TCRLA_Public/180320.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

               Tuesday, March 20, 2018, Vol. 19, No. 56


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

HSBC BANK ARGENTINA: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class 10 Notes
HSBC BANK ARGENTINA: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class 9 Notes
HSBC BANK ARGENTINA: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class 8 Notes


B R A Z I L

AVIANCA HOLDINGS: Fitch Affirms B IDR; Changes Outlook to Stable
RIO OIL 2014-1: Fitch Hikes USD2BB Notes Rating to 'BB-'


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Pension Fund Jumps 19% to US$10.6 Billion


J A M A I C A

JAMAICA: IMF Says Growth Discouraging Since Reforms Program Began


M E X I C O

REPSOL INTERNATIONAL: To Open 200 Gas Stations in Mexico
MEXICO: Former First Lady to Run for President as Independent


P U E R T O    R I C O

HUSKY INC: Court OK's Disclosures; April 10 Plan Hearing
HUSKY INC: New Plan to Pay CRIM in Full Plus Interest in 60 Months
KONA GRILL: Renaissance Technologies Reports 7.87% Stake
KONA GRILL: Anson Funds Lowers Stake to 2.4% by Dec. 31
TOYS "R" US: KBRA Sees 111 Loans Totaling $4.9B With Exposure


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A R G E N T I N A
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HSBC BANK ARGENTINA: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class 10 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo S.A., (MLA)
assigned a Ba3 global local currency senior unsecured debt rating
and an Aaa.ar national scale local currency debt rating to HSBC
Bank Argentina S.A.'s (HSBC Argentina) tenth issuance up to
ARS5,000 million, which will be due in 18 months.

All ratings have stable outlook.

The following ratings were assigned to HSBC Bank Argentina S.A.'s
expected issuance:

Class 10 up to ARS5,000 million:

- Ba3 Global Local Currency Debt Rating

- Aaa.ar Argentina National Scale Local Currency Debt Rating

RATINGS RATIONALE

HSBC Argentina's ratings consider the high probability that the
bank will receive financial support from its parent, HSBC Holdings
plc (HSBCH, A2 negative), in an event of stress. The benefits from
parental support offset challenges related to Argentina's
operating environment, which while improving has historically been
very volatile. As a result of these challenges, coupled with the
close credit linkages between banks and their sovereigns, HSBC
Argentina's standalone credit profile is constrained at the level
of Argentina's B2 sovereign rating despite the strength of its
large and highly granular deposits base and strong asset quality.

Despite HSBC Argentina's positioning as Argentina's sixth largest
bank, its well diversified loan book, and solid corporate and
investment banking franchises, net income fell sharply in 2017 to
just 0.8% of tangible assets, very low by Argentine standards
given the high level of inflation in the country, from 2.3% the
year before. Consequently, earnings were not sufficient to
compensate for capital consumed by the bank's very high 49% loan
grow thin 2017, which was in line with the system average of 46%.
As a result, HSBC's tangible common equity ratio fell to a
relatively modest 7.8% of adjusted risk-weighted assets as of
year-end 2017 from 10.7% as of year-end 2016.

Asset quality remains strong, as reflected in a non-performing
loan ratio of just 1.9% as of December 2017. However, this figure
may be flattered by the bank's rapid loan growth and asset risk
might rise as the new lending portfolio seasons.

Customer deposits are the bank's largest source of funding and are
derived largely from individuals and small and midsized firms
contributing to funding stability. However, deposits grew by just
35% last year, well below the rate of loan growth. While the bank
nevertheless remains very liquid, with cash and investments equal
to 40% of total assets, reliance on market funds increased
considerably, to 16% of tangible banking assets as of year-end
2017, from less than 4% the previous year.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

As the bank's standalone credit profile is constrained by
Argentina's sovereign rating, the Ba3 global scale rating could
face upward pressure if the sovereign rating were upgraded.
Conversely, the global scale rating could face downward pressure
if the government of Argentina were to be downgraded, and both the
global and national scale ratings could be lowered if the entity's
capital base, profitability, and/or asset quality were to
deteriorate significantly in the absence of a sovereign rating
action.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in September 2017.


HSBC BANK ARGENTINA: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class 9 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo S.A., (MLA)
assigned a Ba3 global local currency senior unsecured debt rating
and an Aaa.ar national scale local currency debt rating to HSBC
Bank Argentina S.A.'s (HSBC Argentina) ninth issuance of up to
ARS5,000 million, which will be due in 36 months.

All ratings have stable outlook.

The following ratings were assigned to HSBC Bank Argentina S.A.'s
expected issuance:

Class 9 up to ARS 5,000 million:

- Ba3 Global Local Currency Debt Rating

- Aaa.ar Argentina National Scale Local Currency Debt Rating

RATINGS RATIONALE

HSBC Argentina's ratings consider the high probability that the
bank will receive financial support from its parent, HSBC Holdings
plc (HSBCH, A2 negative), in an event of stress. The benefits from
parental support offset challenges related to Argentina's
operating environment, which while improving has historically been
very volatile. As a result of these challenges, coupled with the
close credit linkages between banks and their sovereigns, HSBC
Argentina's standalone credit profile is constrained at the level
of Argentina's B2 sovereign rating despite the strength of its
large and highly granular deposits base and strong asset quality.

Despite HSBC Argentina's positioning as Argentina's sixth largest
bank, its well diversified loan book, and solid corporate and
investment banking franchises, net income fell sharply in 2017 to
just 0.8% of tangible assets, very low by Argentine standards
given the high level of inflation in the country, from 2.3% the
year before. Consequently, earnings were not sufficient to
compensate for capital consumed by the bank's very high 49% loan
grow thin 2017, which was in line with the system average of 46%.
As a result, HSBC's tangible common equity ratio fell to a
relatively modest 7.8% of adjusted risk-weighted assets as of
year-end 2017 from 10.7% as of year-end 2016.

Asset quality remains strong, as reflected in a non-performing
loan ratio of just 1.9% as of December 2017. However, this figure
may be flattered by the bank's rapid loan growth and asset risk
might rise as the new lending portfolio seasons.

Customer deposits are the bank's largest source of funding and are
derived largely from individuals and small and midsized firms
contributing to funding stability. However, deposits grew by just
35% last year, well below the rate of loan growth. While the bank
nevertheless remains very liquid, with cash and investments equal
to 40% of total assets, reliance on market funds increased
considerably, to 16% of tangible banking assets as of year-end
2017, from less than 4% the previous year.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

As the bank's standalone credit profile is constrained by
Argentina's sovereign rating, the Ba3 global scale rating could
face upward pressure if the sovereign rating were upgraded.
Conversely, the global scale rating could face downward pressure
if the government of Argentina were to be downgraded, and both the
global and national scale ratings could be lowered if the entity's
capital base, profitability, and/or asset quality were to
deteriorate significantly in the absence of a sovereign rating
action.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in September 2017.


HSBC BANK ARGENTINA: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class 8 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo S.A., (MLA)
assigned a Ba3 global local currency senior unsecured debt rating
and an Aaa.ar national scale local currency debt rating to HSBC
Bank Argentina S.A.'s (HSBC Argentina) eighth issuance of up to
ARS5,000 million, which will be due in 24 months.

All ratings have stable outlook.

The following ratings were assigned to HSBC Bank Argentina S.A.'s
expected issuance:

Class 8 up to ARS 5,000 million:

- Ba3 Global Local Currency Debt Rating

- Aaa.ar Argentina National Scale Local Currency Debt Rating

RATINGS RATIONALE

HSBC Argentina's ratings consider the high probability that the
bank will receive financial support from its parent, HSBC Holdings
plc (HSBCH, A2 negative), in an event of stress. The benefits from
parental support offset challenges related to Argentina's
operating environment, which while improving has historically been
very volatile. As a result of these challenges, coupled with the
close credit linkages between banks and their sovereigns, HSBC
Argentina's standalone credit profile is constrained at the level
of Argentina's B2 sovereign rating despite the strength of its
large and highly granular deposits base and strong asset quality.

Despite HSBC Argentina's positioning as Argentina's sixth largest
bank, its well diversified loan book, and solid corporate and
investment banking franchises, net income fell sharply in 2017 to
just 0.8% of tangible assets, very low by Argentine standards
given the high level of inflation in the country, from 2.3% the
year before. Consequently, earnings were not sufficient to
compensate for capital consumed by the bank's very high 49% loan
grow thin 2017, which was in line with the system average of 46%.
As a result, HSBC's tangible common equity ratio fell to a
relatively modest 7.8% of adjusted risk-weighted assets as of
year-end 2017 from 10.7% as of year-end 2016.

Asset quality remains strong, as reflected in a non-performing
loan ratio of just 1.9% as of December 2017. However, this figure
may be flattered by the bank's rapid loan growth and asset risk
might rise as the new lending portfolio seasons.

Customer deposits are the bank's largest source of funding and are
derived largely from individuals and small and midsized firms
contributing to funding stability. However, deposits grew by just
35% last year, well below the rate of loan growth. While the bank
nevertheless remains very liquid, with cash and investments equal
to 40% of total assets, reliance on market funds increased
considerably, to 16% of tangible banking assets as of year-end
2017, from less than 4% the previous year.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

As the bank's standalone credit profile is constrained by
Argentina's sovereign rating, the Ba3 global scale rating could
face upward pressure if the sovereign rating were upgraded.
Conversely, the global scale rating could face downward pressure
if the government of Argentina were to be downgraded, and both the
global and national scale ratings could be lowered if the entity's
capital base, profitability, and/or asset quality were to
deteriorate significantly in the absence of a sovereign rating
action.


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B R A Z I L
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AVIANCA HOLDINGS: Fitch Affirms B IDR; Changes Outlook to Stable
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Avianca Holdings S.A.'s (Avianca
Holdings) Issuer Default Rating at 'B' and revised its Rating
Outlook to Stable from Negative. Fitch has also affirmed the
company's existing unsecured notes ratings at 'B-'/'RR5'.

The Outlook revision encompasses Avianca Holdings' capacity to
maintain liquidity, leverage and margin metrics despite a very
challenging environment in 2017 at levels in line with
expectations previously incorporated in the ratings. The revision
is also aided by prospects of Avianca Holdings' operational
performance to continue benefiting from positive traffic trend in
its main markets during 2018-2019. The Stable Outlook is supported
by Fitch's expectations that Avianca Holdings will lower its
adjusted gross leverage toward 2019.

Fitch's primary concerns revolve around Avianca Holdings'
liquidity position and growth strategy, which will require
material spending on aircraft deliveries over the next few years.
The increased aircraft related capex is a critical part of Avianca
Holdings' capacity plans, but it could pressure on FCF over the
intermediate term and lead to incremental borrowing.

The 'B-'/'RR5' Recovery Rating of the company's unsecured notes
incorporates the subordination of the notes to the significant
levels of secured debt, resulting in below average recovery
prospects in the event of default. The ratings also consider the
vulnerability of the company's cash flow generation to fuel price
variations and the inherent risks of the airline industry, as well
as the carrier's capacity to maintain operational margins based on
the leader position in the markets where it operates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Strike Impact in Credit Metrics Incorporated: In 2017 Avianca
Holdings' operations faced a pilot strike from Sept. 20 until Nov.
13. This event reversed the positive trend observed in the
company's operational margin and leverage metrics during the LTM
ended in September 2017. Despite the pilot strike and its effects
on fourth quarter 2017 passengers transported, which declined by
13.7%, year on year, the company was able to adjust its operations
and transport 30 million passengers in 2017, similar to 2016
traffic levels. The company's 2017 operational result was USD293
million, and Avianca Holdings estimates the negative impact of the
pilot strike in the company's operational results at approximately
USD126 million.

EBIT Margin in 6% to 7% Range: Avianca Holdings' 2017 EBIT margin
was 6.6%, slightly below 2016's margin of 7.2. Fitch expects the
EBIT margin for 2018 to 2019 to remain stable at around 6.5%,
driven primarily by single digit growth in traffic, higher yields,
and the increase in cargo activity. These positive factors should
be partially counterbalanced by expected increase in fuel cost
during the period. The total capacity, measured as available seat
kilometres, is anticipated to increase 8% to 10% during 2018 as
the company operations recovers from the pilot strike impact in
2017.

High Gross Adjusted Leverage: The company's gross adjusted
leverage, as measured by total adjusted debt/EBITDAR, remained
high at 6.4x at the end of December 2017 versus 6.2x at year-end
2016. Fitch expects the company's gross adjusted leverage ratio to
be around 6.4x and 5.7x in 2018 and 2019, respectively. Avianca
Holdings' cash flow generation, as measured by EBITDAR, was USD885
million during 2017. The company held approximately USD5.7 billion
in total adjusted debt at year-end 2017. Debt, as of Dec. 31,
2017, consists primarily of USD3.7 billion of on-balance-sheet
debt, most of which is secured, and an estimated USD2 billion of
off-balance-sheet debt associated with lease obligations.

Capex Management Key for FCF and Deleverage: Fitch considers the
company's capex levels and resulting FCF generation will be
crucial for its financial leverage trend during the next 24 months
ended in December 2019. During the LTM ended September 2017, the
company's FCF generation was positive USD110 million, resulting in
FCF margin (FCF/ revenues) of positive 2.5%. The company's LTM
September 2017 positive FCF resulted primarily from its better
operational performance with an EBIT margin of 7.1% during this
period. The LTM September 2017 FCF calculation reflects USD443
million in cash flow from operations, USD281 million in net capex
and USD51 million in paid dividends. Fitch expects Avianca
Holdings to manage its capital intensity, measured as the
capex/revenue ratio, in the 6% to 10% range during 2017 -- 2019.
Fitch forecast the company to reach slightly negative to neutral
FCF during 2017-2019.

Limited Visibility on Potential Events; Not Incorporated in
Ratings: Avianca Holdings' ratings do not factor in several
potential events including the incorporation of a strategic
partner, the execution of an equity increase, and/or merger and
acquisition activity-related operations in the Brazilian market.
Fitch considers there to be limited visibility at this point as to
final outcomes and timing of each of these events but that in
general the incorporation of a global carrier as a strategic
partner could be a positive development. The move would allow
Avianca Holdings to strengthen key areas such as market position
and corporate governance.

Credit Linkages and Notes' Guarantees Structure Incorporated: The
ratings also reflect Avianca Holdings' corporate structure and
credit linkage with its subsidiaries, Aerovias del Continente
Americano S.A. (Avianca) and Grupo Taca. Combined, these two
operating companies represent the main source of cash flow
generation for the holding company. The significant legal and
operational linkages between the two operating companies are
reflected in the existence of cross-guarantee and cross-default
clauses relating to the financing of aircraft acquisitions for
both companies. Avianca Holdings, Grupo Taca, and Avianca Leasing
are jointly and severally liable under the USD550 million
unsecured notes as co-issuers. Avianca Leasing is a wholly owned
subsidiary incorporated under the laws of the state of Delaware,
whose obligations as a co-issuer of the notes are unconditionally
guaranteed on an unsecured, senior basis by Avianca for up to two-
thirds of the total issuance amount.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Avianca Holdings is well positioned in the 'B' rating category
relative to its regional peers given its network, route
diversification, important regional market position and relatively
more stable operational performance. These positive factors are
tempered by the company's higher gross adjusted leverage and
weaker liquidity relative to peers. Avianca Holdings' 'B' rating
is below LATAM Airlines S.A. (LATAM, B+) and at the same level as
GOL Linhas Aereas Inteligentes S.A. (GOL, B). The ratings
distinction among the three airlines reflects differences in the
financial strategies, credit access, operational performance
volatility and business diversification for each airline.

For 2017, Avianca Holdings generated EBIT margins of 6.6% compared
to levels of 9.4% and 7% for GOL and LATAM, respectively. Avianca
Holdings is expected to maintain operational margins in the 6% to
7% range during 2018 to 2019. These levels are below to those
expected for LATAM and GOL during the same period. Avianca
Holdings' ratings are constrained by its high gross adjusted
leverage. Avianca Holdings' gross adjusted leverage of 6.4x as of
Dec. 31, 2017 is at the high end of its peer group. LATAM and GOL
ended 2017 with gross adjusted leverage metrics of 5.2x and 5.6x,
respectively.

Avianca Holdings has maintained a cash position relatively low to
its annual revenues. Fitch expects the company to maintain a
liquidity position of approximately 12% of its expected annual
revenues levels in 2018. This liquidity position is lower than
those levels expected by LATAM (18%) and GOL (15%) during the same
period. Due to its debt payment schedule and expected aircraft
capex levels, Fitch views Avianca Holdings' financial flexibility
as lower than those observed for LATAM and GOL.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's Key Assumptions within Fitch Rating Case for the Issuer
-- 2018-2019 EBIT margin approximately at 6.5%;
-- 2018-2019 gross adjusted leverage, measured as total adjusted
    debt/EBITDAR ratio, around 6x, 6.4x in 2018;
-- 2018-2019 coverage ratio, EBITDAR/(net interest expense +
    rents), around 1.9x;
-- 2017 liquidity, measured as the readily available cash over
    LTM net revenues, around 12%;
-- 2018-2019 FCF generation slightly negative.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Positive Rating Action
-- Adjusted gross leverage trending to around 5x;
-- EBIT margin consistently above 7%;
-- Coverage ratio, measured as total EBITDAR/(interest expense
    plus rents) ratio, consistently above 2.3x;
-- Liquidity, cash/ LTM revenues, consistently above 12%;
-- Moving toward neutral-to-positive FCF.

Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Negative Rating Action
-- Adjusted gross leverage remaining above 6.5x;
-- EBIT margin consistently below 6%;
-- Coverage ratio, measured as the total EBITDAR/(interest
    expense + rents), consistently below 2x;
-- Liquidity, cash/ LTM revenues, consistently below 10%;
-- Sustained negative FCF.

LIQUIDITY

Moderated Improvement in Liquidity, Debt Payment Schedule Limit
Financial Flexibility: Fitch views as a positive the company's
recent increase in liquidity. As of Dec. 31, 2017, Avianca
Holdings had cash and equivalents of USD514 million (USD375
million as of Dec. 31, 2016), the company does not maintain unused
committed credit lines. Liquidity, measured as total cash and
equivalents, represented around 12% of its revenues in 2017 from
9% in 2016. Upcoming debt maturities are relatively high for the
company's liquidity and expected FCF generation during 2018 --
2019. Debt maturities during 2018 and 2019 are USD572 million and
USD411 million, respectively. Fitch expects Avianca Holdings to
cover its capex and debt maturities with a combination of its own
cash flow generation, debt refinancing, and some incremental debt
during 2018 -- 2019.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has affirmed the ratings for Avianca Holdings and its
subsidiaries:

Avianca Holdings S.A. (Avianca Holdings):
-- Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B';
-- Long-Term Local Currency IDR at 'B';
-- USD550 million unsecured notes due in 2020 at 'B-/RR5'.

Aerovias del Continente Americano S.A. (Avianca):
-- Long-Term IDR at 'B';
-- Long-Term Local Currency IDR at 'B'.

Grupo Taca Holdings Limited (Grupo Taca):
-- Long-Term IDR at 'B'.

Avianca Holdings, Grupo Taca, and Avianca Leasing are co-issuers
of the USD550 million unsecured notes.

The Rating Outlook was revised to Stable from Negative.


RIO OIL 2014-1: Fitch Hikes USD2BB Notes Rating to 'BB-'
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded the series 2014 notes issued by Rio Oil
Finance Trust as follows:

-- USD2 billion series 2014-1 notes to 'BB-' from 'CCC';
-- BRL 2.4 billion series 2014-2 special indebtedness to
    'AA-sf(bra)' from 'CCCsf(bra)';
-- USD1.1 billion series 2014-3 notes to 'BB-' from 'CCC'.

The notes have been assigned a Stable Rating Outlook.

The upgrade on the notes is driven by the amendment to the
transaction structure implemented through the sixth rescission
waiver and amendment agreement executed on March 14, 2018. The
ratings reflect the transaction's increased liquidity, mitigation
of diversion risk and increased free cash flow given the
subordination of FECAM payments. These changes, linked to a faster
than expected deleveraging of the transaction, would minimize
timely debt service exposure to potential disruptions. The
assigned ratings are ultimately linked to Petrobras' Issuer
Default Rating (IDR). Fitch's ratings on the notes address timely
payment of interest and principal on a quarterly basis.

The issuances are backed by royalty flows and special
participations owed by oil concessionaires, predominantly operated
by Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. (Petrobras), to the government of the
State of Rio de Janeiro (RJS). The State of Rio de Janeiro
assigned 100% of these flows to RioPrevidencia (RP), the state's
pension fund, and RP sold these rights to Rio Oil Finance Trust,
the issuer.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Decreased Exposure to Liquidity Risk: In Fitch's opinion, changes
in the sixth rescission waiver and amendment agreement regarding
the amounts in deposit in the Debt Service Reserve Account (DSRA),
the release of amounts in deposit in the DSRA and debt service
payments to quarterly from monthly, decrease the transaction's
exposure to liquidity risk. With these changes, the structure now
permanently benefits from increased liquidity and can better
sustain short-term variations in cash flows.

Oil Revenues Dedicated Account Modification Mitigates Redirection
Risk: Pursuant to the Oil Revenues Dedicated Account Modification
Legislation, the RioPrevi Oil Revenues currently deposited to the
RJS Oil Revenues Dedicated Account will no longer be required by
legislation to be deposited into a state-owned account. Oil
revenues assigned to this transaction will instead be deposited
into an account under the name of the issuer. This change in the
account mitigates potential redirection of flows to RJS.

Expectations are that the new account will be domiciled in Banco
do Brasil S.A.(BdB;
BB-/Outlook Stable and AA+(bra)/Outlook Negative) in Brazil. Given
BdB cannot be replaced as a collection bank, the transaction would
ultimately be capped at the credit quality of BdB.

FECAM Subordination Supports Debt Service Coverage Ratios:
Pursuant to the FECAM Subordination Legislation the Forward FECAM
Allocation will only be deducted from royalties and special
participations, after quarterly debt service payments are met. The
subordination of the Forward FECAM allocations, coupled with the
faster than expected deleveraging of the transaction during the
early amortization period, is expected to translate into
Annualized Average DSCR (AADSCR), which support the rating level
of the transaction.

Potential Exposure Political Risk Partially Mitigated: The state's
liquidity constraints, evidenced by various delays in commercial
and other payments, have heightened the transactions political
risk exposure. However, provisions included in the 6th rescission
waiver and amendment, such as the rescission of the trapping of
excess cash and of the early amortization period, will increase
the cash flows returned to the State, and, in turn, decrease the
transaction's exposure to potential political risk.

Impact of Oil Prices Fluctuations on Performance: The gradual
recovery in oil prices, coupled with the structural changes
contemplated in the sixth rescission waiver and amendment are
expected to translate into higher AADSCRs. These higher AADSCRS
partially mitigate the exposure of the transaction to fluctuations
in oil prices at the current rating level. However, a downturn in
oil price environment may limit royalty and special participation
flows used to pay debt service impacting the transaction rating
level.

Future Production Risk: The transaction benefits from growth in
production levels as it increases the total royalty flows.
Depressed oil prices have led Petrobras to reduce production
targets on multiple occasions. Therefore, sustained low oil prices
could translate into further capital expenditure cuts by
Petrobras.

Petrobras' Rating Downgrade: Petrobras's rating acts as the
ultimate cap for the transaction, as it is the main source of cash
flow generation. The company's Local and Foreign Currency IDRs
were downgraded to 'BB-' with Outlook Stable following the
downgrade of the Sovereign foreign currency rating to 'BB-' from
'BB' and the Country Ceiling to 'BB' from 'BB+'.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The ratings are capped by the credit quality of Petrobras, the
main obligor generating cash flows to support the transaction, and
to the sovereign rating and country ceiling assigned to Brazil.

The transaction is exposed to oil price and production volume
risks. Declines in prices or production levels significantly below
expectations may trigger downgrades.

Additionally, the ratings are sensitive to the rating of Banco do
Brasil as a direct counterparty to the transaction.


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D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Pension Fund Jumps 19% to US$10.6 Billion
-------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that the Pensions Superintendence (SIPEN)
last week published its most recent report on the status of the
pension fund, which stood at RD$520.1 billion (US$10.6 billion) at
the end of Dec. 2017, a 19.02% jump compared to the same period of
2016, when it reached RD$436.9 billion.

The pension fund accounted for 15.8% of GDP at yearend 2017, or
2.2 percentage points more than in 2016, according to Dominican
Today.

On its website, the SIPEN said 78.4% of the pension fund
corresponds to individual capitalization funds (CCI), or RD$407.9
billion; 6.6% to individualized distribution plans (RD$33.2
billion), 0.1% to complementary plans (RD$192.8 billion; 5.3% to
the Social Solidarity Fund (RD$28.3 billion) and 9.6% to the
National Teacher Welfare Institute (INABIMA) (RD$50.5 billion, the
report notes.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Nov. 20, 2017, Fitch Ratings has affirmed Dominican Republic's
Long-Term Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB-'
with a Stable Outlook.


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J A M A I C A
=============


JAMAICA: IMF Says Growth Discouraging Since Reforms Program Began
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A Concluding Statement describes the preliminary findings of IMF
staff at the end of an official staff visit (or 'mission'), in
most cases to a member country. Missions are undertaken as part of
regular (usually annual) consultations under Article IV of the
IMF's Articles of Agreement, in the context of a request to use
IMF resources (borrow from the IMF), as part of discussions of
staff monitored programs, or as part of other staff monitoring of
economic developments.

The authorities have consented to the publication of this
statement. The views expressed in this statement are those of the
IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF's
Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this
mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management
approval, will be presented to the IMF Executive Board for
discussion and decision.

The economic reform program, that began in May 2013, has been a
turning point for Jamaica. With broad-based social and political
support for reforms, the Jamaican government -- over two
administrations -- has embarked on a path of fiscal discipline,
monetary and financial sector reforms, and wide-ranging structural
improvements to break a decades-long cycle of high debt and low
growth.

Considerable progress has been achieved on macroeconomic policies
and outcomes. Fiscal discipline -- anchored by the Fiscal
Responsibility Law -- has been essential to reduce public debt and
secure macroeconomic stability. Employment is at historic highs,
inflation and the current account deficit are modest,
international reserves are at a comfortable level, and external
borrowing costs are at historical lows.

Growth and social outcomes, however, have been discouraging.
Economic growth continues to disappoint, averaging only 0.9
percent since the reforms began. Entrenched structural obstacles,
including crime, bureaucratic processes, insufficient labor force
skills, and poor access to finance, continue to hinder
productivity and growth. Moreover, the agricultural sector's
vulnerability to weather shocks exacerbated rural poverty in 2015.
Not addressing these bottlenecks could pose risks for continued
public support for the government's policy program.

Structurally reducing the wage bill is critical for the government
to reprioritize spending toward growth-enhancing projects. More
expenditure is needed for infrastructure, citizen security,
building agricultural resilience, health, education, and the
social safety net. Creating the space for such spending will
require going beyond temporary remedies like wage freezes and
adjustments to non-wage benefits. It will require high-quality
measures to (i) overhaul the compensation structure to retain
skills and reward performance, (ii) streamline the vast and
inequitable allowances structure, (iii) prioritize key government
functions and shed those activities that the government can no
longer afford to undertake, and (iv) change the capital-labor mix
through technology upgrades, including a better monitoring of (and
accountability for) government spending. Inevitably, these reforms
will also lead to a reduction in the size of the public workforce.
Such a holistic approach will support a durable reduction in the
wage bill, without frequent discordant wage negotiations, and
enhance public service delivery with fewer but better paid public
employees.

Improving social outcomes and fostering inclusive growth will
require addressing structural bottlenecks and creating an enabling
environment for the private sector. Countering both weak social
outcomes and escalating crime will take time but will be essential
for sustained growth. In this regard, the evidence suggests that
early childhood education, interventions to improve school
attendance, and skills training for the youth would foster a
virtuous cycle of lower crime, higher wages, stronger growth, and
increased economic opportunity, particularly for the young.
Policies to support productive private investments, including
improving lending to smaller businesses and reducing lending-
deposit interest spreads, will help fuel such an upswing. However,
the government must resist the pressure to use scarce public
resources to "pick winners" (including through providing tax
incentives). Instead, the goal should be a uniform, broad-based,
and low rate tax system, a level playing field for business, and
harmonized rules for all.

Formalizing the current inflation targeting regime will help
entrench macroeconomic stability and promote growth. With
inflation likely to remain in the lower part of the central bank's
target range, a looser monetary stance remains appropriate.
Meanwhile, upcoming revisions to the Bank of Jamaica (BOJ) Act --
including a clear mandate for price stability, a reformed
governance structure, and a strong central bank balance sheet --
will help institutionalize the inflation targeting framework.
Also, continued development of the foreign exchange (FX) market,
liquidity management and forecasting toolkit, along with upgrading
the BOJ's communication practices, will improve policy signaling
and enhance credibility. Successful inflation targeting will
require a clear commitment to a flexible and market-determined
exchange rate with limited involvement of the central bank in the
currency market. This implies that FX sales should be confined to
disorderly market conditions, especially given the reductions in
the surrender requirements, and buy auctions should aim to build
reserves in a non-disruptive way.

Financial sector stability is a prerequisite for strong and
sustained growth. Ongoing prudential and supervisory improvements
will enhance systemic stability. While changes to investment
limits for non-banks should be considered, they must be backed by
a thorough assessment -- including of appropriate regulations,
risk management guidelines, and supervisory arrangements -- to
ensure that greater flexibility in non-banks' asset-liability
management practices does not jeopardize financial stability.
Introduction of a Special Resolution Regime for financial
institutions will strengthen the system's safety net while putting
clear requirements in place for the use of public resources.

Continued reform implementation will not only safeguard hard-won
gains but also deliver stronger growth and job creation . After 5
years of reforms and tenacious fiscal consolidation, risks from
reform fatigue and loss of social support are high, especially as
growth remains feeble and crime escalates. Addressing some of the
entrenched structural problems that hamper growth is not an
overnight task; these difficult reforms require continued broad-
based support and policymakers' commitment to persevere with the
implementation.

The authorities' program, supported by the IMF's Stand-By
Arrangement (SBA), remains on track. All quantitative performance
criteria and structural benchmarks for the review period ending
December 2017 have been met. Non-borrowed international reserves
well-exceeded the program target and tax revenues for FY2017/18
were above the budget's target (reflecting the payoffs from
revenue administration reforms put in place by the government over
the past few years). The mission reached preliminary staff-level
agreement with the authorities on a package of measures to
complete the third review under the SBA. Consideration by the
IMF's Executive Board is tentatively scheduled for April 2018.
Upon approval, an additional US$233 million would be made
available to Jamaica, bringing the total accessible credit to
about US$1.033 billion. The Jamaican authorities continue to view
the SBA as precautionary, an insurance policy against unforeseen
external economic shocks that are beyond Jamaica's control.


===========
M E X I C O
===========


REPSOL INTERNATIONAL: To Open 200 Gas Stations in Mexico
--------------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that Spanish energy company Repsol inaugurated
its first gas stations in Mexico, where the firm plans to open
some 200 stations over the course of the year as part of a plan to
capture as much as 10 percent of the market within five years.

"Our first goal is to end the year 2018 with 200 stations, and
from there to open between 200 and 250 stations a year to reach a
market share of between 8 and 10 percent," Repsol's director for
refining and marketing, Maria Victoria Zingoni, said, according to
EFE News.

In presenting the plan, Zingoni said that between 20 and 30
percent of Repsol gas stations will be new facilities, while the
rest will be already existing stations that will be rebranded and
will offer a higher standard of service and products, the report
notes, EFE relays.

EFE News notes that at first Repsol will focus on opening gas
stations in Mexico City and the surrounding area, which is home to
more than 20 million people, but the company hopes to gradually
extend its service to an ever wider territory.

All this is made possible by Mexico's energy reform, which opened
the sector to private companies after almost 80 years of state
monopoly, EFE News says.

Mr. Zingoni said that the company's $430 million investment will
be allocated exclusively to the acquisition and construction of
service stations, EFE News says.  Not to be dismissed, therefore,
is the possibility that larger amounts might be invested in
infrastructure such as fuel depots, pipelines and other assets,
EFE News relays.

Repsol notes that Mexico currently has too few gas stations to
serve its population, EFE News notes.

Citing figures provided by Mexico's Energy Regulatory Commission,
Repsol said there are around 11,600 stations in the country, which
signifies one for every 10,560 Mexicans, a much lower ratio than
is found in other large countries like the United States, Germany
and Brazil. In addition, no less than 40 percent of Mexican
municipalities lack service stations altogether, EFE News
discloses.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on May 3,
2016, Egan-Jones Ratings Agency downgraded the local currency and
foreign currency senior unsecured ratings on debt issued by
Repsol SA to B+ from BB- on April 29, 2016.


MEXICO: Former First Lady to Run for President as Independent
-------------------------------------------------------------
Juan Montes at The Wall Street Journal reports that Mexico's
former first lady Margarita Zavala secured the needed number of
citizens' signatures to run as an independent candidate in July's
presidential election, a move that analysts say would divide the
field of candidates and benefit front-runner Andres Manuel Lopez
Obrador.

Ms. Zavala, a conservative lawyer married to Felipe Calderon, who
was president from 2006 to 2012, got 867,000 valid signatures
across 17 states, Mexico's electoral agency said, according to The
Wall Street Journal. She exceeded the required amount by 3,000
signatures, the report notes.

Two other independent hopefuls, leftist Sen. Armando Rios Piter
and Nuevo Leon state Gov. Jaime Rodriguez, were disqualified with
insufficient valid signatures, the report relays.

Aides for the two said they may challenge the decision before the
electoral court, the report notes.

Mr. Rios Piter said in a videotaped messaged posted on Twitter
that he would demand a review "signature-by-signature, because our
signatures are of flesh and bone," the report says.

Mexico's electoral agency voided more than a million signatures
because of irregularities, including allegedly falsified
signatures, the report relays.  Instead of voters' credentials, in
some cases signatures were attached to copies of identifications
such as membership cards of wholesale chain Costco, the report
notes.

"We found a lot of rubbish," said Benito Nacif, a top official at
Mexico's electoral agency, the report relates.  "It's shameful,"
he added.

The decision comes two weeks before campaigning begins for the
July 1 election, the report notes.  It is the first time an
independent candidate will run for president of Mexico after the
laws were changed in 2012, the report relays.

Ms. Zavala was a local lawmaker in Mexico City in the 1990s and a
federal lawmaker from 2003 to 2006, the report discloses.

Polls show Ms. Zavala has little chance of winning, but she could
play a role in deciding the election, the report notes.

The report relays that a former member of the center-right
National Action Party, or PAN, Ms. Zavala remains popular among
many moderate voters and PAN supporters.  That could take votes
from PAN candidate Ricardo Anaya, who is currently polling in
second place, and widen Mr. Lopez Obrador's lead, the report
notes.

"All or nearly all that Zavala gains will be taken from Anaya,"
said Carlos Elizondo, a political scientist and columnist, notes
the report. Ms. Zavala has 6% support, according to the average of
five recent polls.  Mr. Lopez Obrador has 41%, and Mr. Anaya 30%,
while the ruling party candidate Jose Antonio Meade has 20%.

Analysts say moderate voters could split their ballots among Ms.
Zavala, Mr. Anaya and Mr. Meade, who support the pro-business and
pro-market policies of the current administration, WSJ relates.
Mr. Lopez Obrador favors a greater role of the state in the
economy.

WSJ recalls that Ms. Zavala's husband narrowly defeated Mr. Lopez
Obrador in 2006, portraying his rival as "a danger to Mexico." Mr.
Lopez Obrador, who claimed he was the victim of election fraud,
boycotted Mr. Calderon's swearing-in ceremony and opposed most of
his policies.

"Zavala could ultimately facilitate a Lopez Obrador triumph,
that's an irony," said Mr. Elizondo, the analyst, notes WSJ.

Ms. Zavala left the PAN in October to seek an independent
candidacy after a dispute with Mr. Anaya, who was the party
president at the time. Mr. Anaya refused to organize a party
primary to choose the PAN candidate, then agreed on a coalition
with two leftist parties and himself as the candidate, says the
report.

Primaries are optional for Mexican political parties, and none of
the other parties held primaries, WSJ adds.

Ms. Zavala's campaign to get the signatures was mostly supported
by Mr. Calderon. He was the single biggest donor, contributing
some $67,000, according to public records, notes WSJ.


======================
P U E R T O    R I C O
======================


HUSKY INC: Court OK's Disclosures; April 10 Plan Hearing
--------------------------------------------------------
Judge Enrique S. Lamoutte Inclan of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for
the District of Puerto Rico approved Husky, Inc., and Christian
Elderly Home Inc.'s disclosure statement referring to a plan of
reorganization dated July 11, 2017.

Objections to claims must be filed 45 days prior to the hearing on
confirmation.

Acceptances or rejections of the Plan may be filed in writing by
the holders of all claims on/or before 14 days prior to the date
of the hearing on confirmation of the Plan.

Any objection to confirmation of the plan must be filed on/or
before 21 days prior to the date of the hearing on confirmation of
the Plan.

A hearing for the consideration of confirmation of the Plan will
be held on April 10, 2018 at 10:00 A.M. at Jose V. Toledo Fed.
Bldg. & U.S. Courthouse, Courtroom 2, 300 Recinto Sur Street, Old
San Juan, Puerto Rico.

The Troubled Company Reporter previously reported that Class 5
general unsecured claims filed by governmental entities and Class
6 general unsecured claims filed by other creditors will be paid
in 84 equal monthly Installments under the plan. These unsecured
creditors will recover 3% of their claims.

A copy of the disclosure statement is available for free at:

                   https://is.gd/Jn6CWU

                      About Husky Inc.

Husky, Inc., based in Gurabo, Puerto Rico, is the 100% owner of
Christian Elderly Home, Inc., having a current value of $1
million.  It also owns a 2,320 square-meter lot with concrete
building for storage located at Barrio Rincon and valued at
$300,000.

Husky and Christian Elderly filed separate Chapter 11 petitions
(Bankr. D.P.R. Case Nos. 17-02559 and 17-02561) on April 12, 2017.

Edgardo Garcia Rosario, president, signed the petitions.

In its petition, Husky disclosed $1.32 million in assets and $7.63
million in liabilities.  Christian Elderly disclosed $1.04 million
in assets and $7.5 million in liabilities.

Judge Enrique S. Lamoutte Inclan presides over the cases.  Carmen
D. Conde Torres, Esq., at the Law Offices of C. Conde &
Associates, is the Debtors' bankruptcy counsel.


HUSKY INC: New Plan to Pay CRIM in Full Plus Interest in 60 Months
------------------------------------------------------------------
Husky, Inc., and Christian Elderly Home, Inc., filed with the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico their proposed
amended consolidated plan of reorganization.

Class 2 under the amended plan consists of the allowed secured
claim held by CRIM. CRlM's claim will be paid in full including
interest upon disposition of the property which secures such
claim.

The Debtor proposes to pay CRIM's allowed secured claim in full
with 60 consecutive equal monthly installments of principal plus
interest. In the alternative the property is not refinanced, sold
and thus surrendered to Scotiabank, CRIM shall continue to retain
its lien. This class is impaired.

Funding of the plan will be from the refinancing or sale of real
estate property of Husky Inc., the surrendering to Scotiabank of
the real estate properties of Christian Elderly Home, Inc., as the
indubitable equivalent of the secured allowed claim, the
collection
of accounts receivable and a contribution to be made by the
shareholders, as needed. If the refinancing or sale of the Husky
property does not take place within 120 days from the Effective
Date, Scotiabank will receive the collateral itself as the
indubitable equivalent of the allowed secured claim, unless
otherwise agreed.

In any event, the Debtors will continue making the monthly
payments to Scotiabank in the amount of $3,000 until the property
is refinanced, sold or surrendered.

The Debtors have also made a claim to its insurance carrier on
account of the damage received by the commercial building property
of Husky, Inc. due to the passing of Hurricane Maria. As of this
date the Debtor is still negotiating and discussing with the
insurance carrier the amounts to be awarded on account of the
claim made. Any funds received on account of this claim will be
used to make the necessary repairs to the property. Should there
be any surplus, the same will be used to fund the plan.

The Debtors will also continue making all efforts to collect the
accounts receivables in order to provide distribution to
creditors.

A full-text copy of the Amended Consolidated Plan is available at:

    http://bankrupt.com/misc/prb17-02559-11-109.pdf

                       About Husky Inc.

Husky, Inc., based in Gurabo, Puerto Rico, is the 100% owner of
Christian Elderly Home, Inc., having a current value of $1
million.

It also owns a 2,320 square-meter lot with concrete building for
storage located at Barrio Rincon and valued at $300,000.

Husky and Christian Elderly filed separate Chapter 11 petitions
(Bankr. D.P.R. Case Nos. 17-02559 and 17-02561) on April 12, 2017.

Edgardo Garcia Rosario, president, signed the petitions.

In its petition, Husky disclosed $1.32 million in assets and $7.63
million in liabilities.  Christian Elderly disclosed $1.04 million
in assets and $7.5 million in liabilities.

Judge Enrique S. Lamoutte Inclan presides over the cases.  Carmen
D. Conde Torres, Esq., at the Law Offices of C. Conde &
Associates, is the Debtors' bankruptcy counsel.


KONA GRILL: Renaissance Technologies Reports 7.87% Stake
--------------------------------------------------------
Renaissance Technologies LLC and and Renaissance Technologies
Holdings Corporation reported to the Securities and Exchange
Commission that as of May 2, 2017, they beneficially own 795,759
shares of common stock of Kona Grill, Inc., constituting 7.87
percent of the shares outstanding.  A full-text copy of the
Schedule 13G is available for free at https://is.gd/3aboRs

                        About Kona Grill

Kona Grill, Inc., headquartered in Scottsdale, Arizona, Kona
Grill, Inc. -- http://www.konagrill.com/-- currently owns and
operates 45 upscale casual restaurants in 23 states and Puerto
Rico.  The Company's restaurants offer freshly prepared food,
attentive service, and an upscale contemporary ambiance.  The
Company's high-volume upscale casual restaurants feature a global
menu of contemporary American favorites, sushi and specialty
cocktails.   Its menu items are prepared from scratch at each
restaurant location and incorporate over 40 signature sauces and
dressings, creating memorable flavor profiles that appeal to a
diverse group of customers.  Its diverse menu is complemented by a
full service
bar offering a broad assortment of wines, specialty cocktails, and
beers.

Kona Grill reported a net loss of $21.62 million for the year
ended Dec. 31, 2016, following a net loss of $4.49 million for the
year ended Dec. 31, 2015.  As of Sept. 30, 2017, Kona Grill had
$103.59 million in total assets, $85.61 million in total
liabilities and $17.97 million in total stockholders' equity.

"The Company has incurred losses resulting in an accumulated
deficit of $67.3 million, has a net working capital deficit of
$6.9 million and outstanding debt of $38.0 million as of September
30, 2017.  These conditions together with recent debt covenant
violations and subsequent debt covenant waivers and debt
amendments, raise substantial doubt about the Company's ability to
continue as a going concern.  The ability to continue as a going
concern is dependent upon the Company generating profitable
operations, improving liquidity and reducing costs to meet its
obligations and repay its liabilities arising from normal business
operations when they become due.  While the Company believes that
its existing cash and cash equivalents as of September 30, 2017,
coupled with its anticipated cash flow generated from operations,
will be sufficient to meet its anticipated cash requirements,
there can be no assurance that the Company will be successful in
its plans to increase profitability or to obtain alternative
financing on acceptable terms, when required or if at all," the
Company stated in its quarterly report for the period ended Sept.
30, 2017.


KONA GRILL: Anson Funds Lowers Stake to 2.4% by Dec. 31
-------------------------------------------------------
Anson Funds Management LP, Anson Management GP LLC, Mr. Bruce R.
Winson, Anson Advisors Inc., Adam Spears and Moez Kassam disclosed
in a Schedule 13G/A filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission that as of Dec. 31, 2017, they beneficially own 241,000
shares of common stock of Kona Grill, Inc., constituting 2.4
percent based on 10,104,980 shares of Common Stock issued and
outstanding as of Oct. 31, 2017, as reported in the Issuer's 10-Q
Quarterly report filed on Nov. 9, 2017.

This amendment relates to Common Stock of Kona Grill purchased by
a private fund to which Anson Funds Management LP and Anson
Advisors Inc. serve as co-investment advisors.

Anson Funds Management LP and Anson Advisors Inc. serve as
co-investment advisors to the Fund and may direct the vote and
disposition of the 241,000 shares of Common Stock held by the
Fund.

As the general partner of Anson Funds Management LP, Anson
Management GP LLC may direct the vote and disposition of the
241,000 shares of Common Stock held by the Fund.  As the principal
of Anson Fund Management LP and Anson Management GP LLC, Mr.
Winson may direct the vote and disposition of the 241,000 shares
of Common Stock held by the Fund.  As directors of Anson Advisors
Inc., Mr. Spears and Mr. Kassam may each direct the vote and
disposition of the 241,000 shares of Common Stock held by the
Fund.

A full-text copy of the regulatory filing is available at:

                     https://is.gd/BUoBhp

                       About Kona Grill

Kona Grill, Inc., headquartered in Scottsdale, Arizona, Kona
Grill, Inc. -- http://www.konagrill.com/-- currently owns and
operates 45  upscale casual restaurants in 23 states and Puerto
Rico.  The Company's restaurants offer freshly prepared food,
attentive service, and an upscale contemporary ambiance.  The
Company's high-volume upscale casual restaurants feature a global
menu of contemporary American favorites, sushi and specialty
cocktails.

Its menu items are prepared from scratch at each restaurant
location and incorporate over 40 signature sauces and dressings,
creating memorable flavor profiles that appeal to a diverse group
of customers.  Its diverse menu is complemented by a full service
bar offering a broad assortment of wines, specialty cocktails, and
beers.

Kona Grill reported a net loss of $21.62 million for the year
ended Dec. 31, 2016, following a net loss of $4.49 million for the
year ended Dec. 31, 2015.  As of Sept. 30, 2017, Kona Grill had
$103.59 million in total assets, $85.61 million in total
liabilities and $17.97 million in total stockholders' equity.

"The Company has incurred losses resulting in an accumulated
deficit of $67.3 million, has a net working capital deficit of
$6.9 million and outstanding debt of $38.0 million as of September
30, 2017.  These conditions together with recent debt covenant
violations and subsequent debt covenant waivers and debt
amendments, raise substantial doubt about the Company's ability to
continue as a going concern.  The ability to continue as a going
concern is dependent upon the Company generating profitable
operations, improving liquidity and reducing costs to meet its
obligations and repay its liabilities arising from normal business
operations when they become due.  While the Company believes that
its existing cash and cash equivalents as of September 30, 2017,
coupled with its anticipated cash flow generated from operations,
will be sufficient to meet its anticipated cash requirements,
there can be no assurance that the Company will be successful in
its plans to increase profitability or to obtain alternative
financing on acceptable terms, when required or if at all," the
Company stated in its quarterly report for the period ended Sept.
30, 2017.


TOYS "R" US: KBRA Sees 111 Loans Totaling $4.9B With Exposure
-------------------------------------------------------------
Kroll Bond Rating Agency (KBRA) released a KBRA Credit Profile
Report (KCP) highlighting the recent developments with Toys "R"
Us, Inc.

On March 15, 2018, Toys "R" Us filed a motion seeking
authorization through bankruptcy court to wind down its U.S.
operations, liquidate existing inventory and conduct store
closures. The filing follows reports on March 14 that the CEO
informed employees the company would shutter all of its U.S.
stores, including those in Puerto Rico. The company has so far
been unable to identify a potential investor or strategic buyer,
and in recent days, news emerged the company has failed to remit
payments to vendors.

The motion also seeks to establish bidding procedures for the sale
of the retailer's Canadian division. This coincides with reports
indicating that toy manufacturer MGA Entertainment, Inc. is
attempting to assemble its peers in the toy making industry to bid
for Toys "R" Us Canada. The Canadian division also entered
bankruptcy, but is in better financial health than its U.S.
counterpart. MGA Entertainment is also exploring options to make a
bid for up to 200 of the retailer's top-performing U.S. stores
with the potential of merging operations with Toys "R" Us Canada.

According to the KBRA, with a possible liquidation of the entire
U.S. store portfolio looming, KBRA re-examined its $537 billion
coverage universe of over 840 transactions and expanded its
initial CMBS list (No More Fun "N" Games for Toys "R" Us) to
include additional loans backed by properties identified as having
exposure to the struggling retailer.  KBRA identified 111 loans
($4.9 billion) secured by 234 properties with exposure to Toys "R"
Us or Babies "R" Us.  Based on allocated loan amount (ALA),
approximately 110 CMBS transactions contain loans secured by
properties with exposure to the retailer, of which, 89.9% are
post-crisis securitizations.

The largest individual exposure remains within the TRU 2016-TOYS
transaction, a $494.5 million, single-borrower deal secured by 123
Toys "R" Us and Babies "R" Us stores.  Eight of the 182 locations
originally slated for closure serve as collateral, representing
3.9% of the transaction balance.  Seven (3.8%) of these
properties, along with 105 others in the portfolio (93.3%), are
owned by the borrowing entity, itself indirectly owned and
controlled by Toys "R" Us, Inc.

The portfolio was appraised "as-is" at $878.8 million ($173/sf )
and "as vacant" at $617.9 million ($122/sf ) at issuance. The dark
value implied an LTV of 80.0% as of the February 2018 remittance
period.

As part of its monthly coverage, KBRA said it will continue to
monitor the Toys "R" Us exposure within CMBS to identify loans
facing credit risk from the potential liquidation. Specifically,
loans secured by properties that feature Toys "R" Us or Babies "R"
Us as a tenant accounting for 50% of GLA or greater are the
highest concern.  Excluding the TRU 2016-TOYS transaction, three
($36.2 million) of the 111 loans within the Toys "R" Us cohort are
secured by properties that are leased to the store as a single
tenant, while 13 loans ($144.0 million) are secured by properties
with Toys "R" Us or Babies "R" Us leases accounting for 50% or
more of the GLA.

KBRA's a list of CMBS with exposure to the retailer can be
accessed at https://is.gd/3NhDCz

                        About Toys "R" Us

Toys "R" Us, Inc., is an American toy and juvenile-products
retailer founded in 1948 and headquartered in Wayne, New Jersey,
in the New York City metropolitan area.  Merchandise is sold in
880 Toys "R" Us and Babies "R" Us stores in the United States,
Puerto Rico and Guam, and in more than 780 international stores
and more than 245 licensed stores in 37 countries and
jurisdictions.

Merchandise is also sold at e-commerce sites including Toysrus.com
and Babiesrus.com.

On July 21, 2005, a consortium of Bain Capital Partners LLC,
Kohlberg Kravis Roberts and Vornado Realty Trust invested $1.3
billion to complete a $6.6 billion leveraged buyout of the
company.

Toys "R" Us is a privately owned entity but still files with the
Securities and Exchange Commission as required by its debt
agreements.

The Company's consolidated balance sheet showed $6.572 billion in
assets, $7.891 billion in liabilities, and a stockholders' deficit
of $1.319 billion as of April 29, 2017.

Toys "R" Us, Inc., and certain of its U.S. subsidiaries and its
Canadian subsidiary voluntarily filed for relief under Chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. E.D. Va. Lead Case No. Case No.
17-34665) on Sept. 19, 2017.  In addition, the Company's Canadian
subsidiary voluntarily commenced parallel proceedings under the
Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") in Canada in the
Ontario Superior Court of Justice.  The Company's operations
outside of the U.S. and Canada, including its 255 licensed stores
and joint venture partnership in Asia, which are separate
entities, are not part of the Chapter 11 filing and CCAA
proceedings.

Grant Thornton is the monitor appointed in the CCAA case.

Judge Keith L. Phillips presides over the Chapter 11 cases.

In the Chapter 11 cases, Kirkland & Ellis LLP and Kirkland & Ellis
International LLP serve as the Debtors' legal counsel.  Kutak Rock
LLP serves as co-counsel.  Toys "R" Us employed Alvarez & Marsal
North America, LLC as its restructuring advisor; and Lazard Freres
& Co. LLC as its investment banker.  It hired Prime Clerk LLC as
claims and noticing agent.  A&G Realty Partners, LLC, serves as
its real estate advisor.

On Sept. 26, 2017, the U.S. Trustee for Region 4 appointed an
official committee of unsecured creditors.  The Committee retained
Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP as its legal counsel; Wolcott
Rivers, P.C. as local counsel; FTI Consulting, Inc. as financial
advisor; and Moelis & Company LLC as investment banker.

                        Toys "R" Us UK

Toys "R" Us Limited, Toys "R" Us, Inc.'s UK arm with 105 stores
and 3,000 employees, was sent into administration in the United
Kingdom in February 2018.

Arron Kendall and Simon Thomas of Moorfields Advisory Limited, 88
Wood Street, London, EC2V 7QF were appointed Joint Administrators
on Feb. 28, 2018.  The Administrators now manage the affairs,
business and property of the Company.  The Administrators act as
agents only and without personal liability.

The Administrators said they will make every effort to secure a
buyer for all or part of the business.

                    Liquidation of U.S. Stores

Toys "R" Us, Inc.,  on March 15, 2018, filed with the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court a motion seeking Bankruptcy Court approval
to begin the process of conducting an orderly wind-down of its
U.S. business and liquidation of inventory in all 735 of the
Company's U.S. stores, including stores in Puerto Rico.


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2018.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.
.


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