/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA

/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/180226.mbx T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R L A T I N A M E R I C A Monday, February 26, 2018, Vol. 19, No. 40 Headlines A R G E N T I N A CORDOBA PROVINCE: Fitch Affirms B Long-Term IDR; Outlook Positive COMPANIA DE TRANSPORTE DE ENERGIA: S&P Raises CCR to 'B+' B R A Z I L AMPLA ENERGIA E SERVICOS: S&P Raises CCR to 'BB+', Outlook Stable CEMIG GERACAO: Fitch Corrects November 22 Rating Release C O L O M B I A COLOMBIA: Come Closer to Trade Deal With Guatemala C O S T A R I C A COSTA RICA: S&P Affirms 'BB-' SCR, Outlook Remains Negative G U A T E M A L A GUATEMALA: Ex-President, Oxfam Chief Held in Corruption Case J A M A I C A 1834 INVESTMENTS: Delays Release of Unaudited Financial Statements P U E R T O R I C O PUERTO RICO: PREPA Can Borrow $300-Mil. Emergency Loan S U R I N A M E SURINAME: Fitch Affirms B- IDR; Changes Outlook to Stable V E N E Z U E L A VENEZUELA: Transplant Patients Protest Shortage of Medicines VENEZUELA: Poverty Under Maduro Doubled to 87% X X X X X X X X X * BOND PRICING: For the Week From February 19 to Feb. 23, 2018 - - - - - ================= A R G E N T I N A ================= CORDOBA PROVINCE: Fitch Affirms B Long-Term IDR; Outlook Positive ----------------------------------------------------------------- Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Province of Cordoba's Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'B'. The Rating Outlook remains Positive. Fitch has also affirmed the 'B' ratings on the province's 7.125% USD450 million senior unsecured notes and 7.45% senior USD510 million unsecured notes. KEY RATING DRIVERS The entity's strong fiscal performance, positive and sustained operating margins, low level of debt, and importance as Argentina's second economic centre after Buenos Aires, underpin the province's ratings. However, rating constrains include the following: Argentina's sovereign rating, the entity's unhedged debt currency exposure and refinancing risk similar to other country peers, high infrastructure needs and the structurally high staff expenses, especially when considering its unfunded pension liabilities. As expected, Cordoba's fiscal performance improved during 2016 and continued to perform positively throughout 2017. During fiscal 2012 - 2016, operating margins averaged 12.3% of operating revenues and totalled 16.6% in 2016. Considering revenue and expenditure trends from November 2017, Fitch estimates that Cordoba's operating margin will be around 18% for the year end. The province's 2018 budget is conservative and signals a 15.4% operating margin. The Province's margins have historically performed well given administrative policies that focused on maintaining fiscal solvency through expenditure controls. Consequently, the entity's liquidity ratios are favourable, with direct cash deposits and liquid funds totalling ARS8.8 billion at year-end 2016 (9% of operating revenues) and ARS14.5 billion in Sept. 2017. During the past two years, margins were positively affected by a re- composition of federal revenues due to a Supreme Court ruling in favor of the province that discontinued the withholding of 15% of federal co-participation taxes from the nation towards the province. November 2017 trends indicated an operating revenue growth of 33.9% versus operating expenditure growth of 30.9%. However, on average personnel expenses grew below average inflation in 2016 and 2017. Although Cordoba's staff expense ratios bode well relative to Argentine peers, when compared to international peers they are structurally high given the country's yearly high inflation pressures, which totalled 24.8% for 2017. The entity's annual pension deficit weight is lower than other country peers. Funding will be mitigated further by higher transfers from National Administration of Social Security (ANSES) in 2018 due to an agreement reached between both parties in January of 2018. The province is also currently executing an ambitious capex program (for the years 2016-2019) for a total of USD5.7 billion mainly composed of urban infrastructure and important gas trunk pipelines. During 2016 capex totalled ARS11.7 billion, and until November 2017, another ARS22.1 billion. For 2018, the entity has budgeted ARS53 billion. Capex funding includes 2016 and 2017 bond issuances, federal funds, as well as provincial funds. For year-end 2016, the entity's direct debt totalled ARS28.5 billion and increased to ARS45.2 billion in November 2017, due to new bond issuances intended to partially refinance debt and finance capex projects. Although leverage ratios are low at an estimated 34% for year-end 2017, around 94% of total debt is denominated in USD unhedged. The entity also faces an important debt capital maturity peak in 2021 for an estimated ARS21 billion and ARS18 billion in 2024. For the 2018 budget, the province has ARS25.7 billion of authorized new debt. Based on Cordoba's budgeted and authorized debt for 2018, leverage ratios should remain low and aligned with its credit profile. RATING SENSITIVITIES The Province of Cordoba's Positive Rating Outlook is in line with Argentina's sovereign rating. Consequently, an upgrade in Argentina's sovereign rating could lead to an upgrade of the province's ratings. COMPANIA DE TRANSPORTE DE ENERGIA: S&P Raises CCR to 'B+' --------------------------------------------------------- S&P Global Ratings raised its corporate credit and issue-level ratings on Compania de Transporte de Energia Electrica en Alta Tension Transener S.A. (Transener) to 'B+' from 'B'. The outlook remains stable. The rating action follows the improvement in the general business conditions for Transener after the implementation of the Integral Tariff Review (ITR). S&P considers that government's February 2017 approval of this new regulatory framework, which sets a new scheme of rates and an investment plan for 2017-2021, has stabilized the cash flow generation among the Argentinean electricity industry players. The ratings on Transener also reflect S&P's expectation that despite its solid current and projected credit metrics and adequate liquidity position, the 'B+' sovereign rating on Argentina limits Transener's credit quality because the company won't be able to withstand a sovereign stress scenario. The latter includes high inflation, sharp currency depreciation, a severe decrease in the GDP growth, and frozen rates for utilities. =========== B R A Z I L =========== AMPLA ENERGIA E SERVICOS: S&P Raises CCR to 'BB+', Outlook Stable ----------------------------------------------------------------- S&P Global Ratings raised its long-term corporate credit ratings on Ampla Energia e Servicos S.A. (Enel Distribuicao Rio) to 'BB+' from 'BB' on the global scale and to 'brAAA' from 'brAA-' on the Brazilian national scale. S&P also removed the global scale rating from CreditWatch with developing implicationsand the Brazil national scale rating from CreditWatch with positive implications. The outlook on both ratings is stable. The 'bb-' stand-alone credit profile (SACP) remains unchanged. S&P withdrew the issue ratings on the company's sixth, seventh, and eighth debentures issuances, following their prepayment. S&P said, "The upgrade incorporates our view that the company's controlling shareholder, Enel Americas S.A. (Enel Americas: BBB/Stable/--) has incentives to continue providing timely and sufficient support to the distributor, and it would continue to offer support even under a hypothetical scenario in which the Federative Republic of Brazil (Brazil: BB-/Stable/B; brAA- /Stable/--) defaults. We base that belief on (i) the existence of cross default clauses in Enel Americas' debt that could be triggered by the default of any subsidiary debt with a threshold of at least US$150 million, which is the case with Enel Distribuicao Rio; (ii) ongoing liquidity support to the company through intercompany loans and the recent conversion of R$1.2 billion equity injection through the conversion of part of the mutual loans into equity. Nevertheless, in spite of our view of stronger parent support, the ratings on Enel Distribuicao Rio are limited to two notches above the foreign currency rating on Brazil. "The stable outlook reflects our view that Enel Americas has willingness and capacity to continue to support Enel Distribuicao Rio, even if Brazil were to default." CEMIG GERACAO: Fitch Corrects November 22 Rating Release -------------------------------------------------------- This is a correction of a release published on Nov, 22, 2017. It includes Fitch's "Non-financial Corporate Notching and Recovery Rating Criteria", "National Scale Ratings Criteria" and "Country- Specific Treatment of Recovery Ratings," which were omitted from the original release. Fitch Ratings has issued a correction to the ratings release on Cemig Geracao e Transmisao S.A. (Cemig GT) published on Nov. 22, 2017, which includes Fitch's "Non-financial Corporate Notching and Recovery Rating Criteria", "National Scale Ratings Criteria" and "Country-Specific Treatment of Recovery Ratings," which were omitted from the original release. The revised release is as follows: Fitch Ratings has assigned a 'B(EXP)'/'RR3' rating to Cemig Geracao e Transmisao S.A. (Cemig GT)'s proposed USD1 billion senior unsecured Eurobonds due 2024. The proposed Eurobonds are guaranteed by the holding company Companhia Energetica de Minas Gerais (Cemig) and the proceeds will be used to prepay existing debt. Cemig GT's and Cemig Distribuicao S.A.'s (Cemig D) Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) are currenty rated 'B-' and the National Scale rating 'BB-(bra)'. All the ratings are on Negative Watch, including the proposed issuance. The ratings reflect Cemig group's deteriorated credit profile, as Fitch believes that the company's financial flexibility has materially worsened and net adjusted leverage will be in the range of 5.0x to 6.0x in the next two years. Delays in completing its strategy for asset disposal along with significant financial expenses on its debt are having a negative impact on the group's ability to improve its financial metrics, including liquidity ratios. Expected free cash flow (FCF) of around BRL900 million in 2017 and BRL100 million in 2018 are viewed as positive. Cemig and its subsidiaries' credit profiles are analyzed on a consolidated basis due to cross default clauses and cash dynamics. The group's aggressive financial profile is partially offset by its low to moderate business risks, supported by low competition and positive diversification mainly into power generation, transmission and distribution segments, being the latter the most volatile. Positively, Cemig has a relevant asset base in the Brazilian electric sector, including shared control in several companies with relevant market value. The IDRs also factor in the existence of political risk, due to Cemig's condition as a state owned company, as well as a moderate regulatory risk for the Brazilian power sector and a hydrology risk currently above historical average. The ratings are on Negative Watch and reflect Cemig group's challenges in addressing future debt payments, even considering the closing of the BRL4 billion in debt renegotiations with its main creditors and the likely sale of some of its Transmissora Alianca de Energia Eletrica S.A.'s (Taesa) shares to meet part of the BRL1.7 billion put option related to Light S.A.'s (Light) shares. An equity increase of BRL1.3 billion and success on this USD1 billion Eurobond issuance are important actions that may occur, but not enough to solve all the liquidity issues. Fitch expects to assign a 'RR3' Recovery Rating to Cemig GT's proposed issuance, which reflects recovery prospects at the range of 51% to 70% in the event of default, given the group's cash flow generation and strong assets portfolio. KEY RATING DRIVERS Positive FCF: Fitch believes that Cemig's consolidated FCF will be positive at around BRL900 million in 2017 as the group is exhibiting more robust cash flow from operations (CFFO), and capex and dividends have been limited in order to address liquidity issues. In 2018, FCF should be modest at around BRL100 million, which is low compared to debt maturities. In the latest-12-month (LTM) ended September 2017, consolidated CFFO of BRL2.7 billion was crucial to support a FCF of BRL900 million, after BRL1.0 billion in capex and BRL832 million in dividends was paid out. Fitch views Cemig's willingness to reduce dividend payments since 2015 to the legal limit of 25% of net income as positive. Higher Leverage: Fitch expects Cemig's consolidated net adjusted leverage to be in the range of 5.0x to 6.0x in the next two years. In the LTM ended September, 2017, Cemig reported net adjusted debt/adjusted EBITDA of 7.2x, the highest in the last five years. Fitch includes the guarantees of BRL5.9 billion to non- consolidated companies, mainly to Belo Monte and Santo Antonio hydro plants, and the exercised put option in the total adjusted debt. On the other hand, dividends received from non-consolidated investments in the amount of BRL485 million are added to the EBITDA. Favorable Business Model: The group benefits from its diversification in terms of segments and assets, which mitigates operational risks and reduces cash flow volatility. Cemig is one of the largest power companies in Brazil, with 12.7 million clients served in the distribution segment, 8.4 GW of power generation installed capacity and 8.2 thousand km of transmission lines. The company is expected to reduce its activity in greenfield projects and in the acquisition of existing assets, after being very aggressive historically. The debt associated with the acquisitions at relevant levels and strong dividend payments in the past, have significantly affected the group's credit quality. DERIVATION SUMMARY Cemig's financial risk profile is more aggressive, with weaker liquidity and higher leverage compared to Eletropaulo Metropolitana de Eletricidade de Sao Paulo (Local Currency IDR: 'BB'/Stable Outlook, National Scale Rating 'AA-bra'). When assessing the Latin American energy peers in the 'B' category, although Cemig has larger revenue base, its coverage ratios compare unfavorably. AES Argentina and Genneia's ratings are constrained by Argentina's Sovereign Ceiling of 'B' and the high regulatory risk environment while the Brazilian peers operate with moderate regulatory risk. Cemig's business credit profile compares better than Eletropaulo's with a diversified assets portfolio, as it is an integrated energy company. KEY ASSUMPTIONS Fitch's key assumptions within Fitch rating case for the issuer include: -- Cemig D consumption increase of 0.7% in 2017, and 2.4% during 2018. -- Average consolidated capex of BRL1.2 billion during 2017 - 2020; -- Dividend payout of 25% (minimum legal limit); -- BRL1.2 billion disbursement on Light's partners put; -- BRL800 million sale of Taesa's shares; -- Issuance of USD1 billion in Eurobonds. RATING SENSITIVITIES Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive Rating Action: -Positive rating actions are unlikely in the short to medium term. The Watch Negative may be removed if the group improves its liquidity profile and its financial flexibility to meet future financial obligations. Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative Rating Action: - Failure to sell Taesa's shares and/or conclude the expected equity injection; - Failure to issue the USD1 billion Eurobond; - Continuing deterioration on financial flexibility; - Difficulties to conclude asset sales in relevant amounts. LIQUIDITY Challenging Liquidity Profile: Cemig has an aggressive liquidity profile, which may be partially mitigated if the equity injection, the USD1 billion Eurobond issuance and the sale of Taesa's shares are concluded. Even in this positive scenario, Fitch understands that Cemig would still need to roll over around BRL500 million - BRL 1 billion in debt until the end 2018. In September 2017, Cemig group reported total adjusted debt of BRL21.2 billion, including off-balance sheet debt of BRL5.9 billion, while cash and equivalents were BRL1.3 billion. The debt maturing in the short term was BRL6.4 billion including BRL1.2 billion of the put option (net of approximately BRL400 million in cash reserved for this purpose), but should reduce as the BRL4 billion debt refinancing with the group's four major creditors was concluded recently. KEY RECOVERY RATING ASSUMPTIONS The recovery analysis assumes that Cemig would be considered a going concern in bankruptcy and that the company would be reorganized rather than liquidated. Fitch has assumed a 10% administrative claim. -- Cemig's going-concern EBITDA of BRL3.1 billion is based on the EBITDA expected in 2017. Fitch understands 2017 EBITDA reflects the reduced results from the generation segment after the return of important concessions and the distribution segments still adverse scenario; -- An EV multiple of 6x is used to calculate a post- reorganization valuation and reflects a mid-cycle multiple for the sector. -- Cemig's non-consolidated investments were also considered in the analysis. The company has valuable assets in its non- consolidated portfolio, which includes 35% of Light's and 32% of Taesa's total shares. Liquidation Value Fitch excluded the liquidation value (LV) approach because Brazilian bankruptcy legislation tends to favor the maintenance of the business in order to preserve direct and indirect job positions. Moreover, in extreme cases where LV was necessary, the recovery of the assets has been proved very difficult for lenders. FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS Fitch has taken the following rating actions: Cemig GT -- USD1,000 million proposed Eurobonds due 2024 guaranteed by Cemig assigned 'B(EXP)'/'RR3'; Rating Watch Negative. Fitch also currently rates the Cemig's group entities as follows: Cemig -- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR 'B-'; -- Long-Term Local Currency IDR 'B-'; -- Long-Term National scale rating 'BB-(bra)'. Cemig D -- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR 'B-'; -- Long-Term Local Currency IDR 'B-'; -- Long-Term National scale rating 'BB-(bra)'; -- BRL400 million senior unsecured debentures due 2017 'BB- (bra)'; -- BRL1,615 million senior unsecured debentures due 2018 'BB- (bra)'. Cemig GT -- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR 'B-'; -- Long-Term Local Currency IDR 'B-'; -- Long-Term National scale rating 'BB-(bra)'; -- BRL1,350 million senior unsecured debentures, with two outstanding series due 2019 and 2022, 'BB-(bra)'. All the ratings are on Rating Watch Negative. =============== C O L O M B I A =============== COLOMBIA: Come Closer to Trade Deal With Guatemala -------------------------------------------------- Alianza News reports that Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos and Guatemalan counterpart Jimmy Morales agreed to accelerate negotiations on a trade treaty and to expand cooperate in military matters. After a meeting with Colombian businessmen, Morales was received with full honors by Santos at the presidential palace, according to Alianza News. During a subsequent joint press conference, Morales said that "God willing," the proposed trade accord will be ready for signature within a few weeks, the report notes. "There has been great interest by Colombian companies to invest in Guatemala lately," Santos said, pointing also to an increase in bilateral trade, the report relays. Mr. Morales told Mr. Santos that Guatemala wishes to purchase military vessel from Colombia's state-owned Cotecmar, which has provided similar craft to other Latin American countries, such as Brazil and Honduras, the report discloses. Guatemala is happy to see the technological progress Colombia has made in building ships and other tools that are of use in the fight against transnational crime and other "emerging threats," Morales said, the report says. The report notes that Mr. Santos said the purchase of the vessels could be financed with help from "the United States, a country interested in Guatemala increasing and improving its capabilities in the fight against drugs and organized crime." The Colombian president deemed the meeting "very constructive and important," the report adds. =================== C O S T A R I C A =================== COSTA RICA: S&P Affirms 'BB-' SCR, Outlook Remains Negative ------------------------------------------------------------ On Feb. 21, 2018, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB-' long-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on the Republic of Costa Rica. The outlook remains negative. At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'B' short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings and its 'BB+' transfer and convertibility assessment. OUTLOOK S&P said, "The negative outlook reflects the at least one-in-three chance that we could lower the ratings this year if the new administration that takes office later this year fails to promptly address the fiscal situation of the country. Persistently high fiscal deficits could result in lower GDP growth, a higher debt burden, and increased external vulnerabilities that would lead to a downgrade. Conversely, early approval of a fiscal reform that reduces the fiscal deficit and stabilizes the general government's debt burden, along with continued economic growth and moderate current account deficits (CADs), could prevent further erosion of the sovereign's financial profile. This could lead us to revise the outlook to stable this year." RATIONALE The ratings on Costa Rica reflect its stable political system, ample political checks and balances, and higher social indicators than peers'. It also reflects the weak government effectiveness to approve fiscal reform quickly. Many years of large fiscal deficits have raised the government's debt burden. That, along with a high level of dollarization in the financial system and overall monetary inflexibility, contributes to its external vulnerability. Institutional and economic profile: New political landscape might increase the chances of fiscal reform, which could benefit economic growth -- Costa Rica's stable political system and higher social indicators compare positively with peers. -- The inability of the outgoing government of President Luis Guillermo Solis to implement fiscal reform has weakened public finances. -- National elections this year offer the possibility that the new president and Congress might advance quickly with long- discussed fiscal reform. -- Timely reform that reduces the fiscal deficit would have a positive impact on investors' confidence and economic growth over the next few years. Costa Rica continues to compare positively with peers in the region and in similar rating categories because of its strong democratic history, the stability of its political institutions, and higher social standards. Overall low poverty and crime compare positively among most of its Central American peers. S&P estimates that its GDP per capita would reach US$11,580 in 2018. S&P said, "However, our assessment of its institutional effectiveness also reflects the inability of several consecutive governments--including Congress--to take measures on revenue and spending to control a persistently large fiscal deficit. A prolonged stalemate in Congress over policies to boost tax revenues and contain government spending has contributed to currently weak public finances, lower investor confidence, and worse debt management." The results of national elections on Feb. 4, 2018, indicate that the new Congress will be modestly less fragmented than the last one, which could help advance fiscal reform this year. Also, recent political debate about fiscal issues during the political campaign, along with support from the private sector and international organizations, could encourage the new administration and Congress to take corrective actions soon. In the presidential race, Fabricio Alvarado from Partido Restauracion Nacional (PRN) got 24.9% of votes, and Carlos Alvarado from the ruling Partido Acci¢n Ciudadana (PAC) got 21.6% of votes. They will face a runoff election on April 1, 2018. These results show an overall vote against the country's two traditional political parties over the last 30 years, Partido Liberacion Nacional (PLN) and Partido Unidad Social Cristiana (PUSC), neither of which has a candidate in the second round of the presidential elections. Regardless of the winner, S&P expects overall continuity in economic policy. Besides the fiscal reform, the new government will also face accelerating public infrastructure investment and improving effectiveness of education spending, among other challenges. A smooth political transition and early approval of a fiscal reform could help recover economic growth momentum. GDP growth of 3.2% in 2017 was the lowest since 2013. Growth slowed in part because of less dynamic internal demand. Weak demand reflects rising domestic interest rates, a consequence of heavy government borrowing in the country's limited domestic market. For 2018 and 2019, we expect broadly similar economic activity in the country, with average real GDP growth of 3.4% and GDP per capita growth of around 2%. Projected higher economic growth in the U.S. should keep the exports increasing, more than likely offsetting higher prices on imports. Nevertheless, current higher local interest rates would continue reflecting slower credit growth and sluggish private consumption and investment. Over the next few years, fiscal reform would also contribute to easing pressure on the local credit market, which could improve credit conditions for the private sector. Sustainable public finances and a more efficient energy sector while keeping crime rates low should keep Costa Rica's foreign direct investment (FDI) attractive and could boost economic growth. Flexibility and performance profile: Fiscal deterioration and external vulnerabilities are likely to persist, while inflation could remain within target over the next two years -- S&P expects the general government fiscal deficit and debt levels to remain high, and potentially rise if there is not fiscal reform. -- The CAD would likely remain moderate over the next few years, mostly financed through FDI. -- Inflation will likely remain within the central bank's target despite expected higher commodity prices. -- The still-high level of dollarization in the financial system exposes Costa Rica to external shocks. The general government deficit continued to increase and reached 5.7% of GDP in 2017 (our definition of general government includes the central bank, decentralized government agencies, and social security). On the expenditure side, the main drivers were increases in central government capital expenditures and interest payments. On the revenue side, the tax and nontax revenue growth rate decelerated to 4% from 9% the previous year, following decelerating GDP growth. S&P said, Our base case assumes a slightly worse fiscal deficit this year (above 6% of GDP) and implementation of fiscal reform that starts to show results in 2019, gradually reducing the general government deficit toward 4.5% in 2020. Such a fiscal trajectory should also help reduce the growing debt trend. In 2017, net general government debt reached 44.7% of GDP, more than double the 21% of 2010. A comprehensive fiscal reform would be necessary to stabilize and eventually start reducing the sovereign debt in the following years. "We forecast that Costa Rica's debt would continue rising to reach close to 52% of GDP in 2020. We expect a similar trend for interest payments that should nevertheless stay below 13% of general government revenues over the same period. In 2017, interest payments reached the highest level over the last 10 years representing 11% of such revenues." As of December 2017, 21% of general government debt was denominated in foreign currency. Over the last two years, the country has not been able to issue externally because of a lack of Congressional authorization, which is causing a crowding out effect in the local credit market, with a corresponding rise in interest rates and deceleration of private credit. S&P said, "Given that the banks' assets-to-GDP ratio is 77% and that our Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment (BICRA) is at '7', we consider Costa Rica's contingent liabilities as limited. (BICRAs are grouped on a scale from '1' to '10', ranging from what we view as the lowest-risk banking systems [group '1'] to the highest-risk [group '10'].)" This is also based on the immaterial size of the non-deposit-taking corporations (3% of GDP) relative to the size of the deposit-taking institutions and that the nonfinancial public enterprises have had historically flat balances. Costa Rica's external profile has deteriorated in recent years, given a CAD that has averaged close to 4% over the last five years. In 2017, the CAD reached 3.2% of GDP, covered in full by FDI. The CAD rose from the previous year (2.6% of GDP) mainly because of a higher net income deficit following increased interest and dividend payments. The trade deficit stayed at 9% of GDP, balancing increased exports with higher oil prices that in turn increased the import bill, while the service balance continued to post a surplus of 10.5% of GDP with almost half from the tourism sector. S&P said, "We expect a gradual increase in Costa Rica's CAD toward 4% of GDP up to 2020, mostly financed by FDI, containing the sovereign's external debt burden. This should keep the sovereign's gross external financing needs around 105% of current account receipts and usable reserves, and its narrow net external debt (gross external debt less official reserves, other liquid external assets held by the public sector, and financial-sector external assets) around 52% of CAR in 2018-2020. "Our projection considers higher expected U.S. growth, the main destination of the country's exports and source of tourism; moderate currency depreciation; and possibly rising commodity prices and increased imports as economic growth recovers." FDI continues to perform well despite increasing fiscal pressures and political uncertainty. In 2017, FDI reached 5% of GDP, broadly in line with the average of the previous three years. Steady FDI flows could be explained by the overall good business climate, low crime rates, and stronger human capital than its peers in the region. A high level of dollarization in the financial system exposes Costa Rica to external shocks and, at the same time, constrains its monetary policy. An unexpectedly sharp change in the exchange rate could create asset quality problems in the financial system. Dollarization also limits the central bank's ability to act as a lender of last resort. In 2017, dollar- denominated loans represented 39% of total loans to the private sector. Inflation recovered to 2.6% by year-end 2017 from historical lows around 0% in the previous two years following increasing prices in commodities, particularly hydrocarbons. S&P said, "We expect inflation to remain within the central bank's target over the next two years (3% plus/minus 1) as we expect that private consumption would stay subdued given higher interest rates compared to previous years, which would compensate for higher commodity prices. Our inflation forecast also considers a similar Colon gradual depreciation as in previous years." The central bank's exchange-rate policy is managed-floating. Episodes of exchange-rate volatility in 2017 were because of long- lasting low local interest rates, despite increases in the U.S. interest rate, which contributed to local currency depreciation. The central bank acted rapidly by using its foreign exchange reserves and increasing local interest rates to stabilize the currency in the second half of the year. Recurrent central bank intervention would prevent steep local currency depreciation over the next 12 months. In October 2017, the central bank signed a new loan with Fondo Latinoamericano de Reservas (FLAR) for US$1 billion that will be disbursed this year. S&P said, "The bank estimates that reserves will stay around 13% of GDP, a level we consider adequate. In 2018, credit growth will likely remain slow. We are expecting lower credit demand under the country's electoral process, which brings uncertainty, coupled with higher interest rates, which could result in a fall of the consumption confidence levels and in credit appetite. As in 2017, we expect this slowdown to continue during the first months of 2018 and then confidence levels could be restored during the second half of 2018, reaching annual credit growth around 8%, supported mainly by corporate and commercial lending." In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the methodology applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision. After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria. Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts. The committee agreed that Fiscal Assessment had deteriorated. All other key rating factors were unchanged. The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision. The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized in the above rationale and outlook. The weighting of all rating factors is described in the methodology used in this rating action. RATINGS LIST Ratings Affirmed Costa Rica Sovereign Credit Rating BB-/Negative/B Transfer & Convertibility Assessment BB+ Senior Unsecured BB- ================= G U A T E M A L A ================= GUATEMALA: Ex-President, Oxfam Chief Held in Corruption Case ------------------------------------------------------------- Sonia Perez at the Associated Press reports that prosecutors said they have detained ex-President Alvaro Colom and nearly his entire former Cabinet, including the current chairman of Oxfam International, in a Guatemala corruption case involving a bus concession. Mr. Colom, who governed in 2008-2012, is the latest in a series of former Guatemalan presidents to face legal problems, according to Associated Press. He was recently named by the Organization of American States as an envoy to Honduras in a bid to help sort out a highly disputed election there, the report notes. The report relays that Mr. Colom said after appearing making a court appearance that as far as he knows, the concession was handled properly. He added that he hopes justice is done in the case, the report notes. Special prosecutor Juan Francisco Sandoval, who said Colom was arrested, is looking into questionable purchases of public buses for Guatemala City. Sandoval said those arrested face charges of fraud and embezzlement, the report says. The report discloses that Mr. Sandoval said the detentions included the former ministers of the interior, finance, defense, economy, education, labor, environment, health, sports and culture, and energy and mines. Ex-Finance Minister Alberto Fuentes Knight is the Oxfam chairman. The global nonprofit said in a statement that it did not know the nature of formal charges against Mr. Fuentes, the report relays. "However," it said, "he has been entirely open with his Oxfam board and executive that he has been among former officials being investigated as part of a budgetary transaction made by the Guatemalan government while he was finance minister," the report notes. "He has assured us that he has cooperated fully with the investigation in the confidence he did not knowingly transgress rules or procedures," the group added, the report says. The case centers on a public bus company known as Transurbano, the report relays. The government auctioned off 25-year concessions for Guatemala City bus routes, and the private companies that won the contracts were later exempted from taxes, the report notes. Prosecutors say the process was deeply flawed and included subsidies and other measures that benefited public servants, the report says. The United Nations anti-corruption mission in Guatemala participated in the investigation, the report adds. As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on Oct. 23, 2017, S&P Global Ratings, on Oct. 18, 2017, lowered its long-term foreign currency sovereign credit rating on the Republic of Guatemala to 'BB-' from 'BB' and its long-term local currency sovereign credit rating to 'BB' from 'BB+'. The outlook is stable. S&P also affirmed its 'B' short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on Guatemala. At the same time, S&P lowered the transfer and convertibility assessment to 'BB+' from 'BBB-'. ============= J A M A I C A ============= 1834 INVESTMENTS: Delays Release of Unaudited Financial Statements ------------------------------------------------------------------ RJR News reports that 1834 Investments has delayed the release of its Unaudited Financial Statements for the quarter ending December 31, 2017, which were due to be filed with the Jamaica Stock Exchange by February 14. The additional time was required as the company engaged a new accounting firm to provide its financial statements, the report notes. The company said it is making every effort to have its third quarter financial statements submitted by March 5 and will be advising its shareholders by way of a statement in the print media, the report adds. ====================== P U E R T O R I C O ====================== PUERTO RICO: PREPA Can Borrow $300-Mil. Emergency Loan ------------------------------------------------------ Judge Laura Taylor Swain of the U.S. District Court in New York has authorized Puerto Rico's utility company called Prepa to borrow a $300 million loan that will keep it operating. According to Tom Corrigan and Andrew Scurria of The Wall Street Journal Pro Bankruptcy, the judge previously rejected a $550 million loan to keep Prepa in operation, saying the utility hadn't shown that the size of the proposed loan was sufficiently tailored to the utility's needs. The $550 million is part of of a proposed $1 billion financing package. During the hearing on Prepa's request to tap the $550 million loan, Judge Swain made it clear that a $300 million so-called superpriority unsecured loan was likely to win her blessing, the Journal related. But even with the $300 million, Prepa said it would be able to continue normal operations only until late March and will soon have to return to the court for approval of additional financing, the Journal said. The Journal related that Prepa's chief financial adviser has told the court that the government-run utility must have additional financing in place or parts of the Island would begin to go dark within a matter of days. Puerto Rico was already struggling with a $73 billion debt load and a decade of economic stagnation when Maria struck in September, the Journal noted. About Puerto Rico Puerto Rico is a self-governing commonwealth in association with the United States that's facing a massive bond debt of $70 billion, a 68% debt-to-GDP ratio and negative economic growth in nine of the last 10 years. The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has sought bankruptcy protection, aiming to restructure its massive $74 billion debt-load and $49 billion in pension obligations. The debt restructuring petition was filed by Puerto Rico's financial oversight board in U.S. District Court in Puerto Rico (Case No. 17-01578) on May 3, 2017, and was made under Title III of 2016's U.S. Congressional rescue law known as the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act ("PROMESA"). The Financial Oversight and Management Board later commenced Title III cases for the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation (COFINA) on May 5, 2017, and the Employees Retirement System (ERS) and the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (HTA) on May 21, 2017. On July 2, 2017, a Title III case was commenced for the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority ("PREPA"). U.S. Chief Justice John Roberts has appointed U.S. District Judge Laura Taylor Swain to oversee the Title III cases. The Honorable Judith Dein, a United States Magistrate Judge for the District of Massachusetts, has been designated to preside over matters that may be referred to her by Judge Swain, including discovery disputes, and management of other pretrial proceedings. Joint administration of the Title III cases, under Lead Case No. 17-3283, was granted on June 29, 2017. The Oversight Board has hired as advisors, Proskauer Rose LLP and O'Neill & Borges LLC as legal counsel, McKinsey & Co. as strategic consultant, Citigroup Global Markets, as municipal investment banker, and Ernst & Young, as financial advisor. Martin J. Bienenstock, Esq., Scott K. Rutsky, Esq., and Philip M. Abelson, Esq., of Proskauer Rose; and Hermann D. Bauer, Esq., at O'Neill & Borges are on-board as attorneys. McKinsey & Co. is the Board's strategic consultant, Ernst & Youngis the Board's financial advisor, and Citigroup Global Markets Inc. is the Board's municipal investment banker. Prime Clerk LLC is the claims and noticing agent. Prime Clerk maintains a case web site at https://cases.primeclerk.com/puertorico Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC is the service agent for ERS, HTA, and PREPA. O'Melveny & Myers LLP is counsel to the Commonwealth's Puerto Rico Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority (AAFAF), the agency responsible for negotiations with bondholders. The Oversight Board named Professor Nancy B. Rapoport as fee examiner and to chair a committee to review professionals' fees. Bondholders' Attorneys Toro, Colon, Mullet, Rivera & Sifre, P.S.C. and Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP serve as counsel to the Mutual Fund Group, comprised of mutual funds managed by Oppenheimer Funds, Inc., Franklin Advisers, Inc., and the First Puerto Rico Family of Funds, which collectively hold over $3.5 billion in COFINA Bonds and over $2.9 billion in other bonds issued by Puerto Rico and other instrumentalities, including over $1.8 billion of Puerto Rico general obligation bonds ("GO Bonds"). White & Case LLP and Lopez Sanchez & Pirillo LLC represent the UBS Family of Funds and the Puerto Rico Family of Funds, which hold $613.3 million in COFINA bonds. Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, Robbins, Russell, Englert, Orseck, Untereiner & Sauber LLP, and Jimenez, Graffam & Lausell are co-counsel to the ad hoc group of General Obligation Bondholders, comprised of Aurelius Capital Management, LP, Autonomy Capital (Jersey) LP, FCO Advisors LP, Franklin Mutual Advisers LLC, Monarch Alternative Capital LP, Senator Investment Group LP, and Stone Lion Capital Partners L.P. Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP and Reichard & Escalera are co-counsel to the ad hoc coalition of holders of senior bonds issued by COFINA, comprised of at least 30 institutional holders, including Canyon Capital Advisors LLC and Varde Investment Partners, L.P. Correa Acevedo & Abesada Law Offices, P.S.C., is counsel to Canyon Capital Advisors, LLC, River Canyon Fund Management, LLC, Davidson Kempner Capital Management LP, OZ Management, LP, and OZ Management II LP (the QTCB Noteholder Group). Committees The U.S. Trustee formed a nine-member Official Committee of Retirees and a seven-member Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of the Commonwealth. The Retiree Committee tapped Jenner & Block LLP and Bennazar, Garcia & Milian, C.S.P., as its attorneys. The Creditors Committee tapped Paul Hastings LLP and O'Neill & Gilmore LLC as counsel. =============== S U R I N A M E =============== SURINAME: Fitch Affirms B- IDR; Changes Outlook to Stable --------------------------------------------------------- Fitch Ratings has revised the Outlook on Suriname's Long-Term Foreign Currency (LT FC) Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to Stable from Negative and affirmed the IDR at 'B-'. KEY RATING DRIVERS The stabilization of Suriname's Outlook reflects the improving macroeconomic trend and more positive outlook for public finances since Fitch last review in February 2017. Suriname's economy recovered to positive growth in 2017 with inflation falling to single digits at year-end. The financial system is deleveraging and strengthening its capital ratios. Public finances are on a firmer path towards consolidation and debt reduction, partly reflecting Fitch assumption that the government will pass legislation on the introduction of a new Value Added Tax (VAT) in 2018. Disbursements by multilateral and bilateral lenders eased financing constraints to a degree in 2017, and the government has been able to increase its domestic financing via placement of short-term securities. Fitch expects the current account to remain in surplus, supported by higher commodity prices and production volumes, and international reserves to accumulate slowly. The 'B-' rating reflect Suriname's large public and external debt burdens, low external liquidity, high commodity dependence, large government deficits, financial system vulnerability, and monetary policy framework weaknesses. Suriname's higher per capita income and social indicators relative to the 'B' median are structural credit strengths. Macroeconomic conditions are stabilizing. Inflation receded to 9.2% yoy in December 2017 supported by relative exchange-rate stability. In line with central bank expectations, Fitch expects 5% average price inflation (incorporating a temporary increase on introduction of the VAT in the second half of 2018 (2H18), absent external shocks. Suriname adopted a floating exchange rate regime in 2016, but the SRD-USD rate has demonstrated stability during 2017. The economy returned to positive growth of 1.2% in 2017 following two years of recession. Gold and oil-related investments supported by firmer international prices are leading the recovery, and corporate credit demand shows incipient signs of recovery. Fitch expects 2.5% economic growth in 2018 and 2.7% in 2019. Fitch expect the VAT will temporarily suppress consumption, tempered by improving consumer confidence. Suriname's current account swung to an estimated 9.2% of GDP surplus in 2017 from a 19.4% deficit in 2015. The exchange-rate adjustment compressed imports while firming international oil and gold prices plus expanded gold exports increased current external receipts (CXR). Fitch expects the current account to remain in surplus during 2018-2019. International reserves stood at USD445 million as of January 2018, up from the low of USD213 million in May 2016. The government deficit remained large in 2017, with a preliminary estimate at 7.3% of GDP. Fiscal revenues are commodity-dependent and remain below current spending levels. Fitch expects the government to consolidate public finances reducing the deficit to 4.6% and 2.2% of GDP in 2018 and 2019, respectively, via a combination of revenue gains and cuts to current goods, services, and transfers expenditure. The Bouterse administration plans to introduce a VAT, scheduled for parliamentary debate in late February-March and rollout in 2H18. Together with tax administration gains, Fitch expect the VAT could capture 2pp of GDP additional annual revenues net of reductions in other taxes. Additionally, new income tax receipts from the Merian gold mine are expected to lift revenue by 1.5pp of GDP in 2019. Fitch expect the resulting primary fiscal surplus in 2019 will lower the government's large financing needs, put government debt on a downward trajectory, and enable it to reduce the stock (7% of GDP at November 2017) of relatively short-term domestic treasury securities. Suriname's government debt and interest burdens, at 66.9% of GDP and 20.8% of revenue in 2017, are higher than the respective 'B' medians of 58.7% and 9.4%. Sovereign external financing constraints eased during 2017 relative to Fitch expectations following the IMF's Standby Agreement going off track. External disbursements from regional multilateral banks, China, and a USD46 million 18-month commercial placement provided 2% of GDP net external financing. The government was able to finance its remaining needs domestically through placements of short-term treasury securities while clearing nearly all its payment arrears to domestic suppliers by July 2017. Net external debt is expected to have peaked at 74.8% of CXR in 2016. Public external borrowing and drawdown of international reserves in response to the commodity shocks elevated Suriname's net external debt above the 'B' median. Increased gold exports and the current account surplus temper currency risks for public debt service. Suriname has no large international bond maturities until 2026 and a smooth official amortization profile, supporting the 164% international liquidity ratio for 2018. This is despite its still weaker international reserves (at 2.6 months of current external payments coverage) than the 'B' median at 3.9. The Suriname parliament passed a Sovereign Savings and Stabilization Fund (SSSF) law in May 2017, designed to mitigate vulnerability to the volatile commodity-linked fiscal revenue in the future. Political prospects for VAT passage in 2018 are also supported by the administration's visible efforts to build public support. Previous attempts to consolidate public finances by cutting the electricity subsidy were stymied by public demonstrations. The next parliamentary elections are due by May 2020, and local observers estimate the window for policy reforms may close in 2019. Election-related extra-budgetary spending pressures emerged in the most recent competitive national elections in 2015. Suriname has exhibited political stability despite the recession and very high inflation levels during 2015- 2016. Financial system conditions are stabilizing. Real interest rates turned positive in 4Q17, supporting bank profitability. Banks are deleveraging, de-dollarizing credit while holding excess foreign currency liquidity, and writing down non-performing loans, which peaked in 2017. One large systemic financial institution is strengthening its capitalization and remains under intense supervision. SOVEREIGN RATING MODEL (SRM) and QUALITATIVE OVERLAY (QO) Fitch's proprietary SRM assigns Suriname a score equivalent to a rating of 'B-' on the LT FC IDR scale. Fitch's sovereign rating committee did not adjust the output from the SRM to arrive at the final LT FC IDR. Fitch's SRM is the agency's proprietary multiple regression rating model that employs 18 variables based on three-year centered averages, including one year of forecasts, to produce a score equivalent to a LT FC IDR. Fitch's QO is a forward-looking qualitative framework designed to allow for adjustment to the SRM output to assign the final rating, reflecting factors within Fitch criteria that are not fully quantifiable and/or not fully reflected in the SRM. RATING SENSITIVITIES The Outlook is Stable. The main factors that could lead to a positive rating action, individually or collectively, are: -- Consolidation of public finances - potentially supported by structural measures to broaden the tax base - that places general government debt on a downward path. -- Strengthened external liquidity buffers and external balance sheet. -- Stronger investment and economic growth prospects. The main factors that could lead to a negative rating action, individually or collectively, are: -- Failure to consolidate public finances that leads to an upward trajectory for government debt dynamics. -- Emergence of financing constraints or government payment arrears to domestic suppliers. -- Material weakening of the external balance sheet, potentially reflecting commodity price or volume shocks. KEY ASSUMPTIONS Fitch assumes global economic growth and international oil prices evolve according to Fitch quarterly Global Economic Outlook forecasts and that international gold prices remain near current levels during 2018-2019. The full list of rating actions is as follows: -- Long-Term Foreign-Currency IDR affirmed at 'B-'; Outlook revised to Stable from Negative -- Long-Term Local-Currency IDR affirmed at 'B-'; Outlook revised to Stable from Negative -- Short-Term Foreign-Currency IDR affirmed at 'B' -- Short-Term Local-Currency IDR affirmed at 'B' -- Country ceiling affirmed at 'B-' -- Issue rating on the long-term senior unsecured foreign- currency bond affirmed at 'B-' ================= V E N E Z U E L A ================= VENEZUELA: Transplant Patients Protest Shortage of Medicines ------------------------------------------------------------ EFE News reports that more than two-dozen Venezuelan transplant patients protested over a nationwide shortage of life-saving medicines, demanding that the state-run IVSS health system take action. Caracas resident Guillermo Valero, who got a transplant 15 years ago, told EFE that he has been waiting six months to receive his anti-rejection drugs, which are essential to preserve the integrity of the donated organ, according to EFE News. Mr. Valero, 56, said that because of the shortage of medicines in Venezuela's public health system, he has had to buy the drugs on the market for the equivalent of $200, the report notes. He said that the anti-rejection drugs he needs could be imported from Colombia for around $800 per dose, but he doesn't have the money to afford the three doses he requires, the report relays. Iraida Barona, 47, traveled 200 kilometers (124.3 miles) from Guarico to join the protest, saying that she had come to Caracas to demand the "right to health, to have a proper quality of life" and to show her support for the patients whose health has been affected, the report discloses. Ramon Chavier, 51, came 360 kilometers from his home in the western city of Barquisimeto to join the demonstration, holding a sign saying "my son donated his kidney to me, I don't want to lose it," the report says. Francisco Valencia, spokesperson of the Venezuelan Coalition for the Defense of the Right to Health and to Life, told EFE that at least 300,000 Venezuelans could be at risk of dying because of the shortage of medicines, the report adds. As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on Feb. 19, 2018 S&P Global Ratings affirmed its long- and short- term foreign currency sovereign issuer credit ratings on Venezuela at 'SD/D'. S&P said, "At the same time, we lowered seven issue ratings on Venezuela's global bonds to 'D' from 'CC'. Our long- and short-term local currency sovereign credit ratings remain at 'CCC-/C' and are still on CreditWatch with negative implications. In addition, we affirmed our 'CC' transfer and convertibility assessment." VENEZUELA: Poverty Under Maduro Doubled to 87% ----------------------------------------------- Carlos Camacho at The Latin American Herald reports that some 87% of Venezuelans are now poor, from only 48% in 2014, according to a study taken by Venezuela's three largest universities. And the findings are harrowing, according to The Latin American Herald. Year on year, total poverty went from 81.8% last year to 87% now, the report relays. Some 60% of Venezuelans claimed to have lost around 11 kilograms of bodyweight over the last 12 months due to economic hardship, the report notes. Last year, ENCOVI determined that each polled person had lost some eight kilos for the same reason, an ongoing, worsening phenomenon locals have dubbed The Maduro Diet," the report says. "And it is possible that for 2018 the situation is even worse," researcher Marino Gonzalez said in presenting the findings, citing hyperinflation as the main reason for the trend to continue, the report discloses. The inquiry studied more than 6,100 Venezuelan homes, the report relays. Poverty, one way or the other, "has reached all of the homes" in the nation possessing the largest oil reserves known to man but suffering under hyperinflation since October of last year, the ENCOVI study said, the report notes. About 56% of all poverty is "recent poverty," meaning after 2014, the first year of the ENCOVI study, the report notes. Embattled Venezuelan head of state Nicolas Maduro took over in 2013, the report discloses. More than half of Venezuelans, 51.6% were "non poor" in 2014, according to the living conditions poll ENCOVI, a joint study by Universidad Central de Venezuela, Universidad Catolica Andres Bello and Universidad Simon Bolivar, the report relays. Nowadays, the "non-poor" are 13%, with the remaining 87% being either "poor" or "extremely poor," the report notes. Venezuela's Gross Domestic Product has lost more than one third also over the last four years, an economic decline bigger than that of the United States during the Great Depression, Mexican Historian Enrique Krauze wrote in the New York Times, the report says. To February 2018, there are now more Venezuelans classified as "extreme poor," 61.2% of the population, than "non-poor" (13%) or just "poor" (25.8%), the report says. And a large chunk of the poor is not receiving any assistance: Some 13.4 million Venezuelans now receive alimentary assistance of some sort in this country of 31 million, where only 6.7 million Venezuelans were in that situation in 2016, according to ENCOVI, the report relays. Assistance is spotty, with 69% of all homes nationwide saying they have never received the CLAP box of subsidized food, and 18% receiving it once a month, except in the capital city of Caracas, home to 20% of the Venezuelan population, where 62% of low-income homes says to be getting it once a month, the report adds. As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on Feb. 19, 2018 S&P Global Ratings affirmed its long- and short- term foreign currency sovereign issuer credit ratings on Venezuela at 'SD/D'. S&P said, "At the same time, we lowered seven issue ratings on Venezuela's global bonds to 'D' from 'CC'. Our long- and short-term local currency sovereign credit ratings remain at 'CCC-/C' and are still on CreditWatch with negative implications. In addition, we affirmed our 'CC' transfer and convertibility assessment." ================= X X X X X X X X X ================= * BOND PRICING: For the Week From February 19 to Feb. 23, 2018 -------------------------------------------------------------- Issuer Name Cpn Price Maturity Country Curr ----------- --- ----- -------- ------- --- BA-CA Finance Cayman Lt 0.518 62.07 KY EUR AES Tiete Energia SA 6.7842 1.109 4/15/2024 BR BRL Argentina Bogar Bonds 2 39.36 2/4/2018 AR ARS Automotores Gildemeister 8.25 73.25 5/24/2021 CL USD Automotores Gildemeister 6.75 67 1/15/2023 CL USD Automotores Gildemeister 8.25 73.25 5/24/2021 CL USD Automotores Gildemeister 6.75 65.5 1/15/2023 CL USD CA La Electricidad 8.5 63.664 4/10/2018 VE USD Caixa Geral De Depositos 1.439 63.167 KY EUR Caixa Geral De Depositos 1.469 KY EUR CSN Islands XII Corp 7 68 BR USD CSN Islands XII Corp 7 66.266 BR USD Decimo Primer Fideicomiso 6 53.225 10/25/2041 PA USD Decimo Primer 4.54 43.127 10/25/2041 PA USD Dolomite Capital 13.217 73.108 12/20/2019 CN ZAR Enel Americas SA 5.75 56.172 6/15/2022 CL CLP Gol Linhas Aereas SA 10.75 35.861 2/12/2023 BR USD Gol Linhas Aereas SA 10.75 35.601 2/12/2023 BR USD Inversora Electrica 6.5 67.625 9/26/2017 AR USD Inversora Electrica 6.5 67.625 9/26/2017 AR USD MIE Holdings Corp 7.5 64.78 4/25/2019 HK USD MIE Holdings Corp 7.5 64.982 4/25/2019 HK USD NB Finance Ltd 3.88 61.816 2/7/2035 KY EUR Noble Holding 7.7 74.433 4/1/2025 KY USD Noble Holding 5.25 56.279 3/15/2042 KY USD Noble Holding 8.7 71.881 4/1/2045 KY USD Noble Holding 6.2 60.129 8/1/2040 KY USD Noble Holding 6.05 58.38 3/1/2041 KY USD Odebrecht Finance Ltd 7.5 42.5 KY USD Odebrecht Finance Ltd 5.125 56.938 6/26/2022 KY USD Odebrecht Finance Ltd 7 68.053 4/21/2020 KY USD Odebrecht Finance Ltd 7.125 41.366 6/26/2042 KY USD Odebrecht Finance Ltd 4.375 40.002 4/25/2025 KY USD Odebrecht Finance Ltd 5.25 39.211 6/27/2029 KY USD Odebrecht Finance Ltd 6 44.75 4/5/2023 KY USD Odebrecht Finance Ltd 5.25 39.018 6/27/2029 KY USD Odebrecht Finance Ltd 7.5 42.95 KY USD Odebrecht Finance Ltd 4.375 40.363 4/25/2025 KY USD Odebrecht Finance Ltd 7.125 41.635 6/26/2042 KY USD Odebrecht Finance Ltd 6 52.625 4/5/2023 KY USD Odebrecht Finance Ltd 5.125 55.873 6/26/2022 KY USD Odebrecht Finance Ltd 7 67.368 4/21/2020 KY USD Petroleos de Venezuela 8.5 74.5 10/27/2020 VE USD Petroleos de Venezuela 6 30.458 5/16/2024 VE USD Petroleos de Venezuela 6 30.517 11/15/2026 VE USD Petroleos de Venezuela 9.75 35.677 5/17/2035 VE USD Petroleos de Venezuela 9 39.279 11/17/2021 VE USD Petroleos de Venezuela 5.375 30.267 4/12/2027 VE USD Petroleos de Venezuela 8.5 72.5 10/27/2020 VE USD Petroleos de Venezuela 12.75 45.278 2/17/2022 VE USD Petroleos de Venezuela 6 30.367 5/16/2024 VE USD Petroleos de Venezuela 6 30.387 11/15/2026 VE USD Petroleos de Venezuela 9 39.316 11/17/2021 VE USD Petroleos de Venezuela 9.75 35.893 5/17/2035 VE USD Petroleos de Venezuela 6 28.346 10/28/2022 VE USD Petroleos de Venezuela 5.5 30.123 4/12/2037 VE USD Petroleos de Venezuela 12.75 45.23 2/17/2022 VE USD Polarcus Ltd 5.6 75 3/30/2022 AE USD Provincia del Chubut 4 10/21/2019 AR USD Siem Offshore Inc 4.04527 69.5 10/30/2020 NO NOK Siem Offshore 3.75176 65.75 12/28/2021 NO NOK STB Finance 2.05771 56.243 KY JPY Sylph Ltd 2.367 64.438 9/25/2036 KY USD US Capital 1.63611 54.774 12/1/2039 KY USD US Capital 1.63611 54.774 12/1/2039 KY USD USJ Acucar 9.875 67 11/9/2019 BR USD USJ Acucar 9.875 67 11/9/2019 BR USD Venezuela 13.625 68.25 8/15/2018 VE USD Venezuela 7.75 44.065 10/13/2019 VE USD Venezuela 11.95 40.785 8/5/2031 VE USD Venezuela 12.75 45.19 8/23/2022 VE USD Venezuela 9.25 39.645 9/15/2027 VE USD Venezuela 11.75 40.005 10/21/2026 VE USD Venezuela 9 36.285 5/7/2023 VE USD Venezuela 9.375 37.69 1/13/2034 VE USD Venezuela 13.625 72.25 8/15/2018 VE USD Venezuela 7 34.23 3/31/2038 VE USD Venezuela 7 59.19 12/1/2018 VE USD *********** Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par. Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside sources during the prior week we think are reliable. Those sources may not, however, be complete or accurate. The Monday Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication. Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices for actual trades are probably different. Our objective is to share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities. Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report. Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to publication. At first glance, this list may look like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short. Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's assets. A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize. The prices at which equity securities trade in public market are determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test. Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged. Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com *********** S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors. Copyright 2018. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2746. This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior written permission of the publishers. Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is not guaranteed. The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year, delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof are US$25 each. For subscription information, contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000. . * * * End of Transmission * * *