TCRLA_Public/171108.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

               Wednesday, November 8, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 222


                            Headlines



A N T I G U A  &  B A R B U D A

SANDALS RESORTS: CEO Challenges Comments From Prime Minister


B R A Z I L

INTERCEMENT BRASIL: S&P Affirms 'BB-' CCR, Outlook Still Negative
INTERCEMENT PARTICIPACOES: No Upgrade in Fitch Ratings Amid IPO
PETROLEO BRASILEIRO: To Sell Stake in Petrobas Oil


M E X I C O

AXTEL SAB: S&P Rates New $500MM Senior Unsecured Notes 'BB'
SIXSIGMA NETWORKS: S&P Puts B+ CCR on CreditWatch Positive


P U E R T O    R I C O

PUERTO RICO: Candlewood, Fir Tree Hold $716-Mil. of GO Bonds
PUERTO RICO: Kobre & Kim Files First Interim Report


V E N E Z U E L A

PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: Moody's Lowers Rating to Ca; Outlook Neg.
PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: S&P Lowers Corp. Credit Rating to 'CC'
VENEZUELA: Breached Data Reporting Obligation, IMF Board Says
VENEZUELA: S&P Lowers LT FC Sovereign Credit Rating to 'CC'


X X X X X X X X X

LATAM: IDB Presents Index that Compares State of Jobs in Region


                            - - - - -


===============================
A N T I G U A  &  B A R B U D A
===============================


SANDALS RESORTS: CEO Challenges Comments From Prime Minister
-------------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that Adam Stewart, Chief Executive Officer of
Sandals Resorts International, is challenging comments by the
Prime Minister of Antigua & Barbuda, Gaston Browne, that the
company has been demanding heavy concessions.

The Sandals CEO, seeking to refute allegations made by the Prime
Minister, suggested that Browne should challenge his assertions in
court, according to RJR News.

The report notes that Mr. Stewart added that, if the saga reaches
that point, his company will have data to dispel the allegations.

According to a statement issued by Sandals Resorts, there is no
question of the hotel chain ever withholding taxes legally due and
payable, and therefore there is nothing for the government to
write off, the report relays.

It said the tax has been computed exactly as it was written in the
concession agreement granted to Sandals, the report notes.

Browne has for months accused the Jamaica-based company of
unjustifiably asking for long concessionary periods, a request he
says cannot be sustained in the twin-island country's economy, the
report discloses.

The Prime Minister said, throughout the region, the tourism
industry has had to struggle because hoteliers are extracting too
many concessions, the report says.

Sandals has operated in Antigua since 1991, becoming one of the
largest private sector employers on the island, the report
relates.

Stewart said Sandals has made a concerted effort to employ
Antiguans at every level of operations and favors using local
products and services, the report adds.



===========
B R A Z I L
===========


INTERCEMENT BRASIL: S&P Affirms 'BB-' CCR, Outlook Still Negative
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB-' long-term corporate credit
rating on InterCement Brasil S.A. At the same time, S&P affirmed
the national scale rating of 'brA+'. The outlook on both scale
remains negative.

S&P said, "We also affirmed our issue-level rating at 'BB-' on
Cimpor Financial Operations B.V.'s bond issuance, which
InterCement Brasil and InterCement Participacoes (not rated) fully
guarantee. The recovery rating on these notes remains '3',
indicating that we expect meaningful (60%) recovery in a
hypothetical default scenario."

InterCement Brasil is one of the main subsidiaries of InterCement
Participacoes, holding the largest installed capacity, which
amounts to about 40% of the group's total assets. S&P said, "We
deem it as a core subsidiary of InterCement Participacoes. The
Brazilian subsidiary's installed capacity, market position, and
the long-term growth prospects for the cement market in the
country support that view. Therefore, when analyzing InterCement
Brasil's credit profile, we look at the consolidated numbers of
InterCement Participacoes."

The rating affirmation follows the successful IPO of InterCement
Participacoes' Argentinean subsidiary, Loma Negra (not rated),
which will enable the group to reduce debt and improve its capital
structure. Even though the group's leverage will drop to around
5.0x by the end of 2017 from 7.1x at the end of 2016, the group is
still dependent on improvements in the fragile Brazilian market in
order to keep its credit metrics in line with the current rating:
adjusted net debt to EBITDA below 4.5x and FFO to net debt above
12%. In addition, the group is still dependent on covenant
negotiation, even though S&P doesn't foresee this as a major risk
because its improved capital structure should allow it to get
waivers again from creditors.

Loma Negra will mainly use EUR90 million in net proceeds from the
primary offering to partly fund its growth in Argentina through
the expansion of the L'Amali plant. This plant currently has an
installed capacity of 2.2 million tons of cement. The EUR300
million investment during 2018-2020 should increase production by
an additional 2.7 million tons, which would correspond to about
15% of the Argentine cement market's total installed capacity. The
expansion should allow Loma Negra to benefit from the favorable
infrastructure prospects in Argentina.

InterCement Participacoes will use the majority of EUR790 million
in net proceeds from the secondary offering to repay a portion of
the debt and short-term financial obligations, which will improve
its capital structure. Nevertheless, the weak performance in
Brazilian operations is hurting the group's cash flow generation
and pressuring consolidated leverage. S&P said, "We expect
Brazilian operations to post EBITDA of slightly less than EUR30
million in 2017, which represents a decline of more than 90% from
the 2014 figures. As a result, the group's leverage should
continue to be above the 4.5x threshold defined under its
financial covenants agreements. Even though we believe InterCement
Participacoes will be able to get waivers from its creditors
regarding the covenant breach, we view it as restricting the
group's financial flexibility while it's currently facing a
downturn in the Brazilian market. In addition, even though
InterCement Participacoes is persistently subject to covenant
breaches, we didn't see any type of support from its well-
capitalized ultimate parent (Camargo Correa S.A.; not rated)."
This demonstrates a high level of risk tolerance. Those factors
translate into a negative assessment for comparable ratings
analysis.


INTERCEMENT PARTICIPACOES: No Upgrade in Fitch Ratings Amid IPO
---------------------------------------------------------------
The IPO of Loma Negra C.I.A.S.A., InterCement Participacoes S.A.'s
(B+/Stable) Argentinian subsidiary, is positive but will not
result in an upgrade of the company's ratings, according to Fitch
Ratings. Total proceeds from the offerings were EUR944 million,
with EUR120 million from the primary offering being used for
capex, working capital and other general corporate purposes at
Loma Negra and EUR824 million from the secondary offering to be
used to reduce debt at InterCement.

The proceeds of the IPO will result in a material decline in
leverage and will reduce short- to medium-term refinancing risk.
On a pro forma basis, Fitch forecasts InterCement's net adjusted
leverage to fall to around 4.9x at the end of 2017 from 7.1x
during fiscal year 2016. Fitch's leverage ratio calculation
differs from the 4.5x net debt/EBITDA financial covenant
InterCement is subject to on its financial debt. Fitch believes
the company will likely need to get permission from creditors in
order not to have its covenants measured, as net leverage should
remain above its 4.5x financial covenant.

Positive rating actions will continue to depend upon a rebound in
the company's key market, Brazil, where EBITDA declined to EUR13
million during the first six months of 2017. This compares poorly
with EUR29 million in 2016 and an average of EUR139 million during
the first half of each year 2013-2015.

The short- to medium-term horizon for the Brazilian cement
industry remains tough, with elevated real state inventories and a
dearth of infrastructure projects. In Fitch's view this industry
should be one of the last to show a rebound following a potential
recovery of the Brazilian economy. Cement sales dropped 7% in the
country during nine months of 2017. This follows a 12% and 9%
decline during the FY2016 and FY2015, respectively. During 2018,
cement sales are expected to be relatively flat compared to 2017.

InterCement reported cash and cash equivalents of EUR466 million
and total debt of EUR3.1 billion as of June 30, 2017. The company
had debt amortizations of EUR225 million in 2017, EUR394 million
in 2018 and EUR844 million in 2019. During the LTM ended June 30
2017, InterCement generated EUR385 million of EBITDA. This
compares with EUR382 million in 2016 and an average of EUR616
million during 2013 through 2015. Argentina, including the
operations in Paraguay, has historically been the company's second
most important market, and during the LTM, accounted for 50% of
the company's consolidated EBITDA.

Following the IPO, InterCement now holds 51% of the Argentinian
subsidiary, and the free float is 49%.


PETROLEO BRASILEIRO: To Sell Stake in Petrobas Oil
--------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that Brazilian state-controlled oil company
Petroleo Brasileiro S.A said it planned to sell its stake in
Petrobras Oil & Gas B.V. (POGBV), a joint venture that has assets
in Nigeria.

Petrobras owns a 50 percent interest in POGBV, while BTG Pactual
E&P B.V. has a 40 percent stake and Helios Investment Partners
owns a 10 percent interest.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Oct. 19, 2017, Moody's Investors Service upgraded all ratings of
Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. and ratings based on Petrobras'
guarantee, including the company's senior unsecured debt and
corporate family rating (CFR), to Ba3 from B1. The upgrade
reflects Petrobras' material liquidity improvement, declining debt
leverage, solid management discipline and strengthened corporate
governance.  Simultaneously, Moody's raised the company's baseline
credit assessment (BCA) to b1 from b2 and changed the outlook to
stable from positive.



===========
M E X I C O
===========


AXTEL SAB: S&P Rates New $500MM Senior Unsecured Notes 'BB'
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its 'BB' issue-level ratings on Axtel
S.A.B. de C.V.'s (BB/Negative/--) proposed $500 million senior
unsecured notes due 2024. At the same time, S&P assigned its
recovery rating of '3' to the notes, indicating its expectation
for a meaningful (50% to 70%) recovery in the event of a payment
default.

S&P said, "We view the transaction to have no impact on the
company's existing debt level because Axtel plans to use the
proceeds to partially prepay its syndicated term loan. The company
also plans to use about $35 million from the proceeds from the
sale of its 142 towers to American Tower to pay down an additional
amount of the syndicated facility. We expect the proposed
transaction to improve Axtel's debt maturity profile by extending
the average debt term from about two years to about four, further
supporting company's adequate liquidity assessment.

"In connection with the notes offering, the '3' recovery rating
indicating our expectation for a meaningful (50% to 70%) recovery
in the event of payment default. The issue-level rating on the
company's new senior unsecured notes is 'BB', the same as the
corporate credit rating. We take additional comfort from fully
unconditional and irrevocable guarantees for Axtel's debt
instruments coming from its most important subsidiaries, which
account for 99% of the company's consolidated EBITDA.

"We view Axtel as a moderately strategic subsidiary to Alfa S.A.B.
de C.V. (BBB/Stable/--) because Axtel is a successful and
profitable business, unlikely to be sold in the short term, and we
believe it's likely to receive support from its parent company, if
necessary."

Kay Analytical Factors

-- S&P has valued the company on a going-concern basis using a
    6.0x multiple of its projected emergence EBITDA.

-- S&P estimates that for the company to default, its EBITDA
    would need to plummet, impairing the business, which could
    result from heightened and sustained competition, pricing
    pressures, and the general weakening of the Mexican economy.
    These factors would force Axtel to lose or fail to renew
    important contracts with the government and private companies.
    Under such a scenario, the company will be unable to meet its
    debt service obligations.

Simulated default assumptions

-- Simulated year of default: 2022
-- EBITDA at emergence: MXN473.3 million
-- EBITDA multiple: 6.0x

Simplified waterfall

-- Net enterprise value (after 5% administrative costs): MXN450
    million
-- Recovery rating: '3'
-- Recovery expectations: 50% to 70%

RATINGS LIST

  Axtel S.A.B. de C.V.
    Corporate credit rating            BB/Negative/--

  Rating Assigned

  Axtel S.A.B. de C.V.
    Senior unsecured                   BB


SIXSIGMA NETWORKS: S&P Puts B+ CCR on CreditWatch Positive
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings placed its 'B+' long-term corporate credit
rating on Sixsigma Networks Mexico, S.A. De C.V. (KIO Networks) on
CreditWatch with positive implications.

S&P said, "We have also placed our 'B+' issue rating on KIO's $500
million senior unsecured notes due 2021 on CreditWatch positive.
"The CreditWatch placement reflects the possibility that we could
raise the ratings on KIO if the company completes the sale of its
metropolitan fiber optic business and uses the proceeds to pay
down debt, strengthening the company's key credit metrics, leading
to a debt to EBITDA ratio below 5.0x and funds from operations
(FFO) to debt above 12%. We believe this could take place despite
the loss of around 15% of the company's EBITDA, which the telecom
asset generates.

"We expect to resolve the CreditWatch listing in conjunction with
the completion of the sale and when we have sufficient information
on the company's proforma capital structure.

"If the sale doesn't succeed, or succeeds, but the deleveraging is
not significant to change the company's financial risk profile, we
could affirm the ratings at the current level."



======================
P U E R T O    R I C O
======================


PUERTO RICO: Candlewood, Fir Tree Hold $716-Mil. of GO Bonds
------------------------------------------------------------
An ad hoc group of certain holders (the "PBA Funds") of Government
Facilities Revenue Bonds and Government Facilities Revenue
Refunding Bonds issued by the Puerto Rico Public Buildings
Authority ("PBA") and guaranteed by the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico (collectively, the "PBA Bonds") on Nov. 3, 2017, submitted in
the Title III cases of Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, et al., a
verified statement pursuant to Rule 2019 of the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure.

On July 1, 2017, the PBA Funds retained Morrison & Foerster LLP.
In October 2017, the PBA Funds retained G. Carlo-Altieri Law
Offices, LLC as Puerto Rico counsel.

The members of the PBA Funds hold disclosable economic interests
or act as investment managers or advisors to funds and/or accounts
that hold disclosable economic interests in relation to the
Debtors:

   1. Candlewood Investment Group, LP
      777 Third Avenue, Suite 19B
      New York, NY 10017
      * General Obligation Bonds $126,696,000

   2. Fir Tree Partners
      55 West 46th Street
      29th Floor
      New York, NY 10036
      * General Obligation Bonds $588,564,000

Counsel for the PBA Funds:

         G. CARLO-ALTIERI LAW OFFICES, LLC
         254 San Jose St., Third Floor
         San Juan, Puerto Rico 00901
         Tel: (787) 247-6680
         Fax: (787) 919-0527

                - and -

         Gerardo A. Carlo, Esq.
         E-mail: gacarlo@carlo-altierilaw.com
         Kendra Loomis, Esq.
         E-mail: loomislegal@gmail.com
         Mobile: (787) 370-0255
         Fernando O. Zambrana Aviles
         E-mail: fernando@cszlawpr.com
         Tel. 787-919-0026

                - and -

         James M. Peck, Esq.
         Gary S. Lee, Esq.
         MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP
         250 West 55th Street
         New York, New York 10019
         Telephone: (212) 468-8000
         Facsimile: (212) 468-7900
         E-mail: JPeck@mofo.com
                 GLee@mofo.com

                      About Puerto Rico

Puerto Rico is a self-governing commonwealth in association with
the United States that's facing a massive bond debt of $70
billion, a 68% debt-to-GDP ratio and negative economic growth in
nine of the last 10 years.

The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has sought bankruptcy protection,
aiming to restructure its massive $74 billion debt-load and $49
billion in pension obligations.

The debt restructuring petition was filed by Puerto Rico's
financial oversight board in U.S. District Court in Puerto Rico
(Case No. 17-01578) on May 3, 2017, and was made under Title III
of 2016's U.S. Congressional rescue law known as the Puerto Rico
Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act ("PROMESA").

The Financial Oversight and Management Board later commenced Title
III cases for the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation
(COFINA) on May 5, 2017, and the Employees Retirement System (ERS)
and the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (HTA) on
May 21, 2017.  On July 2, 2017, a Title III case was commenced for
the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority ("PREPA").

U.S. Chief Justice John Roberts has appointed U.S. District Judge
Laura Taylor Swain to oversee the Title III cases.  The Honorable
Judith Dein, a United States Magistrate Judge for the District of
Massachusetts, has been designated to preside over matters that
may be referred to her by Judge Swain, including discovery
disputes, and management of other pretrial proceedings.

Joint administration of the Title III cases, under Lead Case No.
17-3283, was granted on June 29, 2017.

The Oversight Board has hired as advisors, Proskauer Rose LLP and
O'Neill & Borges LLC as legal counsel, McKinsey & Co. as strategic
consultant, Citigroup Global Markets, as municipal investment
banker, and Ernst & Young, as financial advisor.

Martin J. Bienenstock, Esq., Scott K. Rutsky, Esq., and Philip M.
Abelson, Esq., of Proskauer Rose; and Hermann D. Bauer, Esq., at
O'Neill & Borges are on-board as attorneys.

McKinsey & Co. is the Board's strategic consultant, Ernst & Young
is the Board's financial advisor, and Citigroup Global Markets
Inc. is the Board's municipal investment banker.

Prime Clerk LLC is the claims and noticing agent.  Prime Clerk
maintains a case web site at:

           https://cases.primeclerk.com/puertorico

Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC is the service agent for ERS, HTA,
and PREPA.

O'Melveny & Myers LLP is counsel to the Commonwealth's Puerto Rico
Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority (AAFAF), the agency
responsible for negotiations with bondholders.

The Oversight Board named Professor Nancy B. Rapoport as fee
examiner and to chair a committee to review professionals' fees.

                      Bondholders' Attorneys

Toro, Colon, Mullet, Rivera & Sifre, P.S.C. and Kramer Levin
Naftalis & Frankel LLP serve as counsel to the Mutual Fund Group,
comprised of mutual funds managed by Oppenheimer Funds, Inc.,
Franklin Advisers, Inc., and the First Puerto Rico Family of
Funds, which collectively hold over $3.5 billion in COFINA Bonds
and over $2.9 billion in other bonds issued by Puerto Rico and
other instrumentalities, including over $1.8 billion of Puerto
Rico general obligation bonds ("GO Bonds").

White & Case LLP and Lopez Sanchez & Pirillo LLC represent the UBS
Family of Funds and the Puerto Rico Family of Funds, which hold
$613.3 million in COFINA bonds.

Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, Robbins, Russell,
Englert, Orseck, Untereiner & Sauber LLP, and Jimenez, Graffam &
Lausell are co-counsel to the ad hoc group of General Obligation
Bondholders, comprised of Aurelius Capital Management, LP,
Autonomy Capital (Jersey) LP, FCO Advisors LP, Franklin Mutual
Advisers LLC, Monarch Alternative Capital LP, Senator Investment
Group LP, and Stone Lion Capital Partners L.P.

Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP and Reichard & Escalera are
co-counsel to the ad hoc coalition of holders of senior bonds
issued by COFINA, comprised of at least 30 institutional holders,
including Canyon Capital Advisors LLC and Varde Investment
Partners, L.P.

Correa Acevedo & Abesada Law Offices, P.S.C., is counsel to Canyon
Capital Advisors, LLC, River Canyon Fund Management, LLC, Davidson
Kempner Capital Management LP, OZ Management, LP, and OZ
Management II LP (the QTCB Noteholder Group).

                           Committees

The U.S. Trustee formed a nine-member Official Committee of
Retirees and a seven-member Official Committee of Unsecured
Creditors of the Commonwealth.  The Retiree Committee tapped
Jenner & Block LLP and Bennazar, Garcia & Milian, C.S.P., as its
attorneys.  The Creditors Committee tapped Paul Hastings LLP and
O'Neill & Gilmore LLC as counsel.


PUERTO RICO: Kobre & Kim Files First Interim Report
---------------------------------------------------
Kobre & Kim LLP, the independent investigator retained by the
Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico, provided
on Oct. 31, 2017, its first interim report on the first 60 days of
its engagement.  The Independent Investigator has not yet released
initial results of its investigation.  It only provided an update
of its investigation, as it didn't want to "compromise the
confidentiality of the investigative measures taken to date."  The
Independent Investigator believes that a realistic timeframe for
the preparation of a final investigation report is 200 days from
the Independent Investigator's retention, subject to adjustment.

Mindful of ongoing difficulties that Hurricanes Irma and Maria
have visited upon the living and work conditions on the island,
the Independent Investigator has accommodated witnesses' requests
for extensions of response deadlines.  The firm has begun its data
collection, requesting relevant documents form AAFAF, and other
entities.  The Independent Investigator has issued 84 document
preservation notices to individuals and entities involved in the
issuance of debt securities in Puerto Rico over the last 20 years,
including to issuers, underwriters advisors, and ratings agencies
and other stakeholders -- and received responses from 79
witnesses.

The Independent Investigator has issued subpoenas to Popular Inc.
and Banco Popular de Puerto Rico.

To recall, the Oversight Board's general counsel has authorized
the Independent Investigator to conduct an informal investigation
regarding (i) a review of the factors contributing to Puerto
Rico's fiscal crisis, including changes in the economy, expansion
of spending commitments ad entitlement programs, changes in the
federal funding it receives and its reliance on debt to finance a
structural budget deficit; (ii) a review of Puerto Rico's debt,
the general use of proceeds, the relationship between the debt and
Puerto Rico's structuring budget deficit, the range of its debt
instruments, and how Puerto Rico's debt practices compare to
practices of states and large municipal jurisdictions, and (iii) a
review of Puerto Rico's debt issuance, disclosure and selling
practices.

The firm can be reached at:

         John D. Couriel, Esq.
         KOBRE & KIM LLP
         201 South Biscayne Boulevard
         Suite 1900
         Miami, FL 33131
         www.kobrekim.com
         Tel: +13059676115

A copy of the First Interim Report is available at:

     http://bankrupt.com/misc/PR_Kobre_1st_Report.pdf

                      About Puerto Rico

Puerto Rico is a self-governing commonwealth in association with
the United States that's facing a massive bond debt of $70
billion, a 68% debt-to-GDP ratio and negative economic growth in
nine of the last 10 years.

The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has sought bankruptcy protection,
aiming to restructure its massive $74 billion debt-load and $49
billion in pension obligations.

The debt restructuring petition was filed by Puerto Rico's
financial oversight board in U.S. District Court in Puerto Rico
(Case No. 17-01578) on May 3, 2017, and was made under Title III
of 2016's U.S. Congressional rescue law known as the Puerto Rico
Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act ("PROMESA").

The Financial Oversight and Management Board later commenced Title
III cases for the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation
(COFINA) on May 5, 2017, and the Employees Retirement System (ERS)
and the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (HTA) on
May 21, 2017.  On July 2, 2017, a Title III case was commenced for
the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority ("PREPA").

U.S. Chief Justice John Roberts has appointed U.S. District Judge
Laura Taylor Swain to oversee the Title III cases.  The Honorable
Judith Dein, a United States Magistrate Judge for the District of
Massachusetts, has been designated to preside over matters that
may be referred to her by Judge Swain, including discovery
disputes, and management of other pretrial proceedings.

Joint administration of the Title III cases, under Lead Case No.
17-3283, was granted on June 29, 2017.

The Oversight Board has hired as advisors, Proskauer Rose LLP and
O'Neill & Borges LLC as legal counsel, McKinsey & Co. as strategic
consultant, Citigroup Global Markets, as municipal investment
banker, and Ernst & Young, as financial advisor.

Martin J. Bienenstock, Esq., Scott K. Rutsky, Esq., and Philip M.
Abelson, Esq., of Proskauer Rose; and Hermann D. Bauer, Esq., at
O'Neill & Borges are on-board as attorneys.

McKinsey & Co. is the Board's strategic consultant, Ernst & Young
is the Board's financial advisor, and Citigroup Global Markets
Inc. is the Board's municipal investment banker.

Prime Clerk LLC is the claims and noticing agent.  Prime Clerk
maintains a case web site at:

           https://cases.primeclerk.com/puertorico

Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC is the service agent for ERS, HTA,
and PREPA.

O'Melveny & Myers LLP is counsel to the Commonwealth's Puerto Rico
Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority (AAFAF), the agency
responsible for negotiations with bondholders.

The Oversight Board named Professor Nancy B. Rapoport as fee
examiner and to chair a committee to review professionals' fees.

                      Bondholders' Attorneys

Toro, Colon, Mullet, Rivera & Sifre, P.S.C. and Kramer Levin
Naftalis & Frankel LLP serve as counsel to the Mutual Fund Group,
comprised of mutual funds managed by Oppenheimer Funds, Inc.,
Franklin Advisers, Inc., and the First Puerto Rico Family of
Funds, which collectively hold over $3.5 billion in COFINA Bonds
and over $2.9 billion in other bonds issued by Puerto Rico and
other instrumentalities, including over $1.8 billion of Puerto
Rico general obligation bonds ("GO Bonds").

White & Case LLP and Lopez Sanchez & Pirillo LLC represent the UBS
Family of Funds and the Puerto Rico Family of Funds, which hold
$613.3 million in COFINA bonds.

Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, Robbins, Russell,
Englert, Orseck, Untereiner & Sauber LLP, and Jimenez, Graffam &
Lausell are co-counsel to the ad hoc group of General Obligation
Bondholders, comprised of Aurelius Capital Management, LP,
Autonomy Capital (Jersey) LP, FCO Advisors LP, Franklin Mutual
Advisers LLC, Monarch Alternative Capital LP, Senator Investment
Group LP, and Stone Lion Capital Partners L.P.

Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP and Reichard & Escalera are
co-counsel to the ad hoc coalition of holders of senior bonds
issued by COFINA, comprised of at least 30 institutional holders,
including Canyon Capital Advisors LLC and Varde Investment
Partners, L.P.

Correa Acevedo & Abesada Law Offices, P.S.C., is counsel to Canyon
Capital Advisors, LLC, River Canyon Fund Management, LLC, Davidson
Kempner Capital Management LP, OZ Management, LP, and OZ
Management II LP (the QTCB Noteholder Group).

                           Committees

The U.S. Trustee formed a nine-member Official Committee of
Retirees and a seven-member Official Committee of Unsecured
Creditors of the Commonwealth.  The Retiree Committee tapped
Jenner & Block LLP and Bennazar, Garcia & Milian, C.S.P., as its
attorneys.  The Creditors Committee tapped Paul Hastings LLP and
O'Neill & Gilmore LLC as counsel.



=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================


PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: Moody's Lowers Rating to Ca; Outlook Neg.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A.
(PDVSA)'s ratings to Ca from Caa3. Moody's also lowered the
company's baseline credit assessment (BCA) to ca from caa3. The
rating action reflects the payment default on November 2nd,
related to the 2017 notes, and Moody's expectation that the
company will default on other debt obligations in the near term
given its significant financial stress and the government's stated
intention to restructure its debt. The ratings outlook remain
negative.

The following is a list of the affected ratings:

  Issuer Rating downgrade to Ca from Caa3

  GTD SR SEC 1ST LIEN GLOBAL NOTES due 2020 downgrade to Ca from
  Caa3

  GTD SR GLOBAL NOTES due 2035 downgrade to Ca from Caa3

  Outlook remains negative

RATINGS RATIONALE

"The rating actions were triggered by the payment default on
November 2nd, when PDVSA was expected to pay USD1,169 million in
principal related to 2017 notes, and by the company's significant
financial stress, which is derived from its limited ability to
generate cash to meet short-term obligations and fund sufficient
capital investments to sustain production and asset quality", said
Nymia Almeida, a VP-Sr. Credit Officer at Moody's. In addition,
Venezuela's president, Nicolas Maduro, on November 1st said that
his government would initiate a restructuring and refinancing of
the country's foreign debt, including that of PDVSA. The downgrade
of PDVSA's rating to Ca from Caa3 reflects Moody's view that
expected loss has increased following these events.

The ratings of government-related issuers combine: (i) their
underlying BCA, which represents the issuer's intrinsic credit
risks regardless of government support and (ii) Moody's
assumptions about the willingness and the ability of the
respective government to provide extraordinary support in a
distressed situation. In the case of PDVSA, the company's Ca
rating does not have uplift to the level of the government's Caa3
rating, which is one notch higher. Despite the government's
significant influence on PDVSA's business decisions and dependence
on its cash generation, Moody's assumes that the government has
limited ability to support PSVSA's liquidity constraints given its
own continued fiscal deterioration.

The methodologies used in these ratings were Global Integrated Oil
& Gas Industry published in October 2016, and Government-Related
Issuers published in August 2017.


PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: S&P Lowers Corp. Credit Rating to 'CC'
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its corporate credit and issue-level
ratings on Petroleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA) to 'CC' from
'CCC-'. The ratings on remain on CreditWatch negative.

On November 2, President Nicolas Maduro announced the formation of
a government commission to restructure the sovereign's and PDVSA's
external debt obligations. Given the highly constrained external
liquidity situation for the sovereign and domestic entities, S&P
would consider any restructuring of PDVSA's debt to be a
distressed debt exchange and equivalent to default.

In October, PDVSA also made active use of the grace period for its
external coupon payments to garner sufficient amount in dollars to
cover its debt maturities that were due on October 28 and November
2nd. S&P said, "According to our methodology, we will lower the
corporate credit rating to 'SD' and the affected issue-level
ratings to 'D' if the payment is not made within the stated grace
period.  The president didn't indicate that the government won't
pay these coupon payments within the grace period, but the
company's capacity to do so is very constrained."

S&P said, "The CreditWatch negative listing reflects our opinion
that there is a one-in-two likelihood that PDVSA defaults within
the next three months. We could lower our ratings to 'SD' if PDVSA
doesn't make its overdue coupon payments within the grace period,
or we could do so upon completion of the announced debt
restructure.

"Avoiding default on the overdue coupon payments and the debt
restructuring could lead us to remove the CreditWatch listing on
our ratings on PDVSA."


VENEZUELA: Breached Data Reporting Obligation, IMF Board Says
-------------------------------------------------------------
The International Monetary Fund Executive Board met on Nov. 3,
2017, to consider a report presented by the Managing Director on
data provision by Venezuela.

The Board approved a decision that finds Venezuela in breach of
its obligation under Article VIII, Section 5 of the Fund's
Articles of Agreement for the failure to provide, by the required
date, certain data on the operations of the social security
institute and on total exports and imports of merchandise, in
terms of local currency values, according to countries of
destination and origin. Reporting these data along with other key
economic indicators, is an obligation of all Fund members to allow
for effective surveillance of macroeconomic developments within
each country as well as that country's effects on other countries.

The Board called on Venezuela to adopt specific remedial measures
and will meet again within 6 months to consider Venezuela's
progress in implementation.

The Executive Board remains hopeful that the decision will
encourage the Venezuelan authorities to re-engage with the Fund
through timely and regular data provision and the resumption of
Article IV consultations. Such re-engagement would benefit
Venezuela and the international community.


VENEZUELA: S&P Lowers LT FC Sovereign Credit Rating to 'CC'
-----------------------------------------------------------
On Nov. 3, 2017, S&P Global Ratings lowered its long-term foreign
currency sovereign credit rating on the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela to 'CC' from 'CCC-'. The long-term local currency
sovereign credit rating remains unchanged at 'CCC-'. The 'C'
short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings
also remain unchanged. S&P placed all ratings on CreditWatch
negative.

S&P said, "At the same time, we lowered our rating on Venezuela's
senior unsecured debt to 'CC' from 'CCC-' and placed the rating on
CreditWatch negative.

"Finally, we lowered our transfer and convertibility assessment on
the sovereign to 'CC' from 'CCC-'."

CREDITWATCH

S&P said, "Our CreditWatch negative placement reflects our opinion
that there is a one-in-two chance that Venezuela defaults within
the next three months. We could lower our ratings to selective
default ('SD') if Venezuela doesn't pay its overdue coupon
payments before the stated grace period expires, or upon the
execution of the announced debt restructuring.

"If the sovereign avoids default on the overdue coupon payments,
we could remove Venezuela from our CreditWatch negative list."
The ratings could gradually improve if steps to defuse the
heightened political tensions in Venezuela are taken, reducing the
risks of eroding governability and high volatility in economic
policies. This would have to be accompanied by prompt corrective
reforms that begin to address the country's economic imbalances
and strengthen its external liquidity."

RATIONALE

On Nov. 2, Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro announced a
government commission to restructure the sovereign's and state-
owned Petroleos de Venezuela S.A.'s (PDVSA) external debt
obligations. A day later, Venezuelan Vice President Tareck El
Aissami announced a meeting with bondholders on Nov. 13, 2017.

S&P said, "We are lowering our long-term foreign currency rating
on Venezuela to 'CC' because, given the highly constrained
external liquidity, we would very likely consider any Venezuelan
restructuring to be a distressed debt exchange and equivalent to
default (see "Rating Implications Of Exchange Offers And Similar
Restructurings, Update"). In addition, in our opinion, U.S.
sanctions on Venezuela will most likely result in a long and
difficult negotiation with bondholders."

In October, Venezuela used the grace period of most of its
external coupon payments to garner enough U.S. dollars to meet
PDVSA's debt maturities that were due on Oct. 27 and Nov. 2. S&P
said, "In our opinion, the announcement also raises doubts about
Venezuela's willingness and capacity to pay its overdue coupon
payments, currently on its stated 30-day grace period, of its
2019, 2024, 2025, and 2026 bonds. According to our methodology, we
will lower the issuer credit rating to 'SD' and the affected issue
to default ('D') if the sovereign doesn't make the payment within
the stated grace period (see "Methodology: Timeliness of Payments:
Grace Periods, Guarantees, And Use of 'D' And 'SD' Ratings")." The
president did not indicate that the government would not pay these
coupon payments within the grace period, but capacity is
constrained.

Venezuela is also late and beyond its stated 15-day grace period
for a coupon payment on its oil-indexed payment obligations. The
coupon payment was due on Oct. 15, and Venezuela's payment agent
publicly confirmed that it received the money on Oct. 26.
According to the payment agent, the deposit was not made in time,
and the payment date was announced for Nov. 20. In our opinion,
based on our "Timeliness of Payments: Grace Periods, Guarantees,
And Use of 'D' And 'SD' Ratings" criteria, the delay relates to a
noncredit extraordinary event, and therefore we do not
characterize it as a default.

S&P said, "We believe the government is less likely to default on
its local currency-denominated debt, and President Maduro made no
mention of any intention to restructure this debt. Therefore, our
long-term local currency rating on Venezuela of 'CCC-' is one
notch higher than the long-term foreign currency rating."

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable (see 'Related Criteria And Research').

At the onset of the committee, the chair confirmed that the
information provided to the Rating Committee by the primary
analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and was sufficient
for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.  The committee
agreed that all key rating factors remained unchanged.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook. The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

RATINGS LIST

Downgraded; CreditWatch Action

Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)

   Sovereign Credit Rating
    Foreign Currency             CC/Watch Neg/C  CCC-/Negative/C
    Senior Unsecured             CC/Watch Neg        CCC-
  CreditWatch Action
                                        To          From
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)

   Sovereign Credit Rating
    Local Currency               CC-/Watch Neg/C  CCC-/Negative/C
    Downgraded
                                        To          From
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)

  Transfer & Convertibility Assessment  CC          CCC-



=================
X X X X X X X X X
=================


LATAM: IDB Presents Index that Compares State of Jobs in Region
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Better Jobs Index enables labor market analysis of the region
through four comparable indicators

The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) has introduced the
Better Jobs Index, a tool that for the first time allows users to
compare working conditions in 17 Latin American countries.

The Better Jobs Index measures the state of employment in
countries through two dimensions (quantity and quality), each
consisting of two indicators. The quantity dimension captures how
many people want to work (labor participation) and how many
actually work (employment). The quality dimension measures how
many workers have access to social security benefits (formality)
and how many workers receive wages that are sufficient to overcome
poverty (living wage). Uruguay, Chile and Panama lead the first
edition of the Better Jobs Index.

The index is based on data periodically published by Latin
American countries, which the IDB harmonizes through its Labor
Markets and Social Security Information System (SIMS). Therefore,
the Better Jobs Index allows for comparisons to be made between
countries and for analysis of how jobs have evolved in Latin
America since 2010. It also provides information on existing
gender and age gaps.

"With the Better Jobs Index, the IDB is contributing useful tools
that will allow deeper analysis of employment trends in the
region," said Carmen Pages, chief of the IDB's Labor Markets
Division. "The goal is to promote policies that will improve
workplace conditions, which is of vital importance for the people
and the economies of the region."

The Better Jobs Index and the 17 detailed country reports can be
found on the web: betterjobs.iadb.org.


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Joseph Cardillo at
856-381-8268.


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