TCRLA_Public/171127.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

           Monday, November 27, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 234


                            Headlines




B R A Z I L

BANCO DE LA NACION: Fitch Affirms B IDR; Revises Outlook to Pos.
BRAZIL: Administration Scales Back Scope of Prop. Pension Reform
CEMIG GERACAO: Fitch Rates Proposed US$1BB Sr. Eurobonds B(EXP)
CENTRAIS ELETRICAS: Fitch Affirms BB- IDR; Revises Outlook to Neg.


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REP: Exports Didn't Sustain 6.3% Jump From 2010 to 2016


M E X I C O

CHIHUAHUA: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Global Scale Issuer Ratings
DEUTSCHE BANK: Moody's 'Ba1' Rating Under Review for Downgrade
MEXICO: Central Bankers Uneasy About Inflation Outlook
NEMAK SAB: Fitch Affirms BB+ Long-Term IDR; Outlook Positive


P U E R T O    R I C O

COLONIAL MEDICAL: Case Summary & 20 Largest Unsecured Creditors


S U R I N A M E

SURINAME: Moody's Puts B1 Issuer Rating on Review for Downgrade


V E N E Z U E L A

VENEZUELA: Creditors Begin Organizing Among Themselves
VENEZUELA: Some Bondholders Joust for Advantage


X X X X X X X X X

* BOND PRICING: For the Week From November 20 to Nov. 24, 2017


                            - - - - -


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B R A Z I L
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BANCO DE LA NACION: Fitch Affirms B IDR; Revises Outlook to Pos.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has revised Banco de la Nacion Argentina (Sucursal
Uruguay)'s (BNAUY) Outlooks to Positive from Stable. The bank's
Long-Term Foreign and Long-Term Local Currency Issuer Default
Ratings (IDRs) have been affirmed at 'B' and Support Rating (SR)
at '4'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRs
The revision of the Outlook to Positive is driven exclusively by
the same action on Argentina's sovereign rating (B/Positive) on 7
November 2017. BNAUY is a fully integrated branch of Banco de la
Nacion Argentina (BNA). BNA's creditworthiness is intrinsically
aligned with that of the sovereign, not only because of the
existing explicit guarantee provided by the government, but also
given BNA's systemic importance as the largest bank in Argentina.
BNA's liabilities, including its branches abroad, are fully
guaranteed by the government.

Given BNA's total ownership by the Argentinean government, the
bank's liabilities (including BNA branches abroad) are fully
guaranteed by the government.

BNA has a leading franchise in Argentina, being the largest bank
in terms of loans and deposits. It has a presence in nine
countries, through branches and representation offices to address
the domestic needs regarding international trade to support trade
activity of Argentina in the region. BNAUY is the smallest bank in
the country given its narrow business focus, with a market share
lower than 1% in terms of total assets and deposits in private
banking. The franchise of the group BNA is strongly influenced by
the Argentinean economic and operational environment, which
remains unstable, despite an improving policy outlook, including
high inflation, a large fiscal deficit, and heavy sovereign
reliance on external financing that render it vulnerable to
shocks.

BNAUY is fully integrated with the head office's strategies,
corporate governance practices and risk management procedures.
BNAUY operates through only one main office and its activities are
reported to the international banking division of BNA. BNAUY has
modest profitability, a fairly liquid balance sheet and adequate
capitalisation metrics.

SUPPORT RATING

BANUY's SR '4' reflects the significant uncertainties regarding
the sovereign's ability to provide support, given Argentina's weak
credit profile, which results in limited probability of support.

RATING SENSITIVITIES
IDRs & SUPPORT RATING

BNAUY's ratings continue to be sensitive to the sovereign rating
and Argentina's capacity and willingness to provide support to BNA
and its branches.


BRAZIL: Administration Scales Back Scope of Prop. Pension Reform
----------------------------------------------------------------
Paulo Trevisani at The Wall Street Journal reports that Brazil's
government is scaling back a proposal to overhaul the country's
insolvent pension system, part of a last-ditch effort to get
congressional support for the unpopular bill ahead of general
elections next year.

Pension reform has proved particularly difficult in Brazil, where
corruption scandals and political stalemate have been the norm for
the past few years, according to The Wall Street Journal.

President Michel Temer's administration is urging Congress to
overhaul a pension system that consumes nearly half of the
national budget and is set to have a $56 billion deficit this
year, the report notes.  The shortfall saps funds that could be
used to improve the country's depleted infrastructure, health and
education, officials said, the report relays.

Investors worry the country's growing debt load could spiral out
of control if nothing is done. "This is a very slow-motion train
wreck," said Robert Abad, founder of the emerging markets advisory
firm EM+BRACE, the report relates.

The report discloses that the new plan, submitted to Congress,
trims contribution periods for pension eligibility and maintains
other benefits that the government initially sought to reduce.
The changes aim at getting enough votes to approve a minimum
retirement age of 65 years for men and 62 for women. Current rules
allow Brazilians to retire in their late 50s, the report relays.

Finance Minister Henrique Meirelles said the watered-down proposal
would still save nearly $150 billion in taxpayer money over the
next decade, roughly 60% of what the government intended to save
in its initial plan, the report notes.

The new proposal "has a very relevant fiscal impact," Mr.
Meirelles said.  "It solves the problem," Mr. Meirelles added, WSJ
relates.

The new plan sets a minimum contribution period of 15 years for
private-sector workers eligible for pension benefits, down from 25
years in an earlier plan presented by the government, the report
relays.  Other costly benefits the government wanted to change,
such as a pension plan for rural workers too poor to make social
security payments, would also be preserved, the report notes.

"The changes are aimed at the lowest-income groups, so they are
good" said Social Security Secretary Marcelo Caetano, who crafted
the government's initial reform plan, the report says.

Mr. Temer wants the Lower House to pass the slimmed-down version
of the bill before a recess in late December, the report notes.
By the time lawmakers return in February, Congress likely would
avoid voting on sensitive topics ahead of general elections in
October, the report discloses.

But it isn't clear whether the government's efforts will be enough
to sway a Congress increasingly worried about siding with a
president whose approval rates are as low as 3%, the report
relays.

"Everything this administration proposes is seen as a bad thing,"
said Rep. Daniel Coelho, from the Brazilian Social Democracy
Party, a key ally of Mr. Temer.  "I don't see how this reform
could possibly be approved," he added.

The Temer administration also is using television ads to convince
a skeptic public angered with costly pension perks given to public
servants, the report relays.

"A lot of people in Brazil work little, earn much and retire
early," says one of the ads.  "We want to put an end to such
privileges," it added, notes the report.

The World Bank estimates that 35% of pension subsidies benefit
only the 20% richest Brazilians, while just 18% of subsidies go to
the 40% poorest, the report relays.

The leftist Workers' Party, or PT, which ruled Brazil from 2003
until last year's impeachment of former President Dilma Rousseff,
has strongly campaigned against the pension overhaul, the report
notes.  With deep roots among public workers, the PT and its
allies say the overhaul would make retirement harder for everyone,
the report relays.

"The pension reform will only hit the neediest ones," the report
quoted PT Sen. Paulo Paim as saying.

A budding economic recovery also could reduce pressure on Congress
for a fast decision on pension reform, the report relays.
Brazil's economy is forecast to grow 0.7% this year and 2.5% in
2018 after two consecutive years of contraction, the report notes.

"Brazilian policymakers operate well under the gun," said Edwin
Gutierrez, head of emerging-markets sovereign debt at Aberdeen
Asset Management, the report notes.  "But not so well when the gun
is taken off," he added.

"Everything is running against pension reform," said political
consultant Leonardo Barreto, noting that legislators see
retirement perks as an easy fix for social inequality, the report
relays.

                 Corrections & Amplifications

Brazil's pension system consumes nearly half of the national
budget and is set to have a $56 billion deficit this year, the
report relays.  An earlier version of this story incorrectly said
that the deficit was nearly half of the budget, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Nov. 14, 2017, Fitch Ratings has affirmed Brazil's Long-Term
Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB' with a
Negative Outlook.


CEMIG GERACAO: Fitch Rates Proposed US$1BB Sr. Eurobonds B(EXP)
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned a 'B(EXP)'/'RR3' rating to Cemig
Geracao e Transmisao S.A. (Cemig GT)'s proposed USD1 billion
senior unsecured Eurobonds due 2024. The proposed Eurobonds are
guaranteed by the holding company Companhia Energetica de Minas
Gerais (Cemig) and the proceeds will be used to prepay existing
debt. Cemig GT's and Cemig Distribuicao S.A.'s (Cemig D) Long-Term
Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) are
currenty rated 'B-' and the National Scale rating 'BB-(bra)'. All
the ratings are on Negative Watch, including the proposed
issuance.

The ratings reflect Cemig group's deteriorated credit profile, as
Fitch believes that the company's financial flexibility has
materially worsened and net adjusted leverage will be in the range
of 5.0x to 6.0x in the next two years. Delays in completing its
strategy for asset disposal along with significant financial
expenses on its debt are having a negative impact on the group's
ability to improve its financial metrics, including liquidity
ratios. Expected free cash flow (FCF) of around BRL900 million in
2017 and BRL100 million in 2018 are viewed as positive.

Cemig and its subsidiaries' credit profiles are analyzed on a
consolidated basis due to cross default clauses and cash dynamics.
The group's aggressive financial profile is partially offset by
its low to moderate business risks, supported by low competition
and positive diversification mainly into power generation,
transmission and distribution segments, being the latter the most
volatile. Positively, Cemig has a relevant asset base in the
Brazilian electric sector, including shared control in several
companies with relevant market value. The IDRs also factor in the
existence of political risk, due to Cemig's condition as a state
owned company, as well as a moderate regulatory risk for the
Brazilian power sector and a hydrology risk currently above
historical average.

The ratings are on Negative Watch and reflect Cemig group's
challenges in addressing future debt payments, even considering
the closing of the BRL4 billion in debt renegotiations with its
main creditors and the likely sale of some of its Transmissora
Alianca de Energia Eletrica S.A.'s (Taesa) shares to meet part of
the BRL1.7 billion put option related to Light S.A.'s (Light)
shares. An equity increase of BRL1.3 billion and success on this
USD1 billion Eurobond issuance are important actions that may
occur, but not enough to solve all the liquidity issues.

Fitch expects to assign a 'RR3' Recovery Rating to Cemig GT's
proposed issuance, which reflects recovery prospects at the range
of 51% to 70% in the event of default, given the group's cash flow
generation and strong assets portfolio.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Positive FCF: Fitch believes that Cemig's consolidated FCF will be
positive at around BRL900 million in 2017 as the group is
exhibiting more robust cash flow from operations (CFFO), and capex
and dividends have been limited in order to address liquidity
issues. In 2018, FCF should be modest at around BRL100 million,
which is low compared to debt maturities. In the latest-12-month
(LTM) ended September 2017, consolidated CFFO of BRL2.7 billion
was crucial to support a FCF of BRL900 million, after BRL1.0
billion in capex and BRL832 million in dividends was paid out.
Fitch views Cemig's willingness to reduce dividend payments since
2015 to the legal limit of 25% of net income as positive.

Higher Leverage: Fitch expects Cemig's consolidated net adjusted
leverage to be in the range of 5.0x to 6.0x in the next two years.
In the LTM ended September, 2017, Cemig reported net adjusted
debt/adjusted EBITDA of 7.2x, the highest in the last five years.
Fitch includes the guarantees of BRL5.9 billion to non-
consolidated companies, mainly to Belo Monte and Santo Antonio
hydro plants, and the exercised put option in the total adjusted
debt. On the other hand, dividends received from non-consolidated
investments in the amount of BRL485 million are added to the
EBITDA.

Favorable Business Model: The group benefits from its
diversification in terms of segments and assets, which mitigates
operational risks and reduces cash flow volatility. Cemig is one
of the largest power companies in Brazil, with 12.7 million
clients served in the distribution segment, 8.4 GW of power
generation installed capacity and 8.2 thousand km of transmission
lines. The company is expected to reduce its activity in
greenfield projects and in the acquisition of existing assets,
after being very aggressive historically. The debt associated with
the acquisitions at relevant levels and strong dividend payments
in the past, have significantly affected the group's credit
quality.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Cemig's financial risk profile is more aggressive, with weaker
liquidity and higher leverage compared to Eletropaulo
Metropolitana de Eletricidade de Sao Paulo (Local Currency IDR:
'BB'/Stable Outlook, National Scale Rating 'AA-bra'). When
assessing the Latin American energy peers in the 'B' category,
although Cemig has larger revenue base, its coverage ratios
compare unfavorably. AES Argentina and Genneia's ratings are
constrained by Argentina's Sovereign Ceiling of 'B' and the high
regulatory risk environment while the Brazilian peers operate with
moderate regulatory risk. Cemig's business credit profile compares
better than Eletropaulo's with a diversified assets portfolio, as
it is an integrated energy company.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within its  rating case for the issuer
include:
-- Cemig D consumption increase of 0.7% in 2017, and 2.4% during
    2018.
-- Average consolidated capex of BRL1.2 billion during 2017-2020;
-- Dividend payout of 25% (minimum legal limit);
-- BRL1.2 billion disbursement on Light's partners put;
-- BRL800 million sale of Taesa's shares;
-- Issuance of USD1 billion in Eurobonds.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Positive Rating Action:
- Positive rating actions are unlikely in the short to medium
   term. The Watch Negative may be removed if the group improves
   its liquidity profile and its financial flexibility to meet
   future financial obligations.

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Negative Rating Action:
- Failure to sell Taesa's shares and/or conclude the expected
   equity injection;
- Failure to issue the USD1 billion Eurobond;
- Continuing deterioration on financial flexibility;
- Difficulties to conclude asset sales in relevant amounts.

LIQUIDITY

Challenging Liquidity Profile: Cemig has an aggressive liquidity
profile, which may be partially mitigated if the equity injection,
the USD1 billion Eurobond issuance and the sale of Taesa's shares
are concluded. Even in this positive scenario, Fitch understands
that Cemig would still need to roll over around BRL500 million -
BRL 1 billion in debt until the end 2018. In September 2017, Cemig
group reported total adjusted debt of BRL21.2 billion, including
off-balance sheet debt of BRL5.9 billion, while cash and
equivalents were BRL1.3 billion. The debt maturing in the short
term was BRL6.4 billion including BRL1.2 billion of the put option
(net of approximately BRL400 million in cash reserved for this
purpose), but should reduce as the BRL4 billion debt refinancing
with the group's four major creditors was concluded recently.

KEY RECOVERY RATING ASSUMPTIONS

The recovery analysis assumes that Cemig would be considered a
going concern in bankruptcy and that the company would be
reorganized rather than liquidated. Fitch has assumed a 10%
administrative claim.

-- Cemig's going-concern EBITDA of BRL3.1 billion is based on the
EBITDA expected in 2017. Fitch understands 2017 EBITDA reflects
the reduced results from the generation segment after the return
of important concessions and the distribution segments still
adverse scenario;

-- An EV multiple of 6x is used to calculate a post-reorganization
valuation and reflects a mid-cycle multiple for the sector.

-- Cemig's non-consolidated investments were also considered in
the analysis. The company has valuable assets in its non-
consolidated portfolio, which includes 35% of Light's and 32% of
Taesa's total shares.

Liquidation Value
Fitch excluded the liquidation value (LV) approach because
Brazilian bankruptcy legislation tends to favor the maintenance of
the business in order to preserve direct and indirect job
positions. Moreover, in extreme cases where LV was necessary, the
recovery of the assets has been proved very difficult for lenders.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has taken the following rating actions:

Cemig GT
--  USD1,000 million proposed Eurobonds due 2024 guaranteed by
     Cemig assigned 'B(EXP)'/'RR3'; Rating Watch Negative.

Fitch also currently rates the Cemig's group entities as follows:

Cemig
-- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR 'B-';
-- Long-Term Local Currency IDR 'B-';
-- Long-Term National scale rating 'BB-(bra)'.

Cemig D
-- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR 'B-';
-- Long-Term Local Currency IDR 'B-';
-- Long-Term National scale rating 'BB-(bra)';
-- BRL400 million senior unsecured debentures due 2017
    'BB-(bra)';
-- BRL1,615 million senior unsecured debentures due 2018
    'BB-(bra)'.

Cemig GT
-- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR 'B-';
-- Long-Term Local Currency IDR 'B-';
-- Long-Term National scale rating 'BB-(bra)';
-- BRL1,350 million senior unsecured debentures, with two
    outstanding series due 2019 and 2022, 'BB-(bra)'.

All the ratings are on Rating Watch Negative.


CENTRAIS ELETRICAS: Fitch Affirms BB- IDR; Revises Outlook to Neg.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has revised the Outlooks on Centrais Eletricas
Brasileiras S.A.'s (Eletrobras) and its wholly owned subsidiary,
Furnas Centrais Eletricas S.A.'s (Furnas) Long-Term Foreign- and
Local-Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) to Negative from
Stable and affirmed the IDRs at 'BB-'. Fitch has also affirmed the
companies' Long-Term National Scale Ratings at 'AA-(bra)' and
revised the Outlooks to Negative from Stable.

The Outlook revision reflects Fitch's view that the expected
increase of the Brazilian Federal Government's support to
Eletrobras may not occur, considering its announced intention to
privatize the power company through the dilution of its
shareholding participation. Based on this, Fitch considers that a
one-notch difference between the Brazilian sovereign IDR
(BB/Negative) and Eletrobras is more appropriate. This means that
changes to the sovereign IDR or Outlook should trigger the same
action on Eletrobras to maintain the distance in the IDRs.

Fitch considers that Eletrobras privatization would potentially be
positive for the company, but due to the high uncertainties
remaining in this process, we have not incorporated it into the
ratings.

Eletrobras' IDRs benefit from its strategic importance to the
country due its prominent position within the Brazilian power
sector. The sovereign directly holds directly 51% of company
voting shares and guarantees around 30% of its consolidated on-
balance sheet debt. On a standalone basis, Eletrobras' IDRs would
be lower due to its still weak operational cash flow generation
and high leverage. Management's initiatives to reduce costs and
capital expenditures, as well as sell assets in order to improve
the group's capital structure are positive, but will take time to
improve the group's current situation.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Federal Government Support: Fitch considers any additional support
from the Brazilian Federal Government to Eletrobras as uncertain,
as the sovereign intends to privatize the company in the near
future. In the last couple of years, the Brazilian government has
shown increasing commitment to Eletrobras' turnaround, supporting
management's decision to cut costs and reduce investments, as well
as through the National Treasury increasing participation as
guarantor of loans to 30% of total consolidated on-balance sheet
debt and equity injections of BRL2.9 billion .Federal banks are
the counterparty to 38% of the group's debt.

High Importance to Brazil: Eletrobras has a strong position as the
largest electricity generation and transmission company in Brazil,
with 32% of installed generation capacity and 47% of transmission
lines as of September 2017. Its size and active presence in the
most relevant energy projects under construction in Brazil make it
strategically important to the country's economy and development.

Negative Free Cash Flow: We expect Eletrobras' free cash flow
(FCF) generation to remain negative, even though capex has been
reduced as part of a new business plan. Fitch views positively
that the company's subsidiaries did not participate in the recent
transmission and generation bids promoted by the government. The
Strategic Plan for 2017-2021 contained investments of BRL35.8
billion, but the group has already reduced this, executing around
42% (BRL3.7 billion) of the budget for this year. In the last 12
months (LTM) ending September 2017, the consolidated cash flow
from operations (CFFO) was negative BRL2.1 billion, while FCF was
negative BRL4.8 billion.

Cash Generation to Improve: EBITDA generation should achieve an
annual average of BRL5.0 billion in 2017-2019, according to
Fitch's projections, considering the cash inflow from compensation
revenues of the transmission concessions renewed early in 2013. In
the LTM ending in September 2017, EBITDA amounted to BRL5.4
billion, having been positively impacted by the booking of
additional compensation revenues, which started to be received in
July 2017, for BRL900 million per quarter.

High Leverage: Fitch expects Eletrobras' adjusted leverage ratios
to remain high in the coming years, with net adjusted debt/EBITDA
above 10x. As a mitigating factor, Eletrobras' consolidated risk
profile benefits from an extended debt maturity schedule. For the
LTM ended on September 2017, total adjusted debt-to-EBITDA and net
adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratios were 12.3 and 11.0, respectively.
Total adjusted debt of BRL77.4 billion includes Reserva Global de
Reversao (RGR) of BRL6,6 billion and off-balance sheet debt of
BRL31.6 billion related to guarantees provided to non-consolidated
subsidiaries. If these debts are excluded, net leverage would
remain high at 7.2x.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Eletrobras' 'BB-'/Negative IDRs derive from the Brazilian
sovereign rating of 'BB'/Negative, considering its linkage with
the government and high importance of its business to the country,
and despite its weak financial metrics. Compared with other state-
owned electric utility companies in Latin America, Eletrobras'
ratings are lower than the Mexican company Comission Federal de
Electricidad (CFE; BBB+/Stable) and the Colombian group
Interconexion Electrica S.A. E.S.P (BBB+/Stable). CFE's ratings
are fully supported by the Mexico sovereign rating of
'BBB+'/Stable, while ISA's ratings are above the Colombian
sovereign 'BBB' and capped by the Country Ceiling of 'BBB+',
reflecting its asset base diversification in terms of segments and
geographic operation, and adequate credit metrics and liquidity.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within our rating case for the issuer
include:
- Receipt of BRL 27.8 billion from compensation value for the
   transmission concession renewal over eight years, starting in
   July 2017 (inflation adjusted);
- Average annual capex of BRL 4.4 billion from 2017 to 2019;
- Dividends corresponding to 25% of net profit in the coming
   three years;
- Privatization of distribution companies in 2018.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Positive Rating Action
- Improvements on Eletrobras' standalone credit profile;
- Positive rating action on the sovereign.

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Negative Rating Action
- Negative rating action on the sovereign;
- Perception of a weakening on the Brazilian government support;
- Significant deterioration on the company's credit profile on a
   standalone basis.

LIQUIDITY

Strong Liquidity to Continue: Eletrobras has historically
maintained a strong liquidity position and a manageable debt
amortization schedule. As of September 30, 2017, the company's
consolidated cash and marketable securities of BRL8.4 billion
compared favorably with BRL 6.1 billion in December 2016and
represented 1.6x its short-term debt of BRL5.2 billion. This high
liquidity position is important for expected negative FCF and the
more uncertain support coming from the Federal Government through
equity injections and guarantees.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Eletrobras
-- Long-Term Foreign-Currency IDR affirmed at 'BB-'; Outlook
    revised to Negative from Stable
-- Long-Term Local-Currency IDR affirmed at 'BB-'; Outlook
    revised to Negative from Stable
-- National Long-Term rating affirmed at 'AA-(bra)'; Outlook
    revised to Negative from Stable
-- USD1 billion senior unsecured notes due 2019 affirmed at 'BB-'
-- USD1.75 billion senior unsecured noted due 2021 affirmed at
    'BB-'

Furnas
-- Long-Term Foreign-Currency IDR affirmed at 'BB-'; Outlook
    revised to Negative from Stable
-- Long-Term Local-Currency IDR affirmed at 'BB-'; Outlook
    revised to Negative from Stable
-- National Long-Term rating affirmed at 'AA-(bra)'; Outlook
    revised to Negative from Stable



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D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
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DOMINICAN REP: Exports Didn't Sustain 6.3% Jump From 2010 to 2016
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that the 6.3% jump in Dominican Republic's
exports from 2010 to 2016 wasn't sustained since the trend was
sluggish year on year, even taking into account the high downward
rates (above 20%) posted after the recovery from the "big
contraction" of 2009.

The figures are from the Industry and Commerce Ministry's Monitor,
a new tool to analyze the prospects of the country's economy and
the performance of industry and commerce, according to Dominican
Today.

"From an extraordinary expansion of exports (23%, 2010), we moved
to a phase in which the value of merchandise exports sustained a
sharp decline, with 2015 being the most critical year, with a
contractionary performance (-5.1%), the report notes.  The
recovery of growth in commerce returned to the scene in 2016," the
Monitor said, the report relays.

Also reported during the presentation of the mechanism was that,
in terms of value, the Monitor noted a climb to US$3.0 billion
over seven years, the report relays.  "In contrast, in the same
period, the region of Latin America and the Caribbean as a whole
accumulated four years of negative growth (2013-2016) in its
exports of merchandise," the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Nov. 20, 2017, Fitch Ratings has affirmed Dominican Republic's
Long-Term Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB-'
with a Stable Outlook.


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M E X I C O
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CHIHUAHUA: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Global Scale Issuer Ratings
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's de Mexico assigned Ba3 (Global Scale, local currency) and
A3.mx (Mexico National Scale) issuer ratings to the State of
Chihuahua. The outlook is negative.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The issuer ratings reflect Chihuahua's high debt levels and its
large, recurring cash financing deficits, as well as Moody's
expectation that efforts to contain spending will help reduce
these deficits over the coming year. The ratings also incorporate
Chihuahua's adequate liquidity position and its diversified
economic base, which has allowed the state to collect high levels
of own source revenues that are more than double the median of Ba3
rated Mexican peers.

Chihuahua's cash financing deficits averaged 9.7% of total
revenues over the 2012-2016 period, reflecting a high cost
structure resulting from rigid recurring outlays for education,
public security and pensions. However, thanks to a series of cost
control measures implemented by a new administration in late 2016,
Moody's expect the state will post somewhat smaller deficits in
2017 and 2018 equal to around 4% of total revenues. The most
important change was a decree that prevents the state from
increasing spending beyond its original budget, which had
historically been a common practice. The measures took effect this
year and will remain in force throughout the current
administration, helping to curb deficit spending.

Chihuahua financed a significant portion of its large deficits in
previous years with long-term bank loans, leaving the state with
high levels of net direct and indirect debt. As of December 2016,
debt was equivalent to 45.1% of total revenues, compared with the
21% median for Mexican states. Given that the state hasn't
contracted any additional debt this year and doesn't plan to
before the end of December, Moody's expect debt levels to decrease
to a 41% of total revenues at the end of 2017. Chihuahua is
currently planning to refinance part of its outstanding debt,
which Moody's expect will help reduce its debt service to 2.7% of
total revenues in 2018, compared to an expected 3.5% in 2017.

Although Chihuahua has tight liquidity metrics, the state's
liquidity position is slightly higher than the median for Ba3
rated Mexican peers, with cash equaling 0.5 times current
liabilities in December 2016. Liquidity is already improving as a
result of the measures taken to rebalance the state's cash
financing results, with cash and equivalents rising to 1.0 times
current liabilities in September.

RATIONALE FOR THE NEGATIVE OUTLOOK

The negative outlook on the ratings reflects the negative outlook
of Mexico's sovereign bond rating (A3 negative), given the state's
significant dependence on federal transfers (83.7% of total
revenues in 2016).

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

If the administration continues implementing measures that
effectively offset Chihuahua's growing expenditure pressures
leading to lower-than-expected cash financing deficits along with
decreasing debt levels and a stronger liquidity position, the
ratings could face upward pressure. Conversely, the ratings could
face downward pressure if Chihuahua's consolidated financial
results deteriorate, leading to higher debt levels and weaker
liquidity.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Regional and
Local Governments published in June 2017.

The period of time covered in the financial information used to
determine State of Chihuahua's rating is between 01/01/2012 and
31/12/2016. (source: financial statements of State of Chihuahua)

Moody's National Scale Credit Ratings (NSRs) are intended as
relative measures of creditworthiness among debt issues and
issuers within a country, enabling market participants to better
differentiate relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's global
scale credit ratings in that they are not globally comparable with
the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with NSRs
for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same country.
NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier signifying the
relevant country, as in ".za" for South Africa. For further
information on Moody's approach to national scale credit ratings,
please refer to Moody's Credit rating Methodology published in May
2016 entitled "Mapping National Scale Ratings from Global Scale
Ratings". While NSRs have no inherent absolute meaning in terms of
default risk or expected loss, a historical probability of default
consistent with a given NSR can be inferred from the GSR to which
it maps back at that particular point in time. For information on
the historical default rates associated with different global
scale rating categories over different investment horizons.


DEUTSCHE BANK: Moody's 'Ba1' Rating Under Review for Downgrade
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's de Mexico S.A. de C.V. said that the ratings of Deutsche
Bank Mexico, S.A. (Deutsche Bank Mexico) and of Deutsche
Securities Mexico, S.A. de C.V. (Deutsche Securities Mexico)
remain under review for downgrade pending regulatory approval of
the sale of these entities to Mexico's Investa Bank, S.A.
(Investabank, unrated). The review was initiated on November 4,
2016.

The following ratings and assessments remain on review for
downgrade:

Deutsche Bank Mexico, S.A. (600069090):

-- Baseline credit assessment of ba2

-- Adjusted baseline credit assessment of ba1

-- Long-term global local currency deposit rating of Ba1

-- Long-term global foreign currency deposit rating of Ba1

-- Long-term Mexican National Scale deposit rating of A1.mx

-- Short-term Mexican National Scale deposit rating of MX-1

-- Long and short term Counterparty Risk Assessments of Baa3(cr)
    and Prime-3(cr)

Deutsche Securities Mexico, S.A. de C.V. (821503957):

-- Long-term global local currency issuer rating of Ba1

-- Long-term Mexican National Scale issuer rating of A1.mx

-- Short-term Mexican National Scale issuer rating of MX-1

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings of Deutsche Bank Mexico and Deutsche Securities Mexico
were placed under review following the signing of an agreement by
the companies' ultimate parent, Deutsche Bank AG (Deutsche AG,
baseline credit assessment of ba1), to sell these operations to
Investabank as part of a broader scaling back of its global
operations pursuant to its 2020 strategic plan.

Barring a significant deterioration in the entities' standalone
creditworthiness prior to the closing of the sale, the conclusion
of the reviews is dependent upon receipt of regulatory approval of
the deal. Once the transaction closes, Deutsche Bank Mexico and
Deutsche Securities Mexico will no longer benefit from support
from Deutsche AG. Despite the marginal business importance of the
Mexican bank to its parent, Moody's assesses a high likelihood of
parent support given their shared brand name, which results in one
notch of ratings uplift from Deutsche Bank Mexico's baseline
credit assessment. In turn, as a highly integrated and harmonized
entity, Deutsche Securities Mexico's ratings are in line with
those of Deutsche Bank Mexico.

Until regulatory approval is received, the reviews for downgrade
will also consider the impact on the two entities'
creditworthiness of the progressive decrease in earnings
generation and business diversification that is already occurring
as the entities continue to wind down business that will not be
part of the sale, and their balance sheets continue to shrink
through the transaction's closing date. Moody's expects that at
the sale's closing, the business being acquired by Investabank
will largely consist of the trustee division of Deutsche Bank
Mexico. The companies have already begun to exit or transfer to
their parent certain operations that will not be sold to
Investabank.

As of September 2017, the bank's total assets had shrunk 81% vis-
a-vis December 2016 as the entity unwound its derivative
positions. The bank posted a profit after taxes of just 0.5% of
total assets during the first nine months of 2017, largely
composed of interest income from its investment portfolio. Despite
the sharp contraction of the balance sheet and the weak reported
profitability, however, the bank's ba2 baseline credit assessment
remains appropriate. As a result of the deleveraging, the bank
reported a strong adjusted tangible capital ratio as of September
2017. Currently, the bank's assets largely consist of investments
in securities, while liabilities are mostly comprised of accounts
payable.

If the sale unexpectedly falls through, Moody's expects an orderly
wind down of the Mexican entities' remaining lines of business,
which are not currently under stress. Should their situation
suddenly deteriorate before the parent can finish winding them
down, however, Moody's expects that Deutsche AG would provide the
necessary financial support to avoid a failure as the reputational
cost for Deutsche AG's global business of allowing these entities
to fail would likely outweigh the costs of bailing them out.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS DOWN

The ratings will likely be downgraded when regulatory approval of
the transaction is received and/or it reaches financial close.
They could be downgraded before if the companies' standalone
credit profiles deteriorate significantly as a result of
preparations for their upcoming sale. This may include a
significant drop in capitalization or profitability. The ratings
could be confirmed if the sale falls through and Deutsche AG
consequently retains ownership of the Mexican subsidiaries until
they are completely wound down, or until a sale to another party
is announced.

The long-term Mexican National Scale ratings of A1.mx indicate
issuers or issues with above-average creditworthiness relative to
other domestic issuers. The short- term Mexican National Scale
ratings of issuers rated MX-1 indicate the strongest ability to
repay short-term senior unsecured debt obligations relative to
other domestic issuers.

The principal methodology used in rating Deutsche Bank Mexico,
S.A. was Banks published in January 2016. The principal
methodology used in rating Deutsche Securities, S.A. de C.V. was
Securities Industry Market Makers published in September 2017.


MEXICO: Central Bankers Uneasy About Inflation Outlook
------------------------------------------------------
Anthony Harrup at The Wall Street Journal reports that although
the Bank of Mexico is sticking to its forecast that inflation will
return to its 3% target by the end of next year, several board
members questioned the likelihood of that happening when they
agreed in early November to leave interest rates unchanged,
minutes to the meeting showed.

The central bank voted unanimously on Nov. 9 to keep the overnight
interest-rate target at 7%, noting that risks for both inflation
and for economic growth had increased since the previous decision,
according to The Wall Street Journal.

The report notes that several of the five voting board members
said that a return to the 3% inflation target next year assumes
minimal increases in noncore items, such as energy and fresh
produce, a strengthening of the Mexican peso against the U.S.
dollar, and a modest increase in the minimum wage.

Another member said inflation expectations gleaned from surveys
and financial markets suggest the central bank's scenario "isn't
altogether credible," the report relays.

Risks the bank sees for the peso include possible interest-rate
increases by the Federal Reserve, an unfavorable outcome for
Mexico in negotiations to redraw the North American Free Trade
Agreement, and Mexico's 2018 presidential elections, the report
discloses.

Since the last policy meeting, labor, government and business
representatives on the minimum wage commission agreed to raise the
minimum wage by 10% as of Dec. 1, and inflation in the first half
of November rebounded to 6.6% from 6.4% at the end of October, the
report relays.

Bank of Mexico Gov. Agustin Carstens, who is leaving at the end of
this month to head the Bank for International Settlements in
Switzerland, said that the minimum wage increase is likely to have
an inflationary effect, but not enough to cancel out the wage
increase, the report relays.  The central bank sees keeping low,
stable inflation as its best contribution to raising real wages,
the report notes.

"For some companies, an increase in the minimum wage will imply a
significant increase in costs and that could be reflected in
increases in different prices," Mr. Carstens said, the report
relays.

Capital Economics said the surprising and broad-based pickup in
inflation in the first half of November, reported, "will have
spooked the more hawkish members of the board," the report
discloses.

Markets have begun pricing in a good chance of an interest-rate
increase in coming months, although inflation is still likely to
ease over the next three to six months, the research firm said in
a note, the report relays.  "So while rate cuts are clearly not
coming onto the agenda anytime soon, we expect the central bank to
look through the latest rise in inflation and keep rates unchanged
at 7% over the coming months," the report adds.


NEMAK SAB: Fitch Affirms BB+ Long-Term IDR; Outlook Positive
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Nemak, S.A.B. de C.V.'s (Nemak) Long-
term Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB+' and its long-term
national scale rating at 'AA-(mex)'. The Rating Outlook is
Positive.

Nemak's increasing product and geographic diversification,
improving financial structure and implicit parent support from
Alfa, S.A.B. de C.V. (BBB-) lead to investment grade
characteristics. These factors complement Nemak's strong
technological competencies, which have given it a very strong
competitive position in North America and Europe. Nemak's ratings
are constrained by the ongoing negotiations of NAFTA, which
threaten the continuity of the North American auto industry.
Satisfactory resolution of on-going NAFTA talks could result in a
rating upgrade. Conversely, an unfavourable outcome from
negotiations that disrupts North America's intricate supply chains
would lead to lower industry profitability and likely set back
Nemak's financial improvements, and could cause Fitch to revise
the Outlook to Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Adverse U.S. Trade Policy: Nemak's 'BB+' credit profile should
endure the near-term threats that protectionist policies in the
U.S. could bring to the North American automotive industry. The
company is the sole global supplier in about 85% of the products
they sell. It is also the main supplier of aluminum cylinder heads
and engine blocks in both the U.S. and Mexico. Competitive threats
that could substitute Nemak's products are not likely to arise in
the near term due to the company's strong competitive position and
expertise in producing cylinder heads and engine blocks using
aluminum castings.

Strong Global Business Position: Nemak's presence in high-growth
regions, such as Asia and its high percentage of installed
capacity in low-cost countries, complements its strong business
position in Europe and the Americas. The company's long-term
customer relationships, its use of aluminium price pass through
contracts that reduce raw material volatility, its position as an
essential supplier for Detroit's OEMs and its participation in
several of the largest global engine platforms are also reflected
in the ratings.

North America Slowing Down: The company derives about two thirds
of its EBITDA from North America, primarily through the sale of
components used in the assembly of vehicles sold in the U.S. where
total light vehicle sales grew strongly during 2009-2015. Fitch
believes U.S. vehicle sales should remain at mid-16 million to
low-17 million over the intermediate term. Nemak has continued to
gain incremental business, primarily in engine blocks, structural
components and electric vehicle components, which should position
the company well to continue to grow volumes despite slower
industry tailwinds in the U.S.

New Contracts Boost Growth: Nemak has been awarded new contracts
for about USD300 million in annual revenues for its structural and
electric and hybrid vehicle aluminium components. The bulk of
these contracts is expected to come online in 2018-2019. As a
result, compound annual consolidated equivalent volume growth is
expected at around 3%.This compares positively to relatively flat
vehicle production growth expected in North America, Nemak's main
market, and is a positive factor supporting the Positive Outlook.

Operating Performance Should Recover: Nemak's financial
performance suffered in 2017 primarily due to weaker volumes from
one of its customers and sharply higher aluminium prices. Nemak's
near-term operating performance suffers when there are sharp
increases in the price of aluminium as there is a time lag until
price fluctuations are passed through to its customers as per
established contracts. Nemak's EBITDA is expected to be around
USD750 million in 2017 compared to USD796 million in 2016. Fitch
is projecting that Nemak's EBITDA will approach USD800 million in
2018 boosted by increased vehicle production and new product
launches in Europe and Asia.

Leverage Expected to Trend Down: Nemak's credit metrics should
strengthen over the next two years, as demand for the company's
high value-added aluminum engine blocks and structural products
grow. Fitch expects Nemak to generate neutral to positive FCF in
2017 and 2018 as the company continues to invest in expanding its
casting and machining capabilities to serve new programs awarded
and pay dividends. Nemak's FCF was USD60 million during 2016 and
USD39 million during 2015. Fitch expects Nemak's net leverage to
be around 1.7x in 2017 and close to 1.5x in 2018. Nemak's gross
leverage is expected to strengthen below 2x over the intermediate
term.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Nemak's business profile is one of the strongest Latin America
auto suppliers. The high complexity and technological innovation
of the company's aluminium castings, has given it a very strong
competitive position which has allowed Nemak to become a sole
supplier to OEMs in 85% of the products it sells. Nemak's business
profile compares well against Metalsa's (BBB-) as Metalsa has a
less dominant position in its core businesses and against Tupy
(BB), which has much smaller scale as it is a niche producer of
iron engine blocks and heads predominantly used in commercial off-
road vehicles and less geographic diversification.

Nemak's business profile is similar to that of European peer GKN
Holding's (BBB-) in terms of completive position, albeit GKN
enjoys a larger scale and a more diversified profile in terms of
product segments, customers and geography of cash flow. Nemak's
financial profile is strong for its BB+ rating, but relatively
weak at this point in the cycle when compared to higher rated GKN
Holdings and Metalsa. Nemak's adjusted FFO net leverage is
projected by Fitch at around 1.8x in 2018, which compares with
expectations of about 1.5x for GKN and about 1x for Metalsa, which
has very conservative financial policies. Tupy's adjusted FFO net
leverage has typically been around 2x although this metric is not
directly comparable as Nemak's business profile is stronger.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within its  rating case for the issuer
include:
-- North America auto production flattens-out over the
    intermediate term.
-- Equivalent unit volume grows low to mid-single digits over the
    intermediate term.
-- Capex of around 9% of sales over the intermediate term.
-- Dividends of about USD170 million per year.
-- The U.S. dollar exchange rate against the Mexican peso does
    not weaken significantly below MXN18:USD1.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Positive Rating Action
-- A favorable outcome from NAFTA negotiations that does not
    undermine North America auto supply chains;
-- Continued expectations of gross leverage strengthening below
    2x.

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Negative Rating Action
-- A severe decline in North American vehicle production that
    leads to reduced demand for Nemak's products;
-- A reduction in EBITDA generation resulting in total
    debt/EBITDA above 3x for a sustained period of time;
-- Sustained negative FCF;
-- Sustained weak liquidity relative to upcoming debt
    obligations;
-- Large acquisitions or investments financed mostly with debt
    resulting in an expectation of higher leverage levels in the
    mid- to long term.

LIQUIDITY

Sound Liquidity: Nemak's liquidity position is considered sound.
As of third quarter 2017, the company's short-term debt was USD156
million. This debt is mostly composed of working capital financing
and bank debt amortizations, which favorably compares to USD130
million of non-restricted cash and USD349 million in undrawn
committed credit lines maturing predominantly in 2018-2020. Fitch
projects Nemak's cash flow from operations (CFFO) should remain
strong at around USD600 million.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has affirmed Nemak's ratings as follows:

-- Long-term Foreign currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR)
    at 'BB+';
-- Long-term Local currency IDR at 'BB+';
-- Long-term national scale rating at 'AA-(mex)';
-- USD500 million senior unsecured notes due 2023 at 'BB+'.
-- EUR500 million senior unsecured notes due 2024 at 'BB+'



======================
P U E R T O    R I C O
======================


COLONIAL MEDICAL: Case Summary & 20 Largest Unsecured Creditors
---------------------------------------------------------------
Debtor: Colonial Medical Management Corp
        PO Box 1716
        Anasco, PR 00610

Business Description: Colonial Medical Management Corp is an
                      ambulatory health care clinic located in
                      Anasco, Puerto Rico.  Colonial Medical
                      Management Corp's practice location is
                      listed as Carretera 402 Km 1.8 Bo. Marias
                      Anasco, PR 00610.  The company previously
                      sought bankruptcy protection on March 13,
                      2014 (Bankr. D. P.R. Case No. 14-01922).

Chapter 11 Petition Date: November 21, 2017

Case No.: 17-06925

Court: United States Bankruptcy Court
       District of Puerto Rico (Old San Juan)

Judge: Hon. Brian K. Tester

Debtor's Counsel: Ada M Conde, Esq.
                  1611 LAW AND JUSTICE FOR ALL, INC.
                  PO Box 11674
                  San Juan, PR 00910
                  Tel: 787-721-0401
                  Email: 1611lawandjustice@gmail.com

Estimated Assets: $0 to $50,000

Estimated Liabilities: $1 million to $10 million

The petition was signed by Luis Jorge Lugo Velez, president.

A full-text copy of the petition containing, among other items,
a list of the Debtor's 20 largest unsecured creditors is
available for free at http://bankrupt.com/misc/prb17-06925.pdf



===============
S U R I N A M E
===============


SURINAME: Moody's Puts B1 Issuer Rating on Review for Downgrade
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed the B1 long-term issuer
rating and senior unsecured notes of the government of Suriname on
review for downgrade.

The decision to initiate the review for downgrade was prompted by
the following:

1) Significant deterioration in the government's fiscal position,
as reflected in debt ratios that are at higher levels than
previously expected

2) The likelihood that fiscal reforms will proceed more slowly in
the absence of an IMF program

3) Increasing government liquidity risks because financing has
shifted toward short-term domestic debt issuance

Moody's review will focus on assessing:

1) Suriname's medium-term fiscal outlook, likely fiscal policy and
the expected trajectory for revenues, primary spending, and debt
affordability

2) The government's funding options for 2018 and policies to
increase resiliency to external shocks

3) The outlook for growth, particularly in the mining sector, and
its fiscal and balance-of-payment implications

During the review, Moody's will also assess how Suriname's overall
credit profile will evolve compared with those of other sovereigns
rated in the B category.

RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR INITIATING THE REVIEW FOR DOWNGRADE

FIRST DRIVER: FISCAL METRICS HAVE WEAKENED MORE THAN PREVIOUSLY
EXPECTED

Moody's expects that Suriname's government debt burden will have
peaked in 2017 at 70.5% of GDP, up from 26% of GDP in 2014, and
that it will stabilize around 60% of GDP, higher than the rating
agency had previously expected. Revisions to the 2017 budget along
with a draft 2018 budget point to a slower pace of fiscal
consolidation, with larger fiscal deficits envisioned in both
years compared with earlier expectations.

In its draft 2018 budget (published in September 2017) and its
medium-term government finance framework, the government revised
its 2017 deficit target to 6.0% of GDP, from 4.0% previously, and
stated that it expects the deficit to narrow to 5.5% of GDP in
2018. In Moody's opinion, these revisions represent a slower place
of consolidation, even compared with the rating agency's
previously conservative forecasts. Moreover, the combination of
interest payments and public wages will equal 60% of total
revenues, leaving limited flexibility to adjust to shortfalls in
revenues or financing. Without the introduction of measures to
increase non-mining revenues, Suriname's fiscal position will
remain susceptible to commodity price volatility.

Through the first seven months of 2017, non-mining revenue
collection has pointed to a weak economic recovery, while mining-
related revenue have increased as expected, benefiting from
increased gold production and prices. Revenues, both mining and
non-mining, have not recovered to levels recorded earlier in the
decade. In addition, as still weak domestic economy has contained
growth in non-mining revenues. Despite a reduction in recurring
government expenditures in recent years, Moody's expect some
fiscal slippage to result in a fiscal deficit somewhat larger than
the government's target of 6.0% in 2017.

Debt affordability metrics have deteriorated as a result of an
increase in interest expenditures in combination with lower
government revenue intake, with interest payments expected to
reach 3.5% of GDP in 2017. Moody's expects interest expenditures
to take up 19% of revenues in 2017, compared with less than 5.0%
in 2012, and above the median for B-rated sovereigns. The rating
agency notes that the deterioration in these fiscal metrics could
erode Suriname's fiscal strength, exerting downward pressure on
its credit profile.

SECOND DRIVER: UNCERTAINTY OVER PACE AND EXTENT OF FISCAL REFORMS
IN THE ABSENCE OF AN IMF PROGRAM

A reversal of fiscal deterioration is unlikely without effective
measures to significantly narrow fiscal deficits, and diversify
the government's revenue base to increase its resilience to future
shocks. Moody's had viewed the government's Stand By Arrangement
with the IMF, initiated in April 2016, as an anchor for Suriname's
public accounts management and its efforts to repair government
finances. However, in May 2017, the government's program with the
IMF was canceled, which, along with larger-than-expected fiscal
deficits this year, increases the uncertainty around the content,
pace and implementation of reforms aimed at increasing fiscal
flexibility and resiliency to fluctuations in government revenues.

Moody's review for downgrade will focus on the government's own
plans for fiscal consolidation and the extent to which their
implementation can arrest or reverse the deterioration in debt
metrics over the last two years. The government is considering the
introduction of a value-added tax (VAT) in 2018, a plan to address
energy subsidies, along with the creation of a sovereign wealth
fund to accumulate excess commodity revenues. If implemented, such
measures could support Suriname's fiscal strength.

The beginning of mining operations at Newmont's Merian mine has
already contributed to an improvement in Suriname's external
accounts, and Moody's still expect to see further increases in
mining-related government revenue. The announcement of a
significant gold discovery at the Saramacca project, located 25
kilometers from the existing Rosebel gold mine, could facilitate
additional revenue growth and upside to Moody's assessment of
economic strength. While the exact implications for government
finances and the economy will hinge on the timeline and outlook
for exploitation and production, the latest discovery could
provide significant support to both the government's fiscal
prospects and Suriname's economic outlook starting in 2019.

THIRD DRIVER: INCREASING GOVERNMENT LIQUIDITY RISKS AS FINANCING
HAS SHIFTED TO SHORT-TERM DOMESTIC DEBT ISSUANCE

The cancelation of the IMF program has resulted in delays in
funding from multilateral donors which had pledged budget support
conditional on the successful implementation of the IMF program.
As a result, the government has relied more heavily on domestic
financing of the deficit this year. In addition to drawing down
the unused portion of proceeds for its 2016 Eurobond issuance, the
government has relied on Treasury bills to finance its deficit in
2017. Short-term domestic debt has increased from 19% of total
domestic debt at the end of 2016 to 27% as of June 2017.

The government's deficit financing needs along with the roll-over
of short-term domestic debt will keep gross funding needs above
10% of GDP in 2018. A lack of visibility into 2018 financing
options heightens government liquidity risk. While Suriname
benefits from a favorable debt structure, and the government has
cleared previously accumulated non-debt related arrears, it has a
very limited track record in covering debt-servicing costs to
private creditors while staying current on other expenditures.

Moody's review will seek to ascertain how Suriname's financing
needs will be met over the near and medium term. The rating agency
will also explore the domestic financial system's capacity to
finance government debt and assess the extent to which
multilateral and bilateral external borrowing can meet the
government's borrowing needs.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING -- DOWN

Moody's could downgrade the rating if the review were to conclude
that Suriname's government's fiscal strength has eroded to levels
no longer consistent with B1 rated peers. In arriving at its
conclusion, the rating agency will assess the likely effectiveness
of the government's fiscal policy response as well as the near-
and medium-term growth outlook, and its impact on fiscal and
balance of payments metrics.

WHAT COULD LEAD TO A CONFIRMATION OF THE RATING AT THE CURRENT
LEVEL

Moody's would confirm the rating at B1 if its review were to
conclude that the government's planned reforms, including the
introduction of a VAT and plan for electricity tariff increases,
among others, will not only increase the revenue base, reduce
fiscal deficits and debt levels but also reduce the fiscal
position's vulnerability to commodity price shocks in the future.

GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 15,633 (2015 Actual) (also known
as Per Capita Income)

Real GDP growth (% change): -2.7% (2015 Actual) (also known as GDP
Growth)

Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 25.1% (2015 Actual)

Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -10.6% (2015 Actual) (also known
as Fiscal Balance)

Current Account Balance/GDP: -16.5% (2015 Actual) (also known as
External Balance)

Level of economic development: Low level of economic resilience

Default history: At least one default event (on bonds and/or
loans) has been recorded since 1983.

On November 20, 2017, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of the Government of Suriname. The main points raised
during the discussion were: The issuer's fiscal or financial
strength, including its debt profile, has materially decreased.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Sovereign Bond
Ratings published in December 2016.

The weighting of all rating factors is described in the
methodology used in this credit rating action, if applicable.


=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================


VENEZUELA: Creditors Begin Organizing Among Themselves
------------------------------------------------------
Katia Porzecanski at Bloomberg News reports that as Venezuela
struggles to make bond payments on time, about a dozen
institutions holding the country's debt are in the early stages of
organizing themselves and meeting with attorneys, according to
people with knowledge of the matter.

The group -- which isn't yet an official committee -- includes
mutual-fund managers Pacific Investment Management Co., T. Rowe
Price Group Inc., Amundi Pioneer, Ashmore Group Plc,
AllianceBernstein Holding LP, Fidelity Investments, BlackRock Inc.
and Allianz SE, as well as the asset-management arms of Goldman
Sachs Group Inc. and HSBC Holdings Plc, according to Bloomberg
News.  It also includes hedge-fund firms Greylock Capital
Management, Autonomy Capital, and Warlander Asset Management, said
the people, who asked not to be identified because the talks are
private, the report discloses.

The mutual-fund investors are among the biggest holders of debt
issued by either Venezuela or its state oil company, Petroleos de
Venezuela, according to filings compiled by Bloomberg, which
represent about a fifth of the total debt outstanding.  Both
Ashmore and Autonomy have funds that are specifically dedicated to
investments in Venezuela, Bloomberg News relates.

Bloomberg News discloses that the efforts to organize come amid
significant bond payment delays that led ratings companies to
declare the nation and its state oil company in default.  While
the government said earlier this month that it will seek to
restructure its debt with global investors, officials have also
insisted that the nation will keep paying its obligations while it
sorts out a plan with creditors, Bloomberg News relays.  Coming up
with a solution will be particularly challenging because of U.S.
sanctions that restrict investors from engaging with some top
officials and purchasing new debt, Bloomberg News notes.

The group met Nov. 20 with Rich Cooper, a partner at Cleary
Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, and Mark Walker, the head of
sovereign advisory at Millstein & Co., and is entertaining
proposals from other attorneys as well, Bloomberg News relays.
The Institute for International Finance, which hosted a call for
creditors earlier this month, has begun to serve as liaison
between the group and the U.S. Treasury Department, Bloomberg News
notes.

                             *   *   *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America, Robin
Wigglesworth at The Financial Times related that Venezuela
appeared to have made a crucial bond repayment in late October.
The Latin American country and its state oil company PDVSA have
failed to make several debt payments in recent weeks, the report
noted. But the most important one was an $842 million instalment
due Oct. 29 on a PDVSA bond maturing in 2020, which, unlike most
of the other overdue debts, had no 'grace period' that allowed for
30 days to clean up any arrears without triggering a default, the
report notes.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Nov. 16, 2017, On Nov. 13, 2017, S&P Global Ratings lowered its
long- and short-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to 'SD/D' from 'CC/C'. The
long- and short-term local currency sovereign credit ratings
remain at 'CCC-/C' and are still on CreditWatch with negative
implications. S&P said, "At the same time, we lowered our issue
ratings on Venezuela's global bonds due 2019 and 2024 to 'D' from
'CC'. Our issue ratings on the remainder of Venezuela's foreign
currency senior unsecured debt remain at 'CC'. Finally, we
affirmed our transfer and convertibility assessment on the
sovereign at 'CC'."


VENEZUELA: Some Bondholders Joust for Advantage
-----------------------------------------------
Dion Rabouin, Maiya Keidan, Corina Pons at Reuters report that
Venezuela's efforts to restructure its debt may have triggered an
initial stampede for the exits, but some investment funds are
maintaining their portfolios or even beefing them up, betting that
other investors' distress could spell opportunity.

President Nicolas Maduro spooked bondholders this month when he
announced plans to restructure some $60 billion in bonds as his
socialist government struggles with an economic crisis brought on
by years of mismanagement, according to Reuters.

Yet, President Maduro also said the country would keep servicing
its obligations for now, the report notes.  That has given a
modicum of comfort to investors wagering on Venezuela's junk
bonds, some of whom are content to reap the massive yields they
offer, the report relays.

Others are actively positioning for large windfall profit similar
to what a group of Argentine creditors reaped last year after more
than a decade of litigation with Argentina's government, the
report notes.

Senior Venezuelan officials gave no clarification on the
government's strategy in a short and confused meeting with
creditors in the Venezuelan capital, says the report.

In the meantime, creditors have been organizing conference calls,
holding improvised meetings in Caracas hotels and discussing the
creation of groups that could represent bondholders in the event
of a default, the report relays.

"There are a lot of different conversations, a lot of lawyers,
financial advisers who are trying to solicit that dialogue," said
Diego Ferro, co-chief investment officer at Greylock Capital,
which focuses on high-yield and distressed assets, the report
relays.

Ferro said that for the past few weeks, he has been buying both
bonds issued by Venezuela's government as well as those sold by
its state-owned oil company PDVSA, with a preference for the
country's 2027 bond, the report notes.

Both the 2027 bond and all of those issued by PDVSA share a common
characteristic: They lack a clause that can force all bondholders
to accept a restructuring pact as long as 75 percent sign off on
the deal, the report relays.

The absence of such collective action clauses, or CACS, can allow
a small group of investors to hold out for better terms, as
famously happened after Argentina defaulted in 2001, the report
notes.

                       Echoes of Argentina

Distressed fund managers including Elliott Management and Aurelius
Capital Management reaped billions of dollars last year when they
negotiated a settlement with Argentina's newly elected government,
which was anxious to end more than a decade of legal battles with
bondholders, the report says.

"We're basically thinking of eventually going into a restructuring
not too dissimilar from what Argentina went through in 2001-2005,"
said Nicolas Galperin, founder of Onslow Capital Management, the
report notes.

The report relays that Mr. Galperin said his firm is looking to
buy the bonds for around 20 cents on the dollar and earn pass-
through interest with the hope of eventually selling them at a
profit through a future restructuring.

Mr. Galperin said he envisioned it as a two to three-year trade
and was employing the strategy on both PDVSA and Venezuela bonds,
the report relays.

But an Argentina-like solution is effectively impossible in the
short term, the report notes.

Sanctions imposed on Venezuela this year by the government of U.S.
President Donald Trump, in response to accusations that Maduro is
creating a dictatorship, block U.S. banks from acquiring newly
issued Venezuelan debt, Reuters discloses.

Investors would be unable to negotiate a settlement like the one
bondholders reached with Argentina because they cannot exchange
the bonds they hold for new debt, the report notes.

Sanctions against specific Venezuelan officials bar investors from
even sitting at the table with Vice President Tareck El Aissami
and Economy Minister Simon Zerpa, two prominent members of
Venezuela's debt negotiation commission, the report relays.

That means long-term investments are clouded by the possibility
that sanctions could impede a successful debt restructuring for
years, particularly if the opposition continues struggling to make
any headway at removing President Maduro, the report says.

Even though President Maduro is widely unpopular, the opposition
remains divided and in disarray, with its most prominent leaders
jailed, exiled or barred from holding public office, the report
relays.  Presidential elections are expected next year, the report
notes.

Nonetheless, investors continue to be attracted to lucrative
short-term returns, the report says.

A holder of Venezuela's most-traded bond, the 2027 maturity
VENGLB27=RR, would get a 34 annual percent return from interest
payments alone, the report relays.  That is 15 times what the same
investor would collect on a 10-year U.S. Treasury note, it adds.

Investors for now appear more interested in collecting those
outsized returns than initiating an Argentina-style battle --
though many believe Venezuela will eventually halt payments and
creditors will sue to pressure the government into a settlement,
according to the report.

Reuters says Bondholders walked away from the meeting in Caracas
with a clear message from Vice President El Aissami: Venezuela
"has hired the best lawyers."

Venezuela has appointed lawyer David Syed to advise it, working
alongside a team at global law firm Dentons, according to IFR, a
Thomson Reuters news service, the report notes.

Many saw El Aissami's words as a warning that, despite the
increasingly complex financial gymnastics, Caracas is preparing
for a battle, and that creditors should do so as well, the report
adds.

                             *   *   *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America, Robin
Wigglesworth at The Financial Times related that Venezuela
appeared to have made a crucial bond repayment in late October.
The Latin American country and its state oil company PDVSA have
failed to make several debt payments in recent weeks, the report
noted. But the most important one was an $842 million instalment
due Oct. 29 on a PDVSA bond maturing in 2020, which, unlike most
of the other overdue debts, had no 'grace period' that allowed for
30 days to clean up any arrears without triggering a default, the
report notes.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Nov. 16, 2017, On Nov. 13, 2017, S&P Global Ratings lowered its
long- and short-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to 'SD/D' from 'CC/C'. The
long- and short-term local currency sovereign credit ratings
remain at 'CCC-/C' and are still on CreditWatch with negative
implications. S&P said, "At the same time, we lowered our issue
ratings on Venezuela's global bonds due 2019 and 2024 to 'D' from
'CC'. Our issue ratings on the remainder of Venezuela's foreign
currency senior unsecured debt remain at 'CC'. Finally, we
affirmed our transfer and convertibility assessment on the
sovereign at 'CC'."


=================
X X X X X X X X X
=================


* BOND PRICING: For the Week From November 20 to Nov. 24, 2017
--------------------------------------------------------------

Issuer Name               Cpn     Price   Maturity  Country  Curr
-----------               ---     -----   --------  -------   ---

BA-CA Finance Cayman Lt   0.518    62.07               KY    EUR
AES Tiete Energia SA      6.7842   1.109  4/15/2024    BR    BRL
Argentina Bogar Bonds     2       39.36   2/4/2018     AR    ARS
Automotores Gildemeister  8.25    73.25   5/24/2021    CL    USD
Automotores Gildemeister  6.75    67      1/15/2023    CL    USD
Automotores Gildemeister  8.25    73.25   5/24/2021    CL    USD
Automotores Gildemeister  6.75    65.5    1/15/2023    CL    USD
CA La Electricidad        8.5     63.664  4/10/2018    VE    USD
Caixa Geral De Depositos  1.439   63.167               KY    EUR
Caixa Geral De Depositos  1.469                        KY    EUR
CSN Islands XII Corp      7       68                   BR    USD
CSN Islands XII Corp      7       66.266               BR    USD
Decimo Primer Fideicomiso 6       53.225 10/25/2041    PA    USD
Decimo Primer             4.54    43.127 10/25/2041    PA    USD
Dolomite Capital         13.217   73.108 12/20/2019    CN    ZAR
Enel Americas SA          5.75    56.172  6/15/2022    CL    CLP
Gol Linhas Aereas SA     10.75    35.861  2/12/2023    BR    USD
Gol Linhas Aereas SA     10.75    35.601  2/12/2023    BR    USD
Inversora Electrica       6.5     67.625  9/26/2017    AR    USD
Inversora Electrica       6.5     67.625  9/26/2017    AR    USD
MIE Holdings Corp         7.5     64.78   4/25/2019    HK    USD
MIE Holdings Corp         7.5     64.982  4/25/2019    HK    USD
NB Finance Ltd            3.88    61.816  2/7/2035     KY    EUR
Noble Holding             7.7     74.433  4/1/2025     KY    USD
Noble Holding             5.25    56.279  3/15/2042    KY    USD
Noble Holding             8.7     71.881  4/1/2045     KY    USD
Noble Holding             6.2     60.129  8/1/2040     KY    USD
Noble Holding             6.05    58.38   3/1/2041     KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.5     42.5                 KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.125   56.938  6/26/2022    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7       68.053  4/21/2020    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.125   41.366  6/26/2042    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     4.375   40.002  4/25/2025    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.25    39.211  6/27/2029    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     6       44.75   4/5/2023     KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.25    39.018  6/27/2029    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.5     42.95                KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     4.375   40.363  4/25/2025    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.125   41.635  6/26/2042    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     6       52.625  4/5/2023     KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.125   55.873  6/26/2022    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7       67.368  4/21/2020    KY    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    8.5     74.5   10/27/2020    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6       30.458  5/16/2024    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6       30.517 11/15/2026    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    9.75    35.677  5/17/2035    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    9       39.279 11/17/2021    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    5.375   30.267  4/12/2027    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    8.5     72.5   10/27/2020    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela   12.75    45.278  2/17/2022    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6       30.367  5/16/2024    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6       30.387 11/15/2026    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    9       39.316 11/17/2021    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    9.75    35.893  5/17/2035    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6       28.346 10/28/2022    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    5.5     30.123  4/12/2037    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela   12.75    45.23   2/17/2022    VE    USD
Polarcus Ltd              5.6     75      3/30/2022    AE    USD
Provincia del Chubut      4              10/21/2019    AR    USD
Siem Offshore Inc         4.04527 69.5   10/30/2020    NO    NOK
Siem Offshore             3.75176 65.75  12/28/2021    NO    NOK
STB Finance               2.05771 56.243               KY    JPY
Sylph Ltd                 2.367   64.438  9/25/2036    KY    USD
US Capital                1.63611 54.774 12/1/2039     KY    USD
US Capital                1.63611 54.774 12/1/2039     KY    USD
USJ Acucar                9.875   67     11/9/2019     BR    USD
USJ Acucar                9.875   67     11/9/2019     BR    USD
Venezuela                13.625   68.25   8/15/2018    VE    USD
Venezuela                 7.75    44.065 10/13/2019    VE    USD
Venezuela                11.95    40.785  8/5/2031     VE    USD
Venezuela                12.75    45.19   8/23/2022    VE    USD
Venezuela                 9.25    39.645  9/15/2027    VE    USD
Venezuela                11.75    40.005 10/21/2026    VE    USD
Venezuela                 9       36.285  5/7/2023     VE    USD
Venezuela                 9.375   37.69   1/13/2034    VE    USD
Venezuela                13.625   72.25   8/15/2018    VE    USD
Venezuela                 7       34.23   3/31/2038    VE    USD
Venezuela                 7       59.19  12/1/2018     VE    USD



                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

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                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
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856-381-8268.


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