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/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/171218.mbx T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R L A T I N A M E R I C A Monday, December 18, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 250 Headlines B A H A M A S BAHAMAS: S&P 'BB+/B' Sovereign Credit Ratings, Outlook Stable B E R M U D A SEADRILL LTD: Confirms Receiving Two Rival Debt Plan Proposals B R A Z I L BRAZIL: President Expected to Be Released From Hospital MULTIPLAN EMPREENDIMENTOS: S&P Affirms Then Withdraws 'BB+' ICR ODEBRECHT SA: Says Payments to Peru President's Company Were Legal C A Y M A N I S L A N D S FGL HOLDINGS: Fitch Assigns BB+ Long-term IDR; Outlook Stable E L S A L V A D O R EL SALVADOR: S&P Alters Outlook to Positive, Affirms 'CCC+/C' SCRs J A M A I C A JAMAICA: Coconut Farmers Struggling to Find Consistent Market P E R U PERU: Congress Launches Process for President's Ouster V E N E Z U E L A PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: S&P Raises Sr. Unsec Notes Rating to 'CC' X X X X X X X X X * BOND PRICING: For the Week From December 11 to Dec. 15, 2017 - - - - - ============= B A H A M A S ============= BAHAMAS: S&P 'BB+/B' Sovereign Credit Ratings, Outlook Stable ------------------------------------------------------------- S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB+/B' long- and short-term sovereign credit ratings on The Commonwealth of The Bahamas. The outlook remains stable. OUTLOOK S&P said, "The stable outlook reflects our expectation that robust political institutions will anchor fiscal consolidation and higher, albeit low, economic growth over the next one-to-two years. "We could lower our ratings on The Bahamas over this period if public finances do not improve as quickly as expected. This could result from stagnant economic growth, external shocks, or weakened political commitment. The lack of confidence that this may generate could push debt costs higher, leading to a downgrade. "Conversely, we could raise the rating over the same timeframe if the government reduces the annual increase in general government debt beyond our expectations. This, combined with significantly higher economic growth forecasts, could lead to an upgrade." RATIONALE The rating on The Bahamas reflects the country's high external liquidity needs and debt levels--which are rising--and a stagnant economy that has lost competitiveness over the past decade. This deterioration has led to weakened public finances and higher debt levels. Nevertheless, the country's strong institutional foundation continues to provide necessary checks and balances that have prevented further erosion to creditworthiness. Institutional and Economic Profile: Strong institutions will drive public sector reform and policies to tackle growth constraints -- The new administration plans to create a more effective and - efficient public sector. -- Its reforms should free up resources for economic growth that the private sector will lead. -- Nevertheless, S&P believes that underlying competitiveness issues will be difficult to overcome in the near term. S&P said, "We expect that the measures implemented under the new administration should arrest the deterioration in The Bahamas' fiscal deficit and debt levels. The Free National Movement (FNM), led by Prime Minister Hubert Minnis, took office in May 2017. Winning 35 of 39 seats in the lower house, the FNM was elected with a strong mandate to rein-in government spending, reform the public sector, and encourage private sector growth. Strong political capital will likely facilitate reforms early in the government's tenure. However, we think that it will take time to see the dividends of these reforms translate into sustainable public finances and higher economic growth." The Bahamas' strong institutions allow for proactive policies to address fiscal deterioration and boost competitiveness. S&P said, "In our view, the country's political system is characterized by prudent and pragmatic macroeconomic policy across party lines, which provides the country with institutional stability. The leaders of The Bahamian government have alternated between the FNM and the Progressive Liberal Party over several decades, with smooth political transitions. We expect this stability to continue over the forecast horizon." This institutional stability provides a solid foundation for government reforms. Since taking office in May, the new administration has announced a number of policies intended to strengthen public sector finances, improve the transparency and accountability of government, and ease processes for doing business. Government leaders, many of who come from the private sector, are keen to encourage growth outside of government. The new administration has established an Ease of Doing Business Committee, which is largely made up of private sector representatives. The committee will advise the government on necessary reforms, ultimately aimed at driving private sector growth. The economy's falling real GDP per capita growth over the past decade reflects structural challenges that will be difficult to overcome in the near term. This growth is lower than that of peers with similar levels of income. Significant revisions to the country's GDP data published by the government's Department of Statistics in 2017 revealed a much larger economy than previously estimated. Based on this new data, S&P now believes that The Bahamas' GDP per capita will be about US$28,990 in 2017, which is nearly 27% higher than our 2017 estimate in 2016. However, the new information also reveals more volatile and significant contractions over the past several years. In S&P's view, this largely reflects the economy's concentration in tourism. The sector, which has suffered from weather-related disruptions, delays in major tourism projects, and a general loss in competitiveness, directly represents about 20%, and indirectly close to 50%, of The Bahamas' GDP. New room capacity and ongoing tourism projects will lead to slightly higher real GDP growth, averaging 1.4% annually, over the next three years. However, growing regional competition in tourism, exposure to weather-related shocks, high energy costs, still-high nonperforming loans that clog private sector lending, and high household indebtedness will continue to constrain growth. New room capacity will come from the gradual opening of the Baha Mar resort. The over US$4 billion resort began to gradually open in mid-2017 after several years of delays, in part because of a previous developer's bankruptcy in 2015. Although new developers have opened about 1,000 rooms in 2017, with an additional 1,300 rooms scheduled by mid-2018, S&P believes that the resort will need time to operate at full capacity. At the same time, hotel closures in other parts of the country, following damages inflicted by a hurricane in late 2016, took nearly 1,000 rooms out of commission in Grand Bahama in 2017. S&P estimates that this represents about 7% of the country's total hotel rooms, before Baha Mar's opening. There is no clear timeframe for those rooms returning to service. Decisive measures to address international scrutiny of offshore banking in The Bahamas should help stop further contraction in the financial services sector. Most estimates conclude that the sector represents about 15% of local GDP. Since taking office, the new administration has taken a multilateral approach in implementing the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)'s Common Reporting Standards for the Automatic Exchange of Information. Before this, The Bahamas was the last country that planned on using a bilateral approach, for which it received significant criticism. The new administration has prioritized strengthening the sector's anti-money laundering (AML)/counter terrorist financing (CTF) and tax transparency compliance, and has sought to avoid being included in any public listings of noncompliant countries. Nevertheless, S&P expects that limited links between the offshore banking sector and the real economy will continue to insulate The Bahamas from the sector's evolution. The direct contribution of the sector to GDP is an estimated 3%, while the sector employs less than 1% of the country's workforce. These values have been relatively stable, despite shifts in asset jurisdiction, over the past several years. Flexibility and Performance Profile: Spending cuts will halt the recent deterioration in the deficit, slowing the pace of debt increase -- Government spending spiked in the run-up to the 2017 elections and following Hurricane Matthew in late 2016. -- Spending cuts across government ministries since the new administration assumed office will reverse this trend. -- S&P expects the pace of growth in both external and domestic debt to slow over the next three years. Recent public sector spending measures will bring the deficit down to more sustainable levels, in our view. Since taking office, the FNM has called for a 10% cut in recurrent spending across all government sectors. The administration has also halted most public sector hiring. It implemented these policies in response to the deficit spiking to nearly 6% of GDP in the 2016-2017 fiscal year from 2.8% a year earlier. S&P expects that these cuts, together with the impact of one-off posthurricane spending and revenue measures that will not reoccur in the current fiscal year, will lead to a 3.2% of GDP deficit in 2017-2018. Thereafter, spending controls, which should benefit from new fiscal responsibility legislation and strengthened revenue collection, will continue to reduce the deficit. S&P forecasts that the deficit will average 2.2% of GDP over the next three years. Excluding the impact of the most recent Bank of the Bahamas (BOB) bailout, S&P expects that these deficits will lead to an average change in general government debt to GDP of 3.6% from 2017-2020. Significant financing needs in 2017 will push The Bahamas' net general government debt to 48% of GDP in 2017, from 42% in 2016. S&P said, "Thereafter, we expect more moderate deficits will slow the debt burden increase. We forecast that net debt will reach 52% of GDP by 2020. At the same time, we expect general government interest payments will average 12.5% of general government revenues from 2017-2020." S&P measures of debt include the debt of Bahamas Resolve Ltd. Resolve is a special-purpose vehicle the government created in 2014 to support the BOB, which is a government-owned commercial bank and the second-largest of the system's three domestic banks servicing a niche of midmarket commercial lending. As such, the government considers it systemically important in a system where Canadian banks account for a majority of the system's overall onshore assets. Over the past several years, BOB has transferred about B$268 million in problem assets to Resolve in exchange for promissory notes from Resolve. The most recent transfer took place in late 2017. As of September 2017, B$50 million of these notes have been repaid. In addition, the government injected capital into the bank in late 2016 by buying a B$40 million rights issue. In early 2017, the government subscribed to B$10 million of BOB's perpetual contingent convertible bonds that were later converted into common shares. Despite this ongoing support to BOB, we don't believe that these problems reflect widespread under provisioning in the Bahamian banking system. Other banks have been more proactive in provisioning or have less risky, more diversified portfolios. With a significant increase in public sector external borrowing, The Bahamas' external debt, will, we expect, continue to rise. In late 2017, the government issued US$750 million in international capital markets. The funds from this issuance refinanced short- term loans that the government used to finance the large deficit increase. This issuance adds to the central government's US$900 million in external bonds outstanding. Following this new debt, S&P expects the external debt of the public and financial sectors, net of useable reserves and financial-sector external assets, to rise to nearly 58% of current account receipts (CAR) in 2017. These figures do not include the external debt and foreign direct investment in the islands' substantial tourism sector. Beyond increasing external debt, large external liquidity needs and errors and omissions continue to contribute to a weak external profile. Errors and omission have increased significantly, accounting for nearly 70% of the current account deficit (CAD) in 2016, compared with 7% five years ago. Large errors and omissions complicate the analysis of the CAD financing and the country's overall external balance sheet. S&P said, "We estimate these errors and omissions likely represent underreported foreign direct investment or tourism flows. Based on the gross external liabilities of the country's large banking sector, we expect the gross external financial needs of the public and financial sectors to reach 331% of CARs in 2017. This reflects the still-high CAD and the financial sector's high rollover needs. However, we consider the sector's external assets highly liquid, which somewhat diminishes liquidity risk. We expect external liquidity needs to decline over the next three years, but remain above 300% of CAR through 2020." The Bahamas' limited monetary and exchange rate flexibility constrain its ability to respond to external shocks. The Bahamian dollar is fixed at par with the U.S. dollar. S&P said, "We expect that the central bank will continue to primarily rely on credit ceilings and capital controls to influence money supply. The central bank has recently eased access to foreign currency and external financing for entities with foreign currency inflows as a way to stimulate business activity. However, this activity's limited nature and restriction to sectors that generate foreign currency should limit the impact on the country's external accounts. In addition, we expect that the banking sector will continue rolling over its external debt despite concerns raised by ongoing data leaks of offshore bank accounts in The Bahamas, along with accounts in other offshore financial centers, over the past several years. At the same time, a rising number of financial institutions--25% of survey respondents in the most recent survey conducted by the central bank in 2016--have been affected by the withdrawal of correspondent banking relationships. While we do not believe that this trend will threaten the banking sector's ability to roll over its debt, we do think that it could further stress the financial system." Nevertheless, the central bank's new AML/CFT supervision regime should strengthen compliance and assist in the maintenance of the system's correspondent banks. In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the methodology applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision. After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria. Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts. The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected in the Ratings Score Snapshot above. The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision. The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized in the above rationale and outlook. The weighting of all rating factors is described in the methodology used in this rating action. RATINGS LIST Ratings Affirmed Commonwealth of The Bahamas (The) Sovereign credit rating BB+/Stable/B Transfer and convertibility assessment Local currency BBB- Senior unsecured ============= B E R M U D A ============= SEADRILL LTD: Confirms Receiving Two Rival Debt Plan Proposals -------------------------------------------------------------- Nerijus Adomaitis at Reuters reports that drilling rig firm Seadrill confirmed on Dec. 13 it had received two rival bids for its debt restructuring from unsecured bondholders. The company, which filed for Chapter 11 restructuring in a U.S. court on Sept. 12, has sought alternative proposals for the plan put forward by its main owner, Norwegian-born billionaire John Fredriksen and a group of hedge funds, Reuters relates. "We have received two alternative bids from unsecured bondholders . . . We are evaluating these bids and are in active dialogue with the bidders," Reuters quotes the company as saying in an emailed statement. "Generally, the bids seek to replace some or all of the existing Restructuring Support Agreement (RSA) new money providers, while replicating the broad construct of the existing Plan." Mr. Fredriksen and a group of hedge funds have proposed to invest $1.06 billion via new equity and secured debt to restructure indebted Seadrill, once the largest drilling rig operator by market value, Reuters discloses. According to Reuters, Seadrill declined to provide more details on the bids or the bidders, but said its evaluation was pending "the receipt of a satisfactory deposit from bidders". Seadrill, as cited by Reuters, said it expected the court to hold a hearing on the official restructuring plan on Jan. 10. Reuters reported on Dec. 12 that Seadrill received one binding proposal from a group of bondholders, including about 40 investors from the United States, Europe and Asia. About Seadrill Limited Seadrill Limited is a deepwater drilling contractor, providing drilling services to the oil and gas industry. It is incorporated in Bermuda and managed from London. Seadrill and its affiliates own or lease 51 drilling rigs, which represents more than 6% of the world fleet. As of Sept. 12, 2017, Seadrill employs 3,760 highly-skilled individuals across 22 countries and five continents to operate their drilling rigs and perform various other corporate functions. As of June 30, 2017, Seadrill had $20.71 billion in total assets, $10.77 billion in total liabilities and $9.94 billion in total equity. Seadrill reported a net loss of US$155 million on US$3.17 billion of total operating revenues for the year ended Dec. 31, 2016, following a net loss of US$635 million on US$4.33 billion of total operating revenues for the year ended in 2015. After reaching terms of a reorganization plan that would restructure $8 billion of funded debt, Seadrill Limited and 85 affiliated debtors each filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Lead Case No. 17-60079) on Sept. 12, 2017. Together with the chapter 11 proceedings, Seadrill, North Atlantic Drilling Limited ("NADL") and Sevan Drilling Limited ("Sevan") commence liquidation proceedings in Bermuda to appoint joint provisional liquidators and facilitate recognition and implementation of the transactions contemplated by the RSA and Investment Agreement. Simon Edel, Alan Bloom and Roy Bailey of Ernst & Young serve as the joint and several provisional liquidators. In the Chapter 11 cases, the Company has engaged Kirkland & Ellis LLP as legal counsel, HoulihanLokey, Inc. as financial advisor, and Alvarez & Marsal as restructuring advisor. Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP, serves as special counsel to the Debtors. Slaughter and May has been engaged as corporate counsel, and Morgan Stanley serves as co-financial advisor during the negotiation of the restructuring agreement. Advokatfirmaet Thommessen AS serves as Norwegian counsel. Conyers Dill & Pearman serves as Bermuda counsel. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP UK, serves as the Debtors' independent auditor; and Prime Clerk is their claims and noticing agent. On September 22, 2017, the Office of the U.S. Trustee appointed an official committee of unsecured creditors. The committee hired Kramer Levin Naftalis& Frankel LLP, as counsel; Cole Schotz P.C. as local and conflict counsel; Zuill& Co. as Bermuda counsel; Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, UK LLP as English counsel; Advokatfirmaet Selmer DA as Norwegian counsel; and Perella Weinberg Partners LP as investment banker. =========== B R A Z I L =========== BRAZIL: President Expected to Be Released From Hospital ------------------------------------------------------- Luciana Magalhaes and Jeffrey T. Lewis at The Wall Street Journal report that Brazilian President Michel Temer, who was admitted to the hospital earlier in the capital of Brasilia after feeling "discomfort," is expected to be released, a presidential spokesman said. The president underwent a urological procedure and is currently resting, the spokesman said, according to The Wall Street Journal. Mr. Temer was first examined in the presidential palace by a staff physician, who detected a "urological obstruction" and recommended more tests be administered at the Army Hospital, the spokesman said in an email, the report notes. Mr. Temer remains in the hospital, the spokesman said. Brazil's lower house of Congress is scheduled to decide whether the president should be tried on corruption charges, the report relays. Congressman Henrique Fontana, from the opposition Workers' Party, told The Wall Street Journal that he expects the vote to be delayed due to the absence of a quorum. As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on Nov. 14, 2017, Fitch Ratings has affirmed Brazil's Long-Term Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB' with a Negative Outlook. MULTIPLAN EMPREENDIMENTOS: S&P Affirms Then Withdraws 'BB+' ICR --------------------------------------------------------------- S&P Global Ratings said it has affirmed its global scale 'BB+' ratings on Multiplan Empreendimentos Imobiliarios, with a negative outlook. S&P subsequently withdrew them at the issuer's request. The national scale and debt ratings on Multiplan were unaffected by the withdrawal. RATING LIST Ratings Affirmed Multiplan Empreedimentos Imobiliarios Issuer Credit Rating BB+/Negative/-- Ratings Withdrawn Multiplan Empreedimentos Imobiliarios To From Issuer Credit Rating NR BB+/Negative/-- ODEBRECHT SA: Says Payments to Peru President's Company Were Legal ------------------------------------------------------------------ Continental News Show reports that Brazilian construction company Odebrecht SA said the more than decade-old payments it made to Peruvian President Pedro Pablo Kuczynski's company when he was a Cabinet minister were within the bounds of the law. In a letter published by Peruvian daily La Republica, Odebrecht supported the explanations Mr. Kuczynski gave a message to the nation, in which he denied any wrongdoing and vowed to fight legislative efforts to force him out of office, according to Continental News Show. The report notes that Mr. Kuczynski delivered that address after Odebrecht revealed it paid more than $782,000 to Westfield Capital for consulting services between 2004 and 2007, a period in Mr. which Kuczynski served as then-President Alejandro Toledo's prime minister and economy minister, the report relays. He acknowledged being the owner of Westfield but said his friend and business partner, Chilean businessman Gerardo Sepulveda, was managing the company's contracts at the time, the report says. The president also admitted that after his time as a Cabinet minister he worked for another company -- Sepulveda-owned First Capital -- as a consultant on an Odebrecht project, the report says. Because the president had previously denied any political or professional ties to Odebrecht, Peru's opposition-controlled unicameral legislature filed a motion aimed at ousting him for "permanent moral incapacity," the report relays. Congress could remove him from office on Dec. 21 in a vote that requires a two-thirds majority (87 of 130 lawmakers), the report notes. Peru's constitution allows that legal concept to be employed to remove a head of state for extraordinary circumstances, even if the chief executive has not committed a crime, the report discloses. It was earlier used to oust Peruvian now-imprisoned former President Alberto Fujimori, whose bid to resign via fax from Japan was rejected by Peru's Congress, the report says. Odebrecht SA, which has entered into a plea deal with Peru's Attorney General's Office stemming from its massive, global bribery schemes, said it had not provided prosecutors with information about payments to Westfield Capital because they were not illegal, the report notes. But in response to a request from a congressional committee investigating the extent of Odebrecht's bribery schemes in Peru, the Brazilian company said in a document made public that it made more than $782,000 in payments to Westfield and also paid more than $4 million to First Capital for consulting services, the report relays. Odebrecht SA said Sepulveda managed the contracts for the services those two companies provided, the report notes. The report discloses that Mr. Kuczynski is the latest major Peruvian political figure dogged by corruption allegations. An arrest warrant has been issued for Toledo, who is accused of awarding Odebrecht SA a major highway project in exchange for $20 million in bribes, the report relays. Toledo, who denies wrongdoing, is a fugitive from justice who is currently living in the United States, the report notes. The report relays that Mr. Kuczynski's predecessor, Ollanta Humala, has been jailed on money laundering and conspiracy charges. Odebrecht SA and its Sao Paulo-based petrochemical unit Braskem reached a settlement last December with the United States Department of Justice in which they pleaded guilty to paying $788 million in bribes to government officials around the world to win business, the report notes. The companies agreed to pay a combined total penalty of at least $3.5 billion to resolve charges with authorities in the US, Brazil and Switzerland arising out of those schemes, the report adds. About Odebrecht Construtora Norberto Odebrecht SA is a Latin American engineering and construction company fully owned by the Odebrecht Group, one of the 10 largest Brazilian private groups. Construtora Norberto is the world's largest builder of hydroelectric plants, of sanitary and storm sewers, water treatment and desalination plants, transmission lines and aqueducts. The Group's main businesses are heavy engineering and construction based in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and Braskem S.A., its chemicals/petrochemicals company, based in Sao Paulo, Brazil. As of May 5, 2009, the company continues to carry Standard and Poor's BB Issuer Credit ratings, and Fitch Rating's BB+ Issuer Default ratings and BB+ Senior Unsecured Debt ratings. * * * As reporter in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on Dec. 2, 2016, The Wall Street Journal related that Marcelo Odebrecht, the jailed former head of Brazilian construction giant Odebrecht SA, agreed to sign a plea-bargain agreement in connection with Brazil's largest corruption probe ever, according to a person close to the negotiations. The move could roil the nation's political class yet again. The testimony of the former industrialist, which is part of the deal, has the potential to implicate numerous politicians who allegedly took kickbacks from contractors as part of a years-long graft ring centered on Brazil's state-run oil company, Petroleo Brasileiro SA, known as Petrobras, according to The Wall Street Journal. ========================== C A Y M A N I S L A N D S ========================== FGL HOLDINGS: Fitch Assigns BB+ Long-term IDR; Outlook Stable ------------------------------------------------------------- Fitch Ratings has assigned a 'BBB' Insurer Financial Strength (IFS) rating to F&G Re Ltd (F&G Re), a Bermuda-domiciled reinsurance entity. The rating assigned to F&G Re is the same as the existing IFS for Fidelity & Guaranty Life Insurance Company (FGLIC) and Fidelity & Guaranty Life Insurance Company of New York (collectively F&G Life). Fitch has also assigned a 'BB+' Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to both FGL Holdings, the Cayman Islands domiciled ultimate parent holding company, and to CF Bermuda Holding Limited, a Bermuda- based intermediate holding company. The Rating Outlook is Stable. KEY RATING DRIVERS The assignment of the 'BBB' IFS to F&G Re Ltd, a new Bermuda- domiciled reinsurance entity, is due to the application of the group rating approach based on Fitch's view that the entity is core to the group. The core status of F&G Re reflects the same branding of the entity as well as the assumption of 60% of FGLIC's core in-force and new annuity business via reinsurance. F&G Re has reasonably consistent capitalization and operating results tied to the overall group. The 'BB+' IDR assigned to both FGL Holdings, the Cayman Islands domiciled ultimate parent holding company, and to CF Bermuda Holding Limited. (CF Bermuda), a new Bermuda domiciled holding company aligns with the 'BB+' IDR currently assigned to Fidelity & Guaranty Life Holdings, Inc. (FGLH). F&G Life expects to hold enough cash between the intermediate and ultimate holding companies to cover at least 2x overall interest expense. In the assignment of IDRs to CF Bermuda and FGL Holdings, Fitch used a ring-fencing assumption based on the view that while a substantial amount of capital and earnings resides in Bermuda, most of the group's business is from the U.S. and the group operations and cash flows would still be potentially influenced by U.S. regulation. Fitch affirmed the IFS and upgraded the IDR and senior debt ratings of FGLH following the company's announcement of the completion of the acquisition by CF Corporation. See press release dated Nov. 30, 2017 for all related rating actions. RATING SENSITIVITIES The following could result in a downgrade of F&G Life's ratings: -- F&G Life's consolidated RBC ratio falling below 300% with operating leverage above 20x; -- Consolidated financial leverage for F&G Life exceeding 35%; -- Fixed charge coverage falling below 5x; -- Operating ROE below 5% over four consecutive quarters. F&G Life's ratings could be upgraded if: -- The company maintains operating ROEs above 10% on a consistent basis and consolidated RBC above 400%; -- Prism capital model score remains on the high end of 'Adequate'; -- Fixed charge coverage is at least 8x and financial leverage is below 25%. Fitch has assigned the following ratings: F&G Re Ltd -- IFS rating at 'BBB'. FGL Holdings -- Long-term IDR 'BB+'. CF Bermuda Holding Limited -- Long-term IDR 'BB+'. The Rating Outlook is Stable. ==================== E L S A L V A D O R ==================== EL SALVADOR: S&P Alters Outlook to Positive, Affirms 'CCC+/C' SCRs ------------------------------------------------------------------ S&P Global Ratings revised its outlook on the Republic of El Salvador to positive from stable. S&P also affirmed its 'CCC+/C' long- and short-term sovereign credit ratings on El Salvador. S&P's 'AAA' transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessment is unchanged. OUTLOOK The positive outlook indicates the at least one-in-three likelihood of an upgrade in the next 12 months if ongoing Congressional negotiations result in agreements on financing that would enable the government to meet upcoming amortizations in 2018 and a Eurobond ($800 million) due in December 2019, thus decreasing the likelihood of default. In addition, the positive outlook reflects recent gains from pension reform that will alleviate the government's structural fiscal deficit and reduce its short-term financing needs. S&P could raise the ratings within the next 12 months if the country's political leadership agrees on measures that facilitate better debt management, building on the recent pension reform. In contrast, S&P could lower the ratings if renewed political polarization and brinksmanship diminish the government's access to liquidity and raise the risk of another debt default. RATIONALE In S&P's opinion, El Salvador is currently vulnerable and is dependent on further political agreements to meet its financial commitments, though its expect El Salvador may not face a near- term (within 12 months) payment crisis. Prolonged political polarization has resulted in an uncertain policy environment and has eroded the government's capability to maintain timely debt service. Recently, El Salvador's Congress failed to approve a budget reallocation that was needed to cover payments owed to the country's private pension funds (Certificates for Pension Investments, or CIPs). As a result, the government defaulted on those payments in April 2017. Subsequently, Congress approved amendments to the term of the CIPs at the end of September, which S&P classified as a distressed exchange offer. Thus, S&P considers El Salvador's debt payment culture a credit risk that sustains S&P's poor assessment of its institutional and governance effectiveness. Political stalemate has dampened investor confidence and limited the country's economic growth prospects. Failure to promote private investments will likely impede economic growth in the coming years. Job creation through more dynamic economic activity is essential to tackle the large informal sector, which represents about 65% of working-age people. The approval of pension reform could allow the government to contain the upward trajectory of public debt, alleviate its fiscal deficit, and reduce its short-term financing needs. Nonetheless, El Salvador's limited monetary and fiscal flexibility and its high general government and external debt still constrain the ratings. Institutional and economic profile: Economic growth remains weak as political stalemate and crime hurt investment -- GDP growth is likely to remain around 2.2% in 2017-2019. -- A polarized political environment continues to weaken policymaking, limiting the country's prospects for economic growth. S&P said, "In our base case, we expect the country's GDP to grow 2.3% this year and in 2018 (or 1.8% on a per capita basis) and closer to 2% over the midterm. Per capita GDP growth averaged only 1.4% during 2010-2016. GDP growth picked up modestly in recent times because of favorable external conditions--mainly increasing U.S. demand. Additionally, growing and resilient remittances, which increased 10.3% as of September 2017, are a major factor boosting private consumption and have fueled economic growth beyond our previous expectation. Despite uncertainty regarding the impact of immigration policies pursued by the U.S. administration, we expect stable trend GDP growth in the coming two years. Prolonged political polarization and resulting uncertainty--more than a lack of physical infrastructure or other weaknesses typical of low-income countries--are an important short-term constraint on economic growth." Growth is also hurt by crime, typically related to drug- trafficking gangs and insecurity, including from extortions. Lack of public safety is also reflected in an increasing rate of emigration, especially to the U.S., where more than 2.3 million Salvadorans live (compared with 6.4 million in El Salvador). Over time, the government's anticrime plan ("El Salvador Seguro") could stimulate investment, business operating costs, and tourism. The ruling political party, Frente Farabundo Mart° para la Liberacion Nacional (FMLN), has little common ground with El Salvador's other major party, the Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA). ARENA holds 35 seats, and FMLN 31, in the country's 84- seat legislature. ARENA has enough votes to block any legislation that requires a two-thirds majority (external debt authorization, for example). Nevertheless, on Sept. 28, 2017, El Salvador's Congress unanimously approved a pension reform that signals an important political breakthrough after many previously failed negotiations. But the ability of the government and opposition parties to reach further agreements on fiscal policy remains a challenge because of the upcoming congressional and municipal elections in March 2018 and presidential elections in February 2019. However, as the two leading parties have incentives to solve roadblocks that could negatively affect the next government (taking office in June 2019), we believe both parties would likely cooperate to secure financing for $1.1 billion in debt repayments due in 2019, including an $800 million Eurobond due in December 2019. The 2018 budget, with negotiations mediated by the Inter-American Development Bank, needs to be approved by year-end with a two- thirds majority since it includes debt authorization (the government is asking for US$550 million in debt issuance). If the Congress fails to approve the budget, then the 2017 budget will be used for 2018. In such a scenario, we expect more fiscal pressure in the second half of the year. Additionally, the government is seeking to refinance Eurobond payments due 2019-2024. We expect at least that 2019 Eurobond repayment will be addressed by the current Congress before the March 2018 elections. Otherwise, amid political divisions, increasing refinancing risk could pressure our ratings on El Salvador. Flexibility and performance profile: Fiscal and external performance should result in a slight increase in debt over the next two years -- S&P expects the current account deficit (CAD) to stabilize around 3% of GDP in 2018-2020 given estimated moderate growth in remittances and an expected rise in commodities prices. -- S&P projects that El Salvador's gross external financing requirements will likely be around 100% of current account receipts (CAR) and usable reserves in the next three years. -- Fiscal policy remains the main tool of economic policy in the absence of monetary policy and a separate currency. -- S&P estimates that the change in general government debt to GDP will hover around 3.4% during 2017-2019. In 2017, the CAD is likely to decline to around 1% of GDP from over 2% in the previous year, mainly because of a 10% increase in remittances. Remittances could hover around 16% of GDP, thanks to renewed economic activity in the U.S. S&P expects that moderate growth in remittances and an expected recovery of imported commodities prices will increase the CAD around 3% of GDP in 2018- 2019, with the trade deficit slightly increasing to 19% of GDP (18% of GDP in 2016). The CAD will be only partly funded by foreign direct investment (FDI), which may remain slightly above 1% of GDP. The rest of the deficit will be funded largely by borrowing by the corporate sector, commercial banks, and the sovereign. S&P said, "We estimate that the country's gross external financing needs will average 100% of CAR and usable reserves over the next two years, up from 98% in 2017. We estimate narrow net external debt to CAR will be 88% in 2017 and will increase over the next two years." The government's debt burden exposes the sovereign to growing vulnerability to potentially adverse shifts in market sentiment. Relatively low FDI has led to reliance on external debt to fund the country's persistent CAD. In November 2016, a Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL) was approved with the objective of reducing the fiscal deficit below 3% of GDP over three years. The FRL also caps short-term debt at 20% of current revenues and caps total debt at 65% of GDP (or 45% excluding debt issued to fund the country's pension system). Moreover, the FRL sets a 2019 target for tax revenues at 17% of GDP and current expenditures at 18.5% of GDP. Estimated figures as of year-end 2017 are 15.9% and 17.7%, respectively. S&P said, "We estimate that the general government deficit (which includes the central government and the central bank) will be 3.2% of GDP in 2017 and could rise toward 3.5% of GDP in 2019-2020. We expect general government revenues will grow at the pace of nominal GDP as the government has ruled out tax increases ahead of the electoral cycle. Revenues could increase slightly as a result of tackling tax evasion. We expect that the average change in general government debt for 2017-2019 will be 3.4% of GDP, and we expect a stable trend in future years as a result of pension reform, which contained the previous upward trajectory of general government debt. The recent pension reform and amendments to the term of CIPs could generate about 0.6% of GDP in savings. "We project that net general government debt could rise to 61% of GDP in 2017 and slightly increase in subsequent years. The debt burden has risen in recent years, largely because of the need to fund obligations of the pension system, highlighting the importance of recently approved pension reform. Excluding pension- related debt, the general government debt burden is similar to its level in 2013. "In our opinion, an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to enhance the country's public finances is less likely because the government has already ruled out tax increases. Upcoming elections also reduce the chances of reaching an agreement with the IMF. As of October 2017, 53% of Salvadoran public debt was external, 21% domestic, and 26% pension-related--similar to its level at the end of 2016. From this external debt, 29% is due to multilateral institutions, 61% to bondholders, 3% to bilateral lenders, and 6% to financial institutions and commercial banks. Central government external debt slightly increased to 50% of the total debt, up from 49% as of December 2016. The stock of short-term locally issued debt (LETES) stands at $657 million as of October 2017; the constitutional limit is $1.3 billion. El Salvador's limited monetary and fiscal flexibility and its high general government and external debt burdens constrain the ratings. Total investment has remained below 15% of GDP for many years, thereby limiting GDP growth and contributing to fiscal strains. The country moved from a de facto pegged exchange rate with the U.S. dollar to full dollarization in 2001. S&P believes that the government is committed to this arrangement despite the economic costs of an inflexible monetary regime. Dollarization has lowered inflation and facilitated international trade, especially with the U.S., but it has failed to sufficiently lower local interest rates and promote investment and growth. As a result, much of the focus of government policy is on boosting productivity and reducing crime to promote investment. S&P expects inflation will stay contained, owning to dollarization and modest energy prices, ending 2017 at 1.5% and 2018-2019 at 2.1%. S&P said, "We assess El Salvador's banking system in our Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment (BICRA) group '10'. BICRAs are grouped on a scale from '1' to '10', ranging from what we view as the lowest-risk banking systems (group '1') to the highest-risk (group '10'). We believe that the banking system poses a limited contingent liability to the sovereign. Public-sector enterprises pose a limited contingent liability to the sovereign. El Salvador has a relatively small state-owned enterprise sector, thanks to privatization the sovereign implemented in previous years. "The T&C assessment remains 'AAA' based on our view that the sovereign will continue to use the U.S dollar as its currency and not restrict dollar outflows by private parties to make debt- service payments." In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the methodology applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision. After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria. Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts. The committee agreed that the economic rating factor had improved. All other key rating factors were unchanged. The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision. The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized in the above rationale and outlook. The weighting of all rating factors is described in the methodology used in this rating action. RATINGS LIST Ratings Affirmed; Outlook Action To From El Salvador (Republic of) Sovereign Credit Rating CCC+/Positive/C CCC+/Stable/C Ratings Affirmed El Salvador (Republic of) Transfer & Convertibility Assessment AAA Senior Unsecured CCC+ ============= J A M A I C A ============= JAMAICA: Coconut Farmers Struggling to Find Consistent Market ------------------------------------------------------------- RJR News reports that Jamaica Coconut Industry Board (CIB) has said several hundred coconut farmers are struggling to find a regular and consistent market for their coconuts. Christopher Gentles, Chairman of the CIB, noted that the sector has rebounded from the shortage caused by the record droughts of 2014 and 2015 and is now in a position of strength, according to RJR News. The CIB said there has been a substantial increase in the production of coconuts in the island over the past 18 months, the report notes. However, Mr. Gentles said cooler temperatures this year have also reduced the demand for jelly coconuts and have negatively impacted the sales of the Coconut Shop, the report says. As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America, S&P Global Ratings affirmed on Sept. 25, 2017, its 'B' long- and short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on Jamaica. The outlook on the long-term rating remains stable. At the same time, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B+' transfer and convertibility assessment on the country. ======= P E R U ======= PERU: Congress Launches Process for President's Ouster ------------------------------------------------------ ABC News reports that lawmakers in Peru launched proceedings to oust President Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, who refuses to resign after being accused of failing to disclose decade-old payments from a Brazilian company embroiled in Latin America's biggest corruption scandal. Congress voted overwhelmingly in favor of a motion to consider impeaching the former Wall Street banker for "permanent moral incapacity" after hours of debate that stretched into the night, according to ABC News. Mr. Kuczynski will have a chance to defend himself before lawmakers decide his fate, the report notes. The report relays that the political turmoil rocking Peru is the latest fallout from the wide-reaching Odebrecht SA corruption scandal that has ensnared some of Latin America's most powerful political leaders. The Brazilian construction giant admitted in a 2016 U.S. Justice Department plea agreement to paying nearly $800 million in bribes to obtain lucrative public works contracts, the report relays. Investigations continue as prosecutors throughout the region try to determine who in the halls of power met and accepted payments from Odebrecht SA, the report discloses. "The country is living an historic moment," lawmaker Indira Huilca told Peruvian congressional leaders before the vote, the report relays. "Odebrecht SA is just the tip of the iceberg," he added. Mr. Kuczynski has denied wrongdoing, stating in an impassioned speech that he had no involvement in payments made by Odebrecht- led consortiums to his Westfield Capital consulting firm, the report relays. "I'm not running and I'm not hiding because I have no reason to," the report quoted Mr. Kuczynski as saying. "I'm not going to abdicate my honor, my values or my responsibilities as president of all Peruvians," he added. Opposition lawmakers presented documents provided by Odebrecht SA showing $782,000 in payments to Westfield between 2004 and 2007, the report notes. Between those years, Peru awarded Odebrecht a major highway contract and Kuczynski was a high-ranking government official, the report relays. The president said he had no management duties at his consulting term during that period, the report says. He added that all the payments were made to his business partner, the report notes. That partner also owns First Capital, which the Odebrecht documents show received $4 million, the report relays. Mr. Kuczynski said all his earnings from Westfield were duly reported to Peru's tax authority, the report notes. Of the $4 million in payments to First Capital, he said only one transaction, for which he held up an invoice, was for financial consulting services he provided the firm in 2012 as part of its work on an Odebrecht-owned irrigation project, the report says. Mr. Kuczynski did not hold a public office in 2012. "I'm an honest man and have been all my life," Mr. Kuczynski said, the report notes. The 79-year-old president was elected in 2016 after a lucrative business career, the report relays. He campaigned on a pledge to clean up corruption and provide much-needed stability in one of South America's most politically volatile nations, the report discloses. The Odebrecht SA scandal continues to ripple across Latin America, with Ecuadorean Vice President Jorge Glas sentenced to six years in jail earlier after a court found him guilty of orchestrating a plot to accept bribes from the company, the report relays. Odebrecht SA has acknowledged paying $29 million in Peru during the 2001-2006 administration of President Alejandro Toledo and two of his successors, the report notes. Mr. Kuczynski served as Toledo's finance chief and prime minister. As recently as last month, Mr. Kuczynski denied having any professional or political ties to Odebrecht SA and wagged his finger at three predecessors accused of taking bribes from the company, the report recalls. His detractors now accuse him of misleading the nation, the report notes. Ninety-three of 118 lawmakers voted in favor of advancing impeachment proceedings, six more votes than the 87 that will be required to remove him out of office soon, the report says. As lawmakers debated his removal, Mr. Kuczynski was holed up in the presidential palace with top cabinet members, the report notes. Supporters of the president in congress described the impeachment vote as a power grab by opposition lawmakers who have a majority in congress, the report relays. They said Kuczynski shouldn't be removed for an isolated incident that took place before he became president, the report notes. Still, Peruvians are unlikely to be convinced by Mr. Kuczynski's reassurances that he did nothing wrong, analysts said, the report says. Steve Levitsky, a Harvard University political scientist who has spent years studying Peru, said Kuczynski was already a weak president with little legislative or popular support before the corruption allegations, which had been quietly dogging him for some time, the report notes. "He definitely seems to be dead in the water," said Mr. Levitsky, the report relays. "It's not that what he did was necessarily illegal, but the fact that he swore over and over again that he had no ties to Odebrecht, and that was proven to be nakedly false," he added. Mr. Kuczynski would not be the first president in Peru removed on moral grounds if lawmakers succeed. In 2000, President Alberto Fuijmori was ousted after flying to Japan amid a mounting corruption scandal, the report discloses. Mr. Fujimori is the father of Keiko Fujimori, who narrowly lost to Kuczynski in last year's election and is the leader of the Popular Force party, the report relays. Alberto Fujimori is in jail for human rights violations, the report notes. Both of his politician children have advocated for their father's release, the report says. Kenji Fujimori, his son and a current opposition congressman, urged lawmakers to listen to Kuczynski's testimony carefully before deciding how to cast their ballot, the report discloses. "I learned a lot from my father's experience," he said. "And I think the presumption of innocence should be respected," he added, notes the report. ================= V E N E Z U E L A ================= PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: S&P Raises Sr. Unsec Notes Rating to 'CC' ----------------------------------------------------------------- S&P Global Ratings corrected its issue-level rating on Petroleos de Venezuela S.A.'s (PDVSA's) 2024 senior unsecured notes by raising it to 'CC' from 'D'. S&P inadvertently lowered the rating on PDVSA's 2024 notes when it lowered the rating on the company's 2017 notes on Dec. 5, 2017. RATINGS LIST Petroleos de Venezuela S.A. To From 2024 sr. unsec. notes CC/Watch Neg D ================= X X X X X X X X X ================= * BOND PRICING: For the Week From December 11 to Dec. 15, 2017 -------------------------------------------------------------- Issuer Name Cpn Price Maturity Country Curr ----------- --- ----- -------- ------- --- BA-CA Finance Cayman Lt 0.518 62.07 KY EUR AES Tiete Energia SA 6.7842 1.109 4/15/2024 BR BRL Argentina Bogar Bonds 2 39.36 2/4/2018 AR ARS Automotores Gildemeister 8.25 73.25 5/24/2021 CL USD Automotores Gildemeister 6.75 67 1/15/2023 CL USD Automotores Gildemeister 8.25 73.25 5/24/2021 CL USD Automotores Gildemeister 6.75 65.5 1/15/2023 CL USD CA La Electricidad 8.5 63.664 4/10/2018 VE USD Caixa Geral De Depositos 1.439 63.167 KY EUR Caixa Geral De Depositos 1.469 KY EUR CSN Islands XII Corp 7 68 BR USD CSN Islands XII Corp 7 66.266 BR USD Decimo Primer Fideicomiso 6 53.225 10/25/2041 PA USD Decimo Primer 4.54 43.127 10/25/2041 PA USD Dolomite Capital 13.217 73.108 12/20/2019 CN ZAR Enel Americas SA 5.75 56.172 6/15/2022 CL CLP Gol Linhas Aereas SA 10.75 35.861 2/12/2023 BR USD Gol Linhas Aereas SA 10.75 35.601 2/12/2023 BR USD Inversora Electrica 6.5 67.625 9/26/2017 AR USD Inversora Electrica 6.5 67.625 9/26/2017 AR USD MIE Holdings Corp 7.5 64.78 4/25/2019 HK USD MIE Holdings Corp 7.5 64.982 4/25/2019 HK USD NB Finance Ltd 3.88 61.816 2/7/2035 KY EUR Noble Holding 7.7 74.433 4/1/2025 KY USD Noble Holding 5.25 56.279 3/15/2042 KY USD Noble Holding 8.7 71.881 4/1/2045 KY USD Noble Holding 6.2 60.129 8/1/2040 KY USD Noble Holding 6.05 58.38 3/1/2041 KY USD Odebrecht Finance Ltd 7.5 42.5 KY USD Odebrecht Finance Ltd 5.125 56.938 6/26/2022 KY USD Odebrecht Finance Ltd 7 68.053 4/21/2020 KY USD Odebrecht Finance Ltd 7.125 41.366 6/26/2042 KY USD Odebrecht Finance Ltd 4.375 40.002 4/25/2025 KY USD Odebrecht Finance Ltd 5.25 39.211 6/27/2029 KY USD Odebrecht Finance Ltd 6 44.75 4/5/2023 KY USD Odebrecht Finance Ltd 5.25 39.018 6/27/2029 KY USD Odebrecht Finance Ltd 7.5 42.95 KY USD Odebrecht Finance Ltd 4.375 40.363 4/25/2025 KY USD Odebrecht Finance Ltd 7.125 41.635 6/26/2042 KY USD Odebrecht Finance Ltd 6 52.625 4/5/2023 KY USD Odebrecht Finance Ltd 5.125 55.873 6/26/2022 KY USD Odebrecht Finance Ltd 7 67.368 4/21/2020 KY USD Petroleos de Venezuela 8.5 74.5 10/27/2020 VE USD Petroleos de Venezuela 6 30.458 5/16/2024 VE USD Petroleos de Venezuela 6 30.517 11/15/2026 VE USD Petroleos de Venezuela 9.75 35.677 5/17/2035 VE USD Petroleos de Venezuela 9 39.279 11/17/2021 VE USD Petroleos de Venezuela 5.375 30.267 4/12/2027 VE USD Petroleos de Venezuela 8.5 72.5 10/27/2020 VE USD Petroleos de Venezuela 12.75 45.278 2/17/2022 VE USD Petroleos de Venezuela 6 30.367 5/16/2024 VE USD Petroleos de Venezuela 6 30.387 11/15/2026 VE USD Petroleos de Venezuela 9 39.316 11/17/2021 VE USD Petroleos de Venezuela 9.75 35.893 5/17/2035 VE USD Petroleos de Venezuela 6 28.346 10/28/2022 VE USD Petroleos de Venezuela 5.5 30.123 4/12/2037 VE USD Petroleos de Venezuela 12.75 45.23 2/17/2022 VE USD Polarcus Ltd 5.6 75 3/30/2022 AE USD Provincia del Chubut 4 10/21/2019 AR USD Siem Offshore Inc 4.04527 69.5 10/30/2020 NO NOK Siem Offshore 3.75176 65.75 12/28/2021 NO NOK STB Finance 2.05771 56.243 KY JPY Sylph Ltd 2.367 64.438 9/25/2036 KY USD US Capital 1.63611 54.774 12/1/2039 KY USD US Capital 1.63611 54.774 12/1/2039 KY USD USJ Acucar 9.875 67 11/9/2019 BR USD USJ Acucar 9.875 67 11/9/2019 BR USD Venezuela 13.625 68.25 8/15/2018 VE USD Venezuela 7.75 44.065 10/13/2019 VE USD Venezuela 11.95 40.785 8/5/2031 VE USD Venezuela 12.75 45.19 8/23/2022 VE USD Venezuela 9.25 39.645 9/15/2027 VE USD Venezuela 11.75 40.005 10/21/2026 VE USD Venezuela 9 36.285 5/7/2023 VE USD Venezuela 9.375 37.69 1/13/2034 VE USD Venezuela 13.625 72.25 8/15/2018 VE USD Venezuela 7 34.23 3/31/2038 VE USD Venezuela 7 59.19 12/1/2018 VE USD *********** Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par. Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside sources during the prior week we think are reliable. Those sources may not, however, be complete or accurate. The Monday Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication. Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices for actual trades are probably different. Our objective is to share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities. Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report. Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to publication. At first glance, this list may look like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short. Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's assets. A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize. The prices at which equity securities trade in public market are determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test. Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged. Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com *********** S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors. Copyright 2017. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2746. This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior written permission of the publishers. Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is not guaranteed. The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year, delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof are US$25 each. For subscription information, contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Joseph Cardillo at 856-381-8268. * * * End of Transmission * * *