/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/180830.mbx            T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

               Thursday, August 30, 2018, Vol. 19, No. 172


                            Headlines



B R A Z I L

ANDRADE GUTIERREZ: Fitch Hikes LT IDRS to 'CCC-', Outlook Stable
BR PROPERTIES: S&P Alters Outlook to Negative & Affirms 'BB-' ICR
TRANSMISSORA ALIANCA: Fitch Affirms 'BB' FC IDR, Outlook Stable


C H I L E

MASISA SA: Fitch Affirms 'B+' FC & LC IDRs, Outlook Negative


J A M A I C A

JAMAICA: BOJ Holding Policy Interest Rate at 2%


P U E R T O    R I C O

HIGH TIMES: Hires Lugo Mender Group LLC as Attorney
JDHG LLC: Monthly Payment to Unsecureds Increased to $2,370
PUERTO RICO: Probe Cites Multiple Causes for Fiscal Free Fall
TOYS R US: Toys Delaware, Geoffrey Debtors File Wind-Down Plan


T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O

PETROLEUM CO: Will be Shutting Down in the Near Future
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Sub-Standard Poultry Will Be Thing of The Past


V E N E Z U E L A

VENEZUELA: 2 Companies Owed US$.97MM for Goods Delivered


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ANDRADE GUTIERREZ: Fitch Hikes LT IDRS to 'CCC-', Outlook Stable
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Fitch Ratings has upgraded Andrade Gutierrez Engenharia S.A.'s (AGE)
Long-Term (LT) Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings
(IDRs) to 'CCC-' from 'RD' and its National Scale Rating to 'CCC(bra)'
from 'RD(bra)'. The Rating Outlook for the corporate ratings is
Stable. Fitch has also assigned a 'CCC-'/'RR4' rating to Andrade
Gutierrez International S.A.'s (AGI) USD336 million senior secured PIK
toggle notes, with 11% coupon, due 2021. The notes are fully and
irrevocably guaranteed by AGE. Fitch has also withdrawn the ratings on
AGI's existing senior notes following a debt exchange.

The upgrade follows the Aug. 20, 2018 conclusion of AGI's debt
exchange offer of its USD500 million senior unsecured bond by the
USD336 million senior secured PIK toggle notes. The new notes also
count toward a secondary lien guarantee of CCR shares owed by Andrade
Gutierrez Participacoes S.A. (AGPar).

Fitch sees the debt exchange offer as a temporary relief for AGE.
However, AGE's ratings reflect the expectation that cash burn will
continue and that liquidity is not compatible with future principal
and coupon payments and high working capital needs. The 'CCC-' ratings
also incorporate the high credit risk due to the several challenges
AGE still faces in attempting to turnaround its operations, recover
backlog and improve operational cash flow generation.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Relevant Turnaround Challenges: AGE still faces relevant challenges to
turnaround its operations and recover backlog in order to improve the
overall credit quality, worsened by weak market environment. AGE also
needs to stop cash-burn and collect past-due receivables to improve
its credit profile. The company's backlog reduced to BRL11.3 billion
at year end 2017, excluding about BRL7.5 billion of projects from
Venezuela and Congo, and consists mostly of private clients. Fitch
believes AGE should register positive operating cash flow in 2019
supported by adequate performance of new contracts. However, the
gradual recovery also depends on the Brazilian macroeconomic scenario
and growing investments in infrastructure. AGE still have to settle
plea bargain agreements with Brazilian General Counsel's Office (AGU)
and Controllers' General Office (CGU) and define the potential
additional penalty.

FCF to Remain Negative: Fitch projects negative FCF in 2018 and 2019,
turning positive only in 2020. In the LTM ended March 2018, AGE
reported a negative FFO of BRL707 million and negative CFFO of BRL260
million. Capex of BRL55 million and dividends of BRL215 million lead
to a negative FCF of BRL530 million in the same period. Fitch projects
negative CFFO of BRL200 million for 2018, with CFFO reaching a
breakeven in 2019. However, this gradual improvement will depend on
AGE's capacity to execute its backlog and start new projects.

Aggressive Capital Structure: Fitch expects AGE to maintain an
aggressive capital structure over the next three years, with net
leverage of 7.1x in 2019 and 4.1x in 2020. Fitch's base case projects
EBITDA of about BRL200 million in 2019 and BRL330 million in 2020,
which should support leverage reduction. In the LTM ended March 2018,
the company generated negative EBITDA of BRL1.4 billion, compared with
positive BRL180 million of 2016. EBITDA was impaired by provisions of
approximately BRL930 million during 2017 related to losses on accounts
receivable, especially on some company's investees.

Limited Financial Flexibility: Fitch understands the financial
flexibility of the Andrade Gutierrez Group to support AGE has
materially reduced after the debt exchange offer as it used the
remaining unencumbered shares in CCR for the new notes guarantee. The
group has historically supported the Engineering & Construction (E&C)
operations through capital increases and more recently through the
sale of its stakes in Cemig and Sanepar. Proceeds from assets sales
will be used to amortize the hold outs of AGI's 2018 bond
(approximately USD7 million). During 2018, AGE received about BRL290
million from asset sales. The group still have 2.1% stake at Santo
Antonio Energia for sale, though the value and timetable remains
uncertain.

High FX Exposure: AGE is exposed to foreign exchange risk, as about
84% of total adjusted debt, including AGI's bonds, are denominated in
foreign currency. The company's international sales fell to USD142
million in 2017 from USD704 million in 2015. On a relative basis,
foreign currency revenues dropped to 31% of total from 40% in the same
period. AGE's foreign currency debt is not hedged; only the coupons
are.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

AGE's high credit risk profile reflects Fitch's opinion that a default
still appears possible due to the uncertainties regarding its capacity
to access new funding and add projects to its backlog. The 'CCC-'
rating also reflects relevant challenges to improve EBITDA generation
and the expectation that leverage will remain high and liquidity will
remain weak to face future coupon payments, debt amortization and high
working capital needs.

AGE's credit profile is one notch higher than its local peer Odebrecht
Engenharia e Construcao S.A. (OEC; CC). AGE has been more successful
in adding a backlog of private clients, which is expected to turn into
revenues in a shorter period compared to OEC.

OEC received a BRL1.3 billion capital increase from its parent to
amortize a BRL500 million bond and USD11 million coupon within the
cure-period and also faces challenges to recover its operations and
pay upcoming coupons. While OEC has to sign plea bargain agreements in
seven countries and with Brazilian authorities, AGE is in the final
steps to settle an agreement with AGU and CGU.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's Key Assumptions Within Its Rating Case for the Issuer

  -- Backlog of BRL12.3 billion in 2018 and BRL12.7 billion in 2019,
from BRL11.3 billion in 2017;

  -- Average conversion ratios of 5.1 years in 2018 and 3.6 years in
2019, leading to net revenues of BRL2.3 billion and BRL3.4
billion, respectively;

  -- EBITDA of BRL23 million in 2018 and BRL198 million in 2019, with
margins of 1.0% and 5.9%, respectively;

  -- Capex of 1.5% of sales in 2018 and 1.5% in 2019;

  -- No dividend distribution in the foreseeable future;

  -- BRL355 million in asset sales in 2018.

KEY RECOVERY RATING ASSUMPTIONS

The recovery analysis assumes that AGE would be considered a going
concern (GC) in bankruptcy and that the company would be reorganized
rather than liquidated. Fitch has assumed a 10% administrative claim.

Going-Concern Approach

  -- AGE's going concern EBITDA of BRL198 million is based on Fitch's
forecast for 2019;

  -- An EV multiple of 5x is used to calculate a post-reorganization valuation;

  -- Considered the group's ownership of about BRL2.7 billion of CCR
shares in a stress case scenario -- value that would allow for
acceleration of guaranteed senior debt in other group subsidiaries, of
which BRL900 million would act as secondary lien guarantees to the
senior secured PIK toggle notes. Currently, the total value of group's
CCR shares is BRL3.2 billion;

  -- The Recovery Rating is capped at 'RR4' as Brazil is classified as
a Group D country by Fitch and represents a recovery prospect between
31% and 50%.

Liquidation Value

Fitch excluded the liquidation value (LV) approach because Brazilian
bankruptcy legislation tends to favor the maintenance of the business
in order to preserve direct and indirect job positions. Moreover, in
extreme cases where LV was necessary, the recovery of the assets has
been proved very difficult for creditors.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action
An upgrade is unlikely in the short term. Lower liquidity pressure
with sustainable CFFO growth could result on positive rating action in
the medium term.

Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action

  -- Fail to monetize its backlog and generate positive operating cash flow;

  -- Beginning of a default or default-like process, such as entering
in a cure-period or in standstill with banks;

  -- The announcement of debt restructuring.

LIQUIDITY

Weak Liquidity: AGE's liquidity will continue pressured in the
medium-term despite the conclusion of the debt exchange offer. As of
March 31, 2018, AGE had BRL193 million of total cash, excluding about
BRL108 million of restricted cash as per Fitch's criteria, and total
adjusted debt was BRL2.1 billion. AGE's readily available cash covered
only 14% of the short term debt maturities of BRL1.4 billion. With the
debt exchange offer this ratio should improve to about 44%. Following
the debt exchange, AGE will have annual coupons of about BRL200
million, including the 11% coupon of the new notes, equivalent to
USD37 million (BRL146 million). AGE also has BRL303 million debt
amortization scheduled for 2018 and BRL110 million for 2019. The group
faces limited financial flexibility to support its engineering
operations after it used the remaining unencumbered CCR shares as
guarantees for the new notes.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has taken the following rating actions:

Andrade Gutierrez Engenharia S.A.

  -- Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs upgraded to 'CCC-' from 'RD';

  -- National Scale Rating upgraded to 'CCC(bra)' from 'RD(bra)'.

Andrade Gutierrez International S.A.

  -- USD336 million senior secured PIK toggle notes due 2021 assigned
a 'CCC-'/'RR4' rating ;

  -- USD500 million senior unsecured notes due 2018 rating withdrawn
as it was no longer considered to be relevant to the agency's
coverage.

The Rating Outlook for the corporate ratings is Stable.


BR PROPERTIES: S&P Alters Outlook to Negative, Affirms 'BB-' ICR
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S&P Global Ratings revised its outlook on BR Properties S.A. to
negative from stable. At the same time, we affirmed our 'BB-' global
scale and 'brAA+' national scale issuer credit ratings on the company.
We also affirmed the 'brAAA' senior secured issue-level rating, with a
'2' recovery rating, reflecting our expectation of a substantial
recovery (between 70-90%).

S&P said, "In addition, we assigned a 'brAA+' issue-level rating to
company's future 10th senior unsecured debentures issuance, with a '3'
recovery rating, indicating that lenders can expect meaningful
(50%-70%) recovery.

"The outlook revision reflects our expectation of continued challenges
for BR Properties to increase occupancy rates and cash flow generation
in the next few quarters. The company underperformed our expectations
over the past few quarters given that the industry recovery is taking
longer than expected, requiring BR Properties to provide higher
discounts than previously expected in order to sign new rent
contracts. If BR Properties is unable to speed up the signing of new
contracts at favorable prices, we could see prolonged weaker credit
metrics with EBITDA interest coverage below 1.2x and with no signs of
considerable improvement as of 2019.

"On the other hand, we believe the company's focus on AAA office
assets will likely allow it to recover somewhat faster than the
industry average, and to post stronger EBITDA margin above 85%
starting in 2019, when we believe vacancy expenses would be much lower
than those in recent years. We forecast average financial vacancy of
around 20% in 2018, improving to below 10% in 2019.  We believe the
company could sell additional non-core assets and continue refinancing
debt. Through these actions, BR Properties could maintain a
comfortable cash position for acquisition opportunities."


TRANSMISSORA ALIANCA: Fitch Affirms 'BB' FC IDR, Outlook Stable
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Fitch Ratings has affirmed Transmissora Alianca de Energia Eletrica
S.A.'s (Taesa) Foreign Currency (FC) and Local Currency (LC) Issuer
Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB' and 'BBB-', respectively. Fitch has
also affirmed the Long-term National Scale Rating 'AAA(bra)' for Taesa
and its senior unsecured debenture issuances. The Rating Outlook is
Stable.

Taesa's ratings reflect its low business risk relative to its strong
and diversified portfolio of power transmission assets, with
predictable and robust cash flow generation and high operating
margins. In addition, none of the 35 concessions that it participates
expire before 2030, which gives sustainability to its operations. The
analysis also incorporates Fitch's expectation that the company will
keep a solid financial profile in the medium term, with credit metrics
strong for the existing IDRs when compared to its peers in Latin
America. On a pro forma consolidated basis, Taesa presents low
leverage for a company within the power transmission sector, as well
as an adequate liquidity profile. Taesa's FC IDR is capped by the
country ceiling, and Fitch considers a three-notch difference between
the company's LC IDR and the sovereign IDR (BB-/Stable) as appropriate
for a regulated sector.

Taesa's ratings are not constrained by the credit quality of one of
its shareholders, Companhia Energetica de Minas Gerais (Cemig) (LC and
FC IDRs B/Stable), since Cemig shares the company's control with
Interconexion Electrica S/A E.S.P. (ISA) (LC and FC IDRs BBB+/Stable),
and its access to Taesa's cash is limited to dividends. The moderate
regulatory risk of the Brazilian power sector was considered, and
Fitch views the risks associated with the construction phase of eight
projects under development as manageable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Low Business Risk: Taesa's ratings are based on the low business risk
of its asset portfolio and no exposure to concession renewals over the
short to medium term. Taesa is one of the largest power transmission
companies in Brazil, with 9.3 thousand km of transmission lines across
the country, with 1.5 thousand km under construction, considering
proportional participation in the concessions. The company
participates in 35 concessions, including 15 fully owned, which
dilutes potential operational risks. Taesa benefits from a diversified
client base and guaranteed payment structure.

Leverage to Remain Low: Fitch expects Taesa to maintain its
consolidated net financial leverage below 3.5x in the coming three
years, which may temporarily go above this level in case of new
relevant acquisitions or greenfield projects. The company was able to
manage historically low consolidated leverage in the last five years
despite substantial dividend payments and significant acquisitions.
For the latest 12 months (LTM) ended June 30, 2018, Taesa reported
total debt/EBITDA of 2.1x and net debt/EBITDA of 1.6x, based on
regulatory accounting rules and proportional consolidation of all
transmission assets Taesa participates in directly or indirectly.
Considering IFRS accounting rules and Fitch's criteria, those ratios
were 2.8x and 2.1x, respectively.

Predictable Revenues and High Margins: Taesa's credit profile benefits
from highly predictable power transmission revenues, which are based
on lines availability, rather than volume transported. EBITDA margin
should be at the range 80%-90% in the coming years despite of the
gradual higher impact of around BRL200 million on revenues until 2023
from the 50% PAR reduction for some assets once the 15th year of
operation is completed. Fitch's base case scenario considers an EBITDA
of BRL1.3 billion in 2018, declining to BRL1.2 billion in 2021,
compared to BRL1.5 billion in 2017, on a regulatory basis. The company
should resume its consolidated EBITDA growth in 2022 due to additional
contribution on revenues and dividends received coming from the
conclusion of the projects under development. Taesa's proportional
stake on these projects' PARs corresponds to BRL584 million.

Negative FCF on Investment Cycle: Fitch believes Taesa will present a
positive free cash flow (FCF) of around BRL160 million in 2018,
reverting to a negative annual average of around BRL300 million from
2019 to 2021. The negative FCF in this period reflects the forecasted
PAR reduction, higher investments related to the 8 new projects and a
strong dividends pay-out ratio corresponding to 91% of net income.
Fitch considers that on a consolidated basis Taesa will have a cash
need of BRL1.5 billion for capex from 2018 to 2021, increasing to
BRL2.3 billion when adding-up capital injections in non-consolidated
companies. In accordance with IFRS accounting rules, CFFO and FCF were
BRL1.1 billion and BRL443 million, respectively, for the LTM ended
June 30, 2018, after BRL669 million in dividends paid.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Taesa has a stronger financial profile compared to its peers in Latin
America, such as Interconexion Electrica S.A. E.S.P. (ISA, LC and FC
IDR BBB+/Stable); Transelec S.A. (Transelec, LC and FC IDR BBB/Stable)
and Consorcio Transmantaro S.A. (CTM, LC and FC IDR BBB-/Stable). All
of them have low business risk profiles and predictable cash flow
generation, which is a characteristic of the power transmission
companies operating in a regulated industry. The main differentiation
in the IDRs of these companies is the country where their main
revenues are generated and the location of their assets. While its
peers are located in investment grade countries, Taesa's ratings are
negatively impacted by the country ceiling of Brazil at 'BB'.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within its rating case for the issuer include:

  - PARs adjusted considering inflation and, in some cases, 50%
reduction when the 15th operational year is completed;

  - Operational expenses adjusted by inflation;

  - Minimum cash of BRL200 million;

  - Dividends corresponding to 91% of net income;

  - No new acquisition or greenfield projects.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Positive Rating Action

  - A positive rating action for the company's IDRs depends on an
upgrade of Brazil's sovereign rating.

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Negative Rating Action

  - Deterioration in Taesa's consolidated financial profile, with net
leverage going above 3.5x on a sustainable basis;

  - Negative rating actions on Brazil's sovereign rating will result
on a downgrade of Taesa's IDRs.

LIQUIDITY

Liquidity Improved: Fitch expects Taesa to keep a robust liquidity
profile, benefited from its robust CFFO and ample access to bank
credit lines and capital market. By the end of June 2018, the cash and
marketable securities, not considering the non-consolidated companies
under IFRS, amounted to BRL805 million as per Fitch's calculations and
short-term debt was BRL471 billion, representing a coverage of 1.7x
against 0.7x at the end of June 2017. The seven-year debenture
issuance of BRL526 million concluded in July 2018 and the cash
position are important to fund the equity contribution in projects and
the expected negative FCF from 2019 to 2021on.

Taesa's consolidated debt is characterized by a manageable maturity
profile and no foreign exchange risk. As of June 30, 2018, the
company's pro forma debt was BRL3.6 billion, considering its
proportional stake in all subsidiaries, or BRL3.2 billion by the IFRS
consolidation rule and Fitch's adjustments. The BRL3.2 billion debt
was mainly composed of debentures (BRL2.7 billion). According to
Fitch's methodology the debt on the IFRS accounting rule also includes
off-balance sheet debt of BRL5.7 million related to guarantees
provided to non-consolidated companies.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

Transmissora Alianca de Energia Eletrica S.A.

  -- Foreign Currency IDR at 'BB', Outlook Stable;

  -- Local Currency IDR at 'BBB-', Outlook Stable;

  -- Long-term National Scale Rating at 'AAA(bra)', Outlook Stable;

  -- BRL2,160 million third senior unsecured debenture issuance at 'AAA(bra)';

  -- BRL543 million fourth senior unsecured debenture issuance at 'AAA(bra)'.



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MASISA SA: Fitch Affirms 'B+' FC & LC IDRs, Outlook Negative
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Foreign and Local Currency Issuer
Default Ratings of Masisa S.A. at 'B+' and its National long-term
rating at 'BBB(cl)'. The Rating Outlook remains Negative.

Masisa's ratings reflect the company's still weak cash flow generation
and high leverage, pressured by declining demand for wood boards in
Latin America, the weak currencies in several markets and the still
struggling economic condition of Argentina. It also reflects concern
about a decline in the company's size and presence in the global board
market after the sale of operations in Argentina, Brazil and the
expected sale of operations in Mexico.

The Negative Outlook reflects the liquidity pressure the company is
facing, which would be increased in the case the sale of the Mexican
operations is delayed more than expected. A revision of the Outlook to
Stable is possible if the liquidity concerns are addressed with the
sale of the Mexican operations and if the leverage is reduced.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Sale of Mexican Operations Key to Improve Capital Structure: Upon
concluding the sale of Mexican assets, Masisa would reduce its net
leverage to around 3.3x, according to Fitch's projections. This would
represent a sharp improvement compared with the still high leverage
presented as of March 2018 of 4.7x. Fitch believes it is unlikely that
Masisa would be able to improve its capital structure and liquidity
should the transaction fall through or is delayed more than expected,
putting pressure to face short term commitments. The company has not
been able to reduce its leverage by sheer improvement of its
operations and has implemented asset sales to recover a more
sustainable capital structure, after weak results from its former
operation in Brazil and Argentina, and sluggish economic growth
throughout the region, while the company's debt levels remain
elevated. Masisa's net debt was USD497 million at the end of March
2018. This compares with USD557 million in December 2017 and USD667
million in December 2016.

Less Diversified Business Profile: Masisa's strategy to sell its
industrial units in Argentina, Mexico and Brazil weakened the
company's geographic diversification and business scale, making it
more susceptible to downturns in one market. The company plans to
concentrate its business strategy on value-added board products in the
Andean Region, Central America, the United States, Canada and other
export markets, which show better margins; conversely, the company
faces the challenges of significantly reducing its size and
operational presence in key markets.

Improved Free Cash Flow Expected: Fitch expects Masisa to generate
about USD81 million of recurring EBITDA in 2018 and USD62 million in
2019 after the sale of the Mexican operations, which coupled with
lower capex and and taxes should result in positive FCF, after several
years in negative territory for this metric. Fitch's base case
projections consider the sale of assets in Mexico by the end of 2018,
and include Venezuela's minimal EBITDA. The company generated
recurring EBITDA of USD119 million and cash flow from operations (CFO)
of USD30 million in the LTM ended March 2018, compared with USD133
million and USD6 million, respectively, in 2017. Results remain
pressured by declining demand for wood boards in Latin America and
weak currencies in several markets.

Significant Presence in Venezuela: Masisa is exposed to exchange
controls in its Venezuelan operations, although operations are
self-sufficient in the country. Restrictions imposed by the Venezuelan
Central Bank have limited the U.S. dollar supply in that country,
which constrains the repatriation of available cash. While Venezuela
represented about 3% of total recurring EBITDA in the LTM ended March
2018, the company still has an important position of forestry assets
in the country.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Masisa has operations in Chile, Argentina and Venezuela, and
commercial presence in all Latin America and the U.S. Masisa is an
important producer of wood boards in Latin America, with 1.3 million
cubic meters of installed capacity of particle boards, MDP and MDF,
180,000 cubic meter of moldings, pro forma after the sale of its
Mexican operations, and 362,000 cubic meters of sawn wood.

Masisa is exposed to exchange controls in its Venezuelan operations,
although its operations are self-sufficient in the country, and to the
volatilities of the Argentinian economy.

In Latin America, Masisa is the third largest player in terms of
production capacity of boards. The company's main competitors are the
Brazilian Duratex (not rated), the leader in the segment in Latin
America, and the Chilean Celulosa Arauco y Constitucion S.A. (Arauco,
BBB/Negative). Arauco is the third-largest market pulp company in the
world.

Among the Latin America forestry products companies, like Arauco,
Empresas CMPC, Fibria, Suzano, and Klabin, Masisa is more exposed to
the economic weakness in Latin America as its activities are
concentrated in boards, it has higher leverage and a more limited
liquidity position. After the sales of its industrial facilities in
Argentina and Brazil, and the expected sale of its Mexican operations,
Masisa's EBITDA generation will be largely concentrated in its
industrial production from Chile, which is mitigated by the exports
that represents 57% of the revenues.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's Key Assumptions Within Its Rating Case for the Issuer

  -- Mexican assets sale finished by the end of 2018 with no
significant change from original announced terms, and proceeds used to
reduce debt and strengthen liquidity.

  -- No other asset disposals included in the base case scenario

  -- No dividends paid in 2019, and 50% of net profit from 2020 onwards.

  -- Capex around USD30 million in 2018 and USD25 million going forward.

  -- Fitch does not consider cash flow form the operations in Venezuela.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action

The favorable conclusion of the divestitures in Mexico, addressing
liquidity issues and significantly improving the company's capital
structure to reduce net debt/recurring EBITDA, excluding Venezuela, to
below 4.0x, would likely result in a revision of the Outlook to
Stable.

Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action

  -- A significant delay in the sale of the Mexican operations, adding
pressure to the tight liquidity of Masisa, without the company finding
alternative sources of liquidity could trigger a downgrade.

  -- An increase in leverage above 5.0x, excluding Venezuela, without
measures to prevent an event of default, would trigger a downgrade.

LIQUIDITY

Tight Liquidity: The main maturities for the second half of 2018 add
up to USD140 million and include a bridge loan used to prepay the
international bond, pre export finances, a committed line, and the
current portion of long-term debt. Fitch believes that Masisa's
liquidity position is limited and reliant upon the sale of assets in
order to pay its maturities and properly refinance its credits. The
sale of the Mexican operation would give enough cash to the company to
face imminent commitments, but a delay in the process could result in
an unfavorable position. Masisa is in the process of selling non-core
assets for around USD20 million in order to strengthen its cash
position and pay its maturities in the case the sale of the Mexican
operations is delayed.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

Masisa S.A.

  -- Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'B+';

  -- National scale rating of Bond Lines at 'BBB(cl)';

  -- Long-term National Scale rating at 'BBB(cl)';

  -- National Short-term rating at 'N2(cl)'.

  -- National Equity rating at 'First Class Level 3(cl)'.

The Rating Outlook remains Negative.



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J A M A I C A
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JAMAICA: BOJ Holding Policy Interest Rate at 2%
-----------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that the Bank of Jamaica (BOJ), has decided to hold
the policy interest rate at two per cent -- as a result,  the Monetary
Policy rate remains unchanged.

This decision reflects the Bank's assessment that inflation, currently
below target, will rise towards the lower end of  the target of  4 to
6 per cent by the March 2019 quarter and approach the middle of the
target range thereafter, according to RJR News.

The Bank's outlook for inflation for the remainder of  2018 and the
first part of 2019 is largely predicated on an expected increase in
agricultural prices, oil prices remaining elevated and higher domestic
GDP growth, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Feb. 5, 2018, Fitch Ratings affirmed Jamaica's Long-Term
Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B' and has
revised the Rating Outlook to Positive from Stable.



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P U E R T O    R I C O
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HIGH TIMES: Hires Lugo Mender Group LLC as Attorney
---------------------------------------------------
High Times Corp seeks authority from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for
the District of Puerto Rico (Old San Juan) to hire Lugo Mender
Group, LLC as debtor's attorney to provide general legal counseling
services in connection with
this bankruptcy petition.

Lugo's hourly rates are:

     Wigberto Lugo Mender, Esq.          $300
     Associate Staff Attorney            $200
     Legal and Financial Assistants      $125

Alexis Betancourt Vincenty, Esq., from Lugo Mender Group, LLC
attests that his firm and its employees are disinterested persons
within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. Sec. 101(14).

The counsel can be reached through:

     Alexis Betancourt Vincenty, Esq.
     Lugo Mender Group, LLC
     100 Carr. 165 Suite 501
     Guaynabo, P.R. 00968-8052
     Tel.: (787) 707-0404
     Fax: (787) 707-0412

                      About High Times Corp

High Times Corp, dba High Times Sport Bar, Agencia Hipica 504, High
Times Convenience Store, & High Times Liquor Store, is the
definitive resource for all things cannabis.  From cultivation and
legalization, to entertainment and culture, to hard-hitting news
exposing the War on Drugs, High Times has been the preeminent
source for cannabis information since 1974.

The Debtor filed their petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. D.P.R. Case no. 18-04770) on Aug. 21, 2018.
Judge Enrique S. Lamoutte Inclan presided over the case.  Alexis A
Betancourt Vincenty at Lugo Mender Group, LLC, is the Debtor's
counsel.


JDHG LLC: Monthly Payment to Unsecureds Increased to $2,370
-----------------------------------------------------------
JDHG, LLC, Caribbean Winds, Inc., August Sage Holdings, LLC, and
Green Horizon, Inc. filed an amended disclosure statement
explaining their joint plan of reorganization.

Under the latest plan, Holders of Allowed Priority Tax Claims,
secured and unsecured, will be paid in full by Debtors either: (i)
upon such terms as may be agreed to with such Holders,(ii) on the
later of the Effective Date of the Plan or the date that such
Allowed Priority Tax Claims would have been due if the Bankruptcy
Cases had not been commenced, or (iii) through 50 consecutive
monthly installments of $2,529.02, including the rate of interest
prevailing during the month the Plan is confirmed, estimated at 5%
per annum. The first installment to be due on the 30th day of the
month following the Effective Date and the remaining 49
installments on the 30th day ol' each month thereafter, provided
that the payment to the Holders of Allowed Priority Tax Claims is
effected in a manner not less favorable than the most favored
non-priority unsecured claims provided for in the Plan.

The previous version of the plan provided that Holders of Allowed
Priority Tax Claims, secured and unsecured, will be paid in full,
in cash, on the Effective Date.

Holders of Allowed General Unsecured Claims in Class 2 totaling
$142,257 will be paid in full satisfaction of their claims 100%
through 60 consecutive equal monthly installments of $2,370.95
instead of $2,338.93 previously proposed, commencing on the 30th
day of the month following the Effective Date and continuing on the
30th day of the following 59 months.

A copy of the Disclosure Statement dated Aug. 8 from
PacerMonitor.com is available at https://tinyurl.com/yahxmz9v at no charge.

A full-text copy of the Amended Disclosure Statement is available
at:

     http://bankrupt.com/misc/prb18-02810-11-46.pdf

A full-text copy of the Joint Plan is available at:

     http://bankrupt.com/misc/prb18-02810-11-45.pdf

                       About JDHG LLC

JDHG, LLC owns hotel furniture and fixtures at Wind Chimes Inn
located in San Juan, Puerto Rico, and boat bar equipment valued at
$65,255 in total.  The company has accounts receivable of $4.6
million.

JDHG sought protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code
(Bankr. D. P.R. Case No. 18-02810) on May 21, 2018.  In the
petition signed by John B. Dennis Brull, president, the Debtor
disclosed $4.67 million in assets and $19.24 million in
liabilities.  Judge Mildred Caban Flores presides over the case.


PUERTO RICO: Probe Cites Multiple Causes for Fiscal Free Fall
-------------------------------------------------------------
Luis Valentin Ortiz at Reuters reports that short-term fixes, deficit
financing and political pressures helped drive Puerto Rico into a
fiscal catastrophe that landed the U.S. commonwealth in bankruptcy
court, according to an investigative report released.

The 600-page report commissioned by the island's federally appointed
oversight board last September also addresses potential claims for
investors and regulators and recommends ways for Puerto Rico to avoid
future fiscal problems, the report notes.

With roughly $120 billion in debt and pension liabilities, Puerto Rico
commenced bankruptcy proceedings in federal court in May 2017, the
report says.  A fiscal oversight board created by the U.S. Congress in
2016 under the so-called PROMESA Act tapped law firm Kobre & Kim to
produce the report, Reuters notes.

"The 10-month investigation involved an extensive evaluation of
evidence from many sources.  We conducted over 100 witness interviews
and reviewed voluminous productions of documents in both English and
Spanish," John Couriel, a lawyer at Kobre & Kim, said in a statement
obtained by the news agency.

In conducting its probe, the law firm had access to documents that had
been restricted from public view by U.S. Judge Laura Taylor Swain, who
oversees the island's bankruptcy, the report relays.

The report found that contrary to accusations by some bondholders,
Puerto Rico's Sales Tax Financing Corporation, known as COFINA, was
not created to evade the island's constitutional debt limit, Reuters
says.

"Over time, however, COFINA became a comparatively accessible source
of liquidity that staved off the need for Puerto Rico to find a more
permanent solution to its financial problems," the report said,
Reuters discloses.

It recommended amending the island's constitution so that debt issued
by COFINA, which securitized sales tax revenue to achieve higher
credit ratings, counts toward the debt limit, Reuters notes.

Reuters says that political pressures impacted rates charged by the
Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA), which became dependent
on short-term loans from the island's Government Development Bank that
were paid off through bond issuances, according to the report.

Meanwhile, investigators could not determine how the Puerto Rico
Aqueduct and Sewer Authority (PRASA) spent some proceeds from bonds
issued between 2010 and 2013, Reuters relays.  The report recommended
a mix of governor-appointed and independent members for utility boards
and the establishment of audit committees and independent rate boards,
Reuters notes.

The probe found deficiencies with Puerto Rico's budgeting process and
chronically late annual audits, as well as with credit rating
agencies, Reuters says.

While the report said it could not conclude the rating agencies
significantly contributed to the island's fiscal crisis, it faulted
them for undeserved high ratings that made bonds more attractive to
certain investors, Reuters relays.

"Indeed, certain of Puerto Rico-related bonds retained
investment-grade ratings for a prolonged period despite mounting
levels of debt service, declining issuer performance, and worsening
macroeconomic indicators, with several issuers ultimately landing in a
form of bankruptcy after (the rating agencies) reduced the ratings
below investment grade," the report stated, Reuters notes.

The report will be the subject of a public hearing the oversight board
set for Sept. 18, Reuters adds.


TOYS R US: Toys Delaware, Geoffrey Debtors File Wind-Down Plan
--------------------------------------------------------------
Toys "R" Us-Delaware, Inc., and certain Toys Delaware affiliates
(collectively, "Toys Delaware Debtors") and Geoffrey Holdings, LLC,
and Geoffrey's subsidiaries (collectively, the "Geoffrey Debtors"),
filed with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia, Richmond Division, a disclosure statement dated August 6,
2018, explaining their Chapter 11 plans.

The Plan constitutes a separate Chapter 11 plan for each Debtor and
derives from a settlement agreement that was extensively negotiated in
good faith and at arm's-length between the Debtors and certain
stakeholders.  If consummated, the Plan will distribute the proceeds
derived from the wind-down, dissolution, and liquidation of the
Debtors' Estates after the Effective Date.  The Geoffrey Debtors and
the Toys Delaware Debtors separately seek to confirm their respective
Plans, and the confirmation of one Plan is not contingent on
confirmation of the other.

The proposed Plan provides the following classification and
treatment of classified claims and interests against the Toys
Delaware Debtors:

   * Class A1: Other Secured Claims against the Toys Delaware
Debtors.  On the Effective Date, or as soon as reasonably
practicable thereafter, in full and final satisfaction and
discharge of each Allowed Other Secured Claim against the Toys
Delaware Debtors, each Holder thereof shall receive, at the option
of the applicable Toys Delaware Debtor: (i) payment in full in cash
solely from the proceeds of collateral securing such Allowed Other
Secured Claim; (ii) delivery of the collateral securing any such claim
and payment of any interest required under Section 506(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code; (iii) reinstatement of such Other Secured Claim; or
(iv) such other treatment as shall render such claim unimpaired,
provided, however, that holders of Allowed Other
Secured Claims shall not receive any distribution from the
Administrative Claims Distribution Pool.

   * Class A2: Other Priority Claims against the Toys Delaware
Debtors.  Except to the extent there is any excess value available
for distribution from the applicable Toys Delaware Debtor following
repayment of all Secured Claims and all Claims entitled to senior or
administrative priority in accordance with the Bankruptcy Code, on the
Effective Date, or as soon as reasonably practicable thereafter, each
Allowed Other Priority Claim against the Toys Delaware Debtors shall
receive no distribution.

   * Class A3: Delaware Secured ABL/FILO Facility Claims against
the Toys Delaware Debtors.  On the Effective Date, or as soon as
reasonably practicable thereafter, in full and final satisfaction
and discharge of each allowed Delaware Secured ABL/FILO Facility
Claim, each holder thereof shall receive payment in full and cash.

   * Class A4: Term B-2 Loan and Term B-3 Loan Claims against the
Toys Delaware Debtors.  On the Effective Date, or as soon as
reasonably practicable thereafter, in full and final satisfaction
and discharge of each allowed Term B-2 Loan and Term B-3 Loan
claim, each Holder thereof shall receive its Term Loan Pro Rata
Share of the Term B-2/B-3 Delaware Portion of (i) the Delaware Term
Loan Distributable Proceeds and (ii) the Delaware Residual Interest
Pool.

   * Class A5: Term B-4 Loan Claims against the Toys Delaware
Debtors.  On the Effective Date, or as soon as reasonably
practicable thereafter, in full and final satisfaction and
discharge of each allowed Term B-4 Loan Claim, each Holder thereof
shall receive its Term Loan Pro Rata Share of (A) 50% of the
Aggregate Canada Proceeds, and (B) the Term B-4 Delaware Portion of
(i) the Delaware Term Loan Distributable Proceeds and (ii) the
Delaware Residual Interest Pool.

   * Class A6: General Unsecured Claims against the Toys Delaware
Debtors.  Except to the extent there is any residual value
available for distribution from the Toys Delaware Debtors after
Classes A1 through A5, as well as Allowed Administrative Claims and
Priority Tax Claims are paid in full, each General Unsecured Claim
against the Toys Delaware Debtors shall receive no distribution on
account of such General Unsecured Claim; however, Holders of General
Unsecured Claims will receive their pro rata share of any such
residual value.

   * Class A7: Toys Delaware Debtor Intercompany Claims against
other Toys Delaware Debtors.  On the Effective Date or as soon as
reasonably practicable thereafter, each allowed Toys Delaware
Debtor Intercompany Claim against another Toys Delaware Debtor
shall be reinstated, canceled and released, or receive such other
treatment, in each case as agreed to by the applicable Debtors and
the Ad Hoc Group of Term B-4 Lenders.

   * Class A8: Toys Delaware Intercompany.  Except as otherwise
provided in the Toys Delaware Plan, Interests in the Toys Delaware
Debtors other than Toys Delaware shall be reinstated, canceled and
released, or receive such other treatment, in each case as agreed
to by the applicable Debtors and the Ad Hoc Group of Term B-4
Lenders.

   * Class A9: Toys Inc. Interests.  On the Effective Date, each
interest in Toys Delaware shall be canceled and released, unless
the Delaware Retention Structure is utilized.

The proposed Plan also provides the following classification and
treatment of classified claims and interests against the Geoffrey
Debtors:

   * Class B1: Other Secured Claims against the Geoffrey Debtors.
On the Effective Date, or as soon as reasonably practicable
thereafter, in full and final satisfaction and discharge of each
Allowed Other Secured Claim, each Holder thereof shall receive, at
the option of the Geoffrey Debtors: (i) payment in full in cash;
(ii) delivery of the collateral securing any such claim and payment of
any interest required under Section 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code in
compliance; (iii) reinstatement of such other secured claim; or (iv)
such other treatment as shall render such claim unimpaired.

   * Class B2: Other Priority Claims against the Geoffrey Debtors.
On the Effective Date, or as soon as reasonably practicable
thereafter, each allowed other priority claim against the Geoffrey
Debtors shall be discharged and canceled in full and shall receive
no distribution.

   * Class B3: Term B-2 Loan, Term B-3 Loan, and Term B-4 Loan
Claims against the Geoffrey Debtors.  On the Effective Date, or as
soon as reasonably practicable thereafter, in full and final
satisfaction and discharge of each allowed Term B-2 Loan, Term B-3
Loan and Term B-4 Loan Claim, each holder thereof shall receive its
Term Loan Pro Rata Share of: (i) the Geoffrey Proceeds, if any, and/or
(ii) the Geoffrey Equity Pool.

   * Class B4: General Unsecured Claims against the Geoffrey
Debtors.  On the Effective Date, or as soon as reasonably
practicable thereafter, each Allowed General Unsecured Claim
against the Geoffrey Debtors shall be discharged and canceled in
full and shall receive no distribution.

   * Class B5: Geoffrey Debtor Intercompany Claims against other
Geoffrey Debtors.  On the Effective Date, or as soon as reasonably
practicable thereafter, each Geoffrey Debtor Intercompany Claim
against the other Geoffrey Debtors shall be reinstated, canceled
and released, or receive such other treatment, in each case as
agreed to by the applicable Debtors and the Ad Hoc Group of Term
B-4 Lenders.

   * Class B6: Geoffrey Debtor Intercompany Interests.  On the
Effective Date, or as soon as reasonably practicable thereafter, in
full and final satisfaction and discharge of Geoffrey Debtor
Intercompany Interest, each Allowed Geoffrey Debtor Intercompany
Interest shall be reinstated, canceled and released, or receive
such other treatment, in each case as agreed to by the applicable
Debtors and the Ad Hoc Group of Term B-4 Lenders.

   * Class B7: Interests in Geoffrey.  On the Effective Date, each
Interest in Geoffrey shall be cancelled, and released, unless the
Delaware Retention Structure is utilized.

A full-text copy of the Toys Delaware and Geoffrey Debtors'
Disclosure Statement is available at:

        http://bankrupt.com/misc/vaeb17-34665-4055.pdf

                   About Toys R Us, Inc.

Toys "R" Us, Inc., was an American toy and juvenile-products
retailer founded in 1948 and headquartered in Wayne, New Jersey, in
the New York City metropolitan area.  Merchandise was sold in 880 Toys
"R" Us and Babies "R" Us stores in the United States, Puerto Rico and
Guam, and in more than 780 international stores and more than 245
licensed stores in 37 countries and jurisdictions.  Merchandise was
also sold at e-commerce sites including Toysrus.com and Babiesrus.com.

On July 21, 2005, a consortium of Bain Capital Partners LLC,
Kohlberg Kravis Roberts, and Vornado Realty Trust invested $1.3
billion to complete a $6.6 billion leveraged buyout of the
company.

Toys "R" Us is a privately owned entity but still files with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission as required by its debt
agreements.

The Company's consolidated balance sheet showed $6.572 billion in
assets, $7.891 billion in liabilities, and a stockholders' deficit
of $1.319 billion as of April 29, 2017.

Toys "R" Us, Inc., and certain of its U.S. subsidiaries and its
Canadian subsidiary voluntarily filed for relief under Chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. E.D. Va. Lead Case No. Case No.
17-34665) on Sept. 19, 2017.  In addition, the Company's Canadian
subsidiary voluntarily commenced parallel proceedings under the
Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") in Canada in the
Ontario Superior Court of Justice.  The Company's operations
outside of the U.S. and Canada, including its 255 licensed stores
and joint venture partnership in Asia, which are separate entities,
were not part of the Chapter 11 filing and CCAA proceedings.

Grant Thornton is the monitor appointed in the CCAA case.

Judge Keith L. Phillips presides over the Chapter 11 cases.

In the Chapter 11 cases, Kirkland & Ellis LLP and Kirkland & Ellis
International LLP serve as the Debtors' legal counsel.  Kutak Rock
LLP serves as co-counsel.  Toys "R" Us employed Alvarez & Marsal
North America, LLC as its restructuring advisor; and Lazard Freres
& Co. LLC as its investment banker.  It hired Prime Clerk LLC as
claims and noticing agent.  Consensus Advisory Services LLC and
Consensus Securities LLC, serve as sale process investment banker.

A&G Realty Partners, LLC, serves as its real estate advisor.

On Sept. 26, 2017, the U.S. Trustee for Region 4 appointed an
official committee of unsecured creditors.  The Committee retained
Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP as its legal counsel; Wolcott
Rivers, P.C., as local counsel; FTI Consulting, Inc. as financial
advisor; and Moelis & Company LLC as investment banker.

                        Toys "R" Us UK

Toys "R" Us Limited, Toys "R" Us, Inc.'s UK arm with 105 stores and
3,000 employees, was sent into administration in the United Kingdom in
February 2018.

Arron Kendall and Simon Thomas of Moorfields Advisory Limited, 88
Wood Street, London, EC2V 7QF were appointed Joint Administrators
on Feb. 28, 2018. The Administrators now manage the affairs,
business and property of the Company.  The Administrators act as
agents only and without personal liability.

The Administrators said they will make every effort to secure a
buyer for all or part of the business.

                   Liquidation of U.S. Stores

Toys "R" Us, Inc., on March 15, 2018, filed with the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court a motion seeking Bankruptcy Court approval to
start the process of conducting an orderly wind-down of its U.S.
business and liquidation of inventory in all 735 of the Company's
U.S. stores, including stores in Puerto Rico.

                         Propco I Debtors

Toys "R" Us Property Company I, LLC and its subsidiaries own fee
and leasehold interests in more than 300 properties in the United
States.  The Debtors lease the properties on a triple-net basis
under a master lease to Toys-Delaware, the operating entity for all
of TRU's North American businesses, which operates the majority of
the properties as Toys "R" Us stores, Babies "R" Us stores or
side-by-side stores, or subleases them to alternative retailers.

Toys "R" Us Property was founded in 2005 and is headquartered in
Wayne, New Jersey.  Toys 'R' Us Property operates as a subsidiary
of Toys "R" Us Inc.

Company LLC, MAP Real Estate LLC, TRU 2005 RE I LLC, TRU 2005 RE II
Trust, and Wayne Real Estate Company LLC (collectively, "Propco I
Debtors") sought protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code
(Bankr. E.D. Va. Lead Case No. 18-31429) on March 20, 2018.  The
Propco I Debtors sought and obtained procedural consolidation and
joint administration of their Chapter 11 cases, separate from the Toys
"R" Us Debtors' Chapter 11 cases.

The Propco I Debtors estimated assets of $500 million to $1 billion
and liabilities of $500 million to $1 billion.

Judge Keith L. Phillips presides over the Propco I Debtors' cases.

The Propco I Debtors hired Klehr Harrison Harvey Branzburg, LLP;
and Crowley, Liberatore, Ryan & Brogan, P.C., as co-counsel.  The
Debtors also tapped Kutak Rock LLP.  They hired Goldin Associates,
LLC, as financial advisors.



================================
T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O
================================


PETROLEUM CO: Will be Shutting Down in the Near Future
------------------------------------------------------
Caribbean News Now reports that as Trinidad and Tobago is about to
celebrate its 56th anniversary of political independence, its state
owned oil refinery company Petroleum Co. of Trinidad & Tobago Ltd
(Petrotrin), which has employed thousands of permanent and contract
workers over the last decades will now be shutting down in the near
future, according to Petrotrin officials and government ministers.

Petrotrin is a state owned enterprise in the integrated oil and gas
industry, engaged in the full range of petroleum operations including
exploration for development of and production of hydrocarbons, and the
manufacturing and marketing of a wide range of petroleum products,
according to Caribbean News Now.

The report notes that Petrotrin has played a pivotal role in the
economy of Trinidad and Tobago and its closing may mean that the
subsidies on petroleum and oil-based products enjoyed by residents
will inevitably come to an end.

All 1,700 jobs in refining will be terminated, the report relays.

The Pointe-a-Pierre South Trinidad Refinery was built by Petrotrin's
predecessor Trinidad Leaseholds Limited (TLL) in 1917. British
Petroleum (BPTT), Shell, Texaco and others were also joint partners,
the report says.  The refinery, which later became the largest
refinery in the country, went through a number of transformations over
the years, while corruption at government levels increased, resulting
in monumental debt, the report discloses.

Petrotrin has lost a total of about TT$8 billion in the last five
years; is TT$12 billion in debt; and owes the government of Trinidad
and Tobago more than TT$3 billion in taxes and royalties, the report
notes.

According to the company, it currently requires a cash injection of
TT$25 billion to stay alive -- to refresh its infrastructure, and to
repay its debt -- and even with that, if left as is, it is projected
to continue losing about TT$2 billion a year, the report says.

In recent months the owner of A&V Oil and Gas Limited, Hanif Nizam
Baksh, was accused by leader of the opposition, Kamla Persad
Bissesser, of defrauding Petrotrin of just over TT$100 million
(US$14.8 million), the report relays.  Baksh is a financier of the
ruling People's National Movement (PNM) and very close friend of Prime
Minister Dr Keith Rowley, the report discloses.

The Oilfield Workers Trade Union (OWTU) leader Ancel Roget, who
recently called Rowley a "liar" and a "wajang" (local term for a low
life, uncouth person), held meetings with workers, the report notes.

According to former minister Vasanth Bharath, Petrotrin is the
embodiment of poor corporate governance, expressed in bad policy
decisions, wastage, corruption, nepotism -- and more, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
May 3, 2018, S&P Global Ratings revised its outlook on Petroleum
Co. of Trinidad & Tobago Ltd (Petrotrin) to negative from stable.
S&P said, "We also affirmed our 'BB' long-term corporate credit
and senior unsecured debt ratings on the company. Additionally,
we're keeping its SACP unchanged at 'b-'."


TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Sub-Standard Poultry Will Be Thing of Past
-------------------------------------------------------------
Trinidad Express reports that sub-standard poultry, like chicken meat,
will soon no longer be allowed to enter this country or to be produced
here.

Trade Minister Paula Gopee-Scoon disclosed that Cabinet had taken a
decision to enforce the Caricom Regional Standard for Poultry and
Poultry Products, according to Trinidad Express.



=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================


VENEZUELA: 2 Companies Owed US$.97MM for Goods Delivered
--------------------------------------------------------
Trinidad Express reports that two local manufacturers -- VEMCO Ltd and
Langston Roach Industries -- are owed US$979,000 for goods delivered
to Venezuela, Trade Minister Paula Gopee-Scoon has said.

She said all other manufacturers have been paid, according to Trinidad Express.

She said the Government has spoken to Venezuelan officials about the
issue, the report notes.  "I have written to my counterpart in
Venezuela and also I had a meeting with a Venezuelan minister of
government who was in Trinidad, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
June 1, 2018, S&P Global Ratings, on May 29, 2018, removed its
long- and short-term local currency sovereign credit ratings on
Venezuela from CreditWatch with negative implications and affirmed
them at 'CCC- /C'. The outlook on the long-term local currency
rating is negative. At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'SD/D'
long- and short-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on
Venezuela. S&P's transfer and convertibility assessment remains at
'CC'.



                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.  Send
announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B.
Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2018.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.


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