TCRLA_Public/171218.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

          Monday, December 18, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 250


                            Headlines



B A H A M A S

BAHAMAS: S&P 'BB+/B' Sovereign Credit Ratings, Outlook Stable


B E R M U D A

SEADRILL LTD: Confirms Receiving Two Rival Debt Plan Proposals


B R A Z I L

BRAZIL: President Expected to Be Released From Hospital
MULTIPLAN EMPREENDIMENTOS: S&P Affirms Then Withdraws 'BB+' ICR
ODEBRECHT SA: Says Payments to Peru President's Company Were Legal


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

FGL HOLDINGS: Fitch Assigns BB+ Long-term IDR; Outlook Stable


E L  S A L V A D O R

EL SALVADOR: S&P Alters Outlook to Positive, Affirms 'CCC+/C' SCRs


J A M A I C A

JAMAICA: Coconut Farmers Struggling to Find Consistent Market


P E R U

PERU: Congress Launches Process for President's Ouster


V E N E Z U E L A

PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: S&P Raises Sr. Unsec Notes Rating to 'CC'


X X X X X X X X X

* BOND PRICING: For the Week From December 11 to Dec. 15, 2017


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BAHAMAS: S&P 'BB+/B' Sovereign Credit Ratings, Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB+/B' long- and short-term
sovereign credit ratings on The Commonwealth of The Bahamas. The
outlook remains stable.

OUTLOOK

S&P said, "The stable outlook reflects our expectation that robust
political institutions will anchor fiscal consolidation and
higher, albeit low, economic growth over the next one-to-two
years.

"We could lower our ratings on The Bahamas over this period if
public finances do not improve as quickly as expected. This could
result from stagnant economic growth, external shocks, or weakened
political commitment. The lack of confidence that this may
generate could push debt costs higher, leading to a downgrade.

"Conversely, we could raise the rating over the same timeframe if
the government reduces the annual increase in general government
debt beyond our expectations. This, combined with significantly
higher economic growth forecasts, could lead to an upgrade."

RATIONALE

The rating on The Bahamas reflects the country's high external
liquidity needs and debt levels--which are rising--and a stagnant
economy that has lost competitiveness over the past decade. This
deterioration has led to weakened public finances and higher debt
levels. Nevertheless, the country's strong institutional
foundation continues to provide necessary checks and balances that
have prevented further erosion to creditworthiness.

Institutional and Economic Profile: Strong institutions will drive
public sector reform and policies to tackle growth constraints

-- The new administration plans to create a more effective and  -
    efficient public sector.

-- Its reforms should free up resources for economic growth that
    the private sector will lead.

-- Nevertheless, S&P believes that underlying competitiveness
    issues will be difficult to overcome in the near term.

S&P said, "We expect that the measures implemented under the new
administration should arrest the deterioration in The Bahamas'
fiscal deficit and debt levels. The Free National Movement (FNM),
led by Prime Minister Hubert Minnis, took office in May 2017.
Winning 35 of 39 seats in the lower house, the FNM was elected
with a strong mandate to rein-in government spending, reform the
public sector, and encourage private sector growth. Strong
political capital will likely facilitate reforms early in the
government's tenure. However, we think that it will take time to
see the dividends of these reforms translate into sustainable
public finances and higher economic growth."

The Bahamas' strong institutions allow for proactive policies to
address fiscal deterioration and boost competitiveness. S&P said,
"In our view, the country's political system is characterized by
prudent and pragmatic macroeconomic policy across party lines,
which provides the country with institutional stability. The
leaders of The Bahamian government have alternated between the FNM
and the Progressive Liberal Party over several decades, with
smooth political transitions. We expect this stability to continue
over the forecast horizon."

This institutional stability provides a solid foundation for
government reforms. Since taking office in May, the new
administration has announced a number of policies intended to
strengthen public sector finances, improve the transparency and
accountability of government, and ease processes for doing
business. Government leaders, many of who come from the private
sector, are keen to encourage growth outside of government. The
new administration has established an Ease of Doing Business
Committee, which is largely made up of private sector
representatives. The committee will advise the government on
necessary reforms, ultimately aimed at driving private sector
growth.

The economy's falling real GDP per capita growth over the past
decade reflects structural challenges that will be difficult to
overcome in the near term.  This growth is lower than that of
peers with similar levels of income. Significant revisions to the
country's GDP data published by the government's Department of
Statistics in 2017 revealed a much larger economy than previously
estimated. Based on this new data, S&P now believes that The
Bahamas' GDP per capita will be about US$28,990 in 2017, which is
nearly 27% higher than our 2017 estimate in 2016. However, the new
information also reveals more volatile and significant
contractions over the past several years. In S&P's view, this
largely reflects the economy's concentration in tourism. The
sector, which has suffered from weather-related disruptions,
delays in major tourism projects, and a general loss in
competitiveness, directly represents about 20%, and indirectly
close to 50%, of The Bahamas' GDP.

New room capacity and ongoing tourism projects will lead to
slightly higher real GDP growth, averaging 1.4% annually, over the
next three years. However, growing regional competition in
tourism, exposure to weather-related shocks, high energy costs,
still-high nonperforming loans that clog private sector lending,
and high household indebtedness will continue to constrain growth.
New room capacity will come from the gradual opening of the Baha
Mar resort. The over US$4 billion resort began to gradually open
in mid-2017 after several years of delays, in part because of a
previous developer's bankruptcy in 2015. Although new developers
have opened about 1,000 rooms in 2017, with an additional 1,300
rooms scheduled by mid-2018, S&P believes that the resort will
need time to operate at full capacity. At the same time, hotel
closures in other parts of the country, following damages
inflicted by a hurricane in late 2016, took nearly 1,000 rooms out
of commission in Grand Bahama in 2017. S&P estimates that this
represents about 7% of the country's total hotel rooms, before
Baha Mar's opening. There is no clear timeframe for those rooms
returning to service.

Decisive measures to address international scrutiny of offshore
banking in The Bahamas should help stop further contraction in the
financial services sector. Most estimates conclude that the sector
represents about 15% of local GDP. Since taking office, the new
administration has taken a multilateral approach in implementing
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)'s
Common Reporting Standards for the Automatic Exchange of
Information. Before this, The Bahamas was the last country that
planned on using a bilateral approach, for which it received
significant criticism. The new administration has prioritized
strengthening the sector's anti-money laundering (AML)/counter
terrorist financing (CTF) and tax transparency compliance, and has
sought to avoid being included in any public listings of
noncompliant countries. Nevertheless, S&P expects that limited
links between the offshore banking sector and the real economy
will continue to insulate The Bahamas from the sector's evolution.
The direct contribution of the sector to GDP is an estimated 3%,
while the sector employs less than 1% of the country's workforce.
These values have been relatively stable, despite shifts in asset
jurisdiction, over the past several years.

Flexibility and Performance Profile: Spending cuts will halt the
recent deterioration in the deficit, slowing the pace of debt
increase

-- Government spending spiked in the run-up to the 2017 elections
    and following Hurricane Matthew in late 2016.

-- Spending cuts across government ministries since the new
    administration assumed office will reverse this trend.

-- S&P expects the pace of growth in both external and domestic
    debt to slow over the next three years.

Recent public sector spending measures will bring the deficit down
to more sustainable levels, in our view. Since taking office, the
FNM has called for a 10% cut in recurrent spending across all
government sectors. The administration has also halted most public
sector hiring. It implemented these policies in response to the
deficit spiking to nearly 6% of GDP in the 2016-2017 fiscal year
from 2.8% a year earlier. S&P expects that these cuts, together
with the impact of one-off posthurricane spending and revenue
measures that will not reoccur in the current fiscal year, will
lead to a 3.2% of GDP deficit in 2017-2018. Thereafter, spending
controls, which should benefit from new fiscal responsibility
legislation and strengthened revenue collection, will continue to
reduce the deficit. S&P forecasts that the deficit will average
2.2% of GDP over the next three years. Excluding the impact of the
most recent Bank of the Bahamas (BOB) bailout, S&P expects that
these deficits will lead to an average change in general
government debt to GDP of 3.6% from 2017-2020.

Significant financing needs in 2017 will push The Bahamas' net
general government debt to 48% of GDP in 2017, from 42% in 2016.
S&P said, "Thereafter, we expect more moderate deficits will slow
the debt burden increase. We forecast that net debt will reach 52%
of GDP by 2020. At the same time, we expect general government
interest payments will average 12.5% of general government
revenues from 2017-2020."

S&P measures of debt include the debt of Bahamas Resolve Ltd.

Resolve is a special-purpose vehicle the government created in
2014 to support the BOB, which is a government-owned commercial
bank and the second-largest of the system's three domestic banks
servicing a niche of midmarket commercial lending. As such, the
government considers it systemically important in a system where
Canadian banks account for a majority of the system's overall
onshore assets. Over the past several years, BOB has transferred
about B$268 million in problem assets to Resolve in exchange for
promissory notes from Resolve. The most recent transfer took place
in late 2017. As of September 2017, B$50 million of these notes
have been repaid. In addition, the government injected capital
into the bank in late 2016 by buying a B$40 million rights issue.
In early 2017, the government subscribed to B$10 million of BOB's
perpetual contingent convertible bonds that were later converted
into common shares. Despite this ongoing support to BOB, we don't
believe that these problems reflect widespread under provisioning
in the Bahamian banking system. Other banks have been more
proactive in provisioning or have less risky, more diversified
portfolios.

With a significant increase in public sector external borrowing,
The Bahamas' external debt, will, we expect, continue to rise. In
late 2017, the government issued US$750 million in international
capital markets. The funds from this issuance refinanced short-
term loans that the government used to finance the large deficit
increase. This issuance adds to the central government's US$900
million in external bonds outstanding. Following this new debt,
S&P expects the external debt of the public and financial sectors,
net of useable reserves and financial-sector external assets, to
rise to nearly 58% of current account receipts (CAR) in 2017.
These figures do not include the external debt and foreign direct
investment in the islands' substantial tourism sector.

Beyond increasing external debt, large external liquidity needs
and errors and omissions continue to contribute to a weak external
profile. Errors and omission have increased significantly,
accounting for nearly 70% of the current account deficit (CAD) in
2016, compared with 7% five years ago. Large errors and omissions
complicate the analysis of the CAD financing and the country's
overall external balance sheet. S&P said, "We estimate these
errors and omissions likely represent underreported foreign direct
investment or tourism flows. Based on the gross external
liabilities of the country's large banking sector, we expect the
gross external financial needs of the public and financial sectors
to reach 331% of CARs in 2017. This reflects the still-high CAD
and the financial sector's high rollover needs. However, we
consider the sector's external assets highly liquid, which
somewhat diminishes liquidity risk. We expect external liquidity
needs to decline over the next three years, but remain above 300%
of CAR through 2020."

The Bahamas' limited monetary and exchange rate flexibility
constrain its ability to respond to external shocks. The Bahamian
dollar is fixed at par with the U.S. dollar. S&P said, "We expect
that the central bank will continue to primarily rely on credit
ceilings and capital controls to influence money supply. The
central bank has recently eased access to foreign currency and
external financing for entities with foreign currency inflows as a
way to stimulate business activity. However, this activity's
limited nature and restriction to sectors that generate foreign
currency should limit the impact on the country's external
accounts. In addition, we expect that the banking sector will
continue rolling over its external debt despite concerns raised by
ongoing data leaks of offshore bank accounts in The Bahamas, along
with accounts in other offshore financial centers, over the past
several years. At the same time, a rising number of financial
institutions--25% of survey respondents in the most recent survey
conducted by the central bank in 2016--have been affected by the
withdrawal of correspondent banking relationships. While we do not
believe that this trend will threaten the banking sector's ability
to roll over its debt, we do think that it could further stress
the financial system." Nevertheless, the central bank's new
AML/CFT supervision regime should strengthen compliance and assist
in the maintenance of the system's correspondent banks.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by
the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and
was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision.
After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot above.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook. The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

RATINGS LIST
  Ratings Affirmed

  Commonwealth of The Bahamas (The)
   Sovereign credit rating                BB+/Stable/B
  Transfer and convertibility assessment
   Local currency                         BBB-
  Senior unsecured


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SEADRILL LTD: Confirms Receiving Two Rival Debt Plan Proposals
--------------------------------------------------------------
Nerijus Adomaitis at Reuters reports that drilling rig firm
Seadrill confirmed on Dec. 13 it had received two rival bids for
its debt restructuring from unsecured bondholders.

The company, which filed for Chapter 11 restructuring in a U.S.
court on Sept. 12, has sought alternative proposals for the plan
put forward by its main owner, Norwegian-born billionaire
John Fredriksen and a group of hedge funds, Reuters relates.

"We have received two alternative bids from unsecured bondholders
. . . We are evaluating these bids and are in active dialogue with
the bidders," Reuters quotes the company as saying in an emailed
statement.

"Generally, the bids seek to replace some or all of the existing
Restructuring Support Agreement (RSA) new money providers, while
replicating the broad construct of the existing Plan."

Mr. Fredriksen and a group of hedge funds have proposed to invest
$1.06 billion via new equity and secured debt to restructure
indebted Seadrill, once the largest drilling rig operator by
market value, Reuters discloses.

According to Reuters, Seadrill declined to provide more details on
the bids or the bidders, but said its evaluation was pending "the
receipt of a satisfactory deposit from bidders".

Seadrill, as cited by Reuters, said it expected the court to hold
a hearing on the official restructuring plan on Jan. 10.

Reuters reported on Dec. 12 that Seadrill received one binding
proposal from a group of bondholders, including about 40 investors
from the United States, Europe and Asia.

                     About Seadrill Limited

Seadrill Limited is a deepwater drilling contractor, providing
drilling services to the oil and gas industry. It is incorporated
in Bermuda and managed from London. Seadrill and its affiliates
own or lease 51 drilling rigs, which represents more than 6% of
the world fleet.

As of Sept. 12, 2017, Seadrill employs 3,760 highly-skilled
individuals across 22 countries and five continents to operate
their drilling rigs and perform various other corporate
functions.

As of June 30, 2017, Seadrill had $20.71 billion in total assets,
$10.77 billion in total liabilities and $9.94 billion in total
equity.

Seadrill reported a net loss of US$155 million on US$3.17 billion
of total operating revenues for the year ended Dec. 31, 2016,
following a net loss of US$635 million on US$4.33 billion of
total operating revenues for the year ended in 2015.

After reaching terms of a reorganization plan that would
restructure $8 billion of funded debt, Seadrill Limited and 85
affiliated debtors each filed a voluntary petition for relief
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Lead
Case No. 17-60079) on Sept. 12, 2017.

Together with the chapter 11 proceedings, Seadrill, North
Atlantic Drilling Limited ("NADL") and Sevan Drilling Limited
("Sevan") commence liquidation proceedings in Bermuda to appoint
joint provisional liquidators and facilitate recognition and
implementation of the transactions contemplated by the RSA and
Investment Agreement. Simon Edel, Alan Bloom and Roy Bailey of
Ernst & Young serve as the joint and several provisional
liquidators.

In the Chapter 11 cases, the Company has engaged Kirkland & Ellis
LLP as legal counsel, HoulihanLokey, Inc. as financial advisor,
and Alvarez & Marsal as restructuring advisor. Willkie Farr &
Gallagher LLP, serves as special counsel to the Debtors.
Slaughter and May has been engaged as corporate counsel, and
Morgan Stanley serves as co-financial advisor during the
negotiation of the restructuring agreement.  Advokatfirmaet
Thommessen AS serves as Norwegian counsel.  Conyers Dill &
Pearman serves as Bermuda counsel.  PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
UK, serves as the Debtors' independent auditor; and Prime Clerk
is their claims and noticing agent.

On September 22, 2017, the Office of the U.S. Trustee appointed
an official committee of unsecured creditors.  The committee
hired Kramer Levin Naftalis& Frankel LLP, as counsel; Cole Schotz
P.C. as local and conflict counsel; Zuill& Co. as Bermuda
counsel; Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, UK LLP as English
counsel; Advokatfirmaet Selmer DA as Norwegian counsel; and
Perella Weinberg Partners LP as investment banker.



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BRAZIL: President Expected to Be Released From Hospital
-------------------------------------------------------
Luciana Magalhaes and Jeffrey T. Lewis at The Wall Street Journal
report that Brazilian President Michel Temer, who was admitted to
the hospital earlier in the capital of Brasilia after feeling
"discomfort," is expected to be released, a presidential spokesman
said.

The president underwent a urological procedure and is currently
resting, the spokesman said, according to The Wall Street Journal.

Mr. Temer was first examined in the presidential palace by a staff
physician, who detected a "urological obstruction" and recommended
more tests be administered at the Army Hospital, the spokesman
said in an email, the report notes.  Mr. Temer remains in the
hospital, the spokesman said.

Brazil's lower house of Congress is scheduled to decide whether
the president should be tried on corruption charges, the report
relays.  Congressman Henrique Fontana, from the opposition
Workers' Party, told The Wall Street Journal that he expects the
vote to be delayed due to the absence of a quorum.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Nov. 14, 2017, Fitch Ratings has affirmed Brazil's Long-Term
Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB' with a
Negative Outlook.


MULTIPLAN EMPREENDIMENTOS: S&P Affirms Then Withdraws 'BB+' ICR
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said it has affirmed its global scale 'BB+'
ratings on Multiplan Empreendimentos Imobiliarios, with a negative
outlook. S&P subsequently withdrew them at the issuer's request.
The national scale and debt ratings on Multiplan were unaffected
by the withdrawal.

RATING LIST
  Ratings Affirmed

  Multiplan Empreedimentos Imobiliarios
    Issuer Credit Rating                    BB+/Negative/--


  Ratings Withdrawn
   Multiplan Empreedimentos Imobiliarios    To    From
    Issuer Credit Rating                    NR    BB+/Negative/--


ODEBRECHT SA: Says Payments to Peru President's Company Were Legal
------------------------------------------------------------------
Continental News Show reports that Brazilian construction company
Odebrecht SA said the more than decade-old payments it made to
Peruvian President Pedro Pablo Kuczynski's company when he was a
Cabinet minister were within the bounds of the law.

In a letter published by Peruvian daily La Republica, Odebrecht
supported the explanations Mr. Kuczynski gave a message to the
nation, in which he denied any wrongdoing and vowed to fight
legislative efforts to force him out of office, according to
Continental News Show.

The report notes that Mr. Kuczynski delivered that address after
Odebrecht revealed it paid more than $782,000 to Westfield Capital
for consulting services between 2004 and 2007, a period in Mr.
which Kuczynski served as then-President Alejandro Toledo's prime
minister and economy minister, the report relays.

He acknowledged being the owner of Westfield but said his friend
and business partner, Chilean businessman Gerardo Sepulveda, was
managing the company's contracts at the time, the report says.

The president also admitted that after his time as a Cabinet
minister he worked for another company -- Sepulveda-owned First
Capital -- as a consultant on an Odebrecht project, the report
says.

Because the president had previously denied any political or
professional ties to Odebrecht, Peru's opposition-controlled
unicameral legislature filed a motion aimed at ousting him for
"permanent moral incapacity," the report relays.

Congress could remove him from office on Dec. 21 in a vote that
requires a two-thirds majority (87 of 130 lawmakers), the report
notes.

Peru's constitution allows that legal concept to be employed to
remove a head of state for extraordinary circumstances, even if
the chief executive has not committed a crime, the report
discloses.

It was earlier used to oust Peruvian now-imprisoned former
President Alberto Fujimori, whose bid to resign via fax from Japan
was rejected by Peru's Congress, the report says.

Odebrecht SA, which has entered into a plea deal with Peru's
Attorney General's Office stemming from its massive, global
bribery schemes, said it had not provided prosecutors with
information about payments to Westfield Capital because they were
not illegal, the report notes.

But in response to a request from a congressional committee
investigating the extent of Odebrecht's bribery schemes in Peru,
the Brazilian company said in a document made public that it made
more than $782,000 in payments to Westfield and also paid more
than $4 million to First Capital for consulting services, the
report relays.

Odebrecht SA said Sepulveda managed the contracts for the services
those two companies provided, the report notes.

The report discloses that Mr. Kuczynski is the latest major
Peruvian political figure dogged by corruption allegations.

An arrest warrant has been issued for Toledo, who is accused of
awarding Odebrecht SA a major highway project in exchange for $20
million in bribes, the report relays. Toledo, who denies
wrongdoing, is a fugitive from justice who is currently living in
the United States, the report notes.

The report relays that Mr. Kuczynski's predecessor, Ollanta
Humala, has been jailed on money laundering and conspiracy
charges.

Odebrecht SA and its Sao Paulo-based petrochemical unit Braskem
reached a settlement last December with the United States
Department of Justice in which they pleaded guilty to paying $788
million in bribes to government officials around the world to win
business, the report notes.

The companies agreed to pay a combined total penalty of at least
$3.5 billion to resolve charges with authorities in the US, Brazil
and Switzerland arising out of those schemes, the report adds.

                         About Odebrecht

Construtora Norberto Odebrecht SA is a Latin American
engineering and construction company fully owned by the
Odebrecht Group, one of the 10 largest Brazilian private groups.
Construtora Norberto is the world's largest builder of
hydroelectric plants, of sanitary and storm sewers, water
treatment and desalination plants, transmission lines and
aqueducts.  The Group's main businesses are heavy engineering
and construction based in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and Braskem
S.A., its chemicals/petrochemicals company, based in Sao Paulo,
Brazil.

As of May 5, 2009, the company continues to carry Standard and
Poor's BB Issuer Credit ratings, and Fitch Rating's BB+ Issuer
Default ratings and BB+ Senior Unsecured Debt ratings.

                        *     *     *

As reporter in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Dec. 2, 2016, The Wall Street Journal related that Marcelo
Odebrecht, the jailed former head of Brazilian construction giant
Odebrecht SA, agreed to sign a plea-bargain agreement in
connection with Brazil's largest corruption probe ever, according
to a person close to the negotiations.  The move could roil the
nation's political class yet again.  The testimony of the former
industrialist, which is part of the deal, has the potential to
implicate numerous politicians who allegedly took kickbacks from
contractors as part of a years-long graft ring centered on
Brazil's state-run oil company, Petroleo Brasileiro SA, known as
Petrobras, according to The Wall Street Journal.


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FGL HOLDINGS: Fitch Assigns BB+ Long-term IDR; Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned a 'BBB' Insurer Financial Strength
(IFS) rating to F&G Re Ltd (F&G Re), a Bermuda-domiciled
reinsurance entity. The rating assigned to F&G Re is the same as
the existing IFS for Fidelity & Guaranty Life Insurance Company
(FGLIC) and Fidelity & Guaranty Life Insurance Company of New York
(collectively F&G Life).

Fitch has also assigned a 'BB+' Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to
both FGL Holdings, the Cayman Islands domiciled ultimate parent
holding company, and to CF Bermuda Holding Limited, a Bermuda-
based intermediate holding company. The Rating Outlook is Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The assignment of the 'BBB' IFS to F&G Re Ltd, a new Bermuda-
domiciled reinsurance entity, is due to the application of the
group rating approach based on Fitch's view that the entity is
core to the group. The core status of F&G Re reflects the same
branding of the entity as well as the assumption of 60% of FGLIC's
core in-force and new annuity business via reinsurance. F&G Re has
reasonably consistent capitalization and operating results tied to
the overall group.

The 'BB+' IDR assigned to both FGL Holdings, the Cayman Islands
domiciled ultimate parent holding company, and to CF Bermuda
Holding Limited. (CF Bermuda), a new Bermuda domiciled holding
company aligns with the 'BB+' IDR currently assigned to Fidelity &
Guaranty Life Holdings, Inc. (FGLH). F&G Life expects to hold
enough cash between the intermediate and ultimate holding
companies to cover at least 2x overall interest expense.

In the assignment of IDRs to CF Bermuda and FGL Holdings, Fitch
used a ring-fencing assumption based on the view that while a
substantial amount of capital and earnings resides in Bermuda,
most of the group's business is from the U.S. and the group
operations and cash flows would still be potentially influenced by
U.S. regulation.

Fitch affirmed the IFS and upgraded the IDR and senior debt
ratings of FGLH following the company's announcement of the
completion of the acquisition by CF Corporation. See press release
dated Nov. 30, 2017 for all related rating actions.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The following could result in a downgrade of F&G Life's ratings:

-- F&G Life's consolidated RBC ratio falling below 300% with
    operating leverage above 20x;
-- Consolidated financial leverage for F&G Life exceeding 35%;
-- Fixed charge coverage falling below 5x;
-- Operating ROE below 5% over four consecutive quarters.

F&G Life's ratings could be upgraded if:
-- The company maintains operating ROEs above 10% on a consistent
    basis and consolidated RBC above 400%;
-- Prism capital model score remains on the high end of
    'Adequate';
-- Fixed charge coverage is at least 8x and financial leverage is
    below 25%.

Fitch has assigned the following ratings:

F&G Re Ltd
-- IFS rating at 'BBB'.

FGL Holdings
-- Long-term IDR 'BB+'.

CF Bermuda Holding Limited
-- Long-term IDR 'BB+'.

The Rating Outlook is Stable.


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EL SALVADOR: S&P Alters Outlook to Positive, Affirms 'CCC+/C' SCRs
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings revised its outlook on the Republic of El
Salvador to positive from stable. S&P also affirmed its 'CCC+/C'
long- and short-term sovereign credit ratings on El Salvador.
S&P's 'AAA' transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessment is
unchanged.

OUTLOOK

The positive outlook indicates the at least one-in-three
likelihood of an upgrade in the next 12 months if ongoing
Congressional negotiations result in agreements on financing that
would enable the government to meet upcoming amortizations in 2018
and a Eurobond ($800 million) due in December 2019, thus
decreasing the likelihood of default. In addition, the positive
outlook reflects recent gains from pension reform that will
alleviate the government's structural fiscal deficit and reduce
its short-term financing needs.

S&P could raise the ratings within the next 12 months if the
country's political leadership agrees on measures that facilitate
better debt management, building on the recent pension reform.

In contrast, S&P could lower the ratings if renewed political
polarization and brinksmanship diminish the government's access to
liquidity and raise the risk of another debt default.

RATIONALE

In S&P's opinion, El Salvador is currently vulnerable and is
dependent on further political agreements to meet its financial
commitments, though its expect El Salvador may not face a near-
term (within 12 months) payment crisis. Prolonged political
polarization has resulted in an uncertain policy environment and
has eroded the government's capability to maintain timely debt
service. Recently, El Salvador's Congress failed to approve a
budget reallocation that was needed to cover payments owed to the
country's private pension funds (Certificates for Pension
Investments, or CIPs). As a result, the government defaulted on
those payments in April 2017. Subsequently, Congress approved
amendments to the term of the CIPs at the end of September, which
S&P classified as a distressed exchange offer. Thus, S&P considers
El Salvador's debt payment culture a credit risk that sustains
S&P's poor assessment of its institutional and governance
effectiveness.

Political stalemate has dampened investor confidence and limited
the country's economic growth prospects. Failure to promote
private investments will likely impede economic growth in the
coming years. Job creation through more dynamic economic activity
is essential to tackle the large informal sector, which represents
about 65% of working-age people.

The approval of pension reform could allow the government to
contain the upward trajectory of public debt, alleviate its fiscal
deficit, and reduce its short-term financing needs. Nonetheless,
El Salvador's limited monetary and fiscal flexibility and its high
general government and external debt still constrain the ratings.

Institutional and economic profile: Economic growth remains weak
as political stalemate and crime hurt investment

-- GDP growth is likely to remain around 2.2% in 2017-2019.
-- A polarized political environment continues to weaken
    policymaking, limiting the country's prospects for economic
    growth.

S&P said, "In our base case, we expect the country's GDP to grow
2.3% this year and in 2018 (or 1.8% on a per capita basis) and
closer to 2% over the midterm. Per capita GDP growth averaged only
1.4% during 2010-2016. GDP growth picked up modestly in recent
times because of favorable external conditions--mainly increasing
U.S. demand. Additionally, growing and resilient remittances,
which increased 10.3% as of September 2017, are a major factor
boosting private consumption and have fueled economic growth
beyond our previous expectation. Despite uncertainty regarding the
impact of immigration policies pursued by the U.S. administration,
we expect stable trend GDP growth in the coming two years.
Prolonged political polarization and resulting uncertainty--more
than a lack of physical infrastructure or other weaknesses typical
of low-income countries--are an important short-term constraint on
economic growth."

Growth is also hurt by crime, typically related to drug-
trafficking gangs and insecurity, including from extortions. Lack
of public safety is also reflected in an increasing rate of
emigration, especially to the U.S., where more than 2.3 million
Salvadorans live (compared with 6.4 million in El Salvador). Over
time, the government's anticrime plan ("El Salvador Seguro") could
stimulate investment, business operating costs, and tourism.

The ruling political party, Frente Farabundo Mart° para la
Liberacion Nacional (FMLN), has little common ground with El
Salvador's other major party, the Alianza Republicana Nacionalista
(ARENA). ARENA holds 35 seats, and FMLN 31, in the country's 84-
seat legislature. ARENA has enough votes to block any legislation
that requires a two-thirds majority (external debt authorization,
for example). Nevertheless, on Sept. 28, 2017, El Salvador's
Congress unanimously approved a pension reform that signals an
important political breakthrough after many previously failed
negotiations. But the ability of the government and opposition
parties to reach further agreements on fiscal policy remains a
challenge because of the upcoming congressional and municipal
elections in March 2018 and presidential elections in February
2019. However, as the two leading parties have incentives to solve
roadblocks that could negatively affect the next government
(taking office in June 2019), we believe both parties would likely
cooperate to secure financing for $1.1 billion in debt repayments
due in 2019, including an $800 million Eurobond due in December
2019.

The 2018 budget, with negotiations mediated by the Inter-American
Development Bank, needs to be approved by year-end with a two-
thirds majority since it includes debt authorization (the
government is asking for US$550 million in debt issuance). If the
Congress fails to approve the budget, then the 2017 budget will be
used for 2018. In such a scenario, we expect more fiscal pressure
in the second half of the year. Additionally, the government is
seeking to refinance Eurobond payments due 2019-2024. We expect at
least that 2019 Eurobond repayment will be addressed by the
current Congress before the March 2018 elections. Otherwise, amid
political divisions, increasing refinancing risk could pressure
our ratings on El Salvador.

Flexibility and performance profile: Fiscal and external
performance should result in a slight increase in debt over the
next two years

-- S&P expects the current account deficit (CAD) to stabilize
    around 3% of GDP in 2018-2020 given estimated moderate growth
    in remittances and an expected rise in commodities prices.

-- S&P projects that El Salvador's gross external financing
    requirements will likely be around 100% of current account
    receipts (CAR) and usable reserves in the next three years.

-- Fiscal policy remains the main tool of economic policy in the
    absence of monetary policy and a separate currency.

-- S&P estimates that the change in general government debt to
    GDP will hover around 3.4% during 2017-2019.

In 2017, the CAD is likely to decline to around 1% of GDP from
over 2% in the previous year, mainly because of a 10% increase in
remittances. Remittances could hover around 16% of GDP, thanks to
renewed economic activity in the U.S. S&P expects that moderate
growth in remittances and an expected recovery of imported
commodities prices will increase the CAD around 3% of GDP in 2018-
2019, with the trade deficit slightly increasing to 19% of GDP
(18% of GDP in 2016). The CAD will be only partly funded by
foreign direct investment (FDI), which may remain slightly above
1% of GDP. The rest of the deficit will be funded largely by
borrowing by the corporate sector, commercial banks, and the
sovereign.

S&P said, "We estimate that the country's gross external financing
needs will average 100% of CAR and usable reserves over the next
two years, up from 98% in 2017. We estimate narrow net external
debt to CAR will be 88% in 2017 and will increase over the next
two years."

The government's debt burden exposes the sovereign to growing
vulnerability to potentially adverse shifts in market sentiment.
Relatively low FDI has led to reliance on external debt to fund
the country's persistent CAD.

In November 2016, a Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL) was approved
with the objective of reducing the fiscal deficit below 3% of GDP
over three years. The FRL also caps short-term debt at 20% of
current revenues and caps total debt at 65% of GDP (or 45%
excluding debt issued to fund the country's pension system).
Moreover, the FRL sets a 2019 target for tax revenues at 17% of
GDP and current expenditures at 18.5% of GDP. Estimated figures as
of year-end 2017 are 15.9% and 17.7%, respectively.

S&P said, "We estimate that the general government deficit (which
includes the central government and the central bank) will be 3.2%
of GDP in 2017 and could rise toward 3.5% of GDP in 2019-2020. We
expect general government revenues will grow at the pace of
nominal GDP as the government has ruled out tax increases ahead of
the electoral cycle. Revenues could increase slightly as a result
of tackling tax evasion. We expect that the average change in
general government debt for 2017-2019 will be 3.4% of GDP, and we
expect a stable trend in future years as a result of pension
reform, which contained the previous upward trajectory of general
government debt. The recent pension reform and amendments to the
term of CIPs could generate about 0.6% of GDP in savings.

"We project that net general government debt could rise to 61% of
GDP in 2017 and slightly increase in subsequent years. The debt
burden has risen in recent years, largely because of the need to
fund obligations of the pension system, highlighting the
importance of recently approved pension reform. Excluding pension-
related debt, the general government debt burden is similar to its
level in 2013.

"In our opinion, an agreement with the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) to enhance the country's public finances is less likely
because the government has already ruled out tax increases.
Upcoming elections also reduce the chances of reaching an
agreement with the IMF.

As of October 2017, 53% of Salvadoran public debt was external,
21% domestic, and 26% pension-related--similar to its level at the
end of 2016. From this external debt, 29% is due to multilateral
institutions, 61% to bondholders, 3% to bilateral lenders, and 6%
to financial institutions and commercial banks. Central government
external debt slightly increased to 50% of the total debt, up from
49% as of December 2016. The stock of short-term locally issued
debt (LETES) stands at $657 million as of October 2017; the
constitutional limit is $1.3 billion.

El Salvador's limited monetary and fiscal flexibility and its high
general government and external debt burdens constrain the
ratings. Total investment has remained below 15% of GDP for many
years, thereby limiting GDP growth and contributing to fiscal
strains.

The country moved from a de facto pegged exchange rate with the
U.S. dollar to full dollarization in 2001. S&P believes that the
government is committed to this arrangement despite the economic
costs of an inflexible monetary regime. Dollarization has lowered
inflation and facilitated international trade, especially with the
U.S., but it has failed to sufficiently lower local interest rates
and promote investment and growth. As a result, much of the focus
of government policy is on boosting productivity and reducing
crime to promote investment. S&P expects inflation will stay
contained, owning to dollarization and modest energy prices,
ending 2017 at 1.5% and 2018-2019 at 2.1%.

S&P said, "We assess El Salvador's banking system in our Banking
Industry Country Risk Assessment (BICRA) group '10'. BICRAs are
grouped on a scale from '1' to '10', ranging from what we view as
the lowest-risk banking systems (group '1') to the highest-risk
(group '10'). We believe that the banking system poses a limited
contingent liability to the sovereign. Public-sector enterprises
pose a limited contingent liability to the sovereign. El Salvador
has a relatively small state-owned enterprise sector, thanks to
privatization the sovereign implemented in previous years.

"The T&C assessment remains 'AAA' based on our view that the
sovereign will continue to use the U.S dollar as its currency and
not restrict dollar outflows by private parties to make debt-
service payments."

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by
the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and
was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision.
After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee agreed that the economic rating factor had improved.
All other key rating factors were unchanged.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook. The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

RATINGS LIST

  Ratings Affirmed; Outlook Action
                                  To                 From
  El Salvador (Republic of)
   Sovereign Credit Rating        CCC+/Positive/C    CCC+/Stable/C

  Ratings Affirmed

  El Salvador (Republic of)
   Transfer & Convertibility Assessment    AAA
   Senior Unsecured                        CCC+


=============
J A M A I C A
=============


JAMAICA: Coconut Farmers Struggling to Find Consistent Market
-------------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that Jamaica Coconut Industry Board (CIB) has
said several hundred coconut farmers are struggling to find a
regular and consistent market for their coconuts.

Christopher Gentles, Chairman of the CIB, noted that the sector
has rebounded from the shortage caused by the record droughts of
2014 and 2015 and is now in a position of strength, according to
RJR News.

The CIB said there has been a substantial increase in the
production of coconuts in the island over the past 18 months, the
report notes.

However, Mr. Gentles said cooler temperatures this year have also
reduced the demand for jelly coconuts and have negatively impacted
the sales of the Coconut Shop, the report says.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America,
S&P Global Ratings affirmed on Sept. 25, 2017, its 'B' long- and
short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on
Jamaica. The outlook on the long-term rating remains stable. At
the same time, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B+' transfer and
convertibility assessment on the country.


=======
P E R U
=======


PERU: Congress Launches Process for President's Ouster
------------------------------------------------------
ABC News reports that lawmakers in Peru launched proceedings to
oust President Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, who refuses to resign after
being accused of failing to disclose decade-old payments from a
Brazilian company embroiled in Latin America's biggest corruption
scandal.

Congress voted overwhelmingly in favor of a motion to consider
impeaching the former Wall Street banker for "permanent moral
incapacity" after hours of debate that stretched into the night,
according to ABC News.  Mr. Kuczynski will have a chance to defend
himself before lawmakers decide his fate, the report notes.

The report relays that the political turmoil rocking Peru is the
latest fallout from the wide-reaching Odebrecht SA corruption
scandal that has ensnared some of Latin America's most powerful
political leaders.  The Brazilian construction giant admitted in a
2016 U.S. Justice Department plea agreement to paying nearly $800
million in bribes to obtain lucrative public works contracts, the
report relays.  Investigations continue as prosecutors throughout
the region try to determine who in the halls of power met and
accepted payments from Odebrecht SA, the report discloses.

"The country is living an historic moment," lawmaker Indira Huilca
told Peruvian congressional leaders before the vote, the report
relays.  "Odebrecht SA is just the tip of the iceberg," he added.

Mr. Kuczynski has denied wrongdoing, stating in an impassioned
speech that he had no involvement in payments made by Odebrecht-
led consortiums to his Westfield Capital consulting firm, the
report relays.

"I'm not running and I'm not hiding because I have no reason to,"
the report quoted Mr. Kuczynski as saying.  "I'm not going to
abdicate my honor, my values or my responsibilities as president
of all Peruvians," he added.

Opposition lawmakers presented documents provided by Odebrecht SA
showing $782,000 in payments to Westfield between 2004 and 2007,
the report notes.  Between those years, Peru awarded Odebrecht a
major highway contract and Kuczynski was a high-ranking government
official, the report relays.  The president said he had no
management duties at his consulting term during that period, the
report says.  He added that all the payments were made to his
business partner, the report notes.  That partner also owns First
Capital, which the Odebrecht documents show received $4 million,
the report relays.

Mr. Kuczynski said all his earnings from Westfield were duly
reported to Peru's tax authority, the report notes.  Of the $4
million in payments to First Capital, he said only one
transaction, for which he held up an invoice, was for financial
consulting services he provided the firm in 2012 as part of its
work on an Odebrecht-owned irrigation project, the report says.
Mr. Kuczynski did not hold a public office in 2012.

"I'm an honest man and have been all my life," Mr. Kuczynski said,
the report notes.

The 79-year-old president was elected in 2016 after a lucrative
business career, the report relays.  He campaigned on a pledge to
clean up corruption and provide much-needed stability in one of
South America's most politically volatile nations, the report
discloses.

The Odebrecht SA scandal continues to ripple across Latin America,
with Ecuadorean Vice President Jorge Glas sentenced to six years
in jail earlier after a court found him guilty of orchestrating a
plot to accept bribes from the company, the report relays.
Odebrecht SA has acknowledged paying $29 million in Peru during
the 2001-2006 administration of President Alejandro Toledo and two
of his successors, the report notes.  Mr. Kuczynski served as
Toledo's finance chief and prime minister.

As recently as last month, Mr. Kuczynski denied having any
professional or political ties to Odebrecht SA and wagged his
finger at three predecessors accused of taking bribes from the
company, the report recalls.

His detractors now accuse him of misleading the nation, the report
notes.  Ninety-three of 118 lawmakers voted in favor of advancing
impeachment proceedings, six more votes than the 87 that will be
required to remove him out of office soon, the report says.

As lawmakers debated his removal, Mr. Kuczynski was holed up in
the presidential palace with top cabinet members, the report
notes.

Supporters of the president in congress described the impeachment
vote as a power grab by opposition lawmakers who have a majority
in congress, the report relays.  They said Kuczynski shouldn't be
removed for an isolated incident that took place before he became
president, the report notes.

Still, Peruvians are unlikely to be convinced by Mr. Kuczynski's
reassurances that he did nothing wrong, analysts said, the report
says.

Steve Levitsky, a Harvard University political scientist who has
spent years studying Peru, said Kuczynski was already a weak
president with little legislative or popular support before the
corruption allegations, which had been quietly dogging him for
some time, the report notes.

"He definitely seems to be dead in the water," said Mr. Levitsky,
the report relays.  "It's not that what he did was necessarily
illegal, but the fact that he swore over and over again that he
had no ties to Odebrecht, and that was proven to be nakedly
false," he added.

Mr. Kuczynski would not be the first president in Peru removed on
moral grounds if lawmakers succeed. In 2000, President Alberto
Fuijmori was ousted after flying to Japan amid a mounting
corruption scandal, the report discloses.  Mr. Fujimori is the
father of Keiko Fujimori, who narrowly lost to Kuczynski in last
year's election and is the leader of the Popular Force party, the
report relays.

Alberto Fujimori is in jail for human rights violations, the
report notes.  Both of his politician children have advocated for
their father's release, the report says.

Kenji Fujimori, his son and a current opposition congressman,
urged lawmakers to listen to Kuczynski's testimony carefully
before deciding how to cast their ballot, the report discloses.

"I learned a lot from my father's experience," he said.  "And I
think the presumption of innocence should be respected," he added,
notes the report.


=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================


PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: S&P Raises Sr. Unsec Notes Rating to 'CC'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings corrected its issue-level rating on Petroleos
de Venezuela S.A.'s (PDVSA's) 2024 senior unsecured notes by
raising it to 'CC' from 'D'. S&P inadvertently lowered the rating
on PDVSA's 2024 notes when it lowered the rating on the company's
2017 notes on Dec. 5, 2017.

RATINGS LIST

Petroleos de Venezuela S.A.     To                   From
   2024 sr. unsec. notes         CC/Watch Neg         D


=================
X X X X X X X X X
=================


* BOND PRICING: For the Week From December 11 to Dec. 15, 2017
--------------------------------------------------------------

Issuer Name               Cpn     Price   Maturity  Country  Curr
-----------               ---     -----   --------  -------   ---

BA-CA Finance Cayman Lt   0.518    62.07               KY    EUR
AES Tiete Energia SA      6.7842   1.109  4/15/2024    BR    BRL
Argentina Bogar Bonds     2       39.36   2/4/2018     AR    ARS
Automotores Gildemeister  8.25    73.25   5/24/2021    CL    USD
Automotores Gildemeister  6.75    67      1/15/2023    CL    USD
Automotores Gildemeister  8.25    73.25   5/24/2021    CL    USD
Automotores Gildemeister  6.75    65.5    1/15/2023    CL    USD
CA La Electricidad        8.5     63.664  4/10/2018    VE    USD
Caixa Geral De Depositos  1.439   63.167               KY    EUR
Caixa Geral De Depositos  1.469                        KY    EUR
CSN Islands XII Corp      7       68                   BR    USD
CSN Islands XII Corp      7       66.266               BR    USD
Decimo Primer Fideicomiso 6       53.225 10/25/2041    PA    USD
Decimo Primer             4.54    43.127 10/25/2041    PA    USD
Dolomite Capital         13.217   73.108 12/20/2019    CN    ZAR
Enel Americas SA          5.75    56.172  6/15/2022    CL    CLP
Gol Linhas Aereas SA     10.75    35.861  2/12/2023    BR    USD
Gol Linhas Aereas SA     10.75    35.601  2/12/2023    BR    USD
Inversora Electrica       6.5     67.625  9/26/2017    AR    USD
Inversora Electrica       6.5     67.625  9/26/2017    AR    USD
MIE Holdings Corp         7.5     64.78   4/25/2019    HK    USD
MIE Holdings Corp         7.5     64.982  4/25/2019    HK    USD
NB Finance Ltd            3.88    61.816  2/7/2035     KY    EUR
Noble Holding             7.7     74.433  4/1/2025     KY    USD
Noble Holding             5.25    56.279  3/15/2042    KY    USD
Noble Holding             8.7     71.881  4/1/2045     KY    USD
Noble Holding             6.2     60.129  8/1/2040     KY    USD
Noble Holding             6.05    58.38   3/1/2041     KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.5     42.5                 KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.125   56.938  6/26/2022    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7       68.053  4/21/2020    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.125   41.366  6/26/2042    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     4.375   40.002  4/25/2025    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.25    39.211  6/27/2029    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     6       44.75   4/5/2023     KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.25    39.018  6/27/2029    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.5     42.95                KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     4.375   40.363  4/25/2025    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.125   41.635  6/26/2042    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     6       52.625  4/5/2023     KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.125   55.873  6/26/2022    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7       67.368  4/21/2020    KY    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    8.5     74.5   10/27/2020    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6       30.458  5/16/2024    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6       30.517 11/15/2026    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    9.75    35.677  5/17/2035    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    9       39.279 11/17/2021    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    5.375   30.267  4/12/2027    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    8.5     72.5   10/27/2020    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela   12.75    45.278  2/17/2022    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6       30.367  5/16/2024    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6       30.387 11/15/2026    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    9       39.316 11/17/2021    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    9.75    35.893  5/17/2035    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6       28.346 10/28/2022    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    5.5     30.123  4/12/2037    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela   12.75    45.23   2/17/2022    VE    USD
Polarcus Ltd              5.6     75      3/30/2022    AE    USD
Provincia del Chubut      4              10/21/2019    AR    USD
Siem Offshore Inc         4.04527 69.5   10/30/2020    NO    NOK
Siem Offshore             3.75176 65.75  12/28/2021    NO    NOK
STB Finance               2.05771 56.243               KY    JPY
Sylph Ltd                 2.367   64.438  9/25/2036    KY    USD
US Capital                1.63611 54.774 12/1/2039     KY    USD
US Capital                1.63611 54.774 12/1/2039     KY    USD
USJ Acucar                9.875   67     11/9/2019     BR    USD
USJ Acucar                9.875   67     11/9/2019     BR    USD
Venezuela                13.625   68.25   8/15/2018    VE    USD
Venezuela                 7.75    44.065 10/13/2019    VE    USD
Venezuela                11.95    40.785  8/5/2031     VE    USD
Venezuela                12.75    45.19   8/23/2022    VE    USD
Venezuela                 9.25    39.645  9/15/2027    VE    USD
Venezuela                11.75    40.005 10/21/2026    VE    USD
Venezuela                 9       36.285  5/7/2023     VE    USD
Venezuela                 9.375   37.69   1/13/2034    VE    USD
Venezuela                13.625   72.25   8/15/2018    VE    USD
Venezuela                 7       34.23   3/31/2038    VE    USD
Venezuela                 7       59.19  12/1/2018     VE    USD


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Joseph Cardillo at
856-381-8268.


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