TCRLA_Public/180927.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

          Thursday, September 27, 2018, Vol. 19, No. 192


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

AEROPUERTOS ARGENTINA 2000: S&P Stays 'BB-' ICR on Watch Negative
ARGENTINA: On Eve of IMF Deal, Central Bank Pres. Replaced
BANCO MACRO: Fitch Affirms 'B' LT IDR, Outlook Stable


B R A Z I L

BANCO SANTANDER: Fitch Affirms B+ LT LC IDR, Outlook Stable
MAGNESITA REFRATARIOS: Fitch Withdraws BB LT Issuer Default Rating
OI SA: S&P Rates Existing $1.6BB Senior Unsecured Notes 'B'
RIO DE JANEIRO: Fitch Affirms BB- LT IDRs, Outlook Stable


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

ARABELLA EXPLORATION: Second Final Cash Collateral Order Entered
FAIRHOLD SECURITISATION: Seeks to Invalidate Admin. Appointment


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: 2019 Budget Bill's Fiscal Deficit Will Up Debt
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Free Zone Exports Jump 11.1%


J A M A I C A

DIGICEL GROUP: Request for Bond Repayment Delay Rejected
JAMAICA: S&P Affirms 'B' Sovereign Credit Rating, Outlook Now Pos.


T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O

SANDALS INC: Deal With Trinidad and Tobago Could Close Off by Nov


                            - - - - -



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A R G E N T I N A
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AEROPUERTOS ARGENTINA 2000: S&P Stays 'BB-' ICR on Watch Negative
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings maintained its 'BB-' issuer credit and issue-
level ratings on Aeropuertos Argentina 2000 (AA2000) on
CreditWatch negative. Its stand-alone credit profile (SACP)
remains at 'bb+'.

AA2000's credit quality continues to be limited to one notch above
that of the sovereign. S&P continues to expect that AA2000 would
be able to withstand a hypothetical sovereign stress scenario
given its strong cash flow generation, in which 80% of revenues
are linked to the U.S. dollar, whereas costs are mostly in
domestic currency. Still, the company's operations heavily rely on
the regulator, which defines concession terms, sets aeronautical
tariffs, and mandates investments. For this reason, S&P limits its
ratings on AA2000 to only one notch above that on the sovereign.

The CreditWatch negative listing of AA2000 mirrors that of the
sovereign, given that the ratings on the company are limited to
one notch above Argentina's credit quality. S&P said, "This
reflects our view that AA2000 has a high exposure to the
Argentina's regulatory framework, while the company would still
survive our solvency stress test in case of a hypothetical
sovereign default scenario. We expect to resolve the CreditWatch
in the upcoming 90 days, when the sovereign's CreditWatch listing
is likely to be resolved."


ARGENTINA: On Eve of IMF Deal, Central Bank Pres. Replaced
----------------------------------------------------------
Ignacio Olivera Doll and Patrick Gillespie at Bloomberg News
report that Argentine Central Bank President Luis Caputo resigned,
a day after President Mauricio Macri said a revised aid deal with
the International Monetary Fund would require a new approach to
monetary policy.

Just three months since moving to the central bank from the
nation's finance ministry, Mr. Caputo cited "personal issues" as
the reason for his departure, according to Bloomberg News.  He was
immediately replaced by Economy Minister Nicolas Dujovne's deputy,
Guido Sandleris, Bloomberg News notes.

The resignation is the latest chapter in Argentina's fight to
address a collapse in its currency and in President Macri's
attempt to tweak the terms of a $50 billion credit line with the
IMF, Bloomberg News relays.  The yield on the country's 100-year
bond due in 2117 rose 20 basis points on the announcement before
paring most losses to 9.19 percent on Sept. 26, the report says.
The peso fell 1.2 percent to 37.75 per dollar, Bloomberg News
discloses.

The shortness of Mr. Caputo's tenure suggests he is taking the
fall for the country's failure to stem the slide in the peso as
Macri renegotiates the IMF credit line, Bloomberg News notes.  Mr.
Macri told Bloomberg News the revamped agreement with the IMF
"will bring confidence" to markets and investors.

"The positive out-take on this -- even if the IMF is pushing for a
more independent central bank -- is that it could help Mr. Macri's
team communicate a more unified message to the markets," said
Roger Horn, senior emerging markets strategist at SMBC Nikko
Securities America, Bloomberg News relays.

Bloomberg News notes that Mr. Caputo raised rates in August to 60
percent, the world's highest, but the move failed to stem the
currency's decline as investors questioned the country's ability
to meet its financing needs amid a second recession in three
years.  The peso has tumbled 50 percent, the most in emerging
markets this year, Bloomberg News relays.

Bloomberg News discloses that the IMF was swift to respond, with
spokesman Gerry Rice issuing a statement that said the lender
looked forward to a "close and constructive" relationship with the
central bank.  "Our staff and the Argentine authorities continue
to work intensively with the objective of concluding the staff
level talks in very short order," Bloomberg News quoted Mr. Rice
as saying.

Bloomberg News notes that before taking the presidency of the
central bank, Caputo -- a former JPMorgan Chase & Co and a
Deutsche Bank trader -- was at the helm of the finance ministry
where he helped arrange a deal for Argentina to sell century
bonds, a rarity for a developing nation.  He was a key figure in
reaching a deal with debt holdouts from the country's 2001
default, an accord that put Argentina on the path back toward
normalcy after Mr. Macri's election in 2015, Bloomberg News
relays.

Unlike his predecessor, Sandleris has spent most of his career in
academics, Bloomberg News notes.  He has degrees from Columbia
University, the London School of Economics and the University of
Buenos Aires, Bloomberg News relays.

Mr. Sandleris has been one of the top Argentine officials at the
negotiating table with the renewed IMF talks, Bloomberg News
notes.  Mr. Dujovne, the economy minister, said that Sandleris has
been deeply involved in reshaping monetary policy during the IMF
talks, Bloomberg News discloses.  Mr. Dujovne called his former
deputy a brilliant person, Bloomberg News notes.

In addition, officials disclosed that Veronica Rappoport, a
professor at the London School of Economics who received a PhD in
economics from M.I.T., will be second vice president at the
central bank, Bloomberg News says.  Ms. Rappoport also taught at
Columbia Business School prior to LSE, Bloomberg News relays.  Her
appointment comes after Lagarde told Dujovne in May that his all-
male team was "short on women," Bloomberg News notes.  Pablo
Quirno, a director at the bank, is said to be leaving, Bloomberg
News discloses.  And Gustavo Canonero, the first vice president,
will stay as Mr. Sandleris' deputy, Bloomberg News notes.

Still, analysts said they were underwhelmed because Caputo had
market experience whereas Mr. Sandleris is a relatively unknown
deputy with an academic background, Bloomberg News relays.

"The market doesn't know Mr. Sandleris as well. He's good on paper
and has the credentials, but he's not as much of a heavy-hitter as
Caputo," said Kathryn Rooney Vera, head of global research at
Bulltick Capital Markets, Bloomberg News adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Sept. 4, 2018, S&P Global Ratings placed on Aug. 31, 2018, its
'B+' long-term and 'B' short-term sovereign credit ratings on
Argentina on CreditWatch with negative implications. At the same
time, S&P placed its 'raAA' national scale rating on CreditWatch
negative and affirmed its 'BB-' transfer and convertibility
assessment.  The CreditWatch negative reflects the risk of
worsening creditworthiness due to potentially weakened
implementation of the government's strategy to stabilize the
economy. Exchange rate volatility, as shown by recent pressure on
the Argentine currency, could jeopardize the effective
implementation of economic adjustment measures, absent further
steps to boost investor confidence.  Consequently, S&P Global
Ratings corrected its short-term ratings on Argentina
by removing them from CreditWatch with negative implications.

Fitch Ratings affirmed on May 8, 2018, Argentina's Long-Term
Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B' and revised
the Outlook to Stable from Positive.

On December 4, 2017, Moody's Investors Service upgraded the
Government of Argentina's local and foreign currency issuer and
senior unsecured ratings to B2 from B3. The senior unsecured
shelves were upgraded to (P)B2 from (P)B3. The outlook on the
ratings is stable.  At the same time, Argentina's short-term
rating was affirmed at Not Prime (NP). The senior unsecured
ratings for unrestructured debt were affirmed at Ca and the
unrestructured senior unsecured shelf affirmed at (P)Ca.

As previously reported by the TCR-LA, Argentina defaulted on some
of its debt late July 30, 2014, after expiration of a 30- grace
period on a US$539 million interest payment.  Earlier that ,
talks with a court-appointed mediator ended without resolving a
standoff between the country and a group of hedge funds seeking
full payment on bonds that the country had defaulted on in 2001.
A U.S. judge had ruled that the interest payment couldn't be made
unless the hedge funds led by Elliott Management Corp., got the
US$1.5 billion they claimed. The country hasn't been able to
access international credit markets since its US$95 billion
default 13 years ago. On March 30, 2016, Argentina's Congress
passed a bill that will allow the government to repay holders of
debt that the South American country defaulted on in 2001,
including a group of litigating hedge funds that won judgments
in a New York court. The bill passed by a vote of 54-16.


BANCO MACRO: Fitch Affirms 'B' LT IDR, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Banco Macro S.A.'s (Macro) Foreign- and
Local-Currency Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) of 'B' and
its viability rating (VR) of 'b'. The Rating Outlook is Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS AND VIABILITY RATING

Argentina's operating environment remains an important driver and
constraint of Macro's VR and IDRs. In Fitch's view, a reduction in
regulatory risk, a correction of macroeconomic imbalances and
economic recovery, will take time to materialize especially
following the recent policy frictions and political headwinds that
have led to market sentiment erosion and have significantly
increased the downside risks to the macroeconomic outlook.

Macro's ratings also reflect the bank's risk appetite and growth
strategy relative to peers, its ample capital cushion, as well as
its diverse funding and comfortable liquidity metrics (LCR of
210%). Macro focuses primarily on low- and middle-income
individuals and small- and medium-sized companies, ranking fourth
among private sector banks with a market share of 6% of the
banking system by assets. Macro has a very widespread geographic
presence throughout Argentina. As of June 2018, Macro had the
largest private-sector branch network with 454 branches, 1,463
ATMs and 918 self-service terminals.

Macro's ample capitalization is supported by earnings retention
and a significant reduction in risk weighted assets since 2015. At
June 2018, Fitch Core Capital remained comfortable at 23.1% of
risk weighted assets even though it was slightly lower than the
24.6% at year-end 2017. Banco Macro's regulatory Tier I capital
ratio of 21.5% and the total capital ratio of 27.6% are nearly
twice the regulatory minimum requirement. The bank's excess
capital of ARS41.5 billion is expected to decline over the medium
term, subject to risk-weighted asset growth exceeding internal
capital generation.

Macro has a diverse funding profile, reliant on a stable retail
deposit base, complemented by demonstrated access to capital
markets. As of June 2018, customer deposits accounted for 76% of
total funding. Macro provides financial agency services to
provincial governments and thus benefits from the related
mobilization of public sector institutional deposits. In addition,
the bank provides payroll services to over 2 million retail
clients that also provide another source of stable, low-cost
funding for the bank.

Macro's risk appetite is relatively higher than its closest peers
due to its middle market, retail focus and growth strategy.
Nevertheless, it demonstrates sound risk control. The bank's
impaired loans to gross loans ratio as calculated by Fitch
remained low at 1.1%, which compares well with the averages of its
domestic private sector peers. Like other players in the banking
system, Macro's loan quality has been supported by high credit
growth, which in turn has been facilitated by elevated inflation.

Macro's nominal profitability compares favorably with the banking
system average. The bank's Operating profit to Risk-Weighted Asset
ratio at June 2018 remained stable at 8.9%, slightly higher than
the 8.6% ratio reported at year-end 2017. Its performance benefits
from its diversified revenue base, a favorable operating
efficiency ratio (38.8% as of June 2018, which compares well with
those of its peers), and relatively low credit costs despite its
consumer loan orientation.

SENIOR UNSECURED DEBT

Ratings on Macro's senior unsecured issuance are in line with the
bank's Long-Term, Local-Currency IDR as the notes rank pari passu
with all other existing and future senior unsecured debt. The
Recovery Rating of 'RR4' assigned to Macro's senior debt issuance
reflects the average expected recovery in case of bank
liquidation.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

The Support Rating of '5' and the Support Rating Floor of 'NF'
reflect that, although possible, external support for Macro cannot
be relied upon given the sovereign's track record.

SUBORDINATED DEBT

The 'B-'/'RR6' ratings of Macro's subordinated debt reflect the
low expected recoveries for these bonds in case of bank
liquidation. However, these are notched only once due to ratings
compression arising from the low VR of the issuer. These
securities are plain-vanilla subordinated liabilities, without any
deferral feature on coupons and/or principal.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRS, SUPPORT and VR

Macro's IDRs, VR and senior debt ratings would likely move in line
with a change in Argentina's sovereign rating. In addition,
Macro's ratings could be negatively affected in the event of an
unlikely material deterioration in its profitability and/or asset
quality metrics that would lead to a sustained decrease in the
bank's Fitch Core Capital to below 9.5%. In addition, the bank's
ratings could be negatively affected by changes in the political
scene that result in a return to unorthodox policies resulting in
political and regulatory intervention in the banking system.
Contrarily, these ratings could benefit from a medium-term
consolidation of a more market-friendly political framework.

Fitch considers it unlikely that Argentine banks could be rated
above the sovereign, making any upside potential in Macro's
ratings contingent on positive developments in the sovereign
rating. Macro's senior debt ratings are sensitive to a change in
Macro's local currency IDR.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

Changes in the SRs and SRFs of Macro are unlikely in the
foreseeable future.

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

Given the 'RR6' Recovery Rating and the low expected recoveries
for these bonds in the case of bank liquidation, a potential
upgrade of the bank's VR will not necessarily result in a similar
action on outstanding subordinated notes due to the current
compression in the rating of Macro's subordinated issuances.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

Banco Macro, S.A.

  -- Long-Term, Foreign-Currency IDR at 'B'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Short-Term, Foreign-Currency IDR at 'B';

  -- Long-Term, Local-Currency IDR at 'B'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Short-Term, Local-Currency IDR at 'B';

  -- Viability Rating at 'b';

  -- Support Rating at '5';

  -- Support Rating Floor at 'NF';

  -- Argentinean-peso-denominated senior unsecured, medium-term
notes at 'B'/'RR4';

  -- USD400 million Tier II subordinated, medium-term notes at 'B-
'/'RR6'.


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B R A Z I L
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BANCO SANTANDER: Fitch Affirms B+ LT LC IDR, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Banco Santander Rio S.A.'s (Santander
Rio) Long-Term Local Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B+'.
Fitch has also assigned Santander Rio a 'B' Foreign Currency IDR
and 'B' Short-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs. The Rating
Outlook is Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRs, SUPPORT RATING AND VIABILITY RATING (VR)
Santander Rio's IDRs and Support rating reflect the probability of
parent support given that Santander Rio is viewed as a
strategically important entity for Spain's Banco Santander, S.A.
(SAN; A-/Stable Outlook). In addition, Argentina's volatile
economic and operating environment constrain Santander's IDRs.
While Santander Rio's Local Currency IDR is one notch above the
Sovereign rating, its Foreign Currency IDR is constrained by
Argentina's 'B' country ceiling rating.

Similarly, Santander Rio's VR is highly influenced by the
operating environment. Fitch also considers the bank's strong
company profile and adequate financial profile in its assessment
of the bank's VR. Santander Rio benefits from its strong and
growing franchise as the largest private sector bank in Argentina
by loans and deposits, with market shares of 10.5% and 13%,
respectively, as of June 30, 2018, and the ample experience of its
main shareholder.

Through 1H18 the bank's expanding transactional business has
allowed it to generate stable and recurrent revenues. However,
higher volume of risk weighted assets (RWA) due to the effect of
the peso depreciation and provisioning expenses weighed on its
operating profits/risk weighted assets ratio, which declined to
3.86% at end-June 2018. Given the recent deterioration of the
operating environment, and the significant change in the prospects
for the economy and the financial system, as is the case across
the financial system, Fitch expects Santander Rio's loan and
revenue growth rates to decelerate in 2H18 and 2019, with downside
risks for growth to turn negative in real terms as inflation could
rise above 40% in 2018. Nevertheless, the agency expects the bank
to continue generating a reasonable level of recurring earnings as
higher interest rates will partly offset slower growth and greater
expected fee income. Fitch notes that high inflation continues to
distort the banks' profitability ratios and affects international
comparability.

Santander Rio's delinquency ratios have deteriorated since 2015
given adverse economic conditions and, in 2017, a change in the
charge-offs policy from 180 to 360 days. However, its non-
performing loans (NPLs) remain at adequate levels, favored by
conservative lending policies, good risk management, strong loan
growth and inflation. At June 30, 2018, NPLs represented 2.49% of
total loans and were covered by loan reserves of 1.08x. Net
charge-offs have increased but remain at relatively low levels.
The bank has taken a series of measures to prevent a deterioration
of the loan portfolio by tightening admission criteria and
strengthening collections and controls. Fitch expects the bank's
asset quality indicators to deteriorate further in the near
future, in line with the recent deterioration of the operating
environment but to remain at acceptable levels. However, high
inflation distorts the figures and international comparisons.

The bank's capital adequacy metrics have historically stood at
adequate levels, albeit lower than its closest peers, in line with
its parent's capital allocation strategy for its subsidiaries.
However, the Fitch core capital to risk weighted assets ratio
(RWA) declined in 2017 as a consequence of the acquisition of the
retail banking operations from Citibank Argentina and at June 30,
2018 it stood at 9.67%, which Fitch considers somewhat low. To
compensate for this, the bank has issued USD160 million in 10-year
subordinated debt that qualifies as regulatory Tier II capital,
and USD100 million of undated subordinated debt that qualifies as
additional tier 1 regulatory capital, both subscribed by other
units of Santander. Its total regulatory capital to RWA ratio
stood at an acceptable 10.89%. Fitch estimates that the bank's
capitalization will gradually return to levels closer to its
historic average of FCC around 12%, helped by its earnings
generation capacity and the higher regulatory capital requirements
in line with Basel III standards.

Santander Rio's main funding source is core customer deposits and
its liquidity levels are ample and benefit from strong deposit
growth and lower demand of long-term credit. Santander Rio's loan
to deposits ratio is one of the strongest among the largest
Argentine banks due to its retail-oriented focus and has
historically been below 85% (72.6% at June 30, 2018) and its
liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) was 205%.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRs, SUPPORT and VR

Santander Rio's IDRs and VR would likely move in line with any
change in Argentina's sovereign rating. In addition, the bank's
Long-Term Local Currency IDR and Support Rating could be
negatively affected by changes in the political scene that result
in a return to unorthodox policies resulting in political and
regulatory intervention in the banking system.

Santander Rio's VR could be downgraded if the difficult operating
environment drives material deterioration in its performance that
results in a sustained deterioration in its FCC ratio below 8.5%.

Fitch has assigned the following ratings:

Santander Rio

  -- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR 'B'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Short-Term Foreign and Local Currency 'B'.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

Santander Rio

  -- Long-Term Local Currency IDR at 'B+'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Viability rating at 'b';

  -- Support Rating at '4'.


MAGNESITA REFRATARIOS: Fitch Withdraws BB LT Issuer Default Rating
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has withdrawn its ratings for Magnesita Refratarios
S.A.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch Ratings has withdrawn the ratings of Magnesita following its
merger and integration into RHI Magnesita N.V., which is not rated
by Fitch; the lack of sufficient information on the combined
entity's financial and operational strategies limits a rating
action at this point.

Further, Magnesita's publically rated debt is no longer
outstanding, and therefore the coverage is no longer considered
relevant for Fitch, and for commercial reasons. Fitch will no
longer provide ratings or analytical coverage for Magnesita.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has withdrawn the following ratings:

Magnesita Refratarios S.A.

  -- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR 'BB';

  -- Long-Term Local Currency IDR 'BB';

  -- National Long-Term rating 'AA(bra)'.

The Rating Outlook is Stable.


OI SA: S&P Rates Existing $1.6BB Senior Unsecured Notes 'B'
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its 'B' issue-level rating to Oi
S.A.'s (global scale: B/Stable/--; national scale: brA/Stable/--)
existing $1.6 billion senior unsecured notes due 2025. S&P also
assigned a '4' recovery rating to the notes, which indicates
average recovery expectation of 30%-50% (rounded estimate 40%) in
the event of payment default.

The notes, which Oi issued on July 27, 2018, were part of the
company's reorganization plan. Oi issued the notes to exchange
part of its obligations that were in default. The issue-level
rating on the notes is the same as the global scale issuer credit
rating, given that debt is senior unsecured with around a 40%
recovery expectation.

Issue Ratings--Recovery Analysis

S&P has assigned a recovery rating of '4' to Oi's senior unsecured
notes, with an average recovery (rounded estimate 40%).

Key analytical factors

S&P said, "Our hypothetical default scenario would occur in 2021
amid a combination of a severe economic slowdown, reduced consumer
discretionary income, and high competition in the telecom industry
that would lead to a decline in cash flow generation. We analyze
Oi under a going concern because we believe the company would
rather be restructured than liquidated under a default, given its
status as the third-largest telecom operator in Brazil. This was
the case with the company's recent reorganization plan. We have
valued Oi using a 5.5x multiple applied to our projected
emergence-level EBITDA of R$2.9 billion, somewhat lower than the
standard of 6x used for larger global telecom operators because we
view the company's competitive position somewhat weaker than the
industry average. With these assumptions, we reach a gross
enterprise value (EV) of R$16.2 billion.

"The various debt instruments at the parent level (Oi) and its
subsidiaries have cross guarantees, which avoid structural
subordination for the obligations. We don't include rejections of
leasing contracts in the debt waterfall because we believe the
company would maintain the contracts to assure the availability of
the services to continue operating. And the concession payments
would be transferred as liabilities to a potential new operator."

Simulated default assumptions

-- Simulated year of default: 2021
-- EBITDA at emergence: R$2.9 billion
-- EBITDA multiple: 5.5x
-- Estimated gross EV: R$16.2 billion

Simplified waterfall

-- Net EV, after 5% of administrative expenses: R$15.4 billion
-- Secured debt: R$3.6 billion (BNDEs loans)
-- Senior unsecured debt: R$26.6 billion (local banks, export
    credit agencies, notes)
-- Non-debt unsecured claims: R$350.5 million (tax liabilities)
-- Recovery expectations for unsecured bond: 30-50% (rounded to
    40%)

  RATINGS LIST

  Oi S.A.
    Issuer credit rating
     Global scale           B/Stable/--
     National scale         brA/Stable/--

  Ratings Assigned

  Oi S.A.
    Senior unsecured        B
      Recovery rating       4(40%)


RIO DE JANEIRO: Fitch Affirms BB- LT IDRs, Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the City of Rio de Janeiro's (CRio)
Long-Term, Foreign- and Local-Currency Issuer Default Ratings
(IDRs) at 'BB-'. In addition, Fitch has also affirmed the national
rating at 'AA(bra)'. The Rating Outlook is Stable.

The affirmations reflect the city's fiscal performance according
to expectation. In 2017, operating margin was negative 0.8%,
according to Fitch's calculations based on publicly available
information.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fiscal Performance: Weak/Stable

Fitch expects very thin operating margins until 2020. Rio presents
average fiscal flexibility, as tax revenue corresponded to around
42% of operating revenue in 2017. Additionally, Rio should
register negative overall results until 2020, according to Fitch's
calculation.

Fitch expects staff expenditure increases to be in line with
inflation up to 2020 despite ongoing pressures to provide
healthcare and education on behalf of the state of Rio, who is
under deep fiscal distress. Personnel expenditures, including
pension payments, accounted for around 53% of operating
expenditures in 2017 down from roughly 62%, according to Fitch's
calculation.

Debt, Liabilities and Liquidity: Neutral/Stable

CRio's consolidated debt of around BRL15 billion in April 2018,
represented a moderate 63% of the entity's current revenues (49.5%
in 2016) when compared with peers. Debt service consumed the
equivalent to 4.6% of the city's operating revenues. As a positive
factor, CRio does not have a significant amount of judicial debt
payable, or precatorios.

The liquidity position of the city has improved. As of April 2018,
gross cash positions increased to BRL2.5 billion (BRL1.8 billion
in December 2017) covering 95% of the city's obligations due in
2018. Unpaid commercial short-term liabilities diminished in April
2018, corresponding to less than 1% of the city's operating
revenues, according to Fitch's calculation (6.9% in 2017).

Economy: Neutral/Stable

With an economy based on services, CRio represents around 5% of
the Brazilian economy and hosts large companies related to oil
production, such as Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. (Petrobras) (BB-
/Stable), and metal mining companies, such as Vale S.A.
(BBB+/Stable).

CRio is home to around 6.3 million people, equal to approximately
3% of the Brazilian population, thus implying a GDP per capita of
around USD9,000. The unemployment rate reached 15.4% in June 2018,
according to IBGE- Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e
Estatisticas, which is higher than Brazil's overall unemployment
rate of 12.4%.

Management and Administration: Neutral/Stable

The reliance on nonrecurring revenue is above average because
credit operations financed 46.3% of capex, compared with 40.7% for
'BB-'-rated peers, and accuracy of forecast is considered as
average.

Institutional Framework: Weak/Stable

Fitch considers the institutional framework to be weak, mostly as
a result of very low fiscal flexibility that stems from subdued
fiscal collection coupled with rigid cost structure. Moreover, the
federal government has great influence over Brazilian local and
regional governments (LRGs), as expressed by the vertical issuance
of laws, and due to the federal government being the largest LRG
creditor in many cases.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fiscal Performance and Debt: An operating margin that is
consistently negative will exert a negative pressure on CRio's
ratings. Additionally, a significant increase in financial debt
should also exert a negative pressure on its ratings.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

City of Rio de Janeiro:

  -- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR at 'BB-';

  -- Short-Term Foreign Currency IDR at 'B';

  -- Long-Term Local Currency IDR at 'BB-';

  -- Short-Term Local Currency IDR at 'B';

  -- Long-Term National at 'AA(bra)';

  -- Short-Term National rating at 'F1+(bra)'


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C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


ARABELLA EXPLORATION: Second Final Cash Collateral Order Entered
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Russell F. Nelms of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
Northern District of Texas has signed a second final order
authorizing Arabella Exploration, LLC, and its affiliates to use
the cash collateral Platinum Partners Credit Opportunities Master
Fund, LP, on a final basis solely in accordance with and to the
extent set forth in the Budget.

The Debtors have an immediate need for cash to preserve and
protect the assets of the Estates, to facilitate the settlement of
ongoing litigation filed by Founders Oil & Gas III, LLC, and
Founders Oil & Gas Operating, LLC, against the Debtors in the
Chapter 11 cases, and to facilitate the sale of substantially all
assets of Debtors for the benefit of Debtors' creditors.

The Debtors are authorized on a final basis to use the Cash
Collateral for the sole purpose of paying the Founders JIBs
Payments.  The Debtors may not use cash collateral in any manner
or for any purpose other than as explicitly set forth in the
Second Final Order or further order of the Court.

However, none of the Cash Collateral which the Debtors propose to
use includes collateral or proceeds thereof which are subject to
liens, of (i) Sooner Pipe, LLC, or (ii) other parties in interest,
in each case, to the extent that Sooner Pipe, LLC or such party in
interest is determined by the Court to have a valid and existing
secured claim against any asset of a Debtor in these Cases, which
such finding is outside the scope of the Second Final Order.

Platinum Partners is granted valid, binding, enforceable and
perfected replacement liens upon and security interests in all of
each Debtor's property and assets, pursuant to Sections 361 and
363 of the Bankruptcy Code.  However, nothing in the Second Final
Order will be construed to prime or subordinate (i) the tax liens
of the ad valorem taxing entities or (ii) the liens of Sooner
Pipe, LLC, to the extent Sooner Pipe, LLC, is determined by the
Court to have a valid and existing secured claim against any asset
of a Debtor in these Cases.

Platinum Partners is also granted pursuant to Sections 503, 507(a)
and 507(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, an allowed superpriority
administrative expense claim in an amount equal to the Diminution
in Value.

A full-text copy of the Second Final Order is available at:

             http://bankrupt.com/misc/txnb17-40120-436.pdf

                   About Arabella Exploration

Arabella Exploration, LLC, formed on Oct. 2, 2009, is a wholly
owned subsidiary of Arabella Exploration, Inc., a Cayman Islands
corporation.  It is an oil and gas exploration company that owns
working interests in a number of oil and gas properties and
interests.

Arabella Exploration filed a voluntary petition for relief under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Case No.
17-40120) on Jan. 8, 2017.  Charles (Chip) Hoebeke, manager,
signed the petition.

Arabella Operating, LLC, filed a Chapter 11 petition (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. Case No. 17-41479) on April 4, 2017.  The case is being
jointly administered with that of Arabella Exploration.

Arabella Exploration estimated $1 million to $50 million in assets
and liabilities.

Judge Russell F. Nelms in Ft. Worth, Texas, is the case judge.

Raymond W. Battaglia, Esq., of the Law Offices of Ray Battaglia,
PLLC, serves as counsel to the Debtor.  Miller Johnson serves as
Battaglia's co-counsel.  Rehmann Turnaround and Receivership's
Charles Hoebeke is the Debtor's chief restructuring officer.
EnergyNet.com, Inc., is the oil and gas broker.

No trustee, examiner or committee has been appointed in the case.


FAIRHOLD SECURITISATION: Seeks to Invalidate Admin. Appointment
---------------------------------------------------------------
Asad Asali at Global Capital reported that the High Court was
standing room only as Fairhold Securitisation Limited and the note
trustee Global Loan Agency Services Limited (GLAS), tried to
invalidate the appointment of three individuals as administrators
of Fairhold.  Clifden, the real estate focused fund manager, had
bypassed GLAS to make the appointment.

Clifden IOM, the fund which failed in its tender offer for UK non-
conforming bonds from the RMAC series earlier this year, is still
on the hunt for assets from the issuer of Fairhold Securitisation,
a pre-crisis distressed CMBS backed by UK ground rents, Global
Capital had disclosed.

According to Global Capital, a court heard on Aug. 8, Clifden
IOM's claims to have appointed administrators to Fairhold, were
"fanciful" and "incredible".

Out-law.com recounts that in a securitisation transaction dated
March 30, 2006, Cayman-registered Fairhold Securitisation Ltd
issued two classes of notes backed by the income receivables from
a complex portfolio of sheltered housing properties in England and
Wales. The notes were due to mature in October 2017. By 2015, the
transaction was in trouble. Cash flow from the properties was
insufficient to support both Fairhold's liability to the
noteholders, and its liability to two issuer swap counterparties,
UBS and HBOS.  Fairhold had entered into swaps with the banks to
hedge its obligations under the notes.  On October 2, 2015, UBS
exercised its right to early termination, triggering a payment of
GBP311 million.  Subsequently, GLAS had replaced Deutsche Trustee
Company Ltd.  This was followed within days by a potential default
event, when the issuer failed to pay the interest due on the
notes.  Fairhold then claimed to be entitled to rescind the swaps
on the grounds that the banks had made fraudulent
misrepresentations. At the same time, the parties had been
discussing a possible restructuring, in the course of which the
same group of noteholders incurred the GBP2.5 million professional
fees at the centre of the dispute. Following an extraordinary
meeting of the noteholders which resolved to direct the trustee to
pay these fees, the trustee entered into an agreement to pay them
as if they were 'trustee costs and expenses'.  As trustee
expenses, the fees had first priority under the payment waterfall
at the expense of UBS. UBS therefore challenged the trustee's
rights to pay the fees as a matter of interpretation of the trust
deed and associated charge over the Fairhold's assets. Pending
resolution of the dispute, no fees had been paid.

The law firm of Simons and Simons said they represent UBS in the
restructuring.



===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: 2019 Budget Bill's Fiscal Deficit Will Up Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that the Dominican College of Economists
warned that the 2019 Budget bill submitted by the Government
includes a fiscal deficit that will raise the public debt, which
accounted for 49.3% of GDP as of June 2018.

"The authorities should make the necessary efforts to avoid
incurring fiscal deficit, because that is one of the main causes
of the accelerated growth of public debt," the economists said,
according to Dominican Today.

In a statement to Listin Diario, College president, Alejandro de
Jesus, said that it's necessary to make more efficient the
management of the revenue agencies to avert "the strong evasion
and dodging of taxes, since it is estimated that in our country
the ITBIS evasion is greater than 40%," the report relays.

Mr. De Jesus noted that the country needs an integral Tax Code
reform to dismantle existing exemptions and exonerations, through
which he affirms that tax expenditures estimated at RD$234.6
billion granted for this year were 6.1% of GDP, the report
discloses.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Sept. 24, 2018, Fitch Ratings has affirmed Dominican Republic's
Long-Term, Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB-'
with a Stable Outlook.


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Free Zone Exports Jump 11.1%
------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that Dominican Republic's free zone
exports jumped 11.1% in the first half this year, and total value
is expected to exceed US$6.0 billion by yearend 2018, Industry and
Commerce minister Nelson Toca Simo revealed.

Speaking at the Dominican Exporters Association (Adoexpo)
conference, the official said the sector accounts for 55% of the
country's total exports, climbing by 19.4% in 2017 and an average
annual growth of 3.0% since 2012, according to Dominican Today.

Moreover, the official said the number of free zone companies in
operation posted a relative growth of 17.3%, from 584 in 2012 to
685 in 2018, the report relays.

In a statement, Mr. Toca also said that 20 new free zone parks
started operations, rising from 53 in 2012 to 73 in 2018, "which
shows a relative growth of 37.7%," the report discloses.

"The number of workers, technicians and administrative staff
employed by the free zones reaches the figure of 170,267," the
official, as quoted by EFE, said, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Sept. 24, 2018, Fitch Ratings has affirmed Dominican Republic's
Long-Term, Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB-'
with a Stable Outlook.


=============
J A M A I C A
=============


DIGICEL GROUP: Request for Bond Repayment Delay Rejected
--------------------------------------------------------
Arthur Beesley at The Financial Times reports that Denis O'Brien's
effort to buy more time for Digicel Group to repay about $3
billion in debt comes at a critical time for the company, amid
anxiety about a possible default on a $2 billion bond due in 2020.

Now bondholders have dismissed Mr. O'Brien's proposal to extend by
two years this debt and a $1 billion 2022 note, saying the terms
he has offered were "unacceptable," according to The Financial
Times.

A statement from a bondholder committee suggests it will take a
robust approach to talks with Mr. O'Brien, who took Digicel into
31 markets after founding the company in Jamaica in 2001, the
report relays.

Digicel Group's bondholders are known to include Ashmore,
BlackRock and Eaton Vance but their precise stance is unknown and
it is not clear whether they are represented on the committee, the
report relays.

Mr. O'Brien faces the prospect of having to sweeten the terms of a
restructuring proposal that has led to downgrades from rating
agencies Moody's and Fitch, the report relays.

The company has been a lucrative investment for Mr. O'Brien but
its bonds have been trading at 60 cents and 70 cents on the
dollar, as concern mounts about its indebtedness at a time of
anxiety over risks to emerging markets more generally, the report
notes.

The report says that revenues and earnings have declined and
Digicel has cut tariffs for data to boost the slow uptake of
services introduced after a $2.4bn investment in networks.

Law firm Akin Gump, which is advising the bondholder committee,
said investors holding more than 60 per cent of each bond have
"entered into a lock-up agreement" in which they resolved not to
tender their notes in response to Mr. O'Brien's proposal to
prolong the debt, the report discloses.

In response, Digicel said that it was extending by three weeks the
early tender deadline for the offer until October 19, the report
notes.

Without naming any Digicel investors, Akin Gump said it has held
two teleconferences for multiple financial institutions who
together hold $2.8 billion of bonds issued by the company, the
report relays.

"Based on the strong feedback received from Digicel Group Ltd note
holders, Akin Gump has informed Digicel Group Ltd and its advisers
that the current terms of the proposal set out in the offering
memorandum are unacceptable to . . . note holders," it said, the
report notes.

The committee has directed Akin Gump to communicate a request to
other bondholders to refuse to tender their notes "and thereby
further increase the already sizeable majority of Digicel Group
Ltd note holders" who oppose it, the report relays.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
July 5, 2018, Moody's Investors Service has changed to negative
from stable the outlook on the ratings of Digicel Group Limited
("Digicel", "DGL" or the "company") and Digicel Limited ("DL") and
assigned a negative outlook to Digicel International Finance
Limited ("DIFL"). At the same time, Moody's has affirmed DGL's B2
corporate family rating (CFR) and B2-PD probability of default
rating (PDR), as well as the B1 rating on the unsecured notes of
DL and the Ba2 rating on the secured bank credit facilities of
DIFL.


JAMAICA: S&P Affirms 'B' Sovereign Credit Rating, Outlook Now Pos.
------------------------------------------------------------------
On Sept. 25, 2018, S&P Global Ratings revised its outlook on
Jamaica to positive from stable. At the same time, S&P Global
Ratings affirmed its 'B' long- and short-term foreign and local
currency sovereign credit ratings, and its 'B+' transfer and
convertibility assessment on the country.

OUTLOOK

The positive outlook reflects the at least one-in-three likelihood
of an upgrade if, in the next 12 months, Jamaica further
strengthens its external liquidity positon while maintaining tight
fiscal policy and high primary surpluses. The combination of
modest GDP growth and better external liquidity, as reflected in
improvement in gross external financing needs to less than 100% of
current account receipts (CAR) plus usable reserves could boost
the sovereign's credit rating. S&P said, "We expect that the
government will continue to meet strict fiscal targets, and
maintain its commitment to a gradual reduction in its debt and
interest burdens.  We also expect that the government will
continue advancing toward a more effective monetary policy
framework for the central bank, including a more flexible exchange
rate."

Upside scenario

S&P said, "We could raise the ratings in the next year if Jamaica
continues improving its external liquidity such that the economy
becomes more resilient to potential external shocks, including
possibly higher oil prices. In addition, over a longer period,
sustained economic growth at higher levels would strengthen
Jamaica's economic profile, potentially resulting in a higher
rating."

Downside scenario

S&P could revise the outlook to stable during the same period if
the recently improving trajectory of Jamaica's external position
reverses and begins to weaken, or the government misses fiscal
targets, leading to an increase in debt and interest burdens.

RATIONALE

S&P said, "Our ratings on Jamaica continue to be limited by the
country's high debt and interest burden, which restricts its
fiscal flexibility. Despite a recent slow pick-up, GDP growth
remains low, constrained by structural impediments. Nevertheless,
the government's tight fiscal stance fosters macroeconomic
stability--including low inflation--and supports the country's
creditworthiness. The country's external indebtedness has improved
in recent years and international reserves are growing. We believe
that Jamaica's policymaking stability and predictability are
bolstered by the continuity of fiscal consolidation policies. In
addition, ongoing changes in the governance and mandate of the
central bank could gradually improve Jamaica's currently limited
monetary flexibility."

Institutional and economic profile: The pace of economic growth,
which we expect will modestly accelerate over the next year, may
facilitate the effectiveness of further institutional reform.

-- The government's commitment to sustainable fiscal policy
    should underpin macroeconomic stability in the medium term.

-- Economic growth will facilitate public-sector reform as a
    growing private sector can absorb displaced public-sector
    workers.

-- Nevertheless, S&P anticipates that bottlenecks will continue
    limiting the speed at which growth accelerates, despite the
    strong performance of some sectors.

S&P said, "We believe that the government's commitment to fiscal
consolidation will continue to foster macroeconomic stability in
Jamaica, even through the election cycle, which is scheduled for
February 2021. This commitment has spanned changes in government
and we believe is representative of bipartisan consensus on the
general direction of macroeconomic policymaking. Despite previous
strong divisions, Jamaica's two main political parties--the ruling
Jamaica Labor Party (JLP) and the opposition People's National
Party (PNP)--currently share a similar outlook on macroeconomic
policy, in our opinion. Since taking office in 2016, the JLP has
largely continued the macroeconomic policies of the former PNP
administration, including achieving strict fiscal targets set
under the previous IMF Extended Fund Facility (EFF) program.

"While we expect general policy continuity over the next several
years, implementing the remaining public-sector reforms on the
government's agenda will take time, particularly as economic
growth only gradually accelerates. Before the EFF program expired
in early 2017, Jamaican authorities engaged with the IMF regarding
a successor program. They agreed on a three-year stand-by
arrangement (SBA), which serves primarily as a precautionary
liquidity backstop but also as an anchor for policy continuity.
Under the program, the government is seeking to shift spending
toward growth-inducing expenditure. To do so, local authorities
are focused on identifying redundancies and services that public-
sector entities can share; and establishing clear controls on
public-sector wages, among other measures.

The government has made progress toward these ends: starting from
fiscal 2018, it has reached a four-year agreement on public-sector
wages (with about 80% of the public service), that will help
reduce wages to 9% of GDP target by fiscal 2019. S&P said,
"Nevertheless, we believe it will take time to fundamentally shift
the structure of spending, as structural growth limitations will
be hard to overcome in the near term. Importantly, we expect that
the government will continue with reforms once the SBA expires at
the end of 2019." To further entrench fiscal sustainability, the
government is developing an independent fiscal council, which it
expects will be operational in the next two years. The fiscal
council will be a permanent, independent, non-partisan institution
enshrined by legislation that will promote sustainable fiscal
practices and deepen government accountability as policymakers
will have to maintain credible policies and explain deviations to
plan.

S&P said, "In our opinion, structural barriers will continue to
impede stronger economic growth in Jamaica. We expect annual real
GDP growth to average 1.9% over the next three years (or 1.4% in
per capita terms), despite stronger performance in certain sectors
of the economy. We also expect that the country's per capita GDP
will be close to US$5,400 in 2018. Tourism, agriculture, mining,
and manufacturing make the Jamaican economy diversified for a
small open economy. Nevertheless, growth is constrained by high
security costs, perceived corruption, low productivity, a lack of
business competitiveness, and vulnerability to external shocks.
Some sectors, such as tourism, which directly represents about
8.5% of Jamaica's GDP, have grown quickly in the past couple of
years. Improvements in capacity utilization in the mining sector
over the past year have also contributed to economic growth. We
expect employment levels to rise; as of April 2018, employment
grew by about 1.2% year-over-year, while unemployment fell to a
10-year low of 9.7% from 12.2%, in the previous year. However,
links between tourism and other sectors, in particular
agriculture, are limited, in our opinion, muting the impact of
tourism growth the overall economy. The government established the
Ministry of Economic Growth and Job Creation in early 2016, headed
by the prime minister, and an Economic Growth Council under the
ministry in part to address these issues. However, we expect that
the dividends of these efforts will take time to translate into
higher GDP growth."

Flexibility and performance profile: Strict fiscal policy will
continue to ease the still-high general government debt burden
while vulnerability to external shocks remains, despite a
strengthening external positon.

-- S&P expects the government to meet its 7% of GDP primary
    surplus target through the medium term.

-- Although this tight fiscal policy will slowly reduce Jamaica's
    debt burden, fiscal flexibility will be limited.

-- Still-high, albeit improving, external liquidity needs and
    indebtedness make the country vulnerable to external shocks
    and potential loss in investor confidence.

S&P said, "We expect that Jamaica will continue to meet or exceed
its primary fiscal surplus target, which we expect will average
7.4% of GDP over the next four years. In the past year, the
government implemented the second phase of its tax reform policy
to shift the tax system toward indirect taxation and broaden the
tax base. It raised the minimum income level required to pay
personal income tax for a second time, offsetting this through
higher excise and consumption taxes on items such as cigarettes,
fuel, and alcohol. Absent new taxes in the current fiscal year,
the government expects that administrative improvements in tax
collection and compliance will produce higher revenues in fiscal
2019."

Continued compliance with ambitious fiscal targets will contribute
to a gradual decline in net general government debt in our
forecasts to about 80% of GDP by 2020, while the change in general
government debt will average 2.2% over the same period. Net
general government debt represented about 90% of GDP in fiscal
2018, and averaged about 115% in the previous three years.  In
addition, the general government balance represented 0.6% of GDP
in fiscal 2018, reflecting an improvement from a modest deficit
position in the three previous years. Nevertheless, S&P expects
that interest payments will continue to represent a significant
portion of the budget, averaging about 21.5% of government revenue
over the next four years. The high interest burden will continue
to limit fiscal flexibility.

Jamaica's debt burden has significant exposure to exchange rate
movements as approximately 60% of general government debt is
denominated in foreign currency. Notably, the government is not
expected to raise new foreign currency-denominated debt in the
domestic market in the medium term. Notwithstanding, external
maturities will be refinanced from funds raised from domestic
issuances and revenue, to the extent that the private sector is
not crowded-out, given the domestic market is not sufficiently
deep to facilitate full refinancing. In addition, the country's
financial institutions have significant exposure to government
debt, limiting their capacity to lend more to the government
without crowding out private-sector borrowing. S&P said, "We
assess Jamaica's contingent liabilities from the financial sector
and all nonfinancial public enterprises as limited. The limited
assessment of contingent liabilities of banks is based on our
Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment score of '9' (with '1'
being the lowest-risk category and '10' the highest) and the ratio
of banking-sector assets to GDP of under 100%."

Strong fiscal performance will serve as a solid anchor for
external stability. Jamaica's external profile has benefited from
favorable conditions over the past couple of years. However,
rising oil prices have contributed to a moderate widening in the
current account deficit, projected to be 5.4% in 2018, from 4.8%
in 2017. Growth in the tourism industry has also benefited
Jamaica's external profile, given that tourism receipts represent
almost 40% of the country's CAR. S&P said, "We expect Jamaica to
record a CAD of just below 7% of GDP for 2019-2020. In line with
recent years, we expect that the bulk of the deficit will be
funded by FDI. Against a backdrop of relatively stable oil prices,
Jamaica's external financing needs will be relatively stable.
Strong growth in tourism earnings and remittances should mitigate
import growth due to increased investment and consumption from a
strengthening economy. As a result, we expect Jamaica's external
financing needs to average 103% of CAR and foreign exchange
reserves over the next four years. The country's external accounts
are linked to the U.S. primarily through tourism and personal
remittances, which account for about 30% of CAR. At the same time,
we expect external debt net of international reserves and liquid
public- and financial-sector assets to continue improving to about
88% of CAR, on average, during the same period. Despite the recent
improvement in the external debt burden, Jamaica remains
vulnerable to external shocks. In addition, we believe the county
is vulnerable to a sudden loss of external funding, given that
Jamaica's net external liability position is substantially worse
than its net external debt position. Negative developments that
undermine FDI and other private capital inflows could again lead
to falling foreign exchange reserves and put pressure on the
currency to depreciate further."

S&P said, "We believe that fiscal tightening will support
historically low inflation levels over the next several years. We
expect inflation to fall within the central bank's target of 4%-6%
through 2021. Although it has a short track record, the central
bank will, we expect, facilitate orderly movements in the local
currency, in line with the country's floating exchange rate. About
47% of financial assets are denominated in U.S. dollars, limiting
the effectiveness of monetary policy, down from about 43% in 2013.
Steps to reduce the level of dollarization, such as capping open
positions at financial institutions, could gradually strengthen
monetary policy. In addition, the central bank is introducing
measures to support inflation targeting, such as revising its
mandate, strengthening operational independence, and improving
market transparency. Still, it will take time before these
measures lead to fully operational inflation targeting. We believe
that monetary policy tools still have a limited impact on the
economy given low--albeit rising--levels of private-sector lending
and limited secondary bond market trading."

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by
the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and
was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision.
After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot above.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook. The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

  RATINGS LIST
  Ratings Affirmed; CreditWatch/Outlook Action
                                To                 From
  Jamaica
   Sovereign Credit Rating      B/Positive/B       B/Stable/B

  Ratings Affirmed

  Jamaica
   Transfer & Convertibility Assessment
    Local Currency                        B+
   Senior Unsecured                       B

  Air Jamaica Ltd.
   Senior Unsecured                       B

  National Road Operating and Constructing Company Ltd
   Senior Unsecured                       B


================================
T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O
================================


SANDALS INC: Deal With Trinidad and Tobago Could Close Off by Nov
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Trinidad Express reports that Trinidad and Tobago's resort deal
with Sandals Inc. could close off by the end of November, Prime
Minister Dr. Keith Rowley said.

Government has also issued proposals for the construction of a
massive marina in Tobago and should have some initial details of
the project to share in the next fortnight, the PM said, the
report notes.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Oct. 10, 2017, Caribbean360.com reports that Hurricanes Irma and
Maria have wreaked havoc on the planned construction of a mega
Sandals resort in Tobago.  The 750-room hotel project has been put
on hold, Trinidad and Tobago's Prime Minister Dr. Keith Rowley
confirmed at a press conference after holding talks with the
business community on the country's financial situation, according
to Caribbean360.com.  He told reporters that negotiations for the
project were well advanced and Sandals Chairman Gordon Butch
Stewart was all set to wrap up the talks and sign a memorandum of
understanding earlier in September when Hurricane Irma struck, the
report noted.


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2018.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.
.


                   * * * End of Transmission * * *