TCRLA_Public/180924.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

           Monday, September 24, 2018, Vol. 19, No. 189


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

PVCRED SERIE XXXVII: Moody's Affirms Class A Certs Ba2


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Lowers Most Fuels as Truckers Threaten Walkout
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Wants a 2019 Budget of US$18.4 Billion
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Fitch Affirms BB- LT IDR, Outlook Stable


H O N D U R A S

BANCO ATLANTIDA: Fitch Rates Sr. Unsec. Notes 'B', Outlook Stable


J A M A I C A

JAMAICA: More Problems at Students' Loan Bureau


M E X I C O

LAZARO CARDENAS: Moody's Cuts Issuer Rating to B2; Outlook Stable


P A N A M A

BANCO INT'L: Moody's Affirms B1 LT CDR; Alters Outlook to Stable


P U E R T O    R I C O

J & M SALES: Taps Retail Consulting as Real Estate Advisor
J & M SALES: Committee Taps Cooley LLP as Lead Counsel
PUERTO RICO: Ct. Tosses Creditor Move to Halt Debt Restructuring


T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O

PETROLEUM CO: Refinery Closure 'Will Impact Penal/Debe'


X X X X X X X X X

* BOND PRICING: For the Week September 17 to September 21, 2018


                            - - - - -


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A R G E N T I N A
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PVCRED SERIE XXXVII: Moody's Affirms Class A Certs Ba2
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo has
affirmed the ratings of the certificates to be issued in
connection with Fideicomiso Financiero Pvcred Serie XXXVII, a
securitization of personal loans in Argentina. These rating
actions are due to changes made to the structure of the
transaction by the sponsor since Moody's took rating actions to
the certificates on August 31, 2018.

Floating rate debt securities Class A (VRDA) and Class B (VRDB),
and the CP Certificates (CP) will be issued by TMF Trust Company
(Argentina) S.A., acting solely in its capacity as issuer and
trustee.

This credit rating is subject to the fulfillment of contingencies
that are highly likely to be completed, such as finalization of
documents and issuance of the securities. This credit rating is
based on certain information that may change prior to the
fulfillment of such contingencies, including market conditions,
financial projections, transaction structure, terms and conditions
of the issuance, characteristics of the underlying assets or
receivables, allocation of cash flows and of losses, performance
triggers, transaction counterparties and other information
included in the transaction documentation. Any pertinent change in
such information or additional information could result in a
change of this credit rating.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

  - ARS 178,129,000 Senior Certificate (VRDA), affirmed Aaa.ar
(sf) (Argentine National Scale) and Ba2 (sf) (Global Scale);
previously on August 31, 2018 affirmed Aaa.ar (sf) and Ba2 (sf).

  - ARS 2,969,000 Mezzanine Certificate (VRDB) affirmed Ba3.ar
(sf) (Argentine National Scale) and Caa1 (sf) (Global Scale);
previously on August 31, 2018 upgraded to Ba3.ar (sf) and Caa1
(sf).

  - ARS 115,783,000 Residual Certificates (CP) affirmed B2.ar (sf)
(Argentine National Scale) and Caa2 (sf) (Global Scale);
previously on August 31, 2018 upgraded to B2.ar (sf) and Caa2
(sf).

RATINGS RATIONALE

The structure has changed since Moody's assigned ratings to the
certificates on August 31, 2018. A key credit positive is that the
credit enhancement level for all the certificates has increased,
driven by changes to the capital structure and the inclusion of a
sizeable cash reserve funded with loan collections received since
loans were assigned to the trust, much of which has been derived
from excess spread. Another credit positive is that since
assigning the initial ratings, Argentina's Congress passed a law
that now makes the subject securitization trust exempt from paying
income tax subject to certain requirements, thereby increasing
cash flows available to investors.

The aforementioned positive aspects either offset or more than
offset certain credit negative changes to the structure, including
higher interest rate caps on the floating rate senior and
mezzanine certificates and Moody's higher mean default assumption.
Moody's has increased its mean default assumption in consideration
of recently received and updated information regarding pool
performance.

The rated securities are payable from the cash flows derived from
the assets of the trust, which is primarily comprised of an
amortizing pool of approximately 12,971 eligible personal loans
denominated in Argentine pesos, bearing fixed interest rate,
originated by Pvcred S.A., a financial company owned by Comafi's
Group in Argentina. Trust assets also include ARS 98.7 million in
cash holdings as of August 2018. Only the installments due after
April 30, 2018 have been assigned to the trust.

The VRDA will bear a floating interest rate (BADLAR plus 100bps)
as of the issuance date with a first coupon payment date in
October 2018. The VRDA's interest rate will never be higher than
40% or lower than 30%.

The VRDB will bear a floating interest rate (BADLAR plus 200bps)
as of the issuance date. The VRDB's interest rate will never be
higher than 41% or lower than 31%.

Overall credit enhancement is comprised of subordination,
overcollateralization, excess spread, and various reserve funds.

The transaction has an initial credit enhancement level in the
form of subordination and overcollateralization of 49.7% and 48.8%
for the VRDA and VRDB respectively, calculated over the total
assets as of August 31, 2018, including cash holdings as of the
same date. The subordination levels will increase over time due to
the full turbo sequential payment structure and the high levels of
excess spread.

The transaction also benefits from an estimated initial, annual
excess spread, of 56.2%, before considering losses, taxes or
prepayments and calculated at the interest rate caps of 40% and
41% for the VRDA and VRDB, respectively.

In assigning ratings to this transaction, Moody's assumed a
lognormal distribution for loan defaults with a weighted average
mean default of 43.1% and a coefficient of variation of 53.2%.
These assumptions were derived considering the historical
performance of Pvcred's loan pools and prior transactions.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Factors that may lead to a downgrade of the ratings include an
increase in delinquency levels beyond the level Moody's assumed
when rating this transaction. Although Moody's analyzed the
historical performance data of previous transactions and similar
receivables originated by Pvcred S.A., the actual performance of
the securitized pool may be affected, among others, by the
economic activity, high inflation rates compared with nominal
salaries increases and the unemployment rate in Argentina.

Factors that may lead to an upgrade of the ratings include the
building of credit enhancement over time due to the turbo
sequential payment structure, when compared with the level of
projected losses in the securitized pool.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Consumer Loan-Backed ABS" published in
September 2015.



===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Lowers Most Fuels as Truckers Threaten Walkout
------------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that the Industry and Commerce Ministry
posted mostly fuel prices for the week from September 22 to 28.

The posted drop in fuel prices comes just one day after the
country's biggest truckers' union (Fenatrado) disclosed a
nationwide walkout to protest rising fuel prices, according to
Dominican Today.

Premium gasoline will cost RD$240.60 and regular RD$230.20, or
RD$1.00 less per gallon in both cases, the report says.

Regular diesel will cost RD$193.80 per gallon; lower by RD$2.00,
while optimal diesel will cost RD$205.90, or RD$1.00 less, the
report notes.

Avtur will cost RD$153.90, and kerosene RD$181.60; both fall
RD$2.00, the report relays.

Propane gas drops RD$1.00 to RD$127.60 per gallon; fuel oil
remains at RD$125.35 per gallon, and natural gas stays at RD$28.97
per cubic meter, the report discloses.

The Dominican Central Bank's posted average exchange rate of
RD$49.91 per dollar was used to calculate fuel prices, the report
adds.


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Wants a 2019 Budget of US$18.4 Billion
----------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that the Council of Ministers approved a
Budget of RD$921.8 billion (US$18.4 billion), for 2019, or RD$91.1
billion more than what Congress approved for this year.

Finance Minister, Donald Guerrero, and Budget Director, Luis
Reyes, said estimated collections are RD$689.9 billion; estimated
total expense are RD$765.5 billion, and RD$156.3 billion is for
debt amortization, according to Dominican Today.

"The Budget contemplates maintaining the reduction in the fiscal
deficit for 2019 with a projected deficit of 1.9 for the non-
financial public sector and 1.7 for the central government," the
report quoted Mr. Guerrero as saying.

The report notes that Mr. Reyes said the Budget bill proposes a
decrease in the Central Government deficit of 2.2 percent of GDP
to 1.7 percent.  "This is 0.5 percent, the most important
decrease, the largest that has taken place since 2013 and is the
effort made by the Government to adapt to the international
environment," the report quoted him as saying.

They added that best practices, Internal Taxes (DGII) and Customs
(DGA) expect increased revenues next year through at .4% of GDP,
or RD$16.0 billion, the report adds.


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Fitch Affirms BB- LT IDR, Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Dominican Republic's Long-Term,
Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB-' with a
Stable Outlook.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The ratings balance Dominican Republic's favorable macroeconomic
performance and narrow current account deficit with its weak
public finances, higher net external debt than 'BB' peers, limited
monetary policy effectiveness, and lower governance and social
indicators than 'BB' peers.

Fitch expects the economy to return to above-potential growth of
5.8% in 2018 (after dipping to 4.6% in 2017) and to average 5.2%
in 2019-2020, driven by investment, tourism and remittances.
Inflation is moderate within the central bank's 4%+/-1% target
band at 3.87% yoy in August, up moderately from 3.3% on average
during 2017 as a result of higher fuel import prices. Fitch
expects the current account deficit (CAD) to remain below 2% of
GDP and financed by net FDI over 2018-2020.

Dominican Republic's public finances are weak relative to the 'BB'
category. Revenues are low at 14.9% of GDP; there is limited
transparency of capital spending, the electricity subsidy, and
projects generating supplier arrears, adding to gross financing
needs beyond the budget. The quasi-fiscal component of the non-
financial public-sector (NFPS) balance has averaged 0.4% of GDP in
addition to the central government average deficit of 3.0% of GDP
over the past five years. Fitch expects the general government
(NFPS) deficit to moderate to 2.6% of GDP in 2018 from 3.2% in
2017, driven by tax administration gains. However, the general
government deficit is expected to widen to 2.8% of GDP during
2019-2020 reflecting higher external interest expense and
increased capital outlays during the 2019-2020 pre-election
period.

The general government debt/GDP ratio (considered in Fitch's
baseline debt analysis) is par with the 'BB' median at 39.5% in
2017, but it is expected to remain on a gradual upward trajectory.
The interest burden, 17.9% of revenue in 2018, is nearly double
the 'BB' median. Debt is vulnerable to currency shocks, as more
than 65% is U.S. dollar-linked, and to real interest rate
pressure. Central bank securities totaling 13.3% of GDP in 2017
are a contingent liability. Consolidated public debt
(consolidating the NFPS and central bank liabilities) totaled
49.9% of GDP at end 2017.

The government has issued nearly USD3.1 billion in external bonds
during 2018 to meet estimated gross financing needs of USD4.2
billion (5.4% of GDP). This included Dominican Republic's first
peso-denominated global bond in February. Fitch expects that the
third USD1.3 billion issuance in July will alleviate pressure on
the local market, which resulted in some rejected auction bids
during April-June, and that the government will be able source its
remaining 2018 needs in the domestic market.

Dominican Republic's external balance sheet is weaker than the
'BB' median, as a result of its higher net external debt/current
external receipts (CXR) ratio, 55% in 2018, and foreign-currency
share of government debt than the 'BB' median. However, its
external debt service metrics are in line with the category, and
its external liquidity is gradually improving.

President Medina's second (PLD) administration has not pushed
forward key economic and fiscal reforms, in Fitch's view. Although
the government has achieved tax administration gains to lower tax
evasion, structural reforms to strengthen the fiscal framework
(outlined by the PLD in a 2012 national strategy) have not
advanced. Furthermore, an electricity pact is not expected to
meaningfully reduce (debt-creating) distributor financial losses.
A successor strategy to recapitalize the central bank after the
previous 10-year plan elapsed remains under political discussion.

Political attention has turned to the 2020 elections with the PLD-
led congress's passage of a political parties law in August.
Competition to lead the governing party is creating political
uncertainty about the PLD's election prospects and potential
election coalition configurations. Competitive elections in 2012
contributed to a widening in the general government deficit to
6.9% of GDP. The 2016 deficit was contained, in part due to
limited competition pressures that resulted from an election
coalition the PLD brokered in 2015. No major reforms are expected
ahead of the 2020 elections.

SOVEREIGN RATING MODEL (SRM) and QUALITATIVE OVERLAY (QO)

Fitch's proprietary SRM assigns Dominican Republic a score
equivalent to a rating of 'BB+' on the Long-Term, Foreign-Currency
(LT FC) IDR scale. Fitch's sovereign rating committee adjusted the
output from the SRM to arrive at the final LT FC IDR by applying
its QO, relative to rated peers, as follows:

  - Public finances: -1 notch, to reflect weaknesses in the fiscal
structure owing to low revenues and rigidity of large current
expenditures; and material contingent liabilities from ongoing
financial losses of public utilities and the large debt of the
central bank.

  - External finances: -1 notch, to reflect higher net external
debt than the 'BB' median and vulnerabilities to shocks from the
large external market and foreign-currency share of government
debt.

Fitch's SRM is the agency's proprietary multiple regression rating
model that employs 18 variables based on three-year centered
averages, including one year of forecasts, to produce a score
equivalent to a LT FC IDR. Fitch's QO is a forward-looking
qualitative framework designed to allow for adjustment to the SRM
output to assign the final rating, reflecting factors within
Fitch's criteria that are not fully quantifiable and/or not fully
reflected in the SRM.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook is Stable. The main factors that, individually
or collectively, could lead to a positive rating action are:

  -- Strengthening of the government's revenue base, fiscal
consolidation and reduction of the public debt burden;

  -- Strengthened international reserves position;

  -- Entrenchment of the central bank's inflation-targeting regime
resulting in greater monetary policy credibility and
effectiveness.

The main factors that could lead to a negative rating action are:

  -- Increased budget deficits and/or weaker growth leading to a
marked increase in the government debt burden;

  -- Emergence of fiscal financing constraints;

  -- Deterioration of the international reserves position and
current account deficit.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch assumes that the global economy, international oil prices,
and U.S. Federal Reserve monetary policy perform in line with
Fitch's Global Economic Outlook.

The full list of rating actions is as follows:

  -- Long-Term, Foreign-Currency IDR affirmed at 'BB-'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- Long-Term, Local-Currency IDR affirmed at 'BB-'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- Short-Term, Foreign-Currency IDR affirmed at 'B';

  -- Short-Term, Local-Currency IDR affirmed at 'B';

  -- Country Ceiling affirmed at 'BB-';

  -- Issue ratings on long-term senior unsecured foreign-currency
bonds affirmed at 'BB-';

  -- Issue ratings on long-term senior unsecured local-currency
bonds affirmed at 'BB-'.


===============
H O N D U R A S
===============


BANCO ATLANTIDA: Fitch Rates Sr. Unsec. Notes 'B', Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned a 'B(EXP)' rating and 'RR4' a recovery
rating (RR) to Banco Atlantida, S.A.'s (Atlantida) proposed senior
unsecured notes due 2023. The amount of this issue is expected to
be USD350 million, with a tenor up to five years. The final rating
is subject to the receipt of final documentation conforming to
information already received.

In addition, Fitch has published Atlantida's Long-Term IDRs of 'B'
with a Stable Outlook.

These notes will constitute direct, unconditional and unsecured
senior obligations of the issuer and will rank pari passu among
themselves and with all other unsubordinated and unsecured
obligations of Atlantida. The proceeds from this issuance will be
used to fund credit growth focused in environmentally sustainable
projects in Honduras. Fitch believes that the additional notes do
not materially alter the risk profile of the issuer or of the
outstanding debt previously rated.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRs and VR

The bank's IDRs are driven by its intrinsic creditworthiness as
reflected in its Viability Rating (VR) of 'b'. Atlantida's Ratings
are highly influenced by the Honduran operating environment and
its company profile. In recent years, the operating environment of
the banking system has fluctuated significantly due to different
stress cases from political unrest to regulatory changes
constraining the potential of the entity. The ratings are also
moderately influenced by the bank's improving asset quality,
moderate profitability, stable funding and reasonable capital
position.

As of June 2018, Atlantida was the second largest bank in Honduras
in terms of assets and loan portfolio, and the first in equity and
customer deposits; while third in profits. Despite Atlantida's
strong franchise and market position in Honduras, it is small on a
global basis. Atlantida focuses on large corporate borrowers from
various sectors of the local economy. In Fitch's opinion,
Atlantida has strong relationships with its clientele and
considerable pricing power, especially in the corporate and
commercial segments. The bank is also a safe haven for customer
deposits within Honduras. This is reflected in the growth of
customer deposits during times of political and economic stress.

Atlantida's asset quality is controlled, but delinquency ratios
are still above the local industry average, and have gradually
declined in the past years. As of June 2018, Atlantida's Non-
performing loan (NPL) ratio was 2.5% (considering contingent
loans), below the 3.3% average for 2013 - 2017. The bank has
improved underwriting standards in recent years, which has
underpinned the improvement in asset quality, although some
pressure is expected from retail segments growth.

The bank's profitability levels are good despite the bank main
focus on lending to companies. Atlantida's profitability ratios
are in line with its business mix and compare well with local
peers. The entity's profitability is based on net interest margin,
underpinned by low funding and credit costs, counterbalanced by
low operative efficiency. Revenue generation is considered stable;
however, in 2017 profitability declined due to lower FX gains, new
regulatory changes that require the deferral of the loan
disbursement fees and other non-recurrent expenses. The bank
accumulated liquidity in USD compared to previous years. The
company's expectations for 2018 are to improve profitability
closer to 2016 levels.

Atlantida's funding structure strongly relies on a stable customer
deposit base. Fitch considers Atlantida's funding profile to be
one of the banks strengths and is underpinned by the bank's strong
franchise in the country. Atlantida's in deposits remains as the
first bank and have demonstrated stability during adverse events
in the operating environment in the Honduran economy. The
franchise in deposits also benefits from the ample branch network
and long track record in the banking industry.

The bank's capitalization levels provide a reasonable capacity to
absorb losses comparing in line with local and internationals
peers in the 'B' category range. The Fitch Core Capital ratio of
the bank was 12.3% as of March 2018 (Dec 2017: 12.1%); while the
bank's tangible common equity to tangible assets ratio stood at
9.7% (Dec 2017: 9.7%). Favourably the bank has a good internal
capital generation despite the average pay-out ratio of 17.5% over
the past five years. Given the expected asset growth and
profitability in 2018, the capital levels should remained stable
in the near future.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

Atlantida's Support Rating (SR) of '5' and Support Rating Floor
(SRF) of 'NF' indicate that Fitch believes that external support
cannot be relied upon, due to Honduras's limited capacity to
provide such support.

SENIOR UNSECURED DEBT

The senior unsecured notes are rated at the same level as the
bank's Issuer Default Rating (IDR), in accordance with Fitch's
rating criteria, given the average recovery prospects of
Atlantida's senior unsecured debt reflecting the recovery rating
of RR4.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDR and VR

Upside potential for Atlantida's IDRs could only come from a
material improvement of the Honduran operating environment. In
turn, although it is not Fitch's baseline scenario, the ratings
could be downgraded in the event of material deterioration in the
asset quality that negatively affects its operating profitability
and lead to a marked weakening of the bank's capital position.

SENIOR DEBT

The bank's senior debt ratings would mirror any change in the
bank's national scale ratings.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

Hondura's propensity or ability to provide timely support to
Atlantida is not likely to change given the operating environment
weaknesses. As such, the SR and SRF have limited upside potential.


The rating actions are as follows:

  -- Five-year USD350 million senior unsecured notes assigned at
'B(EXP)'/'RR4'

The following ratings were published:

  -- Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings
(IDRs) 'B'; Outlook Stable

  -- Short-Term Foreign and Local currency IDRs 'B';

  -- Viability Rating 'b';

  -- Support Rating '5';

  -- Support Rating Floor 'NF';


=============
J A M A I C A
=============


JAMAICA: More Problems at Students' Loan Bureau
-----------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that an audit has uncovered more problems with
the Students' Loan Bureau monitoring the funds it disburses to
borrowers.

The Auditor General has released a performance report which shows
that the SLB's Loan Management System software acquired in 2012
could not accurately identify the loan balance of each beneficiary
in a timely manner, according to RJR News.

The report notes that a number of features of the Loan Management
System were non-functional, resulting in the need for extensive
manual reconciliation with other internal electronic platforms to
verify loan balances.

This contributed to significant delays in the updating and
maintenance of beneficiary loan accounts and the identification of
non-recoverable loans, the report says.

Accordingly, the Auditor General says the SLB did not obtain full
value for the $57.1 million paid to the supplier for the Loan
Management System software, the report relays.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Feb. 5, 2018, Fitch Ratings affirmed Jamaica's Long-Term
Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B' and has
revised the Rating Outlook to Positive from Stable.


===========
M E X I C O
===========


LAZARO CARDENAS: Moody's Cuts Issuer Rating to B2; Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's de Mexico S.A. de C.V. downgraded the Municipality of
Lazaro Cardenas's issuer ratings to B2/Ba1.mx from B1/Baa3.mx. The
outlook was changed to stable from negative.

RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR THE RATINGS DOWNGRADE

The downgrade of Lazaro Cardenas's issuer ratings to B2/Ba1.mx
from B1/Baa3.mx reflects persistent spending pressures that
Moody's expects will lead to widening cash financing deficits, a
further deterioration of its already weak liquidity and an
increasingly risky debt structure.

Lazaro Cardenas's financial deficit equaled 1.3% of total revenues
in 2017, compared with a 7.1% surplus reported the previous year.
The deterioration last year was mainly due to a nearly three-fold
increase in capital spending, which rose to 13% of total revenue
in 2017 from to 5% the previous year. Moody's expects the
municipality's financial deficit will rise to around 4% in 2018
and 2019 due to continued declines in earmarked federal transfers,
which are used mainly to finance capital spending and are on track
to fall again by more than half this year.

These deficits are weighing on the municipality's liquidity. Cash
and equivalents amounted to 0.2x current liabilities in 2017, down
from 0.3x in 2016, and Moody's projects this key liquidity metric
will fall to 0.15x in 2018 and 0.14x the following year. Lazaro
Cardenas had to contract short-term bank loans to meet liquidity
needs at the end of 2016 and 2017, and will likely need to do the
same this year. As a result of this rising reliance on riskier
short-term loans, the municipality's short-term debt averaged 65%
of its total direct debt in 2016 and 2017.

The downgrade also reflects the high degree of volatility in
Lazaro Cardenas's own source revenues, which leaves the
municipality dependent on federal and state revenues and limits
its capacity to face periods of stress. Property tax collections
have been inconsistent during the last 5 years, causing own source
revenues to fluctuate between 37% and 21% of the operating
revenues. Moody's expects that the own source revenues will equal
21% of the operating revenues in 2018, which is broadly in line
with the 24% median for the B2 rated Mexican municipalities.

RATIONALE FOR THE STABLE OUTLOOK

The stable outlook on the municipality reflects Moody's
expectations that total Net Direct and Indirect Debt (NDID) will
remain stable at moderate levels, despite the rising dependence on
short-term loans, and that operating results will be remain
stronger than B2 rated national peers. Additionally, Moody's
expects that the municipality's weak liquidity metrics will remain
in line with B2 rated peers. Thanks to the control of the
operating expenditures in 2017, Lazaro Cardenas posted its first
operating surplus in three years, equal to 0.4% of the operating
revenues. The municipality may post a small operating deficit of
0.8% in 2018 due to an increase in operating expenditures this
year, but will likely return to an operative surplus in 2019 as a
result of steady growth in non-earmarked federal revenues
(participations). Moreover, the municipality's debt as a portion
of its operating revenues averaged 9% in the 2014-2016 period
compared to a 27% for its B2 rated peers. Moody's expects that
Lazaro Cardenas's total debt levels will continue to decline
gradually in 2018 and 2019.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN.

Given the stable outlook, a change in the ratings is unlikely.
However, the issuer ratings could face upward pressure if Lazaro
Cardenas is able to maintain consolidated financial surpluses that
lead to a substantial improvement in its liquidity while
maintaining moderate debt levels. Conversely, if the municipality
posts financial deficits that are larger than Moody's projections,
leading to a rise in indebtedness and a more pronounced decline in
liquidity, this could lead to a downgrade of the ratings.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Regional and
Local Governments published in January 2018.


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P A N A M A
===========


BANCO INT'L: Moody's Affirms B1 LT CDR; Alters Outlook to Stable
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook on Panama-based
Banco International de Costa Rica, S.A. (BICSA) to stable from
negative. At the same time, Moody's affirmed all of BICSA's
ratings and assessments, including its B1 long-term foreign
currency deposit rating and its b2 baseline credit assessment
(BCA).

The following ratings and assessments were affirmed:

Banco Internacional de Costa Rica, S.A.:

Baseline Credit Assessment of b2

Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment of b1

Long-term foreign currency deposit rating of B1, stable from
negative

Short-term foreign currency deposit rating of Not Prime

Long and short-term foreign currency counterparty risk rating of
Ba3 / Not Prime

Long and short-term counterparty risk assessment of Ba3(cr) / Not
Prime(cr)

Outlook Action:

Banco Internacional de Costa Rica, S.A.:

Outlook, Stable from Negative

RATINGS RATIONALE

The change in the outlook reflects the bank's improved asset
quality, as well as its gradually recovering, though low,
profitability and stable capital levels. Further, the rating
action reflects a more steady corporate governance with both
shareholders aiming to manage BICSA on a more coordinated fashion
than it the past.

The bank's nonperforming loans (NPLs) fell back to 1.2% of gross
loans as of June 2018, in line with December 2015 levels and down
from a peak of 1.85% reached in 2016. The lower NPLs are chiefly
explained by an increase in charge-offs to around 0.7% of the
portfolio during the first half of 2018. Moody's VP-Senior Analyst
Jose Monta§o mentioned that "asset quality should remain strong
despite some potential deterioration during the remainder of 2018
and 2019 given economic deceleration and rising interest rates in
Costa Rica, the bank's largest market."

The bank's profitability has been gradually improving over the
past two years, with return on assets (ROA) rising to 0.6% on an
annualized basis during the first half of 2018, from just 0.4% in
2016, due to a reduction in loan loss provisions and a modest
improvement in operating efficiency. Nevertheless, earnings remain
well below the levels the bank posted prior to 2016, when they
averaged about 1% of tangible banking assets. "Moody's expects
BICSA's returns to remain relatively stable as NIMs gradually
widen in line with rising dollar interest rates, while provisions
return to historic levels", Monta§o added.

The stable outlook and affirmation also capture the bank's stable
core capitalization. Despite the bank's modest profitability, TCE
has exceeded 14% of adjusted risk-weighted assets for the past two
years, owing to its policy of full earnings retention and still
moderate asset growth. On the other hand, the bank's ratings also
encompass its heavy reliance on confidence-sensitive and largely
short-term market funding, and moderate liquidity buffers. Market
funds equaled nearly 50% of tangible banking assets as of June
2018, while liquid assets were just 15%.

The B1 deposit rating also continues to incorporate the high
probability that the bank will receive financial support from its
controlling parent, Banco de Costa Rica (BCR, foreign currency
deposits Ba3 negative, BCA of b1). This assessment is based on the
full earnings retention policy, coupled with BICSA's main business
propose of developing international business with companies in
Central America.

BICSA is 51% controlled by Costa Rica's state-owned BCR, with the
remaining 49% held by Banco Nacional de Costa Rica (BNCR, foreign
currency deposits Ba3 negative, BCA of ba2), also government-
owned. The bank is focused on providing trade finance in Central
America. Costa Rica and Panama are BICSA's core markets, with
about 40% and 25% of total loans granted in these countries
respectively. BICSA's outlook is stable despite BCR's negative
outlook as a downgrade of BCR's foreign currency deposit rating to
B1 would have no impact on BICSA's ratings.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS UP OR DOWN

The bank's long-term deposit rating could be upgraded if its
profitability, asset quality and capitalization remain stable, and
the bank avoids any recurrence of the recent challenges it faced
related to corporate governance. On the contrary, the ratings
would face downward pressure again if the bank's asset quality,
profitability, or capital deteriorate substantially, or it faces
further corporate governance challenges.

The long-term deposit rating would also be downgraded in the event
of a downgrade of two notches or more in the Ba3 foreign currency
deposit rating of Banco de Costa Rica.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in August 2018.



======================
P U E R T O    R I C O
======================


J & M SALES: Taps Retail Consulting as Real Estate Advisor
----------------------------------------------------------
J & M Sales Inc. and its affiliated debtors seek authority from
the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware to hire
Retail Consulting Services, Inc., d/b/a RCS Real Estate Advisors,
as real estate advisor.

Services to be provided by RCS are:

     a. prepare a Lease Portfolio Book organized by landlord and
by store showing current lease terms, sales, profits, and
occupancy cost and store contribution percentages relative to
sales;

     b. create a site ranking report by contribution, revenues,
and occupancy costs, etc.;

     c. undertake an in-depth analysis of all leased real estate
assets. Such analysis will involve a review of each asset's
occupancy  costs relative to sales volume, store profit
contribution, and rejection claims analyses.  RCS will meet with
Debtors to discuss its analysis and establish goals and
parameters;

     d. assist Debtor in developing real estate goals and
parameters (Real Estate Action Plan) to determine store closures,
stores to keep under renegotiated terms and stores to go forward
with;

     e. subsequent to the determination of the Real Estate Action
Plan, contact each designated landlord with respect to negotiation
of the said goals and parameters such as rent reductions, term
modifications, lease extensions and any other modification deemed
necessary for all of Debtors' leaseholds, or designated as
properties;

     f. work with landlords and Debtors to document accurately all
lease modification proposals, and provide timely status reports
that will reflect current progress;

     g. attend and participate in all Court hearings, Creditors'
Committee meetings, and meetings with Debtors and Debtors' Counsel
when requested to do so by Debtors;

     h. coordinate all real estate matters with Debtors, Debtors'
Counsel and all other interested parties with respect to the Real
Estate Action Plan, progress and ongoing modifications to said
plan;

     i. negotiate waivers, reductions or payout terms for
pre-petition cure amounts, which will be due and owing to
landlords
at the time of assumption of subject lease or leases;

     j. conduct negotiations with respect to mitigating the
lessor's allowed rejection claims;

     k. offer for disposition, solely on terms and conditions
established by Debtors, all properties designated in writing by
Debtors on Exhibit "B" of the RCS Engagement Letter for sale or
other disposition on an "exclusive right to sell" basis. Debtors
shall have, and retain throughout the term of the RCS Engagement
Letter, the complete discretion and authority to accept or reject
any offer and withdraw any Disposition Properties from RCS's
marketing effort;

     l. RCS' services with respect to the Disposition Properties
shall include:

        i. On request, RCS will review all pertinent documents and
will consult with Debtors' counsel;

       ii. RCS will create a marketing program and budget which
may include newspaper, magazine or journal advertising, letter
and/or flyer solicitation, placement of signs, direct
telemarketing, email, fax blasts and such other marketing methods
as may be necessary;

      iii. RCS will use all professional contacts, mailing lists
and other resources available to RCS to market the Disposition
Properties. All marketing efforts, advertising, signs, flyers and
other marketing strategies shall be subject to Debtors' prior
approval as to form and content and shall be submitted to Debtors
for such approval prior to dissemination;

      iv. RCS will prepare and disseminate all such marketing
materials, all of which shall have been approved by, and at the
sole cost and expense, of Debtors. RCS shall not incur any costs
or expenses with respect to the preparation or dissemination of
marketing materials except in accordance with the provisions and
limitations contained in the RCS Engagement Letter;

       v. RCS will communicate with parties who have expressed an
interest in a Disposition Property and will endeavor to locate
additional parties who may have an interest in the purchase of a
Disposition Property. RCS shall provide to Debtors from
time-to-time an updated and current list of all parties which
shall have expressed interest in a disposition Property which list
shall include the name and address of each such party as well as
the date of initial contact with each such party;

      vi. RCS will respond to and provide information necessary to
negotiate with and solicit offers from prospective purchasers
and/or settlements from landlords and shall make recommendations
to Debtors as to the advisability of accepting particular offers
or settlements;

     vii. When requested, RCS will meet periodically with Debtors,
its accountants and attorneys, in connection with the status of
its efforts, and shall provide guidance to Debtors with respect to
methods to resolve issues and problems pertaining to the
disposition of Disposition Properties;

    viii. If and when appropriate, RCS will coordinate and
organize the public bankruptcy hearing and/or auction and, where
appropriate, will seek to obtain the attendance of all interested
parties through direct communications, supplementing the required
notice process;

      ix. RCS will work with the attorneys responsible for the
implementation of the proposed transaction, reviewing documents,
negotiating and assisting in resolving problems, which may arise;

       x. If and when appropriate, RCS will, if required, appear
in Bankruptcy Court during the term of this retention, to testify
or to consult with Debtors in connection with the marketing or
disposition of a Disposition Property.

RCS professional fees are:

     (a) For renegotiating the terms of any of Debtors' leases,
RCS' compensation shall be 5% of the difference between (i) the
original lease payment terms and (ii) the reduced rental payment
terms;

     (b) For any non-financial lease modification (not involving
rent savings), such as lease extensions, deferred rent payments,
or shortening the lease term, RCS shall receive as compensation
$3,500 per lease;

     (c) Upon the closing of a transaction that disposes of any of
the Disposition Properties, RCS shall receive as compensation an
amount equal to (i) 4% of gross proceeds if no co-broker is used
or (ii) 5% of gross proceeds in the event a co-broker is used in
which case RCS will retain 3% of the gross proceeds and the co-
broker will receive 2% of the gross proceeds;

     (d) For the waiver or reduction of prepetition cure amounts,
RCS shall be paid 4% of the total amount of such reduction. For
the waiver or reduction of a landlord claim under section
502(b)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code, RCS shall be paid 4% of the
savings of any distribution on account of such claim that
otherwise would have been payable to the landlord;

     (e) Upon request by Debtors for additional services not
specifically set forth in the RCS Engagement Letter, such as but
not limited to requests by Debtors for valuations or appraisals,
time spent in court or in depositions, RCS shall be compensated
hourly, not including travel time, as the following rates:
President $750; Senior Vice President: $650; Vice President: $550;
Paralegal: $375; and Administrators: $250.

Ivan Friedman, President and CEO of Retail Consulting Services,
Inc. d/b/a RCS Real Estate Advisors, attests that RCS is a
"disinterested person" within the meaning of section 101(14) of
the Bankruptcy Code, as required by section 327(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code, and does not hold or represent any interest
adverse to Debtors' estates.

The advisor can be reached through:

         Ivan Friedman
         Retail Consulting Services, Inc.
         d/b/a RCS Real Estate Advisors
         460 West 34th Street
         New York, NY 10001
         Tel: 212-239-1100
         Fax: 212-269-5484

                      About National Stores

National Stores is a 344-store chain in 22 U.S. states and Puerto
Rico.  National Stores currently does business as Fallas, Fallas
Paredes, Fallas Discount Stores, Factory 2-U, Anna's Linen's by
Fallas, and Falas (spelled with single "l" in Puerto Rico).
Fallas, which emplolys 9,800 people, is a discount retailer
offering value-priced merchandise, including apparel, bedding and
household supplies.  The brands of National Stores are located in
retail plazas, specialty centers, and downtown areas to serve the
communities its customers and staff members call home.

National Stores, Inc., and its affiliates sought Chapter 11
protection and Aug. 6, 2018, and announced that Hilco Merchant
Resources, LLC, is conducting going-out-of-business sales for 74
stores.  The lead case is In re J & M Sales Inc. (Bankr. D. Del.
Lead Case No. 18-11801).  J & M Sales estimated assets and debt of
$100 million to $500 million as of the bankruptcy filing.

The Hon. Laurie Selber Silverstein is the case judge.

The Debtors tapped Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP as general
bankruptcy counsel; Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP as
bankruptcy co-counsel; Retail Consulting Services, Inc., as real
estate advisor; Imperial Capital, LLC, as investment banker; and
Prime Clerk LLC as the claims and noticing agent.
SierraConstellation Partners, LLC, is providing personnel to serve
as chief restructuring officer and support staff.


J & M SALES: Committee Taps Cooley LLP as Lead Counsel
------------------------------------------------------
The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of J & M Sales Inc.
and its affiliated debtors seeks authority from the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware to hire Cooley LLP
as its lead counsel.

Services required of Cooley are:

     (a) attend the meetings of the Committee;

     (b) review financial and operational information furnished by
the Debtors to the Committee;

     (c) analyze and negotiate the budget and the terms of the
Debtors' use of cash collateral and debtor-in-possession
financing;

     (d) assist in the Debtors' efforts to reorganize or sell
their assets in a manner that maximizes value for creditors;

     (e) review and investigate prepetition transactions in which
the Debtors and/or their insiders were involved;

     (f) assist the Committee in negotiations with the Debtors and
other parties in interest on the Debtors' proposed Chapter 11 plan
and/or exit strategy for these cases;

     (g) confer with the Debtors' management, counsel, and
financial advisor and any other retained professional;

     (h) confer with the principals, counsel and advisors of the
Debtors' lenders and equity holders;

     (i) review the Debtors' schedules, statements of financial
affairs, and business plan;

     (j) advise the Committee as to the ramifications regarding
all of the Debtors' activities and motions before this Court;

     (k) file appropriate pleadings on behalf of the Committee;

     (l) review and analyze the Debtors' financial advisors' work
product and report to the Committee;

     (m) investigate and analyze certain of the Debtors'
prepetition conduct, transactions, and transfers;

     (n) analyze the value of the go forward business;

     (o) provide the Committee with legal advice in relation to
the chapter 11 cases;

     (p) prepare various pleadings to be submitted to the Court
for consideration; and

     (q) perform such other legal services for the Committee as
may be necessary or proper in these proceedings.

Current and adjusted hourly rates of the Cooley professionals are:

                                 Hourly Rate  Adjusted Hourly Rate
                                 -----------  --------------------
     Jay R. Indyke, Partner          $1,250        $900
     Seth Van Aalten, Partner          $940        $900
     Michael Klein, Special Counsel    $900
     Max Schlan, Associate             $865
     Sarah Carnes, Associate           $710
     Joseph Brown, Associat            $555
     Mollie Canby, Paralega            $255

In accordance with Appendix B-Guidelines for Reviewing
Applications for Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses Filed
under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 330 for Attorneys in Larger Chapter 11 Cases,
Jay R. Indyke disclosed that:

   -- Cooley agreed to an hourly rate adjustment for all attorneys
working on these cases whose customary hourly rate is in excess of
$900 per hour will be reduced to $900 per hour;

   -- None of the professionals included in the engagement vary
their rate based on the geographic location of the bankruptcy
case;

   -- the firm has not represented the Committee in the 12 months
prepetition; and

   -- the Committee has approved the budget and staffing plan from
August 16, 2018 through November 30, 2018.

Jay R. Indyke, partner of the law firm of Cooley LLP, attests that
Cooley does not have an interest adverse to the Debtors' estates
and is a "disinterested person," as that term is defined in
section 101(14) of the Bankruptcy Code, as modified by Section
1103(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.

The firm can be reached through:

     Jay R. Indyke, Esq.
     COOLEY LLP
     1114 Avenue of the Americas
     New York, NY 10036
     Tel: (213) 479-6000
     Fax: (213) 479-6275
     Email: jindyke@cooley.com
            svanaalten@cooley.com

                      About National Stores

National Stores is a 344-store chain in 22 U.S. states and Puerto
Rico.  National Stores currently does business as Fallas, Fallas
Paredes, Fallas Discount Stores, Factory 2-U, Anna's Linen's by
Fallas, and Falas (spelled with single "l" in Puerto Rico).
Fallas, which emplolys 9,800 people, is a discount retailer
offering value-priced merchandise, including apparel, bedding and
household supplies.  The brands of National Stores are located in
retail plazas, specialty centers, and downtown areas to serve the
communities its customers and staff members call home.

National Stores, Inc., and its affiliates sought Chapter 11
protection and Aug. 6, 2018, and announced that Hilco Merchant
Resources, LLC, is conducting going-out-of-business sales for 74
stores.  The lead case is In re J & M Sales Inc. (Bankr. D. Del.
Lead Case No. 18-11801).  J & M Sales estimated assets and debt of
$100 million to $500 million as of the bankruptcy filing.

The Hon. Laurie Selber Silverstein is the case judge.

The Debtors tapped Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP as general
bankruptcy counsel; Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP as
bankruptcy co-counsel; Retail Consulting Services, Inc., as real
estate advisor; Imperial Capital, LLC, as investment banker; and
Prime Clerk LLC as the claims and noticing agent.
SierraConstellation Partners, LLC, is providing personnel to serve
as chief restructuring officer and support staff.


PUERTO RICO: Ct. Tosses Creditor Move to Halt Debt Restructuring
----------------------------------------------------------------
Karen Pierog at Reuters reports that a U.S. judge ruled that a
group of unsecured creditors in Puerto Rico's bankruptcy case
cannot stop a debt restructuring agreement involving the island's
Government Development Bank (GDB).

Judge Laura Taylor Swain said the GDB restructuring was happening
outside of the bankruptcy, which was filed in May 2017 by the U.S.
commonwealth's federally appointed financial oversight board,
according to Reuters.

"The GDB restructuring, although subject to court approval, is a
vehicle to effectuate a transaction by, not against, the debtors
and is not subject to the strictures of the automatic stay," Judge
Swain's order stated, the report notes.

The creditors had argued they would be harmed under the
restructuring deal, saying it would eliminate their claims against
the GDB and siphon off assets that could be tapped for settlements
in the bankruptcy case, the report relays.

The report notes that a lawsuit, filed earlier this month by the
creditors' committee seeking to void Puerto Rico's GDB
Restructuring Act, which paved the way for the deal, is pending
before Swain's court.

Puerto Rico government officials announced initial vote results
that showed GDB creditors overwhelmingly approved the
restructuring, which would mark the first consensual debt deal
under the 2016 federal PROMESA Act aimed at rescuing the island
overwhelmed by $120 billion of debt and pension liabilities, the
report says.  Approval of the deal by Swain is expected in early
November, according to the officials, the report discloses.

Under the deal, the GDB, which has about $4 billion of debt, would
transfer to a GDB Debt Recovery Authority portions of its loan
portfolios, mostly made to municipalities and public agencies, as
well as its real estate assets and unencumbered cash, the report
notes.  The authority would issue new bonds backed by a statutory
lien on those assets in an amount equal to 55 percent of
outstanding debt, the report adds.

                      About Puerto Rico

Puerto Rico is a self-governing commonwealth in association with
the United States that's facing a massive bond debt of $70
billion, a 68% debt-to-GDP ratio and negative economic growth in
nine of the last 10 years.

The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has sought bankruptcy protection,
aiming to restructure its massive $74 billion debt-load and $49
billion in pension obligations.

The debt restructuring petition was filed by Puerto Rico's
financial oversight board in U.S. District Court in Puerto Rico
(Case No. 17-01578) on May 3, 2017, and was made under Title III
of 2016's U.S. Congressional rescue law known as the Puerto Rico
Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act ('PROMESA').

The Financial Oversight and Management Board later commenced Title
III cases for the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation
(COFINA) on May 5, 2017, and the Employees Retirement System (ERS)
and the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (HTA) on
May 21, 2017.  On July 2, 2017, a Title III case was commenced for
the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority ("PREPA").

U.S. Chief Justice John Roberts has appointed U.S. District Judge
Laura Taylor Swain to oversee the Title III cases.  The Honorable
Judith Dein, a United States Magistrate Judge for the District of
Massachusetts, has been designated to preside over matters that
may be referred to her by Judge Swain, including discovery
disputes, and management of other pretrial proceedings.

Joint administration of the Title III cases, under Lead Case No.
17-3283, was granted on June 29, 2017.

The Oversight Board has hired as advisors, Proskauer Rose LLP and
O'Neill & Borges LLC as legal counsel, McKinsey & Co. as strategic
consultant, Citigroup Global Markets, as municipal investment
banker, and Ernst & Young, as financial advisor.

Martin J. Bienenstock, Esq., Scott K. Rutsky, Esq., and Philip M.
Abelson, Esq., of Proskauer Rose; and Hermann D. Bauer, Esq., at
O'Neill & Borges are on-board as attorneys.

McKinsey & Co. is the Board's strategic consultant, Ernst & Young
is the Board's financial advisor, and Citigroup Global Markets
Inc.
is the Board's municipal investment banker.

Prime Clerk LLC is the claims and noticing agent.  Prime Clerk
maintains a case web site at
https://cases.primeclerk.com/puertorico

Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC is the service agent for ERS, HTA,
and PREPA.

O'Melveny & Myers LLP is counsel to the Commonwealth's Puerto Rico
Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority (AAFAF), the agency
responsible for negotiations with bondholders.

The Oversight Board named Professor Nancy B. Rapoport as fee
examiner and to chair a committee to review professionals' fees.

                    Bondholders' Attorneys

Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP and Toro, Colon, Mullet,
Rivera & Sifre, P.S.C. and serve as counsel to the Mutual Fund
Group, comprised of mutual funds managed by Oppenheimer Funds,
Inc., and the First Puerto Rico Family of Funds, which
collectively hold over $4.4 billion of GO Bonds, COFINA Bonds, and
other bonds issued by Puerto Rico and other instrumentalities.

White & Case LLP and Lopez Sanchez & Pirillo LLC represent the UBS
Family of Funds and the Puerto Rico Family of Funds, which hold
$613.3 million in COFINA bonds.

Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, Robbins, Russell,
Englert, Orseck, Untereiner & Sauber LLP, and Jimenez, Graffam &
Lausell are co-counsel to the ad hoc group of General Obligation
Bondholders, comprised of Aurelius Capital Management, LP,
Autonomy Capital (Jersey) LP, FCO Advisors LP, and Monarch
Alternative Capital LP.

Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP and Reichard & Escalera are
co-counsel to the ad hoc coalition of holders of senior bonds
issued by COFINA, comprised of at least 30 institutional holders,
including Canyon Capital Advisors LLC and Varde Investment
Partners, L.P.

Correa Acevedo & Abesada Law Offices, P.S.C., is counsel to Canyon
Capital Advisors, LLC, River Canyon Fund Management, LLC, Davidson
Kempner Capital Management LP, OZ Management, LP, and OZ
Management II LP (the QTCB Noteholder Group).

                          Committees

The U.S. Trustee formed an official committee of retirees and an
official committee of unsecured creditors of the Commonwealth.
The Retiree Committee tapped Jenner & Block LLP and Bennazar,
Garcia & Milian, C.S.P., as its attorneys.  The Creditors
Committee tapped Paul Hastings LLP and O'Neill & Gilmore LLC as
counsel.


================================
T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O
================================


PETROLEUM CO: Refinery Closure 'Will Impact Penal/Debe'
-------------------------------------------------------
Carolyn Kissoon at Trinidad Express reports that the closure of
Petroleum Co. of Trinidad & Tobago Ltd (Petrotrin) refinery will
severely impact communities where oil wells and infrastructure are
located, says chairman of the Penal/Debe Regional Corporation, Dr.
Allen Sammy.

And it will also lead to a drain on local government funding.
Sammy said the shutdown will result in the non-maintenance of
roads, traces, drains and other infrastructure which are usually
upgraded by the oil company, according to Trinidad Express.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
May 3, 2018, S&P Global Ratings revised its outlook on Petroleum
Co. of Trinidad & Tobago Ltd (Petrotrin) to negative from stable.
S&P said, "We also affirmed our 'BB' long-term corporate credit
and senior unsecured debt ratings on the company. Additionally,
we're keeping its SACP unchanged at 'b-'."


=================
X X X X X X X X X
=================


* BOND PRICING: For the Week September 17 to September 21, 2018
---------------------------------------------------------------

Issuer Name               Cpn     Price   Maturity  Country  Curr
-----------               ---     -----   --------  -------   ---

Banco do Brasil SA/Cayman 6.25   75.043                 KY     USD
Rio Energy SA             6.875  71.638   2/1/2025      AR     USD
Cia Latinoamericana       9.5    60.447   7/20/2023     AR     USD
CSN Islands XII Corp      7      69.44                  BR     USD
Agua y Saneamientos       6.625  71.982   2/1/2023      AR     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.5    39.15                  KY     USD
YPF SA                   16.5    50.96    5/9/2022      AR     ARS
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     4.37   35.715   4/25/2025     KY     USD
Banco Macro SA           17.5    50       5/8/2022      AR     ARS
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.12   37.293   6/26/2042     KY     USD
China Huiyuan             6.5    75.1     8/16/2020     CN     USD
Odebrecht Finance         5.125  45.754   6/26/2022     KY     USD
Noble Holding             6.2    74.46    8/1/2040      KY     USD
Noble Holding             5.25   70.444   3/15/2042     KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance         7      58.985   4/21/2020     KY     USD
Noble Holding             6.05   73.508   3/1/2041      KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance         5.25   36.2     6/27/2029     KY     USD
Rio Energy SA             6.875  71.551   2/1/2025      AR     USD
BCP Finance Co            1.751  74.397                 KY     EUR
Provincia del Chubut      4              10/21/2019     AR     USD
YPF SA                   16.5    50.96   5/9/2022       AR     ARS
Argentina                 7.125  76      6/28/2117      AR     USD
Automotores Gildemeister  6.75   62.759  1/15/2023      CL     USD
Odebrecht Finance         6      37.193  4/5/2023       KY     USD
Banco do Brasil           6.25   76.375                 KY     USD
Cia Latinoamericana       9.5    60.621  7/20/2023      AR     USD
Polarcus Ltd              5.6    70      7/1/2022       AE     USD
Argentina                 6.875  74.985  1/11/2048      AR     USD
Provincia del Chubut      7.75   72.304  7/26/2026      AR     USD
Banco Macro SA           17.5    50      5/8/2022       AR     ARS
CSN Islands XII Corp      7      74.375                 BR     USD
Provincia de Rio Negro    7.75   70.153  12/7/2025      AR     USD
Provincia de Entre Rios   8.75   71.083   2/8/2025      AR     USD
Argentina                 4.33   70      12/31/2033     AR     JPY
Provincia de Entre Rios   8.75   72.333   2/8/2025      AR     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     4.375  35.242   4/25/2025      KY    USD
Ironshore Pharma         13      69.621   2/28/2024      KY    USD
Automotores Gildemeister  8.25   60.583   5/24/2021      CL    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.125   38.674  6/26/2042      KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.25    36.187  6/27/2029      KY    USD
Province of Santa Fe      6.9     74.177  11/1/2027      AR    USD
Provincia del Chubut      7.75    71.654  7/26/2026      AR    USD
Argentina                 6.25    72.711  11/9/2047      AR    EUR
Cia Energetica            6.1827   1.105  1/15/2022      BR    BRL
Odebrecht Finance         7.5     43.5                   KY    USD
Argentina                 0.45    31.75  12/31/2038      AR    JPY
SACI Falabella            2               7/15/2020      CL    CLP
Province of Jujuy         8.625   72.788  9/20/2022      AR    USD
Province of Santa Fe      6.9     73.44  11/1/2027       AR    USD


Ironshore Pharma         13       69.621  2/28/2024      KY    USD
Tanner Servicios         3.8      52.42   4/1/2021       CL    CLP
AES Tiete Energia SA     6.78      1.06   4/15/2024      BR    BRL
Odebrecht Finance Ltd    6        37.19   4/5/2023       KY    USD
Provincia de Rio Negro   7.75     70.15  12/7/2025       AR    USD
Odebrecht Finance        7        59.466  4/21/2020      KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd    5.12     47.298  6/26/2022      KY    USD
Provincia de Cordoba     7.12     74.286  8/1/2027       AR    USD
Argentina                7.125    75.752  6/28/2117      AR    USD
Automotores Gildemeister 8.25     60.583  5/24/2021      CL    USD
Enlasa Generacion        3.558           11/15/2023      CL    CLP
Metrogas SA/Chile       645               8/1/2024       CL    CLP
Automotores Gildemeister 6.75     62.759  1/15/2023      CL    USD
Provincia del Chaco      9.375    72.315  8/18/2024      AR    USD
Fospar S/A               6.53      1.034  5/15/2026      BR    BRL
Sociedad Concesionaria   2.9547           6/30/2021      CL    CLP
Esval SA                 3.453            3/15/2028      CL    CLP
Caja de Compensacion     7.75     35.23   3/27/2024      CL    CLP
Sociedad Austral       318.478            9/20/2019      CL    CLP
Provincia de Neuquen     7.5      74.753  4/27/2025      AR    USD
Caja de Compensacion     5.2              9/15/2018      CL    CLP
Empresa de Transporte    4.341            7/15/2020      CL    CLP
Corp Universidad         5.968           11/10/2021      CL    CLP
Provincia de Cordoba     7.125    74.802  8/1/2027       AR    USD
Provincia del Chaco      9.375    72.585  8/18/2024      AR    USD
Argentine Republic       7.125    75.322  6/28/2117      AR    USD
Sylph Ltd                2.367    61.194  9/25/2036      KY    USD
Banco Security SA      311                7/1/2019       CL    CLP
Sylph Ltd                2.657   73.081   3/25/2036      KY    USD



                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2018.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.
.


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