TCRLA_Public/180626.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

               Tuesday, June 26, 2018, Vol. 19, No. 126


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

PROVINCE OF JUJUY: S&P Affirms 'B-' Long-Term ICR, Outlook Stable
SUPERCANAL SA: Files Chapter 15 in New York
SUPERCANAL SA: Chapter 15 Case Summary


B A R B A D O S

OZONE WIRELESS: Faces Possible Takeover by FLOW


B R A Z I L

OI SA: US Recognizes Restructuring
USINA CORURIPE: S&P Cuts Corp. Credit Rating to 'B+', Outlook Neg.


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Industries Ask Deputies to Pass Bill


J A M A I C A

JAMAICA: Accused of Not Managing Pre-Shipment Services


M E X I C O

MEXICO: Competition Watchdog Targets Sugar Industry


P U E R T O    R I C O

ANTONIO GUZMAN: Court Dismisses Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Case
GIRARD MANUFACTURING: Unsecureds to Get 4% in 60 Months
SPANISH BROADCASTING: Crowe Horwath LLP Raises Going Concern Doubt


X X X X X X X X X

* Moody's Gives CRRs to 32 Banks in Central American Countries


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PROVINCE OF JUJUY: S&P Affirms 'B-' Long-Term ICR, Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings, on June 13, 2018, affirmed its 'B-' long-term
foreign and local currency issuer credit ratings on the province
of Jujuy. The outlook remains stable. S&P also affirmed the 'B-'
issue-level ratings on the province's unsecured notes.

OUTLOOK

S&P said, "The stable outlook reflects our expectation that Jujuy
will continue its austerity measures to gradually reduce its high
operating deficits in the next 12 months. However, we expect high
deficits after capital expenditures (capex) as the province uses
the proceeds from its 2017 international issuance to fund its
infrastructure plan. We believe the debt burden will remain high,
at around 81% of operating revenues in the next three years, and
liquidity will remain weak."

Downside scenario

S&P said, "We could lower our ratings on Jujuy in the next 12
months if its management of revenues and expenditures worsens and
the province is unable to improve its finances as we expect, such
that we perceive that Jujuy's financial commitments are
unsustainable or that it faces a near-term payment crisis."

Upside scenario

S&P said, "We could raise our ratings on Jujuy in the next 12
months if we observe a faster-than-expected fiscal consolidation,
with operating surpluses and deficits after capex consistently
below 5%. In this scenario, financing needs would diminish and
debt relative to operating revenue would decrease. The fiscal
improvement would have to be accompanied by longer-term capital
and financial planning and a more formal debt and liquidity
policy."

RATIONALE

S&P said, "Our 'B-' ratings on Jujuy reflect its large fiscal
deficits that are above 10% of its total revenue. The ratings also
incorporate the province's limited flexibility to reduce
expenditures, given that most of the spending is concentrated in
personnel. At the same time, Jujuy relies significantly on
transfers from the national government, given the province's low
GDP per capita. These factors only allow for a gradual improvement
of the province's fiscal situation, despite the administration's
efforts to improve its fiscal path. The ratings also reflect a
high debt burden with increasing interest payments and very low
cash reserves."

Operating deficits have started to decrease, but debt stock
remains high

S&P said, "We expect Jujuy to gradually improve its budgetary
performance and reach positive operating results by 2020, while
deficits after capex will average 10% in the next three years due
to increasing infrastructure spending. We assume that the province
will continue its efforts to improve tax collection over the next
three years; our base case assumes that own source revenues will
grow slightly above nominal GDP growth. At the same time,
transfers will still benefit from additional funds following the
elimination of the ANSES retention (Previously, 15% of the co-
participation funds were retained for ANSES [the social security
system], but now this is gradually coming back to the provinces).
The province will continue to rein in spending, with better
control of payroll and transfers to municipalities. Nevertheless,
increasing capital spending will keep balances after capex above
10%. In our opinion, Jujuy's budgetary performance will remain
exposed to volatility because it relies on national government
transfers.

"Under these assumptions, we predict that modifiable revenues will
remain at 14.8% of operating revenues, on average, during 2018-
2020. We believe Jujuy will keep strengthening tax collection, but
its low per capita GDP and its commitment to reduce the tax burden
it assumed in the fiscal pact signed at the end of 2017 will
constrain its ability to increase modifiable revenues in the next
few years. At the same time, the province's expenditures are very
rigid. Payroll puts the most pressure on Jujuy's budget, and is
very inflexible because most of the payroll goes to essential
services like education and health. Jujuy also has limited capital
expenses flexibility, given that almost all these expenses are
funded with earmarked transfers from the national government for
basic infrastructure. Jujuy's main infrastructure project is
constructing a solar farm with the proceeds of its 2017
international issuance and funds obtained from a loan. We expect
the project to conclude in 2019.

"We expect tax-supported debt to represent 71% of the province's
operating revenues in 2020 and interest payments to average 5% of
operating revenues in the next three years. We assume that
borrowings will be in line with Jujuy's financing needs. As of
December 2017, its direct debt was ARS21.3 billion, or 72.5% of
that year's operating revenues. The debt consisted mainly of debt
with the sovereign: 71% of the debt stock. In September 2017, the
province issued its first international bond for $210 million,
which is due Sept. 20, 2022. The increasing debt stock, combined
with higher interest rates from the national government, raised
the province's interest payments to 3.3% of the revenues in 2017.
We estimate this could average 5% in the next three years, from a
level near 0.05% in the past. To reduce debt service pressure on
its budget, the province trying to renegotiate its credit
conditions with the national government."

Jujuy's contingent liabilities are low and represent less than 10%
of its operating revenues. Contingent liabilities come mainly from
four public companies, which aren't consolidated in the provincial
budget: Agua Potable y Saneamiento Jujuy SE, Jujuy Energ=C2=B0a y
Miner=C2=B0a SE (JEMSE), Banco de Desarrollo de Jujuy SE, and GIRSU
(none are rated). JEMSE will manage the solar park. The province
will service the loan granted to fund the park's construction.
Therefore, S&P includes this under the provinces debt stock. GIRSU
is a new company that will be in charge of garbage collection. It
has recently contracted debt with the European Investment Bank for
$45 million.

S&P said, "In our opinion, Jujuy's free cash and reserves are
insufficient to cover the projected 2018 debt service. Therefore,
we initially assess its liquidity position as weak. However, we
believe that the province will be able and willing to meet its
debt service obligations using both internal and external sources.
Although the province obtained financing in 2017, we believe
access to external financing remains limited. This assessment uses
our evaluation of the ongoing development of domestic capital
markets as well as our assessment of the domestic banking system.
For the latter, our Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment
(BICRA) for Argentina is at group '8'. We group our BICRAs, which
evaluate and compare global banking systems, on a scale from '1'
to '10', ranging from what we view as the lowest-risk banking
systems (group '1') to the highest-risk (group '10')."

Signs of more prudent fiscal policies, although long-term planning
remains weak Jujuy's GPD per capita is a key rating constraint.
Its GDP per capita averaged $5,249 between 2015 and 2017, below
the sovereign's average of $14,049. Since the province's growth
has historically been lower than that of the sovereign, S&P
believes growth prospects will remain low in the next few years.
The province's primary industries are producing sugar, tobacco,
and paper. In order to diversify Jujuy's economy, the
administration has been promoting investment in different sectors
such as solar energy production, lithium battery production, and
tourism.

S&P said, "In our opinion, the current administration (Cambia
Jujuy, 2016-2019) has been more prudent in its revenue and
expenditure management. During 2017 and the first few months of
2018, we observed a better fiscal performance than in the past, as
well as improved transparency. Nevertheless, we believe management
needs to improve its long-term financial planning along with its
debt and liquidity management to reduce its dependence on the
national government transfers and financing. We believe the
recently signed Fiscal Responsibility law, signed by most
Argentine provinces, could help the province reverse its fiscal
situation and become fiscally sustainable in the longer term.

"We continue to view the institutional framework for Argentine
LRGs as very volatile and underfunded. However, we believe the
outcome of reforms and the pace of their implementation are
becoming more predictable. This comes amid increased dialogue
between LRGs and the national government to address various fiscal
and economic challenges that we expect to remain in the short to
medium term."

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology. At the onset of the committee, the chair confirmed
that the information provided to the Rating Committee by the
primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and was
sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision.
After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

  RATINGS LIST

  Ratings Affirmed

  Jujuy (Province of)

   Issuer Credit Rating                   B-/Stable/--
   Senior Unsecured                       B-


SUPERCANAL SA: Files Chapter 15 in New York
-------------------------------------------
Global Restructuring Review reports that Argentine cable
television and internet provider Supercanal has filed for Chapter
15 protection in New York, citing debts of over US$400 million.


SUPERCANAL SA: Chapter 15 Case Summary
--------------------------------------
Chapter 15 Debtor: Supercanal S.A.
                   Hipolito Bouchard No. 680, 5th Floor
                   Buenos Airesa
                   Argentina

Type of Business:  Supercanal S.A. is a company in Argentina
                   offering TV Cable and Internet Services.

Foreign
Proceeding:        Concurso Preventivo, Title II, Ch. I through
                   VI of the Arg. Bankr. Law No. 24,522

Chapter 15
Petition Date:     June 21, 2018

Case No.:          18-11869

Court:             United States Bankruptcy Court
                   Southern District of New York
                   (Manhattan)

Judge:             Hon. Martin Glenn

Foreign
Representative:    Eduardo Marcelo Vila

Foreign
Representative's
Attorneys:         Jennifer C. DeMarco, Esq.
                   Sarah N. Campbell, Esq.
                   CLIFFORD CHANCE US LLP
                   31 West 52nd Street
                   New York, NY 10019
                   E-mail: jennifer.demarco@cliffordchance.com
                           sarah.campbell@cliffordchance.com

Estimated Assets: Unknown

Estimated Debt: Unknown

A full-text copy of the Chapter 15 petition is available for free
at http://bankrupt.com/misc/nysb18-11869.pdf



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OZONE WIRELESS: Faces Possible Takeover by FLOW
-----------------------------------------------
Caribbean360.com reports that less than a year after setting up
shop in Barbados, telecommunications company Ozone Wireless is
facing possible takeover by its competitor Flow.

Online newspaper Barbados Today said it had been reliably informed
that the two sides have been actively engaged in negotiations,
according to Caribbean360.com.

But Flow's Director of Communication and Stakeholder Management
Marilyn Sealy said she could neither confirm nor deny the reports,
while Ozone's Head of Marketing Natalie Hartman was also tight-
lipped on the matter, the report notes.

In the meantime, Ozone, which officially began operating in
Barbados last July, has either severed or lost several key staff
members since April, with Managing Director Mark Conway, Chief
Executive Officer Sylvain Tasse and Head of Marketing Dianne
Squires among those who have parted ways with the telecoms
provider, the report relays.

Hartman also declined to comment on those developments.

However, well-placed sources say the company has been experiencing
severe financial challenges over the past several months and was
forced to lay off at least two batches of workers, the report
notes.

Ozone was granted a license to operate in Barbados in 2014 and had
pumped about BDS$20 million (US$10 million) into its operations up
to the point of opening, the report says.

Officials had promised at the time that the company would hire
more than 50 people -- over 90 per cent of whom would be
Barbadians -- while promising over 600 locations across the island
where customers could recharge their credit, the report discloses.

However, it has since found the going quite tough and has had to
entertain purchase bids from both Digicel and Flow, the report
notes.  However, the Digicel discussions did not result in an
agreement, the report adds.



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OI SA: US Recognizes Restructuring
-----------------------------------
Declan Bush at Latin Lawyer reports that one of Latin America's
biggest restructurings will be enforced in the US after a New York
court issued a Chapter 15 order recognizing telecom company Oi's
US$20 billion plan.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
June 4, 2018, Fitch Ratings affirmed Oi S.A.'s Long-Term Foreign-
and Local-Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) at 'D', and
National Long-Term Rating and local debentures rating at 'D
(bra)'. Fitch has also affirmed the existing ratings for Oi's
senior notes as the debt exchange process is still underway.


USINA CORURIPE: S&P Cuts Corp. Credit Rating to 'B+', Outlook Neg.
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its global scale corporate credit
rating to 'B+' from 'BB-' on S.A. Usina Coruripe Acucar e Alcool
(Coruripe). S&P also lowered its long-term national scale
corporate credit rating to 'brA' from 'brA+' and affirmed its
'brA-1' short-term national scale rating on the company. The
outlook on the long-term ratings is negative.

The downgrade reflects Coruripe's weaker EBITDA and cash flow
generation in fiscal 2018 that ended on March 31, 2018, which
resulted in higher-than-expected leverage levels. Drier weather at
the end of the last harvest season reduced crushing volumes, which
along with the steep decline in sugar prices since the second half
of 2017, lowered the company's EBITDA by around 20% compared with
S&P's forecasted level.

At the same time, Coruripe's liquidity was trimmed following the
low free cash flow generation, combined with the cash sweep
feature that obliges the company to use any excess cash to reduce
debt within the scope of the debt renegotiation agreement of 2016.
The negative outlook reflects that another downgrade can occur in
the next 6-12 months if Coruripe struggles to roll over short-term
maturities or if its covenants--measured every March 31 -- are
pressured as the end of the harvest approaches. These factors can
materialize if the company is unable to reduce idle capacity,
sugar prices remain low, or if the state-owned oil company,
Petrobras, changes the current gasoline pricing policy, impacting
ethanol, which prices are capped at about 70% of gasoline prices
due to the biofuel's lower energy content.

The lower-than-expected EBITDA generation, the company's high
interest burden, and the intrinsically high capital expenditures
(capex) requirements in the industry have undermined free
operating cash flow (FOCF). As a result, Coruripe's credit metrics
deteriorated. This, coupled with potentially higher volatility in
cash flow metrics due to the forecasts of global sugar surpluses,
the foreign-exchange swings, and the uncertainty over gasoline
pricing in Brazil, has prompted S&P to revise its financial risk
profile assessment on Coruripe to a weaker category.



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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Industries Ask Deputies to Pass Bill
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Dominican Today reports that Dominican Republic Industries
Association (AIRD) Executive Vice President Circe Almanzar asked
the Chamber of Deputies to approve the bill for the Law to
Eradicate Illicit Trade, Contraband, and Counterfeit Regulated
Products, which has already passed in the Senate.

"It's an important step to eradicate what constitutes a culture of
illegality that makes companies less competitive, but also
negatively impacts the State's collection capacity and creates
distortion in the market by forcing industries that comply with
their legal obligations and tributaries to compete
disadvantageously against importers and marketers who evade paying
taxes," she said, according to Dominican Today.

The report notes that Ms. Almanzar called the legislation an
"instrument that will punish those practices in a more forcefully
and establish links between illegal trade and other related crimes
such as money laundering, corruption and organized crime."

"Dominican authorities and the business sector have been working
for several years to eradicate these evils that do so much damage
to the industries of the country, to the national coffers and the
health of consumers," the business leader said and thanked senator
Charles Mariotti for the initiative, the report relays.

The report notes that she said the bill strengthens the State's
institutional capacity and establishes mechanisms that facilitate
the prosecution of individuals and organizations, which take part
in that type of activity.

Quoted by diariolibre.com, Ms. Almanzar added that "this culture
of illegality in trade leads to criminal structures taking
advantage of this situation and strengthen their operations
through money laundering," the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
April 23, 2018, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB-/B' long- and
short-term sovereign credit ratings on the Dominican Republic.
The outlook remains stable.



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JAMAICA: Accused of Not Managing Pre-Shipment Services
------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that President of the Jamaica Used Car Dealers
Association, Lynvale Hamilton, is accusing the Government of not
managing the island's pre-shipment services properly.

Mr. Hamilton was speaking with the Financial Report, according to
RJR News.

"The pre-shipment inspection is where the government has an agent
in Japan that inspects the vehicles before they get here.  The
time that is taken is like two months -- an inspection that should
have taken three to five days.  We have spoken to the government
about it and nothing is being done . . . ." the report quoted Mr.
Hamilton as saying.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Feb. 5, 2018, Fitch Ratings affirmed Jamaica's Long-Term
Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B' and has
revised the Rating Outlook to Positive from Stable.



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MEXICO: Competition Watchdog Targets Sugar Industry
---------------------------------------------------
Malina McLennan at Latin Lawyer reports that Mexico's competition
watchdog has begun an investigation into an alleged cartel in the
country's sugar market, based on concerns that several companies
fixed prices, rigged bids, allocated markets and restricted
supply.



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ANTONIO GUZMAN: Court Dismisses Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Case
----------------------------------------------------------
Bankruptcy Judge Enrique S. Lamoutte entered an order dismissing
the chapter 11 case of Debtor Antonio Rivera Guzman d/b/a Avian 7
Small Animal Hospital.

This case came before the court on May 30, 2018 for an evidentiary
hearing to consider the motion to dismiss or convert filed by the
Debtor's ex-wife Dr. Sandra Viscal and Debtor's daughter Ms.
Natalia Rivera Viscal, and Debtor's opposition to the same. The
movants in the motion to dismiss allege that there is cause for
dismissal for the following reasons: debtor's material default
with his confirmed plan; failure to comply with an order of the
court; and failure to pay domestic support obligation that first
became payable after the order for relief. The debtor admits to
being in default but alleges that the reason for the default has
been the inability to sell community property to obtain funds to
pay the debts of the "ex-conjugal" partnership with Dr. Viscal and
that the proposed second amended chapter 11 plan which provides
for the payment of all claims in full, including the debts of the
ex-conjugal partnership, and shows good faith on Debtor's part.

In this case, it is undisputed that Dr. Viscal and Ms.
Rivera-Viscal are the holders of pre and post-petition priority
claims for a Domestic Support Obligation. Debtor has admitted to
being [and continues to be] in arrears with his pre and
post-petition arrears with his Domestic Support Obligation.
Moreover, the Debtor has not challenged that the amounts owed to
Dr. Viscal and Ms. Rivera Viscal are in the nature of support.

The statutory standard to establish "cause" pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
section 1112(b)(4)(P) is Debtor's failure to pay any domestic
support obligation. Therefore, in interpreting the plain language
of Section 1112(b)(4)(P), the court finds that movants have met
their burden to prove that there is cause for dismissal of the
case at bar based on Debtor's continuously unexcused failure to
comply with his pre and post-petition Domestic Support Obligation
payments.

The TPI Order of Nov. 23, 2013 provided that the pre-petition debt
amounting to $135,000 would be paid through the bankruptcy
proceeding. Dr. Viscal's DSO Priority Proof of Claim number 11 in
the amount of $135,000 was not paid as provided for in the
Confirmed Plan and remains unpaid. The amounts owed are also
recognized in Debtor's second amended plan. The undisputed facts
show that the Debtor has failed to pay the DSO Priority Claim
pursuant to the terms and conditions of the confirmed plan. Such
failure constitutes cause to dismiss the case upon Debtor's
material default pursuant to 11 USC 1112 (b)(4)(N).

The Debtor is also in arrears with the post-petition priority
Domestic Support Obligations owed to Ms. Rivera-Viscal in the
amount of $21,357.24 for the months of August, September and
October 2016 ($7,119.08 each month). The Debtor is also in arrears
with the post-petition priority Domestic Support Obligations owed
to Ms. Rivera-Viscal in the amount of $6,809.69, with regards to
outstanding payment of college tuition, enrollment, fees, meals,
and college expenses. Consequently, the Debtor has incurred in
arrears of post-petition Domestic Support Obligations.

The Debtor has been in bankruptcy for approximately five years and
has incurred in arrears after the filing of the petition. The
Debtor does not dispute that such arrears exist. Therefore, there
is cause to dismiss the case.

Although the moving creditors discharged their initial burden to
show cause for dismissal, the Debtor failed to present any
evidence to establish that dismissal or conversion to Chapter 7 is
not in the best interests of the estate and the creditors. After
considering the travel of the case, characterized by the
continuous litigation by the Debtor and the DSO claimants, and the
ongoing proceedings before the Puerto Rico courts regarding the
division of community property, the court concludes that
dismissal, and not conversion to Chapter 7 is in the best
interests of the estate and creditors.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated June 15, 2018 is
available at http://bankrupt.com/misc/prb-13-06960-11-747.pdf

Antonio Luis Rivera Guzman filed a voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy
petition (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 13-06960) on August 27, 2013.


GIRARD MANUFACTURING: Unsecureds to Get 4% in 60 Months
-------------------------------------------------------
Girard Manufacturing, Inc., filed with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court
for the District of Puerto Rico a plan of reorganization and
accompanying disclosure statement.

Under the plan, Class 3 secured creditor Banco Desarrollo will be
paid in full from the with the voluntary surrender of its direct
collateral, i.e. the account receivable from Municipio de San Juan
in the amount of $1,900,000.00 and the balance to be paid through
a payment plan of twenty (20) years at a 5% interest per annum.
The total estimated aggregate amount of claims is $2,180,108.09.

Class 4 secured creditor BPPR, will be paid in full through a
payment plan of twenty (20) years at a 5% interest per annum.
BPPR will retain its lien until the payment in full of its claim.

Class 5 unsecured claims will be paid 4% of their claims in 60
monthly payments.

A full-text copy of the Disclosure Statement dated June 13, 2018,
is available at http://bankrupt.com/misc/prb17-05975-83.pdf

               About Girard Manufacturing, Inc.

Girard Manufacturing Inc. provides office furniture in San Juan,
Puerto Rico. The Company offers desks chairs, modular systems,
bookshelves, filing systems, and accessories, as well as online
service and support.

Girard Manufacturing, Inc., based in San Juan, PR, filed a Chapter
11 petition (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 17-05975) on August 24, 2017.
Alexis Fuentes-Hernandez, Esq., at Fuentes Law Offices, LLC,
serves as bankruptcy counsel.

In its petition, the Debtor estimated $2.36 million in assets and
$3.83 million in liabilities. The petition was signed by Jose A.
Casal Seibezzi, president.


SPANISH BROADCASTING: Crowe Horwath LLP Raises Going Concern Doubt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Spanish Broadcasting System, Inc., filed with the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission its annual report on Form 10-K, disclosing
a net income of $19.62 million on $134.70 million of net revenue
for the year ended December 31, 2017, compared to a net loss of
$16.34 million on $144.61 million of net revenue for the year
ended in 2016.

The audit report of Crowe Horwath LLP states that the 12.5% Senior
Secured Notes had a maturity date of April 15, 2017.  Cash from
operations or the sale of assets was not sufficient to repay the
notes when they became due.  In addition, for the year ended
December 31, 2017, the Company had a working capital deficiency
and negative cash flows from operations.  These factors raise
substantial doubt about its ability to continue as a going
concern.

The Company's balance sheet at December 31, 2017, showed total
assets of $435.90 million, total liabilities of $531.82 million,
and a total stockholders' deficit of $95.91 million.

A copy of the Form 10-K is available at https://is.gd/BDKYwT

Based in Miami, Florida, Spanish Broadcasting System, Inc.
(OTCMKTS:SBSAA) --http://www.spanishbroadcasting.com/-- owns and
operates 17 radio stations located in the top U.S. Hispanic
markets of New York, Los Angeles, Miami, Chicago, San Francisco
and Puerto Rico, airing the Spanish Tropical, Regional Mexican,
Spanish Adult Contemporary, Top 40 and Latin Rhythmic format
genres.  SBS also operates AIRE Radio Networks, a national radio
platform which creates, distributes and markets leading Spanish-
language radio programming to over 250 affiliated stations
reaching 94% of the U.S. Hispanic audience.  SBS also owns MegaTV,
a television operation with over-the-air, cable and satellite
distribution and affiliates throughout the U.S. and Puerto Rico.
SBS also produces live concerts and events and owns multiple
bilingual websites, including www.LaMusica.com, an online
destination and mobile app providing content related to Latin
music, entertainment, news and culture.



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* Moody's Gives CRRs to 32 Banks in Central American Countries
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned Counterparty Risk Ratings
(CRRs) to 32 banks in Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, Peru, Central
America and the Dominican Republic, and four of their foreign
branches. At the same time, Moody's assigned a Counterparty Risk
Assessment (CRA) to Corporacion Financiera de Desarrollo S.A.
(COFIDE) and to Banco de Desarrollo de El Salvador (Bandesal). In
addition, Moody's affirmed Bandesal and COFIDE's issuer ratings.
In addition, the long and short-term CRAs of Banco Bilbao Vizcaya
Argentaria Paraguay S.A. were upgraded to Baa3(cr) and P-3(cr),
from Ba1(cr) and not prime(cr) respectively.

Moody's Counterparty Risk Ratings (CRR) are opinions of the
ability of entities to honor the uncollateralized portion of non-
debt counterparty financial liabilities (CRR liabilities) and also
reflect the expected financial losses in the event such
liabilities are not honored. CRR liabilities typically relate to
transactions with unrelated parties. Examples of CRR liabilities
include the uncollateralized portion of payables arising from
derivatives transactions and the uncollateralized portion of
liabilities under sale and repurchase agreements. CRRs are not
applicable to funding commitments or other obligations associated
with covered bonds, letters of credit, guarantees, servicer and
trustee obligations, and other similar obligations that arise from
a bank performing its essential operating functions.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's said that the CRRs assigned to the aforementioned banks
are in line with their CRAs.

Moody's does not considers any of the host countries of banks
affected by this rating action to be jurisdictions with
operational resolution regimes. Consequently, in assigning CRRs to
these banks, the rating agency starts with the banks' adjusted
Baseline Credit Assessment (BCA) and uses the agency's existing
basic Loss-Given-Failure (LGF) approach, which provides one notch
of uplift from the banks' adjusted BCAs to reflect the lower
probability of default of CRR liabilities. In Moody's view,
secured counterparties to banks typically benefit from greater
protections under insolvency laws and bank resolution regimes than
do senior unsecured creditors, and this benefit is likely to
extend to the unsecured portion of such secured transactions in
most bank resolution regimes. Moody's believes that in many cases
regulators will use their discretion to allow a bank in resolution
to continue to honor its CRR liabilities or to transfer those
liabilities to another party who will honor them, in part because
of the greater complexity of bailing in obligations that fluctuate
with market prices, and also because the regulator will typically
seek to preserve much of the bank's operations as a going concern
in order to maximize the value of the bank in resolution,
stabilize the bank quickly, and avoid contagion within the banking
system.

The CRAs and CRRs then incorporate governmental support, which can
result in additional uplift depending on the government's rating
together with Moody's assessment of the respective government's
willingness to provide support to the bank in question. As a
result, two-thirds of the assigned CRAs and CRRs are one notch
above their corresponding senior unsecured debt, local currency
deposit, and/or issuer ratings. All of the remaining CRAs and CRRs
are aligned with their corresponding debt, local currency deposit,
or issuer ratings. This is because CRAs and CRRs for these issuers
receive less uplift from government support than their debt and
deposit ratings due to their higher starting points. Banco
Agricola, S.A.'s CRA and CRR are constrained by El Salvador's B1
foreign currency bond ceiling.

Moody's has assigned only foreign currency CRRs to banks in Panama
and El Salvador given both countries are fully dollarized.

The affirmation of Bandesal and COFIDE's issuer rating follows
Moody's decision to rate the banks using its Banks Methodology to
assess both the bank's standalone credit fundamentals as well as
government support. Previously, Moody's used its Government-
Related Issuers Methodology to assess government support for these
issuers. The change in methodology does not have any impact on the
banks' issuer ratings.

As Bandesal's standalone BCA is already in line with the
government bond rating, neither its issuer rating nor its CRA or
CRR receive any ratings uplift from government support. Moody's
assesses a low probability that the Government of El Salvador will
support Bandesal, of which it is the sole owner, considering the
constraints on the government's ability to support the country's
banks given the full dollarization of the economy.

For COFIDE, Moody's assesses a very high probability of government
support given its government ownership -- the government support
is also proven by the capitalization of multilaterals borrowings,
the reinvestment of dividends, and a comfort letter issued earlier
last year, in which Peru's National Government was committing to
acquire up to 20% of COFIDE's CAF shares to support the entity's
capitalization. This results in 6 notches of uplift to its Baa3
issuer ratings from its adjusted BCA of b3.

The following ratings were assigned to banks in Chile and their
respective offshore branches:

Banco de Chile

Local currency and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of Aa3

Local currency and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of Prime-1

Banco de Credito e Inversiones

Local currency and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of A1

Local currency and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of Prime-1

Banco de Credito e Inversiones (Miami Branch)

Local currency and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of A1

Local currency and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of Prime-1

Banco del Estado de Chile

Local currency and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of Aa3

Local currency and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of Prime-1

Banco Estado, New York Branch

Local currency and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of Aa3

Local currency and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of Prime-1

Banco Santander-Chile

Local currency and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of Aa3

Local currency and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of Prime-1

BBVA (Chile)

Local currency and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of A2

Local currency and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of Prime-2

Coopeuch - Cooperativa de Ahorro y Credito

Local currency and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of Baa1

Local currency and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of Prime-2

Itau CorpBanca

Local currency and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of A2

Local currency and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of Prime-1

The following ratings were assigned to banks in Colombia:

Banco Davivienda S.A.

Local currency and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of Baa2

Local currency and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of Prime-2

Banco de Bogota S.A.

Local currency and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of Baa1

Local currency and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of Prime-2

Banco GNB Sudameris S.A.

Local currency and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of Ba1

Local currency and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of Not Prime

Bancolombia S.A.

Local currency and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of Baa1

Local currency and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of Prime-2

BBVA Colombia S.A.

Local currency and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of Baa1

Local currency and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of Prime-2

The following ratings were assigned to banks in Costa Rica:

Banco de Costa Rica

Local currency and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of Ba2

Local currency and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of Not Prime

Banco Nacional de Costa Rica

Local currency and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of Ba1

Local currency and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of Not Prime

The following ratings were assigned to banks in Dominican
Republic:

Banco de Reservas de la Republica Dominicana

Local currency and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of Ba3

Local currency and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of Not Prime

The following ratings and assessments were assigned to banks in El
Salvador:

Banco Agricola, S.A.

Foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of B1

Foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Not Prime

Banco de Desarrollo de El Salvador

Foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of B2

Foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Not Prime

Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment of B2(cr)

Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment of Not Prime(cr)

The following ratings for banks in El Salvador were affirmed

Banco de Desarrollo de El Salvador

Long-term foreign currency issuer rating of B3, stable

The following ratings were assigned to banks in Guatemala:

Banco de los Trabajadores

Local currency and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of B2

Local currency and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of Not Prime

Banco Industrial S.A.

Local currency and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of Ba1

Local currency and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of Not Prime

The following ratings were assigned to banks in Panama:

BAC International Bank, Inc

Foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Baa2

Foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Prime-2

Banco General, S.A.

Foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Baa1

Foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Prime-2

Banco Internacional de Costa Rica, S.A.

Foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Ba3

Foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Not Prime

Banco Latinoamericano de Comercio Exterior

Foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Baa1

Foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Prime-2

Global Bank Corporation and Subsidiaries

Foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Baa3

Foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Prime-3

The following ratings were assigned to banks in Paraguay:

Banco Basa S.A.

Local currency and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of Ba2

Local currency and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of Not Prime

Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria Paraguay S.A.

Local currency and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of Baa3

Local currency and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of Prime-3

Banco Continental S.A.E.C.A.

Local currency and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of Ba1

Local currency and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of Not Prime

Banco Regional S.A.E.C.A

Local currency and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of Ba1

Local currency and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of Not Prime

The following assessments of banks in Paraguay were upgraded:

Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria Paraguay

Long-term counterparty risk assessment to Baa3 (cr), from Ba1(cr)

Short-term counterparty risk assessment to P-3(cr), from Not
Prime(cr)

The following ratings were assigned to banks in Peru and their
respective offshore branches:

Banco de Credito del Peru

Local currency and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of A3

Local currency and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of Prime-2

Banco de Credito del Peru, Panama Branch

Foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk Ratings of A3

Foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk Ratings of Prime-2

Banco Internacional del Peru -- Interbank

Local currency and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of Baa1

Local currency and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of Prime-2

Banco Internacional del Peru (Panama Branch)

Foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk Ratings of Baa1

Foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk Ratings of Prime-2

Corporacion Financiera de Desarrollo S.A.

Local currency and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of Baa2

Local currency and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of Prime-2

Long term Counterparty Risk Assessment of Baa2(cr)

Short term Counterparty Risk Assessment of Prime-2(cr)

Scotiabank Peru

Local currency and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of A3

Local currency and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings of Prime-2

The following ratings for banks in Peru were affirmed

Corporacion Financiera de Desarrollo S.A.

Local Currency and foreign currency long-term issuer rating of
Baa3, negative

What Could Change the Rating Up/Down

Chilean Banks

The CRRs of Banco de Chile, Banco Santander-Chile, Banco del
Estado de Chile, and Banco de Credito e Inversiones could be
upgraded if the sovereign rating were to be upgraded; however,
there is limited upward rating pressure at present given the
negative outlook on the sovereign rating. The CRR of Itau
CorpBanca could be upgraded if the bank's capitalization improves.
An upgrade of BBVA (Chile)'s CRR would be prompted by a
combination of improvements in its capitalization and
profitability, and an upgrade of the adjusted BCA of its current
parent, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A. (BBVA Spain,
Deposits: A2 stable, Senior Unsecured: A3 stable, BCA: baa2).
Following the completion of the bank's pending sale to Bank of
Nova Scotia (Deposits: A1 negative, BCA: a3), however, an
improvement in the bank's financial fundamentals will be
sufficient to prompt an upgrade of the CRR. Coopeuch --
Cooperativa de Ahorro y Credito's CRR could be upgraded if it is
able to execute its five-year expansion plan without a major
deterioration in its capitalization, asset quality or
profitability.

The CRRs of Banco de Chile, Banco Santander-Chile, Banco del
Estado de Chile, and Banco de Credito e Inversiones could be
downgraded if the Chilean sovereign rating is downgraded, in line
with its negative outlook. The CRRs of Banco de Chile and Banco
Santander-Chile, as well as BBVA (Chile) and Coopeuch --
Cooperativa de Ahorro y Credito, could also be downgraded as a
result of a substantial deterioration in asset quality, earnings
generation, and capitalization. The CRR of Itau CorpBanca could be
downgraded if the bank's profitability weakens or asset risk
increases, or if its dependence on wholesale funding does not
decrease.

Colombian Banks

The CRRs of Bancolombia S.A., Banco de Bogota S.A., and BBVA
Colombia S.A. could be upgraded if the sovereign rating were to be
upgraded; however, there is limited upward rating pressure at
present given the negative outlook on the sovereign rating. The
CRR of Banco Davivienda S.A. could be upgraded if the sovereign
rating were to be upgraded together coupled with an improvement in
the bank's financial fundamentals. Upward pressure on Banco GNB
Sudameris S.A.'s CRR could arise from a substantial improvement in
capitalization, a significant and sustainable increase in core
earnings, and/or an improvement in the bank's funding structure.

The CRRs of Bancolombia S.A. and Banco de Bogota S.A. could be
downgraded if the Colombia sovereign rating is downgraded, in line
with its negative outlook if their asset quality continues to
deteriorate, or their capital ratios weaken. The CRR of Banco
Davivienda S.A. could be downgraded if asset risk and
profitability continue to deteriorate and/or the bank is unable to
sustain capitalization at current levels. The CRR of BBVA Colombia
S.A. could be downgraded if its liquidity position,
capitalization, or profitability weaken or if the standalone BCA
of its parent, BBVA Spain, were to be downgraded. Banco GNB
Sudameris S.A.'s CRR could be downgraded if the bank's reliance on
wholesale funding increases and/or its liquidity position
deteriorates.

Central American banks

The CRRs of Global Bank Corporation and Subsidiaries (Global
Bank), BAC International Bank, Inc (BAC), Banco Latinoamericano de
Comercio Exterior (Bladex), Banco de los Trabajadores (Bantrab)
and Banco Internacional de Costa Rica, S.A. (BICSA) would be
upgraded if their financial fundamentals improve. The CRRs of
Banco Industrial S.A. (Banco Industrial), Bandesal, Banco de Costa
Rica (BCR), Banco Nacional de Costa Rica (BNCR), Banco General,
S.A. (Banco General), Banco Agricola and Banco de Reservas de la
Republica Dominicana (Banreservas) could be upgraded if the
respective sovereigns of Guatemala, El Salvador, Costa Rica,
Panama and the Dominican Republic are upgraded.

The CRRs of Global Bank, BAC, Bladex, Bantrab and BICSA would be
downgraded if their asset quality, profitability, and/or capital
levels deteriorate. The CRRs of Banco Industrial, Bandesal, BCR,
BNCR, Banreservas and Banco Agricola, S.A. (Banco Agricola) would
be downgraded following a downgrade in the respective sovereign
ratings. Banco General's CRR would be lowered if either its
financial fundamentals deteriorte, or if Panama's sovereign rating
is downgraded, though this is unlikely at present given the
positive outlook on the government's rating.

Paraguayan Banks

Paraguayan banks' CRR's could face positive pressure as a result
of improved profitability and asset quality, as well as increased
portfolio diversification. Negative pressure on CRRs could result
from persistent deterioration in asset quality or a decline in
profitability. Additionally, a downgrade of Paraguay's ratings and
deposit ceilings would lead to lower CRRs at Banco Continental
S.A.E.C.A., Banco Regional S.A.E.C.A. and Banco Basa S.A.. Banco
Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria Paraguay S.A.'s CRR could also face
upward or downward pressure if the ratings of its support
provider, BBVA Spain were to be upgraded or downgraded.

Peruvian Banks

Peruvian banks' CRR's could face positive pressure if their asset
risk and capitalization improve. Negative pressure on CRRs could
result from persistent deterioration in asset quality,
profitability, and/or capital. Additionally, a downgrade of Peru's
sovereign ratings would lead to lower CRRs.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in June 2018.


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
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USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
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Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2018.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

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