TCRLA_Public/171214.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

          Thursday, December 14, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 248



ULTRAPETROL BAHAMAS: Moody's Lowers Corporate Family Rating to C


COMPANHIA SIDERURGICA: Fitch Puts B- IDR on Negative Watch

D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REP: Expected to Sign Securities Market Bill Into Law


BANCO INDUSTRIAL: S&P Affirms 'BB-' LT ICR, Outlook Stable


GRUPO CEMENTOS: Fitch Affirms BB Long-Term IDR; Outlook Stable
HIPOTECARIA SU: S&P Withdraws 3 Ratings on RMBS Notes

P U E R T O    R I C O

AEROSTAR AIRPORT: Moody's Confirms Ba2 Rating on $400MM Sr. Bonds
TOYS "R" US: Committee Taps JND as Information Services Agent

T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O

TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Should Consider Regulating Bank Fees, JSC Says


PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: To Pay China's Sinopec to Settle Dispute
VENEZUELA: Maduro's Payoff Couldn't Beat Abstention
VENEZUELA: To Export Gas for T&T by 2022, New Oil Minister Says

                            - - - - -


ULTRAPETROL BAHAMAS: Moody's Lowers Corporate Family Rating to C
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Ultrapetrol (Bahamas)
Ltd. Corporate Family Rating ("CFR") to C from Caa3. Subsequent to
the rating action, all ratings will be withdrawn.


Ratings were downgraded and will be withdrawn given the bankruptcy
proceedings. On February 6, 2017, the company filed for chapter 11
including a prepackaged joint plan of reorganization of the
debtors. According to the approved plan, the noteholders of the
First Preferred Ship Mortgage Notes were entitled to USD280.7316
per each USD1,000 principal amount.

Ultrapetrol (Bahamas) Limited, headquartered in Nassau, Bahamas,
operated in three businesses: River, Offshore, and Ocean.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Shipping Industry published in February 2014.


Issuer: Ultrapetrol (Bahamas) Ltd.

-- Corporate family rating -- downgrade to C, previously rated

-- $200 million Ship Mortgage Notes due 2021 - downgrade to C,
    previously rated Caa3

-- $25 million Senior Secured Notes due 2021 - downgrade to C,
    previously rated Caa3

Outlook actions:

Issuer: Ultrapetrol (Bahamas) Ltd.

-- Outlook, changed to stable from negative


COMPANHIA SIDERURGICA: Fitch Puts B- IDR on Negative Watch
Fitch Ratings has placed Companhia Siderurgica Nacional's (CSN)'s
'B-' Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings
(IDRs), National Scale rating's 'BB-(bra)' and 'B-'/'RR4' senior
unsecured notes on Rating Watch Negative.

The Negative Watch reflects CSN's elevated refinancing risks in
the short term. Within the next two months, Fitch expects CSN to
refinance about BRL10.7 billion within local banks, which should
occur in conjunction with the publication of its audited 2017's
quarterly financial statements, following changes in the
Independent Auditors. If successful, the company will need to
attempt to refinance BRL6.6 billion of international bonds
maturing in 2019 and 2020. The potential political turbulence in
Brazil due to general elections (October 18) and potential for
risk aversion toward Brazilian issuers, will pressure CSN to start
discussions with creditors as early as possible; and any failure
to make progress with the banks during the next few months could
lead to a rating downgrade.

The 'B-' rating reflects CSN's high leverage and the lack of
progress on asset sales during 2017. Other issues constraining the
rating include weak corporate governance and the delayed
publication of audited financial statements.


Improvement in Sector Fundamentals: Higher global iron ore and
steel prices correspond with an upward trend in domestic steel
prices, and some recovery in volumes has benefited CSN's operating
cash flow generation. Fitch projects that CSN's local steel sales
volumes will increase by 10% in 2018, after growing 4% in 2017,
mostly reflecting the strong rebound in automobile production in
Brazil. A bright spot for the local industry is that steel
producers have been able to apply consecutive price increases
since the mid-2016 due to strong international prices. Fitch
expects price increases of between 5% during 2018, excluding a
more meaningful double-digit increase to automakers.

Operating Cash Flow Recovery: CSN's operating cash flow (CFFO)
recovery relies on increasing flat steel sales, the ability to
continue passing along price increases in the domestic steel
segment, manageable coal costs, and sustained iron ore prices
above USD60 per ton. Fitch's base case scenario projects CSN's
EBITDA at approximately BRL4.4 billion for 2017 and BRL4.4 billion
in 2018, considering Fitch's iron ore price deck of USD55 for
2018. CSN's operating performance and cash flow generation are
largely sensitive to iron ore price. If iron ore prices, which are
currently around USD68, remain robust and average USD60 throughout
next year, the company's 2018 EBITDA would be BRL4.9 billion.
During the LTM ended Sept. 30, 2017, CSN generated BRL3.9 billion
of EBITDA and BRL686 million of CFFO; free cash flow (FCF) was
negative BRL479 million, per Fitch's calculation. These results
compare with BRL3.4 billion, BRL276 million and negative FCF of
BRL1.4 billion, respectively, in 2016.

Neutral Free Cash Flow: Considering the current capital structure
and the annual BRL2.5 billion interest burden CSN faces, Fitch
estimates CSN's FCF to be neutral during 2018, considering Fitch's
iron ore price deck of USD55 per ton. At USD60 per ton, FCF would
be positive by BRL450 million. Fitch's base case scenario
considers capex of BRL1.2 billion and BRL1.3 billion in 2017 and
2018, which represents a steady decline from BRL1.6 billion in
2016 and 2015. Going forward, working capital requirements will
return, as inventories are already at low levels, and accounts
receivable are pressured in order to support continued sales
expansion. Fitch's base case considers dividends distribution only
from 2019 on.

Leverage to Decline: Fitch's base case scenario estimates CSN's
net leverage to fall to 5.7x in 2017 from 7.3x in 2016 and 6.3x as
of the LTM period ended Sept. 30 2017. This improvement mostly
reflects the higher EBITDA generation. For 2018, net leverage is
expected to be stable at 5.7x with an iron ore price deck
assumption of USD55 per ton. Net leverage would decline to 4.0x to
5.0x in 2018 under a scenario of iron ore price at USD60 to
USD70/ton. These ratios would respectively decrease to 5.5x and
3.8x to 4.8x in an exercise of non-core assets sale of BRL1
billion. Fitch does not envisage a more material asset sale at
this moment, but considers that non-core asset sale (sort of
capital injection) would be considered positive by creditors and
could help the company in the refinancing discussions.

Elevated Refinancing Risks: The recurring negative free cash flow
generation has deteriorated CSN's historical robust cash position.
CSN's debt schedule amortization shows high concentration in the
short-to-medium term with amortization of BRL1.7 billion during
2017, BRL5.5 billion in 2018 and BRL15.1 billion between 2019 and
2020 (BRL6.6 billion of cross-border issuances). Fitch's base case
scenario assumes CSN will rollover the BRL10.7 billion of local
banks debt during first months of 2018 and then soon find
alternatives to refinance the 2019 and 2020's international bonds.
As a result of the debt renegotiations, Fitch does not expect any
relevant change in the company's debt profile in terms of addition
of collaterals (secured versus unsecured).

Corporate Governance and Event Risks: CSN's delay in releasing
audited financial statements, ongoing disagreements with
independents auditors, internal corruption investigation (so far
concluded, with no evidence of wrongdoing), no clear strategy for
the Transnordestina asset and the current discussion of
environmental licenses for its major facility, sets a framework of
weak corporate governance practices compared to other issuers in
Fitch's corporate rated universe in Brazil. The probability of
event risks for CSN is above-average. Leverage, which is believed
to be high, at the shareholder's level is also a concern.

Good Business Position: CSN's business position as an integrated
steelmaker remains solid, underpinned by captive access to raw
materials (iron ore/energy), high value-added portfolio of
products and an important share in the flat steel industry in
Brazil, which allows some ability to influence local prices. The
company has a diversified portfolio of assets, with operations in
the mining, steel, energy, cement and interests in railways and
ports operations. The company has a medium cost competitive
position in the iron ore segment, within the 2nd quartile of iron
ore cost curve. Giving its integrated operations in the steel, CSN
has a better position in the global slab cost curve (1st/2nd

Largely Dependent on the Brazilian Market: CSN's operations are
still concentrated in Brazil (around 60% of consolidated revenues,
on historical basis). As a result, its operations have been
significantly impacted by the recessionary environment in the
country over the last few years. Flat steel domestic sales in
Brazil are on a declining trend since 2014. CSN's 2016 flat steel
volume sales have dropped 40% since 2013, while its steel EBITDA
declined 23%. For 2017, local flat steel sales have started a
recovery with a 4% increase during the first 10 months of 2017,
mostly influenced by the increase in the auto production in


CSN's 'B-' ratings reflects its unbalanced capital structure, high
refinancing risks and corporate governance issues. CSN's more
integrated business profile and diversified portfolio of assets
compares well with Usinas Siderurgicas de Minas Gerais S.A.'s
(Usiminas; B). Both issuers are highly exposed to the local steel
industry in Brazil. CSN and Usiminas show much weaker business
position compared to the other Brazilian steel producer Gerdau S.A
(Gerdau; BBB-), that has a diversified footprint of operations
with important operating cash flow generated from its assets
abroad, mainly in US, and flexible business model (mini-mills)
that allow it to better withstand economic and commodities cycles.

From a financial risk perspective, Usiminas and CSN are far weaker
than Gerdau, which has been able to maintain positive free cash
flow generation, strong liquidity and no refinancing risks over
the last few years. CSN's corporate governance issues are a
concern and its faces elevated refinancing risks in the medium
term. In contrast, after concluding its debt restructuring,
Usiminas has a more manageable debt schedule amortization.


Fitch's key assumptions within Fitch rating case for the issuer
-- 4% increase in steel volumes sold during 2017; expansion of
    10% in 2018 ;
-- 9% decrease in iron ore volumes sold during 2017 and 5%
    increase in 2018;
-- Average iron ore price of USD70 per ton during 2017 and
    Fitch's price deck of USD55 per ton in 2018;
-- EBITDA of BRL3.7 billion in 2016 and BRL3.2 billion in 2017;
-- Successful refinancing of 2018's local banking debt;
-- No dividends paid in 2017 and 2018.


The recovery analysis assumes that CSN would be considered a going
concern in bankruptcy and that the company would be reorganised
rather than liquidated. Fitch has assumed a 10% administrative

Going-Concern Approach: CSN's going concern EBITDA is based on
2015 EBITDA. The going-concern EBITDA estimate reflects Fitch's
view of a sustainable, post-reorganisation EBITDA level upon which
Fitch's bases the valuation of the company.

The going-concern EBITDA is based on 2015 EBITDA that reflects a
scenario of intense volatilities in the steel industry, in terms
of volume and prices, and on the iron price fundamentals. The
EV/EBITDA multiple applied is 5.5x, reflecting CSN's strong market
share in the flat steel market and it also reflects a mid-cycle

Fitch applies a waterfall analysis to the post-default enterprise
value (EV) based on the relative claims of the debt in the capital
structure. Fitch debt waterfall assumptions take into account debt
at 31 December 2016. The waterfall results in a 36%/'RR4' Recovery
Rating for senior unsecured debt. Therefore, the senior unsecured
notes due 2019, 2020 and perpetual are 'B-'/'RR4'.


Developments that May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Negative Rating Action.

-- CSN's inability to succeed with the refinance the local
    banking debt in the next two to three months and afterwards
    start the bonds refinancing before end of 2018 will lead to a
    downgrade of CSN's ratings;

-- Further deterioration of the steel industry in Brazil, or
    inability to proceed with price increases would also pressure
    free cash flow generation and liquidity, and consequently the

Developments that May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Positive Rating Action.

-- A Rating Outlook to Stable could occur if CSN is successful in
    refinancing both local and cross-border debt;

-- Better than expected scenario for the local steel sales in
    Brazil and healthy iron ore fundamentals which would lead an
    improvement in FCF and net leverage to below 5.0x on
    sustainable basis, could lead a positive rating action.


Under CSN's audited financial statement of Dec. 31 2016, it
reported BRL5.6 billion of cash and marketable securities, BRL2.1
billion of short-term debt and BRL30.4 billion of total debt.
CSN's debt schedule amortization shows high concentration in the
short-to-medium term with amortization of BRL1.7 billion over
2017; BRL5.5 billion in 2018; and BRL15.1 billion between 2019 and
2020 (BRL6.6 billion of cross-border issuances). CSN's debt
primarily consists of prepayment export financings (36%), local
bank loans (24%), senior notes (19%) and perpetual bonds (11%).

As of Sept. 30, 2017, CSN's not audited financial statement
reported BR4.1 billion of cash and marketable securities, a very
tight position compared to its short term debt of BRL3.9 billion
and total debt of BRL29 billion, per Fitch's calculation.


Fitch has placed the following ratings on Negative Watch:
-- CSN Long-term Foreign and Local currency IDRs 'B-';
-- CSN National Long-Term rating 'BB-(bra)';
-- CSN Islands XI Corp. senior unsecured Long-Term rating
    guaranteed by CSN 'B-'/'RR4';
-- CSN Islands XII Corp. senior unsecured Long-Term rating
    guaranteed by CSN 'B-'/'RR4';
-- CSN Resources S.A. senior unsecured USD Note Long-Term rating
    guaranteed by CSN 'B-'/'RR4'.

D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REP: Expected to Sign Securities Market Bill Into Law
Dominican Today reports that the Chamber of Deputies approved the
bill to amend Dominican Republic's Securities Market legislation
with a two-thirds majority, and will be sent to President Danilo
Medina who's expected to sign it into Law.

The law stipulates an urgency to promote market transparency under
fair competition, through the reform of the Dominican Securities
Market structure and its rules of conduct, according to Dominican

As to requirement on third party liability, the bill states that
"No personal, civil or criminal action may be attempted against
the members of the Board, the Superintendent or similar officer,
or the personnel that render their services to the Superintendence
or the Board, for administrative acts performed during the
exercise of their functions, in accordance with the provisions of
this law," the report notes.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Nov. 20, 2017, Fitch Ratings has affirmed Dominican Republic's
Long-Term Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB-'
with a Stable Outlook.


BANCO INDUSTRIAL: S&P Affirms 'BB-' LT ICR, Outlook Stable
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB-' long- and 'B' short-term
global scale issuer credit ratings (ICRs) on Banco Industrial S.A.
(BI). The stand-alone credit profile (SACP) is 'bb'. The outlook
remains stable.

The ratings on BI continue to reflect its solid market position,
mainly in the corporate lending segment as the largest financial
institution in the country. The ratings also incorporate the
bank's projected risk-adjusted capital (RAC) ratio of 6% for the
next two years, reflecting the bank's recent capital injection
from its shareholders, its internal capital generation capacity,
and a reduced dividend payout ratio. S&P's assessment also takes
into account BI's balance sheet position with above-average
dollarization and its stable funding base that relies on retail
deposits. BI's deposit-based funding is one of its main strengths
that also provides it with enough liquidity to face short-term

The stable outlook over the next 12 months reflects that on the
sovereign. It also reflects S&P's belief that the entity will
maintain its financial and operating performance, according to its
base-case expectations.


GRUPO CEMENTOS: Fitch Affirms BB Long-Term IDR; Outlook Stable
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Grupo Cementos de Chihuahua, S.A.B. de
C.V.'s (GCC) Long-Term Local and Foreign Currency Issuer Default
Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB'. The Rating Outlook is Stable.

GCC's ratings reflect the company's solid business position in the
cement, ready mix and aggregates segments in the regions where it
has a presence, diversified operations in Mexico and the U.S. in
the non-residential and residential sectors, as well as positive
free cash flow generation through the recent industry cycle. The
ratings are limited by the company's scale relative to industry
peers' and by the cyclicality of the cement market.


Leading Market Shares: Grupo Cementos de Chihuahua, S.A.B. de
C.V.'s (GCC) contiguous presence from Chihuahua in northern Mexico
to North Dakota and efficient distribution and logistics system,
allow it to serve markets in 14 states across the U.S. Midwest,
Southwest and Rocky Mountain regions. The company is the dominant
cement producer in the state of Chihuahua and has strong market
positions in Colorado, North Dakota, South Dakota, Wyoming, New
Mexico and western Texas. Its strong geographic presence allows it
to ship products from areas of low demand to areas where supply is
constrained, which increases capacity utilization levels and
dilutes fixed costs, and bolsters its product offering throughout
its territories.

Competitive Industry: GCC derives about 65% of its EBITDA from the
U.S. market, where it often competes with larger global and
regional players with more financial resources. This competitive
threat has been somewhat mitigated by GCC's wide distribution
reach relative to its scale. The company continued to generate
positive FCF through the most recent industry downturn and
maintained relatively high profitability. Fierce price competition
following periods of waning demand remains a key risk for cement
producers with U.S. operations.

Performance Boosted by Pricing and Acquisitions: Operating EBITDA
strengthened to USD221 million as of the third quarter 2017 from
USD182 million a year ago, primarily due to strong pricing in
Mexico and the contribution from acquired assets in the U.S. GCC
acquired cement production capacity of 514,000 tons as well as
other ready-mix, aggregates and asphalt assets at the end of 2016.
Cement sales from this plant, which is located in the Permian
basin, have increased in 2017 as oil-well cement demand has risen
due to recovering oil production in the region.

Leverage Expected to Trend Down: GCC's total debt was USD698
million as of third-quarter 2017, and gross leverage was 3.2x.
This compares with gross leverage of 2.4x a year ago. GCC's net
debt increased by around USD180 million when compared to a year
ago mostly due to the funding of acquired assets. Limited capacity
expansions and rising U.S. demand should support rising prices in
the intermediate term and higher EBITDA. Fitch expects GCC's gross
leverage to decline to around 3x in 2018 due to increased cement
demand and stronger prices in GCC's main U.S. markets. Price
increases in Mexico are expected to slow amid macro-economic

Solid Cash Flow Generation: GCC's cash flow from operations (CFFO)
was USD135 million during 2016, similar to the USD122 million
during 2015, and significantly higher than the USD108 million
registered in 2014, primarily due to robust volumes at GCC's U.S.
division and strong pricing in the U.S. and Mexico. Fitch projects
CFFO to average about USD170 million in 2017, reflecting higher
volumes in the U.S. due to the acquired assets and sluggish volume
in Mexico, and boosted by a robust pricing environment in the
U.S.. GCC's expansion of South Dakota should lower freight costs
as new production substitutes shipments to nearby markets
currently sourced from GCC's plant in Pueblo, CO. This should also
be positive for profitability.


GCC derives about 65% of its EBITDA from the U.S. market, where it
often competes with larger global and regional players with more
financial resources. The remainder of the group's EBITDA is
generated in Mexico's Chihuahua state where the company is the
sole cement producer. This dual Mexico and U.S. presence is shared
by Elementia (BB+). However, Elementia enjoys stronger financial
market access due to its ownership by two of Mexico's largest
business groups. Elementia's product and geographic
diversification as a building product and building materials
hybrid with operations in North, Central and South America also
compare favorably. Fitch expects GCC to maintain slightly lower
net leverage than Elementia at around 2.5x for 2018 compared to
1.9x for GCC.

Cementos Pacasmayo (BBB-), a dominant cement producer in Northern
Peru, has a stronger capital structure with its net leverage
projected to gravitate toward 1.5x or less. Pacasmayo's long-term
growth prospects are supported by Peru's infrastructure spending,
which should benefit Peru's Northern region. While the U.S. market
is expected to continue to recover, the country's more developed
infrastructure make GCC's key market more mature than Peru,
Pacasmayo's key market.

GCC's capital structure is projected to be similar to that of
investment-grade cement companies such as CRH (IDR BBB), Lafarge
Holcim (IDR BBB) and Heidelberg (IDR BBB-) during the next two to
three years. GCC's lack of geographic diversification relative to
these companies, smaller scale, and competitive nature of U.S.
cement market, result in a business profile more consistent with
issuers rated in the 'BB' category.

Cemex (IDR BB-) and InterCement (IDR B+) have lower ratings than
GCC because their credit protection measures are projected to be
materially worse than GCC's during the next two years. Both of
these companies have strong businesses in several markets.
Votorantim Cimentos (IDR BBB-), which is a much larger cement
producer with a dominant position in Brazil and operations
throughout the world, is not a direct peer, as its rating is tied
to that of the Votorantim Group, which includes mining, pulp and
financial services subsidiaries.


Fitch's Key Assumptions Within the Agency's Rating Case for the
-- Revenues measured in U.S. dollars grow by double digits in
    2017, mainly reflecting the acquired assets, and by high
    single digits in 2018, reflecting additional volumes and
    robust pricing;

-- EBITDA rises above to around USD230 million in 2017 and to
    around USD250 million in 2018;

-- Debt amortizes according to schedule;

-- Capex is financed mostly through internal cash flow generation
    and available cash;

-- Dividends remain low in the USD10 million to USD15 million per
    year range.


Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Positive Rating Action
A rating upgrade in the near term is unlikely considering the
company's, business profile, targeted capital structure and
current credit metrics. A track record of maintaining total
leverage levels at or below 2.0x and a strong liquidity profile
would be considered positive for credit quality.
Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Negative Rating Action
-- Weak operational results reflecting increased price
    competition, market share loss or a material slowdown in
    cement demand on GCC's key markets of Chihuahua, Western
    Texas, Colorado, South Dakota and New Mexico;

-- A large debt-financed acquisition that increases total
    leverage above 3.5x;

-- A down turn industry cycle that causes net debt/EBITDA to rise
    above 3.0x;

-- Sustained negative FCF generation.


GCC's liquidity is sound. The company's cash position as of third-
quarter 2017 was USD179 million, and Fitch expects FCF to be
around USD50 million in 2017 and 2018 despite high expansion
capex. This compares with debt maturities of USD17 million for
2018 and USD48 million in 2019. GCC is increasing the capacity of
its Rapid City, SD plant by 440,000 tons. The total investment for
the project is USD90 million and is expected to be completed
during 2018. Fitch's base case suggests that GCC will be able to
fund the remaining capex related to this expansion with the cash
flow generated over the next 12 months.

GCC's total debt as of Sept. 30, 2017 was USD698 million and
consists mostly of USD260 million of notes due 2024 and bank debt.
GCC's net debt/EBITDA leverage was 2.3x as of third-quarter 2017,
compared with 1.5x a year ago. The company maintains good access
to bank lending, as evidenced by debt refinancings during 2013,
2015 and 2016.


Fitch has affirmed GCC's ratings as follows:
-- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR at 'BB';
-- Long-Term Local Currency IDR at 'BB';
-- USD260 million senior notes due 2024 at 'BB'.

The Rating Outlook is Stable.

HIPOTECARIA SU: S&P Withdraws 3 Ratings on RMBS Notes
S&P Global Ratings withdrew three ratings on Hipotecaria Su Casita
- Residential Mortgage-Backed Notes, a cross-border residential
mortgage-backed securities transaction originated by Hipotecaria
Su Casita S.A. de C.V. (not rated) and serviced by Adamantine
Servicios S.A. de C.V. (not rated).

S&P said, "We withdrew our 'CCC (sf)' long-term rating on the
class A notes following the Dec. 1, 2017, withdrawal of our long-
term rating on MBIA Insurance Corp., the notes' guarantor (see
"MBIA Inc. And Subsidiaries Ratings Affirmed, Then Withdrawn At
Issuer Request," published Dec. 1, 2017). For insured classes of
notes, our rating is generally the higher of the rating on the
insurer or the Standard & Poor's underlying rating (SPUR) on the

"A SPUR is our opinion of the stand-alone creditworthiness of an
obligation--that is, the capacity to pay debt service on a debt
issue in accordance with its terms--without considering an
otherwise applicable bond insurance policy. We lowered the 'CC
(sf)' SPUR on class A to 'D (sf)' to reflect the fact that the
portfolio has not generated sufficient cash flow to fully cover
the monthly interests; therefore, the transaction has been making
continuous claims to MBIA to fully meet its monthly interests

"We subsequently withdrew the SPUR on class A, as well as the 'D
(sf)' rating on class B, based on our opinion that the default
would persist in the future given the transaction's current
financial position, which as of October 2017, presented an
overcollateralization ratio (measured as 1 minus liabilities
divided by current assets) of -308.74%."


  Hipotecaria Su Casita - Residential Mortgage-Backed Notes
  Class        To         From
  A            NR         CCC (sf)
  B            NR         D (sf)


  Hipotecaria Su Casita - Residential Mortgage-Backed Notes
  Class               To     Interim     From
  Class A SPUR        NR     D (sf)      CC (sf)

P U E R T O    R I C O

AEROSTAR AIRPORT: Moody's Confirms Ba2 Rating on $400MM Sr. Bonds
Moody's Investors Service confirmed the Ba2 rating assigned to
$400 million (original outstanding amount) of senior secured bonds
issued by Aerostar Airport Holdings, LLC and changed the rating
outlook to negative. The rating action concludes the rating review
that was initiated on September 27.


The rating action reflects Aerostar's credit strengths that
partially mitigate the impact of Hurricane Maria on Puerto Rico
and its consequences on the economy and population trends.
Aerostar, the operator of San Juan Luis Munoz Maron Airport, has
an Airport Use Agreement (AUA) with airlines that sets a revenue
floor for the airport regardless of actual enplanements. While
Moody's expect that tourism related travel will be significantly
reduced in the short term, Moody's expect that it will materially
recover over the next two years. Moreover, outmigration and
diaspora related enplanements are expected to partially compensate
lower tourism travel in the short term.

The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (Ca negative) faces almost total
economic disruption in the near term and diminished output
probably through the end of the current fiscal year and maybe well
into the next. On one hand, a massive exodus of residents
relocating to the mainland, rather than rebuilding on the island,
could further erode Puerto Rico's economic base. On the other, an
infusion of federal relief and rebuilding funds could spur the
economic growth and infrastructure replacement that, under normal
conditions, has eluded Puerto Rico. According to preliminary
Moody's Analytics estimates, Puerto Rico faces lost economic
output of $20 billion to $40 billion over an indefinite period. If
concentrated in a single year, that loss would equate to as much
as 57% of GNP. For more information please visit

Aerostar estimates around $70 million in damages to its
infrastructure, but was able to resume operations within few days
after hurricane Maria hit the island. The airport has gradually
expanded commercial activity since then and currently 30 out of 35
gates are open and all airlines have restarted operations. The $70
million are expected to be materially funded with insurance


Given the negative outlook, a rating upgrade in the near term is
unlikely. Nonetheless, a solid recovery of tourism, an improved
operating environment and growth prospects on Puerto Rico could
lead to the stabilization of the outlook. A downgrade would result
if enplanements are materially reduced over an extended period due
to a slow recovery of tourism or lower revenues that lead to a
Moody's Debt Service Coverage Ratio below 2.0x on a sustained

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Privately
Managed Airports and Related Issuers published in September 2017.

TOYS "R" US: Committee Taps JND as Information Services Agent
The official committee of unsecured creditors of Toys "R" Us, Inc.
seeks approval from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia to hire JND Corporate Restructuring as
information services agent.

The firm will assist the committee in establishing and maintaining
a website to provide creditors with access to information; and
will maintain a telephone number and electronic mail address for
creditors to submit questions and comments regarding the Debtors
and their Chapter 11 cases.

The firm's hourly rates are:

                                Standard          Discounted
                            Hourly Rates        Hourly Rates
                            ------------        ------------
     Clerical                  $35-$55         $26.25-$41.25
     Case Assistant            $65-$85         $48.75-$63.75
     IT Manager                $75-$95         $56.25-$71.25
     Case Consultant           $85-$135        $63.75-$101.25
     Sr. Case Consultant      $145-$165        $108.75-$123.75
     Case Director            $175-$195        $131.25-$146.25

Travis Vandell, chief executive officer of JND, disclosed in a
court filing that his firm is a "disinterested person" as defined
in section 101(14) of the Bankruptcy Code.

JND can be reached through:

     Travis K. Vandell
     JND Corporate Restructuring
     8269 E. 23rd Avenue, Suite 275
     Denver, CO 80238
     Phone: 1-800-207-7160

                       About Toys "R" Us

Toys "R" Us, Inc., is an American toy and juvenile-products
retailer founded in 1948 and headquartered in Wayne, New Jersey,
in the New York City metropolitan area.  Merchandise is sold in
880 Toys "R" Us and Babies "R" Us stores in the United States,
Puerto Rico and Guam, and in more than 780 international stores
and more than 245 licensed stores in 37 countries and

Merchandise is also sold at e-commerce sites including

On July 21, 2005, a consortium of Bain Capital Partners LLC,
Kohlberg Kravis Roberts and Vornado Realty Trust invested $1.3
billion to complete a $6.6 billion leveraged buyout of the
company.  Toys "R" Us is now a privately owned entity but still
files with the Securities and Exchange Commission as required by
its debt agreements.

The Company's consolidated balance sheet showed $6.572 billion in
assets, $7.891 billion in liabilities, and a stockholders' deficit
of $1.319 billion as of April 29, 2017.

Toys "R" Us, Inc., and certain of its U.S. subsidiaries and its
Canadian subsidiary voluntarily filed for relief under Chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. E.D. Va. Lead Case No. Case No.
17-34665) on Sept. 19, 2017.  In addition, the Company's Canadian
subsidiary voluntarily commenced parallel proceedings under the
Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") in Canada in the
Ontario Superior Court of Justice.  The Company's operations
outside of the U.S. and Canada, including its 255 licensed stores
and joint venture partnership in Asia, which are separate
are not part of the Chapter 11 filing and CCAA proceedings.

Grant Thornton is the monitor appointed in the CCAA case.

Judge Keith L. Phillips presides over the Chapter 11 cases.

In the Chapter 11 cases, Kirkland & Ellis LLP and Kirkland & Ellis
International LLP serve as the Debtors' legal counsel.  Kutak Rock
LLP serves as co-counsel.  Toys "R" Us employed Alvarez & Marsal
North America, LLC as its restructuring advisor; and Lazard Freres
& Co. LLC as its investment banker.  It hired Prime Clerk LLC as
claims and noticing agent.  A&G Realty Partners, LLC, serves as
its real estate advisor.

On Sept. 26, 2017, the U.S. Trustee for Region 4 appointed an
official committee of unsecured creditors.  The committee hired
Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP as its legal counsel; Wolcott
Rivers, P.C. as local counsel; FTI Consulting, Inc. as financial
advisor; and Moelis & Company LLC as investment banker.

T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O

TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Should Consider Regulating Bank Fees, JSC Says
Aleem Khan at Trinidad Express reports that the Joint Select
Committee (JSC) of Parliament is suggesting that T&T follow
Jamaica and ensure that the fees that banks impose on their
customers receive regulatory oversight.

In its report, the JSC on Finance and Legal Affairs' Inquiry into
Commercial Banking Fees in Trinidad and Tobago said: "The Ministry
of Finance, in consultation with the Central Bank of Trinidad and
Tobago (CBTT), should examine the existing legislation governing
commercial banks and other financial institutions with a view (to)
providing legislative oversight of fees -- applicability and
quantum -- to commercial banking services," according to Trinidad

The JSC said called on the Ministry of Finance, in consultation
with the CBTT, to examine the provisions of section 10 (d) of the
Financial Institutions Act (FIA), with the view of issuing
rules/guidelines for the imposition of fees for commercial banking
services," the report notes.

The referenced section of the FIA states that the Central Bank may
issue guidelines on any matter it considers necessary to regulate
the market conduct of licensees, the report relays.


PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: To Pay China's Sinopec to Settle Dispute
The Latin American Herald reports that one week after Caracas
Capital and the Latin American Herald Tribune (LAHT) broke the
story that China's state-owned oil company Sinopec was suing
Venezuela's state owned oil company Petroleos de Venezuela S.A.
(PDVSA), Sinopec -- after 6 years of trying -- has announced that
it is withdrawing the lawsuit as PDVSA has agreed to pay the debt.

LAHT's scoop went worldwide and even the Chinese Foreign Ministry
was forced to comment on it.

"There is no need to read too much into it," Geng Shuang,
spokesperson for China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said,
according to The Latin American Herald.  "I want to stress that
China attaches high importance to the development of China-
Venezuela relations, and we stand ready to continue with our all-
around pragmatic cooperation with Venezuela on the basis of
equality, mutual benefit and common development," he added.

But apparently there was, as Sinopec has withdrawn the suit after
Venezuela suddenly agreed to pay it, the report notes.

"PDVSA agrees to pay Sinopec USA that accepts it, in relation to
the Arbitration and Litigation . . . the total . . .  of
US$21,517,472.27 . . . PDVSA agrees to make the Settlement Payment
. . . in two parts: the first payment for the amount of RMB
71,500,000 to be paid on December 14, 2017, and the second payment
for the amount of RMB71,500,000 to be made on January 15, 2018 . .
.," the Settlement obtained by LAHT reads.

"Here's the most telling thing about the settlement," says Russ
Dallen, head of investment bank Caracas Capital, who follows
Venezuela closely and uncovered the lawsuit, the report relays.
"The dispute was not a huge amount of money in light of the $60
billion that China has loaned to Venezuela -- it was only $23
million dollars -- but even though Venezuela sits atop the largest
oil reserves in the world, PDVSA is so badly run and so cash-poor
and so full of corruption that they can't even scoop together $23
million at one time to make this all go away," Mr. Dallen added,
the report relays.

Sinopec had filed suit against PDVSA in U.S. Federal District
Court in Houston, Texas on November 27, the report says.  On
November 21, Sinopec had filed a "Request for Arbitration" at the
International Court of Arbitration at the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC) against PDVSA and PDVSA subsidiary Bariven S.A, the
report notes.

                           The Dispute

In 2010, Sinopec had partnered with PDVSA in two blocks in the
Orinoco oil field, Junin 1 along with the Belarusian Oil Company
Belorusneft, as well as in Junin 8, the report says.  At one
point, Sinopec was talking about investing $14 billion to produce
200,000 barrels per day from the field, the report notes.  Sinopec
even had plans to build a refinery called Cabruta in Guarico to
process all the oil it would be producing, the report relays.

For the first half of this year, Sinopec's operating profit was
about $6 billion dollars.

With Venezuela having the largest oil reserves in the world, it
was no surprise for Sinopec and its bigger state owned sister the
China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) to be interested in
Venezuela's vast oil resources, the report discloses.

But those relationships have not gone the way either country would
have expected as PDVSA's unreliability, corruption and
incompetence have not only deterred further investment from the
Chinese but are beginning to end up just like their U.S.
competitors in international arbitration and the courts, the
report relays.

According to the lawsuit, the problem dates back to May 15, 2012,
when PDVSA gave Sinopec a purchase order (PO) for 45,000 tons of
steel rebar for $43.5 million, the report relays.

"Sinopec delivered the Steel Rebar, but the full amount due and
owing under the PO was never paid," says Sinopec in their lawsuit,
the report notes.  "Sinopec has suffered tens of millions of
dollars in damages as a result," the lawsuit added.

Now the Chinese are not quick to sue -- which is obvious from the
fact that the events causing this lawsuit date back almost 6
years, the report relays.  "We have searched all of the federal
and state litigation dockets and this is the only lawsuit with
Sinopec as the plaintiff that we could find in any U.S. court,"
said Russ Dallen, head of investment bank Caracas Capital Markets,
which first uncovered and revealed the case, the report notes.

And the Chinese were apparently more than patient with their
Venezuelans -- Sinopec was still trying to get Venezuela to pay
for years, even in October, the report relays.

"During October of 2017, Pedro Salazar, PDVSA's in-house counsel,
promised Sinopec to pay the Commercial Invoice," China alleges in
the complaint. "PDVSA's promises of payment have been empty at
every turn," Sinopec concluded, the report relays.

The court filings demonstrate a history of attempts to resolve the
issue, even at the highest levels, the report relays.

"During May of 2016, the President of Sinopec discussed payment of
the Commercial Invoice with PDVSA's Vice President of Finance, the
report notes.  She did not dispute that PDVSA could be held liable
in the matter by Sinopec, the report discloses.  To the contrary,
she 'promised to make the payment' to Sinopec," the complaint
alleges, the report relays.

Likewise, during September of 2016, PDVSA informed Sinopec that
the Board of Directors of PDVSA agreed to a proposal to pay the
Commercial Invoice, the report relays.  PDVSA and Sinopec
subsequently exchanged drafts of a settlement of this payment to
Sinopec in writing, but in the end PDVSA avoided the completion of
that process, the report relays.

The Chinese -- who usually take a more diplomatic tone -- had
clearly run out of patience with the partners they were supposed
to invest $14 billion with, the report notes.

"This is not simply a case of a broken promise to pay," the
lawsuit against PDVSA alleges, the report says.  "Rather, this
case involves a complex commercial transaction specifically
calculated to leave Sinopec without a remedy," the report

"Each of Defendants' conduct described herein was committed with
malice and intent to injure, or in the alternative, was committed
with conscious indifference to a high degree of risk to Sinopec, a
risk which was known to each of the Defendants," writes Sinopec's
counsel, the report relays.  "Each of Defendants' conduct also
constitutes actual fraud, justifying punitive damages," the report

Sinopec's resulting avoidance of giving any further money to
Venezuela is echoed by Petrochina, the main subsidiary of China's
biggest oil company China National Petroleum Company (CNPC), in an
insightful September story by Bloomberg's Lucia Kassai, the report
notes.  The money quote: "Petrochina advised its U.S. unit --
which has been the intermediary for much of the $45 billion in
loans that China has provided Venezuela in the past decade -- to
avoid any involvement in future loans to Petroleos de Venezuela .
. . ."

"These lawsuits show just how far relations between the two
countries have deteriorated," said Mr. Dallen, the report notes.
"After $60 billion dollars, the Chinese are ending up in the same
courts and international arbitrations as most others who have
tried to do business with a Chavista Venezuela," Mr. Dallen added.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Nov. 17, 2017, S&P Global Ratings lowered its corporate credit
rating on Petroleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA) to 'SD' from 'CC'.
At the same time, S&P lowered its issue-level ratings on the
company's senior unsecured notes due 2027 and 2037 to 'D' from

Oct. 27, 2017, Bloomberg News said the former chief executive
officer of Venezuela's state run-oil company said it will make
debt payments this year and next, even as he acknowledged the
crude producer is struggling with cash-flow and operational
issues.  The company has "all the resources to honor its
liabilities," Rafael Ramirez, who is now Venezuela's ambassador to
the United Nations, said in an interview in New York.

TCRLA, on Oct 23, 2017, RJR News said that one week before
Venezuela faces a critical debt payment, the distressed petro-
state is already late on a series of smaller bills. PDVSA, has two
major bond payments totaling about $2 billion due in the next
weeks, according to RJR News.  While the market expects the
company to avoid default, the missed payments have rattled
investors and raised fresh questions about how long embattled
President Nicolas Maduro's regime might last, the report noted.

VENEZUELA: Maduro's Payoff Couldn't Beat Abstention
Carlos Camacho at The Latin American Herald Times reports that as
expected, the government managed to paint the map of Venezuela
red, landing 331 municipalities and leaving the opposition with
only four, in city government elections marked by violations and
abstention.  At one point during the journey, head of government
Nicolas Maduro offered to pay voters, according to The Latin
American Herald Times.

"We have the duty to listen to the more than 70% of Venezuelans
that didn't vote," tweeted losing candidate for the Chacao
municipality, Robert Garcia, in conceding remarks, the report
notes.  Gustavo Duque, for the opposition, won that mayoralty,
which has never been in "chavista" hands, the report relays.

People didn't vote, not even after Mr. Maduro went on live
television offering them money to do so, the report says.  In the
afternoon, embattled head of state Nicolas Maduro said those PSUV
ruling party militants voting with "el carnet de la patria" (a
government welfare ID which is being used by the Regime to offer
food for loyalty) would receive a "reward", a promise that was
latter repeated by Erika Farias, the winning candidate in
Libertador, the largest municipality in Venezuela, the report

                   The Power of The Carnet

Tellingly, in the days leading to the elections, holders of "the
Fatherland ID" received Bs 500,000 from Mr. Maduro, the report

Equivalent to only $5 at the parallel exchange rate, that
"Christmas bonus" as Mr. Maduro described it is still almost two
months of minimum wage salary and compliments other benefits
"carnet" holders receive, such as access to subsidized foodstuffs
and free health care (which in theory is the province of all
Venezuelans, but in practice has been restricted for non-holders,
according to local media reports), the report discloses.

In spite of Mr. Maduro and Mr. Farias offers, abstention was
between 50% (according to the government) and 80%, according to
the opposition and preliminary data from city races, the report

Analyst Luis Vicente Leon said that, all in all, the elections
were not representative of Venezuela's political map, the report

"The President's option is still in the minority", Leon tweeted,
the report relays.

The oil-rich nation is in the midst of a nascent humanitarian
crisis, a fact the government begrudgingly admitted earlier this
year, the report relays.  Some 80% of Venezuelans live in poverty,
with 50% in "critical poverty", a concept that is difficult to
grasp for First World denizens: It basically means eating once a
day and being one step removed form homelessness, with no access
to health care or any other public services, the report says.

75% of the country's labor force of 10 million-plus people make
minimum wage, less than $2 a month, the report notes.  And 75% of
the workforce does not have a high-school diploma, including Mr.
Maduro himself, according to his published resume, the report

Observatorio Electoral Venezolano published a report listing 85
violations of electoral law, including one instance of an
opposition witness being threatened with jail by a PSUV party
representative, the report notes.  However, that's nothing new:
52% of all opposition mayors in Venezuela have some sort of
judicial measure against them, a situation that made campaigning
for reelection impossible for the majority of them, the report

                        *   *   *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America, Robin
Wigglesworth at The Financial Times related that Venezuela
appeared to have made a crucial bond repayment in late October.
The Latin American country and its state oil company PDVSA have
failed to make several debt payments in recent weeks, the report
noted. But the most important one was an $842 million instalment
due Oct. 29 on a PDVSA bond maturing in 2020, which, unlike most
of the other overdue debts, had no 'grace period' that allowed for
30 days to clean up any arrears without triggering a default, the
report notes.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Nov. 16, 2017, S&P Global Ratings lowered on Nov. 13, 2017, its
long- and short-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to 'SD/D' from 'CC/C'. The
long- and short-term local currency sovereign credit ratings
remain at 'CCC-/C' and are still on CreditWatch with negative
implications. S&P said, "At the same time, we lowered our issue
ratings on Venezuela's global bonds due 2019 and 2024 to 'D' from
'CC'. Our issue ratings on the remainder of Venezuela's foreign
currency senior unsecured debt remain at 'CC'. Finally, we
affirmed our transfer and convertibility assessment on the
sovereign at 'CC'."

VENEZUELA: To Export Gas for T&T by 2022, New Oil Minister Says
Trinidad Express reports that Venezuela expects to export half of
a billion cubic feet of natural gas to "mainly Trinidad and
Tobago" in under five years, new Venezuelan Petroleum Minister and
Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) President Manuel Quevedo said in
Caracas, Venezuela.

Mr. Quevedo's predecessor, former oil minister Eulogio Del Pino
was arrested in late November, along with others on alleged
corruption charges, according to Trinidad Express.  Venezuelan
president Nicolas Maduro named former military general, Quevedo,
to take Mr. Del Pino's place after firing him, the report relays.

Mr. Del Pino had told Trinidad and Tobago Energy Minister Franklin
Khan, as recently as the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF)
summit in Bolivia, also in the last week of November, that Mr.
Maduro would be visiting Port of Spain, the report notes.

                       *   *   *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America, Robin
Wigglesworth at The Financial Times related that Venezuela
appeared to have made a crucial bond repayment in late October.
The Latin American country and its state oil company PDVSA have
failed to make several debt payments in recent weeks, the report
noted. But the most important one was an $842 million instalment
due Oct. 29 on a PDVSA bond maturing in 2020, which, unlike most
of the other overdue debts, had no 'grace period' that allowed for
30 days to clean up any arrears without triggering a default, the
report notes.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Nov. 16, 2017, S&P Global Ratings lowered on Nov. 13, 2017, its
long- and short-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to 'SD/D' from 'CC/C'. The
long- and short-term local currency sovereign credit ratings
remain at 'CCC-/C' and are still on CreditWatch with negative
implications. S&P said, "At the same time, we lowered our issue
ratings on Venezuela's global bonds due 2019 and 2024 to 'D' from
'CC'. Our issue ratings on the remainder of Venezuela's foreign
currency senior unsecured debt remain at 'CC'. Finally, we
affirmed our transfer and convertibility assessment on the
sovereign at 'CC'."


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Joseph Cardillo at

                   * * * End of Transmission * * *