/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/180514.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                    L A T I N   A M E R I C A

              Monday, May 14, 2018, Vol. 19, No. 94


                            Headlines




A R G E N T I N A

COMPANIA LATINOAMERICANA: S&P Places 'B-' CCR on Watch Neg.


B R A Z I L

BRAZIL: New Minister Hopeful Legislation Can Pass Before Elections
QGOG CONSTELLATION: S&P Lowers Corp Credit Rating to 'D'


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Prices Up 4.05% in Last 12Mo, Paced by Oil
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Securities Chief Says IPOs Coming Soon


J A M A I C A

JAMAICA: Tourism Minister and JMEA to Address Concerns


M E X I C O

FINCOMUN SERVICIOS: S&P Affirms Then Withdraws 'B+/B' ICRs


P U E R T O    R I C O

FIRSTBANK PUERTO RICO: Fitch Affirms 'B-' LT Issuer Default Rating
POPULAR INC: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' Issuer Default Rating


S T.  V I N C E N T   &   T H E   G R E N A D I N E S

ST. VINCENT & THE GRENADINES: Moody's Affirms B3 Ratings


X X X X X X X X X

LATAM: Scraps $2 Billion Worth of Bond Sales as U.S. Rates Jump
* BOND PRICING: For the Week From May 7 to May 11, 2018


                            - - - - -


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A R G E N T I N A
=================


COMPANIA LATINOAMERICANA: S&P Places 'B-' CCR on Watch Neg.
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings placed its 'B-' corporate credit and issue-
level ratings on CLISA - Compania Latinoamericana de
Infraestructura & Servicios S.A. on CreditWatch negative.

S&P said, "The CreditWatch placement reflects our view that
CLISA's cash flow generation and liquidity could face higher
pressures due to the steep slide of the Argentine peso, rising
interest rates, and the rising reputation risks following the
judicial investigations of the main shareholder."

The central bank's increase of reference interest rate to 40% from
27% will raise interest expense on the company's debt in pesos,
which totals about ARP1.8 billion and represents around 22% of
total debt (excluding fiscal obligations). Moreover, Argentine
peso weakened around 12% against the dollar in the past two weeks,
impacting the remaining 78% of the company's debt, which is mainly
composed of the $300 million senior unsecured bonds due 2023. S&P
said, "We believe these factors will increase the company's annual
interest expense to around ARP1.75 billion in 2018 from ARP1.28
billion in 2017. In addition, if fiscal turbulence in Argentina
persists, our forecasted debt to EBITDA for CLISA should reach
3.5x-4.0x in 2018 from our previous expectation of 3.0x-3.5x,
while interest coverage should drop below 2.0x. This would imply a
reduced financial flexibility for Clisa, given the incurrence
covenants under its bond indenture. Those include a maximum of
3.5x net debt to consolidated EBITDA and a minimum of 2.0x
consolidated EBITDA to consolidated net interest expenses."

Exacerbating these trends, the recent prosecution by local
authorities of the company's main shareholder could raise
reputational risks for CLISA. This generates uncertainty over the
company's ability to refinance its short-term obligations, which
represent around 30% of consolidated debt. In addition, CLISA
could run into problems replenishing backlog at its engineering
and construction business, and managing working capital. These
factors could further pressure the company's free cash flow
generation.


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B R A Z I L
===========


BRAZIL: New Minister Hopeful Legislation Can Pass Before Elections
------------------------------------------------------------------
Paulo Trevisani at The Wall Street Journal reports that Brazilian
efforts to reform the economy have lost momentum, but Congress is
still likely to pass some market-friendly legislation before
October elections, the country's new finance minister, Eduardo
Guardia, said.

A pension overhaul considered key to keep the country solvent was
shelved earlier this year and bills to privatize money-losing
power company Eletrobras, reduce consumer-credit risk, simplify
corporate tax and modernize bankruptcy have lost steam as
Brazilian lawmakers turn their focus toward the election,
according to The Wall Street Journal.

Mr. Guardia said it is too early to throw in the towel on all
those proposals, the report notes.

"I want people to know that we are working hard to get things
done," he said in an interview.  "Nothing is easy, but things are
moving forward," he added.

Outside his office, though, few believe much can be done ahead of
the elections. Underscoring the risks of delaying reform, early
polls show market-friendly candidates lagging populist firebrands,
one of the factors behind this year's 10% currency depreciation,
the report notes.

"There is still a tough economic agenda to be dealt with," said
Zeina Latif, chief-economist at XP Investimentos in Sao Paulo, the
report relays. "The next president will need political skills to
get it done."

Mr. Guardia was sworn in last month, replacing Henrique Meirelles
in the job after serving as the former finance minister's
executive secretary, the report notes.  Mr. Meirelles left to
prepare to run for president, the report says.

Mr. Meirelles held the position since early 2016, when President
Michel Temer took office following the impeachment of leftist
leader Dilma Rousseff, the report discloses.

Mr. Temer's government had some early legislative successes,
pushing legislation curbing public spending though Congress in
2016 and loosening labor regulations last year, the report relays.

But the reform push sputtered as dozens of political leaders were
enmeshed in the sprawling graft scandal known as Operation Car
Wash and as the election approached, the report notes.

"I had hoped we'd be moving faster on the reforms at this point,"
said Jose Augusto Fernandes, a board member at Brazil's National
Confederation of Industry, expressing doubt anything else
meaningful can pass before the election, the report relays.

Congress did move earlier on some key issues, note the report.

The Journal said the Lower House approved a bill creating a
consumer credit-rating system, which is expected to reduce
borrowing costs. The bill will go to the Senate, the report
relays.  Also in the Lower House, a bill defining rules for
Eletrobras privatization was set in motion, an early step Mr.
Guardia saluted as meaningful progress, saying a share offer could
happen in the next few months, the report adds.

The minister also said the government is nearing a breakthrough in
negotiations with state oil giant Petroleo Brasileiro SA, or
Petrobras, over contract issues barring the auction of oil
reserves estimated to hold as much as 7 billion barrels along
Brazil's shore, the report discloses.  He expressed hopes bidding
could attract at least $40 billion in investment, the report says.

"This shows the country is doing its homework," the report quoted
Mr. Guardia as saying. He said the privatization is fundamental to
ensure the company can attain a financial position solid enough to
ensure Brazilians won't face blackouts in the future, the report
notes.  He said the result will be a reduction in utility bills,
the report relays.

"All we need to do is to explain our project to lawmakers," he
added, notes the report.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Feb. 28, 2018, Fitch Ratings has downgraded Brazil's Long-Term
Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'BB-' from 'BB'
and revised the Rating Outlook to Stable from Negative.


QGOG CONSTELLATION: S&P Lowers Corp Credit Rating to 'D'
--------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its corporate credit rating on QGOG
Constellation S.A. to 'D' from 'B'. S&P said, "At the same time,
we're lowering our issue-level ratings on the company's 2019 and
2024 notes to 'D' from 'B' and to 'D' from 'B+', respectively.
We're also withdrawing our recovery ratings on the 2019 and 2024
notes, and will reassess recovery once the company presents a new
capital structure."

S&P said, "We're lowering our ratings to 'D' because QGOG
Constellation announced it will miss the payment of the cash
interest payments on the 2019 and 2024 senior notes due on May 9,
2018. QGOG Constellation will use the 30-day grace period defined
under the terms of the notes in order to advance ongoing
negotiations with its key lenders to re-profile the group's debt.
The idle capacity of the offshore drilling market has not only
sharply reduced charter daily rates, but also caused some
postponements for new tender offers from oil and gas (O&G)
producers, thus creating a highly competitive environment in this
market. As such, most of QGOG Constellation's projects are
currently uncontracted or near contractual maturity. In this
context, QGOG Constellation decided to restructure the group's
debt, since it would need several positive market developments in
order to make the current capital structure sustainable. In spite
of the company's current cash position, which is more than
sufficient to comply with the abovementioned interest payments, we
believe that QGOG Constellation won't make the payments within the
30-day grace period under the original terms and conditions, which
is tantamount to default."



===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Prices Up 4.05% in Last 12Mo, Paced by Oil
--------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that inflation has climbed at a faster
pace during the last 12 months, after the inter-annual rate closed
at 4.05%, measured from April 2017 to the same month this year,
according to data published by Dominican Republic's Central Bank.

A year earlier, the annualized consumer prices had climbed 3.51%,
according to Dominican Today.

The rise in oil prices in the domestic market, as well as
increases in alcoholic beverages and tobacco, have led to an
acceleration in consumer prices over the last year, the report
notes.

Based on Central Bank figures, the price of alcoholic beverages
and tobacco jumped 6.4% in 12 months, while transportation, a
group that reflects the impact of higher oil prices, rose 5.3% in
that same period, the report relays.

Meanwhile, the prices of food and non-alcoholic beverages and
education posted increases of 5% in the last year, according to
Central Bank figures, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
April 23, 2018, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB-/B' long- and
short-term sovereign credit ratings on the Dominican Republic.
The outlook remains stable. The transfer and convertibility (T&C)
assessment is unchanged at 'BB+'.


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Securities Chief Says IPOs Coming Soon
----------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that securities superintendent, Gabriel
Castro, said the debt market's development has continued its
sustained growth and greater dynamism.

"We have approved four new public offers, more pension fund
administrators, and we're currently working with the first offers
of stocks to the market," the report quoted Mr. Castro as saying.

The official, speaking after a mass too mark the agency's 15th
anniversary, said he expects the market's pace will continue,
after posting 20 percent growth last year, the report notes.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
April 23, 2018, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB-/B' long- and
short-term sovereign credit ratings on the Dominican Republic.
The outlook remains stable. The transfer and convertibility (T&C)
assessment is unchanged at 'BB+'.



=============
J A M A I C A
=============


JAMAICA: Tourism Minister and JMEA to Address Concerns
------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that a meeting is slated to take place between
Tourism Minister Edmund Bartlett and President of the Jamaica
Manufacturers and Exporters Association Metry Seaga to address
concerns raised about a comment made by the Cabinet member.

Minister Bartlett, in response to complaints that Spanish
hoteliers are not engaging local manufacturers in business,
recently said he cannot tell investors who to do business with,
according to RJR News.

Minister Bartlett said manufacturers should focus on improving the
quality of their products and their ability to supply the tourism
market with what it needs, the report notes.

The JMA, in response, said Bartlett's comments constituted a
blatant disregard for the manufacturing sector, the report relays.

"The truth is Minister Bartlett and myself have spoken and I think
we are going to meet, hopefully before too long to ensure that
anything that was said is not seen in an inflamatory way. We are
not happy with what he said," the report quoted Mr. Seaga as
saying.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Feb. 5, 2018, Fitch Ratings has affirmed Jamaica's Long-Term
Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B' and has
revised the Rating Outlook to Positive from Stable.


===========
M E X I C O
===========


FINCOMUN SERVICIOS: S&P Affirms Then Withdraws 'B+/B' ICRs
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B+/B' global scale and its
'mxBBB-/mxA-3' national scale issuer credit ratings on FinComun
Servicios Financieros Comunitarios (FinComun), with a negative
outlook on both scales. At the same time, it withdrew all ratings
on the company at the issuer's request.

FinComun's operating and financial performance haven't changed
significantly from our assumptions in the last publication. The
ratings reflect the lender's weaker-than-average asset quality
metrics and considerably lower reserve coverage (measured by loans
loss reserves to nonperforming assets) than those of its closest
peers. This is mainly due to exposure to the weak quality of its
payroll loans to government employees. However, S&P expects
gradual improvements in FinComun's asset quality and efficiency
thanks to the auto correction program, which the domestic
regulator had imposed, and scaling back the payroll lending to
government employees.

Likewise, the ratings incorporate FinComun's ineffective operating
strategy during the past few years. This was evident in the sharp
growth of payroll lending to government employees,and led to an
ongoing reorganization of the company. S&P said, "The ratings also
incorporate Fincomun's reliance on only two business lines for
revenue, which leaves the latter susceptible, in our view, to a
downturn in either of those businesses. On the other hand, we view
FinComun's capital and earnings as credit strength due to a
projected risk-adjusted capital ratio of around 9.7% for 2018,
including an expected MXN50 million capital injection in June
2018. Finally, our ratings incorporate our below-average funding
assessment stemming from FinComun's lack of access to the central
bank's credit lines, but sufficient liquidity to cover short-term
obligations."

S&P said, "We believe the 'mxBBB-' national scale rating is
commensurate with other Mexican issuers rated at the same rating
level, considering FinComun's size and business diversification,
its deteriorated asset quality metrics, and the challenges the
company will face over the next 12 months."

The negative outlook reflected a one-in-three chance of a
downgrade as a result of FinComun's weakened risk position. If the
company doesn't comply with the corrective plan and its asset
quality metrics don't keep improving, FinComun's risk position
will weaken and impair its overall credit profile.


======================
P U E R T O    R I C O
======================


FIRSTBANK PUERTO RICO: Fitch Affirms 'B-' LT Issuer Default Rating
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings for First Bancorp (FBP),
including its 'B-' Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR), 'B'
Short-Term IDR and 'b-' Viability Rating (VR). In addition, the
ratings have been removed from Negative Watch and assigned a
Stable Rating Outlook.

Fitch placed FBP's ratings on Rating Watch Negative on Oct. 5,
2017, due to the uncertainty of the impact caused by Hurricanes
Irma and Maria on Puerto Rico in September 2017.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRs and VRs
Fitch believes the initial impact on FBP from hurricanes Irma and
Maria was manageable, and disclosures from the U.S. Federal
Government and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico have brought
greater visibility into the short-term impact of the storms,
resulting in the removal of the Rating Watch Negative. The Stable
Outlook reflects uncertainty over the medium- and long-term
effects the hurricane may have on financial performance, which is
already captured at the current rating level.

Prior to the hurricanes, FBP's ratings had a Positive Outlook
reflecting an improving overall financial profile, signaling that
there was potential for upward rating momentum.

FBP's ratings continue to be constrained by a challenging and
uncertain operating environment. The hurricanes have complicated
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico's efforts to reverse outward
migration, generate sustainable economic growth, and address its
fiscal and debt imbalances. Additionally, the reduction in the
federal corporate tax rate in the U.S. makes Puerto Rico less
attractive on a relative basis. However, rebuilding efforts and a
federal aid package from the U.S. government could have a positive
short-to-medium-term impact on the island's economy. Longer-term
prospects for the islands economy, outside the current rating time
horizon, depend heavily on the effectiveness of fiscal and
structural reforms.

FPB's ratings are also constrained by poor asset quality relative
to Puerto Rico peers and U.S. mainland banks. Although the
hurricanes have not resulted in significant increases in
nonperforming loans and net charge-offs to date relative to
historical levels, Fitch believes that asset quality metrics could
still deteriorate from current levels.

Fitch notes that banks and other service providers in Puerto Rico
provided temporary payment moratoriums to borrowers resulting in
higher liquidity levels and reduced debt service obligations over
the short term. These moratoriums have since expired and FBP's
current ratings and outlook incorporate the possibility that
credit quality could modestly worsen before it shows signs of
improvement over the long term.

Earnings performance has been in line with Fitch's expectations.
For the first quarter of 2018 (1Q18), FBP reported net income of
$33 million for an ROA of 1.10% and provision expense over the
last two quarters has been generally in line with pre-hurricane
periods.

Fitch expects that earnings may also face headwinds going forward
as FBP continues to work down its high levels of nonperforming
assets.

In Fitch's view, capital remains a rating strength and should
provide an adequate buffer to potential losses stemming from
credit quality deterioration. Based on a severe stress test
incorporating reduced core earnings and significant increases in
provisions, Fitch believes FBP's capital base is sufficient to
withstand further credit deterioration and/or volatility. At 1Q18,
FPB's TCE and CET1 stood at 14.8% and 19.2%, respectively, which
are among the highest in Fitch's rated universe in the U.S. Given
FBP's risk profile and uncertainties that remain regarding the
Puerto Rico economy and hurricane impact, the company's higher
capital ratios are viewed as prudent and supportive of the
ratings.

Although FBP's funding profile continues to be weak relative to
higher rated banks, over the past several years, the company has
reduced its reliance on noncore funding sources, particularly
brokered deposits. In Fitch's view, this has notably improved the
overall stability of its deposit base and funding profile. FBP
continues to faces competition for deposits from locally based
commercial banks, several U.S. and foreign banks, and over
one-hundred cooperative banks, which limits deposit gathering
abilities on the island and results in a higher cost of funds. In
Fitch's view, the presents a modest constraint on FPB's rating
over the long term.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

The Support Rating of '5' and Support Ratings Floor of 'NF'
reflect Fitch's view that FBP is not considered systemically
important, and therefore the probability of support is unlikely.
The IDRs and VRs do not incorporate any support.

LONG- AND SHORT-TERM DEPOSIT RATINGS

FBP's uninsured deposit ratings at its subsidiary bank are rated
one notch higher than FBP's IDR and senior unsecured debt rating
because U.S. uninsured deposits benefit from depositor preference.
U.S. depositor preference gives deposit liabilities superior
recovery prospects in the event of default.

HOLDING COMPANY

FBP has a bank holding company (BHC) structure with the bank as
the main subsidiary. IDRs and VRs are equalized with those of the
operating company and bank, reflecting its role as the bank
holding company, which is mandated in the U.S. to act as a source
of strength for its bank subsidiaries. Double leverage is below
120% for the FBP parent company.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRs and VRs

FBP's operating environment is a higher influence on the ratings,
and FBP's ratings are sensitive to changes in Fitch's view of the
operating environment in Puerto Rico. However, given FBP's low
rating level relative to Fitch's assessment of the operating
environment in Puerto Rico, Fitch believes that a modest degree of
deterioration in the island's operating environment over the
longer term is already captured in FBP's current ratings. Fitch
will continue to monitor data on Puerto Rico's economic and
demographic trends to assess the medium- and long-term economic
outlook on the island.

Fitch believes FBP's ratings have upward rating potential given
the significant improvements in the company's financial profile
over the last several years. FBP's ratings could be upgraded
should FBP's asset quality metrics, measured by nonperforming
loans and net charge-offs, not deteriorate significantly from
current levels over the next few quarters. Additionally, positive
rating momentum could develop if FBP is able to maintain stable
core earnings levels without increased reliance on short-term
wholesale funding.


FBP's current ratings incorporate an expectation that asset
quality could deteriorate modestly from current levels. While not
expected given FBP's strong capital levels, FBP's ratings could be
downgraded if asset quality deteriorates significantly resulting
in lower capital ratios relative to Puerto Rico and U.S. mainland
peer banks.

Also, while not envisioned over the outlook horizon, negative
ratings pressure could develop if Fitch believes that the
potential benefits of the planned structural and fiscal reforms in
the recently approved fiscal plan will not be realized, resulting
in a weaker operating environment. Conversely, positive rating
action is possible if Fitch believes that the benefits from the
planned structural and fiscal reforms will be effective resulting
in a stronger operating environment.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

The Support Rating and Support Rating Floor are sensitive to
Fitch's assumption around capacity to procure extraordinary
support
in case of need.

HOLDING COMPANY

If FBP became undercapitalized or increased double leverage
significantly, there is the potential that Fitch could notch the
holding company IDR and VR from the ratings of the operating
companies.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings, removed the Rating Watch
Negative, and assigned a Stable Rating Outlook:

First BanCorp

  --Long-Term IDR at 'B-'; Outlook Stable;

  --Short-Term IDR at 'B';

  --Viability Rating at 'b-'.

FirstBank Puerto Rico

  --Long-Term IDR at 'B-'; Outlook Stable;

  --Long-term deposit at 'B'/'RR3';

  --Short-Term IDR at 'B';

  --Short-term Deposits at 'B';

  --Viability at 'b-'.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

First BanCorp

  --Support at '5';

  --Support floor at 'NF'.

FirstBank Puerto Rico

  --Support at '5';

  --Support floor at 'NF'.


POPULAR INC: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' Issuer Default Rating
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Popular Inc.'s (BPOP) 'BB-' Long-Term
Issuer Default Rating (IDR), 'B' Short-Term IDR, and 'bb-'
Viability Rating (VR). The ratings have been removed from Rating
Watch Negative and assigned a Stable Rating Outlook.

Fitch placed BPOP's ratings on Negative Watch on Oct. 5, 2017 due
to the uncertainty of the impact of hurricanes Irma and Maria on
Puerto Rico in September 2017.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS, VRs AND SENIOR DEBT

Fitch believes the initial impact on BPOP from hurricanes Irma and
Maria was manageable, and disclosures from the U.S. Federal
Government and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico have brought
greater visibility into the short-term impact of the storms,
resulting in the removal of the Rating Watch Negative. The Stable
Outlook reflects uncertainty over the medium- and long-term
effects the hurricane may have on financial performance, which is
already captured at the current rating level.

BPOP's ratings continue to be constrained by a challenging and
uncertain operating environment. The hurricanes have complicated
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico's efforts to reverse outward
migration, generate sustainable economic growth, and address its
fiscal and debt imbalances. Additionally, the reduction in the
federal corporate tax rate in the U.S. makes Puerto Rico less
attractive on a relative basis. That said, rebuilding efforts and
a federal aid package from the U.S. government could have a
positive short- to medium-term impact on the island's economy.
Longer-term prospects for the island's economy, outside the
current Outlook horizon, depend heavily on the effectiveness of
fiscal and structural reforms.

BPOP's ratings are also constrained by poor asset quality relative
to U.S. mainland banks. Although the hurricanes have not resulted
in significant increases in nonperforming loans and net charge-
offs to date relative to historical levels, Fitch believes that
asset quality metrics could still experience deterioration.

Banks and other service providers in Puerto Rico provided
temporary payment moratoriums to borrowers resulting in higher
liquidity levels and reduced debt service obligations over the
short term.

These moratoriums have since expired, and BPOP's current rating
and Outlook incorporate the possibility that credit quality could
modestly worsen before beginning to improve over the long term.

Earnings performance has been in line with Fitch's expectations.
BPOP's solid core earnings strength should provide an offset and
help absorb future provisioning needs. For 1Q18, BPOP reported net
income of $91m for an ROA of 0.84% despite a heightened provision
expense of $71 million provision attributed largely to the
estimated impact of the Hurricane Irma and Maria as well as a $12
million provision for the U.S. taxi medallion portfolio.

In Fitch's view, capital remains a rating strength for BPOP and
should provide an adequate buffer to potential losses stemming
from credit quality deterioration. Based on a severe stress test
incorporating reduced core earnings and significant increases in
provisions, Fitch believes BPOP's capital base is sufficient to
withstand further credit deterioration and/or volatility. For
1Q18, BPOP's TCE and CET1 stood at 9.7% and 16.8%, respectively,
which are on the high end of Fitch's rated universe in the U.S.
Given BPOP's risk profile and uncertainties that remain regarding
the Puerto Rico economy and hurricane impact, Fitch views the
company's higher capital ratios as prudent and supportive of
ratings.

Overall, compared to peers, BPOP has a leading deposit franchise
and a solid funding profile driven by a favorable loan-to-deposit
ratio. Since the hurricanes, weak loan demand in Puerto Rico
coupled with increased deposits as a result of payment moratoriums
offered by banks and other service providers on the island has
pushed BPOP's loan to deposit ratio to 65% at 1Q18. Historically,
BPOP's funding profile has been weaker when compared to U.S. bank
peers given greater reliance on non-core funding sources.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

The Support Rating of '5' and Support Ratings Floor of 'NF'
reflect Fitch's view that BPOP is not considered systemically
important, and therefore the probability of support is unlikely.
The IDRs and VRs do not incorporate any support.

LONG- AND SHORT-TERM DEPOSIT RATINGS

BPOP's uninsured deposit ratings at its subsidiary banks are rated
one notch higher than BPOP's IDR and senior unsecured debt rating
because U.S. uninsured deposits benefit from depositor preference.
U.S. depositor preference gives deposit liabilities superior
recovery prospects in the event of default.

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

Hybrid capital instruments issued by BPOP are notched down from
the company's VR in accordance with Fitch's assessment of each
instrument's respective non-performance and relative loss severity
risk profiles, which may vary considerably.

BPOP's preferred stock and trust preferred stock rating of 'B-' is
three notches below its Viability Rating (VR) of 'bb-', in
accordance with Fitch's assessment of the instruments'
non-performance and loss severity risk profiles for issuers that
have VRs rated below 'bb+'.

HOLDING COMPANY

BPOP has a bank holding company (BHC) structure with the bank as
the main subsidiary. IDRs and VRs are equalized with those of the
operating companies and banks, reflecting its role as the bank
holding company, which is mandated in the U.S. to act as a source
of strength for its bank subsidiaries. Double leverage is below
120% for the BPOP parent company.

SUBSIDIARY AND AFFILIATED COMPANY

All of the BPOP entities factor in a high probability of support
from the parent. This reflects the fact that performing parent
banks have very rarely allowed subsidiaries to default. It also
considers the high level of integration, brand, management,
financial and reputational incentives to avoid subsidiary
defaults.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRS, VRs AND SENIOR DEBT

Fitch believes BPOP's ratings are solidly situated at the current
levels and does not envision upward rating potential for the
foreseeable future. BPOP's operating environment in Puerto Rico is
an important influence on its ratings. Fitch will continue to
monitor data on Puerto Rico's economic and demographic trends to
assess the medium- and long-term economic outlook on the island.

Negative rating pressure could develop if Fitch believes that the
potential benefits of the planned structural and fiscal reforms in
the recently approved fiscal plan will not be realized, resulting
in a weaker operating environment. Conversely, positive rating
momentum could build over time if Fitch believes that the benefits
from the planned structural and fiscal reforms will be effective,
resulting in a stronger operating environment.

Fitch expects to receive additional clarity on the hurricanes'
full impact on asset quality over the next few quarters.
Incorporated into today's rating action is the expectation that
there could be some additional asset quality deterioration
stemming from the hurricanes. BPOP's Outlook could be revised to
Negative from Stable if asset quality deteriorates significantly
from current levels causing increased provisions that materially
impact capital levels.

The Support Rating and Support Rating Floor are sensitive to
Fitch's assumption around capacity to procure extraordinary
support in case of need.

LONG- AND SHORT-TERM DEPOSIT RATINGS

The ratings of long- and short-term deposits issued by BPOP
subsidiaries are primarily sensitive to any change in the
company's IDRs. Should the Long-Term IDR be downgraded, deposit
ratings could be similarly affected.

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

The ratings of hybrid securities are sensitive to any change in
BPOP's VR or to changes in BPOP's propensity to make coupon
payments that are permitted but not compulsory under the
instruments' documentation.

HOLDING COMPANY

If BPOP became undercapitalized or increased double leverage
significantly, Fitch could notch the holding company IDR and VR
from the ratings of the operating companies.

SUBSIDIARY AND AFFILIATED COMPANIES

As the IDRs and VRs of the subsidiaries are equalized with those
of BPOP to reflect support from their ultimate parent, they are
sensitive to changes in the parent's propensity to provide
support, which Fitch currently does not expect, or from changes in
BPOP's IDRs.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings, removed the Rating Watch
Negative, and assigned a Stable Rating Outlook:

Popular, Inc.

  --Long-term IDR at 'BB-'; Outlook Stable

  --Senior unsecured at 'BB-';

  --Short-term IDR at 'B';

  --Short-term Debt at 'B'.

  --Viability rating at 'bb-';

  --Preferred stock at 'B-'.

Popular North America, Inc.

  --Long-term IDR at 'BB-'; Outlook Stable

  --Senior unsecured at 'BB-';

  --Short-term IDR at 'B';

  --Short-term Debt at at B

  --Viability rating at 'bb-'.

Banco Popular North America

  --Long-term IDR at 'BB-'; Outlook Stable

  --Long-term deposits at 'BB';

  --Short-term IDR at 'B';

  --Short-term deposits at 'B'.

  --Viability rating at 'bb-'.

Banco Popular de Puerto Rico

  --Long-term IDR at 'BB-'; Outlook Stable

  --Short-term IDR at 'B';

  --Short-term deposits at 'B';

  --Viability rating at 'bb-'.

BanPonce Trust I

  --Trust preferred at 'B-'.

Popular Capital Trust I

  --Trust preferred at 'B-'.

Popular Capital Trust II

  --Trust preferred at 'B-'.

Popular North America Capital Trust I

  --Trust preferred at 'B-'.

Popular Capital Trust III

  --Trust preferred at 'B-'

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

Popular, Inc.

  --Support at '5';

  --Support floor at 'NF'.

Popular North America, Inc.

  --Support at '5';

  --Support floor at 'NF'.

Banco Popular North America

  --Support at '5';

  --Support floor at 'NF'.

Banco Popular de Puerto Rico

  --Support at '5';

  --Support floor at 'NF'.


=====================================================
S T.  V I N C E N T   &   T H E   G R E N A D I N E S
==================================---================


ST. VINCENT & THE GRENADINES: Moody's Affirms B3 Ratings
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the Government of St
Vincent and the Grenadines' B3 long-term issuer rating and
maintained the stable outlook. Concurrently, Moody's affirmed St
Vincent and the Grenadines' senior unsecured debt rating of B3 and
its short-term rating of Not Prime (NP).

The affirmation of the B3 ratings reflects the following factors:

1) Small open economy highly vulnerable to external shocks;

2) High government debt burden, in line with rated peers.

The stable outlook captures Moody's expectations that growth will
accelerate and the fiscal deficit will remain moderate over the
next two years, conditions that will allow the government debt
burden to remain broadly stable.

St Vincent and the Grenadines' local-currency bond and deposit
ceilings remains unchanged at Ba3. The foreign-currency bond and
bank deposit ceilings also remain unchanged at Ba3/NP.

RATINGS RATIONALE

FIRST DRIVER -- SMALL ISLAND ECONOMY HIGHLY VULNERABLE TO EXTERNAL
SHOCKS

St Vincent's small economic scale and dependence on tourism-
related activities make the sovereign particularly vulnerable to
weather-related shocks -- and natural disasters. Like other
Caribbean nations, St Vincent's economy is not diversified and it
is highly dependent on tourism, which accounts for 23% of GDP, 22%
of total employment, and 48% of export receipts last year.

The country is highly susceptible to climate change and weather-
related shocks. Small island economies such as St Vincent and the
Grenadines are significantly more exposed than other countries
since potential damage and associated costs from these type of
events tends to be elevated in relation to GDP. This vulnerability
explains St Vincent sluggish average GDP growth of just 0.6%
between 2010 and 2017, which incorporates weather-related events
in 2010, 2011 and 2013.

After years of weak economic growth, St Vincent is poised for an
economic recovery. Moody's expects real GDP to grow by more than
2% on average in 2018-19. Growth will benefit from the completion
of the Argyle International Airport, which opened in February
2017, and will improve connectivity to key tourism source
countries such as Canada and the United States. In addition to the
opening of the airport, the development of the Canouan marina, the
construction of a geothermal plant, and the reopening of a luxury
hotel will support construction activities in the next few years
and a pick-up in tourism activity over the medium term, once these
infrastructure projects are completed.

SECOND DRIVER -- HIGH GOVERNMENT DEBT BURDEN

St Vincent's government debt burden is a key rating constraint,
but consistent with B3-rated peers. At 64% of GDP at the end of
2017, government debt is the 16th highest among B-rated
sovereigns, and above the B-rated median of 57% of GDP. Since
2008, government debt has increased by 26 percentage points of
GDP, driven by a combination of disaster-related budgetary
outlays, the construction of the Argyle International Airport, and
low growth.

Moody's expects the fiscal deficit to remain around 1.3% of GDP in
2018 and 2019, while the primary balance will remain in surplus,
averaging 1.4% of GDP. Compared with the government's budget for
2018, Moody's forecasts a smaller fiscal deficit because the
rating agency expects capital expenditures to fall short of
budgeted amounts. Moody's expects the debt burden to remain
broadly stable as real GDP growth accelerates to above 2% per year
and fiscal deficits remain moderate.

The government balance sheet is exposed to contingent liabilities
arising from the debt of state-owned enterprises. Including the
debt of state-owned enterprises increases public sector debt to
more than 80% of GDP.

Risks associated with a high government debt burden are somewhat
offset by a debt profile which benefits from a large share of
concessional debt with multilateral and bilateral creditors
contracted at favorable terms, i.e., low interest rates, and long
maturities. Commercial external debt is relatively small, at 7% of
GDP, and consists of bonds and Treasury bills held by non-
residents. The concessional nature of government debt has kept
interest costs relatively low, with interest payments representing
only 7.8% of government revenues in 2017, below the B-rated median
of 9.2%.

Relatively high debt ratio limits the government's financial
flexibility to respond to adverse shocks, which tend to be
recurrent given St Vincent's high incidence for hurricanes and
tropical storms. To manage this condition, the government has
begun building fiscal buffers with resources earmarked for natural
disasters. The 2017 budget incorporated contributions to a
Contingencies Fund, though the size of the contributions, at 0.5%
of GDP, remain small.

RATIONALE FOR STABLE OUTLOOK

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectations that fiscal
deficits will remain low over the next two years and growth will
accelerates, conditions that will allow government debt ratios to
stabilize.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

There is limited potential for upward rating changes in the near
term. Higher sustained economic growth combined with a faster pace
of fiscal consolidation, would be credit positive and supportive
of a higher rating. A significant improvement in the government's
credit profile associated with a steady reduction in the debt-to-
GDP ratio could place upward pressure on the rating.

A deterioration in the government balance sheet, due to the
materialization of contingent liabilities from state-owned
enterprises, or increased commercial borrowing would be credit
negative. Downward pressure on the rating would emerge if a large
adverse shock, i.e., major hurricane, were to lead to a
substantial deterioration of fiscal and debt metrics or jeopardize
balance of payments sustainability.

GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 11,190 (2016 Actual) (also known
as Per Capita Income)

Real GDP growth (% change): 0.8% (2016 Actual) (also known as GDP
Growth)

Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 1.0% (2016 Actual)

Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: 0.6% (2016 Actual) (also known as
Fiscal Balance)

Current Account Balance/GDP: -15.9% (2016 Actual) (also known as
External Balance)

External debt/GDP: 48.4% (2016 Actual)

Level of economic development: Low level of economic resilience

Default history: No default events (on bonds or loans) have been
recorded since 1983.

On April 26, 2018, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of the Government of St. Vincent and the Grenadines. The
main points raised during the discussion were: The issuer's fiscal
or financial strength, including its debt profile, has increased.
The issuer has become less susceptible to event risks. Other views
raised included: The issuer's economic fundamentals, including its
economic strength, have not materially changed. The issuer's
institutional strength/ framework, have not materially changed.
The issuer's governance and/or management, have not materially
changed.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Sovereign Bond
Ratings published in December 2016.



=================
X X X X X X X X X
=================


LATAM: Scraps $2 Billion Worth of Bond Sales as U.S. Rates Jump
----------------------------------------------------------------
Pablo Rosendo Gonzalez at Bloomberg News reports that the angst
surrounding higher U.S. rates has spread to Latin America's bond
market.

Bloomberg News report that four South American companies postponed
at least $2 billion of planned U.S. dollar bond sales, according
to five people familiar with the situation.  This happened in the
wake of 10-year U.S. Treasury yields climbing above 3 percent for
the first time in four years and the dollar hitting its strongest
level since January, according to Bloomberg News.

Argentina's Petroquimica Comodoro Rivadavia SA and Telecom
Argentina SA, Colombia's Transportadora de Gas Internacional SA
and Paraguay's Banco Regional SAECA, suspended their debt deals
after investors demanded yields about 100 basis points higher than
expected, said the people, who asked not to be named as talks were
private, Bloomberg News relates.  The banks working with the
companies to arrange meetings with investors include Citigroup
Inc., JPMorgan Chase & Co. and HSBC Holdings Plc, Bloomberg News
says.

While PCR, TGI and Banco Regional declined to comment, Telecom,
Argentina's second biggest company, gave a reason for the
postponement: the Federal Reserve, Bloomberg News discloses.

"High volatility conditions in the market generated by the
increase of 10-year T bond had a huge impact in all the emerging
market planned sales, including Argentina," the company said in
email, Bloomberg News notes.  "We will postpone until markets
normalize," they added.

Amid the cancellations, Mexico's state-controlled oil company,
Petroleos Mexicanos, has found an alternative country to sell
bonds: Switzerland, Bloomberg News relays.  Avoiding the U.S.
volatility, it sold 365 million Swiss francs ($366 million) of
bonds due in 2023 at a 1.75 percent yield after having initially
offered 250 million Swiss francs of debt, according to a company
press release, Bloomberg News adds.

The sale was successfully completed "taking advantage of the
window of opportunity presented in the financial market," Pemex
said, Bloomberg News says.


* BOND PRICING: For the Week From May 7 to May 11, 2018
-------------------------------------------------------

Issuer Name               Cpn     Price   Maturity  Country  Curr
-----------               ---     -----   --------  -------   ---

BA-CA Finance Cayman Lt   0.518    62.07               KY    EUR
AES Tiete Energia SA      6.7842   1.109  4/15/2024    BR    BRL
Argentina Bogar Bonds     2       39.36   2/4/2018     AR    ARS
Automotores Gildemeister  8.25    73.25   5/24/2021    CL    USD
Automotores Gildemeister  6.75    67      1/15/2023    CL    USD
Automotores Gildemeister  8.25    73.25   5/24/2021    CL    USD
Automotores Gildemeister  6.75    65.5    1/15/2023    CL    USD
CA La Electricidad        8.5     63.664  4/10/2018    VE    USD
Caixa Geral De Depositos  1.439   63.167               KY    EUR
Caixa Geral De Depositos  1.469                        KY    EUR
CSN Islands XII Corp      7       68                   BR    USD
CSN Islands XII Corp      7       66.266               BR    USD
Decimo Primer Fideicomiso 6       53.225 10/25/2041    PA    USD
Decimo Primer             4.54    43.127 10/25/2041    PA    USD
Dolomite Capital         13.217   73.108 12/20/2019    CN    ZAR
Enel Americas SA          5.75    56.172  6/15/2022    CL    CLP
Gol Linhas Aereas SA     10.75    35.861  2/12/2023    BR    USD
Gol Linhas Aereas SA     10.75    35.601  2/12/2023    BR    USD
Inversora Electrica       6.5     67.625  9/26/2017    AR    USD
Inversora Electrica       6.5     67.625  9/26/2017    AR    USD
MIE Holdings Corp         7.5     64.78   4/25/2019    HK    USD
MIE Holdings Corp         7.5     64.982  4/25/2019    HK    USD
NB Finance Ltd            3.88    61.816  2/7/2035     KY    EUR
Noble Holding             7.7     74.433  4/1/2025     KY    USD
Noble Holding             5.25    56.279  3/15/2042    KY    USD
Noble Holding             8.7     71.881  4/1/2045     KY    USD
Noble Holding             6.2     60.129  8/1/2040     KY    USD
Noble Holding             6.05    58.38   3/1/2041     KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.5     42.5                 KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.125   56.938  6/26/2022    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7       68.053  4/21/2020    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.125   41.366  6/26/2042    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     4.375   40.002  4/25/2025    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.25    39.211  6/27/2029    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     6       44.75   4/5/2023     KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.25    39.018  6/27/2029    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.5     42.95                KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     4.375   40.363  4/25/2025    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.125   41.635  6/26/2042    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     6       52.625  4/5/2023     KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.125   55.873  6/26/2022    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7       67.368  4/21/2020    KY    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    8.5     74.5   10/27/2020    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6       30.458  5/16/2024    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6       30.517 11/15/2026    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    9.75    35.677  5/17/2035    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    9       39.279 11/17/2021    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    5.375   30.267  4/12/2027    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    8.5     72.5   10/27/2020    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela   12.75    45.278  2/17/2022    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6       30.367  5/16/2024    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6       30.387 11/15/2026    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    9       39.316 11/17/2021    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    9.75    35.893  5/17/2035    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6       28.346 10/28/2022    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    5.5     30.123  4/12/2037    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela   12.75    45.23   2/17/2022    VE    USD
Polarcus Ltd              5.6     75      3/30/2022    AE    USD
Provincia del Chubut      4              10/21/2019    AR    USD
Siem Offshore Inc         4.04527 69.5   10/30/2020    NO    NOK
Siem Offshore             3.75176 65.75  12/28/2021    NO    NOK
STB Finance               2.05771 56.243               KY    JPY
Sylph Ltd                 2.367   64.438  9/25/2036    KY    USD
US Capital                1.63611 54.774 12/1/2039     KY    USD
US Capital                1.63611 54.774 12/1/2039     KY    USD
USJ Acucar                9.875   67     11/9/2019     BR    USD
USJ Acucar                9.875   67     11/9/2019     BR    USD
Venezuela                13.625   68.25   8/15/2018    VE    USD
Venezuela                 7.75    44.065 10/13/2019    VE    USD
Venezuela                11.95    40.785  8/5/2031     VE    USD
Venezuela                12.75    45.19   8/23/2022    VE    USD
Venezuela                 9.25    39.645  9/15/2027    VE    USD
Venezuela                11.75    40.005 10/21/2026    VE    USD
Venezuela                 9       36.285  5/7/2023     VE    USD
Venezuela                 9.375   37.69   1/13/2034    VE    USD
Venezuela                13.625   72.25   8/15/2018    VE    USD
Venezuela                 7       34.23   3/31/2038    VE    USD
Venezuela                 7       59.19  12/1/2018     VE    USD




                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2018.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.
.


                   * * * End of Transmission * * *