TCRLA_Public/180813.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

            Monday, August 13, 2018, Vol. 19, No. 159



ARGENTINA: Bonds Slump as Graft Probe Pushes Economy to the Brink


BRAZIL: S&P Affirms BB-/B Sovereign Credit Ratings, Outlook Stable
PETROLEO BRASILEIRO: Gets $265.9MM Reimbursement for Losses


GUATEMALA: Volcano Fires up With Strong Explosion, Avalanches


NICARAGUA: Protesters Plan March Calling for Release of Prisoners

P U E R T O    R I C O

BAILEY'S EXPRESS: Plan Admin Taps Shapiro as Special Counsel
HORNED DORSET: ITC Violated Automatic Stay, Court Rules
SPANISH BROADCASTING: Expects $34.5M to $34.8M 2nd Quarter Revenue
TOYS R US: Affiliates Tap Fox Rothschild as Conflicts Counsel


VENEZUELA: Regime Releases Video of Confession in Attack on Maduro


* BOND PRICING: For the From August 6 to August 10, 2018

                            - - - - -


ARGENTINA: Bonds Slump as Graft Probe Pushes Economy to the Brink
Pablo Rosendo Gonzalez, Carolina Millan, and Patrick Gillespie at
Bloomberg News report that the corruption scandal that broke in
Argentina could be a political godsend for President Mauricio
Macri -- and an economic nightmare for the country.

A federal judge is probing hundreds of alleged bribes paid by
construction companies, energy suppliers and electricity
generators to members of the former government of Cristina
Fernandez de Kirchner, according to Bloomberg News.  While the
accusations may derail Fernandez's hopes of a comeback, aiding
President Macri, they could also halt investment in a country
already threatened with recession after a collapse in the peso,
Bloomberg News notes.

Bloomberg News says that police have arrested more than a dozen
former government officials and business leaders since Aug. 1, the
day that La Nacion published an investigation into a decade of
alleged corruption under Kirchner and her late husband.  Companies
named in the probe include power generator Albanesi SA, the
construction companies IECSA SA and Grupo Roggio, and Grupo
Techint, which owns the oil exploration company Tecpetrol SA. As
the scandal evolves, borrowing costs have soared and Albanesi has
been forced to cancel a bond sale, Bloomberg News notes.

"It will be difficult to put the genie back in the bottle," said
Guido Chamorro, senior investment manager of Pictet Asset
Management Ltd in London, Bloomberg News discloses.  "It doesn't
appear from an outsider perspective that this will end anytime
soon," he added.

Bloomberg News relays that the fear is that investors will shun
the country until the investigation has been completed.  The hope
is that President Macri and his market-friendly reforms will face
less opposition ahead of next year's presidential election,
Bloomberg News relays.  But investors may be getting weary,
Bloomberg News notes.  The latest threat to investment comes on
the heels of a currency collapse in May that forced President
Macri to turn to the International Monetary Fund for a $50 billion
credit line, Bloomberg News says.  Inflation is running at 29.5
percent and the benchmark interest rate is at 40 percent,
Bloomberg News discloses.

For many investors, the scandal all sounds horribly similar to the
so-called Car Wash case in Brazil, which helped bring down one
president and contributed to almost three years of recession,
Bloomberg News notes.

                           Century Bonds

As pressure on the economy mounted, the yield on Argentina's
century bonds rose to a record 9.48 percent Aug. 8 from 8.92
percent the day before the scandal broke, Bloomberg News says.
The bonds pared losses in early trading Aug. 9, with the yield
dropping to 9.42 percent, Bloomberg News says.

It's even worse for corporate bonds, Bloomberg News notes.
Albanesi bonds due 2023 now yield 14.90 percent, up 4.37
percentage points since the case began, pushing the spread over
U.S. Treasuries to more than 10 points, a level typically
associated with distress, Bloomberg News discloses.  MSU Energy
notes due in 2025 yield 13.08 percent, while Tecpetrol bonds due
2022 yield 8.34 percent, Bloomberg News says.  Clisa, controlled
by Grupo Roggio, is the worst performer, with its 2023 bonds
yielding 19.25 percent.

"We are still in the early days of the investigation which means
it is difficult to predict the full scope of the scandal," said
Jeffrey Lehtman, partner at Richards Kibbe & Orbe LLP, Bloomberg
News notes. "But the economy's reaction thus far does not bode
well," he added.

                              Bad Way

Even before the latest scandal broke, Argentina's economy was in a
bad way, Bloomberg News says.  Industrial production slumped 8.1
percent in June from the year earlier, the biggest decline in 16
years, Bloomberg News relays.

The country's dollar-denominated GDP Warrants issued in 2010 -- a
security that pays investors if the economy grows a certain amount
in a year -- have fallen to their lowest level ever as Argentina
heads towards recession this year, Bloomberg News notes.

Now, as the police probe some of the country's largest companies
and the Merval stock index tumbles 9.2 percent in just over a
week, it is not clear where any revival in investment will come
from, Bloomberg News discloses.

"The market is not telling us that there's a heightened risk of
default, it's saying: 'I don't know.' And not knowing comes at a
cost in Argentina," Roger Horn, senior emerging-markets desk
analyst at SMBC Nikko Securities America Inc., said by phone,
Bloomberg News relays.

                         Cutting Exposure

According to Bloomberg News, the scandal broke after La Nacion
obtained a series of notebooks belonging to Oscar Centeno, a
driver for the former deputy secretary for planning.  Mr. Centeno
had meticulously kept records of names, amounts, addresses and
dates of alleged bribes paid between 2005 and 2015.  The paper
said some bribes were delivered directly to Kirchner's apartment
in Buenos Aires and the official presidential residence, Quinta de
Olivos, notes the report.

The judge has kept many of the details of his investigation under
wraps but that may all change today, Aug. 13, when Kirchner has
been called in for questioning, Bloomberg News relays.

For now, it's too soon to evaluate the economic impact of the
Pandora's box that Centeno has opened, the Treasury Ministry's
press office said, responding to a Bloomberg inquiry.  The case
may lead to some short-term uncertainty, Cabinet Chief Marcos Pena
told reporters in Buenos Aires, the report discloses.

The rise in borrowing costs isn't hurting just those named in the
notebooks, Bloomberg News relays.  The oil giant YPF SA said that
it would turn to banks to secure financing after the scandal
caused the bond market to tighten, Bloomberg News notes.  The
company faces a $400 million maturity before year end.

"We see some investors who want to reduce their Argentina
exposure, and others that ask, can we understand the underlying
businesses and where the opportunities are?" Mr. Horn said,
Bloomberg News notes.  "Argentina has become Argentina again."

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
June 7, 2018, S&P Global Ratings affirmed on June 4, 2018, its
'B+' long-term sovereign credit ratings on the Republic of
Argentina. The outlook on the long-term ratings remains stable.
S&P also affirmed its short-term sovereign credit ratings on
Argentina at 'B', its 'raAA' national-scale ratings, and its
transfer and convertibility assessment of 'BB-'.

S&P said the stable outlook incorporates its expectation that
the Macri Administration will implement additional austerity-based
economic measures in the coming six months to contain and soon
reverse the deterioration in inflation dynamics, reduce the fiscal
deficit, and stabilize the economy. S&P expects the government's
decision to enter into an agreement with the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) will help sustain investor confidence and
maintain its access to capital market funding for its large fiscal
deficits. S&P expects that effective implementation of corrective
economic policies, including revised budgetary targets for this
year and next, will set the stage for better policy predictability
and continuity over the next several years.

Fitch Ratings affirmed on May 8, 2018, Argentina's Long-Term
Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B' and revised
the Outlook to Stable from Positive.

On December 4, 2017, Moody's Investors Service upgraded the
Government of Argentina's local and foreign currency issuer and
senior unsecured ratings to B2 from B3. The senior unsecured
shelves were upgraded to (P)B2 from (P)B3. The outlook on the
ratings is stable.  At the same time, Argentina's short-term
rating was affirmed at Not Prime (NP). The senior unsecured
ratings for unrestructured debt were affirmed at Ca and the
unrestructured senior unsecured shelf affirmed at (P)Ca.

As previously reported by the TCR-LA, Argentina defaulted on some
of its debt late July 30, 2014, after expiration of a 30- grace
period on a US$539 million interest payment.  Earlier that ,
talks with a court-appointed mediator ended without resolving a
standoff between the country and a group of hedge funds seeking
full payment on bonds that the country had defaulted on in 2001.
A U.S. judge had ruled that the interest payment couldn't be made
unless the hedge funds led by Elliott Management Corp., got the
US$1.5 billion they claimed. The country hasn't been able to
access international credit markets since its US$95 billion
default 13 years ago. On March 30, 2016, Argentina's Congress
passed a bill that will allow the government to repay holders of
debt that the South American country defaulted on in 2001,
including a group of litigating hedge funds that won judgments
in a New York court. The bill passed by a vote of 54-16.


BRAZIL: S&P Affirms BB-/B Sovereign Credit Ratings, Outlook Stable
On Aug. 9, 2018, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB-/B' long- and
short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on
Brazil. The outlook on the long-term ratings remains stable. S&P
said, "At the same time, we affirmed our transfer and
convertibility assessment of 'BB+'. We also affirmed our 'brAAA'
national scale rating, and the outlook remains stable."


S&P said, "The stable outlook reflects our view that there is a
less than one-in-three likelihood that we could raise or lower the
ratings on Brazil over the coming year. This reflects Brazil's
comparative external and monetary policy strengths that help
offset significant fiscal weakness, an economy with growth
prospects lower than peers, and our view that effectiveness of
policymaking across branches of government will generate slow
progress on consolidating Brazil's fiscal accounts.

"We could lower the ratings over the coming year should unforeseen
weakness in Brazil's balance of payments arise that either impairs
market access or generates a sharp rise in external debt.
Alternatively, a meaningful deterioration in recently improved
monetary policy credibility under the current administration,
marked by a persistent rise in inflation or weakened commitment to
a floating exchange rate regime, would also weigh on the rating.
Finally, we could lower the ratings if the government takes
measures that exacerbate already large fiscal vulnerabilities,
namely that worsen the trajectory for a slow decline in government
deficits or quicken the rise in debt.

"We could raise the ratings under multiple scenarios over the next
several years. The first would be if the next administration --
following the 2018 elections -- articulates and implements a solid
and sustainable fiscal correction backed by congressional support.
Alternatively, broad-based policy correction -- and fruits of
recent microeconomic reforms -- could support a higher rate of
trend GDP growth, such that Brazil's growth trajectory is no
longer weaker than that of its peers with a similar level of
economic development. Or, the currently very high fiscal deficits
could decline if the government runs a primary (non-interest)
fiscal surplus, indicating that net general government debt to GDP
has peaked and is set to fall, thanks to policy measures or better
GDP growth prospects."


S&P said, "Our ratings on Brazil reflect its institutional
strengths and weaknesses -- with the latter including slow
progress and support by the country's political class to put in
place meaningful legislation to correct structural fiscal slippage
on a timely basis over the past several years. While the economy
has stabilized, we see slow growth and fiscal weaknesses as key
credit constraints. The diversified economy has exited a steep
multiyear contraction, but we expect its growth to remain below
peers. High general government deficits persist, with debt
forecasted to continue to rise until 2021. Fiscal correction is a
multiyear, multiadministration challenge, in our view. In
contrast, Brazil's external position and monetary policy
credibility have, in our view, improved and are relative credit

Following the conclusion of party conventions on Aug. 5, the
presidential candidates must formally register to run by Aug. 15.
Campaigning starts thereafter for the Oct. 7 and 28 elections (two
rounds), with formal free TV time beginning Aug. 31. Polls will
prove more meaningful during the formal campaign period. However,
to date, the election dynamics remain very fluid, including
eligibility of former president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva as a
candidate. Voter disenchantment with the established political
class highlights the potential for election surprises and, with
it, policy uncertainty.

Despite efforts by the Temer government, the lack of progress and
substantial support across Brazil's political class for stronger
and swifter fiscal correction measures since the multiyear
economic contraction has exacerbated Brazil's underlying fiscal
vulnerabilities. This presents a challenging scenario for the
country's next president and Congress. It underscores the
importance of swift passage of corrective measures that have an
impact sooner rather than later. S&P's base case is one of
progress, but not necessarily a robust and prompt response
following the 2018 elections given risks about the ability of the
incoming president to amass a cohesive coalition.

Institutional and economic profile: Brazil's political class has
made slow progress on needed fiscal correction while growth moves
back into positive territory

-- Despite improvement in various policies under President Michel
    Temer's Administration, passage of legislation to structurally
    reduce the fiscal deficit remains elusive, creating difficult
    conditions for the next administration, given Brazil's high
    and rising government debt.

-- Corruption investigations have discredited many politicians,
    increasing the support thus far in the polls for potentially
    less experienced outsider candidates in the 2018 elections,
    which highlights risks for concerted coalition building and
    passage of difficult legislation.

-- S&P now expects the economy to grow 1.6% in 2018, a bit lower
    than it previously expected, and coming off a severe
    recession, growth prospects remain constrained by a high debt
    burden and low level of investment.

Postelection policy initiatives and the ability to formulate
strong coalitions will be key for Brazil's creditworthiness. The
Temer Administration has articulated a comprehensive macroeconomic
and microeconomic agenda to create conditions for stronger growth
and fiscal performance in the coming years. The Federal Accounting
Court (TCU) and Ministry of Finance are working more actively
together to strengthen transparency in fiscal accounts. Congress
passed part of the government's agenda:

-- A constitutional cap on spending,

-- Two phases of labor reform,

-- Immigration law,

-- Reopening of the oil and gas sector with lower domestic
    content rules,

-- A fiscal recovery regime for highly indebted, cash-strapped
    states willing to undertake spending reform, and

-- A revised scheme for subsidized credit at state-owned Banco
    Nacional do Desenvolvimento (BNDES) to remove subsidized
    lending over the coming five years.

However, progress passing legislation--to streamline rigid fiscal
expenditures and set the stage for adhering to the already
legislated cap on primary expenditure growth in the coming years--
has stalled, as have numerous other initiatives. This included the
second phase of the administration's back-loaded fiscal adjustment
plan, a pension reform, which hit stumbling blocks throughout
2017. The continued delays reflect weaker political support in
Congress to tackle structural fiscal rigidities--which require
changes to Brazil's constitution--on a timely basis. This and
other setbacks to short-term fiscal measures, including for the
2018 budget, across branches of government highlight the
challenges and reluctance of segments of the country's political
class to tackle difficult fiscal correction. This is despite large
fiscal imbalances.

This mixed support comes on top of a complex election scenario.
Extensive corruption scandals and economic contraction have raised
disenchantment of the electorate with established politicians.
This, coupled with popular push-back during the May truckers'
strike, raises the prospects for success of perceived outsider
candidates during the race. That could mean greater policy
uncertainty given lack of an established track record. In
addition, a less experienced president could face more difficulty
in managing unwieldy multiparty coalitions--a challenge for even
the most experienced politicians. This, in turn, is key to passing
any legislation in Brazil, let alone constitutional amendments.

Furthermore, the corruption scandals have created uncertainty for
Brazil's largest established political parties. Former president
Lula, of the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), is still the most
competitive candidate in public opinion polls despite being in
jail and having high rejection rates. The Partido da Social
Democracia Brasileira (PSDB) candidate, Geraldo Alckmin, despite
having the largest coalition support base, faces the challenge of
amassing popular support in an antiestablishment environment. The
almost 90% disapproval ratings of the Temer government weigh on
support for Movimento Democr†tico Brasileiro (MDB) candidate
Henrique Meirelles. This has opened the door to a wide set of

Uncertainties surrounding the election outcome include whether the
new president will effectively amass solid political capital to
quickly pass constitutional changes to meaningfully alleviate
spending and revenue bottlenecks. This reinforces S&P's view of
moderate progress on implementing fiscal adjustment.

S&P said, "We view the ongoing investigations of corruption
allegations against high-profile individuals and companies in both
the private and public sectors and across political parties as an
example of maturing checks and balances in Brazil. In addition,
Brazil's institutions have held solid amid independent
investigations and subsequent prosecutions of corrupt practices.
This reflects institutional strength, in contrast with some peers.
At the same time, a side effect has been weaker policy outcomes
and somewhat more uncertainty heading into the upcoming election.

"Our base-case expectation continues to be subdued GDP growth over
the next several years and per capita GDP of about US$9,200 for
2018. This follows estimated real GDP growth of 1% in 2017, after
negative GDP growth in 2015 and 2016. We expect growth to average
2.3% during 2019-2021. Brazil's growth prospects have been--and
will continue to be--below those of other countries at a similar
stage of development, in our view.

"The high household, corporate, and government indebtedness
constrains faster growth. Given the 2018 elections, and
uncertainty about potentially competitive outsider candidates, we
expect a muted pickup in investment in the nearer term. That said,
the more pronounced easing of monetary policy, given favorable
inflation dynamics, supports a pickup in growth this year. The
short-term effects of the truckers' strike on activity appear to
be waning, but this has contributed to lesser consumer confidence.
Continued efforts to restore macroeconomic balance are critical,
as is advancing microeconomic reforms, to support higher private
investment and growth."

Flexibility and performance profile: Comparative strength in
Brazil's external position and monetary policy flexibility
contrasts with its high and rising debt, large deficits, and
spending rigidities

-- Fiscal challenges remain significant given reduced revenue
    buoyancy and highly rigid expenditures that generate high
    primary and headline deficits with rising net general
    government debt.

-- Brazil's current account deficit remains low and more than
    financed by net foreign direct investment (FDI), bolstering
    international reserves and a decline in narrow net external

-- Inflation is well-anchored, despite the uptick since the May
    truckers' strike, and monetary policy remains on hold.

Besides subdued growth prospects, Brazil's fiscal position is its
other key rating weakness. Its fiscal trajectory is one of
continued primary (noninterest) deficits and rising debt through
2021. The Temer Administration has systematically evaluated and
streamlined numerous spending programs where it can--such as
student loans, subsidies for housing (Minha Casa Minha Vida), and
disability benefits--to generate budget savings. Fiscal
performance in 2017 and 2018 indicates spending compression,
except for payroll, pensions, and indexed components of mandatory

Tackling mandatory spending is a key policy challenge. Given
Brazil's generous benefits and worsening demographics, pension-
related expenditure has grown rapidly over the past several years
and accounts for 34% of federal primary (non-interest) spending.
The social security deficit essentially accounts for the entire
general government primary deficit. This negatively affects our
fiscal assessment.

Brazil's state and municipal governments face similar budgetary
challenges to the federal government: high, rigid spending on
payroll, pensions, and interest payments, as well as recovering
revenue hurt by the economic contraction. Despite some temporary
relief on debt service due to the federal government, state and
local governments' finances remain under pressure. In addition,
unlike the sovereign, their financing is more constrained because
they cannot issue debt. The federal government has also
strengthened transparency and protocols for approving (and
guaranteeing) borrowing by local governments. S&P views this
positively from the sovereign perspective--in terms of institution
building and containing fiscal slippage at the state and local
levels. However, fragilities in Brazil's federal fiscal framework
remain to be tackled. Just like pension and tax reform, further
resolution of these weaknesses will remain pending until after the
2018 elections.

S&P said, "In 2018, we expect the general government deficit will
be 7.6% of GDP before declining to about 6% in 2021. This compares
with 9% in 2016 and an estimated 7.8% in 2017. This is consistent
with a slow reduction in the general government primary deficit
that averages 1.6% in 2018-2021. Brazil's interest burden is high,
and we expect it to moderate slowly over the forecast period given
the decline in the overnight SELIC interest rate to historic lows,
though this is offset by increased market volatility, a weaker
real, and a higher stock of real-denominated swaps. The slightly
larger change in net general government debt to GDP vis-Ö-vis the
headline deficit assumes some fluctuations in central bank
repurchase operations and exchange and inflation rates but no off-
budget (below-the-line) spending.

"We expect general government debt, net of liquid assets (not
including international reserves), to rise to 72% of GDP by 2021
from 57% in 2016 (and just under 30% in 2013). We expect interest
to revenues to average 15% during 2018-2020. We assess contingent
liabilities from the financial sector and all Brazilian
nonfinancial public enterprises (including Petrobras) as limited.

"Brazil's external accounts remain solid. We now expect the
current account deficit to be 1% of GDP in 2018, versus a 4.2%
peak in 2014. We expect the current account deficit to widen and
average 2% of GDP in 2018-2021 (versus its low in 2017) on higher
imports and to be fully financed by net FDI. We expect narrow net
external debt--expected around -12% of current account receipts in
2018--to return to a debtor position by 2021 as the private sector
taps global markets, nonresident holdings of government securities
increase, and reserve accumulation slows. We calculate our
estimates of external debt on a residency basis. They include
nonresident holdings of locally issued real-denominated government
debt estimated at under US$120 billion as of December 2018 (about
40% of current account receipts).

"Our external debt data, however, do not include debt raised
offshore by Petrobras and other Brazilian companies that is
transferred in the form of FDI to head offices in Brazil. For
Petrobras, this could be approximately 30% of current account
receipts. This is captured in Brazil's net external liability
position, estimated at 190% of current account receipts in 2018.
This ratio is one of the largest among the sovereigns we rate,
suggesting that there are greater risks to Brazil's external
accounts--should market conditions deteriorate--than it would
appear looking at debt indicators alone. The Brazilian real floats
and is an actively traded currency, and Brazil has lower external
financing needs compared with its current account receipts and
high international reserves relative to some of its peers."

Inflation has declined significantly, with consumer price
inflation of 2.95% in December 2017--a record low since 1999 and
just below the lower limit of the inflation tolerance interval.
This compares with 6.3% at year-end 2016 and 10.7% at year-end
2015. Despite some pickup in mid-2018--given the recent truckers'
strike--improved credibility of the central bank has kept
inflation expectations well-anchored.

S&P expects inflation to pick up somewhat in 2018-2019 but to
remain in line with the official targets. The central bank
initiated an easing cycle in October 2016, cutting the SELIC
interest rate by a total of 775 basis points to a historic low of
6.5% as of March 2018. The National Monetary Council has
progressively established lower inflation targets of 4.25%, 4%,
and 3.75% plus/minus 1.5% for 2019, 2020, and 2021, respectively,
from 4.5% plus/minus 1.5% for 2017 and 2018 in light of these
positive developments and to guide longer-term inflation down

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by
the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and
was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision.
After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot above.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook. The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating


  Ratings Affirmed

   Sovereign Credit Rating                   BB-/Stable/B
   Brazil National Scale                     brAAA/Stable/--
   Transfer & Convertibility Assessment      BB+
   Senior Unsecured                          BB-
   Senior Unsecured                          brAAA

PETROLEO BRASILEIRO: Gets $265.9MM Reimbursement for Losses
EFE News reports that Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. (Petrobras) said it
has received a BRL1 billion ($265.9-million) reimbursement for
losses incurred due to a massive bribes-for-inflated contracts
scheme centered on the state oil company.

Petrobras said those funds had been recovered as part of the
sprawling Lava Jato (Car Wash) corruption investigation, according
to EFE News.

It marks the largest amount returned to Petrobras in a single
payment, although more than BRL2.5 billion ($664.8 million) in
diverted funds have been reimbursed to Petrobras since the start
of the Lava Jato probe, the report notes.

The report says that the money has been returned pursuant to plea
deals with dozens of defendants implicated in the corruption
scheme, Petrobras said in a regulatory filing.

"The company, which is recognized by authorities as a victim of
these uncovered actions, will continue to adopt the necessary
measures against the companies and individuals that caused it
losses," the filing read, the report relays.

Prosecutors say Odebrecht and other large Brazilian engineering
companies paid bribes to corrupt Petrobras officials in exchange
for inflated contracts and funneled money to politicians who
provided cover for the graft, the report recalls.

The scheme carried out at Petrobras was replicated at other state
companies, the report notes.

Brazilian former President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva is the
highest profile individual to be convicted of bribe-taking and
money laundering as part of the Lava Jato investigation, the
report relays.

President Lula, whose corruption conviction was upheld by an
appeals court earlier this year, is serving a more than 12-year
prison sentence, the report notes.

He vehemently denies all of the charges and says they are a
politically motivated attempt to prevent him from returning to the
presidency in the October general election, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Apr 12, 2018, Moody's Investors Service upgraded the corporate
family rating of Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. (Petrobras) to Ba2 from
Ba3. The rating action was triggered by Moody's affirmation on
April 9, 2018 of Brazil's government bond rating at Ba2, with the
outlook changed to stable from negative. The action on Petrobras'
ratings also reflects the company's continued success in improving
its liquidity position and reducing debt leverage. Simultaneously,
Moody's raised the company's baseline credit assessment (BCA) to
ba3 from b1. The rating outlook is stable.


GUATEMALA: Volcano Fires up With Strong Explosion, Avalanches
EFE News reports that Guatemala's Fuego volcano, which erupted on
Jun. 3 causing the death of at least 165 people, recorded a strong
explosion accompanied by avalanches around the crater on Aug. 8,
the National Institute for Seismology, Vulcanology, Meteorology
and Hydrology said in a special bulletin.

The explosion took place around 9:20 p.m. and was the first strong
volcanic activity in the last six weeks, it said, according to EFE

The explosion was accompanied by rumblings and shock waves as the
volcano ejected "abundant incandescent material" to a height of
4,800 meters (15,748 feet) and blew out a column of ash that moved
12 kilometers (7.5 miles) westward, the report notes.

"This explosion is the first strong one to be recorded in the last
six weeks and may be the beginning of another phase of activity,"
the institute warned, the report says.

The report relays that the spokesperson of the National
Coordinator for Disaster Reduction, David De Leon, explained that
as a result of the activity, one could hear "rumblings" and urged
the surrounding communities to remain vigilant.

The 3,763-meter-high volcano is located around 50 km west of the
Guatemalan capital, between the departments of Escuintla,
Chimaltenango and Sacatepequez, the report says.

The last eruption in June was one of the biggest in its history
and caused 165 deaths, left 260 missing and almost two million
people affected, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
June 25, 2018, EFE News relayed that the Guatemalan Congress
approved a loan of $250 million from the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, which will be distributed in part
to those affected by the eruption of the Fuego volcano.  With 84
votes in favor, Congress gave the green light to the decree, which
authorizes negotiation on the loan agreement, according to EFE
News.  The loan, which will be endorsed through the Ministry of
Finance, will be used in part to improve the governance of public
resources and nutrition and to attend the victims of the eruption,
the report noted.  According to what was discussed during the
session, about 582.5 million quetzals (about $77.7 million) will
be used for those affected by the Jun. 3 eruption.


NICARAGUA: Protesters Plan March Calling for Release of Prisoners
EFE News reports that the self-appointed demonstrators of
Nicaragua called on marchers Aug. 10 in several cities to demand
the release of the "political prisoners" held by the government,
for protests the next day, while the presidency disclosed a
"counter march".

The largest march is expected to be in Managua, the scene of the
numerous demonstrations against President Daniel Ortega over the
last four months, according to EFE News.

The report notes that the protesters believe that at least 135
people are "political prisoners", after being "kidnapped" by the
"combined forces" of the government, composed of police, riot
police, paramilitaries and groups related to the government, who
capture them without judicial order or proven charges.

For the government, Vice President Rosario Murillo, disclosed
". . . the walk in Managua and throughout the country, during the
end we will demonstrate demanding justice and not impunity,
because we all know who are the terrorists, the coup plotters, the
murderers, the criminals," the report says.

The first lady also referred with these qualifiers to the people
who oppose Ortega remaining in power after as many as 448 people
died in protests since Apr. 18 against his administration,
although the president only recognizes 197, the report relays.

In this regard, the auxiliary bishop of the Archdiocese of
Managua, Silvio Baez, said he dreams "of a Nicaragua without
'pharaohs' and 'oppressed', where the dignity and rights of every
person are respected, where we renounce particular interests to
share our goods and interests in peace and justice, and where
dissent from power is not a crime," the report notes.

For its part, the Organization of American States formed a group
of 12 countries that make up the "Working Group", created by the
Permanent Council of the agency, to seek a solution to the crisis
in Nicaragua, the report says.

The "Working Group" was composed of Argentina, Brazil, Canada,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, the United States, Guyana,
Mexico, Panama and Peru, the report discloses.

Meanwhile, Mr. Ortega also proposed a cut of 9.2 percent to the
General Budget of Nicaragua for 2018, as well as the creation of
Financial Stability Bonds, to strengthen the economy, the report

Nicaragua is going through its bloodiest socio political crisis
since the 1980s, when Ortega was also president, the report notes.

The report discloses that the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (IACHR) and the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights (Acnudh) have blamed the government
of Nicaragua for "murders, extrajudicial executions, ill-
treatment, possible acts of torture and arbitrary detentions",
which Ortega has denied.

The protests against Ortega and his wife, Vice President Rosario
Murillo, were initiated by failed social security reforms and
became a demand for the resignation of the president, after 11
years in power, who faces accusations of abuse and corruption, the
report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
June 29, 2018, Fitch Ratings has downgraded Nicaragua's Long-Term
Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'B' from 'B+'. The
Outlook is Negative.

P U E R T O    R I C O

BAILEY'S EXPRESS: Plan Admin Taps Shapiro as Special Counsel
David Allen, the plan administrator appointed for Bailey's Express
Inc.'s bankruptcy estate, seeks approval from the U.S. Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Connecticut to hire Shapiro Law Offices,
LLC as special counsel.

The Debtor's estate has a cause of action against the John M.
Hall, Sr. Marital Trust by reason of a promissory note in the face
amount of $1.6 million for monies it loaned to the trust.  Shapiro
Law Offices will assist the Debtor in the collection of the note.

The firm will charge these hourly rates:

     Jonathan Shapiro     $315
     Associate            $225
     Paralegals            $75

Jonathan Shapiro, Esq., at Shapiro Law Offices, disclosed in a
court filing that his firm neither holds nor represents any
interest adverse to the Debtor and its estate.

The firm can be reached through:

     Jonathan M. Shapiro, Esq.
     Shapiro Law Offices, LLC
     32 Washington Street
     Middletown, CT 06457
     Tel: 860-347-3325
     Fax: 860-347-3874

                    About Bailey's Express Inc.

Headquartered in Middletown, Connecticut, Bailey's Express -- is a Connecticut-based less than
truckload carrier. It provides service across the nation and is
dedicated in helping Connecticut, Massachusetts and Rhode Island
companies market their products throughout the U.S. including
Hawaii and Alaska. It has distribution points in Charlotte,
Dallas, Denver, Easton, Fontana, Indianapolis, Jacksonville,
Memphis, Neenah, Phoenix, Salt Lake City and Toledo.  It also
provides service to Mexico, Puerto Rico & Canada.

Bailey's Express filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection
(Bankr. D. Conn. Case No. 17-31042) on July 13, 2017, estimating
its assets and liabilities at between $1 million and $10 million.
The petition was signed by David Allen, chief financial officer.

Judge Ann M. Nevins presides over the case.

Elizabeth J. Austin, Esq., and Jessica Grossarth Kennedy, Esq., at
Pullman & Comley, LLC, serve as the Debtor's bankruptcy counsel.

No creditors' committee has been appointed in the case.

On January 12, 2018, the court confirmed the Debtor's Chapter 11
plan of liquidation.  Pursuant to the plan, David Allen was deemed
the plan administrator for the Debtor's estate.

HORNED DORSET: ITC Violated Automatic Stay, Court Rules
The Horned Dorset Primavera Inc. filed a Motion for Civil Contempt
for Violation of the Automatic Stay Injunction against
Inmobiliaria T&C, Inc. alleging a willful violation of the
automatic stay based on ITC's post-petition written request to the
Property Registrar of Aguadilla to alter the rank of the Debtor's
recorded right of usufruct, in order for the Debtor's property
interest (recorded right of usufruct) to be junior to two mortgage
liens that encumber the real property. Upon review, Bankruptcy
Judge Enrique S. Lamoutte granted the Debtor's motion.

After considering the relevant facts and applicable legal
provisions of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, Puerto Rico Mortgage and
Property Registry act of 1979, the Real Property Registry Act of
2015, and the Bankruptcy Code, the Court finds and concludes that
ITC violated the automatic stay provisions of section 362(a)(4)
when it filed the "Instancia" (document) by which it requested the
Property Registrar to alter the ranks of the liens and subordinate
the Debtor's deed of usufruct (lien) to that of one of the
mortgages, meaning that the Debtor's real property rights were
altered resulting in its usufruct lien having an inferior rank
without requesting relief from the automatic stay from the
Bankruptcy Court. Moreover, ITC did not obtain the consent of the
Debtor, as an affected titleholder pursuant to Article 151 of the
prior mortgage law which was the one in effect at the time. The
court holds that the ministerial act exception does not apply to
the instant case.

The Property Registrar acted upon the "Instancia" or document
filed and proceeded to alter the ranks. The court concludes that
ITC's actions are void and therefore have no effect. Therefore,
the actions taken by the Property Registrar altering the ranks of
the liens are also void.

The Debtor's Motion for Civil Contempt for Violation of the
Automatic Stay Injunction against ITC for a willful violation of
the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C.  section362(a) is granted.

However, the court also holds that the Debtor is not entitled to
its remedy (for sanctions) regarding civil contempt because the
Debtor waived the same in the Stipulation with ITC, which this
Court approves.

A full-text copy of  the Court's Opinion and Order dated July 27,
2018 is available at:

             About The Horned Dorset Primavera

The Horned Dorset Primavera Inc. operates the Horned Dorset
Primavera, a small luxury hotel located in northwestern Puerto
Rico, two miles from the town of Rincon.  The hotel -- is set among rolling hills at the
edge of the beautiful Caribbean Sea and is known for reserved
European service executed in an atmosphere unique in  Puerto Rico
and the award-winning Restaurant Aaron.  The hotel is a member of
Relais & Chateaux.

The Horned Dorset Primavera Inc. commenced a Chapter 11 bankruptcy
case (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 15-03837) in Old San Juan, Puerto
Rico on May 22, 2015.

According to the docket, the Debtor's Chapter 11 plan is due Nov.
18, 2015.

The Debtor has tapped Isabel M. Fullana, Esq., at Garcia Arregui &
Fullana PSC, as counsel.

SPANISH BROADCASTING: Expects $34.5M to $34.8M 2nd Quarter Revenue
Spanish Broadcasting System, Inc., reported preliminary estimated
financial results for the second quarter-ended June 30, 2018.

For the second quarter 2018, the Company currently estimates
consolidated net revenue to be between approximately $34.5 million
and $34.8 million, an increase of between 1% and 2% over 2017 and
Adjusted OIBDA, which excludes non-cash stock-based compensation,
to be between approximately $10.8 million and $11.6 million, an
increase of between 34% and 44% over 2017.

"As previously forecasted, the Company has continued its positive
operational momentum throughout the second quarter with strong
OIBDA growth and operating margins that continue to be among the
highest in the industry.

"In addition, the announced $14 million sale of our surplus real
estate in New York City has successfully closed, allowing for our
move to newer and more suitable facilities in midtown Manhattan.
correlated and corresponding repayment of the Company's 12.5%
senior secured notes from the net proceeds of the real estate sale
has been undertaken, as previously envisioned.

"We maintain our positive view as to the continuing momentum in
2018 and will be filing our finalized second quarter results
within [this] week," commented Raul Alarcon, Chairman and CEO.

                     About Spanish Broadcasting

Based in Miami, Florida, Spanish Broadcasting System, Inc.
(OTCMKTS:SBSAA) -- owns and
operates 17 radio stations located in the top U.S. Hispanic
markets of New York, Los Angeles, Miami, Chicago, San Francisco
and Puerto Rico, airing the Spanish Tropical, Regional Mexican,
Spanish Adult Contemporary, Top 40 and Latin Rhythmic format
genres.  SBS also operates AIRE Radio Networks, a national radio
platform which creates, distributes and markets leading Spanish-
language radio programming to over 250 affiliated stations
reaching 94% of the U.S. Hispanic audience.  SBS also owns MegaTV,
a television operation with over-the-air, cable and satellite
distribution and affiliates throughout the U.S. and Puerto Rico.
SBS also produces live concerts and events and owns multiple
bilingual websites, including, an online
destination and mobile app providing content related to Latin
music, entertainment, news and culture.

The report from the Company's independent accounting firm Crowe
Horwath LLP, the Company's auditor since 2013, on the consolidated
financial statements for the year ended Dec. 31, 2017, includes an
explanatory paragraph stating that the 12.5% Senior Secured Notes
had a maturity date of April 15, 2017.  Cash from operations or
the sale of assets was not sufficient to repay the notes when they
became due.  In addition, for the year ended Dec. 31, 2017, the
Company had a working capital deficiency and negative cash flows
from operations.  These factors raise substantial doubt about its
ability to continue as a going concern.

Spanish Broadcasting reported net income of $19.62 million for the
year ended Dec. 31, 2017, compared to a net loss of $16.34 million
for the year ended Dec. 31, 2016.  As of March 31, 2018, Spanish
Broadcasting had $435.59 million in total assets, $534.85 million
in total liabilities and a total stockholders' deficit of $99.26

                          *     *     *

In May 2017, S&P Global Ratings withdrew its 'D' corporate credit
rating and issue-level ratings on Spanish Broadcasting System.
"We withdrew the ratings because we were unlikely to raise them
from 'D', based on SBS' ongoing plans to restructure its debt,"
said S&P Global Ratings' credit analyst Scott Zari.  S&P had
downgraded SBS to 'D' on April 21, 2017, following the company's
announcement that it didn't repay its $275 million 12.5% senior
secured notes that were due April 15, 2017, as reported by the TCR
on May 25, 2017.

In April 2017, Moody's Investors Service downgraded SBS's
corporate family rating to 'Ca' from 'Caa2'.  SBS's 'Ca' corporate
family rating reflects an elevated expected loss rate following
the default under the company's 12.5% senior secured notes due
April 2017, said Moody's.

TOYS R US: Affiliates Tap Fox Rothschild as Conflicts Counsel
Toys "R" Us Property Company II, LLC and two other affiliates of
Toys "R" Us, Inc., seek approval from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia to hire Fox Rothschild LLP.

The firm will represent Toys "R" Us Property, Giraffe Holdings,
LLC and Giraffe Junior Holdings, LLC in matters where there is
conflict of interest between them and their members or affiliates
in connection with their Chapter 11 cases.

The firm will charge these hourly rates:

     Members               $400 - $750
     Of Counsel            $410 - $475
     Associates            $290 - $380
     Paraprofessionals     $150 - $230

Robert Fishman, Esq., a partner at Fox Rothschild, disclosed in a
court filing that his firm is a "disinterested person" as defined
in Section 101(14) of the Bankruptcy Code.

In accordance with Appendix B-Guidelines for reviewing fee
applications filed by attorneys in larger Chapter 11 cases, Mr.
Fishman disclosed that his firm has not agreed to any variations
from, or alternatives to, its standard billing arrangements; and
that no Fox Rothschild professional has varied his rate based on
the geographic location of the Debtors' cases.

Mr. Fishman also disclosed that his firm has not represented the
Debtors during the 12-month period before the petition date.

The Debtors have already approved a budget for Fox Rothschild for
the period from June 11, 2018 through the anticipated end of the
Debtors' cases, Mr. Fishman also disclosed.

Fox Rothschild can be reached through:

     Robert M. Fishman, Esq.
     Peter J. Roberts, Esq.
     Fox Rothschild LLP
     321 North Clark Street, Suite 800
     Chicago, IL 60654
     Telephone: (312) 541-0151 / (312) 666-2842
     Facsimile: (312) 980-3888

                      About Toys R Us, Inc.

Toys "R" Us, Inc., was an American toy and juvenile-products
retailer founded in 1948 and headquartered in Wayne, New Jersey,
in the New York City metropolitan area.  Merchandise was sold in
880 Toys "R" Us and Babies "R" Us stores in the United States,
Puerto Rico and Guam, and in more than 780 international stores
and more than 245 licensed stores in 37 countries and
jurisdictions.  Merchandise was also sold at e-commerce sites
including and

On July 21, 2005, a consortium of Bain Capital Partners LLC,
Kohlberg Kravis Roberts, and Vornado Realty Trust invested $1.3
billion to complete a $6.6 billion leveraged buyout of the

Toys "R" Us is a privately owned entity but still files with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission as required by its debt

The Company's consolidated balance sheet showed $6.572 billion in
assets, $7.891 billion in liabilities, and a stockholders' deficit
of $1.319 billion as of April 29, 2017.

Toys "R" Us, Inc., and certain of its U.S. subsidiaries and its
Canadian subsidiary voluntarily filed for relief under Chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. E.D. Va. Lead Case No. Case No.
17-34665) on Sept. 19, 2017.  In addition, the Company's Canadian
subsidiary voluntarily commenced parallel proceedings under the
Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") in Canada in the
Ontario Superior Court of Justice.  The Company's operations
outside of the U.S. and Canada, including its 255 licensed stores
and joint venture partnership in Asia, which are separate
entities, were not part of the Chapter 11 filing and CCAA

Grant Thornton is the monitor appointed in the CCAA case.

Judge Keith L. Phillips presides over the Chapter 11 cases.

In the Chapter 11 cases, Kirkland & Ellis LLP and Kirkland & Ellis
International LLP serve as the Debtors' legal counsel.  Kutak Rock
LLP serves as co-counsel.  Toys "R" Us employed Alvarez & Marsal
North America, LLC as its restructuring advisor; and Lazard Freres
& Co. LLC as its investment banker.  It hired Prime Clerk LLC as
claims and noticing agent.  Consensus Advisory Services LLC and
Consensus Securities LLC, serve as sale process investment banker.
A&G Realty Partners, LLC, serves as its real estate advisor.

On Sept. 26, 2017, the U.S. Trustee for Region 4 appointed an
official committee of unsecured creditors.  The Committee retained
Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP as its legal counsel; Wolcott
Rivers, P.C., as local counsel; FTI Consulting, Inc. as financial
advisor; and Moelis & Company LLC as investment banker.

                        Toys "R" Us UK

Toys "R" Us Limited, Toys "R" Us, Inc.'s UK arm with 105 stores
and 3,000 employees, was sent into administration in the United
Kingdom in February 2018.

Arron Kendall and Simon Thomas of Moorfields Advisory Limited, 88
Wood Street, London, EC2V 7QF were appointed Joint Administrators
on Feb. 28, 2018. The Administrators now manage the affairs,
business and property of the Company.  The Administrators act as
agents only and without personal liability.

The Administrators said they will make every effort to secure a
buyer for all or part of the business.

                   Liquidation of U.S. Stores

Toys "R" Us, Inc., on March 15, 2018, filed with the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court a motion seeking Bankruptcy Court approval to
start the process of conducting an orderly wind-down of its U.S.
business and liquidation of inventory in all 735 of the Company's
U.S. stores, including stores in Puerto Rico.

                         Propco I Debtors

Toys "R" Us Property Company I, LLC and its subsidiaries own fee
and leasehold interests in more than 300 properties in the United
States.  The Debtors lease the properties on a triple-net basis
under a master lease to Toys-Delaware, the operating entity for
all of TRU's North American businesses, which operates the
majority of the properties as Toys "R" Us stores, Babies "R" Us
stores or side-by-side stores, or subleases them to alternative

Toys "R" Us Property was founded in 2005 and is headquartered in
Wayne, New Jersey.  Toys 'R' Us Property operates as a subsidiary
of Toys "R" Us Inc.

Company LLC, MAP Real Estate LLC, TRU 2005 RE I LLC, TRU 2005 RE
II Trust, and Wayne Real Estate Company LLC (collectively, "Propco
I Debtors") sought protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code (Bankr. E.D. Va. Lead Case No. 18-31429) on March 20, 2018.
The Propco I Debtors sought and obtained procedural consolidation
and joint administration of their Chapter 11 cases, separate from
the Toys "R" Us Debtors' Chapter 11 cases.

The Propco I Debtors estimated assets of $500 million to $1
billion and liabilities of $500 million to $1 billion.

Judge Keith L. Phillips presides over the Propco I Debtors' cases.

The Propco I Debtors hired Klehr Harrison Harvey Branzburg, LLP;
and Crowley, Liberatore, Ryan & Brogan, P.C., as co-counsel.  The
Debtors also tapped Kutak Rock LLP.  They hired Goldin Associates,
LLC, as financial advisors.


VENEZUELA: Regime Releases Video of Confession in Attack on Maduro
The Latin American Herald reports that the Venezuelan government
released a video in which legislator Juan Requesens is heard
confessing that he helped one of the perpetrators of the attempted
attack on the country's president enter the country.

The Venezuelan opposition has said this alleged material evidence
of the confession was made under coercion, according to The Latin
American Herald.

The Venezuelan Minister of Communication and Information, Jorge
Rodriguez, showed at a press conference the video in which
Requesens, detained, "confesses his complicity in the frustrated
assassination attempt," according to Rodriguez, declaring that he
arranged for the entry into the country of Juan Monasterios, who
has been arrested, the report relays.

"I contacted him -- Mr. Monasterios -- through messenger.  I was
in San Cristobal (on the border with Colombia).  Once I wrote to
Mauricio Jimenez, Colombian immigration supervisor, and I made the
request, he immediately put them in touch with Juan Monasterios to
give him passage from San Antonio to Cucuta," Mr. Requesens
appeared to be saying in the video, the report relays.

The report notes that Mr. Requesens also stated that he executed
these actions after the former president of the Venezuelan
National Assembly and opposition legislator Julio Borges, accused
of being one of the masterminds of the attack, asked him for a

According to Mr. Rodriguez, this makes Requesens an important
accomplice in the operation over which there have been at least
seven arrests made and 19 others have been identified, the report

"He reports and confesses that he did it on the orders of Julio
Borges," Mr. Rodriguez emphasized, announcing that Venezuela has
applied for Interpol's Red Notice against Borges, who is in
Colombia, the report discloses.

After showing the video, Mr. Rodriguez reiterated that Mr. Jimenez
is a "customs official of the former government of Juan Manuel
Santos" and said he has records of countless meetings between
Borges and the former Colombian president, the report relays.

He also reported that they are seeking a Red Notice for Osman
Alexis Delgado Tabosky and Rayder Alexander Russo Marquez, both
accused of funding the attack and are currently in Colombia and
the United States, respectively, as well as for all those who have
any responsibility in the assassination attempt, the report says.

The video was repudiated by the opposition, arguing that the
material was obtained under coercion and cruel treatment, the
notes report.

"Recent dissemination of images and videos from the SEBIN
(Venezuela's Bolivarian Service for National Intelligence),
confirm that Juan Requesens has been subjected to coercion, cruel
and inhumane treatment," said a message on Requesen's Twitter
account that is managed by his communications team, the report

On Aug. 4, two drones exploded at an event led by President
Nicolas Maduro, leading him to call it an attack on him and
accused the outgoing president of Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos, of
being involved, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
June 1, 2018, S&P Global Ratings, on May 29, 2018, removed its
long- and short-term local currency sovereign credit ratings on
Venezuela from CreditWatch with negative implications and affirmed
them at 'CCC- /C'. The outlook on the long-term local currency
rating is negative. At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'SD/D'
long- and short-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on
Venezuela. S&P's transfer and convertibility assessment remains at


* BOND PRICING: For the From August 6 to August 10, 2018

Issuer Name               Cpn     Price   Maturity  Country  Curr
-----------               ---     -----   --------  -------   ---

BA-CA Finance Cayman Lt   0.518    62.07               KY    EUR
AES Tiete Energia SA      6.7842   1.109  4/15/2024    BR    BRL
Argentina Bogar Bonds     2       39.36   2/4/2018     AR    ARS
Automotores Gildemeister  8.25    73.25   5/24/2021    CL    USD
Automotores Gildemeister  6.75    67      1/15/2023    CL    USD
Automotores Gildemeister  8.25    73.25   5/24/2021    CL    USD
Automotores Gildemeister  6.75    65.5    1/15/2023    CL    USD
CA La Electricidad        8.5     63.664  4/10/2018    VE    USD
Caixa Geral De Depositos  1.439   63.167               KY    EUR
Caixa Geral De Depositos  1.469                        KY    EUR
CSN Islands XII Corp      7       68                   BR    USD
CSN Islands XII Corp      7       66.266               BR    USD
Decimo Primer Fideicomiso 6       53.225 10/25/2041    PA    USD
Decimo Primer             4.54    43.127 10/25/2041    PA    USD
Dolomite Capital         13.217   73.108 12/20/2019    CN    ZAR
Enel Americas SA          5.75    56.172  6/15/2022    CL    CLP
Gol Linhas Aereas SA     10.75    35.861  2/12/2023    BR    USD
Gol Linhas Aereas SA     10.75    35.601  2/12/2023    BR    USD
Inversora Electrica       6.5     67.625  9/26/2017    AR    USD
Inversora Electrica       6.5     67.625  9/26/2017    AR    USD
MIE Holdings Corp         7.5     64.78   4/25/2019    HK    USD
MIE Holdings Corp         7.5     64.982  4/25/2019    HK    USD
NB Finance Ltd            3.88    61.816  2/7/2035     KY    EUR
Noble Holding             7.7     74.433  4/1/2025     KY    USD
Noble Holding             5.25    56.279  3/15/2042    KY    USD
Noble Holding             8.7     71.881  4/1/2045     KY    USD
Noble Holding             6.2     60.129  8/1/2040     KY    USD
Noble Holding             6.05    58.38   3/1/2041     KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.5     42.5                 KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.125   56.938  6/26/2022    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7       68.053  4/21/2020    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.125   41.366  6/26/2042    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     4.375   40.002  4/25/2025    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.25    39.211  6/27/2029    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     6       44.75   4/5/2023     KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.25    39.018  6/27/2029    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.5     42.95                KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     4.375   40.363  4/25/2025    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.125   41.635  6/26/2042    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     6       52.625  4/5/2023     KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.125   55.873  6/26/2022    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7       67.368  4/21/2020    KY    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    8.5     74.5   10/27/2020    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6       30.458  5/16/2024    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6       30.517 11/15/2026    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    9.75    35.677  5/17/2035    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    9       39.279 11/17/2021    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    5.375   30.267  4/12/2027    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    8.5     72.5   10/27/2020    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela   12.75    45.278  2/17/2022    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6       30.367  5/16/2024    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6       30.387 11/15/2026    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    9       39.316 11/17/2021    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    9.75    35.893  5/17/2035    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6       28.346 10/28/2022    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    5.5     30.123  4/12/2037    VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela   12.75    45.23   2/17/2022    VE    USD
Polarcus Ltd              5.6     75      3/30/2022    AE    USD
Provincia del Chubut      4              10/21/2019    AR    USD
Siem Offshore Inc         4.04527 69.5   10/30/2020    NO    NOK
Siem Offshore             3.75176 65.75  12/28/2021    NO    NOK
STB Finance               2.05771 56.243               KY    JPY
Sylph Ltd                 2.367   64.438  9/25/2036    KY    USD
US Capital                1.63611 54.774 12/1/2039     KY    USD
US Capital                1.63611 54.774 12/1/2039     KY    USD
USJ Acucar                9.875   67     11/9/2019     BR    USD
USJ Acucar                9.875   67     11/9/2019     BR    USD
Venezuela                13.625   68.25   8/15/2018    VE    USD
Venezuela                 7.75    44.065 10/13/2019    VE    USD
Venezuela                11.95    40.785  8/5/2031     VE    USD
Venezuela                12.75    45.19   8/23/2022    VE    USD
Venezuela                 9.25    39.645  9/15/2027    VE    USD
Venezuela                11.75    40.005 10/21/2026    VE    USD
Venezuela                 9       36.285  5/7/2023     VE    USD
Venezuela                 9.375   37.69   1/13/2034    VE    USD
Venezuela                13.625   72.25   8/15/2018    VE    USD
Venezuela                 7       34.23   3/31/2038    VE    USD
Venezuela                 7       59.19  12/1/2018     VE    USD


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior  we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2018.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.

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