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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

               Wednesday, June 20, 2018, Vol. 19, No. 121


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

ARGENTINA: Central Bank Takes Steps to Prop Up Currency


B O L I V I A

BOLIVIA: Agrees to Pay ICSID Award


B R A Z I L

BANCO DA AMAZONIA: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' LT IDRs, Outlook Stable
BANCO DO BRASIL: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' LT IDRs, Outlook Stable
BANCO DO NORDESTE: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' LT IDRs, Outlook Stable
BANCO PAN: Fith Affirms 'B+' LT IDRs, Outlook Stable
CAIXA ECONOMICA: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' LT IDRs, Outlook Stable


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

BANCO MULTIPLE: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' LT IDRs, Outlook Stable
BANRESERVAS: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' LT IDRs, Outlook Stable
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Home Builders Scream as Materials Cost Ups


G U A T E M A L A

BANTRAB: Moody's Hikes LT Deposit Ratings to B3, Outlook Pos.
GUATEMALA: Iberdrola Arbitration Claim Gets Under Way


N I C A R A G U A

NICARAGUA: Dialogue Suspended Due to Government Non-Compliance


P U E R T O    R I C O

IGLESIA CASA DE ADORACION: Case Summary & 3 Unsecured Creditors
LRJ GLOBAL: Plan Outline Okayed, Plan Hearing on June 21
TOYS R US: To Discuss Deal with Lenders, Vendors at Hearing


T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O

PETROLEUM CO: Takes Up Slack in Jamaica


                            - - - - -


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A R G E N T I N A
=================


ARGENTINA: Central Bank Takes Steps to Prop Up Currency
-------------------------------------------------------
Argentina's Central Bank took steps aimed at stopping the peso's
slide against the dollar.

The plan includes increasing banks' reserve requirements by five
percentage points with the aim of mopping up some 100 billion
pesos (US$3.56 billion) in liquidity.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America, S&P
Global Ratings, on June 4, 2018, affirmed its 'B+' long-term
sovereign credit ratings on the Republic of Argentina. The outlook
on the long-term ratings remains stable.

On May 8, 2018, Fitch Ratings affirmed Argentina's Long-Term
Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B' and revised
the Outlook to Stable from Positive.

On December 4, 2017, Moody's Investors Service upgraded the
Government of Argentina's local and foreign currency issuer and
senior unsecured ratings to B2 from B3. The senior unsecured
shelves were upgraded to (P)B2 from (P)B3. The outlook on the
ratings is stable.  At the same time, Argentina's short-term
rating was affirmed at Not Prime (NP). The senior unsecured
ratings for unrestructured debt were affirmed at Ca and the
unrestructured senior unsecured shelf affirmed at (P)Ca.

Moody's said the key drivers of the upgrade of the rating to B2
are: (1) a record of macro-economic reforms that are beginning to
address long existing distortions in Argentina's economy; and (2)
the likelihood that reforms will continue and in turn sustain
the recent return to positive economic growth.

The stable outlook on Argentina's B2 ratings balances Argentina's
credit strengths of its large, diverse economy and moderate income
levels against the credit challenges posed by still high fiscal
deficits and a reliance on external financing, which increases its
vulnerability to external event risk, said Moody's.

On Nov. 10, 2017, Fitch Ratings revised Argentina's Outlook to
Positive from Stable and has affirmed its Long Term Foreign-
Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B'.

On Oct. 30, 2017, S&P Global Ratings raised its long-term
sovereign credit ratings on the Republic of Argentina to 'B+' from
'B'. The outlook on the long-term ratings is stable.  S&P also
affirmed its short-term sovereign credit ratings on Argentina at
'B'. At the same time, S&P raised its national scale ratings to
'raAA' from 'raA+'. In addition, S&P raised its transfer and
convertibility assessment to 'BB-' from 'B+', in line with its
assessment of sustained local access to foreign exchange.

As previously reported by the TCR-LA, Argentina defaulted on some
of its debt late July 30, 2014, after expiration of a 30-day grace
period on a US$539 million interest payment.  Earlier that day,
talks with a court-appointed mediator ended without resolving a
standoff between the country and a group of hedge funds seeking
full payment on bonds that the country had defaulted on in 2001.
A U.S. judge had ruled that the interest payment couldn't be made
unless the hedge funds led by Elliott Management Corp., got the
US$1.5 billion they claimed. The country hasn't been able to
access international credit markets since its US$95 billion
default 13 years ago. On March 30, 2016, Argentina's Congress
passed a bill that will allow the government to repay holders of
debt that the South American country defaulted on in 2001,
including a group of litigating hedge funds that won judgments
in a New York court. The bill passed by a vote of 54-16.



=============
B O L I V I A
=============


BOLIVIA: Agrees to Pay ICSID Award
----------------------------------
Tom Jones at Latin Lawyer reports that Bolivia has agreed to pay
US$42.6 million to satisfy an award from the International Centre
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in favor of Chilean
company Quiborax, ending a 12-year dispute over the expropriation
of mining concessions by a previous administration.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on May
28, 2018, S&P Global Ratings lowered its long-term foreign
and local currency sovereign credit ratings on Bolivia to 'BB-'
from 'BB'. At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'B' short-term
foreign and local currency ratings. The outlook on the long-term
ratings is stable.



===========
B R A Z I L
===========


BANCO DA AMAZONIA: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' LT IDRs, Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Long-Term Foreign and Local
Currency Issuer Defaults Ratings (IDRs), Support Ratings (SRs),
Support Rating Floors (SRFs) and National ratings of Banco da
Amazonia S.A. (BdA). Fitch does not assign Viability ratings to
the entity because of its development bank status. The Rating
Outlooks of the Long-Term IDRs and National Rating remain Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS, NATIONAL RATINGS, SUPPORT RATING, SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

BdA's IDRs and SRFs are equalized with and linked to Brazil's
sovereign ratings; thus the bank is rated at its SRF of 'BB-'. The
SRs of '3' reflect Fitch's view that there exists a moderate
probability of support from the federal government, in case of
need. Fitch believes that the Brazilian government would have a
high willingness to support BdA, but its capacity to do so is not
as strong as it was a few years ago, as reflected in Fitch's
successive sovereign rating downgrades in during the past few
years (the most recent in late February 2018). BdA's SRF is
affirmed at 'BB-' and aligned with the sovereign rating.

The ratings also reflect the important and relatively stable
funding source from shareholders and the important role that the
bank plays in the implementation of government development
policies in Brazil's northern region.

The Outlook on BdA's Long-Term IDRs remains Stable, mirroring the
Outlook of the sovereign ratings. Fitch believes that BdA, similar
to other public entities, could be subject to political influence
given its state-owned nature and strong links with the government.

BdA is the sole manager of the Constitutional Fund of the North
(FNO) and receives significant fee income to manage it. The fund's
related fees will remain relevant to BdA's revenue, despite
efforts to increase the bank's commercial orientation.

As a development bank, profitability remains influenced by the
government policies focusing on the development of the region.
BdA's profitability historically is more volatile than the average
for private sector banks, reflecting its intrinsic higher credit
costs and lower margins, stemming partly from its public policy
role. During the first quarter of 2018, the bank posted a net loss
of BRL57 million; this loss was mainly attributed to higher than
expected impairment charges and lower origination due to certain
operational issues.

Fitch expects asset-quality and credit costs to remain under
pressure during 2018 but at a slower pace than the previous years,
as most of BdA's impaired credit exposures were already
provisioned.

BdA's funding structure is less vulnerable to withdrawals since
the bank is considered a safe haven in times of stress. Moreover,
proceeds from FNO remain the largest funding source.

Capitalization has been maintained adequately over the past three
years, but the level of Fitch Core Capital has been on a downward
trend due to weaker internal capital generation. Partially
offsetting this decline was the decrease in risk-weighted assets.
This has enabled BdA's Regulatory Tier I Capital to remain
satisfactory at 13.5%, which is comfortably above the regulatory
minimum and still allows for the expected return to growth during
2018 and beyond. However, the risk of capital pressure could arise
from a potential legal decision requiring BdA to provision the
actuarial deficit of its proprietary pension plan for employees
(CAPAF). If were the case, Fitch believes the bank's parent, the
National Treasury would ensure that BdA would still comply with
the minimum Basel III rules.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRS, NATIONAL RATING, SUPPORT RATING

Any changes in Brazil's sovereign ratings or in Fitch's evaluation
of the government's willingness to provide support to BdA, in case
of need, would directly affect the banks' IDRs, SRs and SRFs, all
of which are driven by expected sovereign support.

NATIONAL RATING

The National ratings of BdA may be affected by a change in Fitch's
perception of the bank's local relativities with respect to other
Brazilian entities.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

Banco da Amazonia

-- Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'BB-', Outlook
    Stable;

-- Short-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'B';

-- Long-term National rating at 'AA(bra)', Outlook Stable;

-- Short-term National rating at 'F1+(bra)';

-- Support Rating at '3';

-- Support Rating Floor at 'BB-'.


BANCO DO BRASIL: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' LT IDRs, Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Long-Term Foreign and Local
Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) of Banco do Brasil S.A.
(BdB) at 'BB-' and its long-term National rating at 'AA(bra)'. The
Rating Outlooks on the Long-Term IDRs and National Rating are
Stable. Fitch has also affirmed BdB's Viability Rating (VR) at
'bb-', Support Rating (SR) at '3' and Support Rating Floor at 'BB-
'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS, NATIONAL RATINGS

The affirmation of BdB's IDRs reflect Fitch's view that the bank
would receive support from the federal government, should the need
arise. BdB's IDRs are driven by sovereign support and are aligned
with Brazil's sovereign ratings. This reflects the majority
federal government ownership, its key policy role particularly in
rural lending and systemic importance.

The Outlook on BdB' Long-Term IDRs and National Rating is Stable,
mirroring the Outlook of the sovereign ratings. Fitch believes
that BdB, similar to other public entities, remain potentially
subject to political influence given its state owned nature,
despite its solid corporate governance structure underpinned by
its listing in the most stringent Novo Mercado segment of the
Brazilian stock exchange B3. Fitch believes that Banco do Brasil's
disclosure remains of high quality.

VIABILITY RATING

The affirmation of BdB's VR reflects the constraints imposed by
the still challenging operating environment, and the bank's
capitalization indicators that are still lower than its large
private sector peers, despite the strengthening since 2016. The VR
also reflects the bank's strong franchise, stable funding,
adequate asset quality and improving profitability.

Since 2016, BdB's focus shifted to profitability and sustainable
internal capital generation, which has led to a substantial
improvement in capitalization and other key credit metrics.
Improvements in BdB's profitability and slower loan growth
resulted in a meaningful increase in BdB's Fitch Core Capital
(FCC) ratio, which increased to 12.7% as of March 2018 (12.3% and
10.2%, in 2017 and 2016, respectively). In March 2018, BdB's
Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1), Tier 1 (T1) and total regulatory
capital ratios stood at 9.8%, 12.8% and 18.4%, respectively
(10.5%, 13.8% and 19.6%, in 2017, respectively). The decline in
the ratios in the first quarter of 2018 was due to the phase-in of
the Basel III deductions. The change in the bank's dividend payout
target from 25% to an interval of 30%-40% in 2018 reflects the
bank's comfort in meeting the fully implemented Basel III
requirements, which also is Fitch's base case scenario.

BdB's asset quality indicators slightly improved in 2017 and
remained stable through March 2018. At March 2018, BdB's NPLs as a
percentage of gross loans stood at 3.7% of gross loans (3.7% in
2017 and 3.3% in 2016). The companies segment continues to have
highest NPL ratio (5.8% at March 2018), while NPLs ratios in the
rural and individual segments remained relatively low (1.9% and
3.5%, respectively), reflecting the exposure to lower risk loans
with solid guarantee structures. Fitch expects BdB's asset quality
to remain broadly stable through 2018, unless there is the
operating environment significantly deteriorates.

BdB attained solid and sustainable progress in its profitability
since 2016, which was also supported by the gradual alleviation of
the severe operating environment pressures. Pressure on earnings
from high credit costs has eased with loan impairment charges
declining to 54% of pre-impairment operating income, as of March
2018 (56% and 65%, in 2017 and 2016, respectively). This led to an
increase in BdB's operating profit/RWA to 2.2% as of March 2018
(2.3% and 1.9%, in 2017 and 2016, respectively).

BdB has leading franchises in multiple business segments,
including lending, insurance, asset management and debit/credit
cards. It is Brazil's largest bank in terms of assets and
deposits. Its funding is diversified and retail-based. Customer
deposits and local financial bills, which are very similar to
deposits, made up 47% of total funding at March 2018. Locally, the
bank is considered as a safe haven during times of crisis. BdB's
liquidity is very comfortable. At March 2018, BdB's liquidity
coverage ratio was 212% (235% and 350%, in 2017 and 2016,
respectively), while the loans to deposits (including deposit-like
products) ratio stood at an adequate 115% unchanged from a year
earlier.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

The affirmation of BdB's SRs at '3' reflects the moderate
probability of sovereign support. Fitch believes that the
Brazilian government would have a high willingness to support BdB
in case of need; however, its capacity to do so has fallen in the
recent past, as reflected in the successive sovereign rating
downgrades. BdB's SRF is affirmed at 'BB-' and aligned with the
sovereign rating.

SENIOR DEBT RATING

The affirmation of BdB's senior debt ratings at 'BB-' reflects the
affirmation of the bank's LT Foreign Currency IDR, which is the
anchor rating for the debt ratings.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRS, SUPPORT RATING, SUPPORT RATING FLOOR, SENIOR DEBT RATINGS

Any changes in Brazil's sovereign ratings or in Fitch's evaluation
of the government's willingness to provide support to BdB, in case
of need, would directly affect the bank's IDRs, SR, SRF and debt
ratings, all of which are driven by expected sovereign support.

NATIONAL RATINGS

The National ratings of BdB may be affected by a change in Fitch's
perception of the bank's local relativities with respect to other
Brazilian entities.

VIABILITY RATING

BdB's VR would be reviewed in the case of a sovereign upgrade or a
downgrade, but currently has a limited upside potential, as it
captures operating environment constraints. BdB's VR would be
negatively affected if its FCC ratio falls below 9% and/or its
regulatory capital ratios to approach the minimum requirements,
due to a combination of asset quality deterioration, weakening of
profitability or higher than expected growth.

Fitch has affirmed BdB's ratings as follows:

  -- Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'BB-', Outlook
     Stable;

  -- Short-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'B';

  -- National long-term rating affirmed at 'AA(bra)'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- National short-term rating at 'F1+(bra)';

  -- Support Rating at '3';

  -- Support Rating Floor at 'BB-';

  -- Senior unsecured notes due 2018, 2019, 2020, 2022, 2023 and
     2025 ratings at 'BB-';

  -- Viability Rating at 'bb-'.


BANCO DO NORDESTE: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' LT IDRs, Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Long-Term Foreign and Local
Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs), Support Rating (SR),
Support Rating Floor (SRF) and National Ratings of Banco do
Nordeste do Brasil SA (BNB). The Rating Outlooks for the Long-Term
IDRs and National Rating remain Stable. Fitch does not assign
Viability Ratings to BNB because it is a development bank.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - IDRS, SUPPORT RATING AND NATIONAL RATINGS

BNB's IDRs and SRFs are equalized to Brazil's sovereign ratings.
In this way, the bank is classified with a 'BB-' SRF. The '3' SR
reflects Fitch's view that the likelihood of federal government
support is high, if necessary. The ratings also reflect the
important and relatively stable source of funding, the
shareholders, and the important role of the bank in the
implementation of policies to promote development in Northeast
Brazil. Fitch believes that BNB, like other public entities, may
be subject to political influence, given its public control and
strong ties with the government.

The Stable Outlook for BNB's Long-term IDRs mirrors the sovereign
rating Outlook.

BNB's strategy is in line with the government's goal of developing
and supporting the Northeast. By law, the bank manages the
Constitutional Financing Fund of the Northeast (FNE), and its
operations are largely guided by its political role. The
institution grants credit to 11 states, which shows its importance
to the government.

Due to its public mission, BNB's asset quality and profitability
ratios are historically lower than those of its private sector
peers, as there are more risks involved in development portfolios,
since they present lower asset quality and higher expected losses.
The dynamics of credit expansion for regional development banks,
such as BNB, tend to be different from those of commercial banks,
given the countercyclical role of their policies. BNB forecast a
year of strong expansion of its operations related with
infrastructure, given the strong position of the bank in the
region, as well as its competitive cost, benefited by subsidized
funding lines. Despite this, Fitch believes credit expansion will
won't be higher than what observed in other development banks. BNB
continues with its strategic alignment, which seeks to maintain
its capital, improve efficiency and reduce delinquency, which will
gradually increase profitability.

Despite the reduction observed in 2017 and early 2018, BNB's
delinquency ratios remained high; impaired loans, or loans
classified between 'D-H' over total loans was at 12.4%, down from
19% over the same period in 2017. The reduction in delinquency (at
BNB and FNE) and consequent decrease of provisioning expenses (45%
lower in 2017) was mainly derived from approval of laws
(especially federal law No. 13.340) that allowed the bank to
renegotiate a relevant part of its problematic portfolio related
with rural clients. As a result, BNB had a profitability ratio
above its historical average, with ROEA approaching 20% in 2017.
The bank believes that the renegotiations will continue to be an
important driver of results and an improvement in asset quality
ratios in 2018. Nonetheless, it also believes that the benefits
that could be obtained this year will be lower than those observed
in 2017 in addition to the changes in the calculation of FNE
administration fees will reduce 2018 results.

BNB has a solid funding base that is less exposed to withdrawals
due to its nature. This assumption is justified by FNE deposits
and, like other public banks, because it is considered a safe
haven in times of crisis. FNE's resources continue to be the
bank's largest source of funding, reaching BRL25 billion (BRL18.5
billion in March 2017), or about 50% of total funding.

The capital base, which had fallen as a result of the rapid
expansion of credit and the high dividends of previous years, has
remained stable but still close to Basel III minimum levels. In
March 2018, BNB's Tier I capital was 10.2%, down from 10.6% in
March 2017 but still higher than the minimum requirement in 2019
of 8.5%. Fitch's base scenario does not consider the need for
capital contributions. However, it underlines the need to maintain
current dividend levels, combined with sustained growth in its
operations, in line with the internal capital generation.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRS, NATIONAL RATINGS, SUPPORT RATING, SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

Changes in control, sovereign ratings, or Fitch's assessment of
the government's propensity to support BNB, if necessary, could
lead to changes in ratings. Changes in BNB control or the
Treasury's propensity to support it may also change the ratings.

The National ratings of BNB may be affected by a change in Fitch's
perception of a change in local relativities to other local
issuers.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

Banco do Nordeste do Brasil:

  -- Long-term IDRs in Foreign and Local Currencies at 'BB-',
     Outlook Stable;

  -- Short-term IDRs in Foreign and Local Currencies at 'B';

  -- National Long-Term Rating at 'AA (bra)', Outlook Stable;

  -- National short-term rating at 'F1+(bra)';

  -- Support Rating at '3';

  -- Support Rating Floor at 'BB-'.


BANCO PAN: Fith Affirms 'B+' LT IDRs, Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings
(IDRs), National Ratings, Viability Rating (VR) and Support Rating
(SR) of Banco Pan SA (Pan).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRs AND NATIONAL RATINGS

Pan's IDRs and National Ratings are driven by the institutional
support from its co-controlling shareholders, Caixa Economica
Federal (Caixa: 'BB-'/Stable) and Banco BTG Pactual S.A. (BTG:
'BB-'/Stable Outlook). Pan's IDRs are one notch lower than Caixa's
and BTG's IDRs, as Fitch considers the bank a strategically
important subsidiary for both, despite the differences in
strategy, policies controls and brand.

Since the beginning of its restructuring in 2011, Pan has been
supported by its co-controlling shareholders: Banco BTG Pactual
S.A. (BTG: 'BB-'/Stable) and, mainly, Caixa. This support takes
place both through liquidity lines at competitive costs and credit
assignment agreements without risk retention. Although the amount
of these contracts has lessened in recent periods, they remain an
important source of revenues for the bank and support the
viability of its franchise. Revenues generated by assignments are
anticipated as Pan's recurring operating results (excluding the
anticipated revenues) remain weak and below market peers. In March
2018, Pan recorded a credit portfolio of BRL19.1 billion (BRL20.1
billion in March 2017), while the balance of the credit portfolio
without risk retention in Caixa's balance sheet totaled BRL15.8
billion on the same date (BRL19.4 billion a year earlier).

Pan has invested in a strategy to build a more independent funding
franchise of its shareholders and to relate more closely to the
market. However, this move will be gradual and will depend greatly
on an improvement in the bank's performance. Fitch believes this
will happen progressively. In addition, once the market offers
better growth opportunities, Pan will face the challenge of
increasing the volume of credits retained on its balance sheet,
increasing profitability and internal capital generation. Its
capital is close to regulatory limits and there is no expectation
of additional capital injections in the short term. However, Fitch
believes that due to Pan's relatively small size compared to its
shareholders that support (from BTG and Caixa), if necessary, can
be easily managed.

Although Pan's IDRs are one notch lower than Caixa's and BTG's,
Fitch believes the banks place the same degree of importance on
supporting Pan should a stress scenario occur. This is despite the
temporary reduction in Caixa's percentage of shares, in which it
did not participate in the last capital injection made by BTG. The
agency considers the probability of Caixa's support high, if
necessary. This support would be, and currently made through,
large credit assignments, (if capital indices decline abruptly)
and increased liquidity lines in cases of market stress that could
reduce Pan's liquidity.

VR

Pan's (VR) 'b' continues to be influenced by its business model,
which is dependent on portfolio sales and liquidity lines carried
out by Caixa. In addition, the discontinuity of certain
products/portfolios, SME and real estate, currently in the process
of runoff, still show the changes in its business model and
strategy.

Profitability, although still below its peers, has been rising in
recent periods. ROEA was close to 6.1% in March 2018, from 6.1% at
the end of 2017 and 0.5% a year earlier. The increase in portfolio
retention, previously sold to Caixa, combined with improvements in
efficiency and reduction in provisioning expenses resulted in
improved profitability. Fitch expects that Pan's profitability
will remain lower than its peers, although better than historical
figures. The agency also recognizes that the results could become
more volatile as a result of the run-off process of its SME
portfolio, which could increase provisions expenses in the future.

Despite its low internal capital generation, the accumulated
losses in recent years and the increase in minimum requirements
due to the introduction of the Basel III structure, Pan's
regulatory capital ratios have increased. This is due to the
capital injection of BRL400 million at the beginning of 2018.

In March 2018, total regulatory and tier 1 ratios stood at 14.2%
and 11.4%, respectively (11.3% and 8.1% in March 2017), sufficient
to meet 2019 regulatory minimum requirements. Despite the fact
that Fitch no longer considers this a short-term need, the agency
believes that, if necessary, shareholders would provide capital
for the bank with ease, given, in particular, the relatively small
size of Pan versus of its controlling shareholders.

On a positive side, Pan's funding and liquidity profile reflects
Caixa's intrinsic support, which basically consists of credit
assignments and interbank deposit agreements. The availability of
resources has been important for Pan to better manage possible
mismatches between assets and liabilities, given the long-term
profile of its payroll and vehicle loan portfolio.

KEY RATING DRIVER - SUPPORT RATING

The affirmation of Pan's Support Rating at '4' reflects the
moderate likelihood of support from Caixa. Although smaller than
the average of its main competitors, Fitch does not consider the
scenario in which Caixa will need new capital injections in order
to adjust to Basel III requirements in 2019 and may even continue
to support Pan. In March 2018, Caixa's proportional capital in Pan
represented less than 2% of its total capital.

Fitch also believes that the cost of not providing support will be
greater than providing it, because of the risk to the reputation
of the federal bank.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRs, NATIONAL RATINGS AND SUPPORT RATING

IDRs, National Ratings and Pan Support Rating may be downgraded if
Fitch believes that there has been a weakening in the willingness
or ability of Caixa and/or BTG to provide Pan with support.
Changes in the funding limits and the assignment of credit
agreement to Caixa, or in Pan's shareholding structure, may also
lead to a negative rating action.

Pan's National ratings may be affected by a change in Fitch's
perception of a change in local relativities to other local
issuers.

VR

Pan's VR would benefit over the medium term from the consolidation
of its company profile and the successful development of its
business model evidenced by a sustained improvement in the bank's
key credit metrics.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

  -- Long-term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'B+'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- Short-term Foreign- and Local-Currency IDRs at 'B';

  -- Viability Rating at 'b';

  -- Long-Term National Rating at 'A bra)'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Short-term National Rating at 'F1 (bra)';

  -- Support Rating at '4';


CAIXA ECONOMICA: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' LT IDRs, Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Long-Term Foreign and Local
Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) of Caixa Economica Federal
(Caixa) at 'BB-' and its long-term National rating at 'AA(bra)'.
The Outlooks of the Long-Term IDRs and National Rating are Stable.
Fitch has also affirmed Caixa's Support Rating (SR) at '3' and
Support Rating Floor (SRF) at 'BB-'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS, NATIONAL RATINGS

The affirmation of Caixa's IDRs reflects Fitch's view that the
bank would receive support from the federal government, should the
need arise. Caixa's IDRs are driven by sovereign support and are
aligned with Brazil's sovereign ratings. This reflects the
majority federal government ownership, its key policy role in the
implementation of government economic policies, and the bank's
systemic importance. Fitch considers Caixa a policy bank and, as
per the Bank Rating Criteria, it does not assign the entity a
Viability Rating. The Outlook on Caixa's Long-Term IDRs and
National Rating is Stable, mirroring the Outlook of the sovereign
ratings.

Fitch believes that Caixa, similar to other public entities,
remain subject to potential political influence given its state
owned nature and strong links with the government.

Caixa has historically played a crucial policy role in
implementing the government's anticyclical measures, with a
particular focus on mortgages and lending to the lower-income
section of the population. Caixa is Brazil's largest mortgage
lender, with a market share of 69%, as of March 2018.

Since 2016, Caixa's strategic objectives shifted from aggressive
growth to the improvement of profitability and internal capital
generation. To that end, the bank has implemented measures to
increase efficiency and policies to grow only in segments with
adequate return on capital, which started bearing fruit in 2017,
given its effective execution. Caixa's loan growth was negative
0.4% in 2017 and dropped further to negative 1% in first-quarter
of 2018 (quarter-on-quarter basis).

Fitch expects Caixa to meet the Basel III capital requirements,
including the conservation and DSIB buffers in 2019 without any
government support and without resorting to any large asset sales,
given the significant improvement in its capital base since 2016.
As of March 2018, the bank's Fitch Core Capital (FCC) ratio
increased to 13.12% (the highest historical level) from 11.90% in
2017 and 9.62% in 2016. The improvement was due to the slowdown of
loan growth, higher earnings and lower dividend payouts. During
the same period, regulatory ratios have also improved despite the
gradual phase-in of the Basel III framework. As of March 2018,
Caixa's Tier 1 and total regulatory capital ratios were 12.00% and
18.30%, respectively.

Pressures on Caixa's asset quality indicators have eased since
2017 leading to a drop in the bank's loan impairment charges. This
improvement has been supported by renegotiations and better
collections over the past few years. As a result, Caixa's NPLs as
a percentage of gross loans have remained broadly stable through
March 2018, when they stood at 2.9% (2.3% in 2017 and 2.9% in
2016). The deterioration was mainly driven by the loans to
companies segment, where the ratio increased to 6.6% from 5.2% at
year-end 2017, in part, due to the contraction in outstanding
loans. In the mortgage portfolio, NPLs increased to 2.0% at March
2018 from 1.4% at year-end 2017. In 2017, there was a high volume
of loan renegotiations in this segment that corresponded to 6% of
total outstanding mortgages (7% in 2016). The bank's impaired
loans (those in the central bank's D-H range) stood at a
relatively high 10.3% and 9.7%, in March 2018 and 2017,
respectively. Fitch expects some continued pressure on Caixa's
company and unsecured individual loans, given the ongoing
uncertainties in the operating environment. Mortgage loans should
continue to perform better than other segments, although
persistently high unemployment for a prolonged period is a
downside risk.

After reaching its lowest level in 2015, Caixa's operating profit
recovered steadily reaching a high 1.5% of RWAs in 2017 and 3.0%
at March 2018. The significant increase was aided by the steady
fall in loan impairment charges, and progress in the reductions of
costs. The former fell to 44% of pre-impairment operating profit
at March 2018, from 66% in 2017 and 86% in 2016. An improvement in
NIM has also been instrumental. Fitch expects the improvement to
be sustainable, although a severe deterioration in the operating
environment could again lead to an increase in credit costs and
affect overall profitability.

Caixa's funding base is highly diversified and supported by the
bank's extensive network. Caixa is predominantly retail funded,
with customer deposits and deposit-like local financial bills
making up 56% of total funding at March 2018.

Caixa funds its mortgages via savings deposits, local financial
bills linked to mortgages and on-lending from FGTS. The share of
mortgages funded by Fundo de Garantia do Tempo de Servico (FGTS)
has increased gradually since first-quarter 2015, when the system-
wide net outflow from savings deposits began. At March 2018, FGTS
funding made up 56% of all mortgages (51% at March 2017 and 46% at
March 2016). Caixa has a structural maturity mismatch between its
mortgage loans and liabilities, except for those funded by FGTS,
which are fully matched. This maturity mismatch risk is mitigated
by the historic stability of Caixa's funding base and comfortable
liquidity.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

The affirmation of Caixa's SRs at '3' reflects the moderate
probability of sovereign support. Fitch believes that the
Brazilian government would have a high willingness to support
Caixa in case of need, but its capacity to do so has fallen in the
recent past, as reflected in the successive sovereign rating
downgrades. Caixa's SRF has been affirmed at 'BB-' and aligned
with the sovereign rating.

SENIOR and SUBORDINATED DEBT RATING

The affirmation of Caixa's senior and subordinate debt ratings at
'BB-' and 'B' reflects the affirmation of the bank's Long-Term
Foreign Currency IDR, which is the anchor rating for both debt
ratings. Caixa's senior unsecured debt rating corresponds to the
bank's Long-Term IDR, while its subordinated debt is rated two
notches below its Long-Term IDR. The notching is driven by the
expected high loss severity of the notes. No notching for non-
performance is applied because coupons are not deferrable and the
write-down trigger is close to the point of non-viability. As a
result, Fitch believes the non-performance risk is not material
from the rating perspective. In addition, since Caixa is a fully
government-owned domestic systemically important bank, it likely
would receive owner (i.e. government) support before the loss-
absorption features of the notes are triggered.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRS, SUPPORT RATING, SUPPORT RATING FLOOR, SENIOR and
SUBORDINATED DEBT RATINGS

Any changes in Brazil's sovereign ratings or in Fitch's evaluation
of the government's willingness to provide support to Caixa, in
case of need, would directly affect the bank's IDRs, SR, SRF and
debt ratings, all of which are driven by expected sovereign
support.

NATIONAL RATINGS

The national ratings of Caixa may be affected by a change in
Fitch's perception of the bank's local relativities with respect
to other Brazilian entities.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

  -- Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'BB-'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- Short-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'B';

  -- National Long-Term Rating at 'AA(bra)'; Outlook Stable;

  -- National Short-Term Rating at 'F1+(bra)';

  -- Support Rating at '3';

  -- Support Rating Floor at 'BB-';

  -- Senior unsecured notes due 2018, 2019 and 2022 at 'BB-';

  -- Subordinated notes due 2024 at 'B'.



===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================


BANCO MULTIPLE: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' LT IDRs, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings for Banco Multiple BHD Leon
S.A. (BHDL) and its related entity, BHD Leon Puesto de Bolsa, S.A.
(BHDLPB).

KEY RATING DRIVERS BHDL

IDRS, VR AND NATIONAL RATINGS

BHDL's Viability Rating (VR), or standalone creditworthiness,
drives its Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) and National
Ratings. The Stable Outlooks on BHDL's Long-term IDRs are in line
with those of the sovereign and reflect the supportive operating
environment that benefits the bank's profile.

The bank's VR is highly influenced by the operating environment
and solid financial performance. Additionally, the bank's VR also
considers the bank's strong market position, its good
capitalization, asset quality within the parameters of the VR,
stable funding base and sound liquidity.

BHDL's 2017 profitability modestly softened for the second
consecutive year but continued to be solid and higher than the
Dominican financial system's average. The bank's operating profit
declined to 3.8% of risk weighted assets, compared with 3.9% in
2016 and 4.4% in 2015. The bank's profitability was supported by
the sound, although declining, net interest margin and continuous
improvements in operating efficiency. These factors offset the
higher loan impairment charges resulting from the significant
expansion in the riskier retail segment.

The bank's asset quality deteriorated in 2017, considering that
the increase of charge-offs was significant. While impaired loans
to gross loans ratio decreased to 1.85% at year-end from 1.99% at
year-end 2016, the charge-offs increased to 1.85% of average gross
loans (1.1% in 2016); these were particularly concentrated in
credit cards and consumer loans. However, Fitch expects loan
quality ratios to stabilize and remain well within the parameters
of its VR.

BHDL's has one of the highest levels of capitalization among its
closest peers. Bolstered by moderate growth, sustainable
profitability, low market risk, and sound earnings retention,
BHDL's Fitch core capital to risk weighted assets ratio improved
to 16.4% at year-end 2017 from 15.4% at year-end 2016. Tangible
equity to tangible assets ratio stood at 11.1% at year-end 2017.
Continued moderate asset growth in 2018 should provide yet another
year of good levels of capital at BHDL.

BHDL ranks third in customer deposits with a market share in the
Dominican market of 17% at YE17. The bank has a recognized
franchise and reputation as a longstanding conservative
institution that supports a well-diversified and stable funding
base. Customer deposits have covered about 90% of BHDL's funding
needs over the past four years. The bank's loans-to-deposits ratio
slightly stabilized at 71% at YE17.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

Despite having the third largest deposit market share, BHDL's
Support Rating (SR) of '5' and Support Rating Floor (SRF) of 'NF',
indicate that Fitch believes that sovereign external support
cannot be relied upon due to Dominican Republic's speculative-
grade IDR.

SUBORDINATED DEBT

BHDL's outstanding subordinated debt includes a domestic issuance
of up to DOP10 billion. The bank's subordinated debt rating is one
notch below its National Long-Term rating ((AA+(dom)), reflecting
one notch for loss severity, but no notches for incremental non-
performance risk relative to the bank's IDR, since the notes don't
incorporate any going-concern lost absorption characteristic.

KEY RATING DRIVERS BHDLPB

NATIONAL RATINGS

BHDLPB's ratings reflect the operational and financial support
provided by BHDL and its sole shareholder Centro Financiero BHD
Leon (CFBHDL). In Fitch's view, BHDLPB is a key and integral part
of CFBHDL's business as it provides some financial products to
core clients. Furthermore, a clear commercial identification among
this entity with BHDL and CFBHDL, and the reputational risk at
which they would be exposed in the case of eventual troubles at
BHDLPB results in a high probability of direct or indirect support
by BHDL and CFBHDL, should it be required.

RATING SENSITIVITIES BHDL

IDRS, VR AND NATIONAL RATINGS

Given BHDL's current ratings and the Stable Outlook on the
sovereign's Long-Term IDRs, there is limited upside potential. A
deterioration in asset quality or profitability that causes the
bank's Fitch core capital to risk-weighted assets ratio to fall
below 10%, could pressure creditworthiness.

SUPPORT RATINGS
The Dominican government's propensity or ability to provide timely
support to BHDL is not likely to change given the sovereign's low
speculative-grade IDR. As such, the Support Rating and Support
Rating Floor have no upgrade potential.

SUBORDINATED DEBT

BHDL's subordinated debt rating is broadly sensitive to any change
in the Bank's National Long-Term rating.


RATING SENSITIVITIES BHDLPB

NATIONAL RATINGS

There is limited upside potential for BHDLPB's national ratings. A
negative change in the capacity or propensity of CFBHDL to provide
support could pressure creditworthiness.

Fitch has taken the following rating actions:

Banco Multiple BHD Leon S.A.:

  -- Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs affirmed at 'BB-';
     Outlook Stable;

  -- Short-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs affirmed at 'B';

  -- Viability Rating affirmed at 'bb-';

  -- Support Rating affirmed at '5';

  -- Support Rating Floor affirmed at 'NF';

  -- Long-Term National Rating affirmed at 'AA+(dom)'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- Short-Term National Rating affirmed at 'F1+(dom)'.

  -- National subordinated debt rating assigned 'AA(dom)'.

BHD Leon Puesto de Bolsa, S.A.:

  -- Long-Term National Rating affirmed at 'AA+(dom)'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- Short-Term National Rating affirmed at 'F1+(dom).


BANRESERVAS: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' LT IDRs, Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Banco de Reservas de la Republica
Dominicana, Banco de Servicios Multiples' (Banreservas) long-term,
foreign- and local-currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB-'
and its standalone Viability Rating at 'b+'. The rating Outlook is
Stable. Fitch has also affirmed the national ratings of a related
entity, Inversiones y Reservas, S.A. (IRSA).

KEY RATING DRIVERS -- BANRESERVAS

IDRS AND NATIONAL RATINGS

The bank's IDRs, National and senior debt ratings reflect Fitch's
expectations of support from the bank's sole shareholder, the
government of the Dominican Republic (BB-/Stable), should it be
needed.

The Stable Outlook on Banreservas' IDRs are in line with those of
the sovereign.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

The SR and SRF are potentially sensitive to any change in
assumptions as to the propensity or ability of the Dominican
government to provide timely support to the bank. This could arise
in the event of a sovereign rating action. Currently, the Outlook
on the Dominican Republic's long-term, local- and foreign-currency
IDRs is Stable.

VR

The bank's VR reflects the bank's leading franchise. Banreservas
is the largest financial institution in the Dominican Republic
with a market share by assets of 30.7% at March 2018. It is the
market leader in commercial loans, predominantly to the public
sector and ranked second in consumer loans and mortgages at March
2018. It has the largest branch network in the country, being the
only financial institution with a presence in all provinces.
The VR also considers the bank's tight capitalization relative to
its rating category, particularly when considering its high asset
concentrations. Though on an improving trend, Banreservas's
tangible common equity ratio was 7.5% on an unconsolidated basis
at March 2018 compared with a system average of 11.4%. In 2017,
dividend payments plus amortization of obligations to the
Dominican government from the capital account represented
approximately 60% of 2016 net income, in accordance with its
bylaws. Even at current low levels of asset growth, Fitch does not
expect Banreservas's tangible common equity ratio to converge with
the system average over the medium term without additional paid-in
capital.

The bank is strategically reducing its sovereign-backed, public
sector loan portfolio and increasing its proportion of private
sector lending. Fitch views favorably the trend in lower asset
concentration. Including holdings of government securities and
public sector loans, exposure to the speculative-grade sovereign
represented approximately 4.5x capital at YE17. However,
Banreservas's private sector loans have a poorer record of
performance relative to peers, suggesting a higher risk appetite
that could continue to pressure loan quality.

Banreservas's loan impairment ratio of 1.9% at March 2018 remains
in line with the banking system average. However, loan impairment
increase is driven by the private sector loan portfolio, which had
an impairment ratio of approximately 2.4%, higher than the system
average of 1.9%. Positively, loan concentration is declining but
remains elevated. At March 2018, the top-20 borrowers represented
2.4x equity (2.6x at March 2017).

The bank's earnings profile is comparable with the banking system,
reflecting a moderate improvement in margins and healthy income
diversification. Operating ROAA stood at 1.37% on an
unconsolidated basis as of March 2018. The bank reports adequate
income diversification, with a stable contribution from non-
interest income ranging between 29%-31% of gross revenues (less
fee and income expense) over the last five years, driven by fee
income, insurance premiums and securities gains. The bank projects
a 13% reduction in funding costs in 2018, further supporting the
bank's financial performance.

The bank relies on a stable, but relatively costly, deposit base.
Demand deposits represented one fourth of total deposits at March
2018. The bank plans to continue improving its mix of deposits
with the aim or reducing its funding costs. Deposit concentration
remains elevated given a material concentration of public funds.
The largest 20 depositors represented 1.8x capital at March 2018.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

The bank's Support Rating of '3' and its Support Rating Floor of
'BB-' reflect the bank's systemic importance, its role collecting
funds for the government's single treasury account to pay debt
obligations, its role as a provider of public sector loans and its
100% government ownership. The Support Rating of '3' also reflects
some uncertainty over the Dominican Republic's capacity to provide
support, should it be needed.

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

Banreservas' outstanding subordinated debt includes an
international issuance of USD300 million due 2023 and a domestic
issuance of DOP10 billion due 2024. The bank's subordinated note
ratings are one notch below its supported IDR and National long-
term rating, reflecting one notch for loss severity, but no
notches for incremental non-performance risk relative to the
bank's IDR. In Fitch's view, the anchor rating for the
subordinated issues is the bank's IDR, given the bank's government
ownership and policy role. According to Fitch's methodology, the
subordinated notes do not receive equity credit.

KEY RATING DRIVERS -- IRSA

IDR, NATIONAL RATINGS

IRSA's ratings are in line with those of Banreservas, its sole
shareholder, reflecting the operational and financial support
provided by the bank. In Fitch's view, IRSA is a key and integral
part of Banreservas's business as it provides investment services
to its core clients. Furthermore, a clear commercial
identification among this entity with Banreservas, and the
reputational risk to which it would be exposed in the event of an
IRSA default results in a high probability of shareholder support,
should it be required.

RATING SENSITIVITIES -- BANRESERVAS

IDRS AND NATIONAL RATINGS SENIOR DEBT

The bank's IDRs, National ratings and senior debt ratings are
sensitive to a change in Fitch's assumptions as to support.
Changes in the IDRs are also contingent on sovereign rating
actions.

VR

An unexpected deterioration in asset quality or profitability, or
sustained high disbursements of income to the government that
pressure Banreservas's tangible equity-to-tangible assets ratio
below 5.5%, could trigger a downgrade of the bank's VR.
Conversely, a sustained reduction in asset concentrations and a
stronger capital base could lead to an upgrade of the bank's VR.

SUBORDINATED DEBT

Banreservas's subordinated debt ratings are broadly sensitive to
the same considerations that might affect the Bank's IDR and
National long-term rating.

RATING SENSITIVITIES -- IRSA

IRSA's ratings are sensitive to a change in Banreservas's ratings
or a change in the capacity or propensity of Banreservas to
provide support.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

Banreservas

Long-term, foreign- and local-currency IDRs affirmed at 'BB?';
Outlook Stable;

Short-term, foreign and local-currency IDR affirmed at 'B';

Viability Rating affirmed at 'b+';

Support Rating affirmed at '3';

Support Rating Floor affirmed at 'BB-';

Long-term subordinated notes affirmed at 'B+';

National long-term rating affirmed at 'AA+(dom)';

National short-term rating affirmed at 'F1+(dom);

National subordinated debt rating affirmed at 'AA(dom)'.

IRSA

National long-term rating affirmed at 'AA+(dom)';

National short-term rating affirmed at 'F1+(dom);


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Home Builders Scream as Materials Cost Ups
--------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that Cibao Home Builders and Promoters
Association (Aprovici) president Nicolas Polanco demanded that
President Danilo Medina intervene to stop the continuous rising
prices of construction materials.

He said if the increases in prices continue, the housing
developers couldn?t withstand them, according to Dominican Today.
"The increases authorized by the National Wages Committee for the
construction workers and increases in materials, could
considerably reduce the rate of housing construction throughout
the Dominican Republic," the report notes.

"We urge President Danilo Medina to stop these increases, as they
become unsustainable for our sector," he said, quoted by
diariolibre.com.do.

As an example Polanco sad a bag of cement previously cost 425
pesos and now costs 455, or 30 more, the report relays.

He added that the bundle of rebar was increased to 45,500 pesos,
or RD$7,000 more, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
April 23, 2018, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB-/B' long- and
short-term sovereign credit ratings on the Dominican Republic.
The outlook remains stable.



=================
G U A T E M A L A
=================


BANTRAB: Moody's Hikes LT Deposit Ratings to B3, Outlook Pos.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the long-term deposit
ratings of Guatemala's Banco de los Trabajadores (Bantrab) to B3
from Caa1. The rating agency also upgraded the backed foreign
currency senior unsecured debt rating of Bantrab Senior Trust
(BST), a Cayman-Island based trust guaranteed by Bantrab, to Caa1
from Caa2. The outlook on both Bantrab and BST's ratings remains
positive.

At the same time, Moody's upgraded the bank's standalone baseline
credit assessment (BCA) and adjusted BCA to caa1 from caa2, and
its long-term counterparty risk assessment to B2(cr) from B3(cr).

Bantrab's short-term deposit ratings of Not Prime, as well as the
bank's short-term counterparty risk assessment of Not Prime(cr)
were affirmed.

The following ratings and assessments were upgraded:

Issuer: Banco de los Trabajadores:

Baseline credit assessment, to caa1 from caa2

Adjusted baseline credit assessment, to caa1 from caa2

Long-term local and foreign currency deposit ratings, to B3 from
Caa1, outlook positive

Long-term counterparty risk assessment, to B2(cr) from B3(cr)

Issuer: Bantrab Senior Trust:

Backed long-term foreign currency senior unsecured debt rating,
to Caa1 from Caa2, outlook positive

The following ratings and assessments were affirmed

Issuer: Banco de los Trabajadores:

Short-term local and foreign currency deposit ratings of Not
Prime

Short-term counterparty risk assessment of Not Prime(cr)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades reflect the reduction in the bank's international
payment risks as its payment mechanisms are repeatedly tested and
proven following the loss of the bank's previous correspondent
banking relationships. These mechanisms, which have now been
successfully used to make four consecutive coupon payments,
include an international correspondent banking relationship (CBR)
with a foreign bank, coupled with a local brokerage house. The
bank depends upon these mechanisms to transfer funds for the BST's
coupon payments to the bond trustee. The upgrades also reflect a
steady improvement in Bantrab's capital, that more than offsets a
recent decline in the bank's profitability and a gradual
deterioration in its asset quality. The positive outlook
incorporates Moody's view that international payment risks are
likely to continue to decline in line with an initiative launched
last year to strengthen the bank's corporate governance and
improve risk management and control practices.

The bank lost the last of its prior CBRs in 2016 as international
banks became increasingly risk averse in part in response to
governance shortcomings at Bantrab. The bank has since replaced
most of its senior management and will have a new board of
directors starting in August. Notwithstanding the success of the
bank's existing payment mechanisms, management reports that it
continues to actively seek additional CBRs with US and Europe-
based banks, which if obtained, will further diversify Bantrab's
payment channels and reduce its exposure to the loss of any one of
them. Unless and until these redundant CBRs are put in place and
the new arrangement with the brokerage house is more fully tested,
however, external payment risks will remain elevated.
Consequently, Bantrab's BCA and BST's bond rating remain limited
at the caa1/Caa1 level notwithstanding the bank's good financial
fundamentals.

Despite the significant headline risk and damage to its reputation
that the bank faced in 2016 and 2017, the bank's deposit base has
continued to grow. Nevertheless, the bank's deposit ratings
continue to reflect the risk of contagion to Bantrab's other
funding if there is a failure to make a coupon payment on BST's
bond on schedule. At the same time, Bantrab has managed to support
its capital buffer, with the bank's tangible common equity ratio
increasing to about 10% as of March 2018, from 6.6% by year-end
2016.

Further, despite a gradual increase in non-performing loans to
3.1% of gross loans as of March 2018, a result of rapid credit
expansion amid decelerating economic growth, Bantrab's asset
quality remains sound thank to its preferential creditor status.
Notwithstanding a sharp decline in the first quarter of 2018 due
to an accounting change related to the timing of recognition of
loan fees, profitability remains solid as well and is likely to
gradually recover over the next few years. During the first three
months of 2018 net income stood at 1.4% of tangible banking
assets, down from the 2.4% average posted during the entire 2016
and 2017.

The probability that Bantrab will receive public support to avoid
a default on its global bond remains low given the absence of
indications of public support for the bank following the loss of
its previous CBRs in 2016. Still, Moody's believes that the
Superintendency of Banks and the central bank remain more willing
to support Bantrab's domestic deposits should that prove
necessary, and the rating agency continues to assess a moderate
probability of public support for these.

This assessment considers the fact that Bantrab was established by
the Guatemalan State and is largely owned by Guatemalan workers,
as well as its significant overall deposit market share of about
8% as of April 2018. Consequently, Bantrab's B3 deposit ratings
are a notch above the Caa1 rating on BST's bond and the bank's
caa1 BCA.

WHAT COULD CAUSE THE RATINGS TO MOVE UP OR DOWN

In line with the positive outlook, the ratings could eventually be
upgraded again if the bank is able to obtain additional CBRs or
otherwise demonstrate that its international payments risks
continue to decline, while further strengthening its risk
management controls to avoid a recurrence of its recent corporate
governance shortcomings. If these measures are not successful,
however, the outlook could be stabilized.

If the bank were to lose either its sole remaining CBR and/or its
arrangement with the local brokerage house, thereby increasing the
risk that it may not be able to make any payment related to BST's
global bond or other obligations in a timely manner, its ratings
could be lowered again. Ratings could also be lowered in the case
of further disclosures of corporate governance flaws.

The last rating action on Bantrab and on Bantrab Senior Trust was
on November 27, 2017.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in June 2018.


GUATEMALA: Iberdrola Arbitration Claim Gets Under Way
-----------------------------------------------------
After failing to reverse a loss against Guatemala at the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)
over electricity tariffs, Spanish company Iberdrola has brought a
new treaty claim against the Central American state before the
Permanent Court of Arbitration, it has emerged.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
June 13, 2018, Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the
Government of Guatemala's Ba1 issuer and Ba1 senior unsecured bond
ratings. The outlook remains stable.



=================
N I C A R A G U A
=================


NICARAGUA: Dialogue Suspended Due to Government Non-Compliance
--------------------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that the Episcopal Conference of Nicaragua, the
mediator and witness for the national dialogue, decided to suspend
the three dialogue forums created to try and overcome the
country's current crisis because the Daniel Ortega administration
did not provide copies of the invitation letter to visit the
country to international entities.

"The three National Dialogue forums are suspended due to non-
compliance of the government of Nicaragua, which did not present
the invitation letters to the international entities (@IACHR, @UN
and @UNIONEUROPEA) to visit the country, as had been agreed at the
plenary dialogue session," Bishop Silvio Baez said on Twitter,
according to EFE News.

The report notes that the government had agreed to "immediately"
invite the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the UN
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the European
Union and the General Secretariat of the Organization of American
States to visit Nicaragua.

The parties to the dialogue also agreed "to urge the presence of
the IACHR and urge it to announce to the members of the
international investigatory group for Nicaragua that they will
have to work 'in situ' to contribute to the investigation of all
the deaths and acts of violence and the identification of those
responsible" since April 18, the report relays.

The dialogue between the government and the opposition would have
resumed, after two working groups were formed to discuss legal and
electoral reforms proposed by the bishops to resolve the crisis,
measures that imply moving the national elections up to March
2019, the report discloses.

The report says that the dialogue groups are comprised of three
government representatives and three from the Alliance for Justice
and Democracy, which encompasses university students, businessmen,
members of civil society and the peasantry.

Nicaragua is mired in a socio-political crisis that has resulted
in between 178-200 deaths since mid-April, according to
humanitarian organizations, making it the country's bloodiest
crisis since the 1980s, when Ortega was also president, the report
adds.

As reported Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on June 15,
2018, Moody's Investors Service has changed Nicaragua's rating
outlook to stable from positive and affirmed its B2 long-term
issuer ratings.



======================
P U E R T O    R I C O
======================


IGLESIA CASA DE ADORACION: Case Summary & 3 Unsecured Creditors
----------------------------------------------------------------
Debtor: Iglesia, Casa De Adoracion Jabes International, Inc.
        aka Iglesia Centro Cristiano De Adoracion Familiar De
        Bayamon, Inc.
        PMB 518
        PO Box 607071
        Bayamon, PR 00960-7071

Business Description: Iglesia, Casa De Adoracion Jabes
                      International, Inc. is a religious
                      organization based in Bayamon, Puerto
                      Rico.

Chapter 11 Petition Date: June 15, 2018

Case No.: 18-03374

Court: United States Bankruptcy Court
       District of Puerto Rico (Old San Juan)

Judge: Hon. Mildred Caban Flores

Debtor's Counsel: Nilda M. Gonzalez Cordero, Esq.
                  NILDA GONZALEZ CORDERO
                  PO Box 3389
                  Guynabo, PR 00970
                  Tel: 787-721-3437
                  Email: ngonzalezc@ngclawpr.com

Estimated Assets: $1 million to $10 million

Estimated Liabilities: $1 million to $10 million

The petition was signed by Nixon Cruz Rivera, president.

A full-text copy of the petition containing, among other items, a
list of the Debtor's three unsecured creditors is available for
free at: http://bankrupt.com/misc/prb18-03374.pdf


LRJ GLOBAL: Plan Outline Okayed, Plan Hearing on June 21
--------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico will
consider approval of the Chapter 11 plan of reorganization for LRJ
Global Quality Concrete Inc. at a hearing on June 21.

The court will also consider at the hearing final approval of
LRJ's disclosure statement, which it conditionally approved on May
17.

Voting creditors are required to submit ballots of acceptance or
rejection of the plan on or before 14 days prior to the June 21
hearing.  Objections to the plan and disclosure statement must be
filed on or before 14 days prior to the hearing.

The Debtor's amended disclosure statement disclose that it has
appraised its property at $430,000, and the Debtor will pay Banco
de Desarrollo Economico Para PR the full amount of the loan in 20
years with an interest of 3.5% with a monthly payment of
$2,493.83.

The total interest to be paid will be $168,518.43 plus principal
of $430,000.00. The remainder amount of $33,051.08 claim will
participate in the pro-rata unsecured class.

A full-text copy of the Amended Disclosure Statement is available
at http://bankrupt.com/misc/prb17-04359-56.pdf

                 About LRJ Global Quality Concrete

Based in Yauco, Puerto Rico, LRJ Global Quality Concrete filed a
voluntary petition for reorganization pursuant to Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 17-04359) on June 19,
2017.  The Debtors' assets and liabilities are both below $1
million.

Judge Edward A. Godoy presides over the case.  The Debtor is
represented by Nydia Gonzalez Ortiz, Esq., of Santiago & Gonzalez.


TOYS R US: To Discuss Deal with Lenders, Vendors at Hearing
-----------------------------------------------------------
Toys "R" Us, Inc., Toys "R" Us - Delaware, Inc., Wayne Real Estate
Parent Company, LLC, Geoffrey Holdings, LLC, Geoffrey, LLC,
Geoffrey International, LLC, an ad hoc group of B-4 lenders, the
Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, and an ad hoc group of
postpetition vendor administrative claimants have entered into the
settlement term sheet.

The settlement is subject to the completion of definitive
documentation and Court approval.  The Debtors intend to address
the timing for submission of the documentation and the Court
approval process for the proposed settlement, including the
confirmation timeline for the chapter 11 plan contemplated in the
Term Sheet, at the omnibus hearing scheduled on June 25, 2018.

The deal provides that the Term DIP lenders to Toys Delaware and
the B-4, B-3 and B-2 lenders to Toys Delaware -- on account of
their funded debt claims and adequate protection claims -- will
receive all remaining value in the estate of Toys "R" Us Delaware,
Inc., other than as expressly set forth in this Term Sheet. The
allocation of value among the B-4, B-3 and B-2 lenders shall be
governed by existing documentation and is not altered by the Term
Sheet.

After the repayment of the ABL/FILO DIP Facility, funds will be
included in the Term Loan Wind-Down Carve Out and made available
only to (i) all merchandise vendors who have unpaid administrative
claims arising under sections 503(b)(1) and 503(b)(9) of the
Bankruptcy Code and for agreed to, but unpaid, critical vendor
payments, in all such cases arising out of ordinary course sales
of goods or provision of services to Toys-Delaware for the value
of such goods and services, and (ii) certain holders of other
unpaid administrative claims (including merchandise vendors) not
otherwise accounted for in the wind-down budget (excluding, for
the avoidance of doubt, professional fee claims and adequate
protection claims) -- Administrative Claims Distribution Pool --
free and clear of liens, claims, and encumbrances, except as
provided.

     (A) Fixed Amounts

         A fixed amount equal to $160 million, which will include
         amounts required to be funded into the Merchandise
         Reserve pursuant to the DIP Amendment Order.  This
         amount will be funded in August 2018 consistent with the
         DIP Amendment Order.

         Following repayment in full of the Term DIP Facility,
         the first $20 million in recovery from Toys Delaware
         will also be distributed to the Administrative Claims
         Distribution Pool.

         The fixed amounts will not be subject to any increases,
         offsets, discounts, or reductions.

     (B) Once the aggregate post-petition recovery of all B-4
         lenders from Toys Delaware and Wayne Real Estate Parent
         Company, LLC -- inclusive of monthly adequate protection
         payments made under paragraph 18(d) of the final DIP
         financing order -- but not of any fees or expenses paid
         to any advisors under the final DIP financing order or
         otherwise -- and exclusive of any recoveries from
         Geoffrey, LLC or sources besides Toys Delaware and Wayne
         Real Estate Parent Company, LLC -- reaches 50% of the
         face amount of their B-4 claims as of the petition
         date:

        (1) the Prepetition Secured Lenders will receive 50% of
            any further recoveries from Toys Delaware and the
            remaining 50% will be distributed to the
            Administrative Claims Distribution Pool; and

        (2) the B-4 lenders will receive 50% of any further
            recoveries from Wayne Real Estate Parent Company, LLC
            and the remaining 50% will be distributed to the
            Administrative Claims Distribution Pool. (For the
            avoidance of doubt, lender recoveries on account of
            equity interests held by Toys Delaware or Wayne Real
            Estate Parent Company, LLC will be included as assets
            of such entities for purposes of calculating
            contingent sharing amounts set forth, but no
            recoveries from any of the Geoffrey Debtors will be
            shared under this provision.)

The proposal assumes that the administrative claims eligible to
participate in the Administrative Claims Distribution Pool are
approximately $800 million.

The aggregate face amount of the B-4 claims as of the petition
date included approximately $998 million in outstanding principal
and $5 million in accrued and unpaid interest.

Following payment in full of the Prepetition Secured Lenders of
Toys Delaware -- including all principal amounts outstanding as of
the petition date, plus all allowed claims for post-petition
interest and any other contractually owed amounts -- all other
proceeds of the liquidation will be distributed to holders of
administrative expense claims until such claims are paid in full.

Consideration allocated to the Administrative Claims Distribution
Pool shall be placed in a segregated account and treated in the
same manner as the funds in the Merchandise Reserve on the terms
set forth in the DIP Amendment Order.

The Debtors, the Creditors' Committee, and the Ad Hoc Group of
B-4 Lenders will agree to support the pro rata distribution of the
funds in the Administrative Claims Distribution Pool. The Parties
will seek a finding from the Court in the proposed order approving
this settlement that no party shall have liability, including to
any vendor that supplied merchandise after March 5, 2018, as a
result of the pro rata distribution of the Administrative Claims
Distribution Pool to all administrative creditors.

The parties also agree that the most recently updated winddown
budget for the Delaware debtors will be further updated to reflect
at least $10 million in expense savings, which budget will be
filed by the Debtors as soon as reasonably practicable.

The Debtors and the Creditors' Committee will support entry of an
order approving the section 363 bidding procedures motion filed on
June 11 for consideration at the June 25, 2018 hearing.

The Prepetition Secured Lenders shall have the right to credit bid
for equity and assets and the Creditors' Committee will not object
to or seek to impede such credit bid; provided, however, that the
Prepetition Secured Lenders will consult with the Debtors and the
Creditors Committee about the terms of any such credit bid. The
Debtors and the Creditors' Committee will continue to support (and
the Debtors will act to implement) the ongoing sale process for
the equity and any other assets of Geoffrey Holdings, LLC,
Geoffrey, LLC and Geoffrey International, LLC (the "Geoffrey
Debtors"), whether through a chapter 11 plan or a section 363
sale. The Ad Hoc Group of B-4 Lenders, the Debtors and the
Creditors' Committee will consult on whether to consummate the
sale through a chapter 11 plan or a section 363 sale. In either
case the asset sale will be completed by August 31, 2018.

For the avoidance of doubt, assets of Geoffrey Holdings, LLC,
Geoffrey, LLC and Geoffrey International, LLC including causes of
action, will not be available for distribution to the
Administrative Claims Distribution Pool. No claims or causes of
actions of the Geoffrey Debtors will be released or otherwise
impaired pursuant to this settlement.  Notwithstanding, the
Geoffrey Debtors will limit their recoveries against (and
ultimately release, as applicable) the individual officers,
directors, and managers of the Debtors, to the same extent that
Toys Delaware is limiting recoveries against such officers,
directors and managers. The Geoffrey Debtors shall release any
claims against the Sponsors (other than Sponsor-appointed
directors, officers, and managers). To the extent any claims or
causes of action of the Geoffrey Debtors are not otherwise
resolved in connection with any chapter 11 plan or sale of the
assets of TRU Taj, LLC, the settlement agreement or any other
definitive documentation will include terms providing for
coordination between the Geoffrey Debtors and the Non-Released
Claims Trust in pursuing claims against and sharing and/or
allocating any proceeds of insurance to the extent any judgments
or settlements exceed the policy.

             Vendor Professionals' Fees and Expenses

The Debtors (or the Ad Hoc Vendor Group and the vendor Committee
members with the support of the Debtors and the Creditors'
Committee) will seek approval of a substantial contribution claim
under section 503(b) of the Bankruptcy Code in the amount of $2
million (which may be included as part of an order approving this
Term Sheet), which amount will be satisfied solely from the Fixed
Amount distributed to the Administrative Claims Distribution Pool
and will be used to pay the professional fees and expenses of the
members of the Ad Hoc Vendor Group and the vendor Committee
members in connection with the negotiation of the Wind-Down Order,
the DIP Amendment Order and this Term Sheet. The Ad Hoc Vendor
Group and the vendor Committee members' professionals will agree
among themselves as to an allocation of these funds. The
Committee, the Ad Hoc Vendor Group, and any other party receiving
a distribution from the Administrative Claim Distribution Pool
agree not to seek substantial contribution claims from the
Debtors' estates for any other fees and expenses incurred.

Prior to June 29, 2018, to the extent the Creditors' Committee
becomes aware of facts and/or circumstances relating to the
releases contemplated herein (other than releases pertaining to
claims subject to the Committee's challenge period set forth in
the
Final DIP Order) that cause the Committee to conclude that
proceeding with the transactions  contemplated by this Term
Sheet would be inconsistent with the continued exercise of
fiduciary duties, the Committee may determine to terminate its
obligations under this Term Sheet, in which case all obligations
would be terminated. All Parties will exercise reasonable best
efforts to submit the settlement agreement for Court approval by
June 29, 2018 and in any event by no later than July 6, 2018.

The Debtors and the Ad Hoc Group of B-4 Lenders will reasonably
cooperate upon request in facilitating an initial distribution
from the Administrative Claims Distribution Pool by the earlier of
the Effective Date of a chapter 11 plan of liquidation or
September 30, 2018.

The Debtors, the Creditors' Committee, the Ad Hoc Group of B-4
Lenders, and merchandise vendors that participate in the
Administrative Claims Distribution Pool will not (i) file any
motion to convert or dismiss the chapter 11 cases of Toys Delaware
or its debtor subsidiaries or (ii) file any motion to appoint an
examiner in the chapter 11 cases of Toys Delaware or its debtor
subsidiaries, so long as the parties act in compliance with the
terms hereof. The Debtors, the Creditors' Committee and the Ad Hoc
Group of B-4 Lenders will oppose any such motions filed by any
other party-in-interest.

All Parties to this Term Sheet agree to take all reasonable
actions to support the Debtors' motion to extend the exclusive
periods to January 15, 2019 which will be heard at the July
Omnibus Hearing.

The Ad Hoc Vendor Group consists of merchandise vendors
represented by Foley & Lardner LLP, Fox Rothschild LLP; Schiff
Hardin LLP; Saul Ewing Arnstein & Lehr LLP; Morris, Nichols, Arsht
& Tunnell; and Wasserman, Jurista & Stolz, P.C.

The B-4 lenders in the Ad Hoc Group of B-4 Lenders consist of
funds and accounts managed or advised by Angelo, Gordon & Co.,
L.P.; Franklin Mutual Advisors, LLC; Highland Capital Management,
LP; Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.; and Solus Alternative Asset
Management LP.

The Ad Hoc Vendor Group consists of merchandise vendors
represented by Foley & Lardner LLP, Fox Rothschild LLP; Schiff
Hardin LLP; Saul Ewing Arnstein & Lehr LLP; Morris, Nichols, Arsht
& Tunnell; and Wasserman, Jurista & Stolz, P.C.

                       About Toys R Us, Inc.

Toys "R" Us, Inc., was an American toy and juvenile-products
retailer founded in 1948 and headquartered in Wayne, New Jersey,
in the New York City metropolitan area.  Merchandise was sold in
880 Toys "R" Us and Babies "R" Us stores in the United States,
Puerto Rico and Guam, and in more than 780 international stores
and more than 245 licensed stores in 37 countries and
jurisdictions.  Merchandise was also sold at e-commerce sites
including Toysrus.com and Babiesrus.com.

On July 21, 2005, a consortium of Bain Capital Partners LLC,
Kohlberg Kravis Roberts, and Vornado Realty Trust invested $1.3
billion to complete a $6.6 billion leveraged buyout of the
company.

Toys "R" Us is a privately owned entity but still files with the
Securities and Exchange Commission as required by its debt
agreements.

The Company's consolidated balance sheet showed $6.572 billion in
assets, $7.891 billion in liabilities, and a stockholders' deficit
of $1.319 billion as of April 29, 2017.

Toys "R" Us, Inc., and certain of its U.S. subsidiaries and its
Canadian subsidiary voluntarily filed for relief under Chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. E.D. Va. Lead Case No. Case No.
17-34665) on Sept. 19, 2017.  In addition, the Company's Canadian
subsidiary voluntarily commenced parallel proceedings under the
Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") in Canada in the
Ontario Superior Court of Justice.  The Company's operations
outside of the U.S. and Canada, including its 255 licensed stores
and joint venture partnership in Asia, which are separate
entities, were not part of the Chapter 11 filing and CCAA
proceedings.

Grant Thornton is the monitor appointed in the CCAA case.

Judge Keith L. Phillips presides over the Chapter 11 cases.

The Debtors tapped Kirkland & Ellis LLP and Kirkland & Ellis as
their legal counsel; Kutak Rock LLP as co-counsel; Alvarez &
Marsal North America, LLC as restructuring advisor; Lazard Freres
& Co. LLC as investment banker; Prime Clerk LLC as claims and
noticing agent; Consensus Advisory Services LLC and Consensus
Securities LLC as sale process investment banker; and A&G Realty
Partners, LLC as real estate advisor.

On Sept. 26, 2017, the U.S. Trustee for Region 4 appointed an
official committee of unsecured creditors.  The Committee retained
Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP as its legal counsel; Wolcott
Rivers, P.C. as local counsel; FTI Consulting, Inc. as financial
advisor; and Moelis & Company LLC as investment banker.

On May 29, 2018, the Office of the U.S. Trustee appointed Elise S.
Frejka, Esq., as the consumer privacy ombudsman.

                        Toys "R" Us UK

Toys "R" Us Limited, Toys "R" Us, Inc.'s UK arm with 105 stores
and 3,000 employees, was sent into administration in the United
Kingdom in February 2018.

Arron Kendall and Simon Thomas of Moorfields Advisory Limited, 88
Wood Street, London, EC2V 7QF were appointed Joint Administrators
on Feb. 28, 2018.  The Administrators now manage the affairs,
business and property of the Company.  The Administrators act as
agents only and without personal liability.

The Administrators said they will make every effort to secure a
buyer for all or part of the business.

                   Liquidation of U.S. Stores

Toys "R" Us, Inc., on March 15, 2018, filed with the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court a motion seeking Bankruptcy Court approval to
start the process of conducting an orderly wind-down of its U.S.
business and liquidation of inventory in all 735 of the Company's
U.S. stores, including stores in Puerto Rico.

                         Propco I Debtors

Toys "R" Us Property Company I, LLC and its subsidiaries own fee
and leasehold interests in more than 300 properties in the United
States.  The Debtors lease the properties on a triple-net basis
under a master lease to Toys-Delaware, the operating entity for
all of TRU's North American businesses, which operates the
majority of the properties as Toys "R" Us stores, Babies "R" Us
stores or side-by-side stores, or subleases them to alternative
retailers.

Toys "R" Us Property was founded in 2005 and is headquartered in
Wayne, New Jersey.  Toys 'R' Us Property operates as a subsidiary
of Toys "R" Us Inc.

Company LLC, MAP Real Estate LLC, TRU 2005 RE I LLC, TRU 2005 RE
II Trust, and Wayne Real Estate Company LLC (collectively, "Propco
I Debtors") sought protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code (Bankr. E.D. Va. Lead Case No. 18-31429) on March 20, 2018.
The Propco I Debtors sought and obtained procedural consolidation
and joint administration of their Chapter 11 cases, separate from
the Toys "R" Us Debtors' Chapter 11 cases.

The Propco I Debtors estimated assets of $500 million to $1
billion and liabilities of $500 million to $1 billion.

Judge Keith L. Phillips presides over the Propco I Debtors' cases.

The Propco I Debtors hired Klehr Harrison Harvey Branzburg, LLP;
and Crowley, Liberatore, Ryan & Brogan, P.C., as co-counsel.  The
Debtors also tapped Kutak Rock LLP.  They hired Goldin Associates,
LLC, as financial advisors.

An official committee of unsecured creditors has been appointed in
the Propco I Debtors' cases.



================================
T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O
================================


PETROLEUM CO: Takes Up Slack in Jamaica
---------------------------------------
Aleem Khan at Trinidad Express reports that Trinidad and Tobago's
Petroleum Co. of Trinidad & Tobago Ltd (Petrotrin) is now
supplanting Venezuela as the main supplier of oil imports to the
north Caribbean country as PetroCaribe stopped supplying the
fellow Caribbean Community (Caricom) member since May last year,
Jamaica's Energy Minister Dr. Andrew Wheatley confirmed.

PetroCaribe is an energy cooperation agreement initiated by the
Government of Venezuela to provide preferential payment
arrangements for petroleum and petroleum products to some
Caribbean and Latin American countries, according to Trinidad
Express.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
May 3, 2018, S&P Global Ratings revised its outlook on Petroleum
Co. of Trinidad & Tobago Ltd (Petrotrin) to negative from stable.
S&P said, "We also affirmed our 'BB' long-term corporate credit
and senior unsecured debt ratings on the company. Additionally,
we're keeping its SACP unchanged at 'b-'."


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
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Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
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Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
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issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

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Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
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USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
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Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2018.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

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