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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

               Thursday, December 20, 2018, Vol. 19, No. 252


                            Headlines



B R A Z I L

BANESCO BANCO: Fitch Keeps CC on Watch Neg., Then Withdraws Rating


E L  S A L V A D O R

GRUPO UNICOMER: Fitch Affirms BB- LT IDR, Outlook Stable


J A M A I C A

DIGICEL GROUP: Inching Toward Debt-Swap Agreement


M E X I C O

MEXICO: To Give Minimum Wage Another Boost


P U E R T O    R I C O

TSAWD HOLDINGS: Court Grants M.J. Soffe Bid for Summary Judgment
TSAWD HOLDINGS: PAC Wins Summary Judgment Bid vs WSF


T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O

TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: PM Urge HDC Tenants to Pay Rent


U R U G U A Y

URUGUAY: Loryser Reaches Agreement With Creditors


V E N E Z U E L A

VENEZUELA: Sued by Casa Express $34-Mil. Over Unpaid Bonds
VENEZUELA: Migrants Raise Regional Fiscal and Political Pressures


                            - - - - -


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B R A Z I L
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BANESCO BANCO: Fitch Keeps CC on Watch Neg., Then Withdraws Rating
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken the following rating actions on Banesco
Banco Universal, C.A.:

  -- Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs 'CC' maintained on
     Negative Watch and withdrawn;

  -- Viability Rating 'cc' downgraded to 'c' and withdrawn;

  -- Short-Term Foreign and Local Currency ratings affirmed at 'C'
     and withdrawn;

  -- Support '5' affirmed at '5' and withdrawn;

  -- Support Floor affirmed at 'NF' and withdrawn;

  -- National Long-Term Rating 'A-(ven)' maintained on Negative
     Watch and withdrawn;

  -- National Short-Term Rating 'F1(ven)' maintained on Negative
     Watch and withdrawn.

The Viability Rating has been downgraded due to a sharp decline in
capitalization ratios to critically low levels in light of
hyperinflation. In Fitch's view, the probability of failure has
increased as Banesco's tangible common equity/tangible assets
ratio declined to only 3.8% as of end-June 2018 and its regulatory
capital ratio declined to 11.6%, while the minimum required in
Venezuela is 11%.

Fitch maintained the Negative Watch on the Long-Term Foreign and
Local Currency IDRs as well as on the National scale ratings as
the government's intervention of the bank has yet to be resolved.
Banesco's Long-term IDR remained at 'CC' since Fitch believes that
the probability that depositors will have to bear losses is lower
than the probability of the bank's failure due to the high level
of liquidity in the domestic market.

Fitch has withdrawn these ratings considering the ongoing
government intervention in Banesco by the Venezuelan government
and the uncertainly about when the intervention will be resolved.
Banesco has been subject to a special intervention measure since
May 2018, a measure that has been twice extended. The latest
extension is effective until March 2019 unless earlier resolved.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating sensitivities are not applicable as all ratings have been
withdrawn.



====================
E L  S A L V A D O R
====================


GRUPO UNICOMER: Fitch Affirms BB- LT IDR, Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch has affirmed Grupo Unicomer Company Limited's Long-Term
Local and Foreign Currency Issuer Default Ratings at 'BB-'. Fitch
has also affirmed Grupo Unicomer's USD350 million senior notes due
2024 at 'BB-'. The Rating Outlook is Stable.

Grupo Unicomer's ratings reflect a leading business position in
most of the countries in which it operates and the solid financial
position of its main shareholders. The ratings also incorporate
Grupo Unicomer's geographic and format diversification that have
contributed to positive consolidated cash flow from operations
(CFFO) throughout economic cycles. The company has reported stable
operational results based on a retail business model that targets
the low- to middle-income segments. Grupo Unicomer's ratings also
factor its growth strategy through acquisitions, funded mainly
with debt, which in turn has prevented it from reducing
consolidated leverage.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Good Track Record and Solid Business Position: Grupo Unicomer has
commercial operations in 24 countries across Central America,
South America and the Caribbean. The company has a track record of
more than 17 years in consumer durables sales, which has enabled
it to develop long-term relationships with suppliers and to have
competitive advantages in terms of location of its stores within
small countries, where prime retailing points of sale are very
limited. The company maintains a leading business position in the
retailing of consumer durable goods, supported by its proprietary
financing services and economies of scale in terms of purchasing
power and logistics.

Geographic Diversification: Geographic diversification allows
Grupo Unicomer to have a broad revenue base, supported by
different economic dynamics and mitigating the company's country
risk of any individual market. Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Costa
Rica, Ecuador and Guyana are among the most important cash flow
contributors, giving the company some strength and stability to
its operating cash flows. Most of the other countries where the
company operates are within the 'B' rating category. The company
has several store formats and brands across its operations.

Persistent Positive CFFO: For the LTM ended Sept. 30, 2018, the
company generated USD54.1 million of CFFO. Fitch expects the
company's CFFO to be above USD60 million per year during 2020-
2022. One of Grupo Unicomer's goals is to recover the
profitability margins it recorded in the past (around 13.5% EBITDA
margin). Capex levels should be around USD40 million per year
during the medium term, excluding potential acquisitions. The most
recent acquisitions occurred in 2015-2016, when the company
acquired two retail chains, one in Paraguay and the other in the
Caribbean countries of Bonaire, Curacao and St. Maarten.

Growth Funded Mainly with Debt: Historically, Grupo Unicomer
expanded its operations through a combination of organic and
inorganic growth. Since its inception, the company has made
significant acquisitions that increased its size and coverage.
While organic growth was primarily funded with internal operating
cash flows, acquisitions were funded mainly with debt. As of
September 2018, lease adjusted debt/EBITDAR was 4.7x and Fitch
expects this ratio to be 4.6x by the end of fiscal year ending
March 2019. Fitch also expects the company to reduce the adjusted
leverage ratio to around 4.3x in the medium term.

Stable Portfolio Yield: The company's consumer finance strategy
includes sufficient financial spreads to cover credit risks in the
portfolio. During the past eight years, the portfolio yield after
deducting uncollectable expenses and write-offs has been nearly
40% on average. As of Sept. 30, 2018, Grupo Unicomer's credit
portfolio had NPLs for 8.6% (past due accounts for 90 days or
more), an increase from the five-year-average of 6.8% mainly due
to the deterioration of the Nicaraguan credit portfolio derived
from the weakened economic environment in that country and to a
lesser extent the Dominica NPLs levels due to the devastation of
hurricane Maria. The company has provisions equivalent to 101% of
those NPLs. The level of overdue accounts is partially offset by
the company's efficient collection program and portfolio yield.

Strong Shareholders: The ratings consider the sound financial
position of Grupo Unicomer's shareholders Milady Group and El
Puerto de Liverpool, S.A.B. de C.V. (BBB+/Stable), which each owns
50% of Grupo Unicomer. Liverpool has a proven track record in
retail since 1847 in Mexico. Fitch is not incorporating into Grupo
Unicomer's ratings potential financial support from its
shareholders, if needed. Also, in Fitch's view, the shareholders'
solid credit profiles give flexibility to Grupo Unicomer, as the
shareholders' financial position does not rely on Grupo Unicomer's
dividend payments.

Milady's operations include real estate developments, department
store chains, all Inditex's franchises in Central America, and a
vertically integrated textile manufacturing and wholesaling
business. Liverpool, a department store with 261 units and 27
shopping malls in Mexico, had USD6.9 billion in total revenues
during the LTM ended Sept. 30, 2018 with a 14.9% of EBITDA margin.
Liverpool's total adjusted debt/EBITDAR (including captive finance
adjustment) was 0.8x for the period.

                      Derivation Summary

Grupo Unicomer has about the same scale in number of stores as
Grupo Elektra (BB/Stable) while Grupo Famsa (B-/Stable) has fewer
stores. Unicomer's credit portfolio is smaller in size than
Elektra and Famsa and it does not lend through regulated banking
operations. The company is more geographically diversified than
Elektra and Famsa, which mitigates the company's operating risk of
any individual market; however, Unicomer operates in countries
with higher sovereign risks than Elektra and Famsa.

Unicomer's financial risk profile is similar to other peers rated
in the 'BB-'/'B+' category. The company maintains a weaker
financial position in terms of profitability, flexibility and
financial structure than Elektra but it is stronger than Famsa.
Unicomer's operating margins are higher but closer to Famsa, while
Elektra has the best operating margins of the three companies.
Unicomer ranks in the middle between Elektra and Famsa in terms of
credit metrics and liquidity position.

As per Fitch's criteria, Unicomer's applicable Country Ceiling is
'BB+' and does not constrain the ratings as the LC IDR is lower
than the applicable Country Ceiling. At the current rating level,
the operating environment (OE) of the countries where the company
has operations does not constrain the ratings, but OE would likely
constrain them in the upper 'BB' range.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within its rating case for the issuer
include:

  - Revenues slightly decrease at year-end March 2019. Then they
    grow at 3% annually on average for 2020-2022;

  - EBITDA margin of 12.3% on average for 2019-2022;

  - Capex of USD40.7 per year in average for 2019-2022;

  - Dividend payment of USD11.1 million and a share premium
    distribution of USD11.3 million during the year-end 2019;

  - Dividend payments equivalent to 25% of net income for 2020-
    2022;

  - Stable portfolio credit quality;

  - Potential inorganic growth in 2020 and 2021.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Positive Rating Action

  -- Diversification of operating subsidiaries in countries with
     lower sovereign risk, consolidated adjusted net leverage
     below 4.0x on a sustained basis, retail-only adjusted net
     leverage below 3.5x on a sustained basis, maintained credit
     quality of the portfolio and significant reduction on its
     current maturities that result in a consistent ratio of cash
     plus CFO-to-short-term debt of 1.0x.

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Negative Rating Action

  -- Deterioration in overdue accounts from the consumer finance
      business, significant reduction in cash flow generation,
      further debt-financed acquisition activity resulting in a
      consolidated adjusted debt to EBITDAR ratio above 5x and/or
      deterioration of liquidity compared with short-term debt.

LIQUIDITY

Adequate Liquidity: As of Sept. 30, 2018, Grupo Unicomer reported
total debt of USD780.7 million, of which USD174 million was
classified as short-term. This level of current debt compares with
USD65 million of cash and marketable securities and USD189 million
of uncommitted undrawn revolving credit facilities.

The company's main source of liquidity is internal cash generation
consisting of positive CFFO. Cash and equivalents of USD65 million
and a short-term net receivables portfolio of USD590.2 million
further support the company's liquidity. The liquidity ratio,
measured as FCF plus cash and marketable securities over short-
term debt, was 0.5x at Sept. 30, 2018; including short-term
account receivables in the calculation increases the ratio to
3.9x.

As of Sept. 30, 2018, Grupo Unicomer's total debt was allocated
45.6% at the holding level (from 35.0% in December 2016), 31.1% at
Unicomer Latin America Co. Ltd., 21.3% at Unicomer Caribbean
Holding Co. Ltd. and the remaining 2.1% at Regal Worldwide Trading
Inc. (RWT; from the previous 12.0%). Unicomer Latin America is a
secondary holding that groups all the subsidiaries in Latin
America, including Central America, Ecuador, Paraguay and
Dominican Republic. Unicomer Caribbean is a secondary holding
company that groups all the subsidiaries in the Caribbean region,
including islands in the Caribbean Sea as well as Belize and
Guyana. RWT is also a secondary holding company dedicated to
managing the franchises and the international trade and logistics
for the group. Certain Grupo Unicomer's subsidiaries guarantee the
holding company senior notes outstanding but the holding companies
do not guarantee their subsidiaries' debt unless very particular
cases arise.

Full List Of Rating Actions

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

Grupo Unicomer Company Limited

  - Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at
    'BB-'; Outlook Stable;

  - Long-Term Local Currency IDR at 'BB-'; Outlook Stable;

  - USD350 million senior notes due 2024 at 'BB-'.



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J A M A I C A
=============


DIGICEL GROUP: Inching Toward Debt-Swap Agreement
-------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that telecom company Digicel Group is edging
toward an accord with some investors to push out a share of its
debt after months of negotiations.

RJR News, The Irish Times, says the company is offering new
secured bonds maturing in 2022 in exchange for $2 billion of
unsecured notes originally due in September 2020.

Digicel disclosed that at least a portion of its investors have
taken up of the offer, the report notes.

Bondholders rejected elements of an exchange plan outlined by
Digicel in August and quickly organized to push for better terms,
the report says.

This month, Digicel extended the deadline for take-up of the offer
to December 18 and sweetened the terms, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
July 5, 2018, Moody's Investors Service changed to negative
from stable the outlook on the ratings of Digicel Group Limited
("Digicel", "DGL" or the "company") and Digicel Limited ("DL") and
assigned a negative outlook to Digicel International Finance
Limited ("DIFL"). At the same time, Moody's has affirmed DGL's B2
corporate family rating (CFR) and B2-PD probability of default
rating (PDR), as well as the B1 rating on the unsecured notes of
DL and the Ba2 rating on the secured bank credit facilities of
DIFL.



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M E X I C O
===========



MEXICO: To Give Minimum Wage Another Boost
------------------------------------------
Anthony Harrup at The Wall Street Journal reports that the Mexican
government, labor and business sectors agreed to raise the minimum
wage by 16.2% in 2019, a third consecutive year of double-digit
increases aimed at restoring the purchasing power of the country's
lowest earners.

The minimum wage will rise to MXN102.68 (US$5.10) a day from 88.36
pesos on Jan. 1, while along the northern border with the U.S. the
minimum daily wage will double to MNX176.72 ($8.80), said Labor
Minister Luisa Maria Alcalde, The Wall Street Journal relays.

Mexicans work longer hours than anyone in an Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development country, but wages are among
the lowest, she said, the report notes.

The report relays that Mexico's minimum wage has for years been
insufficient to pay for the most basic needs.  Few workers in
formal jobs earn that little, although millions are paid somewhere
between one and two times the minimum wage, according to
government data, the report relays.

Moves to raise the wage substantially in recent years prompted
some concerns that it could push up wages across the board,
generating high inflation, the report discloses.  But a 10%
increase in the wage in January 2017, and another 10% increase in
December 2017, didn't extend to other contract wage settlements,
which averaged 4.2% in 2017 and 5.2% in 2018, the report relays.

At MXN102.68 a day, the minimum wage probably won't have reached
the point where it will have a direct impact on all wages, said
David Kaplan, a senior labor specialist at the Inter-American
Development Bank, the report says.

Mexico's low wages were also an issue in this year's negotiations
to redraw the North American Free Trade Agreement, the report
relays.  President Trump saw the wages as unfair competition that
was drawing manufacturers out of the U.S. to Mexico, the report
notes.  Under the trade agreement reached this year, at least 40%
of cars imported duty-free in the region will have to be made by
workers earning at least $16 an hour, which means either in the
U.S. or Canada, the report says.

The decision to double the minimum wage along the border with the
U.S. should help to address high turnover rates at businesses
there and be an incentive for migrants seeking to enter the U.S.
to stay in Mexico, officials said, the report relays.  The impact
on inflation and production costs would be offset by the planned
reduction in value-added-tax and income-tax rates along the
border, said Economy Minister Graciela Marquez, the report
discloses.

President Andres Manuel Lepez Obrador, who took office Dec. 1, is
cutting the salaries of top bureaucrats while promising to raise
the wages of lower-paid public servants by one to 3 percentage
points above inflation next year, the report says.

He welcomed private-sector support for the minimum-wage increase
and said his administration is taking into account the views of
the central bank, "to be careful that it doesn't set off
inflation," the report discloses.

"This is going to help the economy a lot because when people have
more income the domestic market is strengthened," he added, the
report notes.

The Bank of Mexico, in raising interest rates in November, warned
that wage increases that are above gains in productivity are a
risk for inflation, which is currently above the bank's 3% target
at 4.7%, the report adds.



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P U E R T O    R I C O
======================


TSAWD HOLDINGS: Court Grants M.J. Soffe Bid for Summary Judgment
----------------------------------------------------------------
Bankruptcy Judge Mary F. Walrath addressed the cross-motions for
summary judgment filed by Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB and
M.J. Soffe, LLC, as well as Soffe's motion for summary judgment
against Debtors TSAWD Holdings Inc. in the case captioned TSA
STORES, INC., TSA PONCE, INC., and TSA CARIBE, INC., Plaintiffs,
and WILMINGTON SAVINGS FUND SOCIETY, FSB, AS SUCCESSOR
ADMINISTRATIVE AND COLLATERAL Plaintiff-Intervenor/Counterclaim
Defendant, v. M J SOFFE, LLC a/k/a M.J. SOFFE, LLC,
Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff, Adv. No. 16-50364(MFW) (Bankr.
D. Del.)

The dispute is which party has priority in the inventory (and its
proceeds) sold by Soffe to the Debtors on consignment. Because the
Court finds that WSFS did not have actual knowledge of Soffe's
consignment interest until after Soffe filed a UCC-1 financing
statement on Feb. 4, 2016, the Court grants WSFS's motion and deny
Soffe's motion with respect to goods sold before that date. In
light of that ruling and certain concessions of the parties, the
Court grants Soffe's motion for summary judgment against the
Debtors, as the Debtors' preference and strong arm claims are now
moot.

WSFS argued that Article 9 of the UCC governs the priority of the
competing interests in the Disputed Goods. It contended that its
interest is superior to Soffe's interest in the Disputed Goods
delivered prior to February 4, 2016, because its financing
statement was filed first. N.Y. U.C.C. section 9-322(a)(1). Soffe
responds that Article 9 does not apply to its interest because BOA
had actual knowledge of its consignment interest and that
knowledge is imputed to the Term Loan Lenders.

In this case, the Court finds that Soffe's evidence is
insufficient to establish that Bank of America, N.A. (BOA), as the
Term Loan Agent, had actual knowledge of Soffe's consignment
relationship with the Debtors. At most Soffe sought to show that
Hipsman, a BOA Vice-President in the Business Capital Group, knew
that Soffe sold goods on consignment to the Debtors. However,
Hipsman and the Business Capital Group played no role in
administering the Debtors' Term Loan Agreement. The latter was
handled by distinct BOA departments, the Wholesale Leveraged
Finance Unit and the Agency Management Team. Therefore, there is
no basis for finding that any knowledge Hipsman may have acquired
was actually known to BOA in its capacity as the Term Loan Agent.

Because the Court finds that Soffe has failed to establish that
BOA had actual knowledge of its consignment relationship with the
Debtors or that it could be imputed to the Term Loan Lenders, the
Court concludes that the relative interests of Soffe and the Term
Loan Lenders are governed by Article 9 of the UCC.

Soffe also asked the Court to grant summary judgment and dismiss
the Debtors' preference and strong arm claims.

With regard to the Debtors' preference claim, Soffe argued that it
filed its UCC-1 to protect its consignment interest in the
$580,207.53 worth of goods that it shipped to the Debtors after
filing its UCC-1, not to protect the consigned goods it shipped to
the Debtors prior to the UCC-1. Soffe, therefore, argued that its
UCC-1 filing cannot constitute a preference because it was not a
transfer on account of an antecedent debt. 11 U.S.C. section
547(b)(2).

The Debtors do not dispute that Soffe has a perfected security
interest in goods delivered to the Debtors after the UCC-1 was
filed. The Debtors argue only that if Soffe is asserting a
perfected security interest in the consigned goods delivered to
the Debtors before it filed the UCC-1, then that claim is
avoidable as a preference.

Because the Debtors concede that Soffe is perfected as to goods
delivered after the UCC-1 was filed, the Court concludes that the
Debtors' preference claim is moot. The Court further concludes
that the Debtors' strong arm claim against Soffe is also moot
given the Court's earlier conclusion that WSFS has an interest
superior to Soffe's interest in the Disputed Goods delivered
before Soffe's UCC-1 filing.  Accordingly, the Court grants
Soffe's motion forsummary judgment and dismisses the Debtors'
claims as moot.

A copy of the Court's Opinion dated Nov. 26, 2018 is available at
https://bit.ly/2Lg3n30 from Leagle.com.

TSA Stores, Inc., TSA Ponce, Inc. & TSA Caribe, Inc., Plaintiffs,
represented by Andrew L. Magaziner -- amagaziner@ycst.com -- Young
Conaway Stargatt & Taylor, LLP & Michael S. Neiburg --
mneiburg@ycst.com -- Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor, LLP.

M J Soffe, LLC, aka, Defendant, represented by Amy D. Brown --
abrown@gsbblaw.com -- Gellert Scali Busenkell & Brown, Michael G.
Busenkell -- mbusenkell@gsbblaw.com -- Gellert Scali Busenkell &
Brown, LLC, R. Stephen McNeill -- rmcneill@potteranderson.com --
Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP, Jeremy William Ryan --
jryan@potteranderson.com -- Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP, John A.
Sensing -- jsensing@potteranderson.com -- Potter Anderson &
Corroon LLP & Etta Ren Wolfe -- ewolfe@potteranderson.com --
Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP.

Kurtzman Carson Consultants LLC, Claims Agent, represented by
Albert Kass, Kurtzman Carson Consultants, LLC.

Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, as Successor Administrative
and Collateral Agent, Intervenor-Plaintiff, represented by Daniel
B. Butz -- dbutz@mnat.com -- Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell.

Kurtzman Carson Consultants LLC, Claims Agent, represented by
Albert Kass , Kurtzman Carson Consultants, LLC.  Wilmington
Savings Fund Society, FSB, as Successor Administrative and
Collateral Agent, Intervenor-Plaintiff, represented by Daniel B.
Butz, Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell.

M J Soffe, LLC, Counter-Claimant, represented by Amy D. Brown,
Gellert Scali Busenkell & Brown, Michael G. Busenkell, Gellert
Scali Busenkell & Brown, LLC, R. Stephen McNeill, Potter Anderson
& Corroon LLP, Jeremy William Ryan, Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP
& John A. Sensing, Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP.

                      About TSAWD Holdings

TSAWD Holdings Inc., formerly known as Sports Authority Holdings,
and its affiliates are sporting goods retailers with roots dating
back to 1928.  The Debtors currently operate 464 stores and five
distribution centers across 40 U.S. states and Puerto Rico.  The
Debtors offer a broad selection of goods from a wide array of
household and specialty brands, including Adidas, Asics, Brooks,
Columbia, FitBit, Hanesbrands, Icon Health and Fitness, Nike, The
North Face, and Under Armour, in addition to their own private
label brands.  The Debtors employ 13,000 people.

TSAWD and six of its affiliates filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy
petitions (Bankr. D. Del. Case Nos. 16-10527 to 16-10533) on March
2, 2016.  The petitions were signed by Michael E. Foss as chairman
and chief executive officer.

The Debtors have engaged Robert A. Klyman, Esq., Matthew J.
Williams, Esq., Jeremy L. Graves, Esq., and Sabina Jacobs, Esq.,
at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP as general counsel; Michael R.
Nestor, Esq., Kenneth J. Enos, Esq., and Andrew L. Magaziner,
Esq., at Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor, LLP as co-counsel;
Rothschild Inc. as investment banker; FTI Consulting, Inc., as
financial advisor; and Kurtzman Carson Consultants LLC as notice,
claims, solicitation, balloting and tabulation agent.

Andrew Vara, Acting U.S. trustee for Region 3, appointed seven
creditors of Sports Authority Holdings Inc. to serve on the
official committee of unsecured creditors.  Lawyers at Pachulski
Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP represent the Official Committee of
Unsecured Creditors.

                         *     *     *

In May 2016, the Delaware Court allowed Sports Authority to
proceed with the liquidation of all of its roughly 450 stores
across the country after the Debtors resolved or beat out about
100 objections to the sale.  Judge Mary F. Walrath approved an
agreement for a joint venture of Gordon Brothers Retail Partners
LLC, Hilco Merchant Resources LLC and Tiger Capital Group LLC to
conduct going out of business sales.  The Joint Venture won an
auction for the Debtors' inventory.  The Debtors failed to obtain
a winning going-concern bid at a May 17, 2016 auction.

In July 2016, Judge Walrath approved the sale of the Debtors'
intellectual property and more than two dozens of property leases
to Dick's Sporting Goods Inc.  Dick's bid was reportedly for $15
million.


TSAWD HOLDINGS: PAC Wins Summary Judgment Bid vs WSF
----------------------------------------------------
Bankruptcy Judge Mary F. Walrath granted Defendant Performance
Apparel Corporation's motion for summary judgment and denied
Plaintiff-Intervenor Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB's motion
for summary judgment in the case captioned TSA STORES, INC., TSA
PONCE, INC., and TSA CARIBE, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, and
WILMINGTON SAVINGS FUND SOCIETY, FSB, AS SUCCESSOR ADMINISTRATIVE
AND COLLATERAL AGENT, Plaintiff-Intervenor Counterclaim Defendant.
v. PERFORMANCE APPAREL CORP. a/k/a HOT CHILLY'S, INC.,
Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff, Adv. No. 16-50317 (MFW) (Bankr.
D. Del.).

Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB ("WSFS") sought disgorgement
of proceeds from certain goods sold on consignment. Defendant
Performance Apparel Corporation ("PAC") contended it is entitled
to keep the proceeds because WSFS's actual knowledge of the
consignment relationship between PAC and the Debtors precludes
WSFS from claiming a superior interest in goods that PAC sold to
the Debtors on consignment. The Court agrees with PAC and finds
that WSFS had actual knowledge of PAC's consignment interest which
precludes it from obtaining a superior interest in the consigned
goods.

In its motion for summary judgment, WSFS argued that it has a
perfected security interest under the Uniform Commercial Code
("UCC") that is superior to the security interest asserted by PAC
because PAC allowed its 2009 UCC-1 financing statement to lapse,
thereby resulting in its interest becoming unperfected.

PAC argued that notwithstanding the lapse of its UCC security
interest, WSFS cannot assert its rights are superior to PAC. PAC
argued that its consignment rights are not subject to the filing
requirements and priorities of the UCC at all, because the Term
Loan Lenders had actual knowledge of PAC's consignment arrangement
with the Debtors before the Term Loan was extended.

The Court holds that the UCC is to be liberally construed to
promote its underlying purposes. The purpose underlying the UCC
provisions with respect to priority of consignment interests is to
protect other creditors from hidden liens. If the Term Loan
Lenders had actual knowledge of PAC's consignment interests at the
time the Term Loan was granted, they could not have been misled by
any "hidden" lien. Requiring PAC to give them "constructive"
notice, when they already had actual notice, would be to elevate
form over substance and would not serve the purposes of the UCC.

Therefore, the Court concludes that if the Term Loan Lenders knew
PAC was a consignor of goods to the Debtors at the time they
extended a loan to the Debtors, it would be absurd to conclude
that PAC had to give constructive notice to them by filing a UCC
continuation form.

The Court also finds that because the Term Loan Agent (and
Lenders) actually knew of PAC's interest in the consigned goods at
the time the Term Loan was extended, the UCC does not determine
their relative priority and the rights of the consignor are
paramount.

Therefore, the Court concludes that PAC's interest in the goods it
consigned to the Debtors is superior to the blanket interests of
the Term Loan Lenders in the Debtors' inventory.

A copy of the Court's Opinion dated Nov. 26, 2018 is available at
https://bit.ly/2EkoAYd from Leagle.com.

TSA Stores, Inc., TSA Ponce, Inc. & TSA Caribe, Inc., Plaintiffs,
represented by Andrew L. Magaziner -- amagaziner@ycst.com -- Young
Conaway Stargatt & Taylor, LLP & Michael S. Neiburg --
mneiburg@ycst.com -- Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor, LLP.

Performance Apparel Corp., Defendant, represented by R. Stephen
McNeill --  rmcneill@potteranderson.com -- Potter Anderson &
Corroon LLP, Edwin J. Rambuski, Law Offices of Edwin J. Rambuski &
John A. Sensing "- jsensing@potteranderson.com -- Potter Anderson
& Corroon LLP.

Kurtzman Carson Consultants LLC, Claims Agent, represented by
Albert Kass, Kurtzman Carson Consultants, LLC.

Performance Apparel Corp a/k/a Hot Chillys, Inc, Counter-Claimant,
represented by R. Stephen McNeill  Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP &
John A. Sensing, Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP.

Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, as successor administrative
and collateral agent, Intervenor-Plaintiff, represented by Daniel
B. Butz -- dbutz@mnat.com -- Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell &
Gregory W. Werkheiser , Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell.

                     About TSAWD Holdings

TSAWD Holdings Inc., formerly known as Sports Authority Holdings,
and its affiliates are sporting goods retailers with roots dating
back to 1928.  The Debtors currently operate 464 stores and five
distribution centers across 40 U.S. states and Puerto Rico.  The
Debtors offer a broad selection of goods from a wide array of
household and specialty brands, including Adidas, Asics, Brooks,
Columbia, FitBit, Hanesbrands, Icon Health and Fitness, Nike, The
North Face, and Under Armour, in addition to their own private
label brands.  The Debtors employ 13,000 people.

TSAWD and six of its affiliates filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy
petitions (Bankr. D. Del. Case Nos. 16-10527 to 16-10533) on March
2, 2016.  The petitions were signed by Michael E. Foss as chairman
and chief executive officer.

The Debtors have engaged Robert A. Klyman, Esq., Matthew J.
Williams, Esq., Jeremy L. Graves, Esq., and Sabina Jacobs, Esq.,
at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP as general counsel; Michael R.
Nestor, Esq., Kenneth J. Enos, Esq., and Andrew L. Magaziner,
Esq., at Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor, LLP as co-counsel;
Rothschild Inc. as investment banker; FTI Consulting, Inc., as
financial advisor; and Kurtzman Carson Consultants LLC as notice,
claims, solicitation, balloting and tabulation agent.

Andrew Vara, Acting U.S. trustee for Region 3, appointed seven
creditors of Sports Authority Holdings Inc. to serve on the
official committee of unsecured creditors.  Lawyers at Pachulski
Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP represent the Official Committee of
Unsecured Creditors.

                         *     *     *

In May 2016, the Delaware Court allowed Sports Authority to
proceed with the liquidation of all of its roughly 450 stores
across the country after the Debtors resolved or beat out about
100 objections to the sale.  Judge Mary F. Walrath approved an
agreement for a joint venture of Gordon Brothers Retail Partners
LLC, Hilco Merchant Resources LLC and Tiger Capital Group LLC to
conduct going out of business sales.  The Joint Venture won an
auction for the Debtors' inventory.  The Debtors failed to obtain
a winning going-concern bid at a May 17, 2016 auction.

In July 2016, Judge Walrath approved the sale of the Debtors'
intellectual property and more than two dozens of property leases
to Dick's Sporting Goods Inc.  Dick's bid was reportedly for $15
million.



===============================
T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O
===============================


TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: PM Urge HDC Tenants to Pay Rent
--------------------------------------------------
Anna Ramdass at Trinidad Express reports that with over $100
million being owed to the Housing Development Corporation (HDC),
Prime Minister Dr Keith Rowley has urged homeowners in public
housing to pay their rent, change their behavior or face eviction.

Speaking at the distribution of housing units for Tower B of the
Vieux Fort housing development in St. James, the Prime Minister
said there are many delinquent persons who are in arrears as he
also disclosed that people have called him complaining about their
neighbors, some of whom are a menace and go as far as to urinate
in corridors of apartment complexes, according to Trinidad
Express.



=============
U R U G U A Y
=============


URUGUAY: Loryser Reaches Agreement With Creditors
-------------------------------------------------
Orosur Mining Inc. discloses that its wholly-owned Uruguayan
subsidiary, Loryser S.A., has reached a payment plan agreement
with creditors in Uruguay.

Loryser has been working diligently to reach a fair and balanced
solution in Uruguay in the interests of all its stakeholders. In
parallel with ongoing discussions with third parties, Loryser has
negotiated and reached an agreement with the majority of its
creditors.

The Agreement contemplates that net proceeds from the sale of
Loryser's assets in Uruguay together with the issuance of 10
million common shares of Orosur shall fully satisfy all amounts
owing to Loryser's creditors as well as provide funds for Loryser
to conduct this process and close operation responsibly. As
contemplated by the Agreement, Loryser would manage the process,
to be completed within two years. The issuance of common shares of
Orosur is subject to approval of the Toronto Stock Exchange.

Loryser contacted over 90% of the creditors by value, distributed
the Agreement and was successful in obtaining execution of the
Agreement by the majority of its creditors. To date, approximately
68% of the creditors by value have executed the Agreement. Loryser
may continue to receive executed Agreements from additional
creditors. The support level is already above the required simple
majority, being 50% of creditors by value, required to proceed. As
such, on December 17, 2018 Loryser submitted the Agreement to the
Court and the Court cancelled the meeting of creditors.

The Agreement is now subject to consideration by the Court and the
Intervenor, and normal procedures for approval, like public
notice, which the Company expects to conclude in the first half of
2019. Once approved by the Court, the Agreement will be legally
binding for all the creditors and Loryser's creditor protection
status will cease together with Intervenor's control over the
Company.

                    About Orosur Mining

Orosur Mining Inc. (TSX: OMI; AIM: OMI) is a precious metals
developer and explorer focused on identifying and advancing gold
projects in South America. The Company operates in Colombia and
Uruguay.



=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================


VENEZUELA: Sued by Casa Express $34-Mil. Over Unpaid Bonds
----------------------------------------------------------
Brian Ellsworth, citing filing in a U.S. court, Reuters reports
Florida company Casa Express Corp sued Venezuela for $34 million
for defaulting on bonds that matured in 2018 in what may be the
first legal strike by a creditor since the OPEC nation broadly
defaulted on its debt.

Venezuela President Nicolas Maduro stopped making payments on
nearly all bonds issued by Venezuela and state oil company
Petroleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA) this year and has accumulated
some $8 billion in pending interest and principal, according to
Reuters.

Investors had taken few concrete actions in response until a group
of creditors this month demanded payment on a $1.5 billion
defaulted bond -- though they have not yet taken their claim to
court, the report relays.

The Casa Express complaint was filed with U.S. District Court in
Manhattan, noting that the company via a trust of the same name
owns Venezuelan bonds with a face value of $29 million. Venezuela
failed to pay the principal when the bonds matured in August and
also missed two interest payments this year, the complaint noted.
Casa Express is seeking to recoup principal, interest, damages and
legal fees, according to the complaint.

The state of Florida's Division of Corporations shows Casa Express
was created in 2015 and lists its registered agent as Luis
Gamardo, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America,
S&P Global Ratings in May 2018 removed its long- and short-term
local currency sovereign credit ratings on Venezuela from
CreditWatch with negative implications and affirmed them at 'CCC-
/C'. The outlook on the long-term local currency rating is
negative. At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'SD/D' long- and
short-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on Venezuela.
S&P's transfer and convertibility assessment remains at 'CC'.


VENEZUELA: Migrants Raise Regional Fiscal and Political Pressures
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The unprecedented rise in Venezuelan migrants in 2017 and 2018
linked to the country's economic crisis could increase social and
political tensions in neighboring countries, says Fitch Ratings.
The influx of hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans, particularly
in Colombia, could also elevate social expenditures and affect
fiscal consolidation efforts.

The number of Venezuelan asylum seekers, migrants and irregular
border crossers has risen significantly this year as the
deteriorating economic environment has resulted in continued
hyperinflation, economic contraction, social instability, high
unemployment and shortages of basic necessities.  The United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and International
Organization for Migration (IOM - a U.N. agency) estimate that
over 2.6 million Venezuelans currently live outside the country,
out of a total population of just under 32 million.  The U.N.
estimate could be a significant underestimation as it does not
account for migrants with irregular or undocumented status.
Formal asylum seekers have topped 200,000 thus far this year, more
than double all of 2017.

The IOM estimates that a majority of migrants end up in
neighboring South American countries, with Colombia, Peru and
Ecuador.  The U.S. and Spain have been the top destinations
outside the region.

The direct net economic effects of sudden, large-scale immigration
to the aforementioned South American countries will depend on the
economies' ability to absorb individuals into the labor market,
especially in the formal economy. Colombia and Peru have notably
taken steps to formalize the immigration status of large numbers
of migrants, enabling them to work and access social services.

The surge is likely to lead to increased fiscal expenditures as
regional governments face higher demands for healthcare and other
social services.  Some resource reallocation may be possible in
the short term but fiscal consolidation challenges could increase.
In Colombia, medium-term fiscal consolidation goals set by its
fiscal rule could be challenged by the ongoing rising fiscal
pressure related to Venezuelan migration, especially if the
government cannot pass revenue-enhancing reform (currently in
congress).  According to Colombian think tank Fedesarollo, fiscal
costs related to Venezuelan migration could amount between 0.2%
and 0.4% of GDP.  How much international assistance Colombia will
receive to confront these additional costs is unclear.

Direct economic risks to destination countries are likely to be
limited. However, large-scale immigration may increase political
and social tensions, especially if migrants are perceived to be
straining social services and infrastructure. The migration surge
has not yet escalated political risk; if migrant numbers continue
to increase in line with 2018 trends, then the potential for the
issue to become more sensitive will increase. There is little sign
that the Venezuelan economic crisis driving the migration will be
remedied soon, suggesting the potential for significant migration
to continue.  Large-scale sudden migration in other regions of the
world have raised political risks to incumbent governments,
affected election dynamics and policy direction on fundamental
economic issues.

There is no immediately forthcoming national election cycle in the
countries with the largest intake of migrants. Colombia, Peru and
Ecuador will have their next general elections in 2022, 2021 and
2021, respectively. All three governments are in the process of
fiscal consolidation and confronting challenges to varying
degrees. Fitch has cited the improvement in general government
deficit and debt trajectories as an important credit consideration
for all three countries.

In Peru, higher fiscal revenues and the phasing out of
reconstruction efforts following last year's natural disasters are
more relevant for fiscal consolidation efforts. Furthermore,
execution constraints in public infrastructure, especially at the
local government level, could limit the fallout on public finances
from the immigration issue. Colombia's fiscal consolidation
challenges could grow with the immigration issue.  Ecuador faces
also a challenging fiscal consolidation strategy due to a
difficult financing environment. Spending pressures from the
Venezuelan migration could complicate the consolidation strategy
in the coming years.


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2018.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.
.


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