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                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

            Friday, February 8, 2019, Vol. 20, No. 28



BAHIA: Moody's Withdraws Ba3 Issuer Rating for Business Reasons
SAMARCO MINERACAO: To Reboot Creditor Talks After Dam Disaster
STATE OF ALAGOAS: S&P Affirms BB- Global Scale ICR, Outlook Stable
STATKRAFT RENOVAVEIS: Moody's Pulls Ba3 CFR for Business Reasons

D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Agricultural Sector Wants to Declare Emergency
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Supply is 14% Above Demand, ADIE Says


PARAGUAY: Fitch Assigns BB+ Rating to USD500MM Bond due 2050

P U E R T O    R I C O

CHARLOTTE RUSSE: Taps Donlin Recano as Claims Agent

T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O

PETROLEUM CO: Refinery Closure Still Hurting Fishermen


VENEZUELA: Mexico, Uruguay Propose Four-Stage Mechanism for Peace

                            - - - - -


BAHIA: Moody's Withdraws Ba3 Issuer Rating for Business Reasons
Moody's America Latina Ltda., has withdrawn the Ba3/ issuer
ratings assigned to the State of Bahia. Prior to the withdrawal,
the outlook on the rating was stable.

The following ratings were withdrawn:

Issuer: State of Bahia

Issuer Ratings: Ba3 (Global Scale Rating), (National Scale


Moody's has decided to withdraw the ratings for its own business

The last rating action on the State of Bahia was taken on April
10, 2018 when Moody's affirmed the company's ratings at Ba3/,
outlook stable.

SAMARCO MINERACAO: To Reboot Creditor Talks After Dam Disaster
Pablo Rosendo Gonzalez and R.T. Watson at Bloomberg News report
that Samarco Mineracao SA, the Brazilian mining venture that
hasn't operated since a deadly dam collapse in 2015, will seek to
reboot talks with creditors after one of its parent companies
suffered an even worse disaster at its own site, according to
people involved in the discussions.

Last month's deadly accident at a Vale SA tailings dam in Minas
Gerais state has upended the outlook for Samarco, which is jointly
owned by Vale and BHP Group Ltd, according to Bloomberg News.
While Samarco and debtholders had been in discussions since late
November, those talks were scrapped and negotiations will restart
from scratch, according to the people who asked not to be
identified because they aren't authorized to discuss the matter
publicly, Bloomberg News says.

With Vale SA's financial outlook imperiled by the latest
catastrophe, creditors can expect Samarco to drive a harder
bargain over the company's $2.2 billion in defaulted bonds and
$3.8 billion in loans and other obligations, Bloomberg News
discloses.  The joint venture and entities it owed money had
reached a preliminary understanding that a debt swap was the best
way to get the company back on its feet, but a final deal hadn't
been reached, the people said, Bloomberg News relays.

After negotiations formally started Nov. 27, the parties, which
exchanged written offers and counter proposals, were still far
from reaching a deal as an end-of-January deadline loomed, the
people said, Bloomberg News notes.

The biggest sticking point was how to treat the funds that Vale
and BHP had injected into Samarco in the wake of the November 2015
dam spill that killed 19 people and polluted waterways, which was
considered Brazil's worst environmental disaster, Bloomberg News
says.  The dispute involves about $908 million in shareholder
debentures and $892 million of cash that shareholders provided to
pay for disaster cleanup and remediation, the people said,
Bloomberg News relates.

Creditors rejected Samarco's offer to treat the injections as
senior or pari-passu debt, Bloomberg News discloses.

On Jan. 24, the parties verbally agreed to a 15-day extension in
order to allow for time to conclude the complicated talks, the
people said. Everything changed, however, when the next day the
second dam belonging to Vale gave way, Bloomberg News notes.  The
company, advised by JPMorgan Chase & Co., called off the
negotiations, Bloomberg News says.

The price of Samarco's $1 billion of notes due in 2022 plunged
more than 30 percent after the accident to about 52 cents on the
dollar, Bloomberg News relays.  They rallied on Jan. 29 after the
company disclosed that it had been holding talks with creditors,
and now trade at 61 cents on optimism that successful negotiations
will allow the company to resume operations, Bloomberg News notes.

The bond's current price is roughly equivalent to the net present
value that creditors will be looking to obtain when the talks
resume, one person close to the creditors said, Bloomberg News
says.  That group includes distressed-debt hedge funds including
Solus Recovery Fund LP, York Total Return LP and Silver Point
Capital Fund LP, who bought claims held by Japanese banks,
according to the people familiar with the talks, Bloomberg News
discloses.  Representatives of the funds didn't immediately reply
to calls and emails seeking comment.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
June 1, 2017, S&P Global Ratings said it affirmed then withdrew
its 'D' (default) issuer and issue-level ratings on Samarco
Mineracao S.A. and its senior unsecured debt at the issuer's

STATE OF ALAGOAS: S&P Affirms BB- Global Scale ICR, Outlook Stable
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its global scale 'BB-' long-term
foreign and local currency issuer credit ratings on the state of
Alagoas. S&P also affirmed its national scale 'brAA+' rating on
the state. The outlook on both scale ratings remains stable.


The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Alagoas will continue
to post surpluses of above 5% of operating revenue, along with
after-capex surpluses, in the next 12 months amid a diminishing
debt burden and cash levels that comfortably cover the state's
debt service.

Downside scenario

S&P said, "We could lower the ratings on Alagoas in the next 12
months if its budgetary performance deteriorates, reflecting
impaired financial management practices; or if contingent
liabilities--stemming from its government-related entities (GREs)-
-materialize beyond our expectation such that they increase
budgetary stress; or if we perceive that the state's liquidity
position has worsened beyond our expectations. We could also
downgrade Alagoas in the next 12 months if we were to lower the
sovereign local and foreign currency ratings."

Upside scenario

Given that S&P doesn't believe Alagoas meets the conditions to
have higher ratings than those on the sovereign, it would only
raise the ratings on the state in the next 12 months if it were to
raise its local and foreign currency ratings on Brazil. That would
also have to be accompanied by a sustained increase in state's
own-source revenue, such that Alagoas would be less dependent on
federal transfers and its budgetary performance less prone to


The 'BB-' global scale ratings on the state of Alagoas reflect its
operating and after-capex surpluses, owing to an experienced
management that has been introducing considerable fiscal changes
since 2015, which S&P expects to continue doing so in the next
four years. The ratings also reflect Alagoas' cash levels that
more than cover its projected debt service for the next 12 months.
On the other hand, Alagoas' creditworthiness suffers from a
socioeconomic profile that's weaker than those of other states in
Brazil, and from still high debt--although declining in relative
terms--due to unfunded pension liabilities.

Governor Renan Filho from the PMDB party was reelected in October
2018 in the first round. Mr. Filho will maintain a broad support
at the state legislature, given that his coalition will continue
to hold a majority. S&P believes this will be pivotal to pass key
pieces of legislation such as downsizing the state payroll as well
as continue strengthening own-revenue collection. The management
has made public accounts transparent and implemented more medium-
term fiscal planning instruments, which S&P assesses as positive
credit factors. More recently, the state completed the framework
to implement compliance policies for the public administration
with the Ministry of Finance.

Nevertheless, Alagoas is among Brazil's poorest states, which
weighs on its creditworthiness. Its estimated GDP per capita was
$4,558 for 2016-2018, and we expect it to reach $4,270 in 2019.
The state's socioeconomic profile is also a rating constraint,
which is weaker than those of domestic peers such as the states of
Minas Gerais and Santa Catarina. Main economic activities are
public administration, tourism, and agriculture (mainly the
production of sugar and alcohol). The latter, which is the second-
largest employer in the state, has been under significant pressure
due to a combination of factors in the recent past, but the
government is currently seeking ways to attract companies in the
sugar industry and harmonize taxes in line with those practiced in
other states. In addition, the state is aiming to diversify its
economy by promoting the chemicals and plastic, ceramics, and
furniture sectors, which are at various stages of development.

S&P said, "We believe that the Brazilian local and regional
governments' (LRGs') institutional framework is volatile and
unbalanced. We believe the system continues to have an adequate
level of predictability and transparency, with enhanced central
government oversight of LRGs' finances and adherence to fiscal
discipline. However, structural rigidities of Brazil's
intergovernmental system have prevented LRGs from reaching
revenue-and-expenditure balance. Overall, our current assessment
draws on our evaluation of an intrinsically rigid
intergovernmental system that has failed to address LRGs'
significant budgetary imbalances and this isn't likely to change
over the short to intermediate term. Therefore, these factors, in
our view, have left LRGs unprepared to address key long-term
spending trends and financing options."

Given its weak and narrow economic base, Alagoas depends heavily
on transfers from the federal government. Historically, more than
half of Alagoas' revenue has come from federal transfers, which
adds volatility to the budgetary performance. However, because of
the current administration's ongoing efforts, own-source revenue
have risen since 2015. S&P's base-case scenario assumes the
administration will continue strengthening tax collection, and it
expects own-source revenue to increase to nearly 53% of operating
revenue by 2021 from 50% in 2015.

S&P said, "Likewise, spending pressures--stemming from weak
economy and considerable infrastructure needs--constrain Alagoas'
budget. In 2019-2021, we estimate the state will spend R$2 billion
-- or close to 8% of total expenditures -- on healthcare,
education, roads, and sanitation. Furthermore, minimum spending
requirements mandated at the national level for healthcare and
education, along with payments of public-servants' salaries and
pensions, will also continue to limit Alagoas' ability to cut
spending. (The state payroll and pensions represent around 60% of
the state's operating spending.) As the state increases its own-
source revenue and controls its expenses, we expect its operating
surplus to average almost 8% of operating revenue in 2019-2021,
while ongoing capex projects will keep after-capex surpluses
around 2.6% of total spending.

"Our base-case scenario assumes the state will finance its capital
spending in the next three years through new and existing
borrowings from public banks and multilateral lending
institutions, funds from the federal government, and own
resources. At the same time, debt repayment should total nearly
R$770 million. We expect Alagoas' debt to decline both in absolute
and relative terms as the state strengthens its revenue base and
requires less borrowings to finance capex. As a result, our base-
case scenario for Alagoas' tax-supported debt assumes that it will
decline to 80% of consolidated operating revenue in 2021 from 104%
at the end of 2018. We incorporate in Alagoas' debt stock the debt
of its development agency, Desenvolve, which we consider as a non-
self-supporting GRE." While Alagoas' debt stock dropped in 2018
resulting from a R$1 billion reduction after a favorable decision
from the Supreme Court following a dispute with the federal
government, the level of unfunded pension liabilities is a risk to
the state's current debt burden. Although the state has recently
created a new pension fund, the level of current liabilities is
likely to require increasing budgetary outlays in the future,
which will elevate budgetary stress.

Alagoas also plans to increase its investments through Casal, a
self-supporting water and sanitation GRE, to expand these services
in the state. The company currently has three public-private
partnership (PPP) for the provision of water, and plans to
establish more PPP projects in the future. The GRE's PPPs are
guaranteed by Casal's future receivables and by a fund managed by
Alagoas Ativos, a company created to manage PPP projects. In
addition to Casal, Alagoas has a self-supporting gas company,
Algas, and Desenvolve. We assess Alagoas' exposure to the
contingent liabilities stemming from these GREs to be less than
10% of its consolidated operating revenue.

S&P said, "Alagoas' net free cash and liquid assets will cover
1.1x of its service in the next 12 months, which we estimate to be
around R$690 million. However, we expect Alagoas' significant
funding needs, stemming from its investments, to dent cash levels.
We assess Alagoas' access to external liquidity as limited. This
assessment incorporates Brazil's Banking Industry Country Risk
Assessment (BICRA) of '6'. Our BICRAs, which evaluate and compare
global banking systems, are grouped on a scale from '1' to '10',
ranging from what we view as the lowest-risk banking systems
(group '1') to the highest-risk (group '10')."

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by
the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and
was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot above.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion.

The chair or designee reviewed the draft report to ensure
consistency with the Committee decision. The views and the
decision of the rating committee are summarized in the above
rationale and outlook. The weighting of all rating factors is
described in the methodology used in this rating action.

  Ratings Affirmed

  Alagoas (State of)
   Issuer Credit Rating
   Global Scale                           BB-/Stable/--
   Brazil National Scale                  brAA+/Stable/--

STATKRAFT RENOVAVEIS: Moody's Pulls Ba3 CFR for Business Reasons
Moody's America Latina Ltda., has withdrawn Statkraft Energias
Renovaveis S.A. Ba3/ corporate family ratings. Prior to the
withdrawal, the outlook on the rating was stable.

The following ratings were withdrawn:

Issuer: Statkraft Energias Renovaveis S.A.

Corporate Family Ratings: Ba3 (Global Scale Rating),
(National Scale Rating)


Moody's has decided to withdraw the ratings for its own business

The last rating action on Statkraft Renovaveis was taken on
November 1, 2018 when Moody's affirmed the company's ratings at
Ba3/, outlook stable.

Statkraft Renovaveis is owned 81.31% by Statkraft Investimentos
Ltda. and 18.69% by the pension fund Fundacao dos Economiarios
Federais. Statkraft Investimentos Ltda. is a holding company
controlled by the Norwegian company Statkraft AS (Baa1, stable).
Statkraft Renovaveis holds interests in 22 power plants in Brazil,
being 18 hydropower plans and 4 onshore wind farms, with a total
installed capacity of 927 MW (or the equivalent to 450 MW in
proportion to Statkraft Renovaveis 's stake). In the last twelve
months ended on September 30, 2018, Statkraft Renovaveis posted a
net income of BRL76 million on consolidated revenues of BRL338

D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Agricultural Sector Wants to Declare Emergency
Dominican Today reports that the agricultural producers of the
Dominican Republic will formally request the Government to declare
the emergency in the areas most affected by the drought, where the
crops are drying up, and the livestock has begun to die, after
months without rain to alleviate the agostamiento of the field.

This was confirmed by Efe, the president of the National
Confederation of Agricultural Producers (Confenagro), Eric Rivero,
who pointed out that this formal request will be made to the
authorities, given the situation suffered by the northern and
southern regions but, on all, the northwest line, according to
Dominican Today.

The report notes Mr. Rivero described the situation as "terrible"
for a region where most municipalities are agricultural producers,
"everything is drying up," crops are being lost, among them, those
of organic bananas, one of the main items exported, although at
the moment it does not count on figures of economic losses.

Also, between 150 and 200 head of cattle have already died, and
milk production in populations such as Santiago Rodriguez, which
represented 120 million pesos per month (about 2.4 million
dollars), has been reduced to 35% of what it is usual, explained
the president of Confenagro, the report says.

Seeing the conditions in which the field is "heartbreaking," they
are experiencing "very difficult" moments, he said, the report
relays.  Hence they will request an emergency declaration in the
most affected areas, as the measures that have been put in place
by Government are not enough to alleviate the situation, the
report discloses.

The authorities launched an emergency plan on the northwest line
last Sunday that includes measures such as the delivery of food
rations in the communities most in need, the distribution of
molasses to feed livestock, and the shipment of tankers to supply
water to the population and agricultural producers, the report

However, Mr. Rivero considers these and other actions insufficient
and draws attention to the fact that, although it is the most
affected, not only does the Northwest line need help, also in the
south and in the north, they are suffering the consequences of
lack of rainfall, the report relays.

For starters, it would take more trucks carrying water, more sugar
cane for livestock, and more facilities for small producers, for
whom "it is difficult to transport what is necessary to save the
cows," he said, the report notes.

He also noted that the state's investment in the construction of
dams and aqueducts "has been paralyzed" in recent years, and is
considered necessary to create more infrastructure for the
collection of water, something that would not only help to
alleviate the drought but would improve the problem of lack of
electrical power, he said, the report says.

The National Office of Meteorology (Onamet) declared a state of
drought in the south, southwest and northwest regions of the
country due to the continuous deficit of rains in these areas, the
report relays.

From January to November 2018, there was a drought classified as
weak to severe; and in December the country had a general balance
of rainfall, 58.2% lower than average values, the report notes.

The situation continued in January, a month in which 84% of the
measurement stations analyzed showed some degree of drought, with
the most alarming negative balances being those of the southwest
(-98.3%), Northwest (-85.8%) and south of the country (79.4%),
the report discloses.

The report relays that an additional problem, and derived from the
lack of water, is the presence of a plague of the pine beetle (Ips
calligraphus) in the Sierra de la Cuenca del Rio Yaque del Norte,
an area that is suffering the most intense drought it has
sustained on record.

This insect lodges under the bark of the tree and dries it
quickly, especially during periods of prolonged droughts, when the
trees are weak and can not produce resin to defend themselves, so
that, although it is also acting to end the plague, the lack of
water also endangers one of the most important natural areas of
the country, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Sept. 24, 2018, Fitch Ratings affirmed Dominican Republic's
Long-Term, Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB-'
with a Stable Outlook.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Supply is 14% Above Demand, ADIE Says
Dominican Today reports that 2019 begins with a 14% surplus on the
electricity supplied, according to the Dominican Electrical
Industry Association (ADIE).

In the first 36 days this year, 1,639 GWh of electricity was
consumed by the system for which the ADIE reiterates the power
companies' capacity to supply the demand of the distributors,
according to Dominican Today.

"For the period from January 1 to February 5, the availability of
energy represented 1,873.3 GWh. while the electricity consumed in
the system reached 1,639 GWh," ADIE said, the report relays.

The ADIE, citing information by the National Electric System
Coordinating Body, added that the reserve, the energy that the
power companies supplied but not required by the distributors, was
234.4 GWh, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Sept. 24, 2018, Fitch Ratings affirmed Dominican Republic's
Long-Term, Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB-'
with a Stable Outlook.


PARAGUAY: Fitch Assigns BB+ Rating to USD500MM Bond due 2050
Fitch Ratings has assigned a 'BB+' rating to Paraguay's USD500
million bond, with final maturity in 2050. The bond has a coupon
of 5.4%.

Proceeds from the issuance will be used for capital expenditures
and to refinance a portion of outstanding debt.


The bond rating is in line with Paraguay's Long-Term Foreign-
Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) of 'BB+'.


The bond would be sensitive to any changes in Paraguay's Long-Term
Foreign Currency IDR. Fitch upgraded Paraguay's Long-Term Foreign
Currency IDR to 'BB+' from 'BB' and revised the Rating Outlook to
Stable from Positive on Dec. 11, 2018.

P U E R T O    R I C O

CHARLOTTE RUSSE: Taps Donlin Recano as Claims Agent
Charlotte Russe Holding, Inc., received approval from the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware to hire Donlin,
Recano & Company, Inc., as its claims and noticing agent.

The firm will oversee the distribution of notices and the
maintenance, processing and docketing of proofs of claim filed in
the Chapter 11 cases of the company and its affiliates.

The firm's hourly rates for professional services are:

     Executive Staff                        No charge
     Senior Bankruptcy Consultant          $117 - $149
     Case Manager                           $81 - $117
     Technology/Programming Consultant      $54 - $90
     Consultant/Analyst                     $45 - $72
     Clerical                               $22 - $41

Prior to the Debtor's bankruptcy filing, Donlin received a
of $25,000.

Donlin is "disinterested" as defined in Section 101(14) of the
Bankruptcy Code, according to court filings.

The firm can be reached through:

     Nellwyn Voorhies
     Donlin, Recano & Company, Inc.
     6201 15th Avenue,
     Brooklyn, NY 11219
     Phone: 212.481.1411

                About Charlotte Russe Holding Inc.

Charlotte Russe Holding, Inc. -- -
- is a specialty fashion retailer of young women's apparel and
accessories comprised of seven entities.  The company and its
affiliates are headquartered in San Diego, California and have one
distribution center located in Ontario, California.  In addition,
the companies lease office space in Los Angeles, California and
San Francisco, California, where they primarily conduct
merchandising, marketing, e-commerce and technology functions.

The companies sell their merchandise to customers in the
contiguous 48 states, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico through their online
store and 512 Charlotte Russe brick-and-mortar stores located in
various regional malls, outlet centers, and lifestyle centers.
The bulk of the companies' apparel and accessory products are sold
under the Charlotte Russe brand with ancillary brands for denim
and perfume (Refuge), young women's plus-size apparel (Charlotte
Russe Plus), and cosmetics (Charlotte by Charlotte Russe).

Charlotte Russe Holding and its affiliates sought protection under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. D. Del. Case Nos.
19-10210 to 19-10216) on Feb. 3, 2019.

At the time of the filing, Charlotte Russe Holding had estimated
assets of $100 million to $500 million and liabilities of $100
million to $500 million.

The cases are assigned to Judge Laurie Selber Silverstein.

The Debtors tapped Bayard, P.A. and Cooley LLP as their bankruptcy
counsel; Guggenheim Securities, LLC as their investment banker;
A&G Realty Partners, LLC as lease disposition consultant and
business broker; Gordon Brothers Retail Partners LLC, Hilco
Merchant Resources LLC and Malfitano Advisors, LLC as liquidation
consultant; and Donlin, Recano & Company, Inc. as claims and
noticing agent.

T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O

PETROLEUM CO: Refinery Closure Still Hurting Fishermen
Trinidad Express reports that local fishermen may have a long wait
before their fuel woes end.  Energy Minister Franklin Khan told
Express Business that until government finds a partner for the
Pointe-a-Pierre oil refinery and refining operations reopen,
fishermen will have to "rally" with using super gasoline for their
boats, according to Trinidad Express.

Before the closure of the refinery, regular gasoline was widely
used by fishermen because it was cheap, the report notes.

Following the closure of State-owned Petroleum Co. of
Trinidad & Tobago (Petrotrin)'s oil refinery in November last
year, the last stocks of regular gas were distributed by December
7, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Sept. 28, 2018, Moody's Investors Service placed Petroleum Co. of
Trinidad & Tobago's B1 corporate family rating and senior
unsecured debt ratings on review for downgrade. This rating action
was based on the lack of clarity regarding Petrotrin's new
business profile and strategy as well as increasing liquidity risk
related to the approaching maturity of the 2019 bonds.


VENEZUELA: Mexico, Uruguay Propose Four-Stage Mechanism for Peace
EFE News reports that Mexico and Uruguay in Montevideo proposed
the so-called "Montevideo Mechanism," a four-stage process
consisting of immediate dialogue, negotiation, commitments and
implementation to achieve peace in Venezuela.

"We're proposing the Montevideo Mechanism as per our legitimate
interest and readiness to contribute to helping the Venezuelan
people and the involved actors find a solution to their
differences," the two nations said in a joint communique backed by
the Caribbean Community (Caricom), according to EFE News.

If Venezuela's elected government, headed by President Nicolas
Maduro, and the opposition -- unified behind the figure of self-
proclaimed interim President Juan Guaido -- agree to dialogue in
accord with this plan, the head of the Ibero-American General
Secretariat (Segib), Rebeca Grynspan, former Uruguayan Foreign
Minister Enrique Iglesias and former Mexican Foreign Secretary
Bernardo Sepulveda would be invited to accompany the process, the
report relays.

In addition, a top Caricom representative and "figures of
recognized international experience and moral quality" would also
be called upon to participate, EFE says.

In that regard, the tripartite initiative is being established as
a "peaceful and democratic alternative that favors dialogue and
peace to foster the necessary conditions for a comprehensive and
lasting solution," the report discloses.

According to the proposal, the first phase -- that of immediate
dialogue -- is designed to generate the conditions for direct
contact among the involved actors "within a secure environment,"
the report notes.

Immediately thereafter, the process would move to the negotiation
phase where a "strategic presentation of the results of the
dialogue phase" would be made to the parties in which points in
common and areas of opportunity would be sought to make their
positions more flexible and identify potential areas of agreement,
the report says.

The third phase, that of commitment, would consist of constructing
and signing the agreement based on the results of the previous
phase, the report notes.

Finally, the implementation phase would be undertaken with
international monitoring and support, the report relays.

Although Mexico and Uruguay, along with the Caricom countries,
recognize "the level of complexity and the circumstances" in
Venezuela, they also said in the document that they feel this is
"no reason to reject diplomatic routes to the solution of
controversies," the report notes.

In addition, they reiterated their concern over the serious
humanitarian situation in Venezuelan and "respectfully" urged the
parties to guarantee the preservation of human rights, the report

Uruguayan President Tabare Vazquez and his foreign minister,
Rodolfo Nin Novoa, met in Montevideo with Mexican Foreign
Secretary Marcelo Ebrard to discuss the Venezuelan crisis, the
report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America,
S&P Global Ratings in May 2018 removed its long- and short-term
local currency sovereign credit ratings on Venezuela from
CreditWatch with negative implications and affirmed them at
'CCC-/C'. The outlook on the long-term local currency rating is
negative. At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'SD/D' long- and
short-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on Venezuela.
S&P's transfer and convertibility assessment remains at 'CC'.


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2019.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.

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