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                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

               Friday, November 10, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 224


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

ARGENTINA: Fitch Affirms B IDR & Revises Outlook to Positive
STONEWAY CAPITAL: Fitch Affirms B Rating on Secured Notes Due 2027


B R A Z I L

BR MALLS: Moody's Affirms Ba2 CFR; Outlook Remains Negative
COMPANHIA ENERGETICA: Fitch Lowers Long-Term IDR to B-
CORPORACION ELECTRICA: Fitch Cuts Long-Term FC IDR to 'C'
MAGNESITA REFRATARIOS: Moody's Withdraws B2 Corp. Family Rating
OI SA: Brazil Court Delays Creditors Meeting Again

OI SA: Regulator Rejects Firm's Request for Deadline Extension
OI SA: Bondholder Group Seeks Court Intervention in Firm's Board


C U B A

CUBA: US Announces New Restrictions
CUBA: Moody's Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms Caa2 Ratings


M E X I C O

PLAYA RESORTS: Moody's Hikes CFR to B2; Outlook Stable


P U E R T O    R I C O

LIBERTY CABLEVISION: Fitch Cuts Long-Term IDR to 'CCC'


V E N E Z U E L A

PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: Fitch Lowers LT For. Currency IDR to C
VENEZUELA: US Warns Bondholders That Negotiating May be Illegal
VENEZUELA: EU to Impose Arms Embargo as Crisis Deepens
VENEZUELA: US Urged to Impose Full Embargo on Oil
VENEZUELA: Russia to Ease Debt Burden on Country


V I R G I N   I S L A N D S

HATTON BAY: Goes Into Voluntary Liquidation


                            - - - - -


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A R G E N T I N A
=================


ARGENTINA: Fitch Affirms B IDR & Revises Outlook to Positive
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has revised Argentina's Outlook to Positive from
Stable and has affirmed its Long Term Foreign-Currency Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) at 'B'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The revision of the Outlook to Positive reflects an improving
backdrop for policies that could support a stronger and more
stable macroeconomic outlook, after a decade of weak and volatile
performance. Recent midterm elections have improved confidence in
the durability of the ongoing policy shift, which augurs well for
investment and the sovereign's ability to maintain favourable
financing access. The build-up in international reserves and a
more flexible exchange rate confer greater policy flexibility to
manage shocks.

Argentina's 'B' ratings reflect weaknesses that persist despite an
improving policy outlook, including high inflation, a large fiscal
deficit, and heavy sovereign reliance on external financing that
render it vulnerable to shocks. These weaknesses are balanced by a
moderate government debt burden and favourable external solvency
indicators. High per-capita income and a large, diversified
economy are also credit strengths, but a weak repayment record
suggests these structural factors provide only limited support to
the credit profile.

In midterm elections on October 22, 2017, President Mauricio
Macri's Cambiemos coalition received a strong vote of confidence
and made significant gains in seats in both legislative chambers
(though short of a majority). The administration's strengthened
mandate could provide renewed impetus to its policy agenda, namely
in the areas of fiscal consolidation and structural reforms where
political headwinds have slowed progress the most.

Confidence in institutions has already improved, as evidenced by
Argentina's large jump in the World Bank governance indicators
this year from the 38th to the 50th percentile among rated
sovereigns. The improved reliability of official statistics is one
important, concrete example of institutional strengthening.

Fitch expects growth will rise from 2.8% in 2017 to 3.4% in 2018,
driven by investment, as fiscal consolidation and efforts to
moderate salary hikes could restrain consumption somewhat. This
would be positive for the credit profile as it would end
Argentina's erratic growth pattern of the past six years and mark
the start of a more stable growth trajectory supported by private-
sector initiative rather than policy stimulus.

Fitch expects that greater confidence in policy sustainability and
progress on reforms will support higher investment, which remains
very low at just 15% of GDP as of 2017. Some policy changes
already enacted could encourage investment in specific sectors,
evidenced by the sizeable investment pipeline taking shape in the
energy sector. The administration plans to advance reforms in the
next year to tackle key bottlenecks to investment and employment,
including reducing the tax burden and distortionary taxes,
deepening the country's shallow capital market, and improving
labour market flexibility and formalization.

Domestic-demand-driven growth has coincided with a rise in the
current account deficit to its highest level since the 1990s at
3.4% of GDP through 2017Q2. It has been financed primarily via
external borrowing rather than foreign direct investment (still
low at 1% of GDP), highlighting a vulnerability of the current
growth trajectory to external shocks.

Capital inflows have supported significant build-up in
international reserves, to USD52 billion as of October 2017 from
USD38 billion at end-2016. Reserve accumulation has lifted
external liquidity metrics closer to the 'B' median from
previously weak levels. Reserve adequacy has also improved in the
context of a more flexible exchange rate, and in terms of
composition given the build-up captures increases in net reserves
(rather than those with corresponding FX liabilities such as
reserve requirements and swaps).

The disinflation process is facing headwinds. Inertial pressures
have kept monthly inflation prints above 1.5%, causing year-on-
year inflation to creep back up to 26% (IPC-BA index) in September
and expectations to drift above target. The BCRA has hiked its
policy rate twice since October to 28.75% from 26.25%,
highlighting its commitment to keeping the disinflation process on
track. High real interest rates have had limited efficacy in
mopping up peso liquidity, however, and money supply growth has
stayed high at around 28% as the BCRA has been unable to fully
sterilize its large FX purchases and still sizeable (albeit lower)
financing to the treasury.

Fiscal consolidation has not yet begun under the Macri
administration, as subsidy cuts have been more than offset by
pension hikes, phase-out of export taxes, and the shift to
costlier market-based financing. Fitch projects the central
government primary deficit will ease somewhat to 4.0% of GDP in
2017 from 4.3% in 2016, but that the total deficit will rise due
to the growing interest bill. At the general government level
(consolidating federal and provincial figures), Fitch projects the
deficit will rise to 6.5% of GDP in 2017 from 5.4% in 2016, well
above the 'B' median of 4%.

The government aims to gradually reduce the central government
primary deficit by 1 percentage point of GDP per year starting in
2018 via further subsidy cuts and broad restraint in current
spending. It is pushing a fiscal responsibility law to require
similar spending restraint at the provincial level as well. Fitch
expects the government to meet its targets, but sees downside
risks from rigid and growing social benefits, narrower room for
further cuts to subsidies or capex, and political headwinds around
of 2019 elections. The government expects the estimated direct
cost of its proposed tax reform (1.5% of GDP) will be mostly
offset by revenue gains from faster growth and formalization, but
this could pose further downside fiscal risk.

Public debt metrics are set to rise from a starting point that is
favourable, but not outstanding relative to peers. Fitch projects
general government debt (national and provincial consolidated with
social security holdings) to rise from 54% of GDP in 2017 and
gradually converge with the 'B' median of 58% in the coming years.
Debt is below the median net of a large share held by the BCRA
(17% of GDP) with negligible rollover risk and interest rates.
However, the ratio of interest to revenues is already in line with
the 'B' median of 10% and on an upward path.

The sovereign's heavy reliance on foreign-currency funding - a key
credit weakness - renders debt metrics highly sensitive to
monetary variables and the exchange rate. Debt metrics have risen
only moderately in the past two years despite heavy borrowing, as
peso depreciation has greatly lagged inflation, but faster peso
depreciation could reverse this effect.

SOVEREIGN RATING MODEL (SRM) and QUALITATIVE OVERLAY (QO)

Fitch's proprietary SRM assigns Argentina a score equivalent to a
rating of 'B+' on the Long-term FC IDR scale.

Fitch's sovereign rating committee adjusted the output from the
SRM to arrive at the final LT FC IDR by applying its QO, relative
to rated peers, as follows:

Macro Policies and Performance: -1 notch, to reflect a record of
macroeconomic instability in terms of growth, inflation, and the
real exchange rate that has not yet been overcome. However, an
improved policy framework is being consolidated that could support
a more stable macroeconomic performance.

Fitch's SRM is the agency's proprietary multiple regression rating
model that employs 18 variables based on three year centred
averages, including one year of forecasts, to produce a score
equivalent to a Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR. Fitch's QO is a
forward-looking qualitative framework designed to allow for
adjustment to the SRM output to assign the final rating,
reflecting factors within our criteria that are not fully
quantifiable and/or not fully reflected in the SRM.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The main factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to
an upgrade are:

-- Improvement in the outlook for growth and inflation;

-- Consolidation of a more consistent policy framework and
    progress on reforms;

-- Progress on fiscal consolidation and maintenance of favorable
    sovereign financing access;

-- Further strengthening of external buffers.

The main factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to
a stabilisation of the Outlook are:

-- Fiscal slippage and/or re-emergence of fiscal financing
    constraints;

-- Erosion of international reserves.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

-- Fitch expects Brazil's economy will accelerate moderately in
    2018 after returning to positive growth in 2017.

-- Fitch expects monetary policy normalisation in the US will
    proceed gradually, and will not materially impair Argentina's
    external financing access.

Fitch affirms the following ratings:

-- Long-Term Foreign-Currency IDR at 'B'; Outlook revised to
    Positive from Stable;

-- Long-term Local-Currency IDR at 'B'; Outlook revised to
    Positive from Stable;

-- Short-Term Foreign-Currency IDR at 'B';

-- Short-Term Local-Currency IDR at 'B';

-- Country Ceiling at 'B';

-- Issue ratings on long-term senior-unsecured foreign-currency
    bonds affirmed at 'B'.


STONEWAY CAPITAL: Fitch Affirms B Rating on Secured Notes Due 2027
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Stoneway Capital Corporation's $500
million senior secured notes at 'B' with a Stable Rating Outlook.

The affirmation reflects Fitch's expectation that the $165 million
add-on to Stoneway's existing $500 million 10% senior secured
notes due 2027 will not deteriorate Stoneway's credit profile. The
action follows the announcement of the Consent and Waiver
Solicitation required for issuing additional debt to be used to
acquire the affiliate company, Araucaria Generation S.A.
(Araucaria Generation), and fund the construction of an additional
120 MW of installed capacity to Stoneway. Araucaria Generation was
recently awarded a 15-year power purchase agreement (PPA) with
CAMMESA to support the expansion and combined-cycle conversion of
the San Pedro plant, adding an additional 120 MW to the current
simple cycle's 103.5 MW.

The expansion and conversion project is expected to benefit from
the same EPC, O&M, and LTSA contractual framework with Siemens
affiliates developed for the original 686.5 MW of installed
capacity. Also, the new PPA follows the same structure as the
original PPAs: US-dollar denominated, benefiting from fixed
capacity and variable payments.

The rating affirmation incorporates the fact that current works of
the four generation facilities are somewhat behind schedule
although exhibiting substantial progress and the view that
potential delays should not threaten termination of the PPAs and
the project's ability to service its debt.

Credit metrics following the issuance of the additional $165
million are expected to weaken as a result of capacity expansion
works being financed exclusively with debt, yet they remain strong
for the rating category, according to applicable criteria,
considering several scenarios of energy dispatch.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Summary: The rating reflects Stoneway's PPAs with sole off-taker
CAMMESA, moderate operating risks established through fixed-priced
operation and maintenance (O&M) and overhaul costs with an
experienced counterparty, and the project's pre-completion status
mitigated through a fixed-price engineering, procurement,
construction (EPC) agreement signed with Siemens Energy Inc.

The project benefits from an adequate debt structure, with fixed
interest rate, adequate covenants, and reserves. While DSCR
results are strong for the rating category, the rating is
ultimately capped by Fitch's view on the credit quality of the
revenue stream derived through payments by CAMMESA as sole off-
taker.

Low Complexity of Works; Fixed Price, Date Certain EPC Agreement
[Completion Risk: Midrange]:

The greenfield project benefits from individual full EPC turnkey-
lump sum contracts with a strong-counterparty (Siemens) and other
contractors on a joint and several basis. The simple-cycle
technology nature of the oil & gas thermal plants is considered of
low complexity and scale, with technology widely established.
Contract terms and scope are adequate and encompass all needed
activities, delivery date of Dec. 1, 2017 is challenging but
achievable, liquidated damages (LDs) provisions and delivery dates
are in line with PPA obligations, and funded contingencies are
approximately 5% of EPC costs. Delay risks, which lead to PPA
termination (+180 days delayed) are viewed as very unlikely due to
low complexity of works, contractor expertise, and adequate LDs.

Experienced Operator and Defined Overhaul Costs [Operations Risk:
Midrange]:

All four plants benefit from O&M agreements and Long-Term Services
Agreements (LTSA) with Siemens S.A. for the entire tenor of the
debt. Plants benefit from a defined overhaul routine with fixed
prices for up to 60,000 hours (Las Palmas/San Pedro plants) and
75,000 hours (Lujan/Matheu plants). Considering the higher
dispatch scenario, an additional overhaul stress for the Las
Palmas and San Pedro plants was included for up to 80,000 hours.
Weaknesses of contract structure are the exposure to foreign
exchange (FX) risk, as a major part of the O&M fixed fee is
denominated in Argentine pesos (ARS), and LTSA for Las Palmas/San
Pedro plants are defined in Swedish kronas (SEK), and expected to
be hedged only after commercial operations date (COD).

Supply Risk Embedded in the Offtake Agreement [Supply Risk:
Midrange]:

Both oil and gas will be fully supplied by CAMMESA, project's sole
off-taker. As per the PPA, in case of any supply failure the
project is not obligated to dispatch and still receives its fixed
capacity payment.

Weak Counterparty with Sufficient Capacity Payments [Revenue Risk:
Weaker]:

The project's sole off-taker is CAMMESA, the wholesale power
market administrator in Argentina. CAMMESA is considered a
counterparty of weak financial profile and is dependent on
sovereign subsidies to honor commitments. Most of the project's
revenues will come from fixed capacity payments that cover fixed
costs and debt service. Project also benefits from a one year tail
on the original PPAs and a six year tail on the additional one.

Adequate Debt Structure with Overhaul Provisions [Debt Structure:
Stronger]:

The fixed-rate debt is fully amortizing and senior, and benefits
from a six month DSRA -- that will be funded with cash generation
-- and a 1.50x DSCR distribution test for the period between the
original project completion date and completion of the additional
project. DSCR distribution test will return to 1.40x after the
completion date of the additional project. Debt structure includes
an O&M Reserve Account, which accumulates overhaul provisions
whenever the project is dispatched and will be used to make
scheduled major maintenance payments. Additional debt can only be
issued with a rating confirmation after giving pro forma effect to
such new debt.

Strong Metrics for the Rating Category:

Rating case minimum and average DSCRs of 1.19x (in 2023) and 1.35x
(2018-2026 period) remain strong for the rating category,
according to applicable criteria, across dispatch scenarios that
go from 0% to full dispatch. In the 2018-2020 period, the DSCR
calculation considers net interest payments of drawdowns from the
Interest during Construction Account (IDC) of the $500 million and
the expected $165 million add-on.

Peers Analysis:

The transaction's rating is capped by the credit quality of the
off-taker. There are no other transactions in Fitch's Latin
American portfolio with a similar profile.

Criteria Variation:

For this transaction, a criteria variation to the 'Rating Criteria
for Infrastructure and Project Finance,' dated July 8, 2016, is
being applied with respect to the section 'Contractor Rating and
Credit Enhancement' in 'Appendix 1 - Completion Risk in Project
Finance.' The criteria does not specify which Issuer Default
Rating (IDR) should be used for the contractor rating in the case
of important subsidiaries of strong global or regional
multinational companies, with a solid reputation and widely
recognized expertise in a certain sector or industry. The
variation considers that when a regional or country subsidiary of
a multinational corporation that meets the aforementioned
conditions and is part of a strategic business line of such
multinational company is a contractual counterparty of an EPC
agreement, the IDR that will be used for the purposes of the
completion risk analysis will be the one of the ultimate parent
company.

Siemens Energy Inc., counterparty of the EPC agreement, is the
U.S.-based subsidiary of Siemens AG, which consolidates the power
and gas business unit for Siemens A.G. ('A'/Outlook Stable) for
the Americas. The 'Americas' segment represents +30% of total
Siemens A.G. consolidated revenues. The Power and Gas business
line, of which Siemens Energy Inc. ultimately reports to, is the
largest revenue contributor, with over EUR16 billion in sales in
2016.

For purposes of the contractor IDR under the 'Contractor Rating
and Credit Enhancement' section of the 'Rating Criteria for
Infrastructure and Project Finance', this analysis considers
Siemens A.G.'s 'A'/Outlook Stable IDR.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Positive Rating Action:

-- An improvement in the credit quality of CAMMESA as sole off-
    taker to the revenue stream.
-- Successful completion of construction works

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Negative Rating Action:

-- Deterioration in the credit quality of CAMMESA as sole off-
    taker to the revenue stream;

-- Significant delays in the completion schedule which could
    threaten PPA cancellation;

-- Delays from CAMMESA on the PPA payments leading to a
    deterioration of the project's liquidity.



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B R A Z I L
===========


BR MALLS: Moody's Affirms Ba2 CFR; Outlook Remains Negative
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina upgraded BR Malls' national scale rating
corporate family to Aa1.br from Aa2.br and affirmed the Ba2
(global local currency rating). The rating outlook remains
negative.

The following ratings for BR Malls were upgraded:

-- Corporate Family Rating (National scale) to Aa1.br from Aa2.br

-- Senior Unsecured Rating (National scale, local currency) to
    Aa1.br from Aa2.br

The following ratings for BR Malls were affirmed:

-- Corporate family rating at Ba2 (global local currency rating)

-- Senior Unsecured Rating at Ba2 (global local currency rating)

RATINGS RATIONALE

BR Malls' Ba2 (global local currency scale) / Aa1.br (national
scale) ratings reflect the company's dominant size and scale as
the largest owner, operator and developer of shopping malls in
Brazil and the significant deleveraging of its balance sheet,
following the full repayment of its US$378 million (R$1.2 billion)
senior unsecured, perpetual bond with the proceeds from a recent
R$1.7 billion equity raise. At 2Q17, the company reported strong
leverage metrics of Total Debt to Gross Assets and Net Debt to
EBITDA at 22% and 3.0x, respectively, compared to 25% and 5.5x for
the same period last year. The ratings also account for the
company's high-quality portfolio, substantial unencumbered asset
base and its improving operational performance as the economy and
the retail sector recovers from Brazil's worst recession. At
quarter-end, the company posted Same Store Sales (SSS) and Same
Store Rent (SSR) growth rates, in nominal terms, of 5.3% and 7.5%,
respectively, compared to -1.7% and 2.2% for the same period last
year.

These credit strengths, however, are offset by the portfolio's
gradual uptick in its vacancy rate as well as its moderately
elevated lease maturity risk of approximately 20% of the GLA
expiring in the next 12 to 24 months. As of 2Q17, the portfolio's
occupancy rate had decreased to 94.7% from a pre-crisis level of
97% in 4Q14. Lastly, because the company has all of its assets,
generates all of its revenue streams and has all its financing
sources in Brazil, BR Malls is unequivocally exposed to the
macroeconomic challenges and political uncertainties facing the
country.

The rating outlook for BR Malls incorporates Moody's view that the
company is well positioned for growth, given its low leverage,
ample liquidity and broad access to capital. Furthermore, Moody's
expect the company's operational performance will continue to
improve. However, the outlook on Brazil's sovereign bond rating
effectively caps BR Malls' ratings. The negative outlook reflects
the potential adverse effects of the persistent political
uncertainty on the government's reform agenda and on the prospects
of the country's growth over the medium term.

While maintaining its current levels of low leverage and ample
liquidity, upward rating movement for BR Mall would be predicated
upon the following factors on a recurring basis: 1). the
investment property portfolio exceeding R$20 billion in market
value; 2). the unencumbered asset pool approaching 70% of gross
assets; and 3). secured debt as a percentage of gross assets below
10%. Equally important, a positive change in Moody's credit view
on Brazil would also provide upward lift to the company's ratings.

Downward rating pressure would likely result from the following
criteria on a consistent basis: 1). a loss of liquidity to cover
24 months of obligations; 2). total debt to gross assets
approaching 30%; 3). Net Debt to EBITDA approaching 4.0x; 4). an
unencumbered asset pool below 50% of gross assets; 5). secured
debt to gross assets over 15%; 6). a development pipeline
exceeding 15% of gross assets and 7). a fixed charge coverage
ratio below 1.75x. Additional pressure on Brazil's credit profile
would also negatively affect the company's ratings.

Moody's last rating action with respect to BR Malls was on
February 25, 2016, when Moody's downgraded both the company's
global scale senior unsecured Rating and its corporate family
rating to Ba2, affirmed its national scale rating at Aa2.br and
revised the rating outlook to negative.

Based in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, BR Malls Participacoes S.A
[BOVESPA: BRML3] is the largest owner, manager and developer of
shopping malls in Brazil. Totaling over 1.6 million square meters
(m2) of gross leasable area (GLA), the company owns interests in
44 properties, including two greenfield projects under development
projects and five expansion projects, located across 15 states. As
of June 30, 2017, the company reported R$20.7 billion in gross
assets.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global Rating
Methodology for REITs and Other Commercial Property Firms
published in July 2010.


COMPANHIA ENERGETICA: Fitch Lowers Long-Term IDR to B-
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Companhia Energetica de Minas Gerais
(Cemig), Cemig Distribuicao S.A. (Cemig D) and Cemig Geracao e
Transmissao S.A.'s (Cemig GT) Long-Term (LT) Foreign and Local
Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) to 'B-' from 'B+', as well
as Cemig GT's proposed USD1 billion eurobonds due 2024 to
'B(EXP)'/'RR3' from 'BB-(EXP)'/'RR3'. Concurrently, Fitch has
withdrawn the rating of the proposed eurobonds as it has passed
more than 90 days since this rating was assigned without
conclusion of the issuance. Fitch has also downgraded the National
Scale rating to 'BB-(bra)' from 'BBB(bra)' for the three companies
and their senior unsecured debentures. The Outlook Negative was
removed and the ratings were placed on Watch Negative.

The downgrade reflects the deterioration of Cemig group's credit
profile, as Fitch believes that its financial flexibility has
materially worsened and that net adjusted leverage will be in the
range of 5.0-5.5x in the next two years, which is high for the
previous rating. Delays in completing its strategy for asset
disposal along with high interest rates on its debt are having a
negative impact on the group's ability to improve its financial
metrics, including liquidity ratios.

The ratings were placed on Watch Negative to reflect the more
challenging situation Cemig group is in as far as addressing
future debt payments, even considering the likely closing of the
debt renegotiations with its main creditors for BRL4 billion and
the sale of Transmissora Alianca de Energia Eletrica S.A.'s
(Taesa) shares to meet part of the BRL1.7 billion put option
related to Light S.A.'s (Light) shares. An equity increase of
BRL1.3 billion and the resumption of the USD1 billion Eurobond
issuance are important actions that may occur, but not enough to
solve all the liquidity issues.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Negative FCF: Fitch believes that Cemig's consolidated FCF will be
negative in 2017 and 2018, which adds to refinancing risk. This is
due to a reduction in cash flow from operations (CFFO) and more
aggressive annual capex of approximately BRL1.7 billion. In the
LTM ended June 2017, Cemig D's strong recovery of non-manageable
costs, which weighed heavily on the company last year, was crucial
for the consolidated CFFO of BRL3.3 billion and FCF of BRL1.5
billion, but will not likely reoccur. Nevertheless, it helped to
mitigate the reduction in the generation segment's contribution.
Fitch view Cemig's willingness to reduce dividend payments since
2015 to the legal limit of 25% of net income as positive.

Higher Leverage: Fitch expects Cemig's consolidated net adjusted
leverage to be in the range of 5.0-5.5x in the next two years. In
the LTM ended June 2017, Cemig reported net adjusted debt/adjusted
EBITDA of 5.0x, the highest in the last five years and not
compatible with the previous rating. Fitch includes the guarantees
of BRL6.4 billion to non-consolidated companies, mainly to Belo
Monte and Santo Antonio hydro plants, and the exercised put option
in the total adjusted debt. On the other hand, dividends received
from non-consolidated investments in the amount of BRL494 million
are added to the EBITDA.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Cemig's financial risk profile is more aggressive, with weaker
liquidity compared to Eletropaulo Metropolitana de Eletricidade de
Sao Paulo (Local Currency [LC] IDR: BB/Stable, National Scale
Rating [NSR] (AA-bra) and Copel (LC IDR N.A./NSR A-(bra)), which
benefit from better liquidity cushion. When assessing the Latin
American energy peers in the 'B' category, although Cemig has
larger revenue base, its coverage ratios compare unfavorably. AES
Argentina and Genneia's ratings are constrained by Argentina's
Sovereign Ceiling of 'B' and the high regulatory risk environment,
while the Brazilian peers operate with moderate regulatory risk.
Cemig's business credit profile compares better than Eletropaulo's
with a diversified assets portfolio, as it is an integrated energy
company It has also had better operational results than Light (LC
IDR N.A./NSR A-(bra)), although results are expected to improve
with the positive tariff review.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within the base case:

-- Cemig D consumption increase of 0.7% in 2017, and 2.4% during
    2018;
-- Cemig D parcel A expenses fully passed through on tariffs;
-- Average consolidated capex of BRL1.6 billion during 2017-2020;
-- BRL1.1 billion transmission line indemnity starting in 2017
    (eight annual installments);
-- Dividend payout of 25% (minimum legal limit);
-- BRL1.2 billion disbursement on Light's partners put;
-- BRL800 million sale of Taesa's shares;
-- Issuance of USD1 billion in eurobonds.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Positive Rating Action

  -- Positive rating actions are unlikely in the short to medium
     term. The Watch Negative may be removed if the group improves
     its liquidity profile and its financial flexibility to meet
     future financial obligations

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Negative Rating Action

-- Failure to conclude the BRL4 billion debt refinancing with
    its main creditors;

-- Failure to sell Taesa's shares and/or conclude the expected
    equity injection;

-- Failure to issue the USD1 billion eurobond;

-- Continuing deterioration on financial flexibility;

-- Difficulties to conclude asset sales in relevant amounts.

LIQUIDITY

Cemig has an aggressive liquidity profile, which may be partially
mitigated if the debt refinancing, the equity injection, the USD1
billion eurobond issuance and the sale of Taesa's shares are
concluded. Even in this positive scenario, Fitch understands that
Cemig would still need to roll over around BRL1 billion in debt in
2018. At June 2017, Cemig group reported total adjusted debt of
BRL22.1 billion, including off-balance sheet debt of BRL6.4
billion, while cash and equivalents were BRL2 billion. The debt
maturing in the short term was BRL6.3 billion including BRL1.2
billion of the put option (net of approximately BRL400 million in
cash reserved for this purpose).

KEY RECOVERY RATING ASSUMPTIONS

The recovery analysis assumes that Cemig would be considered a
going concern in bankruptcy and that the company would be
reorganized rather than liquidated. Fitch has assumed a 10%
administrative claim.

-- Cemig's going-concern EBITDA of BRL3.1 billion is based on
    the EBITDA expected in 2017. Fitch understands 2017 EBITDA
    reflects the reduced results from the generation segment after
    the return of important concessions and the distribution
    segments still adverse scenario;

-- An EV multiple of 6x is used to calculate a post-
    reorganization valuation and reflects a mid-cycle multiple for
    the sector.

-- Cemig's non-consolidated investments were also considered in
    the analysis. The company has valuable assets in its non-
    consolidated portfolio, which includes 35% of Light's and 32%
    of Taesa's total shares.

Liquidation Value

Fitch excluded the liquidation value (LV) approach because
Brazilian bankruptcy legislation tends to favor the maintenance of
the business in order to preserve direct and indirect job
positions. Moreover, in extreme cases where LV was necessary, the
recovery of the assets has been proved very difficult for lenders.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has downgraded the following ratings:

Cemig
-- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR downgraded to 'B-' from 'B+';
-- Long-Term Local Currency IDR downgraded to 'B-' from 'B+';
-- Long-Term National scale rating downgraded to 'BB-(bra)'
    from 'BBB(bra)'.

Cemig D
-- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR downgraded to 'B-' from 'B+';
-- Long-Term Local Currency IDR downgraded to 'B-' from 'B+';
-- Long-Term National scale rating downgraded to 'BB-(bra)' from
    'BBB(bra)';
-- BRL400 million senior unsecured debentures due 2017 downgraded
    to 'BB-(bra)' from 'BBB(bra)';
-- BRL1.6 billion senior unsecured debentures due 2018 downgraded
    to 'BB-(bra)' from 'BBB(bra)'.

Cemig GT
-- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR downgraded to 'B-' from 'B+';
-- Long-Term Local Currency IDR downgraded to 'B-' from 'B+';
-- Long-Term National scale rating downgraded to 'BB-(bra)' from
    'BBB(bra)';
-- BRL1.4 billion senior unsecured debentures, with two
    outstanding series due 2019 and 2022, downgraded to 'BB-(bra)'
    from 'BBB(bra)';
-- USD1 billion proposed eurobonds due 2024 guaranteed by Cemig
    downgraded to 'B(EXP)'/'RR3' from 'BB-(EXP)'/'RR3' and
    subsequently withdrawn.

All ratings were placed on Watch Negative.


CORPORACION ELECTRICA: Fitch Cuts Long-Term FC IDR to 'C'
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings issued a correction to a press release on
Corporacion Electrica National S.A. published on Nov. 7, 2017. It
reflects additional information in the Dodd-Frank Rating
Information Disclosure Form.

The revised release is as follows:

Fitch Ratings has downgraded Corporacion Electrica Nacional S.A.'s
(CORPOELEC) Long-Term (LT) Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating
(IDR) to 'C' from 'CC', and affirmed its LT Local Currency IDR at
'CC'. The rating action also affects the company's senior
unsecured notes' rating, which has been downgraded to 'C'/'RR4'
from 'CC'/'RR4'. Additionally, Fitch has affirmed CORPOELEC's LT
National rating at 'CCC(ven)' and the Short-Term National Scale
rating at 'C(ven)''.

CORPOELEC's downgrade is linked to Fitch's recent downgrade of
Venezuela's LT Foreign Currency IDR to 'C', following the
announcement by the authorities on November 3 that they intend to
pursue a renegotiation of the country's sovereign external debt
obligations. Coupled with the previously missed payments on
outstanding sovereign bonds that are currently within their 30-day
grace periods, a default event appears highly probable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Ratings Linked to Sovereign: CORPOELEC's ratings are linked to
that of the Republic of Venezuela, reflecting the sovereign's
ownership of the issuer, and CORPOELEC's dependence on current
public transfers (39% of total revenues as of December 2016) to
carry out its day-to-day operations, other public transfers to
finance its investment needs, and transfers to third parties on
its behalf to meet its financial obligations.

Monopolistic Position: CORPOELEC is a vertically integrated public
utility responsible for the operation of the country's electricity
sector. The company was created in 2007 when the government
nationalized the electricity sector. The entity absorbed all of
the country's generation assets along with transmission,
distribution and electric power retail infrastructure during 2010-
2011. CORPOELEC had an installed capacity of 29,180MW and a client
base of 6.4 million users as of December 2016 (28,998 MW in fiscal
year [FY] 2015).

Results Affected by Tariff Lag: The government implemented tariff
adjustments during 2013-2015, resulting in a 29.8% increase in
2015 over the prior year. No adjustments were made to the tariff
structure in 2016, while the company implemented a tariff increase
of 142.5% in February 2017. The issuer continued to post a large
operational deficit during FY 2016, despite the price adjustments,
demonstrating that current prices for electricity do not allow for
cost recovery and prolong dependence on the government's current
and capital transfers for its day-to-day operations.

Fitch expects CORPOELEC's dependence on public funding to remain
unchanged, preserving the linkage to the sovereign. CORPOELEC's
EBIT (presented by management in its interim figures) was negative
VEB166 billion measured at constant prices, a figure that includes
current public transfers accounted for as revenues of VEB147
billion, equivalent to 39% of total revenues in FY 2016.

Sovereign Funds Capex: CORPOELEC used USD1 billion in capex during
2016, a substantially lower investment outlay than in 2014-2015
(USD2.6 billion in 2015 and USD4.1billion in 2014). The low level
of additional capex and the progress of ongoing capex execution
funded with public transfers allowed CORPOELEC to incorporate
870MW of new capacity and re-establish 3,340 MW to the national
electric system in 2016.

Poor Quality of Information: The company is expected to make
available a first draft of the auditor notes of its 2016
consolidated financial statements sometime during the second half
of 2017. Previously, the auditor (Deloitte) could not issue an
opinion on the reasonability of 2015 statements, given the
weaknesses observed in the administrative control environment and
lack of accounting support to establish an opinion on key
components of the company's financial statements. According to
management, 2016 statements will carry a similarly qualified
opinion, with a marginal improvement at best over 2015 statements
in terms of the number of issues raised.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

CORPOELEC's LT Foreign- and Local-Currency IDRs are not well
positioned relative to peers as a result of insufficient cost
recovery which is explained by a continuing tariff lag that
impedes a sustainable CFFO performance, especially when compared
with peers such as Comision Federal de Electricidad (CFE) and
Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad ICE.

CORPOELEC depends on public fund transfers from its parent to
carry out its day-to-day operations, meet its financial
obligations and finance its capital expenditure. Specifically, the
company's 2018 bond financial obligations are paid by the central
government, through the Ministry of Finance's Public Credit
Office, which transfers the funds directly to the paying agent
(Citi Bank).

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions include:

- Maintenance of the tariff lag further consolidates the
   sovereign linkage, as Fitch expects the company's dependence
   on current and capital transfers to continue.

- The company continues to depend on transfers from the central
   government to meet its financial obligations.

CORPOELEC's 'C' rating suggests that default is imminent. If a
default or restructuring occurs, Fitch anticipates average
recovery for CORPOELEC's bondholders of 31%-50%, likely closer to
the lower end of the range. Fitch's recovery analysis yields a
Recovery Rating commensurate with an average recovery of 50%, but
the willingness of Venezuela's government to extend concessions to
investors will likely move actual recovery closer to the lower end
of the 31%-50% range.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Positive Rating Action

- Positive rating action is unlikely at this time. However, an
   upgrade of the sovereign would lead to an upgrade of
   CORPOELEC'S ratings.

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Negative Rating Action

- A downgrade of the sovereign, the announcement of a debt
   restructuring, and/or government failure to honor its financial
   obligations.

LIQUIDITY

Liquidity is determined by timely access to government transfers
that allow CORPOELEC to meet operating costs, finance its capex
and meet its financial obligations. The company's liquidity is
expected to be pressured over the next 12 months as a result of
the sizable foreign-currency denominated payments of USD650
million due April 2018.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Corporacion Electrica Nacional S.A.

-- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';

-- Long-Term Local Currency IDR affirmed at 'CC';

-- EDC's USD650 million senior unsecured bond issuance due 2018
    downgraded to 'C/RR4' from 'CC/RR4';

-- National Long-Term Rating affirmed at 'CCC(ven)';

-- National Short-Term Rating affirmed at 'C(ven)' .


MAGNESITA REFRATARIOS: Moody's Withdraws B2 Corp. Family Rating
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn Magnesita Refratarios S.A.
B2 corporate family rating (CFR) and the B2 ratings of the senior
unsecured notes due 2020, issued by Rearden G Holdings EINS GmbH
and guaranteed by Magnesita. The outlook changed to rating
withdrawn from negative.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has decided to withdraw the ratings because it believes it
has insufficient or otherwise inadequate information to support
the maintenance of the ratings. Please refer to the Moody's
Investors Service's Policy for Withdrawal of Credit Ratings,
available on its website, www.moodys.com.

Magnesita Refratarios S.A. is a vertically integrated low-cost
producer of refractories used in the steel, cement and glass
manufacturing process, among others. Magnesita is the largest
manufacturer of refractories in Latin America and the third
largest worldwide by sales volume. Besides Brazil, Magnesita has
operations in South America, USA, Europe and Asia. Magnesita
reported consolidated net revenues of BRL 3.3 billion in the last
twelve months ended June 30, 2017.


OI SA: Brazil Court Delays Creditors Meeting Again
--------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that the court overseeing the debt restructuring
of Brazilian telecoms company Oi SA postponed a creditors meeting
scheduled for Nov. 10 until Dec. 7, amid continued disagreements
between shareholders and bondholders.

The meeting, which has now been delayed several times, may carry
over to Dec. 8, the court said, and could resume again on Feb. 1
and the following day if needed, according to Reuters.

Public banks including Banco do Brasil SA, which are Oi creditors,
asked the court to delay the meeting, the report notes.

The repeated delays highlight the distance between competing
proposals put forward by banks, regulators, bondholders,
shareholders and potential investors in Latin America's largest-
ever bankruptcy protection process, the report relays.

                         About Oi SA

Headquartered in Rio de Janeiro, and operating almost exclusively
within Brazil, the Oi Group provides services like fixed-line data
transmission and network usage for phones, internet, and cable,
Wi-Fi hot-spots in public areas, and mobile phone and data
services, and employs approximately 142,000 direct and indirect
employees.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Nov. 9, 2017, Gram Slattery and Leonardo Goy at Reuters report
that the head of Brazil's telecommunications watchdog, Anatel,
demanded that debt-laden carrier Oi SA submit its latest
restructuring proposal to the regulator before officially filing
it with a bankruptcy court.

Anatel head Juarez Quadros told reporters in Brasilia that the
regulator, an Oi creditor due to billions of dollars in unpaid
regulatory fines, would wait for the country's solicitor-general
to give an opinion on the company's proposal before deciding
whether or not to vote for it, according to Reuters.

On June 20, 2016, pursuant to Brazilian Law No. 11.101/05 (the
'Brazilian Bankruptcy Law'), Oi S.A. and certain of its
subsidiaries filed for recuperao judicial (judicial
reorganization) in Brazil.

On June 21, 2016, OI SA and its affiliates Telemar Norte Leste
S.A. and Oi Brasil Holdings Cooperatief U.A. commenced Chapter 15
proceedings (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Lead Case No. 16-11791).  Ojas N.
Shah, as foreign representative, signed the petitions.

Coop and PTIF are also subject to proceedings in the Netherlands.

The Chapter 15 cases are assigned to Judge Sean H. Lane.

In the Chapter 15 cases, the Debtors are represented by John K.
Cunningham, Esq., and Mark P. Franke, Esq., at White & Case LLP,
in New York; and Jason N. Zakia, Esq., Richard S. Kebrdle, Esq.,
and Laura L. Femino, Esq., at White & Case LLP, in Miami, Florida.

On July 22, 2016, the New York Court recognized the Brazilian
Proceedings as foreign main proceedings with respect to the
Chapter 15 Debtors, and granted certain additional related relief.


OI SA: Regulator Rejects Firm's Request for Deadline Extension
--------------------------------------------------------------
Leonardo Goy at Reuters report that Brazilian telecommunications
regulator Anatel rejected a request by telecoms company Oi SA for
an extension of the regulator's deadline to explain Oi's latest
restructuring proposal.

Anatel demanded that Oi explain to the regulator if its latest
debt restructuring proposal posed 'operational risks' to the
company, according to Reuters.  Oi asked for a seven-day extension
to respond to Anatel's inquiries, the report notes.

Following the regulator's rejection of the extension request, Oi
SA would have to present a response by Thursday, Nov. 9.

Creditors are set to vote on a restructuring plan by the company
to take Oi out of bankruptcy protection, the report relays.  It is
unclear if that meeting will take place as public banks with debt
in Oi, such as Banco do Brasil SA and Caixa Economica Federal,
asked for it to be delayed, a source told Reuters.

                            About Oi SA

Headquartered in Rio de Janeiro, and operating almost exclusively
within Brazil, the Oi Group provides services like fixed-line data
transmission and network usage for phones, internet, and cable,
Wi-Fi hot-spots in public areas, and mobile phone and data
services, and employs approximately 142,000 direct and indirect
employees.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Nov. 9, 2017, Gram Slattery and Leonardo Goy at Reuters report
that the head of Brazil's telecommunications watchdog, Anatel,
demanded that debt-laden carrier Oi SA submit its latest
restructuring proposal to the regulator before officially filing
it with a bankruptcy court.

Anatel head Juarez Quadros told reporters in Brasilia that the
regulator, an Oi creditor due to billions of dollars in unpaid
regulatory fines, would wait for the country's solicitor-general
to give an opinion on the company's proposal before deciding
whether or not to vote for it, according to Reuters.

On June 20, 2016, pursuant to Brazilian Law No. 11.101/05 (the
'Brazilian Bankruptcy Law'), Oi S.A. and certain of its
subsidiaries filed for recuperao judicial (judicial
reorganization) in Brazil.

On June 21, 2016, OI SA and its affiliates Telemar Norte Leste
S.A. and Oi Brasil Holdings Cooperatief U.A. commenced Chapter 15
proceedings (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Lead Case No. 16-11791).  Ojas N.
Shah, as foreign representative, signed the petitions.

Coop and PTIF are also subject to proceedings in the Netherlands.

The Chapter 15 cases are assigned to Judge Sean H. Lane.

In the Chapter 15 cases, the Debtors are represented by John K.
Cunningham, Esq., and Mark P. Franke, Esq., at White & Case LLP,
in New York; and Jason N. Zakia, Esq., Richard S. Kebrdle, Esq.,
and Laura L. Femino, Esq., at White & Case LLP, in Miami, Florida.

On July 22, 2016, the New York Court recognized the Brazilian
Proceedings as foreign main proceedings with respect to the
Chapter 15 Debtors, and granted certain additional related relief.


OI SA: Bondholder Group Seeks Court Intervention in Firm's Board
----------------------------------------------------------------
Reuters, citing a motion filed in court, reports that the law firm
representing a bondholder group in debt-laden Brazilian telecoms
company Oi SA has asked a court to nullify decisions made by the
company's board.

The motion by law firms including Pinheiro Neto Advogados, which
represents the so-called Ad Hoc Group of Oi Bondholders, asked the
court in Rio de Janeiro to suspend appointments the board made of
two members of Oi's management.

The filing also asks the court to suspend the voting rights of
board members associated with major shareholders Pharol SGPS SA
and Nelson Tanure's Societe Mundiale on any matters relating to
the company's current debt restructuring. In the filing, the
bondholders argued those groups have obstructed all attempts by
the company to talk to creditors to the detriment of Oi, among
other issues.

A spokesman for Tanure responded that the motion lacks legal
founding. Oi and Pharol did not immediately respond to requests
for comment.

Oi, Brazil's fourth largest telecoms company, filed for Latin
America's largest ever bankruptcy proceeding last year, sagging
under 65.4 billion reais ($20.1 billion) of debt. The
restructuring process has been messy, with fighting between and
among shareholders, bondholders and the government.

Oi's board, which Tanure and Pharol control, appointed two new
members to the company's management, allowing a restructuring plan
approved by the board to be finalized. However, Brazilian telecoms
regulator Anatel demanded that plan be presented to the regulator
before it is filed with a bankruptcy court.

While a final creditor vote on the company's restructuring plan is
scheduled for Nov. 10, Brazilian public banks with debt in Oi
requested that it be delayed, a government source told Reuters.
Even if the meeting is officially convened, creditors may decide
to delay a vote to a later date.

In the bondholders' filing, creditors also requested that the Oi
board's most recent restructuring plan only be signed after the
bankruptcy judge on the case reviews and approves it. ($1 = 3.25
reais) (Reporting by Gram Slattery; editing by Grant McCool)

                           About Oi SA

Headquartered in Rio de Janeiro, and operating almost exclusively
within Brazil, the Oi Group provides services like fixed-line data
transmission and network usage for phones, internet, and cable,
Wi-Fi hot-spots in public areas, and mobile phone and data
services, and employs approximately 142,000 direct and indirect
employees.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Nov. 9, 2017, Gram Slattery and Leonardo Goy at Reuters report
that the head of Brazil's telecommunications watchdog, Anatel,
demanded that debt-laden carrier Oi SA submit its latest
restructuring proposal to the regulator before officially filing
it with a bankruptcy court.

Anatel head Juarez Quadros told reporters in Brasilia that the
regulator, an Oi creditor due to billions of dollars in unpaid
regulatory fines, would wait for the country's solicitor-general
to give an opinion on the company's proposal before deciding
whether or not to vote for it, according to Reuters.

On June 20, 2016, pursuant to Brazilian Law No. 11.101/05 (the
'Brazilian Bankruptcy Law'), Oi S.A. and certain of its
subsidiaries filed for recuperao judicial (judicial
reorganization) in Brazil.

On June 21, 2016, OI SA and its affiliates Telemar Norte Leste
S.A. and Oi Brasil Holdings Cooperatief U.A. commenced Chapter 15
proceedings (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Lead Case No. 16-11791).  Ojas N.
Shah, as foreign representative, signed the petitions.

Coop and PTIF are also subject to proceedings in the Netherlands.

The Chapter 15 cases are assigned to Judge Sean H. Lane.

In the Chapter 15 cases, the Debtors are represented by John K.
Cunningham, Esq., and Mark P. Franke, Esq., at White & Case LLP,
in New York; and Jason N. Zakia, Esq., Richard S. Kebrdle, Esq.,
and Laura L. Femino, Esq., at White & Case LLP, in Miami, Florida.

On July 22, 2016, the New York Court recognized the Brazilian
Proceedings as foreign main proceedings with respect to the
Chapter 15 Debtors, and granted certain additional related relief.



=======
C U B A
=======


CUBA: US Announces New Restrictions
-----------------------------------
RJR News reports that the U.S. government announced new
restrictions against Cuba, tightening sanctions as part of
President Donald Trump's pledge to roll back his Democratic
predecessor's move toward warmer ties with Havana.

The U.S. Treasury Department said in a statement that the changes,
which take effect, are aimed at preventing U.S. trade and
travelers from benefiting its military, intelligences and security
arms of the Communist-ruled country, according to RJR News.

They will expand the list of Cuban government officials barred
from transactions as well as set policy to deny exports to
prohibited Cuban entities, the report notes.


CUBA: Moody's Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms Caa2 Ratings
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed Government of Cuba's Caa2
foreign currency issuer rating, assigned a Caa2 local currency
issuer rating, and changed the rating outlook to stable from
positive.

The key drivers of the change of outlook are:

1) The rapprochement process with the United States has stalled
resulting in a reversal of measures to ease the economic embargo,
and in recent months US-Cuba relations have deteriorated

2) Moody's expectations of continued reform momentum and favorable
macroeconomic performance have not materialized due to a series of
climate shocks, strained relations with the US and the upcoming
domestic political transition

Cuba's Caa2 sovereign rating reflects credit weaknesses that
include limited access to external financing, structural
inefficiencies, political transition risk, and importantly,
limited data transparency. The rating also incorporates the
economic impact of the growing tourism sector, nickel-related
mining activities, and the potential for future economic
diversification.

Cuba's long-term local-currency country risk ceilings and the
foreign currency bond ceiling remain unchanged at Caa2. The
foreign-currency bank deposit ceilings is also unchanged at Caa3.
The short-term foreign currency bond and deposit ceilings remain
at NP (Not Prime).

RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR THE OUTLOOK CHANGE TO STABLE

The positive outlook on Cuba's Caa2 rating was based on increased
prospects for rapprochment with the US as well as for domestic
economic reforms. The principal drivers of Moody's decision to
change the outlook to stable from positive are the stalled process
of rapprochement with the US, and the dimmer prospects for further
economic reform on the island.

Restrictions on travel to Cuba, which the previous US
administration had loosened, have been tightened. Regulations
effective 9 November rescind the travel authorization for
individual 'people-to-people' exchanges, a broad category
increasingly used by Americans under the previous administration
to conduct legally authorized travel to the island without the
need to participate in organized group exchanges. The tightened
controls also include a provision applicable to persons that are
otherwise authorized to engage in Cuban travel or other Cuba-
related activity, prohibiting them from engaging in most direct
financial transactions with 180 entities linked to the Cuban
military, which controls a broad swath of the tourist economy.

While the tightened travel authorizations only reinforce the
longstanding statutory tourism ban on Cuba, these changes and new
sanctions targeting the Cuban military highlight a reversal of the
previous rapprochement efforts undertaken by Cuba and the previous
US administration. Although a number of relevant measures taken by
the previous US administration remain in place, Moody's believes
that the changes to be adopted on 9 November will curtail the flow
of American visitors to Cuba and diminish impetus for investment
into the country, primarily into tourism projects, but also into
other sectors that were expecting a further opening up of the
Cuban economy.

More recently, diplomatic relations between the US and Cuba have
become strained by alleged sonic attacks on US embassy and
government personnel in Havana, resulting in the US recalling the
majority of the staff from its embassy in Cuba and expelling Cuban
diplomats from Washington. These developments will likely
constrain further economic or diplomatic openness between the two
nations.

Despite recent growth in the tourism sector, Cuba's economic
outlook remains challenging following climate and commodity price
shocks, and negative spillovers from the economic crisis in
Venezuela. The country has been hit by two major hurricanes since
late-2016. This caused widespread destruction and affected
economic activity. Agriculture, food production, construction and
healthcare likely posted a significant contraction owing to the
various shocks faced by the economy. Key export prices for nickel
have recovered but remain short of the highs achieved in 2008 and
2011, and sugar prices remain near 2015 lows.

Moody's estimates that the Cuban economy contracted 0.9% in 2016
despite a 13.3% increase in visitor arrivals. Moody's forecasts
that the economy will contract once again in 2017 by 0.5% before
returning to moderate growth of 1.1% in 2018. Nevertheless,
prospects for recovery remain fragile and the upcoming political
transition will limit the pace of reforms that could support
economic recovery.

President Raul Castro will step down at the end of his second five
year term in February 2018. This will be the first time since 1959
that a member of the Castro family will not rule Cuba, potentially
posing risks to political stability and increasing uncertainty
over economic policy and prospects. Moody's believes that risks to
economic liberalization are substantial given the state's wavering
commitment to private enterprise and Cuba's lack of experience
with implementation of market policies.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATING UP/DOWN

There could be upward pressure on Cuba's rating if there is a
further easing of US economic sanctions or domestic reforms that
have a material impact on Cuba's economic prospects. More clarity
over the political transition at the end of President Raul
Castro's current term would ease concerns over political and
social instability. Enhanced data timeliness and transparency
would also be credit positive.

Conversely, evidence of increased stress on Cuba's external
finances along with deteriorating economic prospects due to
external shocks or reform reversal would result in downward
pressure on Cuba's rating.

GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): $7,700 (2016 Actual) (also known
as Per Capita Income)

Real GDP growth (% change): -0.9% (2016 Actual) (also known as GDP
Growth)

Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 3.1% (2016 Actual)

Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -6.8% (2016 Actual) (also known
as Fiscal Balance)

Current Account Balance/GDP: 0.7% (2016 Actual) (also known as
External Balance)

External debt/GDP: 23.4% (2016 Actual)

Level of economic development: Low level of economic resilience

Default history: No default events (on bonds or loans) have been
recorded since 1983.

Note: Numbers have been updated to 2016 (from 2014), which is what
was used for committee purposes.

On November 6, 2017, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of the Cuba, Government of. The main points raised during
the discussion were: The issuer's economic fundamentals, including
its economic strength, have materially decreased. The issuer's
institutional strength/ framework, have not materially changed.
The issuer's governance and/or management, have not materially
changed.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Sovereign Bond
Ratings published in December 2016.



===========
M E X I C O
===========


PLAYA RESORTS: Moody's Hikes CFR to B2; Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded Playa Resorts Holding B.V.
(Playa) corporate family rating (CFR) to B2 from B3. At the same
time, Moody's affirmed Playa's senior secured ratings at B2 and
its senior unsecured ratings at Caa1. Additionally, Moody's also
affirmed B2 rating to Playa's proposed $ 380 million add-on to its
first lien senior secured term loan due 2024. The outlook of all
the ratings is stable.

The following rating was upgraded:

Issuer: Playa Resorts Holding B.V.

LT Corporate Family Rating upgraded to B2 from B3

The following ratings were affirmed:

$375 million GLOBAL NOTES due 2020 at Caa1

$50 million GLOBAL NOTES due 2020 add-on at Caa1

$100 million SR SEC REVOLVING CREDIT FACILITY due 2022 at B2

$530 million (plus the $380 million add-on) SR SEC TERM LOAN due
2024 at B2

The outlook is stable

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrade reflects a sustained improvement in Playa's credit
profile following the conclusion of its reconversion plan in the
end of 2015. As a result, execution risk has significantly reduced
and Playa's cash generation has strengthen' said Sandra Beltran, a
Moody's AVP-Analyst. Playa plans to accelerate its growth path
over the next few years, which will involve heavy capital
investments towards 2019. Still, given its strong cash position
and solid cash generation from existing assets, Moody's expects
Playa to be able to maintain an adequate credit profile during
that period.

Playa's B2 corporate family rating continues to reflect the
company's small operating scale relative to global industry peers
and its low geographic and segment diversification, which makes it
vulnerable to economic cycles. Also constraining the ratings are
the company's high leverage and operation in a highly cyclical
industry with intense competition. Execution still pose a risk to
Playa, given its current growth plan.

Conversely, Playa's ratings consider its improved credit profile
following a two-year reconversion plan. The ratings also
incorporate the good quality of the properties in Playa's
portfolio, its experienced senior management team, and Hyatt
Hotels Corporation's (Baa2 stable) participation as a shareholder.
The access to Hyatt's widely recognized brand name, distribution
channels, and loyalty program are a positive for Playa's
positioning strategy and growth, given Hyatt's track record in the
lodging industry. As well, the ratings consider Playa's strong
liquidity that supports its expansion without threatening its plan
to reduce leverage.

Playa started operations in 2013, in the midst of a strong
reconversion plan including the closing of important assets, such
as the Hyatt Ziva Cancun and Hyatt Ziva and Zilara Rose Hall in
Jamaica. During this period, execution risk remained high and cash
generation was weak. However, at the end of 2015, Playa concluded
its reconversion plan. Therefore, 2016 was the first year Playa
operated at full capacity, with positive implications for its
credit profile.

Since then, Playa has taken additional measures to support growth
and improve its capital structure, being the most relevant a
business combination closed in March 2017. Through the
transaction, Playa merged with Pace Holdings, a special-purpose
acquisition company sponsored by an affiliate of TPG. The combined
entity is publicly listed, trading on NASDAQ under the ticker
'PLYA.'

Playa has good liquidity. The transaction with Pace added $500
million to Playa's balance sheet, out of which $346 million were
used to redeem preferred shares and $100 million were kept in
cash. Also during that time, Playa signed a new senior secured
term loan maturing 2024, amounting to $530 million. Proceeds were
used to prepay $115 million of its 8% global notes and $363
million senior secured term loan maturing in 2019.

The proposed $380 million add-on to its term loan will repay the
existing $360 million global notes due 2020. Once the transaction
is completed, virtually all of Playa's debt will be represented by
the first lien senior secured term loan due 2024, amounting $909
million.

Although refinancing risk will remain low in the upcoming years, a
strong investment program will continue to pressure Playa's cash
generation towards 2019. For the remainder of 2017, Playa will
need to spend some $ 40 million related with the reconversion of
two four star hotels in Quintana Roo into the Panama Jack brand.
But the most relevant project is the development of a Hyatt
complex in the Dominican Republic (Cap Cana) expected to open
until 2019. Investments related with the Cap Cana Hyatt will be
around $109 million in 2017, $117 million in 2018 and $20 million
in 2019. Although sizeable, Moody's expects Playa to be able to
fund this expansion capex and other cash needs, with internal cash
generation and cash on hand of $137 million. During this
timeframe, cash from operation should range $100 million annually.

Structural Considerations

The rating of Playa's secured term loan and revolving credit
facility are in line with the company's B2 corporate family rating
(CFR), reflecting Moody's expectation that going forward, all of
Playa's debt will be first lien senior secured. Therefore, despite
the collateral package, expected loss of rated debt will be in
line with expected loss considered within the CFR. Playa's senior
unsecured notes continue to be rated Caa1, two notches below the
CFR, reflecting high expected loss relative to the secured debt.

The stable rating outlook reflects Moody's expectation that, now
that the company has concluded its brand conversion and
repositioning plan, it will be able to achieve its projected
growth while improving its operating and credit metrics. The
outlook also considers that ongoing expansion plan does not risk
improvements in credit profile due to a strong liquidity profile.

Playa's ratings could be upgraded should debt/EBITDA be maintained
below 4.5x while maintaining EBITA/interest expense above 2.5x and
EBITA margins above 15%.

The ratings could be downgraded if the company's projected growth
plan is hampered, for example, by a weak macroeconomic
environment, such that its profitability or credit metrics
deteriorate with interest expense approach 1.25x or leverage (adj.
debt/ EBITDA) remaining above 5.5 times without room for
improvement.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Business and
Consumer Service Industry published in October 2016.

Playa Hotels & Resorts N.V. (Playa) is a leading owner, operator
and developer of all-inclusive resorts in prime beachfront
locations in popular vacation destinations in Mexico and the
Caribbean. Playa owns a portfolio consisting of 13 resorts (6,130-
rooms) located in Mexico, the Dominican Republic and Jamaica.
Playa owns and manages Hyatt Zilara and Hyatt Ziva Cancun, Hyatt
Zilara and Hyatt Ziva Rose Hall Jamaica, Hyatt Ziva Puerto
Vallarta and Hyatt Ziva Los Cabos. The company also owns and
operates three resorts under Playa's brands, as well as five
resorts in Mexico and the Dominican Republic that are managed by a
third party. In March 2017, Playa closed a merger of its
predecessor, Playa Hotels & Resorts B.V. and Pace Holdings Corp.,
an entity that was formed as a special purpose acquisition
company. After the transaction, Playa became a publicly listed
entity in the NASDAQ under the ticker PLYA. Public float is 45.4%,
Farallon Capital Management holds 27.7%, Hyatt 11% and other
Playa's legacy investors 7.8%. The balance 8.1% is in hand of TPG.



======================
P U E R T O    R I C O
======================


LIBERTY CABLEVISION: Fitch Cuts Long-Term IDR to 'CCC'
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Liberty Cablevision of Puerto Rico
LLC (LCPR) to 'CCC' from 'B+' and removed the rating from Negative
Watch. The downgrade reflects Fitch's expectation of significant
liquidity challenges for the company in the aftermath of Hurricane
Maria. LCPR's operational recovery has been and is likely to
remain slow, mainly hindered by the slow restoration of
electricity in Puerto Rico and by widespread destruction to
residential properties. Lower service affordability, higher
unemployment rates and a decline in the island's population are
additional challenges faced by the company in the near term.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Weak Liquidity:

Fitch expects LCPR to face a significant liquidity problem in
coming quarters as cash flow generation will be limited, absent
financial support from its shareholders, Liberty Global plc (LG)
(60%) and Searchlight Capital Partners (40%). LCPR held a cash
balance of USD46 million as of Sept. 30, 2017 and the company drew
down USD40 million from its bank facility, which leaves no
additional amounts available to be borrowed under the facility.
LCPR is expected to burn cash as operational difficulties are
unlikely to show material improvement in coming months. The
Liberty Group disclosed during its 3Q17 earning release an
expectation of a decline in quarterly revenues of between USD80
million and USD100 million and a drop in operating cash flow of
between USD60 million and USD80 million for LCPR in 4Q17. This
estimated negative impact compares to LCPR's average quarterly
revenue and EBITDA of USD106 million and USD52 million,
respectively, during the last four quarters until 2Q17.

Shareholder Support Necessary:

Based on Liberty group's insurance program, the company is
expected to submit two separate claims for Hurricane Maria and
Hurricane Irma, through which the group could potentially receive
up to USD120 million of net proceeds in 2018. The timing and the
actual proceeds amount remain uncertain at the current juncture.
As a result, shareholders' support, either by equity injection or
a subordinated shareholder loan, will be necessary for LCPR to
cope with its tight liquidity and a potential covenant breach
going forward. While operating entities in LiLAC Group (LiLAC),
which represents LG's Latin American and Caribbean operations, are
separately capitalized and managed independently, LG could
potentially utilize the liquidity buffer of other LiLAC entities,
such as Cable & Wireless Communications Limited (CWC, BB-
/Negative) and VTR Finance B.V. (VTR, BB-/Stable), which amounted
to USD1.5 billion with cash balance and revolving credit
facilities as of Sept. 30, 2017.

Covenant Breach Expected:

Fitch expects LCPR to breach its maintenance covenant leverage
ratios in 4Q17 under the bank facility credit agreement due to
material EBITDA erosion. Challenging operating conditions are
likely to continue in 2018, which could result in the company's
consecutive breaches of the maintenance covenant, absent any
material support from shareholders. LCPR's maintenance covenant
for the first lien net leverage ratio and total net leverage
ratios are 4.5x and 5.5x, respectively, which Fitch believes to be
challenging for the company to meet. Under the credit agreement,
LCPR can cure the financial covenants with either equity
contributions or loans up to two cures during any period of four
consecutive quarters. The company is also allowed to adjust for
certain items, such as one-off hurricanes damages, and insurance
proceeds in its covenant leverage calculations. LCPR's inability
to cure the covenant breach, or obtain relief from the facility
loan creditors will result in default.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

LCPR's 'CCC' rating reflects the catastrophic operating conditions
in Puerto Rico due to Hurricane Maria, which has resulted in a
lack of electricity for the majority of the company's customers
and a very challenging operating environment. Compared to most
companies at this rating level, LCPR has a very strong business
position under normal operating conditions and would be rated in
the 'B' category. A rating at the 'B' level would reflect its
relatively small scale of operations, lack of diversified service
offerings, and high leverage.

No Parent/Subsidiary Linkage is applicable, and the rating is
based on a stand-alone credit profile. No Country Ceiling
constraint was in effect for these ratings

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within its rating case for the issuer
include:

-- Continued negative FCF generation in coming quarters with
    slow recovery of infrastructure in Puerto Rico.

-- The recovery analysis assumes that Liberty Cablevision of
    Puerto Rico would be considered a going-concern in bankruptcy
    and that the company would be reorganized rather than
    liquidated. Fitch has assumed a 10% administrative claim.

-- The going-concern EBITDA estimate reflects Fitch's view of a
    sustainable, post-reorganization EBITDA level upon which Fitch
    bases the valuation of the company.

-- Fitch assumes that any potential distress that provoked LCPR's
    default could occur due to continued slow recovery in
    electricity system, the company's inability to materially
    increase the pace of service restoration for its subscribers,
    resulting in continued erosion of its cash balance. The post-
    reorganization EBITDA assumption is USD107 million, which
    represents close to 50% of discount to the LTM EBITDA as of
    June 30, 2017, reflecting a lower level of revenue generating
    units and lower revenue per user due to deteriorated service
    affordability under the challenging environment. An EV
    multiple of 5.5x was used to calculate a post-reorganization
    valuation in line with the regional average used for the
    telecom sector in Latin America.

-- Fitch calculates the recovery prospects for the 1st lien
    senior secured term loan, including USD40 million of revolving
    facility, in the 51%-70% range based on a waterfall approach.
    This level of recovery results in the 1st lien senior secured
    term loan being rated a one-notch above its IDR of 'CCC+/RR3'.
    Fitch does not expect there to be any residual value to cover
    the 2nd lien senior secured term loan. This level of recovery
    results in the 2nd lien senior secured term loan being rated
    two notches below the IDR at 'CC/RR6'.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Positive Rating Action

-- Fitch expects any positive rating action in the short term to
    be limited given the ongoing challenging operating conditions
    in Puerto Rico. Any signs of material operational recovery and
    shareholders' financial support to enable a sustainable
    capital structure would be positive for the ratings.

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Negative Rating Action

-- Ratings would be downgraded in case of further erosion in its
    liquidity profile in the absence of any support from
    shareholders.

LIQUIDITY

Tight Liquidity: LCPR liquidity is weak. As of Sept. 30, 2017 the
company's cash balance was US46 million, and the company drew out
additional USD40 million from its facility in October 2017, which
leaves no additional borrowing capacity. The company made its
interest payment for the fourth quarter of 2017 and its next
interest payment of approximately US17 million will be due in
January of 2018.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has downgraded and removed from Rating Watch Negative the
following ratings:

Liberty Cablevision of Puerto Rico

-- Long-term Issuer Default Rating to 'CCC' from 'B+';

-- 1st lien senior secured loan and revolving credit facility to
    CCC+/RR3 from 'BB-(RR3)';

-- 2nd lien senior secured loan to 'CC'/RR6 from 'B-(RR6)'.



=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================


PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: Fitch Lowers LT For. Currency IDR to C
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Petroleos de Venezuela S.A.'s (PDVSA)
Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'C' from
'CC' and affirmed the company's Local Currency IDR at 'CC' and
National scale at 'CCC(ven)'. The rating action affects all of
PDVSA's international senior unsecured and secured debt issuances,
which have been downgraded to 'C'/'RR4' from 'CC'/'RR4'. A full
list of rating actions follows at the end of this rating action
commentary.

The rating downgrades reflect the recent announcement by both the
company and the government that they intend to pursue a
renegotiation of the company's sovereign external debt
obligations. The downgrades also reflect the previously missed
payments on international bonds that are currently within their
30-day grace periods as well as the recent downgrade of
Venezuela's sovereign rating to 'C' from 'CC'. In Fitch's view,
this makes a default event highly probable.

PDVSA's ratings reflect the company's weakening liquidity position
as a result of transfers to the central government, material
principal and interest payments due in 2017, which were not able
to be refinanced and low hydrocarbon price environment. PDVSA's
credit quality continues to reflect its close linkage to the
government of Venezuela as a state-owned entity, combined with
absolute government control over business strategies and internal
resources. This underscores the close link between the company's
credit profile and that of the sovereign. The large funds
transfers to the central government have significantly affected
PDVSA's cash flow generation.

PDVSA's international long-term ratings of 'C' are in line with
Fitch's sovereign ratings for Venezuela of 'C'. Fitch expects that
it will be challenging for the Venezuelan government to extend
financial aid to PDVSA as both entities are simultaneously facing
financial difficulties and have jointly announced their intention
to restructure their foreign financial obligations. The company
has recently been facing issues making debt payments on time after
delaying two interest payments due on Oct. 12 2017, which
heightened uncertainty as to PDVSA's liquidity. The Venezuelan
government's external reserves amounted to USD10.1 billion as of
November 2017, of which a significant portion was in gold. PDVSA's
cash on hand as of Dec. 31, 2016 amounted to approximately USD8.3
billion.

Venezuela's external liquidity was weak before the announcement
with a liquidity ratio estimated at just 33% (the stock of central
bank international reserves plus the banking system's liquid
foreign assets relative to external debt with a residual maturity
of less than one year). Gross international reserves have declined
further in 2017, falling by nearly USD1 billion in the year
through November to USD10.1 billion. Venezuela has additional
foreign exchange (FX) liquidity in government-managed funds, but
these have likely declined and remain opaque in their
administration and execution. The sovereign faces external coupon
payments of USD619.6 million in the last two months of 2017 and
USD3.3 billion in 2018, as well as external bond principal
maturities of approximately USD2.1 billion in 2018.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Uncertain Liquidity Position: PDVSA's decision to use the grace
periods for interest payments as well as the company's
announcements regarding its liquidity position during last year's
debt exchange highlight its uncertain liquidity position. During
2017, the company has made payments for more than USD9.0 billion
of an estimated USD9.8 billion of interest and principal payments
due during the year. Measured against these expenses, the company
presents a very limited liquidity cushion with reported cash of
approximately USD8.3 billion as of year-end 2016.

Limited Transparency: The Venezuelan government displays limited
transparency in the administration and use of government-managed
funds, as well as in fiscal operations, which poses challenges to
accurately assessing its fiscal state and the full financial
strength of the sovereign. PDVSA displays similar characteristics,
which reinforces the linkage of its ratings to the sovereign.

Average Recovery: PDVSA's 'C' rating suggests a default or
default-like process has begun. If a default or restructuring
occurs, Fitch anticipates average recovery for PDVSA's bondholders
of 31% to 50%, and likely closer to the lower end of the range.
While Fitch's recovery analysis yields a high recovery, the
willingness of Venezuela's government to extend concessions to
investors will likely move actual recovery closer to the lower end
of the 31% to 50% range. In addition, should oil prices remain
depressed, an average recovery may lead to additional future
defaults in order to further reduce obligations and allow for
necessary transfers to the government. The senior secured notes
also have an 'RR4' average Recovery Rating, as the collateral
provided may only marginally enhance recovery given default, which
could still range from 31% to 50%.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

PDVSA's rating linkage to the Venezuelan sovereign rating is in
line with the linkage present for most National Oil and Gas
companies (NOCs) in the region, including Pemex ('BBB+' IDR),
Ecopetrol ('BBB 'IDR), Petrobras ('BB' IDR), PetroPeru ('BBB+'
IDR), Enap ('A' IDR). In most cases in the region, NOCs are of
significant strategic importance for energy supply to the
countries were they operate as is the case in Mexico, Colombia,
Venezuela and Brazil. NOCs can also serve as a proxy for federal
government funding as in Mexico and Venezuela and have strong
legal ties to governments through their majority ownership, strong
control and at times governmental budgetary approvals.

On a stand-alone (SA) basis, PDVSA's credit profile is somewhat
more difficult to assert than other NOCs; however, Fitch believes
it is commensurate with a below 'CCC' rating category. This is
several notches below the SA of all other NOCs in the region and
it reflects the company's low and uncertain liquidity position,
delay in payment of interest and limited access to debt capital
markets as a result of U.S. economic sanctions.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

-- Fitch expects Brent oil prices to average USD52.5/b in 2017,
    USD55/b in 2018 and USD60/b in 2019.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Positive Rating Action

-- A payment default or debt restructuring exercise by PDVSA.

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Negative Rating Action

-- Public announcement of the intention to continue servicing
    sovereign debt obligations and the timely debt service in line
    with the original maturity schedule for upcoming debt
    obligations.

LIQUIDITY

PDVSA's liquidity position is expected to continue to weaken as a
result of low oil prices and near-term debt service payments and
transfers to the central government. As of December 2016, PDVSA
reported cash of USD8 billion, which compared unfavorably with
interest and principle payments of approximately USD9.8 billion
due in 2017 and approximately USD5.0 billion in 2018. As of this
year, the company has made payments of approximately USD9.0
billion, although it delayed interest payments on more than one
occasion to use the grace period provided under the indentures.
The company's current liquidity position is uncertain given
expenditures, transfers to government, and interest and principal
debt payments that might have driven down liquidity from the last
reported amount. Under Fitch's base case scenario, which assumes
WTI oil prices of USD50/bbl in 2017, PDVSA's liquidity position
will continue to deteriorate. Venezuela's gross international
reserves continued to decline and as of end of October they
amounted to approximately USD10.2 billion.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has taken the following rating actions:

Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A.

-- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR downgraded to 'C' from 'CC'
-- Long-Term Local Currency IDR affirmed at 'CC';
-- National Scale long-term rating affirmed at 'CCC(ven)';
-- Senior unsecured notes downgraded to 'C'/'RR4' from 'CC'/'RR4'
-- Senior secured notes due 2020 downgraded to 'C'/'RR4'
    from 'CC'/'RR4'


VENEZUELA: US Warns Bondholders That Negotiating May be Illegal
---------------------------------------------------------------
Lesley Wroughton at Reuters reports that the U.S. Treasury has
warned bondholders that dealing with Venezuela's chief debt
negotiators, both of whom are blacklisted by the United States,
would be 'problematic' and could lead to stiff penalties under
U.S. sanctions.

President Nicolas Maduro invited creditors to a Nov. 13 meeting in
Caracas to kick off talks to discuss a restructuring of some $60
billion in Venezuelan bonds, according to Reuters.

Creditors have been balking at the proposal, citing concerns over
the U.S. sanctions and the security situation in the city, the
report relays.

Maduro charged Vice President Tareck El Aissami, named by U.S.
authorities as a drug 'kingpin' for his alleged dealings with drug
traffickers, with leading the talks, the report relays.

The report relays that another major player in negotiators would
be Simon Zerpa, acting economy minister and finance boss of state
oil company PDVSA, who is also under U.S. sanctions for alleged
corruption.

Both are designated by the United States as a Specially Designated
National (SDN), the report discloses.

The U.S. Treasury said that while creditors were not prohibited
from attending meetings related to bonds under General License
Three of an Aug. 25 executive order by President Donald Trump, any
dealings with officials on the SDN list was forbidden, the report
relays.

The order was aimed at ensuring that U.S. investors did not help
to finance Maduro's expansion of a rule that Trump has described
as undemocratic, the report notes.  It bans purchases of new
equity and debt issued by Venezuela with a maturity greater than
30 days, and by PDVSA with a maturity greater than 90 days, the
report says.

'While there is no prohibition on U.S. persons attending a meeting
related to bonds on the annex to General License Three, the
involvement of persons on the SDN list in these meetings appears
problematic,' the U.S. Treasury said in guidance shared with
Reuters.

'U.S. persons should be cautious in dealings with the Venezuelan
government to ensure that they are not engaged in transactions or
dealings, directly or indirectly, with an SDN,' it said, the
report relays.

The Treasury said sanctions covered U.S. citizens and green card
holders, as well as U.S.-based banks and their foreign branches,
the report notes.  Under the U.S. 'Kingpin' Act, anyone breaking
the law could face up to 30 years in prison and fines of up to $5
million, according to the Treasury, the report relays.

Financial institutions or businesses could face fines of up to $10
million if they broke the law, it warned, the report discloses.

'Looking at this right now U.S. bondholders will probably not be
able to participate in the restructuring,' said Monica de Bolle, a
senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International
Economics, the report says.

But even if loopholes existed in the sanctions that allowed the
restructuring of some old debt, creditors would likely stay away
because any engagement with Venezuela was too risky, according to
sanctions experts, the report notes.

The White House said it was aware of the announced debt
restructuring, but said: 'It was Maduro's irresponsible economic
policies that led Venezuela to this unfortunate situation,' the
report relays.

'He has presided over the long-running and complete collapse of
his economy, the looting of the Venezuelan people's inheritance,
and the erosion of the rule of law,' a White House spokeswoman
told Reuters.

Maduro has said that Venezuela is the victim of an 'economic war'
waged by political adversaries and fueled by U.S. sanctions, the
report adds.

                           *   *   *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America, Robin
Wigglesworth at The Financial Times related that Venezuela
appeared to have made a crucial bond repayment in late October.
The Latin American country and its state oil company PDVSA have
failed to make several debt payments in recent weeks, the report
noted. But the most important one was an $842 million instalment
due Oct. 29 on a PDVSA bond maturing in 2020, which, unlike most
of the other overdue debts, had no 'grace period' that allowed for
30 days to clean up any arrears without triggering a default, the
report notes.

On Nov. 3, 2017, S&P Global Ratings lowered its long-term foreign
currency sovereign credit rating on the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela to 'CC' from 'CCC-'. The long-term local currency
sovereign credit rating remains unchanged at 'CCC-'. The 'C'
short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings
also remain unchanged. S&P placed all ratings on CreditWatch
negative.


VENEZUELA: EU to Impose Arms Embargo as Crisis Deepens
------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that Ambassadors of European Union member states
agreed to impose an arms embargo on Venezuela.

They also said there would be a ban on any equipment which could
be used to repress opponents within Venezuela, according to BBC
News.

The sanctions come after a UN report released in August accused
Venezuela of human rights violations and using excessive force
against the opposition, the report notes.

Venezuela dismissed the allegations as 'lies' and said it was the
victim of an 'imperialist war,' the report relays.

                              Blacklist

The country has been mired in a worsening economic and political
crisis which triggered mass anti-government protests earlier this
year, the report says.

Several key Venezuela opposition figures have been prosecuted,
jailed or stripped of their political rights since Nicolas Maduro
was elected president in 2013, the report discloses.

Venezuela's Supreme Court stripped opposition politician Freddy
Guevara of his immunity from prosecution and said he would be
prosecuted on charges of inciting violence, the report says.

The report relays that Mr. Guevara, who is the vice-president of
the opposition-controlled National Assembly, has sought refuge in
the residence of the Chilean ambassador in Caracas.

Canada and the United States have already imposed sanctions on
Venezuela and frozen the assets of Venezuelan individuals they say
are linked to human rights abuses, the report notes.

Diplomatic sources told Agence France Press news agency that the
EU would also create a blacklist of Venezuelan individuals,
although no names had been added to it yet, the report says.

'The political aim remains to force the government to get round
the negotiating table with the opposition and contribute to
getting out of the current political crisis,' the source told AFP,
the report relays.

                          'Meddling'

EU foreign ministers are expected to sign off the arms embargo,
BBC News cites.

Member states have also agreed to ban companies from exporting
surveillance equipment which could be used to spy on opposition
figures, the report says.

Foreign criticism is routinely dismissed as 'meddling' by
Venezuelan officials, and sanctions imposed by the US were cited
by President Maduro as evidence that 'imperialist forces' were
conspiring to oust him from power, the report relays.

Opinion polls suggested that following the US sanctions, President
Maduro's popularity rose for the first time in months, the report
adds.

                            *   *   *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America, Robin
Wigglesworth at The Financial Times related that Venezuela
appeared to have made a crucial bond repayment in late October.
The Latin American country and its state oil company PDVSA have
failed to make several debt payments in recent weeks, the report
noted. But the most important one was an $842 million instalment
due Oct. 29 on a PDVSA bond maturing in 2020, which, unlike most
of the other overdue debts, had no 'grace period' that allowed for
30 days to clean up any arrears without triggering a default, the
report notes.

On Nov. 3, 2017, S&P Global Ratings lowered its long-term foreign
currency sovereign credit rating on the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela to 'CC' from 'CCC-'. The long-term local currency
sovereign credit rating remains unchanged at 'CCC-'. The 'C'
short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings
also remain unchanged. S&P placed all ratings on CreditWatch
negative.


VENEZUELA: US Urged to Impose Full Embargo on Oil
-------------------------------------------------
Robin Wigglesworth and Ed Crooks at The Financial Times report
that Argentine president Mauricio Macri has urged the Trump
administration to dramatically tighten its sanctions on Venezuela
by imposing a full embargo on its oil exports to the US.

President Donald Trump unveiled a series of financial sanctions on
Venezuela and members of its government over the summer, including
prohibiting any US institutions from lending more money to the
country, but stopped shy of more draconian measures such as a full
embargo on Venezuelan oil exports to the US, The Financial Times
cites.

'I think we should go to a full oil embargo,' Mr. Macri said in an
interview with The Financial Times. 'Things have gotten worse and
worse.  Now, it's really a painful situation. Poverty is going up
every day, sanitary conditions are getting worse every day,' he
added.

The Argentine president is the first Latin American leader to
openly advocate such as tough step, the report points out.  He
noted that there would be 'broad support' across the region for
such a draconian measure, despite the hardship it would entail,
the report relays.

Venezuela's economic and financial crisis has deepened lately,
with president Nicolas Maduro announcing that the country could no
longer service its foreign debts, summoning bondholders to talks
in Caracas next week to discuss a restructuring, the report says.
Analysts expect the move to result in a disorderly default in the
coming days, which will worsen an already precarious situation,
the report discloses.

The US is considered unlikely to block all imports of Venezuelan
crude because that would create significant disruption in its
refining industry, according to The Financial Times.  US imports
of Venezuelan oil have been running at about 800,000 barrels a
day, roughly 8 per cent of the country's total crude imports last
year, the report cites.

Citgo, the US downstream subsidiary of Venezuela's state oil
company PDVSA, is a large buyer of the country's crude and employs
3,500 people at three refineries in Louisiana and Texas.

In August, senators from states with refineries along the gulf
coast wrote to Mr. Trump warning that 'unilateral sanctions'
against Venezuela 'could harm the US economy, impair the global
competitiveness of our businesses and raise costs for our
consumers,' the report relays.

However, Senator Bill Nelson, the Democratic representative of
Florida, wrote an open letter to Treasury secretary Steven Mnuchin
urging him to impose tougher sanctions on the Venezuelan regime,
and to also consider banning Venezuelan oil imports, the report
says.

The Lima Group, a regional block of countries set up this summer
to pressure Venezuela into free elections, in late October said
that more sanctions might be needed to isolate the regime and
hasten a return to democracy, the report relays.

                            *   *   *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America, Robin
Wigglesworth at The Financial Times related that Venezuela
appeared to have made a crucial bond repayment in late October.
The Latin American country and its state oil company PDVSA have
failed to make several debt payments in recent weeks, the report
noted. But the most important one was an $842 million instalment
due Oct. 29 on a PDVSA bond maturing in 2020, which, unlike most
of the other overdue debts, had no 'grace period' that allowed for
30 days to clean up any arrears without triggering a default, the
report notes.

On Nov. 3, 2017, S&P Global Ratings lowered its long-term foreign
currency sovereign credit rating on the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela to 'CC' from 'CCC-'. The long-term local currency
sovereign credit rating remains unchanged at 'CCC-'. The 'C'
short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings
also remain unchanged. S&P placed all ratings on CreditWatch
negative.


VENEZUELA: Russia to Ease Debt Burden on Country
------------------------------------------------
The New York Times reports that Russian Finance Minister Anton
Siluanov disclosed that Russia and Venezuela have agreed to the
restructuring of roughly $3 billion in Kremlin loans.

The amount is tiny compared with Venezuela's crushing $120 billion
debt, but it may help President Nicolas Maduro's government make
hundreds of millions of dollars in payments over the next few
weeks to other creditors and help reassure bondholders that a
default is not imminent, The New York Times cites.

This is the third time since last year that Russia has come to
Venezuela's aid when Caracas was in deep financial trouble, the
report relays.  And its lending to the Venezuelans has been part
of a worldwide strategy to use the Russian national oil company
Rosneft to help achieve foreign policy objectives, the report
notes.

Over the past three years, Russia has provided Caracas with $10
billion in financial assistance, and last year, Rosneft took a
49.9 percent stake in Citgo, the Venezuelan state oil company's
refining subsidiary in the United States, the report notes.  That
represented collateral for a $1.5 billion loan to the parent
company, Petroleos de Venezuela, known as PDVSA, the report
relays.  Rosneft is negotiating to swap the interest in Citgo for
oil fields in Venezuela, the report notes.

The terms of the restructuring were not made public, and neither
were details of the original loan, the report says.  Ms. Grais-
Targow said the Russian loan might go back several years, to a
time when former President Hugo Chavez, who died of cancer in
2013, bought Russian armaments, the report notes.

Since Venezuela customarily pays Russia back with oil, the
renegotiation could mean that Venezuela will have more oil to sell
on world markets for badly needed cash to make debt payments as
well as import food and medicines that are in short supply, the
report relays.

The Venezuelan government has invited international bondholders to
Caracas to begin negotiations to restructure more than $50 billion
in bonds owed to private creditors, the report says. The
announcement was an acknowledgment that Venezuela cannot pay all
its debts on time, but any renegotiation will be made difficult if
not impossible by United States sanctions, the report discloses.

Washington's sanctions prohibit Americans from dealing with the
man in charge of the renegotiation, Vice President Tareck El
Aissami, whom American officials have linked to drug trafficking,
the report relays.  Sanctions put in place in August also restrict
trading of Venezuelan bonds sold by the government in American
financial markets, the report notes.

But the call for negotiations also makes an outright Venezuelan
declaration of nonpayment of loans more unlikely, so a default
would have to be declared by major bondholders themselves, the
report relays.

For a default to occur, holders of 25 percent of the value of the
bonds would first have to raise the issue with trustees or fiscal
agents listed on the bonds, the report discloses.  If the
government does not satisfy the trustee or agent that it is
prepared to make good on the obligations, the creditors can then
seek a resolution in court, the report relays.

                            *   *   *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America, Robin
Wigglesworth at The Financial Times related that Venezuela
appeared to have made a crucial bond repayment in late October.
The Latin American country and its state oil company PDVSA have
failed to make several debt payments in recent weeks, the report
noted. But the most important one was an $842 million instalment
due Oct. 29 on a PDVSA bond maturing in 2020, which, unlike most
of the other overdue debts, had no 'grace period' that allowed for
30 days to clean up any arrears without triggering a default, the
report notes.

On Nov. 3, 2017, S&P Global Ratings lowered its long-term foreign
currency sovereign credit rating on the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela to 'CC' from 'CCC-'. The long-term local currency
sovereign credit rating remains unchanged at 'CCC-'. The 'C'
short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings
also remain unchanged. S&P placed all ratings on CreditWatch
negative.



===========================
V I R G I N   I S L A N D S
===========================


HATTON BAY: Goes Into Voluntary Liquidation
-------------------------------------------
Hatton Bay Limited Incorporated on the territory of the British
Virgin Islands, in accordance with Section 204 (1) (b) of the BVI
Business Companies Act 2004, is undergoing the process of
voluntary liquidation.  The voluntary liquidation started on
November 7, 2017.

Emil Tsuniyhov of Cyprus has been named as liquidator.

The liquidator can be reached at:

         Emil Tsuniyhov
         Cyprus, 2007 Nicosia
         23 Mesaloggio


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Joseph Cardillo at
856-381-8268.


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