TCRLA_Public/171114.mbx           T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

             Tuesday, November 14, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 226


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

ARGENTINA: Fitch Alters Outlook to Positive on Various Corporates
ARGENTINA: Fitch Alters Outlook on 6 Argentine LRGs to Positive


B R A Z I L

BRAZIL: Fitch Affirms BB LT Foreign Curr. IDR, Outlook Negative


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Manufacturing Falls Sharply in September
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: To Start Quest For Oil, Gas in 1Q 2018


E L  S A L V A D O R

INVERSIONES ATLANTIDA: Fitch Affirms 'B' IDR, Outlook Stable


V E N E Z U E L A

PROVINCIAL DE REASEGUROS: Fitch Lowers Insurer Fin. Strength to C
VENEZUELA: Prepares for Debt Restructuring Meeting
VENEZUELA: EU Agrees Sanctions on Government
VENEZUELA: Tagged by BP Head as Main Geopolitical Concern
VENEZUELA: Fitch Affirms CC on 6 Banks Amid Sovereign Downgrade


                            - - - - -


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A R G E N T I N A
=================


ARGENTINA: Fitch Alters Outlook to Positive on Various Corporates
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken rating actions on the following corporate
issuers as a result of the revision in Argentina's Rating Outlook
to Positive from Stable:

* AES Argentina Generacion S.A.
* Albanesi S.A.
* Central Termica Roca S.A.
* Generacion Mediterranea S.A.
* Arcor S.A.I.C.
* Cablevision S.A.
* Capex S.A.
* Compania Latinoamericana de Infraestructura y Servicios S.A.
    (CLISA)
* Genneia S.A.
* Inversiones y Representaciones S.A.
* IRSA Propiedades Comerciales S.A.
* Pampa Energia S.A.
* Pan American Energy LLC
* Pan American Energy LLC Sucursal Argentina
* YPF S.A.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The revision of Argentina's Rating Outlook to Positive from Stable
reflects an improving backdrop for government policies that could
support a stronger and more stable macroeconomic outlook, after a
decade of weak and volatile performance. Recent midterm elections
have improved confidence in the durability of the on-going policy
shift, which augurs well for investment and the sovereign's
ability to maintain favorable financing access. The build-up in
international reserves and a more flexible exchange rate confer
greater policy flexibility to manage shocks.

Fitch affirmed its Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) of
Argentina as well as its Country Ceiling at 'B' on Nov. 7, 2017.
Argentina's 'B' ratings reflect weaknesses that persist despite an
improving policy outlook, including high inflation, a large fiscal
deficit, and heavy sovereign reliance on external financing that
render it vulnerable to shocks. Country Ceilings are designed to
reflect the risks associated with sovereigns placing restrictions
upon private sector corporates, which may prevent them from
converting local currency to any foreign currency) under a stress
scenario, and/or may not allow the transfer of foreign currency
abroad to service foreign currency debt obligations.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The main factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to
an upgrade are:

-- An upgrade of the Argentine sovereign rating and country
    ceiling rating;

-- Material improvements in economic conditions and the
    availability of additional financing options could positively
    impact local currency and issuance ratings.

The main factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to
a stabilization of the Outlook are:

-- Any negative rating actions on the Argentine sovereign;

-- Marked economic weakness;

-- A significant deterioration of corporates' credit metrics.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

AES Argentina Generacion S.A.

-- Foreign Currency Long-Term IDR affirmed at 'B'; Outlook
    revised to Positive from Stable;

-- Local Currency Long-Term IDR affirmed at 'BB-'; Outlook
    Stable;

-- Long-term senior unsecured notes due 2024 affirmed at
    'B+/RR3'.

Albanesi S.A.

-- Foreign Currency Long-Term IDR affirmed at 'B'; Outlook
    revised to Positive from Stable.

-- Local Currency Long-Term IDR affirmed at 'BB-'; Outlook
    Stable.

Central Termica Roca S.A.

-- Long-term senior unsecured notes due 2023 affirmed at
    'B+/RR3'.

Generacion Mediterranea S.A.

-- Long-term senior unsecured notes due 2023 affirmed at
    'B+/RR3'.

Arcor S.A.I.C.

-- Foreign Currency Long-Term IDR affirmed at 'B+'; Outlook
    revised to Positive from Stable;

-- Local Currency Long-Term IDR affirmed at 'BB'; Outlook Stable;

-- Long-term senior unsecured notes due 2023 affirmed at 'BB-
    /RR3'.

Cablevision S.A.

-- Foreign Currency Long-Term IDR affirmed at 'B'; Outlook
    revised to Positive from Stable;

-- Local Currency Long-Term IDR affirmed at 'BB-'; Outlook
    Stable;

-- Long-term senior unsecured notes due 2021 affirmed at
    'B+/RR3'.

Capex S.A.

-- Foreign Currency Long-Term IDR affirmed at 'B'; Outlook
    revised to Positive from Stable;

-- Local Currency Long-Term IDR affirmed at 'BB-'; Outlook
    Stable;

-- Long-term senior unsecured notes due 2024 affirmed at
    'B+/RR3'.

Compania Latinoamericana de Infraestructura y Servicios S.A.
(CLISA)

-- Foreign currency Long-Term IDR affirmed at 'B'; Outlook
    revised to Positive from Stable;

-- Local Currency Long-Term IDR affirmed at 'B'; Outlook revised
    to Positive from Stable;

-- Long-term senior unsecured notes due 2019 and 2023 affirmed at
    'B/RR4'.

Genneia S.A.

-- Foreign Currency Long-Term IDR affirmed at 'B'; Outlook
    revised to Positive from Stable;

-- Local Currency Long-Term IDR affirmed at 'BB-'; Outlook
    Stable;

-- Long-term senior unsecured notes due 2022 affirmed at
    'B+/RR3'.

Inversiones y Representaciones S.A.

-- Foreign Currency Long-Term IDR affirmed at 'B'; Outlook
    revised to Positive from Stable;

-- Local Currency Long-Term IDR affirmed at 'BB-'; Outlook
    Stable;

-- Long-term senior unsecured notes due 2020 affirmed at
    'B+/RR3'.

IRSA Propiedades Comerciales S.A.

-- Foreign Currency Long-Term IDR affirmed at 'B'; Outlook
    revised to Positive from Stable;

-- Local Currency Long-Term IDR affirmed at 'BB-'; Outlook
    Stable;

-- Long-term senior unsecured notes due 2023 affirmed at
    'B+/RR3'.

Pampa Energia S.A.

-- Foreign Currency Long-Term IDR affirmed at 'B'; Outlook
    revised to Positive from Stable;

-- Local Currency Long-Term IDR affirmed at 'BB-'; Outlook
    Stable;

-- Long-term senior unsecured notes due 2027 affirmed at
    'B+/RR3'.

Pan American Energy LLC.

-- Foreign Currency Long-Term IDR affirmed at 'B+'; Outlook
    revised to Positive from Stable;

-- Local Currency Long-Term IDR affirmed at 'BB'; Outlook Stable.

Pan American Energy LLC Sucursal Argentina

-- Long-Term senior unsecured notes due 2021 affirmed at 'BB-
    /RR3'.

YPF S.A.

-- Foreign Currency Long-Term IDR affirmed at 'B'; Outlook
    revised to Positive from Stable;

-- Local Currency Long-Term IDR affirmed at 'B'; Outlook revised
    to Positive from Stable;

-- Long-term senior unsecured notes affirmed at 'B/RR4'.


ARGENTINA: Fitch Alters Outlook on 6 Argentine LRGs to Positive
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Long-Term Foreign and Local
Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) on six Argentine local and
regional governments (LRGs) at 'B'. The Rating Outlooks have been
revised to Positive from Stable.

The LRGs include: the City of Buenos Aires, Provinces of Cordoba,
La Rioja, San Juan, Santa Fe, and the Municipality of Cordoba.

These rating actions follow Fitch's Nov. 7, 2017 revision of
Argentina's 'B' sovereign ratings Outlook to Positive. The outlook
revision reflects an improving backdrop for policies that could
support a stronger and more stable macroeconomic outlook, after a
decade of weak and volatile performance. Recent midterm elections
have improved confidence in the durability of the on-going policy
shift, which augurs well for investment and the sovereign's
ability to maintain favourable financing access. The build-up in
international reserves and a more flexible exchange rate confer
greater policy flexibility to manage shocks.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

An upgrade in Argentina's sovereign rating could lead to an
upgrade in the rating of the LRGs, whose ratings are constrained
by the sovereign.



===========
B R A Z I L
===========


BRAZIL: Fitch Affirms BB LT Foreign Curr. IDR, Outlook Negative
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Brazil's Long-Term Foreign-Currency
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB' with a Negative Outlook.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Brazil's ratings are constrained by the structural weaknesses in
its public finances and high government indebtedness, weak growth
prospects, and weaker governance indicators compared with peers
and recent history of periodic political instability that weighs
on policy making. These weaknesses are counter-balanced by
Brazil's economic diversity and entrenched civil institutions,
with its per capita income higher than the 'BB' median. The
country's capacity to absorb shocks is underpinned by its flexible
exchange rate, robust international reserves position, a strong
net sovereign external creditor position, and deep and developed
domestic government debt markets. An improved policy environment,
reduced external imbalances, and the passage of some microeconomic
reforms in recent months are supportive of the credit profile.

The Negative Outlook reflects continued uncertainties around the
strength and sustainability of Brazil's economic recovery, the
prospects for medium-term debt stabilization given large fiscal
deficits, and the progress on the legislative agenda, especially
related to the social security reform. A challenging political
environment continues to impede progress on the social security
reform, which is important for the medium term viability and
credibility of the spending cap. The 2018 election cycle could
also detract from reform progress and weigh on economic recovery.

Fitch expects a moderate cyclical rebound to take hold in Brazil,
with growth expected to accelerate from 0.6% in 2017 to an average
of 2.6% during 2018-2019. A recovery in consumption has taken
hold, underpinned by lower inflation boosting real wages,
stabilization in the unemployment rate and the prior deleveraging
by households which has opened up space for renewed growth of
consumer credit. A recovery in investment is also anticipated in
2018-2019. Downside risks to growth could come from lingering
political, fiscal and reform uncertainties.

The government has renewed its focus on the microeconomic reform
agenda to boost productivity and investment prospects. Over the
past few months, the authorities have passed an outsourcing law, a
labor reform and the law for converting a subsidised long-term
lending rate ('TJLP') to a market-based long term lending rate
('TLP'). While important, the positive spill-overs from these
initiatives will likely take time to materialize.

Fiscal deficits are high although declining, reflecting largely
the easing of the interest burden from lower interest rates. The
general government fiscal deficit is expected to decline to 8.5%
of GDP in 2017 (compared with the 'BB' median of around 3%) and
average around 7% of GDP in 2018-2019. Despite the tighter control
of discretionary spending, the growth in mandatory spending and
revenue underperformance have frustrated the consolidation of the
primary deficits, with the government revising up its primary
fiscal deficit targets for 2017-2020 twice this year. This
continues to weigh on Brazil's fiscal credibility.

Near-term downside risks to meeting fiscal targets include a
weaker economic recovery and difficulty in cutting spending to
confront potential revenue shortfalls, especially in an election
year. Beyond 2018, a new government could also alter fiscal
targets. Moreover, implementation of a social security reform and
other spending adjustment measures will be needed to secure
expenditure savings and to ensure the compliance with the spending
cap over the medium term.

Fitch projects that Brazil's government debt will continue to
increase during the forecast period even after incorporating the
impact of the expected prepayments of Treasury loans by the
Brazilian development bank, BNDES in 2017-2018. Fitch projects
general government debt to reach 76% of GDP by the end of 2017
(compared with the 'BB' median of around 45%) and increase to
close to 80% by 2018, thereby eroding fiscal space to confront
future shocks.

Brazil's political environment has remained challenging and the
corruption-related allegations against President Temer appear to
have eroded his political capital and congressional support,
making the passage of the social security reform more difficult.
As such, uncertainty remains if and what type of reform could
pass, especially as the window of opportunity to make progress on
this issue is shrinking due to the impending election cycle.
Brazil's 2018 presidential and congressional elections could also
introduce uncertainty given the fragmented electoral landscape,
reduced trust in institutions, and the ongoing Lava Jato
investigations. The policy orientation of the next administration
gains importance in the context of Brazil's large fiscal
imbalances and adverse debt dynamics, which will require sustained
austerity and reform efforts to support confidence, growth and
reduce concerns about medium-term public debt sustainability.

Some of Brazil's macroeconomic imbalances continue to decline. The
disinflation process has gained pace with the IPCA inflation rate
falling to 2.54% in September 2017 (well-below the 4.5% target)
and inflation expectations are well-anchored around the target for
2018-2019, highlighting gains in the central bank's credibility.
The central bank has cut interest rates by a cumulative 675 basis
points (bps) since the last peak, and Fitch expects the monetary
easing cycle to end this year.

The current account deficit has adjusted significantly with Fitch
forecasting the deficit to reach below 1% of GDP in 2017 and
remain below 2% of GDP during the forecast period. The current
account deficit has declined by 80% during the first nine months
of 2017 compared to the same period a year ago, underpinned by a
surging trade surplus. Moreover, foreign direct investment has
remained resilient and is fully financing the current account
deficit in 2017 and is expected to continue to do so during 2018-
2019. Brazil's international reserves position remains strong and
the central bank has reduced the stock of FX swaps significantly,
giving the country space to confront external shocks.

SOVEREIGN RATING MODEL (SRM) and QUALITATIVE OVERLAY (QO)

Fitch's proprietary SRM assigns Brazil a score equivalent to a
rating of 'BBB-' on the Long-Term Foreign-Currency (LT FC) IDR
scale.

Fitch's sovereign rating committee adjusted the output from the
SRM to arrive at the final LT FC IDR by applying its QO, relative
to rated peers:

-- Public Finance: -1 notch, to reflect Brazil's rapidly worsened
    general government debt ratio which is likely to continue
    increasing during the forecast period. Moreover, fiscal
    flexibility is constrained by the highly rigid spending
    profile and a heavy tax burden that makes adjustment to shocks
    difficult.

-- Structural Features: -1 notch, to reflect Brazil's challenging
    political environment and corruption-related issues that have
    made it difficult for the country to make timely policy
    adjustments. In addition, the Ease of Doing Business
    indicators are weaker than the 'BB' median, reflecting
    structural constraints to growth.

Fitch's SRM is the agency's proprietary multiple regression rating
model that employs 18 variables based on three-year centred
averages, including one year of forecasts, to produce a score
equivalent to a LT FC IDR. Fitch's QO is a forward-looking
qualitative framework designed to allow for adjustment to the SRM
output to assign the final rating, reflecting factors within Fitch
criteria that are not fully quantifiable and/or not fully
reflected in the SRM.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The main factors that individually or collectively, could lead to
a downgrade are:

-- A setback in the domestic reform agenda that undermines
    confidence in the trajectory of medium-term public finances
    and weighs on economic recovery.

-- Failure to arrest the pace of increase in the government debt
    burden. Crystallization of contingent liabilities would be
    negative.

-- Erosion of international reserves and deterioration in
    government debt composition.

The Rating Outlook is Negative. Consequently, Fitch's sensitivity
analysis does not currently anticipate developments with a high
likelihood of leading to a positive rating change.

Future developments that could individually, or collectively,
result in a stabilization of the Outlook include:

-- Improvement in policy implementation and reform progress that
    supports confidence, investment and growth prospects.

-- Fiscal consolidation that leads to greater confidence in the
    capacity of the government to achieve debt stabilization in
    the medium term.

-- Maintenance of improved macroeconomic stability.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

-- Fitch assumes that China (an important trading partner for
    Brazil) will be able to manage a gradual slowdown and is
    forecasted to grow at 6.7% in 2017 and 6.3% in 2018.
    Argentina's economic performance (key destination of
    manufacturing exports) is forecasted to improve over the
    forecast period as well.

-- Fitch assumes that Brazil maintains international and domestic
    market access even if there is return of higher international
    financial volatility and further domestic confidence shocks.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

Brazil

-- Long-Term Foreign-Currency IDR at 'BB'; Outlook Negative;

-- Long-Term Local-Currency IDR at 'BB'; Outlook Negative;

-- Short-Term Foreign-Currency IDR at 'B';

-- Short-Term Local-Currency IDR at 'B';

-- Country Ceiling at 'BB+';

-- Issue ratings on long-term senior unsecured foreign-currency
    bonds at 'BB';

-- Issue ratings on long-term senior unsecured local-currency
    bonds at 'BB'.



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D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Manufacturing Falls Sharply in September
------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that the Dominican Republic Industries
Association's (AIRD) Monthly Manufacturing Activity Index (IMAM)
fell sharply from 53.4 in August to 45.0 in September, and below
the 50-point ceiling.

The Index, below the 50-point barrier is viewed as a negative
signal that the manufacturing activity is in decline, according to
Dominican Today.

The IMAM's performance, according to the size of the companies,
fell significantly in small, medium and large companies, and rose
in microenterprises, the report notes.  It placed below the 50.0
ceiling in medium and large companies, at 40.6 and 41.0
respectively, the report relays.

There was a decrease in four of the five variables analyzed: Sales
volume, Production volume and Employment fell below the 50.0
barrier (42.7, 43.5, and 46.0 respectively), while "Raw Material
Inventory" decreased but remained above 50, going from 54.0 in
August to 51.6 in September, the report notes.

The "Delivery Term to lso Suppliers" was the only variable that
posted a slight increase, from 43.1 to 47.6 (still below 50.0),
the report adds.

As reported in Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on July 24,
2017, Moody's Investors Service upgraded the Dominican Republic's
long term issuer and debt ratings to Ba3 from B1 and changed the
outlook to stable from positive, based on the following key
drivers:

(1) The Dominican Republic's continued robust growth outlook
     compared to rating peers, coupled with a reduction in
     external risks as current account deficits have declined and
     international reserves have increased.

(2) The reduction in fiscal deficits over the last four years and
     Moody's expectation that fiscal deficits will remain shy of
     3% of GDP, supported by fiscal restraint and reduced
     transfers to the electricity sector.


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: To Start Quest For Oil, Gas in 1Q 2018
----------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that Energy and Mines Minister Antonio Isa
on Sunday said exploration for oil will start in Azua (south) and
Dajabon (northwest) provinces in the first quarter next year, and
for natural gas in the San Pedro de Macoris province (east) in the
second quarter.

"The exploration will be carried out through contracts with terms
of reference that guarantee the State, in case of feasibility for
exploitation, a minimum of 40% of income between taxes and
benefits, which could reach up to 66% in case of an increase in
international prices," the official said, according to Dominican
Today.

Mr. Isa said he does not want to create false expectations, but
expects that Dominican oil has marketing potential, noting that
the shared production model will be used and the bids will be won
by those who propose better conditions, the report notes.

"The studies determine that there were six blocks in the country
where there was undoubtedly an oil and gas system, but this
doesn't mean that it is commercially exploitable.  Now let's
explore them.  We understand that natural resources are ours and
we have to defend and protect them," the report quoted Mr. Isa as
saying.

As reported in Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on July 24,
2017, Moody's Investors Service upgraded the Dominican Republic's
long term issuer and debt ratings to Ba3 from B1 and changed the
outlook to stable from positive, based on the following key
drivers:

(1) The Dominican Republic's continued robust growth outlook
     compared to rating peers, coupled with a reduction in
     external risks as current account deficits have declined and
     international reserves have increased.

(2) The reduction in fiscal deficits over the last four years and
     Moody's expectation that fiscal deficits will remain shy of
     3% of GDP, supported by fiscal restraint and reduced
     transfers to the electricity sector.



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E L  S A L V A D O R
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INVERSIONES ATLANTIDA: Fitch Affirms 'B' IDR, Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------------
Following Inversiones Atlantida, S.A. y Subsidiarias' (Invatlan)
Nov. 1 taking control of Banco ProCredit, S.A. (El Salvador)
(ProCredit SLV), Fitch Ratings has affirmed Invatlan's Issuer
Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'B'. The Rating Outlook is Stable. The
affirmation is based on Fitch's expectation that the full taking
control of the Salvadorian bank will not have material effects on
Invatlan's financial profile nor double leverage levels.

At the same time, Fitch has downgraded ProCredit SLV to 'A+(slv)'
from 'AAA(slv)' with a Stable Outlook , as they are now support-
driven by a lower rated parent company. ProCredit SLV ceased to
have the support of its previous majority shareholder, ProCredit
Holding AG & Co. (PCH), which holds an international rating of
'BBB', which was the driver of ProCredit SLV's ratings. These
ratings now are determined based on the support of its new
shareholder Invatlan. ProCredit SLV is in the process of
rebranding to Banco Atlantida El Salvador.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Invatlan's IDRs and Senior Debt

Invatlan's IDRs reflect the financial profile of its main
subsidiaries, mainly Banco Atlantida (Atlantida HND) in Honduras,
rated 'A+(hnd)' on the national scale by Fitch, which has
demonstrated sound financial performance through the economic
cycle. The ratings also consider Invatlan's high operational
integration with its operating subsidiaries, as well as the light
restrictions on subsidiaries upstreaming liquidity to Invatlan.
Invatlan's ratings also reflect the expected moderate levels of
double leverage.

Invatlan's creditworthiness is aligned with its main operating
subsidiary, Atlantida HND, since its status as a pure holding
company with low ability to generate profits in an unconsolidated
basis creates a natural dependence on the dividend flows from its
subsidiaries to meet its financial commitments. This is
particularly relevant because of Invatlan's expected moderate
levels of double leverage, defined as equity investments in
subsidiaries plus the holding company's intangibles, divided by
the holdco's common equity.

With the acquisition of ProCredit SLV, Fitch estimates a double
leverage (defined as equity investments in subsidiaries plus
intangibles, divided by common equity) close to 100%. However, the
agency expects Invatlan's double-leverage ratio to increase due to
the holdco's future proceeds of the remaining balance of the
recently issued USD150 million notes, although in Fitch's view it
will be maintained below 120%. According to Fitch's criteria, a
double-leverage ratio of 120% or below indicates a manageable
level of debt service costs, thus supporting the equalization of
Invatlan's creditworthiness with that of Atlantida HND.

Invatlan's senior debt rating reflects that these are senior
obligations of Invatlan that rank pari passu with other senior
indebtedness, and therefore this rating is aligned with the
company's Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs of 'B'. The
recovery rating of 'RR4' assigned to Invatlan's senior debt
issuance reflects the average expected recovery in case of the
company liquidation.

Banco ProCredit El Salvador's National Ratings

ProCredit SLV's ratings reflect the support it would receive from
its ultimate parent Invatlan, rated 'B', Stable Outlook. Fitch's
opinion of the support is based on the strategic important role of
ProCredit SLV to Invatlan's regional expansion strategy and the
significant reputational risk that its default would pose to its
parent company. Invatlan's propensity of support has showed
through the recent capital injection of USD15 million which drives
total equity to USD40 million.

ProCredit SLV is important for its parent company, since it is the
group's first bank outside of Honduras and consolidates its
presence in El Salvador, where it already owns other financial
services companies. Synergies are expected to generate slowly
starting in 2018. The bank's operations have just begun a process
of managerial, operational and technological integration with
Invatlan. It will also provide a risk management framework. Fitch
believes the process will be slow albeit favourable for ProCredit
SLV.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Invatlan's IDRs and Senior Debt

Invatlan's creditworthiness will likely move in line with that of
its main subsidiary, Atlantida HND. Also, Invatlan's IDRs could be
downgraded by one notch if the company's double-leverage ratio is
sustained above 120%.

Given their senior nature, these notes will typically be aligned
with the company's IDRs, and the rating of the notes will mirror
any potential change to Invatlan's IDRs.

ProCredit SLV's National Ratings

Rating upside potential could arise if Invatlan's operations in El
Salvador (including Banco Procredit) perform in a robust and
sustained manner that would materially increase their relative
contribution to the consolidated group. For instance, higher and
sustained operating profitability, coupled with material increases
to the overall consolidated earnings at the ultimate parent's
level, could potentially increase the propensity of support in
Fitch's assessment and, therefore, trigger a positive rating
action.

On the other hand, ratings downgrades could arise if the capacity
and propensity to support Atlantida SLV's by its ultimate parent
weakens, although this is not Fitch's base case scenario. This
could be triggered by a rating downgrade at Invatlan or a weaker
than expected relative contribution of the Salvadoran operations
to the consolidated group.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

Invatlan

-- Long-Term Foreign and Local currency Issuer Default Ratings
    (IDRs) at 'B';

-- Short-Term Foreign and Local currency IDRs at 'B';

-- Five-year USD150 million senior notes at 'B/RR4'.

Fitch has downgraded the following ratings:

ProCredit SLV

-- Long-Term National Scale Rating to 'A+(slv)'; Outlook Stable
    from 'AAA(slv)'; Outlook Stable;

-- Short-Term National Scale Rating to 'F1(slv)' from 'F1+(slv)';

-- Long-Term National Scale Rating for a senior secured debt
    issuance to 'AA-(slv)' from 'AAA(slv)'.

Fitch has assigned the following rating:

ProCredit SLV

-- Long-Term National Scale Rating for a senior unsecured debt at
    'A+(slv)'.



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V E N E Z U E L A
=================


PROVINCIAL DE REASEGUROS: Fitch Lowers Insurer Fin. Strength to C
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Provincial de Reaseguros, C.A.'s (Pro
Re) Insurer Financial Strength (IFS) rating to 'C' from 'CC'.

The rating action on Pro Re follows the downgrade of Venezuela's
Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'C' from
'CC'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

It is Fitch's view that Pro Re's financial performance will remain
highly influenced by its operating environment and vulnerable to
political uncertainty in Venezuela. The company has thus been
unable to achieve adequate international business diversification,
given that 99.9% of its premium income came from Venezuela and 6%
of its assets are invested in sovereign debt as of June 2016 (last
available fiscal year-end). Therefore, the exposure to the local
operating environment constrains the company's rating and is
highly correlated with the sovereign's credit quality.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

In the case of Venezuela's sovereign default, Fitch would review
Pro Re's IFS rating and could affirm the current rating, as long
as the reinsurer's credit profile remains stable. Pro Re's IFS
rating could be upgraded if Venezuela's sovereign rating was
upgraded.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has taken the following actions:

Provincial de Reaseguros

-- IFS downgraded to 'C' from 'CC'.


VENEZUELA: Prepares for Debt Restructuring Meeting
--------------------------------------------------
DW News reports that speaking on Nov. 12, President Nicolas Maduro
insisted his country would "never" default on the country's US$150
billion (EUR129 billion) debt.

"Our strategy is to renegotiate and refinance all the debt," Mr.
Maduro said during his weekly television speech, according to DW
News.  He highlighted talks with allies China and Russia, the
report relays.

Negotiations with China were "moving along perfectly," the
president said, the report relays.  Venezuela owes China $28
billion and Russia $8 billion, the report discloses.

In the last three years, Russia has provided Caracas with $10
billion in financial assistance, and last year energy giant
Rosneft took a 49.9 percent stake in Citgo, the Venezuelan state
oil company's refining subsidiary in the United States, the report
notes.

In a fourth year of recession with food shortages, soaring prices
and a collapse in the bolivar currency, the once powerful oil-
producing state was warned by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) over gaps in economic data and transparency earlier this
month, the report says.

Inflation is forecast to reach more than 2,000 percent next year,
up from 653 percent this year, the report relays.

               EU Adopts Sanctions Against Venezuela

Adding pressure on Venezuela, European Union foreign ministers
agreed to ban arms sales to the country and to set up a legal
framework to sanction individuals through asset freezes and travel
restrictions, the report notes.

"These measures will be used in a gradual and flexible manner and
can be expanded, by targeting those involved in the non-respect of
democratic principles or the rule of law and the violation of
human rights," the EU foreign ministers said in a statement
obtained by the news agency.

"These measures were designed not to harm the Venezuelan
population whose plight the EU wishes to alleviate," the report
relays.

                             Key Meeting

As the Venezuelan government runs out of funds, the newly created
debt renegotiation committee has invited creditors to come to the
government's 'White Palace' opposite the presidential building,
Finance Minister Simon Zerpa said, the report discloses.  The
creditors hold some $60 billion in junk bonds to Venezuela, the
report relays.

Mr. Zerpa is also the head of state oil company PDVSA.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) issued a warning earlier
this month to Caracas for failing to provide economic data on time
and gave it six months to address the lack of some statistics, the
report relays.  If it did not improve the data flow, the IMF could
issue a "declaration of censure," the report discloses.

Venezuela has found an ally in Russia, which objected to the IMF
Board's warning and also agreed to restructure $3 billion in
loans, allowing Caracas to meet other obligations, including a
$1.2 billion payment on a national oil company bond due last
Nov. 10, the report relays.

                   Sanctioned Committee Members

Mr. Zerpa is one of the six men in charge of negotiating a deal on
the estimated $150 billion of Venezuela's outstanding foreign
debt. He is also under US sanctions for alleged corruption, the
report relays.

The head of the committee, Vice President Tareck El Aissami, has
been accused by Washington of drug trafficking, the report relays.

Both men have denied the accusations, but due to the US sanctions,
there could be legal repercussions for anyone meeting or doing
business with them, the report says.  US laws ban business
dealings with people officially under US sanctions, and anyone
doing so could in theory face up to 30 years in jail, the report
notes.

The sanctions also effectively bar US banks from rolling over the
South American country's debt into new bonds, the report
discloses.

This may have consequences for the attendance of the meeting, but
it has also raised questions over whether Maduro wants to
refinance the debt, the report notes.

                     Preparing for a Default?

Some analysts have suggested Mr. Maduro may be preparing the
ground for a default, after which he would blame Washington's
policies and sanctions, DW News cites.  The US Treasury Department
sanctioned 10 current and former Venezuelan government officials
as part of the Trump administration's broader crackdown on the
South American state, the report notes.

US sanctions put in place in August also restrict trading of
Venezuelan bonds sold by the government in American financial
markets, the report relays.

Ending Venezuela's debt payments would set off the biggest default
in history, the report notes.

For a default to occur, the Venezuelan and international
institutional holders of 25 percent of the value of the bonds
would have to take action, the report discloses.

Speaking on television last week, El Aissami called on investors
to discuss debt restructuring at the meeting, which is also the
deadline for almost $300 million in outstanding bond interest
payments, the report says.

It is unclear what the commission is proposing to investors,
either for the payment of their bonds or restructuring of
Venezuela's debts, the report adds.

                           *   *   *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America, Robin
Wigglesworth at The Financial Times related that Venezuela
appeared to have made a crucial bond repayment in late October.
The Latin American country and its state oil company PDVSA have
failed to make several debt payments in recent weeks, the report
noted. But the most important one was an $842 million instalment
due Oct. 29 on a PDVSA bond maturing in 2020, which, unlike most
of the other overdue debts, had no 'grace period' that allowed for
30 days to clean up any arrears without triggering a default, the
report notes.

On Nov. 3, 2017, S&P Global Ratings lowered its long-term foreign
currency sovereign credit rating on the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela to 'CC' from 'CCC-'. The long-term local currency
sovereign credit rating remains unchanged at 'CCC-'. The 'C'
short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings
also remain unchanged. S&P placed all ratings on CreditWatch
negative.


VENEZUELA: EU Agrees Sanctions on Government
--------------------------------------------
John Murray Brown at The Financial Times reports that the European
Union agreed a range of sanctions on Venezuela, banning arms
sales, setting up a system for freezing assets and imposing travel
restrictions on some government officials.

Foreign ministers from the 28-member bloc announced the measures
after a meeting in Brussels, according to The Financial Times.

The EU said in a statement the steps could be reversed if
President Nicolas Maduro made moves to reintroduce greater
democracy, the report notes.

The decision follows similar moves from the U.S., which put
financial sanctions on 10 current and former Venezuelan officials
over corruption and abuse of power allegations related to
President Maduro's crackdown on the opposition, the report
relates.

The EU's arms ban is aimed at stopping the repression and
surveillance of ordinary Venezuelans, the report notes.

The moves come as Venezuela prepares to enter talks with creditors
to agree a restructuring of part of its foreign debt to avoid a
default, the report adds.

                          *   *   *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America, Robin
Wigglesworth at The Financial Times related that Venezuela
appeared to have made a crucial bond repayment in late October.
The Latin American country and its state oil company PDVSA have
failed to make several debt payments in recent weeks, the report
noted. But the most important one was an $842 million instalment
due Oct. 29 on a PDVSA bond maturing in 2020, which, unlike most
of the other overdue debts, had no 'grace period' that allowed for
30 days to clean up any arrears without triggering a default, the
report notes.

On Nov. 3, 2017, S&P Global Ratings lowered its long-term foreign
currency sovereign credit rating on the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela to 'CC' from 'CCC-'. The long-term local currency
sovereign credit rating remains unchanged at 'CCC-'. The 'C'
short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings
also remain unchanged. S&P placed all ratings on CreditWatch
negative.


VENEZUELA: Tagged by BP Head as Main Geopolitical Concern
---------------------------------------------------------
CNBC News reports that despite the instability in the Middle East,
the biggest risk for the oil industry is Venezuela, the chief
executive officer of gas & oil company BP plc said.

"I think most people would say the Gulf region, I actually say
Venezuela," Bob Dudley, CEO of BP told CNBC at the Abu Dhabi
Petroleum Exhibition & Conference, when asked about geopolitics
and the oil sector.

"I think Venezuela is just defying economic gravity and I think
that's a real wild card," he added.

Venezuela, an OPEC nation and one of the biggest oil producers in
the world, is starting a debt renegotiation with foreign
investors, according to CNBC News.  However, it is not clear that
President Nicolas Maduro will succeed in these talks, increasing
the risk of debt default, the report notes.

According to Reuters, Mr. Maduro said that "default will never
reach Venezuela" and the country has "a clear strategy" -- to
renegotiate and refinance the foreign debt, the report relays.

Venezuela aims to restructure about $60 billion in bonds, the
report notes.  Caracas has struggled to refinance its debt because
U.S. banks cannot buy new Venezuelan bonds due to sanctions
imposed by U.S, the report relays.

The Venezuelan economy has been in recession for four years, where
food shortages, the lack of U.S. dollars and the depreciation of
its own currency, has sent inflation soaring, the report
discloses.  According to Reuters, using data from the opposition-
led congress, prices quickened to 248.6 percent in the first seven
months of 2017, the report relays.  There is no published official
data.

The report relays that Mr. Dudley from BP believes that this
situation deserves more of a spotlight than the instability in the
Middle East, where the Saudi Arabia-Iran relationship has become
more fragile.  The former has in fact urged the international
community to slap fresh sanctions on Iran, accusing it of
supporting terrorism, the report relays.

The European Union imposed new sanctions on Venezuela, prohibiting
arms sales, setting up a system for freezing assets and announcing
new travel restrictions on some government officials, the report
discloses.  The EU said that the sanctions could be reversed if
Venezuela returns to greater democracy, the report says.

                      Mexico-US Relationship

Speaking earlier to CNBC on the sidelines of the Abu Dhabi
Petroleum Exhibition & Conference, the CEO of the Mexican oil firm
PEMEX told CNBC that he hopes the relationship with the United
States will grow in the energy sector, the report relays.

"Energy was not part of NAFTA (The North American Free Trade
Agreement), because it was a closed sector," Jose Antonio Gonzalez
Anaya, CEO of PEMEX told CNBC. "Now that's open, I hope the
relationship can only grow," he added, the report notes.

Mexico and the U.S. have been embroiled in a tense political fight
since President Donald Trump took office, the report relays.
Trump said last month that the 23-year-old trade deal between the
U.S., Canada and Mexico will come to an end, if they cannot agree
on how to reform it, the report notes.

"We have to protect our workers. So we'll see what happens with
NAFTA, but I've been opposed to NAFTA for a long time, in terms of
the fairness of NAFTA," Trump said during a visit to Canada, the
report says.

Mr. Anaya told CNBC that Mexico exports about a million barrels of
oil to the U.S. a day and imports about 700,000 barrels of diesel
and gasoline.  Mr. Anaya said he hopes that the political rhetoric
will not overcome the economic logic when both countries talk
trade, the report adds.

                           *   *   *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America, Robin
Wigglesworth at The Financial Times related that Venezuela
appeared to have made a crucial bond repayment in late October.
The Latin American country and its state oil company PDVSA have
failed to make several debt payments in recent weeks, the report
noted. But the most important one was an $842 million instalment
due Oct. 29 on a PDVSA bond maturing in 2020, which, unlike most
of the other overdue debts, had no 'grace period' that allowed for
30 days to clean up any arrears without triggering a default, the
report notes.

On Nov. 3, 2017, S&P Global Ratings lowered its long-term foreign
currency sovereign credit rating on the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela to 'CC' from 'CCC-'. The long-term local currency
sovereign credit rating remains unchanged at 'CCC-'. The 'C'
short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings
also remain unchanged. S&P placed all ratings on CreditWatch
negative.


VENEZUELA: Fitch Affirms CC on 6 Banks Amid Sovereign Downgrade
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings
(IDRs) at 'CC' and the Viability Ratings (VRs) at 'cc' of the
following six private sector Venezuelan banks, following the
Nov. 3, 2017 downgrade of the country's sovereign rating to 'C':

-- Banesco, Banco Universal, CA (BBU);
-- Mercantil, C.A. Banco Universal (Mercantil);
-- Banco Occidental de Descuento, Banco Universal C.A. (BOD);
-- Banco del Caribe, C.A. Banco Universal (Bancaribe);
-- Banco Exterior, C.A. Banco Universal (Exterior);
-- Banco Nacional de Credito C.A. (BNC)

These banks are among the largest private sector universal
commercial banks in the country with a combined market share of
42.5% by assets at September 2017. Their IDRs are driven by their
VRs, or standalone intrinsic financial profiles, and do not take
into account either institutional or state support.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS AND VRS

In Fitch's view, although the Venezuelan authorities have
announced their intention to pursue a renegotiation of the
sovereign external debt obligations, the banks under review are
not similarly undergoing a default-like process. The banks report
adequate levels of cash and cash equivalents ranging from 36%-49%
of short term funding at September 2017. Their direct exposure to
the sovereign is also much reduced, with holdings of public sector
securities of less than 6% of total assets at all issuers as of
the same date. The highly transactional nature of the banks'
balance sheets as well as the absence of foreign currency
obligations and the expected continuance of capital controls
mitigate concerns over debt payment capacity.

The banks' ratings also reflect concerns about downside risks to
solvency and asset quality in the context of an expected sovereign
default and a possibly acute forced economic adjustment,
particularly considering the very weak and uncertain operating
environment. High inflation, which Fitch expects to exceed 600% in
2017, distorts financial ratios and, in Fitch's view, they are not
reliable for the purposes of comparison with other emerging market
peers. The banks' low impaired loans, which do not exceed 0.2% of
gross loans at September 2017, are diluted by inflation-led loan
growth (which averaged 139.5% across the banking system in 2016).
Capital levels remain pressured by high asset growth. In addition,
the banks' continued nominal profitability and adequate liquidity
is attributable to the continued growth of deposit funding
(primarily demand deposits) which earn deeply negative returns in
real terms.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRS AND VRS

Deterioration in the banks' financial performance resulting in
capitalization levels near or below the regulatory minimum could
result in a negative rating action. In addition, while not Fitch's
base case due to capital controls in place, a material and
persistent decline in deposits would also pressure ratings
downward. There is virtually no upside potential in the banks'
ratings given the exceptionally weak operating environment they
are facing, although this depends on the sovereign rating actions
when and if the debt restructuring process is completed.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

The banks' Support Rating (SR) of '5' and Support Rating Floor
(SRF) of 'NF' reflect Fitch's expectation of no support. Despite
these banks' systemic importance, support cannot be relied upon
given Venezuela's weak capacity and lack of a consistent policy on
bank support. In addition, in Fitch's view, government
interference in the banking system and the economy as a whole
negatively influences shareholder support.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

BBU
-- Long-term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'CC';
-- Short-term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'C';
-- Viability Rating at 'cc';
-- Support Rating at '5';
-- Support Rating Floor at 'NF'.

Mercantil
-- Long-term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'CC';
-- Short-term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'C';
-- Viability Rating at 'cc';
-- Support Rating at '5';
-- Support Rating Floor at 'NF'.

BOD
-- Long-term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'CC';
-- Short-term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'C';
-- Viability Rating at 'cc';
-- Support Rating at '5';
-- Support Rating Floor at 'NF'.

Bancaribe
-- Long-term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'CC';
-- Short-term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'C';
-- Viability Rating at 'cc';
-- Support Rating at '5';
-- Support Rating Floor at 'NF'.

Exterior
-- Long-term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'CC';
-- Short-term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'C';
-- Viability Rating at 'cc';
-- Support Rating at '5';
-- Support Rating Floor at 'NF'.

BNC
-- Long-term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'CC';
-- Short-term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'C';
-- Viability Rating at 'cc';
-- Support Rating at '5';
-- Support Rating Floor at 'NF'.


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Joseph Cardillo at
856-381-8268.


                   * * * End of Transmission * * *