency-denominated debt issues. At the same
time, S&P affirmed its 'CCC-' long-term foreign and local
currency sovereign issuer credit ratings. The outlook on the long-
term ratings is negative. In addition, S&P affirmed its 'C' short-
term foreign and local currency sovereign issuer credit ratings.
The transfer and convertibility assessment remains 'CCC-'.


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Joseph Cardillo at
856-381-8268.


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