TCRLA_Public/180716.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

              Monday, July 16, 2018, Vol. 19, No. 139


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

PROVINCE OF ENTRE RIOS: S&P Affirms 'B' ICR, Outlook Stable


B R A Z I L

CEMIG GERACAO: Fitch Rates Proposed Reopening Eurobonds 'B'/'RR4'
OGX PETROLEO: Batista Gets 30-Year Jail Sentence for Corruption
USJ ACUCAR: S&P Lowers Corp Credit Rating to 'CCC', Outlook Neg.


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

ARABELLA PETROLEUM: Trustee, Committee File Chap. 11 Plan Outline


P E R U

CHINA FISHERY: Copeinca Expects to Repay $6MM Loan on August 15
CHINA FISHERY: CFPG Peru Trustee Files Lawsuit Against HSBC


P U E R T O  R I C O

INTRADE LOGISTICS: Case Summary & 11 Unsecured Creditors
KONA GRILL: Hires BDO USA as Auditors
S DIAMOND STEEL: Aug. 15 Plan Confirmation Hearing
YORAVI INVESTMENT: Disclosure Statement Hearing Set for Aug. 10


V E N E Z U E L A

PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: Accused of Fraud by ConocoPhillips
PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: Proposed Bankruptcy Law Faces Challenges


X X X X X X X X X

* BOND PRICING: For the Week From July 9 to July 13, 2018


                            - - - - -



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A R G E N T I N A
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PROVINCE OF ENTRE RIOS: S&P Affirms 'B' ICR, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------
On July 11, 2018, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B' long-term
foreign and local currency issuer credit ratings on the Argentine
province of Entre Rios. The outlook remains stable. At the same
time, S&P affirmed its 'B' issue-level ratings on the province's
senior unsecured debt.

OUTLOOK

S&P said, "The stable outlook reflects our expectation that Entre
Rios will continue to pursue prudent fiscal policies and reduce
its fiscal deficit in the next 12 to 18 months. However, we expect
that its low capital expenditures (capex) relative to total
spending and its limited revenue flexibility will persist,
especially in the context of slower economic growth and higher
inflation in Argentina. We expect the debt burden to remain
moderate, at around 33% of operating revenues in the next three
years, although it will likely be highly vulnerable to exchange
rate volatility. We believe interest payments will probably rise
to 3.4% of operating revenues (on average) due to increased
interest rates in Argentina and pressure from the Argentine peso
depreciation."

Downside scenario

S&P said, "We could lower our ratings on Entre Rios within the
next 12 months if the province is unable to improve its finances
as we expect, posting persistent fiscal deficits. This could occur
if the administration can't rein in spending or if Argentina's
economy worsens over the next couple of years, reducing the
province's revenues. Additionally, a scenario where the province
relies extensively on significant levels of short-term debt could
pressure the ratings downwards."

Upside scenario

S&P said, "We could raise our ratings on Entre Rios in the next 12
months if we observe a faster-than-expected fiscal consolidation,
with operating surpluses near 5% or if it posts a surplus after
capex, allowing for better long-term fiscal planning. A stronger
domestic institutional framework for local and regional
governments (LRGs) could also result in an upgrade if it's
accompanied by improvements in Entre Rios' individual credit
profile."

RATIONALE

S&P said, "Our 'B' ratings on Entre Rios reflect its individual
credit profile and the institutional framework in which it
operates. Entre Rios, like all LRGs in Argentina, operates under
what we view as a very volatile and underfunded institutional
framework. At the same time, the province's negative fiscal
results, its limited flexibility to reduce expenditures or raise
revenues, and its weak financial management constrain the ratings.
On the other hand, its moderate debt levels and low contingent
liabilities are rating strengths."

Efforts to contain spending and additional transfers will reduce
the fiscal deficit and keep debt at moderate levels

S&P said, "We expect Entre Rios to keep reducing its fiscal gap in
the next three years, despite Argentina's challenging
macroeconomic conditions. In our base case, we expect positive
operating results by 2019, compared to a deficit of 1.6% of
operating revenues in 2017. We assume the province will continue
to tightly control spending and keep trying to improve tax
collection. In addition, Entre Rios will benefit from the steady
transfer of 15% of co-participation funds, as agreed between the
province and the federal government. We don't think that the
December 2017 tax reform, which changed the rates of some
activities in the gross receipt taxes, harmed the province's
finances. Therefore, we assume its own source revenues will keep
growing in line with the nominal GDP growth."

"Under these assumptions, we expect modifiable revenues to remain
at 48.6% of total revenues in the next three years. We believe the
province's ability to raise own source revenues will be
constrained by the commitment to reduce the tax burden, which it
assumed when it signed the fiscal pact at the end of 2017. This
pact agreed to decrease the gross receipt and stamp tax. In terms
of expenses, we believe Entre Rios' flexibility is also limited,
given that half of current spending relates to payroll and
interest payments while capital spending is already low. In line
with Entre Rios' goal of fiscal consolidation, capex over total
spending decreased from 9.0% in 2015 to 6.0% in 2017. In the next
three years, we expect capex over total spending to average 5.5%,
leading to deficits after capex of 2.4% of total spending in the
same period. However, the recent challenging macroeconomic
conditions will accelerate the need for stronger fiscal
consolidation at the central government and provincial levels,
which could result in even lower capex than expected in the
provinces, including Entre Rios, in the future.

"We expect tax-supported debt to represent 30% of the province's
operating revenues in 2020 and interest payments to average 3.4%
of operating revenues in the next three years. As of December
2017, Entre Rios' direct debt was ARS25.6 billion, or 34% of that
year's operating revenues. In February 2017, the province issued
its first international bond for $350 million, which is due 2025.
It reopened the bond in November 2017, and the province obtained
an additional $150 million. The issuances raised debt denominated
in foreign currency to 57% of the total stock; and we believe the
province could be exposed to some risk given that current
conditions both locally and internationally could make access to
debt markets more challenging for Argentinean entities going
forward. On Sept. 30, 2018, the province has to repay ARS900
million to the sovereign. We believe the province could rely on
short-term debt to cover this maturing payment, as it did until
December 2017, when it canceled all outstanding short-term debt.
In our view, large levels of short-term debt could pressure the
rating downwards.

"In our view, Entre Rios' contingent liabilities are low. Eleven
public companies aren't consolidated in the provincial budget. We
consider them as self-supporting entities because they don't need
financial support from the province, and are unlikely to receive
support from it in the future. The largest of these entities are
the electricity distribution company ENERSA, the insurance company
Instituto Aut†rquico Provincial del Seguro Entre R°os, and Ente
Interprovincial del T£nel Subfluvial, which operates the tunnel
that connects Entre Rios with Santa Fe. The debt of the eleven
companies amounts to ARS4.2 billion, which is equivalent to 8% of
the province's operating revenues.

"We estimate that Entre Rios' free cash and liquid assets will
cover almost 30% of its estimated debt service of ARS8.9 billion
in 2018. We also believe that the province will be able and
willing to meet its debt service obligations using both internal
and external sources. Although the province obtained financing in
2017, its access to external financing remains limited. Our
assessment uses our evaluation of the developing domestic capital
markets as well as our assessment of the domestic banking system.
For the latter, our Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment
(BICRA) for Argentina is at group '8'. We group our BICRAs, which
evaluate and compare global banking systems, on a scale from '1'
to '10', ranging from what we view as the lowest-risk banking
systems (group '1') to the highest-risk (group '10').

"Fiscal prudency somewhat offsets challenging economic conditions
and a volatile and underfunded institutional framework
Entre Rios' administration (Frente Para la Victoria, 2016-2020)
has made progress in reducing its fiscal deficit. During 2017 and
the first half of 2018, we've seen the province's revenue and
expenditure management improve. We believe the financial
management has adequate expertise and sufficient transparency.
However, long-term capital and financial planning, as well as debt
and liquidity management, remain limited. In the last few years,
the province's planning focused on the short to medium term, and
it mainly used debt to cover liquidity needs.

"The province's GDP per capita is similar to that of the
sovereign. We estimate that it averaged $12,628 during 2015-2017,
compared to the national average of $14,048 during the same
period. We expect Entre Rios' economy to perform in line with the
sovereign; growing by 1% and 2% in 2018 and 2019, respectively.
Entre Rios' main economic activities are related to services,
especially wholesale and retail trade, and the food industry.
Entre Rios is Argentina's main poultry and citrus producer.

"We continue to view the institutional framework for Argentine
LRGs as very volatile and underfunded. However, we believe the
outcome of reforms and the pace of their implementation are
becoming more predictable. This comes amid increased dialogue
between LRGs and the national government to address various fiscal
and economic challenges that we expect to remain in the short to
medium term."

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by
the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and
was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision.
After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.

Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot above.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook. The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

  RATINGS LIST

  Ratings Affirmed

  Entre Rios (Province of)
   Issuer Credit Rating                   B/Stable/--
   Senior Unsecured                       B



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B R A Z I L
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CEMIG GERACAO: Fitch Rates Proposed Reopening Eurobonds 'B'/'RR4'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned a 'B'/'RR4' rating to Cemig Geracao e
Transmissao S.A.'s (Cemig GT) proposed reopening of up to USD500
million of its USD1 billion eurobonds due 2024.

The reopening will be unconditionally and irrevocably guaranteed
by Companhia Energetica de Minas Gerais (Cemig). The company will
use the proceeds to repay certain existing debt and improve
liquidity position. Fitch currently rates Companhia Energetica de
Minas Gerais (Cemig) and its wholly owned subsidiaries Cemig
Distribuicao S.A. (Cemig D) and Cemig Geracao e Transmissao S.A.
(Cemig GT)'s Long-term Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default
Ratings (IDRs) 'B' and Long-term National Scale Rating 'BBB-(bra)'
with a Stable Outlook.

Cemig, Cemig D and Cemig GT's ratings reflect the group's
aggressive consolidated financial profile and pressured liquidity.
As of March 31, 2018, the group has to manage short-term
obligations of BRL2.6 billion and roughly BRL600 million of the
remainder portion of the put option related to Light S.A.'s
shares. Positively, Cemig was able to deal with challenging
refinancing needs since the end of 2017, as the group renegotiated
around BRL3.4 billion with bank; issued the USD1 billion
eurobonds; had a capital injection of BRL1.3 billion and sold
around BRL 700 million in Transmissora Alian?a de Energia Eletrica
S.A. (Taesa)'s shares. Nevertheless, delays in completing its
strategy for asset disposal are having a negative impact on the
group's ability to improve its financial metrics on a sustainable
basis.

The ratings also incorporate the expected additional EBITDA, by
around BRL400 million to BRL500 million annually, coming from
Cemig D's tariff review process, which is viewed as positive to
support the group's deleveraging process. The expected better
operational results of the distribution segment will help the net
adjusted leverage to be around 3.5x-4.2x in the next four years,
according to Fitch's base case scenario, which is low for the IDR
of the a company in the power sector. Negatively, the high
interest payments should continue to pressure the group's free
cash flow (FCF).

Cemig and its subsidiaries' credit profiles are analyzed on a
consolidated basis due to cross-default clauses and cash dynamics.
The group has low to moderate business risk, supported by low
competition and positive asset diversification, mainly into power
generation, transmission and distribution segments, being the
latter the most volatile. Positively, Cemig has a relevant asset
base in the Brazilian electric sector, including shared control in
several companies with significant market value. The IDRs also
factor in the existence of political risk, due to Cemig's
condition as a state-owned company, as well as a moderate
regulatory risk for the Brazilian power sector and hydrology risk
currently above historical average.

The Recovery Rating of Cemig GT's eurobond issuance of 'RR4'
reflects the bulk of Cemig group's assets being in the Brazilian
jurisdiction, which means limiting recovery prospects at the range
of 31%-50% in the event of default, given the group's cash flow
generation and assets portfolio.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Higher EBITDA: Fitch believes that Cemig's consolidated FCF will
be positive at around BRL160 million in 2018 and BRL300 million in
2019, as Cemig D is expected to obtain annual additional EBITDA of
BRL400 million-BRL500 million after the implementation of the
fourth tariff review cycle, concluded in May 2018. The higher
EBITDA should contribute to boost the group's cash flow from
operations (CFFO). Cemig D's reported EBITDA of BRL831 million in
2017 is far from the regulatory EBITDA of BRL1.7 billion, so the
company needs to improve efficiency. In the LTM ended March 31,
2018, consolidated CFFO was negative BRL880 million due to the
impact of non-manageable costs of around BRL1.1 billion at Cemig
D, compared with a positive impact of BRL1.6 billion in the year-
earlier period. Capex of BRL1.1 billion and BRL540 million in
dividend payments resulted in negative FCF of BRL2.5 billion.

Moderate Leverage: Fitch expects Cemig's consolidated net adjusted
leverage to reduce to the range of 3.5x to 4.2x in the next four
years. As of March 31, 2018, Cemig reported consolidated net
adjusted debt/adjusted EBITDA of 5.0x after almost 6.0x in 2016.
Fitch includes the guarantees of BRL5.9 billion to non-
consolidated companies, mainly to the Belo Monte and Santo Antonio
hydro plants, and the exercised put option in total adjusted debt.
On the other hand, dividends received from non-consolidated
investments of BRL390 million were added to EBITDA.

Favorable Business Model: The group benefits from diversification
of segments and assets, which mitigates operational risks and
reduces cash flow volatility. Cemig is one of Brazil's largest
power companies, with 8.4 million clients in the distribution
segment, 5.7GW of power generation installed capacity and 8.2
thousand of transmission lines. The company is not expected to
enter in greenfield projects and in the acquisition of assets,
after having historically a very aggressive growth strategy. The
debt associated with the acquisitions at relevant levels and
strong dividend payments in the past have significantly affected
the group's credit quality.

Strategic Sector for the Country: In Fitch's analysis, the credit
profile of agents in the Brazilian power sector benefits from its
strategic importance to sustain the country's economic growth and
to foster new investments. The federal government has acted to
circumvent systemic problems that impact the cash flow of
companies and guided discussions to improve the current regulatory
framework in order to reduce the sector's risk.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Comparing to peers in the power sector, Cemig presents higher
leverage and weaker liquidity than Eletropaulo Metropolitana de
Eletricidade de Sao Paulo (Local and Foreign Currency IDRs 'BB')
and its affiliated company Light S.A. (Local and Foreign Currency
IDRs 'BB-'), despite of its more diversified asset base that tends
to reduce operational risks and cash flow volatility. When
assessing other Latin American players at the power sector,
although Cemig has a larger revenue base, its coverage ratios
compare unfavourably with AES Argentina and Genneia, both with
Local Currency IDR of 'BB-'.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within the rating case for the issuer
include:

  -- Average energy consumption growth in Cemig D's concession
     area to increase 2.75% in 2018 and 3% in 2019-2020;

  -- Positive annual impact of BRL400 million-BRL500 million on
     Cemig D's EBITDA related to the fourth tariff review cycle;

  -- Cemig D's non-manageable costs fully passed through tariffs;

  -- Average consolidated capex of BRL1.5 billion during 2018-
     2021;

  -- Dividend payout of 50% of net income or BRL420 million,
     considering which one presents the higher amount;

  -- No cash outflow to pay Light shares put option in 2018.

RATING SENSITIVITIES
Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Positive Rating Action.

  -- Improvement of liquidity with cash/short-term debt higher
     than 1.0x;

  -- Maintenance of net adjusted leverage lower than 3.5x;

  -- Ability to reduce interest rates.

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Negative Rating Action

  -- Deterioration of liquidity and reduction in financial
     flexibility with cash/short-term debt below 0.5x;

  -- Maintenance of net adjusted leverage higher than 5.0x;

  -- Perception of lower financial flexibility to meet short-term
     debt maturities.

LIQUIDITY

Still Weak Liquidity Profile: Cemig group still has an aggressive
liquidity profile despite of the improvements in the last six
months through the debt renegotiation with banks, equity
injection, eurobond issuance and the sale of Taesa shares.
Nevertheless, as of March 31, 2018, the group has faced the
challenge of managing short-term obligations of BRL3.2 billion,
coming from BRL 2.3 billion of debentures and around BRL600
million of Light's shares put options on November and BRL330
million of local bank debt and others. The group has already paid
BRL 800 million debentures in February 2018.

The expected additional EBITDA from the distribution segment and
potential asset sales may also be important internal sources of
liquidity in the next years. As of March 31, 2018, Cemig group's
total adjusted debt amounted to BRL20.5 billion (including off-
balance-sheet debt of BRL5.9 billion and exercised put option of
BRL600 million), while cash and equivalents were BRL842 million.
The proposed up to USD 500 million eurobonds re-opening
(equivalent to around BRL1.8 billion) is expected to improve the
group's liquidity profile.

FULL LIST OF RATINGS

Fitch currently rates Cemig as follows:

Cemig

  -- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR 'B';

  -- Long-Term Local Currency IDR 'B';

  -- Long-Term National scale rating 'BBB-(bra)'.

Cemig D

  -- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR 'B';

  -- Long-Term Local Currency IDR 'B';

  -- Long-Term National scale rating 'BBB-(bra)';

  -- BRL1.6 billion senior unsecured debentures due 2018
     'BBB-(bra)'.

Cemig GT

  -- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR 'B';

  -- Long-Term Local Currency IDR 'B';

  -- Long-Term National scale rating 'BBB-(bra)';

  -- BRL1.4 billion senior unsecured debentures, with two
     outstanding series due 2019 and 2022, 'BBB-(bra)';

  -- USD1 billion eurobonds due 2024 'B/RR4'.

The Rating Outlook is Stable.


OGX PETROLEO: Batista Gets 30-Year Jail Sentence for Corruption
---------------------------------------------------------------
Xinhua reports that Brazilian former billionaire Eike Batista was
found guilty of corruption and money laundering and sentenced to
30 years in prison on July 3.

The sentence marks a victory for Federal Police in their ongoing
anti-corruption investigation, known as Operation Car Wash which
began in 2014 after large-scale corruption at both local and
federal levels of Brazilian government was uncovered, Xinhua
notes.

The erstwhile business tycoon was found guilty of paying million-
dollar bribes to former Rio de Janeiro state governor Sergio
Cabral, in exchange for his company being favored for state
government contracts, Xinhua discloses.  Mr. Batista's lawyers, as
cited by Xinhua, said they would appeal the sentence.  Mr. Batista
is currently serving house arrest, Xinhua states.

According to Xinhua, Mr. Batista will face further charges
relating to Operation Car Wash at a later date, meaning his
sentence could be added to.

The former mining and oil magnate was once Brazil's richest man
and the eighth richest man in the world, at one time enjoying a
fortune of around USD34 billion, Xinhua relays.

However, most of this was lost after OGX, the oil conglomerate
Batista headed, was discovered to have forged reports to make
their oil fields appear viable, despite the wells being duds,
according to Xinhua.

Mr. Batista's empire crumbled after the value of OGX plummeted
following the discovery of the forgeries, Xinhua discloses.  The
company defaulted payments and filed for bankruptcy protection in
2013, Xinhua recounts.

                      About OGX Petroleo

Based in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, OGX Petroleo e Gas Participacoes
S.A., now known as Oleo e Gas, is an independent exploration and
production company with operations in Latin America.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter - Latin America on
Jan. 22, 2016, Hannah Sheehan at Law360.com reports that a British
High Court judge upbraided OGX Petroleo e Gas Participacoes S.A.,
now known as Oleo e Gas, for omitting evidence in an attempt to
escape a London arbitration proceeding brought by two foreign
firms.

Justice Richard Snowden expressed dismay that OGX Petroleo never
revealed that the dispute in arbitration over $78.73 million in
unpaid ship charter fees was not subject to the company's
reorganization plan, which the Fourth Corporate Court of Rio de
Janeiro approved after OGX filed for bankruptcy in Brazil,
according to Law360.com.

OGX filed for bankruptcy in a business tribunal in Rio de Janeiro
on Oct. 30, 2013, case number 0377620-56.2013.8.19.0001.  The
bankruptcy filing puts US$3.6 billion of dollar bonds into default
in the largest corporate debt debacle on record in Latin America.
The filing by the oil company that transformed Eike Batista into
Brazil's richest man followed a 16-month decline that wiped out
more than US$30 billion of his personal fortune.

The filing, which in Brazil is called a judicial recovery, follows
months of negotiations to restructure the dollar bonds, in which
OGX sought to convert debt to equity and secure as much as US$500
million in new funds.  OGX said Oct. 29, 2013 that the talks
concluded without an agreement.


USJ ACUCAR: S&P Lowers Corp Credit Rating to 'CCC', Outlook Neg.
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its global scale corporate credit
rating on USJ Acucar e Alcool S/A (USJ) to 'CCC' from 'CCC+'. The
outlook is negative. At the same time, S&P lowered its senior
unsecured debt rating to 'CC' from 'CCC-', but kept its recovery
rating of '6' on USJ's unsecured debt unchanged.

The downgrade reflects S&P's belief that USJ will face significant
strains to meet its obligations in the next 6-12 months, which
include cash interest payments on its 2021 bond beginning in
November 2018, amid the currently unfavorable industry
fundamentals and the company's deteriorating operating
performance, which hinder USJ's cash generation.

USJ posted worse-than-expected operating performance in fiscal
2018 (ended March 31, 2018) due to a steep decline in sugar prices
and a drought that shrunk yields at the company's plantations,
increasing idle capacity and preventing the company from diluting
fixed costs. This, coupled with unexpectedly higher capital
expenditures (capex), resulted in a free operating cash flow
(FOCF) shortfall of close to R$70 million, weakening credit
metrics and increasing refinancing risks compared with our July
2017 assessment.

S&P's base-case scenario assumes that the company will be unable
to meet its obligations in fiscal 2020, with mounting pressures in
May 2019, when it has to service another cash interest coupon from
its 2021 bond. Even though USJ has been able to roll over most
bank debt as it comes due, its sources of cash won't be enough to
cover its uses, especially given the low sugar prices and the
depreciation of the Brazilian real, affecting the company's debt,
which is mostly dollar-denominated.

Absent external factors, such as substantial land sales, capital
injection, or considerably stronger industry fundamentals
(including higher crushing volumes, and consistently higher sugar
and ethanol prices), the company's options would be to default or
renegotiate its debt with its bondholders. S&P would most likely
consider the latter as a distressed negotiation, which its
criteria considers as tantamount to default.



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C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
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ARABELLA PETROLEUM: Trustee, Committee File Chap. 11 Plan Outline
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Morris D. Weiss, the chapter 11 trustee for Arabella Petroleum
Company, LLC, and the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
for APC filed a joint disclosure statement in support of their
chapter 11 plan of reorganization, dated June 22, 2018, for APC.
Class 4 general unsecured creditors will receive a prorata share
of interests in the Liquidating Trust, equivalent to the ratio
that their individual Allowed Claim bears to the total of Class 4
Allowed Claims.

All assets of the Estate remaining as of the Effective Date, other
than as necessary to pay any Allowed Secured Claims, Allowed
Priority Claims, allowed Administrative Claims, pre- Effective
Date U.S Trustee's fees and a reserve for wind down costs will be
transferred to the Liquidating Trust.

The Trustee will fund payments under the Plan with Cash on hand.
Any Distributions made by the Liquidating Trustee to beneficiaries
of the Liquidating Trust will consist only of Trust Assets in
accordance with the Trust Agreement.

A full-text copy of the Disclosure Statement is available at:

          http://bankrupt.com/misc/txwb15-70098-752.pdf

Attorneys for Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors:

    Kenneth Green, Esq.
    Blake Hamm, Esq.
    Carolyn Carollo, Esq.
    SNOW SPENCE GREEN LLP
    2929 Allen Parkway, Suite 2800
    Houston, TX 77019
    Telephone: (713) 335-4800

    Email: kgreen@snowspencelaw.com
           blakehamm@snowspencelaw.com
           carolyncarollo@snowspencelaw.com

                    About Arabella Exploration

Arabella Exploration, LLC, formed on Oct. 2, 2009, is a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Arabella Exploration, Inc., a Cayman Islands
corporation. It is an oil and gas exploration company that owns
working interests in a number of oil and gas properties and
interests.

Arabella Exploration filed a voluntary petition for relief under
chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Case No. 17-
40120) on Jan. 8, 2017. Charles (Chip) Hoebeke, manager, signed
the petition.

Judge Russell F. Nelms in Ft. Worth, Texas, is the case judge.
Raymond W. Battaglia, Esq., of the Law Offices of Ray Battaglia,
PLLC, serves as counsel to the Debtor. Miller Johnson serves as
Battaglia's co-counsel. Rehmann Turnaround and Receivership's
Charles Hoebeke is the Debtor's chief restructuring officer.

Arabella Exploration estimated $1 million to $50 million in assets
and liabilities.

No trustee, examiner or committee has been appointed in the case.

On April 4, 2017, Arabella Operating, LLC, filed a Chapter 11
petition (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Case No. 17-41479). The case is being
jointly administered with that of Arabella Exploration.



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P E R U
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CHINA FISHERY: Copeinca Expects to Repay $6MM Loan on August 15
---------------------------------------------------------------
Jason Smith at Undercurrent News reports that Peruvian fishmeal
producer Copeinca will soon repay a $6 million line of credit that
it took out on the verge of its parent firm's June 30, 2016
bankruptcy filing.

According to Undercurrent News, William Brandt, the trustee
overseeing China Fishery's bankruptcy, said in a US court filing
the "emergency working capital" loan made on May 30, 2016, by
Peru's Cuantica Inversiones to Copeinca, a unit of China Fishery
Group, was used to pay "employees, overdue taxes and critical
suppliers" allowing it to operate for the 2016 fishing season.

The loan carries a 29.3% annual interest rate plus tax,
Undercurrent News discloses.  Mr. Brandt, as cited by Undercurrent
News, said Copeinca has paid Cuantica over $2.6 million in accrued
interest in the two years, but plans to use the fishing firm's
proceeds from the 2018 anchovy season to fully repay the loan's
principal on Aug. 15.

He noted that the bankruptcy court's approval is not needed to
repay the loan but he was providing notice of his plans "out of an
abundance of caution and in the interest of transparency",
according to Undercurrent News.

Mr. Brandt noted that he "has some concern" that entities
affiliated with Hong Kong's Ng family, which ultimately owns China
Fishery parent company Pacific Andes International Holdings
(PAIH), "may have been involved with the Cuantica Loan",
Undercurrent News relates.

According to Undercurrent News, Mr. Brandt wrote this could have
occurred "either by providing a guarantee for the loan or in some
other capacity, but the chapter 11 trustee has not independently
investigated the relationship between the Ng family and the
Cuantica loan".

Mr. Brandt, who was appointed in November 2016 after creditors
argued they had lost "trust" in the Ng family's management, has
long said that a sale of China Fishery, including Copeinca, is the
best way to recoup creditors' losses in PAIH's bankruptcy,
Undercurrent News recounts.

Interest in China Fishery, which is expected to fetch over $1
billion in a sale, has whittled down to around a half dozen
serious bidders, according to Undercurrent News.

Mr. Brandt said in June that expects to receive formal offers in
the coming weeks although several potential buyers have asked for
a slowdown in the sales process given recent political turmoil in
Peru, Undercurrent News notes.

           About China Fishery Group Limited (Cayman)

China Fishery Group Limited (Cayman) and its affiliates sought
protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Lead Case No. 16-11895) on June 30, 2016.

In the petition signed by CEO Ng Puay Yee, China Fishery Group
estimated its assets at $500 million to $1 billion and debt at
$10 million to $50 million.

The cases are assigned to Judge James L. Garrity Jr.
Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP has been tapped to serve as lead
bankruptcy counsel for China Fishery and its affiliates other
than CFG Peru Investments Pte. Limited (Singapore). Weil Gotshal
replaces Meyer, Suozzi, English & Klein, P.C., the law firm
initially hired by the Debtors. The Debtors have also tapped
Klestadt Winters Jureller Southard & Stevens, LLP, as conflict
counsel; Goldin Associates, LLC, as financial advisor; RSR
Consulting LLC as restructuring consultant; and Epiq Bankruptcy
Solutions, LLC, as administrative agent. Kwok Yih & Chan serves
as special counsel.

On Nov. 10, 2016, William Brandt, Jr., was appointed as Chapter
11 trustee for CFG Peru Investments Pte. Limited (Singapore), one
of the Debtors. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP serves
as the trustee's bankruptcy counsel; Hogan Lovells US LLP serves
as special counsel; and Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP,
serves as special litigation counsel.


CHINA FISHERY: CFPG Peru Trustee Files Lawsuit Against HSBC
-----------------------------------------------------------
Cliff White at Seafood Source reports that a lawsuit suit filed by
CFG Peru trustee William A. Brandt, Jr., has accused Hong Kong and
Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) of malicious behavior that
contributed to the insolvency of seafood giant China Fishery.

According to Seafood Source, the lawsuit was filed on June 29, the
same day as a separate lawsuit alleging that HSBC forced
Hong Kong-based China Fishery and its subsidiaries, including
Pacific Andes and CFG Peru Singapore, to make so-called "avoidable
transfers" worth more than USD22.6 million (EUR19.4 million),
directly contributing to its bankruptcy filing in 2016.

Mr. Brandt was appointed by U.S. Bankruptcy Court Judge James
Garrity in November 2016 to act as an impartial arbiter for the
restructuring of CFG Peru's assets and business during China
Fishery's Chapter 11 reorganization, Seafood Source recounts.  CFG
Peru is a holding company for three anchovy fishing and processing
operations in Peru, and is considered the most lucrative asset of
China Fishery, which at one time was ranked as the 12th-largest
seafood company in the world, Seafood Source notes.

Mr. Brandt's suit claims HSBC's conduct gives rise to common law
claims for negligence, breach of duty, and tortious interference,
Seafood Source relays.  The 46-page complaint, the public portion
of which is partially redacted to protect sensitive materials,
outlines a narrative that alleges HSBC led an effort to undermine
Pacific Andes' operations and valuation, either out of malice or
gross negligence, Seafood Source notes.

Mr. Brandt's suit primarily argues that the value of CFG Peru was
hurt by HSBC's actions, Seafood Source relaes.

The suit claims that China Fishery received indications of
interest in a sale of the CFG Peru's assets for USD1.7 billion in
the fall of 2015, and that in November 2015, China Fishery's
management was in advanced negotiations with two investment groups
regarding the acquisition of some or all of the CF Group, Seafood
Source discloses.  Furthermore, the suit claims China Fishery
officials had also received signals from a group of lenders that
included HSBC, Rabobank, Standard Chartered Bank, China Citic
Bank, and DBS Bank, indicating they all would soon approve an
extension of credit to the company, according to Seafood Source.

However, HSBC -- acting alone and without the knowledge or
approval of its fellow creditors -- initiated an action in a Hong
Kong court on November 25, 2015, seeking the winding up of China
Fishery and the appointment of joint provisional liquidators
(JPLs), Seafood Source relays, citing the lawsuit.

"The appointment of the Hong Kong JPLs and the specter of
liquidation altered the environment in which the sale was being
conducted, inviting lower bids," Seafood Source quotes Mr. Brandt
as saying in the lawsuit.  "The JPLs' appointment also damaged the
prospects for a value-maximizing sale for the Peruvian Business.
In November 2015, two investors interested in acquiring the CF
Group for as much as USD 1.7 billion were in discussions with the
Pacific Andes Group.  A memorandum of understanding was expected
to be signed on November 26, 2015.  HSBC commenced the proceedings
the day before, on November 25, 2015, and scuttled those
negotiations."

Mr. Brandt alleges furthermore, HSBC's actions scared away local
lenders in Peru, forcing China Fishery to accept financing at a
much higher cost and with painful stipulations, according to
Seafood Source.

                About China Fishery Group Limited (Cayman)

China Fishery Group Limited (Cayman) and its affiliates sought
protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Lead Case No. 16-11895) on June 30, 2016.

In the petition signed by CEO Ng Puay Yee, China Fishery Group
estimated its assets at $500 million to $1 billion and debt at
$10 million to $50 million.

The cases are assigned to Judge James L. Garrity Jr.
Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP has been tapped to serve as lead
bankruptcy counsel for China Fishery and its affiliates other
than CFG Peru Investments Pte. Limited (Singapore). Weil Gotshal
replaces Meyer, Suozzi, English & Klein, P.C., the law firm
initially hired by the Debtors. The Debtors have also tapped
Klestadt Winters Jureller Southard & Stevens, LLP, as conflict
counsel; Goldin Associates, LLC, as financial advisor; RSR
Consulting LLC as restructuring consultant; and Epiq Bankruptcy
Solutions, LLC, as administrative agent. Kwok Yih & Chan serves
as special counsel.

On Nov. 10, 2016, William Brandt, Jr., was appointed as Chapter
11 trustee for CFG Peru Investments Pte. Limited (Singapore), one
of the Debtors. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP serves
as the trustee's bankruptcy counsel; Hogan Lovells US LLP serves
as special counsel; and Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP,
serves as special litigation counsel.



====================
P U E R T O  R I C O
====================


INTRADE LOGISTICS: Case Summary & 11 Unsecured Creditors
--------------------------------------------------------
Debtor: Intrade Logistics Corp.
        State Road 865 Km. 5.4 Lot A-2
        Candelaria Arenas Ward
        Toa Baja, PR 00950

Business Description: Headquartered in Toa Baja, Puerto Rico,
                      Intrade Logistics Corp. is in the wine and
                      distilled beverages business.

Chapter 11 Petition Date: July 5, 2018

Case No.: 18-03828

Court: United States Bankruptcy Court
       District of Puerto Rico (Old San Juan)

Debtor's Counsel: Charles A. Cuprill Hernandez, Esq.
                  CHARLES A CURPILL, PSC LAW OFFICES
                  356 Calle Fortaleza
                  Second Floor
                  San Juan, PR 00901
                  Tel: 787 977-0515
                  E-mail: ccuprill@cuprill.com

Total Assets as of July 5, 2018: $1.13 million

Total Liabilities as of July 5, 2018: $1.88 million

The petition was signed by Rolando Fernandez, president.

A full-text copy of the petition containing, among other items, a
list of the Debtor's 11 unsecured creditors is available for free
at:

             http://bankrupt.com/misc/prb18-03828.pdf


KONA GRILL: Hires BDO USA as Auditors
-------------------------------------
The Audit Committee of the Board of Directors of Kona Grill, Inc.,
has engaged BDO USA, LLP as the Company's independent registered
public accounting firm.

During the Company's two most recent fiscal years and the
subsequent interim period through July 10, 2018, neither the
Company nor anyone on its behalf consulted with BDO with respect
to either (i) the application of accounting principles to a
specified transaction, either completed or proposed, or the type
of audit opinion that might be rendered on the Company's
consolidated financial statements, and no written report or oral
advice was provided to the Company that BDO concluded was an
important factor considered by the Company in reaching a decision
as to the accounting, auditing, or financial reporting issue or
(ii) any matter that was the subject of either a "disagreement".

                          About Kona Grill

Kona Grill, Inc., headquartered in Scottsdale, Arizona, Kona
Grill, Inc. - http://www.konagrill.com/- currently owns and
operates 46 restaurants in 23 states and Puerto Rico.
Additionally, Kona Grill has three restaurants that operate under
a franchise agreement in Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Vaughan,
Canada and Monterrey, Mexico.

Kona Grill incurred a net loss of $23.43 million in 2017 and a net
loss of $21.62 million in 2016. As of March 31, 2018, Kona Grill
had $87.01 million in total assets, $83.84 million in total
liabilities and $3.16 million in total stockholders' equity.
The Company has incurred losses resulting in an accumulated
deficit of $79.7 million, has a net working capital deficit of
$7.6 million and outstanding debt of $37.8 million as of Dec. 31,
2017. The Company said in its 2017 Annual Report that these
conditions together with recent debt covenant violations and
subsequent debt covenant waivers and debt amendments, raise
substantial doubt about its ability to continue as a going
concern.


S DIAMOND STEEL: Aug. 15 Plan Confirmation Hearing
--------------------------------------------------
Bankruptcy Judge Brenda K. Martin issued an order approving S
Diamond Steel, Inc.'s second amended disclosure statement
referring to its second amended plan.

The hearing to consider the confirmation of the Second Amended
Plan will be held at the United States Bankruptcy Court, 230 N.
First Avenue, 7th Floor, Courtroom 701, Phoenix, Arizona on
August 15, 2018 at 11 a.m.

Ballots accepting or rejecting the plan must be received by the
Plan Proponent at least seven days prior to the hearing date set
for the confirmation of the plan.

The last day for filing with the Court and serving written
objections to confirmation of the plan is fixed at seven days
prior to the hearing date set for confirmation of the plan.

As previously reported by the Troubled Company Reporter, the
Second Amended Disclosure Statement provides that the Debtor and
creditor Board of Trustees of the California Ironworkers Field
Pension Trust have entered into a Settlement Agreement, and a
motion to approve the same has been filed with the Court.

A full-text copy of the Second Amended Disclosure Statement is
available at:

          http://bankrupt.com/misc/azb2-16-07846-246.pdf

A full-text copy of the Second Amended Plan is available at:

         http://bankrupt.com/misc/azb2-16-07846-247.pdf

                       About S Diamond Steel

S Diamond Steel, Inc., based in Phoenix, Arizona, has been in
business as a Steel fabrication and erection contractor primarily
in the states of Arizona, Nevada, New Mexico, and California since
2001. Since 2001, S Diamond has also worked in other states as
well as Puerto Rico.

The Debtor filed a Chapter 11 petition (Bankr. D. Ariz. Case No.
16-07846) on July 11, 2016. The petition was signed by Matthew
Miles Stevens, president. The case is assigned to Judge Brenda K.
Martin.

Allan NewDelman, Esq., at Allan D. NewDelman P.C. serves as the
Debtor's legal counsel. Guy W. Bluff, Esq., at Bluff & Associates
represents the Debtor in connection with a $1.9 million claim
filed by the Board of Trustees of the California Ironworkers Field
Pension Trust in November last year.

The Debtor disclosed $1.59 million in total assets and $5.58
million in total liabilities. No official committee of unsecured
creditors has been appointed in the Debtor's case.


YORAVI INVESTMENT: Disclosure Statement Hearing Set for Aug. 10
---------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico is set
to hold a hearing on August 10 to consider approval of the
disclosure statement, which explains the Chapter 11 plan of
reorganization for Yoravi Investment, Inc.

The hearing will be held at 9:30 a.m., at Courtroom 3.

Under the proposed plan, creditors holding Class 1 general
unsecured claims will be paid 100% of their allowed claims in five
years, plus interest at the rate of 4.25% per annum.

The total amount of general unsecured claims is approximately
$15,641.71. Class 1 is impaired.

The plan will be funded by cash on hand on the effective Date, and
future earnings of the reorganized company, according to Yoravi's
disclosure statement.

A copy of the disclosure statement is available for free at

           http://bankrupt.com/misc/prb17-05446-124.pdf

                      About Yoravi Investment

Yoravi Investments, Inc., owns a real estate property at Centro
Comercial Turabo Gardens valued at $1.10 million. Yoravi
Investments sought protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 17-05446) on Aug. 1, 2017. In the
petition signed by Rafael E. Acosta Santiago, vice-president and
treasurer, the Debtor disclosed $1.15 million in assets and
$714,000 in liabilities. Judge Edward A. Godoy presides over the
case. The Debtor tapped Godreau & Gonzalez Law, LLC, as its
bankruptcy counsel, and Enrique Peral Soler, Esq., as special
counsel.



=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================


PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: Accused of Fraud by ConocoPhillips
----------------------------------------------------------
Tom Jones at Latin Lawyer reports that US energy multinational
ConocoPhillips has accused Venezuela's state-run oil company PDVSA
of fraudulently trying to shield the potential proceeds of a
billion-dollar fraud litigation in Florida from the reach of its
arbitral creditors.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
March 19, 2018, Moody's Investors Service downgraded Petroleos de
Venezuela, S.A.(PDVSA)'s ratings to C from Ca.  Moody's also
lowered the company's baseline credit assessment (BCA) to c from
ca.


PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: Proposed Bankruptcy Law Faces Challenges
----------------------------------------------------------------
Jose Ignacio Hernandez at Americas Quarterly reports that a
National Assembly-proposed bankruptcy law shows the depths of the
challenges PDVSA faces.

Venezuela's oil industry is in a state of collapse: PDVSA, the
state-oil firm, is strapped for cash and facing intense pressure
from international creditors, Americas Quarterly notes discloses.
Production at the company has fallen by 38 percent since 2016,
Americas Quarterly notes.

Against that panorama, members of the opposition-controlled
National Assembly have introduced legislation to address a complex
patchwork of laws that leave PDVSA unable to seek relief from
creditors through bankruptcy procedures, Americas Quarterly
relates.  This last-ditch effort to pull PDVSA from the brink
faces long odds: Even if it's approved by the Assembly, President
Nicolas Maduro's Supreme Court, or his National Constituent
Assembly, will likely declare it null, Americas Quarterly states.

But the fact that the legislation is being debated at all is a
sign of progress -- one that could be meaningful to Venezuela's
eventual economic recovery, Americas Quarterly notes.

The seizure of oil assets would only make it more difficult for
Venezuela to emerge from its political, economic and humanitarian
crisis, according to Americas Quarterly.  PDVSA has struggled to
ship to China, for example, since the U.S. oil firm ConocoPhillips
took over crucial assets in the Caribbean after winning a $2
billion arbitration award in an international court, Americas
Quarterly relays.

It doesn't help that "most of the oil produced does not generate
cash flow to PDVSA," in the words of energy expert Francisco
Monaldi, Americas Quarterly discloses.  According to Americas
Quarterly, the decline in production has aggravated cash-flow
problems, which are already severe due in part to the government's
oil-for-cash commitments to countries like Russia and China.  To
complicate matters further, the U.S. government recently expanded
sanctions to target PDVSA's factoring operations, a process that
helps oil and gas companies increase cash flow, Americas Quarterly
states.

The National Assembly's law would give the company some breathing
room, Americas Quarterly says.  The proposal calls for a special
bankruptcy regime for state-owned enterprises like PDVSA, since it
is unclear how existing bankruptcy laws should currently be
applied, according to Americas Quarterly.

The proposed law would ensure non-discriminatory treatment among
PDVSA's creditors, as well as compliance with due process
standards following the UN's general guidelines, Americas
Quarterly notes.

This would allow PDVSA to request the recognition of a domestic
bankruptcy procedure before any court in countries in which the
company has assets, Americas Quarterly relays.  Following other
similar regulations, the special law could also create a procedure
by which PDVSA, under the control of the court, would be able to
negotiate a debt restructuring with a majority of its bondholders,
Americas Quarterly says.

The National Assembly is expected to approve the law in the coming
months, Americas Quarterly discloses.  Unfortunately, the
government-controlled Supreme Court or National Constituent
Assembly would likely declare it null, as they have done with
other laws, Americas Quarterly states.

In the meantime, PDVSA's assets overseas will continue to lack
special protection and, accordingly, they will be subject to
claims that could aggravate the company's production problems,
according to Americas Quarterly.  Claims may be presented not only
by PDVSA's creditors, but also by creditors who own government
debt and argue that PDVSA is an "alter ego" of the government,
Americas Quarterly relays.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
March 19, 2018, Moody's Investors Service downgraded Petroleos de
Venezuela, S.A.(PDVSA)'s ratings to C from Ca.  Moody's also
lowered the company's baseline credit assessment (BCA) to c from
ca.



=================
X X X X X X X X X
=================


* BOND PRICING: For the Week From July 9 to July 13, 2018
----------------------------------------------------------

Issuer Name               Cpn     Price   Maturity  Country  Curr
-----------               ---     -----   --------  -------   ---

BA-CA Finance Cayman Lt   0.518    62.07               KY    EUR
AES Tiete Energia SA      6.7842   1.109  4/15/2024    BR    BRL
Argentina Bogar Bonds     2       39.36   2/4/2018     AR    ARS
Automotores Gildemeister  8.25    73.25   5/24/2021    CL    USD
Automotores Gildemeister  6.75    67      1/15/2023    CL    USD
Automotores Gildemeister  8.25    73.25   5/24/2021    CL    USD
Automotores Gildemeister  6.75    65.5    1/15/2023    CL    USD
CA La Electricidad        8.5     63.664  4/10/2018    VE    USD
Caixa Geral De Depositos  1.439   63.167               KY    EUR
Caixa Geral De Depositos  1.469                        KY    EUR
CSN Islands XII Corp      7       68                   BR    USD
CSN Islands XII Corp      7       66.266               BR    USD
Decimo Primer Fideicomiso 6       53.225 10/25/2041    PA    USD
Decimo Primer             4.54    43.127 10/25/2041    PA    USD
Dolomite Capital         13.217   73.108 12/20/2019    CN    ZAR
Enel Americas SA          5.75    56.172  6/15/2022    CL    CLP
Gol Linhas Aereas SA     10.75    35.861  2/12/2023    BR    USD
Gol Linhas Aereas SA     10.75    35.601  2/12/2023    BR    USD
Inversora Electrica       6.5     67.625  9/26/2017    AR    USD
Inversora Electrica       6.5     67.625  9/26/2017    AR    USD
MIE Holdings Corp         7.5     64.78   4/25/2019    HK    USD
MIE Holdings Corp         7.5     64.982  4/25/2019    HK    USD
NB Finance Ltd            3.88    61.816  2/7/2035     KY    EUR
Noble Holding             7.7     74.433  4/1/2025     KY    USD
Noble Holding             5.25    56.279  3/15/2042    KY    USD
Noble Holding             8.7     71.881  4/1/2045     KY    USD
Noble Holding             6.2     60.129  8/1/2040     KY    USD
Noble Holding             6.05    58.38   3/1/2041     KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.5     42.5                 KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.125   56.938  6/26/2022    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7       68.053  4/21/2020    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.125   41.366  6/26/2042    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     4.375   40.002  4/25/2025    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.25    39.211  6/27/2029    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     6       44.75   4/5/2023     KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.25    39.018  6/27/2029    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.5     42.95                KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     4.375   40.363  4/25/2025    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.125   41.635  6/26/2042    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     6       52.625  4/5/2023     KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.125   55.873  6/26/2022    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7       67.368  4/21/2020    KY    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    8.5     74.5   10/27/2020    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6       30.458  5/16/2024    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6       30.517 11/15/2026    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    9.75    35.677  5/17/2035    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    9       39.279 11/17/2021    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    5.375   30.267  4/12/2027    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    8.5     72.5   10/27/2020    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela   12.75    45.278  2/17/2022    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6       30.367  5/16/2024    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6       30.387 11/15/2026    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    9       39.316 11/17/2021    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    9.75    35.893  5/17/2035    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6       28.346 10/28/2022    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    5.5     30.123  4/12/2037    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela   12.75    45.23   2/17/2022    VE    USD
Polarcus Ltd              5.6     75      3/30/2022    AE    USD
Provincia del Chubut      4              10/21/2019    AR    USD
Siem Offshore Inc         4.04527 69.5   10/30/2020    NO    NOK
Siem Offshore             3.75176 65.75  12/28/2021    NO    NOK
STB Finance               2.05771 56.243               KY    JPY
Sylph Ltd                 2.367   64.438  9/25/2036    KY    USD
US Capital                1.63611 54.774 12/1/2039     KY    USD
US Capital                1.63611 54.774 12/1/2039     KY    USD
USJ Acucar                9.875   67     11/9/2019     BR    USD
USJ Acucar                9.875   67     11/9/2019     BR    USD
Venezuela                13.625   68.25   8/15/2018    VE    USD
Venezuela                 7.75    44.065 10/13/2019    VE    USD
Venezuela                11.95    40.785  8/5/2031     VE    USD
Venezuela                12.75    45.19   8/23/2022    VE    USD
Venezuela                 9.25    39.645  9/15/2027    VE    USD
Venezuela                11.75    40.005 10/21/2026    VE    USD
Venezuela                 9       36.285  5/7/2023     VE    USD
Venezuela                 9.375   37.69   1/13/2034    VE    USD
Venezuela                13.625   72.25   8/15/2018    VE    USD
Venezuela                 7       34.23   3/31/2038    VE    USD
Venezuela                 7       59.19  12/1/2018     VE    USD





                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2018.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.
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