TCRLA_Public/180423.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

               Monday, April 23, 2018, Vol. 19, No. 78


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

BUENOS AIRES: Fitch Withdraws B on Up to ARS10BB Treasury Bills
TRANSPORTADORA DE GAS: S&P Affirms 'B+' Currency Ratings


B E R M U D A

SEADRILL LTD: To Preserve Plan Exclusivity Through March 2019
SEADRILL LTD: Plans to Exit Chapter 11 in June or July


B R A Z I L

BRAZIL: EU Bans 20 Meat Plants, Hits 35 Percent of Exports
CORURIPE LUX: S&P Rates Proposed Senior Unsecured Notes 'BB-'
JBS SA: S&P Puts 'B' Corp Credit Rating on Watch Developing
RIO OIL: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating on 2018-1 Fixed-Rate Notes
SANCOR SEGUROS: Fitch Affirms 'B+' Insurer Financial Strength

SBM BALEIA: Fitch Affirms BB- Rating on Series 2012-1 Notes


C H I L E

GEOPARK LIMITED: Fitch Raises LongTerm IDRs to B+


C O S T A   R I C A

BICSA: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Issuer Default Ratings, Outlook Negative


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Yellow Dragon Plight Devastates Plantations
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: S&P Affirms 'BB-/B' SCRs, Outlook Still Stable


G U A T E M A L A

GUATEMALA: Fitch Affirms 'BB' LT FC Issuer Default Rating


J A M A I C A

JAMAICA: Utility Companies Paid Millions for Breaches in 2017


M E X I C O

GRUPO SENDA: S&P Cuts ICR to B- on Weak Liquidity, Outlook Stable


P A N A M A

INVERSIONES CREDIQ: Fitch Affirms B/B Issuer Default Ratings


P E R U

* PERU: President Urges Businesses to Help Boost Development


T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O

CONSOLIDATED ENERGY: S&P Rates New $550MM Secured B-Term Loan 'BB'


X X X X X X X X X

* BOND PRICING: For the Week From April 16 to April 20, 2018


                            - - - - -


=================
A R G E N T I N A
=================


BUENOS AIRES: Fitch Withdraws B on Up to ARS10BB Treasury Bills
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has withdrawn the international scale short-term
rating of 'B' for the City of Buenos Aires' programme of short-
term treasury bills of up to ARS10.0 billion.

Fitch has withdrawn this rating for commercial reasons.


TRANSPORTADORA DE GAS: S&P Affirms 'B+' Currency Ratings
--------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B+' foreign and local currency
ratings on Transportadora de Gas del Sur S.A. (TGS). The company's
SACP remains at 'bb'. At the same time, S&P assigned its 'B+'
rating to the company's proposed seven-year senior unsecured notes
for up to $500 million. The outlook is stable.

S&P's ratings on TGS continue to incorporate its belief that
despite its solid current and projected credit metrics and
adequate liquidity position, the 'B+' sovereign rating on
Argentina limits TGS' credit quality because the company wouldn't
withstand a sovereign stress scenario. The latter includes high
inflation, sharp currency depreciation, a severe decrease in GDP
growth, and frozen rates for utilities.

In turn, TGS' 'bb' SACP reflects the company's conservative
leverage and S&P's expectation of its relatively stable financial
and operating performance in the next two years. Approximately 60%
of the company's EBITDA comes from the regulated natural gas
distribution business, which radically changed in April 2017 when
Argentina's government approved the Integral Tariff Review (ITR)
for gas companies, eliminating the players' dependence on
discretionary tariff adjustments from the government to cover
their operating and investment needs, although it still has a
short track record.



=============
B E R M U D A
=============


SEADRILL LTD: To Preserve Plan Exclusivity Through March 2019
-------------------------------------------------------------
Seadrill Limited and its debtor-affiliates ask the U.S. Bankruptcy
Court for the Southern District of Texas to extend (a) the period
during which the Debtors have the exclusive right to file a
chapter 11 plan through and including the earlier of the Effective
Date and March 12, 2019, and (b) the period during which the
Debtors have the exclusive right to solicit a plan filed during
the Filing Exclusivity Period through and including the earlier of
the Effective Date and May 10, 2019.

On February 26, 2018, the Debtors filed the Disclosure Statement
Relating to the Second Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of
Reorganization. That same day, the Court entered the Order
approving the adequacy of the disclosure statement, among others.

On April 12, 2018, the Debtors filed the Plan, the Voting Report,
the Memorandum of Law in Support of Confirmation of the Second
Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization and the Proposed Confirmation
Order.

The Debtors believe it is prudent to seek an extension of the
Exclusivity Periods to preserve their exclusive right to both
prosecute the Plan currently on file, and file and solicit a new
plan of reorganization should unforeseen issues arise with respect
to and after confirmation.

Over the course of these chapter 11 cases, the Debtors have worked
tirelessly to maximize consensus in favor of the Second Amended
Joint Chapter 11 Plan, and were ultimately successful. The
Debtors' restructuring now has the support of the overwhelming
majority of their creditors at every level of their capital
structure.

Indeed, every active creditor constituency in these Chapter 11
Cases supports confirmation of the Plan, and it is not surprising
that more than 99% of all voting creditors aggregated across all
classes of Claims entitled to vote and more than 96% of the
Seadrill Limited interest holders voted to approve the Plan.

Owing in large part to the consensual nature of these chapter 11
cases and relief granted by the Court at the first and second day
hearings, the Debtors' businesses have operated largely without
interruption. Now, the Debtors are poised for a nearly fully
consensual confirmation hearing and swift emergence from chapter
11.

The Plan is the foundation on which the Debtors have built a
value-maximizing restructuring. In the unlikely scenario where the
Plan does not go effective or the Debtors do not swiftly emerge
from chapter 11, the Debtors' momentum through these Chapter 11
Cases could be unnecessarily slowed, especially if the Debtors
were forced to fend off alternative chapter 11 plan proposals.
Even worse, a lapse in exclusivity could potentially destroy the
progress the Debtors have made over the course of these Chapter 11
Cases and jeopardize the Debtors' ability to secure the benefit of
the $1.08 billion new capital commitment contemplated by the Plan.

The hearing to confirm the Plan that embodies this
globally-supported restructuring is scheduled to commence on
April 17, 2018, approximately one month before the expiration of
the Debtors' exclusive right to file a chapter 11 plan on May 10,
2018.  Further, the expiration of the Debtors' exclusivity period
will occur prior to the conclusion of the implementation of the
Debtors' complex corporate restructuring and going effective under
the Plan.

Out of an abundance of caution, the Debtors seek an extension of
the exclusivity period in which the Debtors may file and solicit
acceptances of a chapter 11 plan of reorganization. The Debtors
believe that maintaining the exclusive right to file and solicit
votes on a plan of reorganization is critical to realizing the
value-maximizing restructuring contemplated by the Plan.

The Debtors need a clear runway through emergence. The Debtors
intend to and are on track to proceed with the confirmation
hearing. Extending exclusivity will afford the Debtors and their
stakeholders time to finalize the transactions contemplated by the
Plan and proceed towards the Effective Date uninterrupted for the
benefit of all stakeholders, and will help the Debtors avoid
future unnecessary motion practice, and in no way prejudices any
parties in interest.

Thus, the Debtors seek an extension of exclusivity not only to
continue to press forward with confirmation of the Plan, but also
to ensure that the Plan is implemented effectively and that the
Debtors efficiently emerge from these Chapter 11 Cases. For all of
the foregoing reasons, and the reasons more specifically described
herein, an extension of exclusivity is appropriate.

                      About Seadrill Ltd

Seadrill Limited is a deepwater drilling contractor providing
drilling services to the oil and gas industry.  It is incorporated
in Bermuda and managed from London.  Seadrill and its affiliates
own or lease 51 drilling rigs, which represents more than 6% of
the world fleet.

As of Sept. 12, 2017, Seadrill employed 3,760 highly-skilled
individuals across 22 countries and five continents to operate
their drilling rigs and perform various other corporate functions.

As of June 30, 2017, Seadrill had $20.71 billion in total assets,
$10.77 billion in total liabilities and $9.94 billion in total
equity.

Seadrill reported a net loss of US$155 million on US$3.17 billion
of total operating revenues for the year ended Dec. 31, 2016,
following a net loss of US$635 million onUS$4.33 billion of total
operating revenues for the year ended in 2015.

After reaching terms of a reorganization plan that would
restructure $8 billion of funded debt, Seadrill Limited and 85
affiliated debtors each filed a voluntary petition for relief
under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. Lead Case No. 17-60079) on Sept. 12, 2017.

Together with the chapter 11 proceedings, Seadrill, North Atlantic
Drilling Limited ("NADL") and Sevan Drilling Limited ("Sevan")
commenced liquidation proceedings in Bermuda to appoint joint
provisional liquidators and facilitate recognition and
implementation of the transactions contemplated by the RSA and
Investment Agreement, and Simon Edel, Alan Bloom and Roy Bailey of
Ernst & Young are to act as the joint and several provisional
liquidators.

In the Chapter 11 cases, the Company has engaged Kirkland & Ellis
LLP as legal counsel, Houlihan Lokey, Inc. as financial advisor,
and Alvarez & Marsal as restructuring advisor.  Slaughter and May
has been engaged as corporate counsel, and Morgan Stanley served
as co-financial advisor during the negotiation of the
restructuring agreement.  Advokatfirmaet Thommessen AS is serving
as Norwegian counsel. Conyers Dill & Pearman is serving as Bermuda
counsel.  Prime Clerk serves as claims agent.

The United States Trustee for Region 7 formed an official
committee of unsecured creditors with seven members: (i)
Computershare Trust Company, N.A.; (ii) Daewoo Shipbuilding &
Marine Engineering Co., Ltd.; (iii) Deutsche Bank Trust Company
Americas; (iv) Louisiana Machinery Co., LLC; (v) Nordic Trustee
AS; (vi) Pentagon Freight Services, Inc.; and (vii) Samsung Heavy
Industries Co., Ltd.

Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP is serving as lead counsel to
the Committee.  Cole Schotz P.C. is local and conflicts counsel to
the Committee.  Zuill & Co (in exclusive association with Harney
Westwood & Riegels) is serving as Bermuda counsel.  London based
Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, UK LLP, is serving as English
counsel. Parella Weinberg Partners LLP is the investment banker to
the Committee.  FTI Consulting Inc. is the financial advisor.


SEADRILL LTD: Plans to Exit Chapter 11 in June or July
------------------------------------------------------
Nerijus Adomaitis at Reuters report that offshore oil driller
Seadrill plans to emerge from Chapter 11 bankruptcy in late June
or early July to catch the rising wave of rig market activity.

The company won U.S. court approval on April 17 for its
multi-billion dollar debt restructuring plan after reaching a
deal with more than 40 banks, unsecured creditors and shipyards,
Reuters relates.

"The confirmation is the most significant milestone in the
process, and now we need to implement the plan over 60 to 90
days.  Obviously, we would like to do it as fast as possible,"
CEO Anton Dibowitz told Reuters.

According to Reuters, he said Seadrill plans to expand relations
with Schlumberger, the world's largest oil services firm, and
other suppliers to the global oil and gas industry, although the
company had no immediate consolidation plans.

Seadrill, as cited by Reuters, said the approved plan, which
extends maturities of US$5.7 billion in bank debts, converts
US$2.3 billion of unsecured bonds to equity and injects US$1
billion in new debt and equity, would enable the company to take
advantage of a market recovery.

"We are fully confident that it (the drilling market) would
recover within the next five years, and now we have a runway that
we needed in order to see that," Reuters quotes Mr. Dibowitz as
saying.

                       About Seadrill Ltd

Seadrill Limited is a deepwater drilling contractor providing
drilling services to the oil and gas industry.  It is
incorporated in Bermuda and managed from London.  Seadrill and
its affiliates own or lease 51 drilling rigs, which represents
more than 6% of the world fleet.

As of Sept. 12, 2017, Seadrill employed 3,760 highly-skilled
individuals across 22 countries and five continents to operate
their drilling rigs and perform various other corporate
functions.

As of June 30, 2017, Seadrill had $20.71 billion in total assets,
$10.77 billion in total liabilities and $9.94 billion in total
equity.

Seadrill reported a net loss of US$155 million on US$3.17 billion
of total operating revenues for the year ended Dec. 31, 2016,
following a net loss of US$635 million on US$4.33 billion of
total operating revenues for the year ended in 2015.

After reaching terms of a reorganization plan that would
restructure $8 billion of funded debt, Seadrill Limited and 85
affiliated debtors each filed a voluntary petition for relief
under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. Lead Case No. 17-60079) on Sept. 12, 2017.

Together with the chapter 11 proceedings, Seadrill, North
Atlantic Drilling Limited ("NADL") and Sevan Drilling Limited
("Sevan") commenced liquidation proceedings in Bermuda to appoint
joint provisional liquidators and facilitate recognition and
implementation of the transactions contemplated by the RSA and
Investment Agreement, and Simon Edel, Alan Bloom and Roy Bailey
of Ernst & Young are to act as the joint and several provisional
liquidators.

In the Chapter 11 cases, the Company has engaged Kirkland & Ellis
LLP as legal counsel, Houlihan Lokey, Inc. as financial advisor,
and Alvarez & Marsal as restructuring advisor.  Slaughter and May
has been engaged as corporate counsel, and Morgan Stanley served
as co-financial advisor during the negotiation of the
restructuring agreement.  Advokatfirmaet Thommessen AS is serving
as Norwegian counsel.  Conyers Dill & Pearman is serving as
Bermuda counsel.  Prime Clerk serves as claims agent.

The United States Trustee for Region 7 formed an official
committee of unsecured creditors with seven members: (i)
Computershare Trust Company, N.A.; (ii) Daewoo Shipbuilding &
Marine Engineering Co., Ltd.; (iii) Deutsche Bank Trust Company
Americas; (iv) Louisiana Machinery Co., LLC; (v) Nordic Trustee
AS; (vi) Pentagon Freight Services, Inc.; and (vii) Samsung Heavy
Industries Co., Ltd.

Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP is serving as lead counsel to
the Committee.  Cole Schotz P.C. is local and conflicts counsel
to the Committee.  Zuill & Co (in exclusive association with
Harney Westwood & Riegels) is serving as Bermuda counsel.
London-based Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, UK LLP, is
serving as English counsel.  Parella Weinberg Partners LLP is the
investment banker to the Committee.  FTI Consulting Inc. is the
financial advisor.



===========
B R A Z I L
===========


BRAZIL: EU Bans 20 Meat Plants, Hits 35 Percent of Exports
----------------------------------------------------------
Ana Mano and Samantha Koester at Reuters report that Europe's
decision to ban meat imports from several Brazilian suppliers
affects 30 to 35 percent of the country's exports to the bloc and
will force companies to find new markets while officials work to
reverse the measure, Brazil's Agriculture Minister said.

The European Union suspended imports of Brazilian meat products,
mostly poultry, in a move that affected 20 plants in the South
American nation that had been authorized to export to the EU,
according to a European Commission statement, according to
Reuters.

"I was in Europe last week and we were waiting for a definition of
how many, if any plants, were going to be de-listed," Minister
Blairo Maggi told reporters in Parana after the measure was
unveiled, the report notes.

"We need to start talks to reestablish these plants as soon as
possible," Mr. Maggi said, the report notes.

Mr. Maggi noted the Brazilian government would request that a
trade mission be allowed in Europe to negotiate a reversal of the
measure, the report notes.  Meanwhile, he said, Brazilian
companies "will have to search for new markets to quickly
substitute these exports," the report relays.

The ban also dealt a blow to Brazil's largest chicken processor,
BRF SA, which had 12 plants delisted by the EU after its
involvement in a food safety investigation, the report discloses.

Twenty plants were affected by the EU's decision, eight of which
were operated by smaller companies, according to a draft document
related to the decision seen by Reuters.

JBS SA, Brazil's second-largest chicken meat producer, had no
plants affected by the ban, a source close to the matter told
Reuters on condition of anonymity, the report relays.

BRF did not have an immediate comment on the ban.  JBS declined to
comment.

BRF shares soared after top shareholders on Wednesday agreed to
appoint a new board chairman who investors felt could pull off a
successful turnaround, the report relays.

Earlier the Brazilian government threatened to file a complaint to
the World Trade Organization (WTO) to discuss its claims that the
EU chicken import quotas breached global trade rules, the report
notes.

The government affirmed its intention after the EU decision on,
claiming European trade restrictions were "not a health issue,"
the report relays.

Brazil's basic argument is that, when domestic companies that
export chicken have to pay a EUR1,024 tariff per ton, health
demands are relaxed, the report relays.  "This will be what we
will complain about at the WTO," Mr. Maggi said, the report adds.

The EC said the ban was related to "deficiencies detected in the
Brazilian official control system." The ban will apply 15 days
after the publication in the official journal of the European
Union, it added, the report says.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Feb. 28, 2018, Fitch Ratings has downgraded Brazil's Long-Term
Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'BB-' from 'BB'
and revised the Rating Outlook to Stable from Negative.


CORURIPE LUX: S&P Rates Proposed Senior Unsecured Notes 'BB-'
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its 'BB-' issue-level rating to
Coruripe Lux S.A.'s proposed senior unsecured notes due 2025 of up
to $425 million. S&P also assigned the recovery rating of '3' to
the proposed notes, which indicates an average recovery
expectation of 50%-70% (rounded 65%).

The notes reflect the credit quality of the group, and will be
fully and unconditionally guaranteed by the parent company, S.A.
Usina Coruripe Acucar e Alcool (Coruripe; BB-/Stable/--), as well
as Coruripe EnergÇtica S.A., the energy cogeneration company.
Coruripe will use the proceeds to prepay part of its refinanced
debt of about $550 million, replacing the remaining portion with
unsecured bank debt. S&P expects the issuance to lower Coruripe's
interest burden and further extend the company's overall debt
maturity profile.

RECOVERY ANALYSIS

Key analytical factors

S&P said, "We have assigned a 'BB-' rating to Coruripe Lux's
proposed senior unsecured notes, which reflects a recovery rating
of '3', given the recovery expectation of 50%-70% (rounded 65%).

"Our simulated path to default for Coruripe would encompass a
scenario in which the company's operations would suffer from
severe weather conditions, significantly lower sugar prices, more
expensive access to credit markets, and lower cane availability
due to unmaintained plantations over the years following minimum
capex levels."

Under such a scenario, Coruripe would be unable to generate enough
cash to service its debt, refinance short-term debt maturities
with banks, or access the capital markets.

S&P said, "Under a simulated default scenario, we believe that
Coruripe would be restructured rather than liquidated. In that
sense, we have continued using an EBITDA multiple valuation of 5x,
which is the standard for the agribusiness companies."

The combination of R$408.6 million emergence EBITDA after recovery
adjustment with a 5.0x multiple results in a gross enterprise
value (EV) at emergence of R$2 billion, with a recovery
expectation at '3', between 50%-70% (rounded 65%).

Simulated default assumptions

-- Simulated year of default: 2022
-- EBITDA at emergence: R$408.6 million
-- EBITDA multiple: 5.0x
-- Estimated gross EV: R$2 billion

Simplified waterfall

-- Net EV, after 5% of administrative expenses: R$1.9 billion
-- Priority debt: R$143 million (ACC lines)
-- Senior secured debt: R$170.5 million (FINAME, FNE, Pr¢-Renova
    and Progeren loans)
-- Unsecured debt: R$2.4 billion (mainly composed of the new
    notes issuance and bank debt)
-- Recovery expectation of the proposed senior unsecured notes:
    65%

RATINGS LIST

C S.A. Usina Coruripe Acucar e Alcool

  Corporate credit rating                    BB-/Stable/--

  Ratings Assigned

  Coruripe Lux S.A.
    Senior unsecured                           BB-
     Recovery rating                           3(65%)


JBS SA: S&P Puts 'B' Corp Credit Rating on Watch Developing
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings placed its ratings on JBS S.A. (JBS) and JBS
USA Lux S.A. (JBS USA), including its 'B' corporate credit
ratings, on CreditWatch with developing implications.

The CreditWatch placement reflects JBS's ongoing negotiation to
refinance its large short-term debt of R$13.5 billion as of the
end of 2017, which could trigger different rating actions
depending on the outcome of negotiations. S&P said, "We understand
that the company is in the final stages of a negotiation with the
most representative banks that are part of the agreement for the
preservation of credit lines signed in July 25, 2017, which ends
in July 2018. We previously expected that the company would have
refinanced its debt by now. Given JBS's current strong operations,
we believe a refinancing is likely to occur, which would ease our
concerns over the company's liquidity, which could prompt an
upgrade."

S&P said, "On the other hand, we still note a risk for a downgrade
if the ongoing corruption investigations against the company
and/or potential contingent liabilities prompt the banks to not
sign the refinancing agreement. This would result in higher
liquidity pressures going forward, which would likely result in a
downgrade. The company had R$11.7 billion of cash as of the end of
2017 and undrawn committed lines of about R$3.3 billion.
Therefore, if the company is unable to refinance all of its short-
term debt, we wouldn't necessarily expect a suspension of payments
or a default.

"We expect to resolve the CreditWatch placement within the next
three months. We could raise the ratings, most likely by one
notch, if JBS is able to refinance its upcoming short-term debt
maturing in July 2018, indicating diminished liquidity pressures
going forward. We would also expect the company to maintain solid
operating performance in most markets, allowing for continued debt
reduction through free operating cash flows.

"We could lower the ratings by one or more notches if JBS is
unable to sign a refinancing agreement with banks in the next two
months. In this scenario, we would see a deterioration of
company's liquidity position and it would likely require
alternative financing lines to pay down debt."


RIO OIL: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating on 2018-1 Fixed-Rate Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its 'BB-' rating to Rio Oil Finance
Trust's $600 million fixed-rate notes series 2018-1.

The note issuance is backed by all current and future royalty and
special participation payments from offshore oil and natural gas
production in the Rio de Janeiro State (RJS) in Brazil. The
transaction's sponsor is Rioprevidencia, a social security fund
for RJS state employees that has been allocated present and future
RJS royalties rights, after mandatory deductions.

The rating reflects the following components: The corporate
performance risk assessment, which addresses Petrobras' ability to
continue operating the oil and gas fields despite a restructuring
or default on its corporate debt obligations. S&P said, "However,
in this analysis, given the exposure to Petrobras as obligor, our
rating considered Petrobras' 'BB-' foreign currency rating as
opposed to its corporate performance risk. We included Petrobras
as the only producer since it accounts for more than 90% of the
royalty and special participation payments to the National
Treasury that will then be allocated to RJS and then
Rioprevidencia."

The structural assessment, which addressed the receivables'
ability to generate sufficient cash flows to repay the notes.
Additionally, it evaluated the key structural features, early
amortization triggers, reserves, and the legal transfer of the
assets. A sovereign interference assessment that considered the
possibility of government interference in the transaction. Since
we issued preliminary ratings, the following changes have
occurred:

S&P said, "We updated the amortization schedule for series 2018-1
to reflect the transaction's documents. The interest rate on the
notes was determined at 8.20%; therefore, our debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) calculations were minimally affected. Under
the same assumptions outlined in the presale, we observed that the
minimum quarterly DSCR under our stressed scenario will equal
about 3.21x (instead of 3.13x) the quarterly debt service amount
when the maximum amount is due (including reserves). Under our
base-case scenario, this ratio goes up to 4.00x (instead of
4.01x). Likewise, without reserves, the numbers would be 0.23x and
1.34x (instead of 0.24x and 1.35x) for the stressed and base
cases, respectively. Moreover, under all additional scenarios
presented in the presale, the transaction would still show
quarterly DSCR and forward-looking annualized ratio above 1.0x and
above the transaction's thresholds, respectively, when we
considered the existence of reserves."

Other non-material definitions were updated in the transaction
documents, including the conditions to issuance of additional
series of securities, which now include the condition that
outstanding ratings must be at least investment grade on the
global scale.

None of the changes listed above affected any ratings.

S&P said, "Finally, we were notified that on April 13, 2018, a
public civil action was filed with the RJS District Court, seeking
certain information about the issuer and its securitization
program and, in connection therewith, requesting a preliminary
injunction to enjoin the issuance of the series 2018-1 notes. We
have received confirmation that the RJS District Court denied the
request to grant a preliminary injunction that would prevent the
issuance of the series 2018-1 notes as Rioprevidància is the owner
of the oil revenue rights, not RJS, among other factors. This
denial may be appealed by the Prosecutor's Office; however, we
have received legal comfort that it does not affect the true sale
of the assets and their isolation, thereby not affecting our
credit analysis."

S&P will continue to closely monitor legal developments on this
matter.

  RATING

  Rio Oil Finance Trust

  Series     Rating     Amount
                       (mil. $)
  2018-1     BB-         600


SANCOR SEGUROS: Fitch Affirms 'B+' Insurer Financial Strength
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Sancor Seguros S.A. (Sancor) Insurer
Financial Strength (IFS) rating at 'B+'. The Rating Outlook is
Stable.

The affirmation considers the positive results achieved by Sancor
during 2017 due to structural changes on the underwriting and
pricing policies. The rating remains constrained by Sancor's
business profile, which Fitch considers adversely affected by the
company's small size in in absolute terms and comparative lack of
diversification.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

After two years of consecutive losses, Sancor showed a positive
net result of UYU25.5 million at December 2017, with a pre-tax
ROAA of 2.4% and ROE of 8.5%. Even with favorable performance
relative to 2016 results (-5.7% and -25.2%), its ratios remain
below local peers of 3.7% and 18.5%, respectively.

Due to stricter controls in the pricing and underwriting process,
the company lowered the net loss ratio from 61.9% during 2016 to
52.6% in 2017. This improvement led to a combined ratio of 105.3%
and an operating ratio of 95%, both consistent with the results
expected for its business mix. Fitch expects the improvement in
these ratios will be sustained.

Sancor reversed the upward trend in leverage shown over the past
five years. During 2017, capital adequacy improved, and Fitch
expects this to continue given favorable profitability trends. As
of December 2017, the liabilities-to-equity ratio reached 3.0x.

In Fitch's opinion, Sancor will continue to receive capital and
liquidity support from its Argentine parent, Grupo Sancor Seguros,
(Grupo Sancor) if needed under expected economic and financial
conditions in Argentina. As of December 2017, capital
contributions from Grupo Sancor represented 64.0% of Sancor's
equity. However, given Argentina's 'B' Country Ceiling, Fitch
gives no explicit support to Sancor's rating from Grupo Sancor's
potential support.

The company's investment portfolio remains concentrated in local
fixed-income securities, primarily from the Uruguayan government
and other local financial institutions, maintaining its low risk
profile and its high liquidity relative to many Latin American
insurers.

Retention levels remained high at 78% of its total premium and
reinsurance is provided by a diversified group through both
proportional and non-proportional policies. The greatest
catastrophic exposure per event is equivalent to a 4.2% of equity
which Fitch views as moderate.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The rating could be downgraded if liabilities-to-equity ratio
exceeds 4x; operating ratio exceeds 100% over several years and
current business diversification is reduced.

Favorable rating factors include a decline in the liabilities-to-
equity ratio to market levels along with a sustained operating
ratio below 100%.


SBM BALEIA: Fitch Affirms BB- Rating on Series 2012-1 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed SBM Baleia Azul, S.a.r.l.'s senior
secured notes as follows:

-- Series 2012-1 senior secured notes due 2027 at 'BB-'.

The Rating Outlook remains Stable.

The notes are backed by the flows related to the charter agreement
signed with Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. (Petrobras) for the use of
the floating production storage and offloading unit (FPSO) Cidade
de Anchieta for a term of 18 years. SBM do Brasil Ltda. (SBM
Brasil), the Brazilian subsidiary of SBM Holding Inc. S.A. (SBM),
is the operator of the FPSO. SBM is the sponsor of the
transaction. The FPSO Cidade de Anchieta began operating at the
Baleia Azul oil field in September 2012.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Linkage to Petrobras' Credit Quality: The off-taker's credit
quality is a key risk factor for determining the strength of the
off-taker's payment obligation. On Feb. 27, 2018, Fitch downgraded
Petrobras' Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (LT IDR) to 'BB-
'/Outlook Stable from 'BB'/Outlook Negative. Petrobras' ratings
continue to reflect its close linkage with the sovereign rating of
Brazil due to the government's control of the company and its
strategic importance to Brazil as its near-monopoly supplier of
liquid fuels.

Strength of Off-taker's Payment Obligation: Fitch's view on the
strength of the off-taker's payment obligation is typically
notched from the off-taker's IDR, and will act as the ultimate
rating cap to the transaction. Fitch's qualitative assessment of
asset/contract/operator characteristics and the off
taker's/industry's characteristics related to this transaction
would ultimately cap the transaction at Petrobras' LT IDR.

Supply and Demand Fundamentals: The growth and stability of the
FPSO market is more robust than other floating facilities for many
reasons; they usually require less capex; can be brought on
production quicker (even as a full-scale conversion), with
attendant cash flow benefits and have the possibility for
relocation from one comparable field to another.

Credit Quality of the Operator/Sponsor: SBM Offshore N.V. is the
ultimate parent of SBM Holding Inc. S.A., the main sponsor of the
transaction. The transaction benefits from SBM Offshore N.V.'s
solid business position, global leadership in leasing FPSOs and
overall strong operational performance of its fleet. The rating of
the transaction is ultimately capped by Fitch's view of the credit
quality of the sponsor.

Stable Asset Performance: Asset performance is in line with
expectations, tied to characteristics of the contract including
fixed rates, which provide for cash flow stability. Average uptime
levels have been consistently stable, at 98.9% on average during
2017; the latter compares favourably to the 96.8% average in 2016.
Average economic uptime levels, considering gas production and
water injection with bonus days, have averaged 107%, materially
higher than Fitch's base case assumption, including bonus, of
98.5%.

Available Liquidity: The transaction benefits from a $26 million
(letters of credit provided by ABN Amro, rated A+/Stable) debt
service reserve account equivalent to the following two quarterly
payments of principal and interest. As of December 2017, net debt
balance closed at approximately $345.9 million.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The rating may be sensitive to changes in the credit quality of
Petrobras as charter off-taker and any deterioration in the credit
quality of SBM as operator and sponsor. In addition, the
transaction's rating is sensitive to the operating performance of
the FPSO Cidade de Anchieta.



=========
C H I L E
=========


GEOPARK LIMITED: Fitch Raises LongTerm IDRs to B+
-------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded GeoPark Limited's (GeoPark) and GeoPark
Latin America Limited Agencia en Chile Long-Term Foreign and Local
Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) to 'B+' from 'B'. The
Rating Outlook remains Stable. Fitch has also upgraded GeoPark's
senior notes due 2024 to 'B+'/'RR4' from 'B'/'RR4'.

Simultaneously, Fitch has withdrawn GeoPark Latin America Limited
Agencia en Chile's ratings as the bonds were repaid early and the
entity is no longer issuing debt.

The upgrade of GeoPark's ratings reflects the company's track
record of increasing production and improving reserve life, and
its ability to continuously implement an effective cost reduction
plan. Fitch's base case scenario expects that Geopark will reach
nearly 50,000 boed by 2021 and will have an average Total
Debt/EBITDA of 1.4x from 2019 through 2020.

Despite improved operating metrics, the ratings remains
constrained by the company's relatively small size and the low
diversification of its oil fields. Further increase in production
to the aforementioned levels while maintaining its reserve life
and capital structure at existing levels would bode positively for
GeoPark's credit quality. The rating also reflects Fitch's
expectations that GeoPark will continue strengthening its capital
structure with a rapid deleveraging process that could result in a
net leverage below 1.0x on average.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Positive Cash Flow Generation, Interest Expense Coverage from
Take-or-Pay Contracts: Fitch expects GeoPark to report positive
free cash flow (FCF) generation over the medium term, supported by
growing production, relatively low and stable capex and minor
dividend payments. Fitch expects that GeoPark will generate enough
cash flow from operations (CFFO) after interest expense to cover
capex requirements. GeoPark's financial profile benefits from
stable cash flow from the natural gas contract sales in Chile and
Brazil and the prolific oilfields it operates in Colombia and its
low costs structure.

GeoPark's credit profile would benefit from take-or-pay contracts
with high quality off-takers covering all of its interest expense.
Fitch estimates, GeoPark's EBITDA from take-or-pay contracts,
mostly connected to its Brazilian business, will cover nearly two
thirds of its pro forma interest expense over the rated horizon.
The company's ability to increase this number to 1.0x would augur
well for the company, further differentiating itself from some of
its 'B' rating category peers.

Expected Production Increase: Fitch expects GeoPark's daily
production to increase year-over-year (yoy) reaching close to
50,000 boed by 2021. This assumes a modest crude oil price using
Fitch's Oil and Gas base case price assumptions through 2021.
During the first quarter of 2018 (1Q18), the company reported an
increase of 28% in Oil and Gas production reaching an average of
32,195 boed, and Fitch expects it to surpass 35,000 boed by the
end of 2018, after the simultaneously announced acquisition of
blocks in the Agrentine Neuquen basin, which also have development
and exploration potential. Despite its growing production profile,
GeoPark's ratings remain constrained by its small size and the low
diversification of its oilfields.

Effective Cost Reduction Plan: Fitch expects that the company will
continue to maintain its cost-reduction efforts implemented during
the low oil price environment. GeoPark's competitive advantages
are derived from its operations in onshore and growing oilfields
which results in lower exploration costs than big players in the
region. In 2017, it reduced its half cycle cost by 10% yoy to
$14.6/boe. Since 2015, the company has focused on lower risk
projects and concentrated production in Colombia, specifically in
the Tigana and Jacana oil fields in the Llanos 34 block. In 2017,
the company continued its focus on preserving a solid cash
position by reducing capex, drilling costs and operating expenses.
Under Fitch's oil price assumptions, Fitch forecasts the company
will record an average netback of USD26 per barrel over the rating
horizon, increasing the company's EBITDA to USD260 million in 2018
and nearly USD330 million in 2019.

Adequate Reserve Life: GeoPark maintains an adequate reserve life,
and Fitch does not currently consider it a constraining factor for
the company's ratings. As of Dec. 31, 2017, GeoPark had proved,
developed and producing (PDP) oil and gas reserves of 28.5 million
barrels of equivalent (mmboe), while its proved reserves (1P)
totalled 97.0 mmboe; this translates into a 1P reserve life of 9.5
years. This figure does not include the recent Argentina
acquisition announced by the company

Strong Credit Profile: Fitch expects GeoPark's EBITDA to be
approximately USD260 million for a total debt/EBITDA of 1.6x in
2018. Considering production will reach around 40,000 boed in 2019
and nearly 50,000 boed by 2021, Fitch expects the company could
repay its debt with its own cash flow generation. Debt on a
reserve basis remain adequate as Fitch estimates that total
debt/1P reserves stands close to $4.43/boe after the incorporation
of the reserves, not including recent Argentine acquisition.


DERIVATION SUMMARY

GeoPark's upgrade to 'B+' reflects the company's track record of
increasing production to 35,000 boed, amid the past downturn in
the oil and gas industry, and its proven ability to maintain an
effective cost reduction plan in growing oil fields. The ratings
also reflect Fitch's expectation that the company will be able to
maintain and grow its production size and further diversifying its
asset base away from Colombia and maintain, and potentially
further reduce production costs in the medium and long term.

GeoPark's small production size compares favorably to other 'B'
rated oil and gas E&P producers, but continues to constrain its
rating to the 'B' category. These peers include Frontera Energy
(B+/Stable), Gran Tierra Energy (B/Stable) and Compania General de
Combustibles (CGC, B/Negative). Over the rating horizon, Fitch
expects that GeoPark will reach nearly 50,000 boed by 2021 higher
than Gran Tierra at 40,000 boed and CGC at nearly 30,000 boed, but
less than Frontera Energy 70,000 boed. Further, Geopark reported
97 million boe 1P reserves at the end of 2017 equating to a
reserve life of 9.5 years is higher than Frontera Energy's 4.3
years, Gran Tierra's 5.9 years and GCG's 6.6 years. GeoPark has a
strong reserve base, and Fitch estimates the company will be able
to maintain its reserve life of greater than seven years as it
continues to increase production size.

GeoPark's has a strong capital structure, which Fitch expects to
further improve after 2018. Fitch expects gross leverage to be
approximately 1.8x in 2019 as a result of increased production and
improved prices. GeoPark's leverage is strong compared to CGC with
expected gross leverage in 2019 at 4.0x, and in line with Gran
Tierra's at 1.7x, but higher than Frontera Energy at 0.7x.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's Key Assumptions Within Its Rating Case for the Issuer

-- Fitch's price deck per barrel of Brent oil of USD57.50 from
2018 through 2021;

-- Production of approximately 35,000 boed in 2018, in line with
management work program indications for Brent of USD50 per barrel
or above;

-- Annual production increasing at a similar pace for the next
four years reaching nearly 50,000 boed;

-- Half cycle costs averaging USD13 with an average EBITDA per
boe of USD22.


KEY RECOVERY RATING ASSUMPTIONS


-- The recovery analysis assumes that GeoPark would be liquidated
in bankruptcy;

-- Fitch has assumed a 10% administrative claim.

LIQUIDATION APPROACH

-- The liquidation estimate reflects Fitch's view of the value of
inventory and other assets that can be realized in a
reorganization and distributed to creditors;

-- The 50% advance rate is typical of inventory liquidations for
the oil and gas industry.

-- The USD10 per barrel reflects the typical valuation of recent
reorganizations in the oil and gas industry. The waterfall results
in a 100% recovery corresponding to 'RR1' recovery for the senior
secured notes (USD425 million). However, the Recovery Rating is
limited to 'B+'/R'R4' due to the 'RR4' soft cap for several
countries in which the company operates, such as Colombia and
Argentina.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Positive Rating Action

-- Net production rising consistently to 75,000 boed on a
sustained basis; and

-- Reserve life is unaffected as a result of production increase
at approximately 10 years.

-- Company's ability to maintain a conservative financial profile
with gross leverage of 2.0x or below;

-- Cash flow generated from take-or-pay contracts from high
quality off-takers covering interest expense by 1.0x;

-- Diversification of operations and improvements in realized oil
and gas differentials.

Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Negative Rating Action

-- Sustainable production size decreased to below 30,000 boed;

-- Reserve life decreased to below seven years on a sustained
basis;

-- A significant deterioration of credit metrics to total
debt/EBITDA of 3.0x or more;

-- A persistently weak oil and gas pricing environment that
impairs the longer-term value of its reserve base or a reduction
in reserves due to a change in the Peruvian concession.

LIQUIDITY

Adequate Liquidity: As of Dec. 31, 2017, GeoPark had cash on hand
of USD135 million, which covers its interest expense through 2021.
The company does not have any major maturities until its USD425
million bond comes due in 2024. Fitch estimates the company will
finance capex through operating cash flow over the rating horizon.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has upgraded the following ratings

Geopark Ltd.

-- Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs to 'B+' from 'B';
    Outlook Stable;

-- Senior secured notes due 2024 to 'B+'/'RR4' from 'B'/'RR4'.

Fitch has upgraded and withdrawn the following rating:

GeoPark Latin America Limited Agencia

-- Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs to 'B+' from 'B' and
    withdrawn; Outlook Stable



===================
C O S T A   R I C A
===================


BICSA: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Issuer Default Ratings, Outlook Negative
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Banco Internacional de Costa Rica's
(Bicsa) Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB' and its Viability
Rating (VR) at 'b+'. The Rating Outlook is Negative.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS, NATIONAL RATINGS AND SENIOR DEBT

The bank's IDRs, National and senior debt ratings reflect the
potential support it would receive from its shareholders, the
Costa Rican state owned banks Banco de Costa Rica (BCR) and Banco
Nacional de Costa Rica (BNCR). Bicsa's IDR and Outlook are aligned
with its shareholders'.

Fitch's assessment of BCR and BNCR's propensity to support Bicsa
reflects the material reputational impact that the default of this
subsidiary would have on its shareholders, its significant role in
its owners' regional objectives and the unquestioned support track
record.

Fitch's base case scenario is that support would be provided by
both shareholders, and that the cost would be manageable
considering Bicsa's relative size, close to 8% of its
shareholders' combined assets. In Fitch's view, Bicsa's long track
record of operations in Panama also supports its shareholders'
objectives.

Bicsa's issuer and senior debt National Ratings of 'A+(pan)' and
'F1(pan)' are driven by support. These ratings reflect the
relative strength of its shareholders compared to other rated
issuers in Panama.

VR
The bank's VR reflects, with high importance, Bicsa's company
profile.

In Fitch's opinion, Bicsa's small market share and its focus in
corporate and commercial clients results in concentrations in both
sides of its balance sheet. Nevertheless, Fitch also considers
Bicsa's business model and its competitive position, which has a
wider geographic diversification than similarly rated peers and
benefits from being part of Costa Rica's state owned banks.
Bicsa's VR also takes into account the bank's strengthened capital
position, recovering profitability and contained asset quality
deterioration.

Bicsa's funding profile has an even distribution between customer
deposits and wholesale funding from international commercial
banks.

While Bicsa's reliance on non-deposit funding (54% of total
funding) is higher than similarly rated peers, it is reasonably
diversified by provider and has an adequate term structure that
minimizes gaps. In turn, the high concentration of the bank's
deposit base can be more prone to changes in market conditions. In
Fitch's view, Bicsa's liquidity levels are consistent with the
rating.

Bicsa's capital position, as measured by its Fitch Core Capital
(FCC) ratio, strengthened in 2016 and 2017, underpinned by
recovering profitability, modest asset growth and full retention
of earnings. As of December 2017, the bank's FCC to RWAs ratio
stood at 13.9%, improving considerably from its 2013-2016 average
of 12.4%. This level absorbs some asset quality weaknesses such as
borrower concentrations.

Bicsa's operating profits recovered in 2017, underpinned by asset
growth, lower charge offs and contained credit costs that
compensated the increased pressure on its net interest margins. In
our view, profitability levels are likely to return to their
historic averages in the medium term, as the bank resumes asset
growth and contains credit costs due to its moderate delinquency
rates.

In Fitch's view, Bicsa's diversified loan book is consistent with
a blended (weighted) view of the risks posed by its relevant
jurisdictions. Fitch estimates Bicsa's operating environment risks
at 'BB'. The higher risk of the operating environment compared to
the rest of the Panamanian banking system reflects the bank's
material exposure to the Costa Rican economy through its loan and
investment portfolios, as well as its relevant exposure to other
lower rated countries in Latin America.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

Bicsa's Support Rating reflects Fitch's opinion on BCR's and
BNCR's ability and propensity to provide assistance to Bicsa,
should the need arise. The Support Rating of '3' maps to Bicsa's
IDR of 'BB' and reflects a moderate probability of support from
its shareholders.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRS, NATIONAL RATINGS AND SENIOR DEBT

The bank's IDRs, National and senior debt ratings are sensitive to
a change in Fitch's assumptions around BCR's and BNCR's ability
and propensity to support Bicsa, should the need arise. A
downgrade in the shareholders' IDRs would trigger a similar rating
action in Bicsa's IDRs, National and senior debt. The ratings
could also be downgraded if Fitch perceives a diminished
propensity from Bicsa's shareholders' to support its operations.

The Rating Outlook is Negative limiting upside potential. Bicsa's
Outlook would return to Stable if the parents' Rating Outlooks
return to Stable.

Changes in Bicsa's shareholders' IDR are aligned with Costa Rica's
sovereign ratings, as both shareholders' IDRs are driven by the
potential support from the Government of Costa Rica.

VR

The bank's VR is sensitive to improvements in diversification on
both sides of the bank's balance sheet and improvements in Bicsa's
funding structure in terms of stability and concentration. In
turn, a downgrade could result from material liquidity stress or
significant asset quality deterioration.

SUPPORT RATING

The Support Rating is potentially sensitive to any change in
assumptions around the propensity or ability of BCR and BNCR to
provide timely support to the bank. Changes in Bicsa's Support
Rating are unlikely; this would require multi-notch changes in the
shareholders' IDRs.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

Banco Internacional de Costa Rica:

--Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB'; Outlook
   Negative;
--Short-term IDR at 'B';
--Viability Rating at b+;
--Support Rating at '3';
--National Long-Term Rating at 'A+(pan)'; Outlook Negative;
--National Short-Term Rating at 'F1(pan)';
--Senior Unsecured National Long-Term Rating at 'A+(pan)';
--Senior Unsecured National Short-Term Rating at 'F1(pan)'.



===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Yellow Dragon Plight Devastates Plantations
---------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that Dominican Republic is practically
without citrus since in 2008 when the plight "Yellow Dragon" began
to devastate plantations of, sweet and sour oranges, grapefruit
and Hispaniola lemons.

Those fruit are no longer so abundant as harvests fell by 90
percent, El Caribe reports, according to Dominican Today.

The Citrus Canker (Huanglongbing HLB) has eliminated over 100,000
trees on around 32,000 hectares in just three years, according to
the Agriculture Ministry's report "Nutrition of Citrus and
Handling of HLB" presented in 2014 by the Agricultural and
Forestry Development Center, the report notes.

                       Citrus Figures

According to Agriculture Ministry figures, grapefruit production
fell from 2.1 million pounds in 2005 to 1.9 million in 2016, the
report relays.

Nonetheless orange harvests haven't decreased, but languish at a
modest 30% rise in 13 years, the report adds.


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: S&P Affirms 'BB-/B' SCRs, Outlook Still Stable
------------------------------------------------------------------
On April 19, 2018, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB-/B' long-
and short-term sovereign credit ratings on the Dominican Republic.
The outlook remains stable. The transfer and convertibility (T&C)
assessment is unchanged at 'BB+'.

OUTLOOK

S&P said, "Our stable outlook mirrors our expectation that the
Dominican Republic will continue to grow at an average of 5%
annually during the next two years, which helps mitigate a rise in
net general government debt and deficits expected to average 4.2%
of GDP during 2018-2021. Our stable outlook also assumes that
tourism and remittances will partially offset higher oil prices
during the forecast period, with some weakening in the current
account deficit (CAD) and external liquidity.

"We could raise the ratings if the government takes steps to
improve structural fiscal trends, such as through energy sector
reform, tackling the quasi-deficit of the central bank, or central
government fiscal reform. Lower fiscal deficits, coupled with
sustained improvement in external liquidity ratios, could lead to
an upgrade during the next two years.

"We could lower our ratings if policy decisions or adverse
external conditions generate lower potential GDP growth during the
next two years or if the Dominican Republic doesn't grow faster
than peers with a similar level of economic development, also
weighing on the Dominican Republic's fiscal dynamics."

RATIONALE

"Our ratings on the Dominican Republic reflect our view that
despite decelerating over the past couple years, especially in
2017, we expect real GDP growth to average 5% during 2018-2021,
still above peers. The ratings also reflect the Dominican
Republic's monetary policy framework, which includes inflation
targeting, with a growing track record of effectiveness. The
ratings are constrained by, in our view, institutional weaknesses,
rising net general government debt and interest burdens, and a
still relatively weak external profile.

Institutional and economic profile: A diversified economy with
strong growth prospects, mitigated by the institutional capacity
to advance structural reforms

At a projected average of 5% annually, S&P expects real GDP growth
to continue to compare favorably with peers during 2018-2021.
Strong tourism and demand from the U.S. and stable growth of the
financial sector will be the main economic drivers.

Institutional weakness is reflected by an inability to advance
various structural reforms and weaker policy execution across
political cycles. S&P said, "We project the country's GDP per
capita at US$7,780 in 2018. The Dominican Republic posted GDP
growth of 4.6% in 2017, below the average during 2014-2016 of
7.1%. The slowdown stems from weaker business confidence and
uncertainties associated with corruption allegations and social
unrest stemming from the company Odebrecht's role in the
government's infrastructure projects. In addition, two significant
hurricanes caused sizable damage on the northern region of the
island. We expect U.S. demand for Dominican goods and tourism to
bolster exports of goods and services, and remittances to support
private consumption, resulting in average real GDP growth of 5%
during 2018-2021. We expect real per capita GDP growth to remain
slightly above 4% during the same period, which still compares
positively with peers at the same level of economic development."

President Danilo Medina from the Partido de la Liberaci¢n
Dominicana (PLD) party is halfway through his second four-year
mandate and continues to post high, although declining, approval
ratings. The PLD has an absolute majority in both legislative
chambers and runs a vast majority of the Dominican Republic's
municipalities. However, dominance of the PLD has not translated
to passage of needed structural reforms.

President Medina's and the PLD's capacity to pass reforms has been
constrained by corruption allegations, internal divisions of the
PLD between President Medina's and former president Leonel
Fernandez's (1996-2000, 2004-2012) factions, and electoral-driven
considerations. In S&P's opinion, well-known structural reforms,
including the energy, fiscal, labor, and competitiveness reforms,
along with the renewal of the central bank recapitalization law,
have been on hold since President Medina took power in 2012.
Lastly, in S&P's opinion, the absence of action to correct
structural deficiencies raises greater uncertainty about the
Dominican Republic's capacity to maintain sustainable public
finances and promote balanced economic growth over the longer
term.

Flexibility and performance profile: The Dominican Republic is
likely to post fiscal deficits and rising debt during the next two
years

The Dominican Republic's fiscal performance is marked by
consistent fiscal deficits and rising debt. Tourism and
remittances should somewhat offset higher oil prices, but S&P
expects CAD and external liquidity indicators to weaken. The
Dominican Republic moved to an inflation-targeting regime in 2012
and continues to build an adequate track record by maintaining
inflation at or below the target range. The general government
(which includes central government results, the central bank
quasi-deficit, and the nonfinancial public sector) posted a
deficit of 4.4% of GDP in 2017, slightly worse than the 2016
deficit of 4.2%. The benefits of the 2012 fiscal reform waned by
2016. The government was only able to raise marginally higher
revenue by administrative measures, while extraordinary
reconstruction costs (after the season's hurricanes) underpin
higher deficits in 2017.

Administrative measures such as the integration between the tax
database and customs database should promote higher tax compliance
and yield some revenue gains, but assuming no fiscal reform over
the forecast horizon, we would expect general government deficits
to average 4.2% of GDP. This includes increased fiscal slippage
deviation during the next electoral period in 2020. Absent a new
central bank recapitalization law (currently under discussion),
our projections still assume the quasi-deficit of the central bank
would remain around 2% of GDP (estimate includes the central
government transfers to the central bank). The energy pact has
been delayed since August 2015; the version currently under
discussion among the sector's main players is unlikely to address
key system structural issues, such as the 30% physical losses. The
Punta Catalina energy plant is expected to start operating at
year-end 2018 and reach full capacity sometime in 2019, which
should help to reduce the cost of the losses.

S&P said, "We expect the Dominican Republic's change in net
general government debt to average 5.1% during 2018-2021, which
includes general government deficits and considers some
depreciation of the peso. We expect net general government debt to
reach 52% of GDP by 2021, significantly higher than the 32% posted
a decade earlier." The net debt stock includes central bank
certificates (equivalent to 13.3% of GDP in 2017) and excludes the
recapitalization bonds that the central government issued to
capitalize the central bank (equivalent to 3.7% of GDP) following
the 2003-2004 bailout of the banking sector. Higher debt will keep
interest payments high, at an average of 21% of general government
revenues during 2018-2021. This figure is not fully comparable
with peers because almost 25% of the central government's interest
bill is paid to the central bank to help recapitalize it."

Due to its still-shallow domestic debt market, the Dominican
Republic is highly dependent on external financing. More than 50%
of the general government debt is denominated in foreign currency.
S&P said, "We assess the contingent liabilities as limited. This
considers assets of the deposit-taking financial institutions that
are just below 50% of GDP. Non-deposit-taking institutions are not
material in size, mainly considering the size of the Dominican
pension system funds, which is less than 15% of GDP. Moreover, we
incorporate much of the debt of nonfinancial public enterprises
into our general government debt figures, as well as the fiscal
results of large enterprises (such as energy transmission and
distribution public companies) into our calculation of general
government deficits."

In 2017, the Dominican Republic posted the lowest CAD of the last
of the last 25 years, thanks to growing tourism and remittance
receipts. S&P said, "We expect relatively higher oil prices during
2018-2021 to result in still-moderate CAD at an average of 1.7% of
GDP. We expect foreign direct investment and the rest of the
financial account to fully finance the Dominican Republic's CAD
and contribute to the growing international reserves. We expect
the country's gross external financing needs at around 100% of
current account receipts (CAR) plus usable reserves during 2018-
2021, while its narrow net external debt is set to increase toward
80% of CAR from 70% in 2017. We expect net external liabilities to
reach 180% during the forecast period. We consider the gap between
narrow net external debt and net liabilities to be significant,
and it highlights the country's vulnerability to adverse external
conditions."

In 2012, the central bank became operationally independent and
moved to an inflation-targeting regime, improving its policy track
record. Inflation has averaged 2.7% since then, near the lower end
of the central bank's target (4% plus/minus 1%). The central bank
has allowed the Dominican Republic's peso to float more freely,
although it still intervenes in the foreign exchange market. Its
monetary transmission mechanism is constrained by quasi-fiscal
losses, a low level of domestic credit (below 30% of GDP in 2017),
and shallow domestic debt and capital markets. These factors
constrain S&P's long-term local currency rating at 'BB-'.

The T&C assessment is 'BB+', two notches higher than the foreign
currency sovereign rating. This reflects S&P's opinion that the
likelihood of the sovereign restricting access to foreign exchange
that Dominican Republic-based nonsovereign issuers need for debt
service is moderately lower than the likelihood of the sovereign
defaulting on its foreign currency obligations. The distinction is
based on the outward orientation of the Dominican economy,
especially given the importance of tourism and tourism investment,
CARs at 35% of GDP, and the fairly unrestrictive nature of
Dominican Republic's foreign-exchange regime.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by
the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and
was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot above.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook. The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

  RATINGS LIST

  Ratings Affirmed

  Dominican Republic
   Sovereign Credit Rating                BB-/Stable/B
   Transfer & Convertibility Assessment   BB+
   Senior Unsecured                       BB-



=================
G U A T E M A L A
=================


GUATEMALA: Fitch Affirms 'BB' LT FC Issuer Default Rating
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Guatemala's long-term, foreign-currency
(LT FC) Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB' with a Stable Outlook.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Guatemala's ratings are supported by its track record of
macroeconomic stability and conservative policies, low public debt
to GDP and sound external liquidity. These strengths are
counterbalanced by a narrow tax base that constrains policy
flexibility and limits debt tolerance, as well as weak governance
and human development indicators.

A series of corruption scandals has shaken the political
environment in Guatemala since 2015. Corruption allegations
against President Morales and his attempt to dismiss the head of
the UN-appointed anti-corruption body (CICIG) led to protests at
the end of 2017. The erosion of the President's political capital
diminishes the prospects for reforms this side of the June 2019
elections, including reforms to raise Guatemala's low taxes, the
lowest in the 'BB' category. A fragmented Congress makes consensus
on legislation difficult to achieve. A key sign of the gridlock
was the failure of the Congress to pass the 2018 budget or approve
a series of multi-lateral loans (a small share of Guatemala's
financing) despite the concessional terms.

Despite the high level of political noise over the last three
years, economic growth has proven relatively resilient, supported
partly by favorable external U.S. demand and strong worker
remittances flows. Growth slowed to 2.8% in 2017, a level below
potential due to fiscal retrenchment and the closure of the
Escobal silver mine.

Uncertainty lingering from the continued political crisis
continues to weigh on investment spending, especially for the
public sector. Investment to GDP has fallen steadily since 2007
and was only 12.2% in 2017. However, real GDP is forecast to
accelerate to 3.2% in 2018 and 3.5% in 2019 on the assumption of
higher budget execution of public investment and strong
remittances inflows supporting private consumption. The near- and
medium-term risks to domestic investment and growth are on the
downside, in Fitch's view, due to budget execution risks to public
investment and political uncertainty. Longer-term constraints on
growth include a low domestic savings rate, a narrow fiscal
revenue base limiting budget space for public infrastructure
spending, shallow credit penetration and governance problems.

Guatemala's external indicators are supportive of its credit
profile. The current account balance moved into surplus in 2016,
reflecting the lower energy import bill and strong remittance
inflows (11% of GDP). The current account surplus remained at 1.5%
of GDP in 2017 on the back of continued strong remittances, up
13.4% yoy, despite a higher trade deficit. Fitch expects these
drivers to sustain a declining current account balance in 2018-
2019. The country's external financing needs are low and
adequately covered by broad-based foreign direct investment.
Modest external debt and ample international reserves mitigate
external liquidity risks; Guatemala's external liquidity ratio is
more than double the BB median. The central bank's foreign-
exchange market intervention during 2017 raised its international
reserves by 28.5% in 2017 to USD11.7 billion or 6.3 months of
current account payments.

Guatemala's central government fiscal deficit is low relative to
peers. In 2017, it reached 1.3% of GDP, up marginally from the
decade-low of 1.1% of GDP in 2016. The Guatemalan Congress failed
to pass the 2018 budget, resulting in the 2017 budget being rolled
over. Fitch expects the deficit to fall marginally to 1.1% of GDP
in 2018, reflecting the government's under-execution of
infrastructure spending.

In 2017, some institutional strengthening of the tax
administration office (SAT) plus large, one-off payments of back-
taxes and fines for tax evasion helped to arrest the slide in
revenue-to-GDP underway since 2013. However, Fitch expects tax
collection to fall in terms of GDP in 2018 as the one-off effects
of back-taxes and fines last year wear off and there is
uncertainty whether tax administrative measures will be fortified
in the coming months. At less than 11% of GDP, the revenue base is
the second-lowest of all rated sovereigns. A deeper tax reform
would be needed to raise the government's low tax base. However, a
fragmented legislature and low presidential political capital
suggest that this is unlikely until after the 2019 elections at
the earliest.

A primary surplus in 2017 lowered central government debt while
enabling the government to build its cash position. Fitch
forecasts the primary balance to remain positive again in 2018.
Fitch expects overall fiscal deficits to remain modest over the
forecast period, which, combined with faster economic growth, will
keep the debt-to-GDP relatively stable. At 20.9% of GDP in 2018
(net of public debt holdings by the social security fund IGSS),
the government debt ratio is one of the lowest in the 'BB'
category. However, the strength this confers to the credit profile
is limited by the low revenue. Guatemala's debt- and interest-to-
revenue ratios, 196% and 13% respectively, are higher than the
'BB' medians of 182% and 9.6%, respectively, denoting Guatemala's
weaker debt tolerance and fiscal flexibility than its rating
peers.

SOVEREIGN RATING MODEL (SRM) and QUALITATIVE OVERLAY (QO)

Fitch's proprietary SRM assigns Guatemala a score equivalent to a
rating of 'BB+' on the LT FC IDR scale.

Fitch's sovereign rating committee adjusted the output from the
SRM to arrive at the final LT FC IDR by applying its QO, relative
to rated peers, as follows:

-- Structural: Down one notch, to reflect congressional gridlock
that limits the government's ability to pass reforms as well as
the 2018 budget.

Fitch's SRM is the agency's proprietary multiple regression rating
model that employs 18 variables based on three-year centered
averages, including one year of forecasts, to produce a score
equivalent to a LT FC IDR. Fitch's QO is a forward-looking
qualitative framework designed to allow for adjustment to the SRM
output to assign the final rating, reflecting factors within our
criteria that are not fully quantifiable and/or not fully
reflected in the SRM.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Outlook reflects Fitch's view that upside and downside
risks to the rating are broadly balanced. The main risk factors
that, individually or collectively, could trigger a rating action
are:

Positive:

-- Sustained improvements in tax collection and the budget
process that enhance fiscal policy flexibility;

-- Higher investment and growth prospects;

-- Improvements in governance and human development indicators
relative to peers.

Negative:

-- A slowdown in growth, for example due to a disruption of
remittances, social unrest and/or governability challenges;

-- Continued erosion of the revenue base that undermines fiscal
flexibility;

-- Political gridlock that constrains government financing
flexibility and effective policy making, such as failure to pass
the 2019 budget and/or interruptions in financing.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

-- Fitch forecasts that Guatemala's economy and balance of
payments will continue to benefit from moderate oil prices
(USD57.5/bl in 2018 and USD57.5/bl in 2019) and supportive U.S.
economic growth rates (2.7% in 2018 and 2.5% in 2019).

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

Long-Term Foreign-Currency IDR at 'BB'; Outlook Stable;
Long-Term Local-Currency IDR at 'BB'; Outlook Stable;
Short-Term Foreign-Currency IDR at 'B';
Short-Term Local-Currency IDR at 'B';
Country Ceiling at 'BB+';
Issue ratings on long-term senior unsecured foreign-currency
  bonds at 'BB'



=============
J A M A I C A
=============


JAMAICA: Utility Companies Paid Millions for Breaches in 2017
-------------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that over $100 million has been paid out to
Jamaican utility customers last year, following reports of
breaches of the Guaranteed Standards as well as credits and
compensation secured by the Office of Utilities Regulation's (OUR)
Consumer Affairs Unit.

The Jamaica Public Service Company paid $124 million and the
National Water Commission $3.8 million, according to RJR News.

An additional $1.5 million was secured in credits and compensation
for utility customers through actions taken by the OUR, the report
notes.

JPS and NWC accounted for 18 per cent and 80 per cent of total
credits with the remaining 2 per cent being secured from Cable and
Wireless and Flow, the report relays.

A statement from the OUR said during 2017, the JPS committed
75,571 breaches while there were 2,561 breaches by the NWC of the
Guaranteed Standards, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Feb. 5, 2018, Fitch Ratings has affirmed Jamaica's Long-Term
Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B' and has
revised the Rating Outlook to Positive from Stable.



===========
M E X I C O
===========


GRUPO SENDA: S&P Cuts ICR to B- on Weak Liquidity, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it had lowered its global scale long-
term issuer credit rating on Grupo Senda Autotransporte S.A. de
C.V. (Senda) to 'B-' from 'B'. S&P said, "At the same time, we
lowered our long-term national scale issuer credit rating to
'mxBB+' from 'mxBBB-' and our short-term national scale issuer
credit and debt ratings to 'mxB' from 'mxA-3'. The outlook on the
long-term issuer credit ratings is stable."

Pressures on Senda's liquidity have lingered mainly from
significant short-term debt maturities related to the company's
syndicated loan, leases, and revolving facilities. S&P said, "This
is despite the company refinancing in early 2016 of its
outstanding debt through a syndicated loan that we had originally
expected to enhance liquidity. We note that the company has
maintained the use of its credit facilities to fund its working
capital requirements and the expansion of the personnel business."

Furthermore, Senda's operating performance and cash flow
generation in 2017 were weaker than our previous expectations of
FFO to debt in the 19%-24% range and FFO cash interest coverage in
the 2.5x-3.0x range, because the company posted 13.2% and 1.9x,
respectively, at the end of 2017. Operating efficiencies and
organizational restructuring weren't sufficient, in our opinion,
to bolster cash flow generation and liquidity.

The company has continued to refinance its short-term debt in 2017
and 2018. However, these actions are not enough to overcome
Senda's substantial short-term maturities. In addition, although
the company is currently in negotiations with the syndicated loan
banks and other financial institutions, the outcome along with the
terms and conditions of the potential financing is still uncertain
and beyond the company's control. Moreover, S&P also considers
that debt refinancing could take longer than the company expected,
as seen in the syndicated loan negotiations.

S&P said, "We consider that the company faces challenging
conditions to implement debt refinancing in a timely fashion,
keeping its liquidity weak over the next two years. In addition,
we believe that Senda will continue using its short-term debt
facilities to fund its operations over the next few years. We
expect that the personnel business segment will continue to grow
in the following years, providing more stable cash flows."

Senda compares unfavorably relative to some of its international
peers given its smaller size, geographic concentration, and
service offering. As a result, S&P continues to incorporate a
negative adjustment to the ratings on the company.

S&P now assesses Senda's liquidity as weak, because it expects the
company's sources of liquidity to be materially lower than its
uses over the next 12 months, with sources to uses well below
1.0x, reflecting a substantial deficit over the next 12 months.
Senda could face further liquidity pressures if its cash flow
generation further deteriorates and/or if it can't reach a
refinancing plan for its short-term debt maturities.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that the company,
despite its weak liquidity, will post key credit metrics in line
with its aggressive financial risk profile for the next 12 months,
with FFO to debt of about 22% and FFO cash interest coverage of
about 3.0x. These metrics will underscore Senda's operating
efficiency initiatives and the continued expansion of its
personnel business.

A downgrade is possible if the company is unable to refinance its
short-term maturities, which could lead to further deterioration
of its liquidity, resulting in unsustainable financial commitments
in the long term. S&P could also lower the ratings if Senda's
credit metrics and liquidity further weaken in the next few
quarters, leading to a breach of its financial covenants,
particularly its EBITDA interest coverage.

S&P could upgrade the company if its liquidity were to improve
consistently, which could result from higher-than-expected FFO
generation, lower use of short-term debt, and/or refinancing of
short-term debt with long-term issues.



===========
P A N A M A
===========


INVERSIONES CREDIQ: Fitch Affirms B/B Issuer Default Ratings
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Inversiones CrediQ Business, S.A.'s
(ICQB) Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B' and its Short-
Term IDR at 'B'. The Rating Outlook on the Long-Term IDR is
Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS
ICQB's ratings are highly influenced by its concentrated business
model focused in vehicle financing and its relatively small scale
of operations in Central America compared to higher rated regional
financial groups. The group's main subsidiary companies are
located in Costa Rica, El Salvador and Honduras. The ratings also
consider its relatively diversified funding structure, mainly with
wholesale funding from several creditors complemented by customer
deposits and debt issuances. Additionally, Fitch takes into
account the group's consistent financial performance it has
exhibited in the recent years.

ICQB is the holding company of Non-Bank Financial Institutions
(NBFIs) focused in financing vehicle sales from Grupo Q, a vehicle
dealership company with presence in Central America. ICQB benefits
from the synergies with GrupoQ in terms of customer relationships,
market expertise and pricing power. ICQB provides financing
primarily for new-car sales and a lower proportion for used-car
sales. The Costa Rican company is the largest subsidiary in terms
of net income and assets, with more than 70% and 45% contribution
as of December 2017, respectively. The Salvadoran entity
represents close to 18% and 30% of net income and assets
respectively, and Honduras contributes between 20% and 25% in both
size and income.

At the consolidated level, the funding structure of the company is
a key factor for its financial profile and it is concentrated in
wholesale funding, given its business nature and profile. Credit
lines represented more than 80% of total funding at the end of
December 2017 and were well diversified among more than 30
commercial banks and financial institutions. The remaining
proportion of the entity's funding consisted of deposits from its
Honduran subsidiary, which is allowed to take deposits from
customers, and debt issuances from the Salvadoran entity. The
group aims to maintain its current funding structure, and
therefore its costs could remain similar over the ratings horizon.
Almost 38% of ICQB's funding is unsecured; it benefits from
deposits in Honduras and issuances in El Salvador as 75% of its
bank credit lines are secured.

ICQB exhibits good profitability levels and these have remained
stable in recent years. Its profits are driven by net interest
income and relevant fees, which represented almost 35% of total
net revenues in 2017. Low loan impairment charges also benefited
its net income, as these represented 10.9% of its pre-impairment
operating profit in 2017. Its pre-tax profits were 4.1% of average
assets a level Fitch views as sustainable over the rating horizon
given controlled operating and credit costs.

The entity's asset quality is at reasonable levels, considering
its business orientation, with delinquency ratios that were
similar to previous years. As of December 2017, its non-performing
loans were 1.1% of the total credit portfolio, which is adequate
in light of its consumer-oriented loan book. Loan loss reserve
coverage decreased to 73.5% from 96.5% in 2016 as a result of loan
write-offs from previous periods that were only partially
reserved. According to management, the bank increased provisions
to cover the unreserved portion of these loan write-offs in
accordance to the entity's policies. These loans were subsequently
charged off.

ICQB's capital position is adequate with good loss absorption
capacity (Debt to tangible equity: 5.3x as of December 2017). This
would remain similar considering the entity's growth and earnings
retention plans.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRS
Upside potential for ICQB's rating is limited over the medium
term. A sustainable increase of its scale of operations and a
reduction in funding concentration could be positive for its
ratings. On the other hand, potential downgrades would come from
significant difficulties in accessing funding for its operations
or increased reliance on a lower base of creditors, although this
is not Fitch's base scenario.]

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

--Long-term IDR at 'B'; Outlook Stable;
--Short-term IDR at 'B'.



=======
P E R U
=======


* PERU: President Urges Businesses to Help Boost Development
------------------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that Peruvian President Martin urged business
owners from across the Americas to collaborate with governments to
help boost the region's economic development and to fight
corruption.

During the third CEO Summit leading up to the Summit of the
Americas, Mr. Vizcarra encouraged a "productive dialog to be
established between the private and public sectors" so as to
properly identify the challenges facing the Americas -- as well as
the opportunities to be seized -- to achieve "inclusive, quality
growth," according to EFE News.

"We cannot achieve integration if we do not reach a level of
connectivity efficient enough to guarantee Internet access," he
added, stressing the importance of this element in entering new
markets and making electronic payments.

"A third fundamental aspect is transparency and integrity," Mr.
Vizcarra said, the report notes.  "We must decisively face the
problem of corruption, promoting a culture of integrity," Mr.
Vizcarra added.

The CEO Summit -- which brings together more than 700 business
owners and executives and is organized by the Inter-American
Development Bank -- will come to a close and produce a
recommendation document to be presented to the heads of state and
government attending the eighth Summit of the Americas in Lima
from April 13-16, the report relays.



================================
T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O
================================


CONSOLIDATED ENERGY: S&P Rates New $550MM Secured B-Term Loan 'BB'
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it assigned its 'BB' issue-level
rating to Consolidated Energy Finance S.A.'s (CEF) proposed $550
million seven-year secured B-term loan. CEF is a financing
subsidiary of Consolidated Energy Limited (CEL) (BB/Negative/--).

CEF plans to use the proceeds to refinance existing debt, which
consists of Methanol Holding (Trinidad) Limited's (MHTL) secured
B-term loan due 2022 and revolving credit facility due 2020 for
$282 million and $300 million (thereof $260 million drawn) in
total, respectively. These debts total around $542 million drawn
(total of $582 million). Although S&P considers this transaction
as neutral leverage, given that CEF will mainly use the proceeds
from the new term loan to pay existing debt, S&P expects the
proposed transaction to improve CEL's debt maturity profile by
extending the average term of its debt to approximately six years
from four. This further supports its strong liquidity assessment
on CEL.

The issue-level rating is at the same level as S&P's corporate
credit rating on CEL, reflecting that the priority debt ratio is
below the 50% threshold of CEL's consolidated debt. CEL's ratio of
priority debt ratio is slightly above 30%, thus, there is no
potential material disadvantage to noteholders under a bankruptcy
or liquidation scenario.

  RATINGS LIST

  Consolidated Energy Limited
   Corporate Credit Rating         BB/Negative/--

  Ratings Assigned
  Consolidated Energy Finance S.A.
   New Ratings
   Term Loan                       BB



=================
X X X X X X X X X
=================


* BOND PRICING: For the Week From April 16 to April 20, 2018
-----------------------------------------------------------

Issuer Name               Cpn     Price   Maturity  Country  Curr
-----------               ---     -----   --------  -------   ---

BA-CA Finance Cayman Lt   0.518    62.07               KY    EUR
AES Tiete Energia SA      6.7842   1.109  4/15/2024    BR    BRL
Argentina Bogar Bonds     2       39.36   2/4/2018     AR    ARS
Automotores Gildemeister  8.25    73.25   5/24/2021    CL    USD
Automotores Gildemeister  6.75    67      1/15/2023    CL    USD
Automotores Gildemeister  8.25    73.25   5/24/2021    CL    USD
Automotores Gildemeister  6.75    65.5    1/15/2023    CL    USD
CA La Electricidad        8.5     63.664  4/10/2018    VE    USD
Caixa Geral De Depositos  1.439   63.167               KY    EUR
Caixa Geral De Depositos  1.469                        KY    EUR
CSN Islands XII Corp      7       68                   BR    USD
CSN Islands XII Corp      7       66.266               BR    USD
Decimo Primer Fideicomiso 6       53.225 10/25/2041    PA    USD
Decimo Primer             4.54    43.127 10/25/2041    PA    USD
Dolomite Capital         13.217   73.108 12/20/2019    CN    ZAR
Enel Americas SA          5.75    56.172  6/15/2022    CL    CLP
Gol Linhas Aereas SA     10.75    35.861  2/12/2023    BR    USD
Gol Linhas Aereas SA     10.75    35.601  2/12/2023    BR    USD
Inversora Electrica       6.5     67.625  9/26/2017    AR    USD
Inversora Electrica       6.5     67.625  9/26/2017    AR    USD
MIE Holdings Corp         7.5     64.78   4/25/2019    HK    USD
MIE Holdings Corp         7.5     64.982  4/25/2019    HK    USD
NB Finance Ltd            3.88    61.816  2/7/2035     KY    EUR
Noble Holding             7.7     74.433  4/1/2025     KY    USD
Noble Holding             5.25    56.279  3/15/2042    KY    USD
Noble Holding             8.7     71.881  4/1/2045     KY    USD
Noble Holding             6.2     60.129  8/1/2040     KY    USD
Noble Holding             6.05    58.38   3/1/2041     KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.5     42.5                 KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.125   56.938  6/26/2022    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7       68.053  4/21/2020    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.125   41.366  6/26/2042    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     4.375   40.002  4/25/2025    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.25    39.211  6/27/2029    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     6       44.75   4/5/2023     KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.25    39.018  6/27/2029    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.5     42.95                KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     4.375   40.363  4/25/2025    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.125   41.635  6/26/2042    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     6       52.625  4/5/2023     KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.125   55.873  6/26/2022    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7       67.368  4/21/2020    KY    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    8.5     74.5   10/27/2020    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6       30.458  5/16/2024    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6       30.517 11/15/2026    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    9.75    35.677  5/17/2035    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    9       39.279 11/17/2021    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    5.375   30.267  4/12/2027    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    8.5     72.5   10/27/2020    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela   12.75    45.278  2/17/2022    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6       30.367  5/16/2024    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6       30.387 11/15/2026    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    9       39.316 11/17/2021    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    9.75    35.893  5/17/2035    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6       28.346 10/28/2022    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    5.5     30.123  4/12/2037    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela   12.75    45.23   2/17/2022    VE    USD
Polarcus Ltd              5.6     75      3/30/2022    AE    USD
Provincia del Chubut      4              10/21/2019    AR    USD
Siem Offshore Inc         4.04527 69.5   10/30/2020    NO    NOK
Siem Offshore             3.75176 65.75  12/28/2021    NO    NOK
STB Finance               2.05771 56.243               KY    JPY
Sylph Ltd                 2.367   64.438  9/25/2036    KY    USD
US Capital                1.63611 54.774 12/1/2039     KY    USD
US Capital                1.63611 54.774 12/1/2039     KY    USD
USJ Acucar                9.875   67     11/9/2019     BR    USD
USJ Acucar                9.875   67     11/9/2019     BR    USD
Venezuela                13.625   68.25   8/15/2018    VE    USD
Venezuela                 7.75    44.065 10/13/2019    VE    USD
Venezuela                11.95    40.785  8/5/2031     VE    USD
Venezuela                12.75    45.19   8/23/2022    VE    USD
Venezuela                 9.25    39.645  9/15/2027    VE    USD
Venezuela                11.75    40.005 10/21/2026    VE    USD
Venezuela                 9       36.285  5/7/2023     VE    USD
Venezuela                 9.375   37.69   1/13/2034    VE    USD
Venezuela                13.625   72.25   8/15/2018    VE    USD
Venezuela                 7       34.23   3/31/2038    VE    USD
Venezuela                 7       59.19  12/1/2018     VE    USD





                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2018.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.
.


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