/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/180313.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

            Tuesday, March 13, 2018, Vol. 19, No. 51


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

IAM RETORNO: Moody's Assigns B-bf Global Scale Bond Fund Rating
QUINQUELA DEUDA: Moody's Assigns B-bf Global Scale Bond Rating


B A R B A DO S

CLICO: Barbadian Policyholders Start Getting Payouts


B R A Z I L

ELDORADO BRASIL: Fitch Keeps 'B' LC IDR on Rating Watch Evolving


C H I L E

AUTOMOTORES GILDEMEISTER: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Long-Term IDRs


P U E R T O   R I C O

PUERTO RICO: Contract Spending Speeds Up with Army Corps Exit
TOYS "R" US: Reportedly Prepping Shutdown of U.S. Stores


T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O

CARIBBEAN AIRLINES: Guyana Expresses Concerns About Price Gouging


V E N E Z U E L A

VENEZUELA: Moody's Lowers Currency Issuer Ratings to C


                            - - - - -


=================
A R G E N T I N A
=================


IAM RETORNO: Moody's Assigns B-bf Global Scale Bond Fund Rating
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo has
assigned a B-bf global scale bond fund rating and a Aa-bf.ar
national scale bond fund rating to IAM Retorno Total (the Fund), a
short-to-medium term bond fund managed by Industrial Asset
Management S.A.S.G.F.C.I.

The ratings assigned are:

- Global scale bond fund rating: B-bf

- National scale bond fund rating: Aa-bf.ar

RATINGS RATIONALE

"The B-bf global scale bond fund rating is based on Moody's
expectation that the Fund will maintain a single B credit profile
derived from investments in LEBACs, corporate bonds, term deposits
and asset backed securities. All investments will be denominated
in Pesos. The Fund is expected to have an average duration of less
than one-year. The Aa-bf.ar national scale rating reflects a
national scale mapping consistent for a Fund with a strong B-bf
global scale credit profile.

The rating agency noted that the Fund is a fund managed by an
experienced investment manager. Moody's analysis was performed on
a pro-forma model portfolio. Moody's expects the Fund to be
managed in line with this portfolio. If the Fund's portfolio, once
launched, deviates materially from its pro-forma model portfolio,
the Fund's ratings could change.

Industrial Asset Management S.A.S.G.F.C.I. is a medium sized asset
manager in the Argentinean Mutual Fund Industry being a subsidiary
of Banco Industrial. As of February 2018, Industrial had
approximately ARS 6.044 billion in assets under Management (AUM)
or approximately $303 million. The manager is the 28th largest
asset manager in the market with 0.92 % AUM market share.


QUINQUELA DEUDA: Moody's Assigns B-bf Global Scale Bond Rating
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo has
assigned a B-bf global scale bond fund rating and A-bf.ar national
scale bond fund rating to Quinquela Deuda Argentina FCI (the
Fund), a new medium-to-long term bond fund managed by QM Asset
Management S.G.F.C.I.S.A.

The ratings assigned are:

- Global scale bond fund rating: B-bf

- National scale bond fund rating: A-bf.ar

RATINGS RATIONALE

"The B-bf global scale bond fund rating is based on Moody's
expectation that the Fund will have an average credit quality of
single B based on a portfolio consisting primarily of investments
in subsovereign bonds and treasuries as well as National
Government Treasuries bills. All investments will be denominated
in Pesos", said Carlos de Nevares, Moody's Vice President. The
Fund's average duration will not exceed 2 years. The A-bf.ar
national scale rating reflects a national scale mapping consistent
for a Fund with a single B global scale credit profile.

The rating agency noted that the Fund is a new fund managed by an
experienced investment manager. Moody's analysis was performed on
a model portfolio provided by the fund sponsor. The rating agency
expects the Fund to be managed in line with this model portfolio.
However, Moody's noted that if the Fund's actual portfolio
deviates materially from the model portfolio, the Fund's ratings
could change.

QM Asset Management S.G.F.C.I.S.A. is a medium Argentinian
independent asset manager with a 1.5% of market share. As of
February 2018, QM Asset Management had assets under management of
approximately ARS9.81 billion (USD494 million).



==============
B A R B A DO S
==============


CLICO: Barbadian Policyholders Start Getting Payouts
----------------------------------------------------
Carribean360 reports that after years of waiting, people who had
policies with insurance company Colonial Life Insurance Company
Ltd. (CLICO) have started to get money back.  And Minister of
Finance Chris Sinckler says policyholders in the Organization of
Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) could be next in line,
Carribean360 states.

From March 1, Barbadian policyholders began receiving payments on
some of the instruments they held with the company which is now
being managed by Resolution Life Assurance Company Limited,
Carribean360 relates.

According to Carribean360, Mr. Sinckler made the disclosure March
7, following discussions with Resolution Life's Executive
Chairman, Clenell Goodman and Chief Executive Officer,
Cheryl Senhouse at the new company's headquarters.

Ms. Senhouse added that, on average, the payment to the annuitants
was about BDS$400,000 (US$200,000) per month and payments were
made for January and February of 2018, Carribean360 notes.

Meantime, Mr. Sinckler sought to give the assurance that those
policyholders in the OECS who were awaiting a resolution are not
far from thought, Carribean360 discloses.

"We decided to go with the Barbados first option, and not the
Barbados-only option, because the restructure proposal was for the
entire CLICO portfolio," Carribean360 quotes Mr. Sinckler as
saying.  "We still have issues to work out in the OECS.  We
believe that when we see what is happening here and how this has
unfolded, and that policyholders are seeing the benefits of the
exercise, we can encourage them to get on board so the second
phase of the restructuring can be completed."

Mr. Sinckler, as cited by Carribean360, said he was happy that
Resolution Life, which deals with the portfolio instruments under
CLICO is under excellent management.

The minister said he was also extremely comfortable with the
regulations put in place since the CLICO collapse, mainly the
Financial Services Commission Act and Insurance Act, Carribean360
relays.



===========
B R A Z I L
===========


ELDORADO BRASIL: Fitch Keeps 'B' LC IDR on Rating Watch Evolving
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has maintained Eldorado Brasil Celulose S.A.'s Long-
Term Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) of
'B' and National Long-Term Rating of 'BBB-(bra)' on Rating Watch
Evolving (RWE). Fitch has also maintained the 2021 notes rated
'B'/'RR4' issued by Eldorado Intl. Finance GmbH and guaranteed by
Eldorado and Cellulose Eldorado Austria GmbH on RWE.

The Evolving Watch reflects the continuing uncertainty as to
Eldorado's credit profile following the announcement that J&F
Investimentos S.A. (J&F) has entered into a share-purchase
agreement to sell part, or all, of its direct and indirect equity
interest in Eldorado to CA Investment (Brazil) S.A., a Paper
Excellence company. The transaction values Eldorado at BRL15
billion.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Rating Watch Revision: Fitch will resolve the Watch once it has a
clearer understanding of Eldorado's credit profile following the
acquisition. Positively, since being placed on RWE in September
2017, pulp prices have been relatively robust, which has helped
Eldorado's cash flow to improve. Eldorado's acquisition by new
shareholders could facilitate the refinancing of BRL2.2 billion of
short-term debt as of Sept. 30, 2017, which would relieve the
company's heavy short-term debt burden.

Negatively, the financial strength of Paper Excellence and its
ability to support and improve the financial profile of Eldorado
remains uncertain. Without this support, the company could
struggle to meet upcoming debt obligations, as most lenders are
not expected to increase their exposure in Eldorado given the
legal risks faced by its controlling shareholders. The ability and
willingness of Paper Excellence to facilitate the refinancing of
Eldorado's short-term debt will be a key input to future rating
actions. Other considerations will include more visibility on the
potential synergies, financial and operational ties with Paper
Excellence.

Risks Remain High: Eldorado's ratings reflect its reliance on
banks when it wants roll over the short-term debt, the concerns
related to the corporate governance practices of its controlling
shareholders and the uncertainty surrounding the various
investigations that are occurring at J&F and its shareholders.
Several investigations involving Eldorado shareholders continue to
move forward. They include administrative procedures by the CVM
(Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission), potential fines
from the U.S. Department of Justice, and an investigation by
Brazil's attorney general into possible breaches of the terms
agreed to in the J&F leniency agreement. These ongoing legal
matters represent a threat to the maintenance of the leniency
agreement signed by the controlling shareholders with the
Brazilian Federal Public Prosecutor's Office (MPF) concerning
allegations of corruption. This risk will be eliminated when Paper
Excellence concludes the acquisition of all the direct and
indirect equity interest held by J&F in Eldorado.

Improved Cash Flow Generation: Fitch projects that Eldorado will
generate about BRL2 billion of adjusted EBITDA in 2018, benefiting
from the expected increase in pulp prices. Eldorado generated
BRL1.5 billion of Fitch adjusted EBITDA and BRL607 million of cash
flow from operations (CFFO) in the LTM ended Sept. 30, 2017. This
compares with BRL1.3 billion of Fitch adjusted EBITDA and BRL671
million of CFFO during 2016. FCF was BRL95 million in the LTM,
after investments of BRL512 million. Fitch expects FCF to remain
pressured by high financial expenses, as total debt is not
projected to be significantly reduced. Eldorado's financial
statement as of Sept. 30, 2017 is not audited, and the latest
audited financials are dated Dec. 31, 2016.

Leverage to Slowly Diminish: Eldorado's leverage remains high and
Fitch projects net leverage will fall to about 3.3x during 2018.
Better pulp prices should contribute to a gradual deleveraging.
Eldorado's net debt/adjusted EBITDA ratio was reduced to 5.1x at
Sept. 30, 2017, as per Fitch's calculations, from 6.2x in 2016.
However, the strategy for Eldorado's capital structure following
Paper Excellence's acquisition is still unclear.

Strong Business Profile: Eldorado's business profile is strong and
reflects its excellent position in the lowest quartile of the
production cost curve due to its productive forests, a favorable
climate for growing trees and a modern pulp mill. In 2017, the
company's cash cost of production was about USD158 per ton, which
placed it firmly in the lowest quartile of the cost curve. In
comparison, producers in the third quartile have production costs
in the range of USD350-USD450 per ton, while those in the fourth
quartile can have costs of more than USD500. Eldorado was able to
reduce its dependence on wood from third parties and the average
distance from the forest to the mill during 2017. Eldorado also
has some financial flexibility from its forest base, with the
accounting value of the biological assets of its forest
plantations at BRL2.5 billion as of Sept. 30, 2017. The nearly
ideal conditions for growing trees in Brazil make these
plantations extremely efficient by global standards and give the
company a sustainable advantage with fiber costs.

Eldorado has limited scale of operations compared with peers in
Latin America and only one pulp mill located in Brazil, with
annual production capacity of 1.7 million tons of BEKP. Paper
Excellence has seven industrial operations in Canada and in
France, with annual production capacity of approximately 2.3
million tons of pulp. Together, Eldorado and Paper Excellence will
have an annual production capacity of approximately 4 million tons
of pulp in an industry of 62 million tons, becoming the world's
second-largest market pulp company.

Cyclicality of Pulp Prices: The market pulp industry is very
cyclical. Prices move sharply in response to changes in demand or
supply. Market fundaments for pulp producers have turned
favorable, as strong demand from China has helped the market
seamlessly absorb new capacity from Asia Pulp and Paper and
Fibria. Prices from 2018 through 2020 should be healthy due to the
dearth of new projects, which should help issuers build cash
positions for new projects or reduce debt accumulated during
recent pulp mill projects. China will continue to play a key role
in supporting prices. Its demand should be driven by a growing
economy and the closing of pulp mills that relied upon non-wood
fibers.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Eldorado's ratings reflect its reliance on banks to roll over its
short-term debt, ongoing litigation issues at its controlling
shareholders and weak corporate governance. Eldorado's leverage
and refinancing risk is high compared to other Latin America pulp
companies, which has resulted in a lower rating. Eldorado's rating
has also been constrained by concerns related to the corporate
governance practices of its controlling shareholders.

Eldorado's business profile is strong and reflects its excellent
position in the production cost curve due to productive forests, a
favorable climate for growing trees and a modern pulp mill. This
places the company's business risk profile in line with Latin
America pulp companies like Fibria (BBB-/Positive), Suzano (BBB-
/Stable), Empresas CMPC (BBB/Stable), and Celulosa Arauco
(BBB/Negative). The company's business is concentrated only in
pulp and is therefore exposed to the cyclicality of pulp prices.
No country-ceiling or operating environment aspects impact the
rating.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's Key Assumptions Within Fitch Rating Case for the Issuer
-- Pulp sales volume of 1.7 million tons;
-- Average hardwood net pulp price between USD675 and USD700 per
    ton;
-- FX rate of 3.3 BRL/USD;
-- Base case does not incorporate investments in the new pulp
    mill.

KEY RECOVERY RATING ASSUMPTIONS
-- The recovery analysis assumes that Eldorado would be
    considered a going concern in bankruptcy and that the company
    would be reorganized rather than liquidated.
-- Fitch has assumed an 8% administrative claim.

Going-Concern Approach:
-- Eldorado's going-concern EBITDA is based on December 2016
    Fitch-adjusted EBITDA.
-- The going-concern EBITDA estimate reflects Fitch's view of a
    sustainable EBITDA level upon which Fitch base the company's
    valuation and reflects pulp prices in the low price cycle.
-- An EV multiple of 5x is used to calculate a post-
    reorganization valuation and reflects a mid-cycle multiple.
    The waterfall results in a 45% recovery corresponding to an
    'RR4' Recovery Rating.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch will resolve the Rating Watch Evolving once Fitch have a
clearer understanding of Eldorado's credit profile and refinancing
risk following the conclusion of the transaction. In addition,
Fitch will evaluate the relative credit quality and financial
profile of Paper Excellence, as well as Fitch's view on the degree
of financial support or financial strain the buyer could provide.

LIQUIDITY

As of Sept. 30, 2017, Eldorado had cash and marketable securities
of BRL620 million and total debt of BRL8.1 billion, of which about
BRL2.2 billion is due in the short term. Excluding trade finance
lines, debt maturities up to the end of 2018 are about BRL1.2
billion. Eldorado needs to continue to refinance part of its
impending debt maturities, as FCF is still limited and pressured
by high financial expenses. The company's net debt fell by about
BRL567 million since December 2015, to BRL7.5 billion in September
2017.

Total debt was composed of loans from the Brazilian Development
Bank, pre-export financing, export credit agencies, export credit
notes, debentures from Fundo de Investimento do Fundo de Garantia
do Tempo de Servico, a term loan, and senior unsecured notes.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has maintained the Rating Watch Evolving on the following
ratings:

Eldorado Brasil Celulose S.A.
-- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR 'B';
-- Long-Term Local Currency IDR B';
-- National Long-Term Scale rating 'BBB-(bra)'.

Eldorado Intl. Finance GmbH
-- Senior unsecured notes, in the amount of USD350 million and
    due in 2021 'B/RR4'.

The transaction was issued by Eldorado Intl. Finance GmbH and
guaranteed by Eldorado Brasil Celulose S.A. and Cellulose Eldorado
Austria GmbH.



=========
C H I L E
=========


AUTOMOTORES GILDEMEISTER: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Long-Term IDRs
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Automotores Gildemeister S.p.A.'s (AG)
Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs)
at 'CCC'. Fitch has also upgraded AG's USD490 million senior
secured notes to 'CCC'/'RR4', which reflects average recovery
prospects, in the range of 31%-50%, in case of a default despite
its weaker position in the capital structure relative to the
company's secured bank loans.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High Credit Risk: AG's 'CCC' rating reflects its continued high
leverage and weak liquidity profile despite ongoing performance
improvement due to sales volume growth. The company will need to
continue to grow its EBITDA generation and successfully execute
its asset disposal plan to improve its financial flexibility. The
ratings consider the expectation of improvement in the business
environment in Chile and Peru, with single-digit volume growth
expected in both markets in 2018. The company has been reducing
SG&A and others costs. Fitch estimated the company's EBITDA in
2017 to be at about USD62 million (including dividends received)
compared to USD38 million in fiscal year end 2016 (FYE16).

Improved Leverage: Fitch expects AG's debt/EBITDA to trend towards
8.5x in 2018 from about 10.6x estimated for FYE17, driven by
increased EBITDA and asset divestments. Negatively, the company's
free cash flow generation is likely to remain negative due to a
higher interest payment and negative change in working capital
associated with its volume growth. Fitch expects AG to pay about
USD64 million of cash interest in 2018 as the company resumes
paying interest on its senior secured notes. AG is selling non-
core assets to reduce leverage. Fitch estimated that AG sold about
USD17 million of assets (real estate, equipment, and businesses)
in 2017.

Improved Business Environment: Fitch believes the company's
capacity to improve debt services depends on the improvement of
vehicle sales in Chilean and Peruvian markets. The Chilean and
Peruvian markets have recovered in 2017 and are showing signs of
further improvement in early 2018 thanks to improved economic
environment and the strengthening of the Chilean Peso relative to
the U.S. dollars, despite intense price competition. Based on
Fitch's assumption for a continued recovery in these markets in
2018, AG could reach interest coverage above 1.2x in 2018, which
is the first year that the company will cover the full annual
amount of interest expenses on its bond after two years of
capitalizing interest on the senior secured notes.

Capital Structure: AG's capital structure is comprised of secured
bank loans and bonds. Total adjusted debt, including factoring,
was USD645 million as of September 2017. The USD490 million senior
secured notes mature on May 23, 2021, with no scheduled
amortization. The notes are secured by priority liens on real
estate properties with a value of USD180 million and the bank
debt. Bank debts are secured by short-term assets (inventories,
receivables).

DERIVATION SUMMARY

AG's 'CCC' ratings are primarily driven by the company's high
leverage, negative FCF generation and tight financial flexibility.
Fitch expects a gradual improvement of the group's credit metrics
due to a recovery of sales in Peru and Chile. Fitch doesn't rate a
direct peer to the company. AG has been Hyundai's sole distributor
Hyundai passenger vehicles and light commercial vehicles in Chile
and Peru since 1986 in Chile and since 2002 in Peru. Hyundai is
one of the most popular brands in those markets, offering vehicles
ranging from mid-range sedans to high-end sport utility vehicles
(SUVs). AG benefits from its exclusive agreement to distribute
Hyundai car in Peru and Chile.

The company's business risk is high. The automotive retail
industry is sensitive to adverse economic conditions and to the
volatility of consumer demand which is influenced by consumer
confidence, discretionary spending, interest rates, credit
availability and currency changes. AG also faces intense
competition from other car manufacturers and distributors.

AG's peers in other sectors include non-food retailers such as
Falabella (BBB+), which is exposed to discretionary consumer
demand and has a strong business and geographical diversification
in non-food retail business, and Brazilian fleet and car rental
industry leaders, Localiza (BB) and JSL S.A (BB), whose industry
risk is considered less volatile. Both companies enjoy higher
profitability and scale than AG. No country ceiling,
parent/subsidiary or operating environment aspects have an impact
on AG's IDR.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's Key Assumptions Within Fitch Rating Case for the Issuer
-- Single-digit revenue growth in 2018;
-- Debt/EBITDA trending towards 8.5x in 2018;
-- Minimum capex level around USD12 million per year and no
    dividend payments during 2018-2019.

KEY RECOVERY RATING ASSUMPTIONS
Fitch believes that a debt restructuring would likely occur in a
distressed scenario where the company experiences weak level of
demand for automobiles and consumer discretionary spending, and
intense price competition. Therefore, Fitch has performed a going-
concern recovery analysis for AG based on the assumption that the
company would be reorganized rather than liquidated.

Key going-concern assumptions are:
-- AG would have a going-concern EBITDA of about USD 55 million.
    This figure reflects the company's LTM EBITDA as of Sept. 30,
    2017 and AG's current emergence from the depressed automotive
    retail sectors in Peru and Chile, which suffer from low
    consumer confidence and weak demand.
-- A distressed multiple of 5.7x due to the exposure to the auto
    industry sector and the company's position as the sole
    distributor of the Hyundai brands in Peru and Chile;
-- A distressed EV of USD284 million (post 10% for administrative
    claims).

The recovery performed under this scenario resulted in a recovery
rating of 'RR4'.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Positive Rating Action
-- Improved liquidity profile;

-- Continued growth in vehicle sales leading to improved EBITDA
    and the completion of planned asset sales;
-- Cash to short-term debt ratio of above 1x;
-- Debt/ EBITDA ratio below 7x and interest coverage above 1.5x.

Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Negative Rating Action
-- Weak operational results with vehicle sales declining,
    limiting the recovery of AG's cash flow generation;
-- Expectations of AG's interest coverage ratio, measured as
    total EBITDA to Interest Expenses ratio, substantially below
    1x;
-- Consistent negative FCF generation.

LIQUIDITY

AG's liquidity is tight but manageable. The company ended
Sept. 30, 2017 with a cash position of around USD39 million and
short-term debt of USD95 million. The company's secured bonds
mature in 2021. The company also has USD52 million of restricted
cash held to guarantee imports of vehicles from the factory.
Liquidity relies on the company's capacity to renew short-term
debt with banks (and factoring). In 2018, Fitch expects the
company to continue to generate negative FCF due to working
capital needs and higher interest expenses. AG reported USD44
million of assets held for sale as of Sept. 30, 2017. Fitch
expects most of the divestments to be completed in 2018 and for
cash proceeds to be used for working capital and debt repayment.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has taken the following ratings actions:

Automotores Gildemeister S.p.A.
-- Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs affirmed at 'CCC';
-- Senior unsecured notes upgraded to 'CCC'/'RR4' from 'CCC'-
    /'RR4'.



=====================
P U E R T O   R I C O
=====================


PUERTO RICO: Contract Spending Speeds Up with Army Corps Exit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Andrew Scurria, writing for The Wall Street Journal Pro
Bankruptcy, reported that Puerto Rican utility company Prepa
expects to spend more than $960 million through June on two
mainland U.S.-based firms that were hired to repair downed
electricity lines.

According to a liquidity forecast compiled and reviewed by the
Journal, payments to those contractors, Cobra Acquisitions LLC and
Whitefish Energy Holdings LLC, make up more than half of Prepa's
projected 10-month, $1.5 billion budget for emergency work
following the devastation of Hurricane Maria.

Since the storm, Prepa has more than tripled the size of Cobra's
contract to $945 million, fueling an 82% jump in its stock price
since it signed the deal, the report related. By contrast, Prepa
expects to spend $350 million on grid repair work under so-called
mutual assistance programs with stateside electric utilities,
according to the internal forecast, the report further related.

The Journal pointed out that the document, entered as evidence in
February in Prepa's court-supervised bankruptcy, underscores how
heavily Prepa has relied on for-profit contractors instead of
mutual aid deals, which are emergency assistance agreements
between utilities that don't include a profit element.

Utilities are working under mutual assistance in Puerto Rico "on a
not-for-profit basis," the report said, citing a spokesman for the
Edison Electric Institute, a trade group of investor-owned
utilities. EEI and other utility groups have roughly 1,500 crews
in Puerto Rico providing mutual aid, the report said. But Prepa
failed to activate these programs in the immediate aftermath of
the storm and made its first mutual aid request Oct. 31, one day
after Gov. Ricardo Rossello canceled the controversial Whitefish
contract, the report added.

                         About Puerto Rico

Puerto Rico is a self-governing commonwealth in association with
the United States that's facing a massive bond debt of $70
billion, a 68% debt-to-GDP ratio and negative economic growth in
nine of the last 10 years.

The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has sought bankruptcy protection,
aiming to restructure its massive $74 billion debt-load and $49
billion in pension obligations.

The debt restructuring petition was filed by Puerto Rico's
financial oversight board in U.S. District Court in Puerto Rico
(Case No. 17-01578) on May 3, 2017, and was made under Title III
of 2016's U.S. Congressional rescue law known as the Puerto Rico
Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act ("PROMESA").

The Financial Oversight and Management Board later commenced Title
III cases for the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation
(COFINA) on May 5, 2017, and the Employees Retirement System (ERS)
and the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (HTA) on
May 21, 2017. On July 2, 2017, a Title III case was commenced for
the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority ("PREPA").

U.S. Chief Justice John Roberts has appointed U.S. District Judge
Laura Taylor Swain to oversee the Title III cases. The Honorable
Judith Dein, a United States Magistrate Judge for the District of
Massachusetts, has been designated to preside over matters that
may be referred to her by Judge Swain, including discovery
disputes, and management of other pretrial proceedings.

Joint administration of the Title III cases, under Lead Case No.
17-3283, was granted on June 29, 2017.

The Oversight Board has hired as advisors, Proskauer Rose LLP and
O'Neill & Borges LLC as legal counsel, McKinsey & Co. as strategic
consultant, Citigroup Global Markets, as municipal investment
banker, and Ernst & Young, as financial advisor.

Martin J. Bienenstock, Esq., Scott K. Rutsky, Esq., and Philip M.
Abelson, Esq., of Proskauer Rose; and Hermann D. Bauer, Esq., at
O'Neill & Borges are on-board as attorneys.

McKinsey & Co. is the Board's strategic consultant, Ernst &
Youngis the Board's financial advisor, and Citigroup Global
Markets Inc. is the Board's municipal investment banker.

Prime Clerk LLC is the claims and noticing agent. Prime Clerk
maintains a case web site at
https://cases.primeclerk.com/puertorico
Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC is the service agent for ERS, HTA,
and PREPA.

O'Melveny & Myers LLP is counsel to the Commonwealth's Puerto Rico
Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority (AAFAF), the agency
responsible for negotiations with bondholders.

The Oversight Board named Professor Nancy B. Rapoport as fee
examiner and to chair a committee to review professionals' fees.

                      Bondholders' Attorneys

Toro, Colon, Mullet, Rivera & Sifre, P.S.C. and Kramer Levin
Naftalis & Frankel LLP serve as counsel to the Mutual Fund Group,
comprised of mutual funds managed by Oppenheimer Funds, Inc.,
Franklin Advisers, Inc., and the First Puerto Rico Family of
Funds, which collectively hold over $3.5 billion in COFINA Bonds
and over $2.9 billion in other bonds issued by Puerto Rico and
other instrumentalities, including over $1.8 billion of Puerto
Rico general obligation bonds ("GO Bonds").

White & Case LLP and Lopez Sanchez & Pirillo LLC represent the UBS
Family of Funds and the Puerto Rico Family of Funds, which hold
$613.3 million in COFINA bonds.

Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, Robbins, Russell,
Englert, Orseck, Untereiner & Sauber LLP, and Jimenez, Graffam &
Lausell are co-counsel to the ad hoc group of General Obligation
Bondholders, comprised of Aurelius Capital Management, LP,
Autonomy Capital (Jersey) LP, FCO Advisors LP, Franklin Mutual
Advisers LLC, Monarch Alternative Capital LP, Senator Investment
Group LP, and Stone Lion Capital Partners L.P.

Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP and Reichard & Escalera are
co-counsel to the ad hoc coalition of holders of senior bonds
issued by COFINA, comprised of at least 30 institutional holders,
including Canyon Capital Advisors LLC and Varde Investment
Partners, L.P.

Correa Acevedo & Abesada Law Offices, P.S.C., is counsel to Canyon
Capital Advisors, LLC, River Canyon Fund Management, LLC, Davidson
Kempner Capital Management LP, OZ Management, LP, and OZ
Management II LP (the QTCB Noteholder Group).

                               Committees

The U.S. Trustee formed a nine-member Official Committee of
Retirees and a seven-member Official Committee of Unsecured
Creditors of the Commonwealth. The Retiree Committee tapped Jenner
& Block LLP and Bennazar, Garcia & Milian, C.S.P., as its
attorneys. The Creditors Committee tapped Paul Hastings LLP and
O'Neill & Gilmore LLC as counsel.


TOYS "R" US: Reportedly Prepping Shutdown of U.S. Stores
--------------------------------------------------------
Toys "R" Us, Inc., is reportedly making preparations for a
liquidation of its U.S. operations absent a buyer or a deal with
its lenders.

Bloomberg News, citing people familiar with the matter, reported
that while the situation is still fluid, a shutdown of the U.S.
division has become increasingly likely in recent days.

Reuters, also citing an unnamed source, said that negotiations
with creditors are continuing and no decision has yet been taken.
The company is also considering other options, including a
potential sale in bankruptcy if possible, Reuters reported.

Toys "R" Us was hoping that strong sales during the key holiday
season would boost its chances of clinching a deal with its
creditors in bankruptcy.   The company is expected to report
three-month earnings to the end of January later this month.

A shutdown by Toys "R" Us is expected to affect Hasbro, Mattel and
other toymakers.

"Without a dedicated toy retailer -- 365 days a year -- you will
see growth in the industry slow," Gerrick Johnson, an analyst for
BMO Capital Markets, said, according to Bloomberg.  "Toys 'R' Us
is where new products can be discovered and blossom.  It's also
where smaller toy companies can have an opportunity."

The toy industry rose just 1% in 2017 and fell during the holiday
season, according to research firm NPD Group.

                      About Toys "R" Us

Toys "R" Us, Inc., is an American toy and juvenile-products
retailer founded in 1948 and headquartered in Wayne, New Jersey,
in the New York City metropolitan area.  Merchandise is sold in
880 Toys "R" Us and Babies "R" Us stores in the United States,
Puerto Rico and Guam, and in more than 780 international stores
and more than 245 licensed stores in 37 countries and
jurisdictions. Merchandise is also sold at e-commerce sites
including Toysrus.com and Babiesrus.com.

On July 21, 2005, a consortium of Bain Capital Partners LLC,
Kohlberg Kravis Roberts and Vornado Realty Trust invested $1.3
billion to complete a $6.6 billion leveraged buyout of the
company.

Toys "R" Us is a privately owned entity but still files with the
Securities and Exchange Commission as required by its debt
agreements.

The Company's consolidated balance sheet showed $6.572 billion in
assets, $7.891 billion in liabilities, and a stockholders' deficit
of $1.319 billion as of April 29, 2017.

Toys "R" Us, Inc., and certain of its U.S. subsidiaries and its
Canadian subsidiary voluntarily filed for relief under Chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. E.D. Va. Lead Case No. Case No.
17-34665) on Sept. 19, 2017.  In addition, the Company's Canadian
subsidiary voluntarily commenced parallel proceedings under the
Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") in Canada in the
Ontario Superior Court of Justice.  The Company's operations
outside of the U.S. and Canada, including its 255 licensed stores
and joint venture partnership in Asia, which are separate
entities, are not part of the Chapter 11 filing and CCAA
proceedings.

Grant Thornton is the monitor appointed in the CCAA case.

Judge Keith L. Phillips presides over the Chapter 11 cases.

In the Chapter 11 cases, Kirkland & Ellis LLP and Kirkland & Ellis
International LLP serve as the Debtors' legal counsel.  Kutak Rock
LLP serves as co-counsel.  Toys "R" Us employed Alvarez & Marsal
North America, LLC as its restructuring advisor; and Lazard Freres
& Co. LLC as its investment banker.  It hired Prime Clerk LLC as
claims and noticing agent.  A&G Realty Partners, LLC, serves as
its real estate advisor.

On Sept. 26, 2017, the U.S. Trustee for Region 4 appointed an
official committee of unsecured creditors.  The Committee retained
Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP as its legal counsel; Wolcott
Rivers, P.C. as local counsel; FTI Consulting, Inc. as financial
advisor; and Moelis & Company LLC as investment banker



================================
T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O
================================


CARIBBEAN AIRLINES: Guyana Expresses Concerns About Price Gouging
-----------------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that the authorities in Guyana have turned the
spotlight on Caribbean Airlines and Fly Jamaica following claims
of price gouging.

According to RJR News, Minister of State Joseph Harmon says the
government has already called in the two airlines to express
concerns about price gouging on the Guyana route.

The Ministry of Public Infrastructure had threatened to raise the
bond lodged by the airlines, RJR News relays, citing Mr. Harmon.

Caribbean Airlines Limited -- http://www.caribbean-airlines.com/
-- provides passenger airline services in the Caribbean, South
America, and North America.  The company also offers freighter
services for perishables, fish and seafood, live animals, human
remains, and dangerous goods.  In addition, it operates a duty
free store in Trinidad.  Caribbean Airlines Limited was founded in
2006 and is based in Piarco, Trinidad and Tobago.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
November 2, 2015, RJR News said that Michael DiLollo, Chief
Executive Officer of Caribbean Airlines Limited has quit after
just 17 months on the job. The 48-year-old Canadian national,
citing personal reasons, resigned with immediate effect.  His
resignation was accepted by the airline's board of directors. Mr.
DiLollo was appointed Caribbean Airlines CEO in May 2014,
following the sudden resignation of Robert Corbie in September
2013.

In early February 2015, Larry Howai, then Finance Minister, told
Parliament that unaudited accounts for 2014 showed the airline
made a loss of US$60 million, inclusive of its Air Jamaica
operations, and the airline planned to break even by 2017.
Mr. Howai told the Parliament that a five-year strategic plan had
been completed and was in the process of being approved for
implementation.

In an interview with the Trinidad & Tobago Guardian in early
November 2015, Mr. DiLollo said CAL did not need a bailout just
yet. Mr. DiLollo said the airline had benefited from extremely
patient shareholders for years and he believed the airline was
strategically positioned to break even in three years.



=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================


VENEZUELA: Moody's Lowers Currency Issuer Ratings to C
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the Government of
Venezuela's foreign currency and local currency issuer ratings,
foreign and local currency senior unsecured ratings, and foreign
currency senior secured rating to C from Caa3. Concurrently, the
foreign currency senior unsecured medium term note program has
also been downgraded to (P)C from (P)Caa3. The outlook has been
changed to stable from negative.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The key drivers underpinning the ratings downgrade are:

1) Moody's expectation that the continuing erosion of Venezuela's
payment capacity will lead to heavy losses to bondholders, with
ongoing defaults on interest payments on various bonds compounded
by upcoming principal maturities

2) The limits on Venezuela's ability to restructure its debt posed
by current US sanctions that prevent US investors from accepting
new debt instruments under a potential debt exchange, which will
further exacerbate losses.

In a related decision, Moody's lowered Venezuela's long-term
country ceilings: the local-currency country ceilings for bonds
and bank deposits to Ca from Caa2; the foreign-currency bond
ceiling to Ca from Caa3; the foreign-currency bank deposit ceiling
to C from Ca. The short-term foreign currency bond and deposit
ceilings remain unchanged at Not-Prime (NP).

The action signals that in Moody's view Venezuela's capacity to
service its principal and interest obligations will remain
severely impaired, and that losses to bondholders will be very
high, most likely in excess of 65%. This view principally reflects
the following drivers.

FIRST DRIVER: CONTINUING EROSION OF PAYMENT CAPACITY AND FURTHER
DEFAULTS ON UPCOMING PAYMENTS WILL COMPOUND LOSSES

The ongoing decline in Venezuela's oil production is likely to be
sustained and will further pressure foreign currency cash flows,
with severe hard currency shortages unlikely to abate. The
prospects for Venezuela's oil sector are likely to mirror the
country's worsening financial situation. The country's large
external funding gap and diminishing financing sources imply that
upcoming debt service payments will continue to be missed. Already
since November 2017 when the first defaults on market debt
occurred, pending coupon payments due from both the sovereign and
the state-owned oil company PDVSA have surpassed $1.7 billion.

Given that the government has so far made late payments only on
PDVSA coupons that went beyond 30-day grace periods and not on
sovereign coupons, it is increasingly likely that the government
will not be able to meet upcoming principal payments on its market
debt, the first falling in August 2018 for $1.05 billion. Even
though the authorities have signaled that they plan to remediate
some of the late payments on interest on both PDVSA and sovereign
bonds, cash flow pressures from the lower oil production will
weigh heavily on their ability to clear all arrears. Moody's
expect that losses on principal and interest will be very high and
consistent with a C rating.

SECOND DRIVER: CONSTRAINED ABILITY TO RESTRUCTURE DEBT WILL
EXACERBATE LOSSES

The current US sanctions against Venezuela contain restrictions
that make it impossible for the country to refinance, and hence
restructure, its outstanding market obligations on debt held by US
companies or investors despite President Maduro's announcement on
2 November 2017 that the government intends to restructure its
debt. Even if there were investor appetite to restructure
Venezuela's debt, current sanctions would make this unlawful for
US bondholders to do so. The inability to ease near-term liquidity
pressures through a formal restructuring will exacerbate the
government's financial constraints and heighten losses to
bondholders.

Moreover, the US government has suggested further sanctions could
be forthcoming if, as seems very likely, free and fair elections
are not held. The upcoming presidential election in Venezuela that
has now been set for 20 May will be boycotted by most of the
opposition due to allegations of fraud in regional elections held
in October 2017 and in municipal elections held in December 2017.
New sanctions following the vote may target Venezuela's oil
sector, further undermining the sovereign's ability to clear any
arrears or make upcoming payments, potentially requiring greater
debt relief in an eventual restructuring.

Because of these additional considerations, losses in past
sovereign defaults offer limited visibility for Venezuela.
However, while the magnitude of losses if the restructuring
actually takes place is highly uncertain, they are in Moody's view
very likely to be substantial, consistent with current market
pricing of Venezuela's outstanding sovereign debt instruments. As
such, very low recovery values for bondholders, in line with
Moody's lowest rating of C, are likely.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP

Venezuela's sovereign rating would move up from the current level
of C if a restructuring were to provide sufficient cash flow
relief to ease the severe foreign currency liquidity shortages and
allow debt service to recommence. A withdrawal of current
financial sanctions, or any possible new ones, by the US would
enhance Venezuela's ability to orchestrate such a restructuring,
which would likely decrease the severity of losses on bondholders
somewhat, potentially supporting a higher rating.

GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 14,016 (2016 Actual) (also known
as Per Capita Income)

Real GDP growth (% change): -16.2% (2016 Actual) (also known as
GDP Growth)

Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 660.1% (2016 Actual)

Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -2% (2016 Actual) (also known as
Fiscal Balance)

Current Account Balance/GDP: -3.4% (2016 Actual) (also known as
External Balance)

External debt/GDP: 94.4% (2016 Actual)

Level of economic development: Low level of economic resilience

Default history: At least one default event (on bonds and/or
loans) has been recorded since 1983.

On March 8, 2018, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of the Venezuela, Government of. The main points raised
during the discussion were: The issuer's fiscal or financial
strength, including its debt profile, has materially decreased.
The issuer has become increasingly susceptible to event risks.




                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2018.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.
.


                   * * * End of Transmission * * *