TCRLA_Public/190530.mbx        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                 L A T I N   A M E R I C A

          Thursday, May 30, 2019, Vol. 20, No. 108

                           Headlines



A N T I G U A   A N D   B A R B U D A

LIAT: PM Browne Defends Position in Airline


B R A Z I L

BRAZIL: Sluggish Economic Recovery is Underway, IMF Says
CIELO SA: Moody's Rates New BRL3-Bil. Debentures 'Ba1/Aaa.br'
MARANHAO: Fitch Affirms LongTerm BB- IDRs, Outlook Stable


C O L O M B I A

BANCOLOMBIA SA: Moody's Assigns ba1 Baseline Credit Assessment


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Chinese Chamber to Probe 'Unfair' Competition


E L   S A L V A D O R

EL SALVADOR: Inflation Expected to Remain at 1% in 2019, IMF Says


G U A T E M A L A

GUATEMALA: Fitch Rates 2030 & 2050 USD Bonds 'BB'


J A M A I C A

FLY JAMAICA: In Talks With Prospective Purchasers
JAMAICA: Cabinet Approves Fourth MTF for Vision 2030


P E R U

FERREYCORP SAA: S&P Withdraws 'BB+' Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating


P U E R T O   R I C O

AMERILIFE GROUP: Moody's Affirms B3 CFR & Alters Outlook to Stable
AMERILIFE GROUP: S&P Alters Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'B' ICR
CARLOS ROBLES: Amends Treatment of Oriental Bank's Claims


V E N E Z U E L A

PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: Tankers to Be Detained for Lack of Payment

                           - - - - -


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A N T I G U A   A N D   B A R B U D A
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LIAT: PM Browne Defends Position in Airline
-------------------------------------------
The Daily Observer reports that Antigua Prime Minister Gaston
Browne has declared that issues surrounding LIAT Ltd. are of
regional interest and are not private matters or solely for
shareholder governments.

Browne made these comments recently on a public platform following
statements by Barbadian Prime Minister Mia Mottley that her Cabinet
is yet to decide the future of its relationship with the
cash-strapped carrier, according to The Daily Observer.

This was a week after PM Browne disclosed that the Barbados leader
has agreed to sell all but 10 percent of her country's 49 percent
share in LIAT, the report notes.

Browne's view is that everyone should be concerned about the fate
of the regional carrier, the report says.

"Placing LIAT on the path of viability and sustainability is not
for private discussion.  You're talking about an airline that is
owned by several Caribbean countries, one in which we utilized
taxpayer's money to invest in LIAT and when it comes to public
funds, I believe we all have an obligation," the report quoted
Prime Minister Browne as saying.

"I have tried my best to be accountable to the people of Antigua &
Barbuda and I make no apologies about it," he added.

Prime Minister Browne said he does not believe that he spoke out of
turn about the current talks between himself and Prime Minister
Mottley as it is his role as leader of the country to sensitize his
citizens on matters concerning the nation, the report says.

Prime Minister Browne defended his position, saying that other
information in the letter was never disclosed, as negotiations are
ongoing, the report notes.

He stated that the public was only informed about a letter dated
May 16, 2019, in which Mottley indicated a willingness to divest
some of Barbados's shares, the report relays.

Prime Minister Browne gave insight into his plans for LIAT, which
include reducing the carrier's expenses, the report relays.  He
added further that the government is making provisions for the
expansion of LIAT and will be making use of the old VC Bird
terminal building, the report adds.

With regards to raising revenue, he said measures will be put in
place to ensure that LIAT will no longer be porous with losses, the
report adds.

                           About LIAT

LIAT Ltd., formerly known as Leeward Islands Air Transport or LIAT,
is an airline headquartered on the grounds of V. C. Bird
International Airport in Antigua.  It operates high-frequency
inter-island scheduled services serving 15 destinations in the
Caribbean.  The airline's main base is VC Bird International
Airport, Antigua and Barbuda, with bases at Grantley Adams
International Airport, Barbados and Piarco International Airport,
Trinidad and Tobago.

The airline is owned by seven Caribbean governments, with three
being the major shareholders: Barbados, Antigua & Barbuda and St.
Vincent and the Grenadines along with Dominica(94.7 %); other
Caribbean governments, private shareholders and employees (5.3%).

In the last few years, LIAT has been challenged with financial
difficulties, often needing additional funding as the airline dealt
with the high cost of operations.  In November 2016, the Barbados
government defended LIAT's operations, even as opposition
legislators called for a cessation of the business.  In early 2015,
LIAT offered early retirement packages to employees in efforts to
downsize.  In 2014, LIAT knew it had to deal with unprofitable
routes to make operations viable.  In the third quarter of 2013,
the airline's top management was shaken, with news Chief Executive
Officer Captain Ian Brunton's sudden resignation.

LIAT's current chief executive officer is Julie Reifer-Jones,
chairman is Jean Holder, and chief financial officer is Rojer
Inglis.

Dr. Ralph Gonsalves, prime minister of St. Vincent & the
Grenadines, serves as chairman of LIAT shareholders.




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B R A Z I L
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BRAZIL: Sluggish Economic Recovery is Underway, IMF Says
--------------------------------------------------------
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) staff released a Mission
Concluding Statement on its preliminary findings on Brazil on May
24, 2019. The views expressed in the statement are those of the IMF
staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF's
Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of the mission,
staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval,
will be presented to the IMF Executive Board for discussion and
decision.

The Statement notes that a sluggish recovery for Brazil is
underway, constrained by subdued aggregate demand and lackluster
productivity.  A robust social security reform and additional
fiscal measures are necessary to put public debt on a sustainable
trajectory, thereby boosting investor confidence. The mission
welcomes the government's ambitious reform agenda which includes
pension reform, privatization, trade openness, tax reform, and
reducing state intervention in credit markets. These reforms are
essential to boost potential growth. The monetary stance is
appropriately supportive at present.

1. The recovery remains sluggish. After contracting by almost 7
percent during the 2015-16 recession, real GDP grew by only 1.1
percent per year in 2017 and 2018. Short-term indicators show that
weakness persisted in Q1. Investment remains subdued, held back by
large spare capacity and lingering uncertainty about the prospects
for fiscal and structural reforms. Weak global growth and the
recession in Argentina are holding back exports. Growth in 2019 is
projected between 1 and 1.5 percent with significant downside
risks. Conditional on the approval of a robust pension reform and
favorable financial conditions, growth is expected to accelerate in
2020, supported by a recovery in private investment.

2. The fiscal stance was broadly neutral in 2018. In 2018, the
nonfinancial public sector primary balance improved marginally to
- 1.7 percent of GDP and the structural fiscal stance was neutral.
The current budget may entail a slight relaxation of the fiscal
stance in 2019. Compliance with the expenditure ceiling in the
following years depends on the approval of the pension reform and
other consolidation measures.

3. Monetary policy is supportive. The central bank has held the
policy rate at the historic low of 6.5 percent since March 2018,
providing the economy with some monetary stimulus. Headline
inflation is around the 4.25 inflation target for 2019, while core
inflation is more muted. Inflation expectations are anchored around
target.

4. Credit growth has been subdued. Lending by public banks has been
declining, driven primarily by reduced funding available to BNDES
development bank. Credit from private banks has grown instead at
around 8 percent in real terms over the past year, leading to a
moderate growth of overall bank lending. The reduction of the role
of public banks in favor of market-based credit allocation is a
welcome structural transformation. However, intermediation margins
in the banking sector remain high, hindering credit demand and
investment. The financial system is well capitalized.

5. Brazil's external position remains strong. The current account
deficit widened to 0.8 percent of GDP in 2018 and is projected to
deteriorate to 1.5 percent of GDP in 2019 mostly because of one-off
operations related to the energy sector and the recession in
Argentina. However, Brazil's external position is strong thanks to
a large amount of reserves, a flexible exchange rate, and a
contained current account deficit fully financed by large FDI
inflows.

6. The improvement in social conditions has stalled in recent
years. The unemployment rate declined only marginally in 2018,
remaining high compared to pre-crisis levels, along with informal
labor and underemployment. Despite the economic recovery, income
inequality and the number of people living in poverty increased in
2017.

7. Domestic and external shocks could derail the recovery. The main
domestic risk is the failure to approve a robust pension reform. In
addition, other fiscal measures are necessary to comply with the
expenditure ceiling and put debt on a sustainable trajectory.

Failure to undertake fiscal consolidation could undermine
confidence and deter investment. External risks include a deepening
of the recession in Argentina and global trade tensions.

             Decisive Policy Action is Needed

8. Historically low growth, high public debt, and pervasive
inequality call for a bold reform agenda. Since 1980, economic
growth in Brazil has averaged 2.5 percent, well below peer
countries. At 88 percent of GDP, public debt is one of the largest
among emerging markets. Furthermore, debt continues to grow and is
projected to peak only in 2024, conditional on continued fiscal
consolidation. Despite remarkable improvements in previous years,
inequality and poverty have increased since the 2015/16 recession
and remain high by international standards. To tackle these
challenges, the new government has rightly emphasized bold reforms
with the overarching goals of unleashing growth potential and
achieving fiscal consolidation, while its pension reform proposal
would contribute to reducing inequalities.

                   Fiscal Consolidation

9. Pension reform is the crucial step. The ambitious pension reform
proposal under consideration by congress would stabilize pension
spending over the next decade and make the system more equitable.
To deliver the needed fiscal adjustment, Congress should preserve
the proposed increase in retirement ages and decrease in the
relatively high benefits, particularly for public sector
employees.

10. But additional measures beyond the pension reform are needed to
comply with the expenditure ceiling and stabilize debt . The
government should preserve a neutral fiscal stance in 2019.
Furthermore, to comply with the constitutional expenditure ceiling
in outer years, the government should lower the public wage bill
(which would also make earnings more equitable relative to private
employees) and reduce other current expenditures, including by
limiting minimum wage increases to cost of living adjustments since
they also affect the growth of pensions and other benefits. Given
the high level of debt, windfall revenue from oil -- including
proceeds from the upcoming Transfer of Rights transaction -- should
be used exclusively to lower debt. While pursuing fiscal
consolidation, it is critical to protect effective social programs,
including Bolsa Familia, and support public investment, both
essential for sustained and inclusive growth.

11. The overly complicated and distortive tax system should be
reformed . An ambitious tax reform is necessary to eliminate
multiple indirect taxes by moving toward a single broad-based VAT,
harmonize the fragmented federal and state tax regimes, and remove
distortionary and costly tax exemptions. Efforts to strengthen
revenue administration should continue.

12. The fiscal framework should be enhanced. To ensure the quality
of fiscal adjustment, the authorities should address budget
rigidities, including revenue earmarking, mandatory expenditure,
and the indexation of key spending items. In addition, to
facilitate the prolonged adjustment implied by the expenditure
ceiling, the government should move toward a medium-term budget
framework.

13. Fiscal risks for some states loom large. Governors of seven
states have declared a state of calamity facing severe fiscal
challenges. Of these, Rio de Janeiro has negotiated a fiscal
recovery program with the federal government. Other states might
also receive temporary relief if they implement fiscal
consolidation measures under a program being considered by the
authorities. But deeper structural measures, including pension and
tax reforms, are essential to restore the medium-term
sustainability of subnational governments.

                         Monetary Policy

14. The monetary stance should remain accommodative, given the
large output gap and anchored inflation expectations . The monetary
stance is appropriately supportive at present. In the future, to
the extent that fiscal consolidation is contractionary, there is
scope to loosen further monetary policy provided inflation
expectations remain well anchored. The recent bill on the
relationship between the Treasury and the Central Bank enhances the
institutional framework and is welcome. Enshrining central bank
independence into law would further improve the inflation-targeting
regime.

15. A flexible exchange rate remains important to absorb shocks.
Intervention in the foreign exchange market should be used only to
address disruptive market volatility. International reserves
continue to provide a buffer against external shocks and should be
preserved.

16. Further steps should be taken to enhance oversight of the
banking sector. While there has been progress towards many of the
2018 FSAP recommendations, the authorities should build on recent
efforts to further enhance the prudential, crisis management,
safety net, and macroprudential frameworks. The regulatory and
supervisory approach to credit risk should be upgraded further with
regards to related party exposures and transactions, country and
transfer risk, and restructured loans. A new financial resolution
regime in line with the FSAP recommendations should be put in place
promptly. The deposit guarantee fund should be brought into the
public sector and the process for providing emergency liquidity
assistance should be tightened. Efforts to create a multi-agency
committee with explicit mandates for macroprudential policy and
crisis management should be completed.

                      Structural Reforms

17. Structural reforms are necessary to boost productivity. The
government has rightly identified reducing the footprint of the
state in the economy as a priority, by pursuing privatization,
reducing state intervention in credit markets, lowering trade
barriers, tackling corruption, and simplifying taxation.

18. The government is working on an ambitious privatization
program. While privatization may provide some helpful one-off
revenue, its main benefit will come by the improvement in
productivity in some key sectors, including infrastructure and
energy.

Privatized companies may also increase investment without using
limited public resources.

19. Reforms are needed to improve bank intermediation efficiency.
Firms and households face an unduly high cost of borrowing due to
banks' large credit losses, high operating costs, and lack of
competition. A proposed corporate bankruptcy law would reduce
delinquency costs for banks. Efforts to reduce the role of public
banks and directed lending in credit markets should continue.
Actions are needed to facilitate client mobility and financial
product cost transparency. The recent approval of a credit registry
law (cadastro positivo) is a step in the right direction.

20. Trade liberalization is essential to improve competitiveness.
Brazil remains one of the most closed economies in the world to
trade. After some trade liberalization in the early 1990s, tariffs
have not changed much and nontariff barriers are high. In this
context, plans to lower import barriers are welcome. Prospective
OECD accession is an opportunity to foster trade integration. But
trade liberalization should be pursued in any case.

21. The effective implementation of anti-money laundering and
anti-corruption measures remains critically important. The
government continues to pursue significant money laundering and
corruption cases and has submitted proposals to improve the legal
framework. Authorities are encouraged to continue focusing on
preventive measures, effective enforcement, and long-term
legislative improvements. In addition, authorities are urged to
expedite the completion of the national anti-money laundering risk
assessment.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on May
27, 2019, Fitch Ratings has affirmed Brazil's Long-Term
Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB-' with a Stable
Outlook.


CIELO SA: Moody's Rates New BRL3-Bil. Debentures 'Ba1/Aaa.br'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina assigned Aaa.br National Scale corporate
family rating to Cielo S.A. and a Ba1/Aaa.br rating to Cielo S.A.
proposed BRL3.0 billion senior unsecured debentures. Outlook is
stable.

The rating of the proposed debentures assumes that the final
transaction documents will not be materially different from draft
legal documentation reviewed by Moody's to date and assume that
these agreements are legally valid, binding and enforceable.

Ratings assigned:

Cielo S.A.

Corporate Family Rating -- National Scale: Aaa.br

  - BRL3.0 billion senior unsecured debentures due 2022:
Ba1/Aaa.br

Outlook is stable

RATINGS RATIONALE

Cielo S.A.'s Ba1/Aaa.br rating reflects its dominant position in
the Brazilian payment card industry and broad footprint in the
large Brazilian territory. Moody's also takes into consideration
the favorable growth fundamentals for the payment sector in Brazil,
as well as the close business support from its main shareholders,
Banco do Brasil S.A. (BB, Ba2 stable) and Banco Bradesco S.A.
(Bradesco, Ba2 stable), and strong metrics.

At the same time, Cielo Ba1 global scale ratings are capped at 1
notch above Brazil's government bond rating of Ba2. Ratings also
incorporate an increasingly competitive payments industry
environment. Moody's expects Cielo's margins to decline as it works
to defend its market share with lower pricing, higher costs
relating to a reinforced commercial team and higher marketing
expenses; however, Cielo maintains a robust capital structure and
liquidity. Dividend payout will remain considerable, but it
believes the company will continue seek to balance payout levels
and leverage.

Competition in the cards and electronic payment sector should
continue to increase over time with technological innovation,
alternative payment options and new entrants. As the industry
matures in Brazil, yields will continue to decline because of lower
net merchant discount rates (MDRs), POS (Point-of-Sales equipment)
prices and rental fees, and spreads on the purchase of receivables.
Since September of 2018 Cielo has become more aggressive in order
to defend its market share and it believes that the company has a
strong scale and a wide distribution network, robust financial
flexibility, funding access, strong research and development
capabilities, and the flexibility to grow its business in an open
platform. As a result of this more aggressive strategy, Moody's
believes EBITDA margin in 2019 will be of 37% including the result
of purchase of receivables, from an average 56% in the last five
years, driving gross leverage to 2.3x (and net leverage to 1.4x) in
2019, including Moody's adjusted figures. Following the proposed
liability management liquidity profile will remain strong.

The issuance of BRL 3.0 billion is part of Cielo┬┤s liability
management process. Use of proceeds include the tender of part of
the $475 million (BRL 1,850 million) from 2022 maturing bond, and
pay down of BRL 936 million in bank debt.

The stable outlook reflects its view that Cielo will be able to
sustain its good credit metrics despite a more difficult
competitive environment, and its significant dividend stream will
not prevent future free cash flow generation.

An upgrade of Cielo's rating would depend on an upgrade of Brazil's
government bond rating, combined with the resilience of the
company's credit metrics to the expected increase in competition in
the sector.

Negative pressure on Cielo's rating would arise (1) in case of a
negative action on Brazil's government bond rating, (2) if Cielo's
liquidity or credit metrics were to deteriorate significantly, or
(3) if its FCF generation were to remain negative. Downward
pressure would also arise in the case of a weakening in the
company's market position.

Headquartered in the city of Barueri, Brazil, Cielo S.A. (Cielo) is
the leading corporation in the merchant acquiring and payment
processing industry in Brazil, with presence in almost all
Brazilian municipalities. With shares listed on B3 S.A. - Brasil,
Bolsa, Balcao (B3, Ba1 stable), formerly BM&F Bovespa, Cielo is
controlled by BB and Bradesco, which together hold 58.7% of the
company's voting stocks and are the largest and fourth-largest
commercial banks in Brazil, respectively, in terms of total assets.
In the 12 months ended in March 2019, Cielo's revenue, including
the result of its purchase of receivables, was BRL13.0 billion
($3.5 billion at the average exchange rate) and its Moody's
adjusted EBITDA margin was 45.9%.


MARANHAO: Fitch Affirms LongTerm BB- IDRs, Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Brazilian state of Maranhao's
Long-Term Foreign- and Local-Currency Issuer Default Ratings at
'BB-' with a Stable Outlook and its Short-Term Foreign- and
Local-Currency IDRs at 'B'. Fitch has also affirmed Maranhao's
National Long-Term Rating at 'AA-(bra)' with a Stable Outlook.

The rating actions are based on Fitch's new "Rating Criteria for
International Local and Regional Governments" published on April 9,
2019. Under these criteria, the key rating drivers for Brazilian
LRGs are their risk profile and debt sustainability ratios. Fitch
classifies Maranhao as a type B LRG since the state must cover debt
service from cash flow on an annual basis.

The state's IDRs are capped by Brazil's sovereign IDR (BB-/Stable).
Fitch has assigned Maranhao a Standalone Credit Profile (SCP) of
'bb', which reflects a combination of Weaker risk profile
assessment and good debt metrics, which resulted in a 'aa' debt
sustainability assessment. The SCP also factors in rated peers'
positioning. Fitch does not apply any asymmetric risk or
extraordinary support from upper-tier governments.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Risk Profile Assessment: Weaker

There is a combination of five weaker and one midrange assessments
for the risk factors, which in combination with sovereign rating of
'BB-' resulted in a weaker risk profile assessment.

Revenue Robustness: Weaker

Maranhao presents revenue growth prospects in line with the
national GDP average but has a history of volatile operating
revenue growth due to the state's dependency on transfers from the
Federal Government of Brazil. This revenue source corresponded to
almost 48% of operating revenues in 2018 in a slightly decreasing
trend. Fitch's rating case projects that assessment tax revenues
will increase by 4.1% through 2021.

Revenue Adjustability: Weaker

The state presents low tax autonomy, which reflects a low capacity
level for revenue increase in response to downturn. Like other
Brazilian states, Maranhao has a fairly concentrated tax base. The
10 largest taxpayers were responsible for about 40% of total tax
collections in 2016-2018.

Expenditure Sustainability: Midrange

Maranhao presents moderate control over expenditure growth since
operating revenues are volatile. The state's obligations are
moderately countercyclical since it is engaged in healthcare,
education and law enforcement. Maranhao does not present aggressive
off-loading of investments and borrowings, which also supports the
midrange assessment.

Expenditure Adjustability: Weaker

As per the Brazilian Constitution, there is low affordability to
reduce expenditure, especially of salaries. As a result, whenever
there is an unpredictable reduction in revenues, operating
expenditure does not follow automatically. In addition, inflexible
costs are high with over 90% of expenditures being mandatory and
committed. Maranhao has a limited track record of stimulus packages
aside from tax exemptions given to companies. There are balanced
expenditure rules in place but no strong track record of
application.

Liabilities and Liquidity Robustness: Weaker

There is a moderate national framework for debt and liquidity
management since there are prudential borrowing limits and
restrictions on loan types. The federal government guarantees all
USD denominated debt of the state. As of December 2018, external
debt corresponded to around 25% of total debt with no significant
maturity concentration. There is moderate off-balance sheet risk
stemming from the pension system, since the pension actuarial
deficit corresponded to 1.6x the state's operating revenues in
2018.

Liabilities and Liquidity Flexibility: Weaker

There is a framework of providing emergency liquidity support from
the federal government via the granting of extended maturity over
the prevalent federal debt portion. Nevertheless, all liquidity is
held at institutions rated below 'BBB-', leading this factor to be
weaker.

Fitch assesses Maranhao's debt sustainability at 'aa'. Fitch's
rating case forward-looking scenario indicates net direct risk
corresponding to 5.3x the operating balance. Considering this, the
payback ratio (net direct risk to operating balance), which is the
primary metric of debt sustainability assessment, should reach
levels close to 5x, thus corroborating the 'aa' assessment. Fitch
expects under its rating case scenario debt service coverage
(operating balance/debt service, including short-term debt
maturities) of between 2x and 4x.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's rating case scenario is a "through-the-cycle" scenario,
which incorporates a combination of revenue, cost and financial
risk stresses. It is based on the 2018 estimated figures and
2019-2021 projected ratios.

Its rating case scenario for Maranhao assumes income tax and
transfers linked to inflation. Salaries and pensions are expected
to increase based on inflation plus 1%.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Maranhao's IDRs are capped by the sovereign rating. Any rating
actions affecting Brazil (BB-/Stable) would result in a similar
action for Maranhao. Maranhao's ratings would be downgraded if the
SCP is downgraded by more than two notches, which would occur if
payback is higher than 13x. Fitch does not expect this to happen in
the short term.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has affirmed Maranhao's ratings as follows:

  -- Long-term foreign and local-currency IDR at 'BB-'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- Short-term foreign and local-currency IDR at 'B';

  -- National Long-term Rating at 'AA-(bra)'; Outlook Stable;

  -- National Short-term Rating at 'F1+(bra)'.

Fitch has assigned Maranhao a Standalone Credit Profile of 'bb'.




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C O L O M B I A
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BANCOLOMBIA SA: Moody's Assigns ba1 Baseline Credit Assessment
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed to stable, from negative, the
outlook on Bancolombia S.A.'s ratings. At the same time, Moody's
affirmed Bancolombia, Banco de Bogota S.A. and Banco Davivienda
S.A.'s long-term global local- and foreign currency deposit ratings
as well as the long-term foreign currency senior unsecured debt
ratings, following the affirmation of their respective baseline
credit assessments The outlook on Banco de Bogota and Davivienda's
ratings remains negative. These actions follow the change in
outlook to stable, from negative, on Government of Colombia's Baa2
government bond rating, on May 23, 2019.

In addition, Moody's affirmed the ratings assigned to Grupo Aval
Acciones y Valores S.A. and Grupo Aval Limited. The outlook remains
negative.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions were prompted by the change in outlook to
stable, from negative, on Colombia's Baa2 sovereign bond rating,
reflecting that improving economic conditions and continuation of
the fiscal consolidation process will support the stabilization of
the government's debt metrics and that risks stemming from the
external accounts, given the widening of the current account
deficit, remain contained.

BANCOLOMBIA

Moody's affirmation of Bancolombia's ratings reflects the bank's
good earnings generation capacity, its improving consumer asset
quality, despite still high corporate loan delinquencies, and
Bancolombia's broad and stable core funding access, which partially
offsets the bank's moderate reliance on market funding.
Bancolombia's profitability has benefited from lower credit costs
and a shift in loan portfolio mix towards consumer lending, as the
Colombian economy recovers. Bancolombia's long-term deposit and
senior unsecured debt ratings of Baa2 are positioned at the same
level of Colombia's sovereign bond rating and incorporates two
notches of uplift from the bank's ba1 baseline credit assessment
(BCA) to reflect Bancolombia's systemic importance. This assessment
considers Bancolombia's leading deposit franchise in Colombia, with
market share of 22.7% as of March 2019; the Colombian authorities'
track record of providing support to systemically important
financial institutions in the past; and the material systemic
consequences of an unsupported failure of any of them. As the
bank's ratings currently benefit from two notches of uplift from
its ba1 baseline credit assessments (BCA), Bancolombia's ratings
carry the same outlook as the sovereign ratings, which have been
changed to stable, from negative.

BANCO DE BOGOTA

Moody's affirmed Banco de Bogota's ratings to reflect strong
earnings amid a period of moderate loan growth in Colombia and its
stronger but still moderate core capitalization levels. Banco de
Bogota's high single borrower concentrations and exposures to
troubled corporate loans continue to expose its asset quality and
earnings to volatility.

Moody's negative outlook on Banco de Bogota's ratings, despite the
outlook change to stable from negative on Colombia's sovereign
ratings, incorporates the deteriorating operating conditions in
both Costa Rica and Nicaragua, which account for combined 16% of
Banco de Bogota's loans. Moody's has commented that the bank's
large presence in potentially more volatile Central American
markets could expose Banco de Bogota's assets and earnings to
increased risks that could lead to downward pressures on its
baseline credit assessment (BCA). The bank reported strong earnings
in 2018, with net income equal to 2.5% of tangible assets, up from
1.5% in 2017. However, Moody's noted that the bank's bottom-line
earnings have benefited from its equity investment in Corporacion
Financiera Colombiana S.A. (Corficolombiana, unrated) and from
changes in accounting rules that allowed the recognition of a
project's results in its construction phase rather than in the last
operating years of the concession. Returns also benefited from a
controlled efficiency and high margins. That said, the bank's
profitability faces the risk of higher credit costs stemming from
its exposures to large troubled corporates and one infrastructure
project in Colombia.

GRUPO AVAL ACCIONES Y VALORES S.A and GRUPO AVAL LIMITED

The affirmation of Grupo Aval and Grupo Aval Limited's ratings with
negative outlook incorporates the downward pressure on Banco de
Bogota's baseline credit assessment. Banco de Bogota is the group's
chief operating entity, in which 64% of gross loans of the
consolidated group are booked as of March 2019. Grupo Aval's
ratings incorporate the structural subordination of the bank
holding company's liabilities versus the liabilities of the bank
and its other subsidiaries and are notched off Banco de Bogota's
BCA. Moody's does not incorporate governmental support in the
holding company's ratings.

The affirmation of Grupo Aval's ratings follows the affirmation of
Banco de Bogota's BCA and also incorporates the company's very
stable though somewhat high double leverage ratio, which is
measured by investments in subsidiaries divided by shareholders'
equity, at 115% and reflects the extent to which a holding company
relies upon debt to finance its investments in subsidiaries.
Moody's considers double leverage in excess of 115% to be high. The
company has also shown a very stable and high interest coverage
underpinned by a strong dividend income from its subsidiaries, with
core earnings (dividends paid by its subsidiaries) amounting to 5.4
times interest expenses in March 2019.

Grupo Aval Limited's debt ratings are based on Grupo Aval's
irrevocable and unconditional guarantee of Grupo Aval Limited's
liabilities under the indentures. The negative outlook on Grupo
Aval Limited's rating is in line with the negative outlook on Grupo
Aval.

DAVIVIENDA

The affirmation of Davivienda's ratings incorporates an improvement
in the bank's capitalization in 2018 due to the slowdown in loan
growth. Despite a 18 basis point increase, however, tangible common
equity remained a relatively low 8.5% of risk-weighted assets. Slow
loan growth has also reduced pressures on the bank's liquidity and
on its need to raise market funds.

Davivienda's deposit and senior unsecured debt ratings also
incorporate Moody's assessment of a high probability that
Davivienda would benefit from government support in an event of
financial stress given its meaningful market share of local
deposits. This results in one notch of ratings uplift from the
bank's BCA of ba1.

The negative outlook on Davivienda's ratings reflects the
deterioration in its asset risk and profitability metrics in recent
years. Problem loans rose to 3.9% of gross loans as of December
2018, from 2.8% a year earlier. This deterioration was driven by
the mortgage and commercial segments, which represent 24% and 50%
of total loans, respectively.

Davivienda is more exposed than its peers to mortgages to low
income households and hence are more sensitive to economic
downturns. The deterioration in commercial loans was mainly caused
by a relatively small number of large corporate exposures. Although
strong, Davivienda's reserve coverage may reduce further if
additional provisions are required.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING -- DOWN/UP

BANCOLOMBIA

Bancolombia's supported ratings are positioned at the same level of
sovereign bond rating and could face upward pressure if Colombia's
government bond rating is upgraded in conjunction with continued
improvement in the issuers' credit fundamentals and/or Colombia's
macroeconomic environment. However, if Colombia's government bond
rating again faces downward pressures, the affected ratings would
be negatively pressured as well. The ratings would also face
downward pressure if the issuers' intrinsic credit fundamentals
deteriorate unexpectedly.

BANCO DE BOGOTA

Banco de Bogota's supported ratings are positioned at the same
level of sovereign bond rating and will likely be downgraded if
Colombia's sovereign rating is lowered. Banco de Bogota's ratings
could also be downgraded if the operating environment in Central
America, specifically Costa Rica and/or Nicaragua, deteriorates
further, leading to increased delinquencies and credit costs, or if
the bank's exposures to those countries increase, contrary to
current expectations and trends in Nicaragua. The ratings could
also face downward pressure if the bank's capital ratio weakens, or
if the bank experiences higher-than-expected delinquencies and
credit costs steaming from its exposures to large troubled
Colombian corporates.

Banco de Bogota's ratings are unlikely to face upward pressures
because they have a negative outlook. However, the outlook could be
stabilized provided the operating environment in Costa Rica and
Nicaragua and asset quality in those counties stabilize as well,
and the bank's exposures to those countries decline in line with
current expectations.

GRUPO AVAL

Upward/downward pressures on Grupo Aval and Grupo Aval Limited's
ratings would be associated with similar pressures on Banco do
Bogota's BCA. The ratings could also face downward pressures if the
group's double leverage appear likely to exceed 115% by a
meaningful amount on a sustained basis and/or the interest coverage
ratio decrease significantly.

DAVIVIENDA

Davivenda's ratings could be downgraded if asset risk and
profitability continue to deteriorate and/or the bank is unable to
sustain capitalization at current levels. However, the ratings
would not be affected by a downgrade of Colombia's sovereign bond
rating of Baa2.

While an upgrade of Davivienda's ratings is unlikely given the
bank's negative outlook, the outlook could be stabilized if the
bank manages to halt the deterioration of its asset quality and
earnings and preserve its current capitalization levels even as
loan growth begins to accelerate.

ISSUERS AND RATINGS AFFECTED

The following Bancolombia S.A.'s ratings and assessments were
affirmed:

  - Long term local currency deposit rating of Baa2, Stable from
Negative

  - Long term foreign currency deposit rating of Baa2, Stable from
Negative

  - Long term foreign currency senior unsecured rating of Baa2,
Stable from Negative

  - Short term local currency deposit rating of Prime-2

  - Short term foreign currency deposit rating of Prime-2

  - Long-term foreign currency global subordinated debt rating of
Ba2/Ba3 (hyb)

  - Long term local currency counterparty risk rating of Baa2

  - Long term foreign currency counterparty risk rating of Baa2

  - Short term local currency counterparty risk rating of Prime-2

  - Short term foreign currency counterparty risk rating of
Prime-2

  - Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment of ba1

  - Baseline Credit Assessment of ba1

  - Long-term counterparty risk assessment of Baa2(cr)

  - Short-term counterparty risk assessment of Prime-2(cr)

  - Outlook, changed to Stable from Negative

The following Banco de Bogota S.A.'s ratings and assessments were
affirmed:

  - Long term local currency deposit rating of Baa2, Negative

  - Long term foreign currency deposit rating of Baa2, Negative

  - Long term foreign currency senior unsecured rating of Baa2,
Negative

  - Short term local currency deposit rating of Prime-2

  - Short term foreign currency deposit rating of Prime-2

  - Long-term foreign currency global subordinated debt rating of
Ba2

  - Long term local currency counterparty risk rating of Baa2

  - Long term foreign currency counterparty risk rating of Baa2

  - Short term local currency counterparty risk rating of Prime-2

  - Short term foreign currency counterparty risk rating of
Prime-2

  - Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment of ba1

  - Baseline Credit Assessment of ba1

  - Long-term counterparty risk assessment of Baa2(cr)

  - Short-term counterparty risk assessment of Prime-2(cr)

  - Outlook, Remains Negative

The following Grupo Aval Acciones y Valores S.A.'s ratings were
affirmed:

  - Long term local currency issuer rating of Ba2, Negative

  - Long term foreign currency issuer rating of Ba2, Negative

  - Short term local currency issuer rating of Not Prime
  
  - Short term foreign currency issuer rating of Not Prime
  
  - Outlook, Remains Negative

The following Grupo Aval Limited's rating was affirmed:

  - Backed senior unsecured debt rating of Ba2, Negative

  - Outlook, Remains Negative

The following Banco Davivienda S.A.'s ratings were affirmed:

  - Long-term local currency deposit rating of Baa3, Negative

  - Long-term foreign currency deposit rating of Baa3, Negative

  - Short-term local currency deposit rating of P-3

  - Short-term foreign currency deposit rating of P-3

  - Long-term foreign currency senior unsecured debt of Baa3,
Negative

  - Long-term foreign currency global subordinated debt of Ba2

  - Long term local currency counterparty risk rating of Baa2

  - Long term foreign currency counterparty risk rating of Baa2

  - Short term local currency counterparty risk rating of Prime-2

  - Short term foreign currency counterparty risk rating of
Prime-2
  
  - Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment of ba1

  - Baseline Credit Assessment of ba1

  - Long Term counterparty risk assessment of Baa2(cr)

  - Short Term counterparty risk assessment of Prime-2(cr)

  - Outlook, Remains Negative
  
METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks published
in August 2018.



===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Chinese Chamber to Probe 'Unfair' Competition
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that Chinese Chamber of Commerce President
Roberto Santana said they want to know in detail the complaint from
the Dominican Industries Association and the Dominican Plastics
Industry Association over alleged unfair competition by five
Chinese businesses in Dominican territory.

He said they'll contact the industries to agree on a joint
investigation, "as well as in any other diligence to clarify the
issue denounced and promote the adoption of corrective measures if
appropriate in the case," according to Dominican Today.

Both China and the Dominican Republic, Santana said, have agreed to
develop their relations in a framework of equality and respect for
the law, promoting mutually beneficial exchanges and cooperation,
"so that any practice that deviates from these criteria is alien to
the will of both countries and the actions of the entities that
support the healthy development of exchange and cooperation between
the parties," the report notes.

He added that any company with foreign capital, national or mixed,
"must strictly adhere to the national legislation, as well as to
the agreements and pacts of which the country is officially a
signatory," the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America in
September 2018, Fitch Ratings affirmed Dominican Republic's
Long-Term, Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB-'
with a Stable Outlook.




=====================
E L   S A L V A D O R
=====================

EL SALVADOR: Inflation Expected to Remain at 1% in 2019, IMF Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
On May 22, 2019,
The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
concluded the Article IV consultation with El Salvador on May 22,
2019.  Under Article IV consultations, the IMF attempts to assess
each country's economic health and to forestall future financial
problems.

Accordingly, on May 24, 2019, the IMF issued a press release on the
consultation, laying out a backgrounder on the country and the
IMF's assessment.

Background

The IMF notes that during the past decade, El Salvador has made
considerable strides in social development: poverty, inequality and
migration to the U.S declined, especially after 2015, due to
sustained social spending and a growing economy.

Fueled by strong domestic consumption and investment, real GDP grew
by 21/2 percent in 2018. The primary fiscal surplus increased to
about 1 percent of GDP, driven by strong import tax revenues and
one-off tax measures. Nevertheless, the rising interest bill offset
the improvement in the primary balance, leading to a slight
deterioration of the overall fiscal deficit. Public debt (including
pensions) remained at about 70 percent of GDP at end-2018. The
banking sector continued to be solid and used the remittance-fueled
increase in deposits to expand credit to the private sector.

Real GDP is projected to grow at 21/2 percent in 2019 and converge
to its potential of 2.2 percent over the medium-term, in line with
the global growth outlook. Inflation is expected to remain anchored
at 1 percent, and remittances growth will decline to its long-term
rate. Public debt would drift upwards under the baseline, as the
fiscal balance will deteriorate due the expected loss in temporary
revenues and a rising interest bill.

Downside risks to the outlook stem from weaker-than-expected global
growth, rising protectionism, and domestic policy slippages,
especially if spending measures are adopted without identifying
appropriate funding resources. On the upside, global financial
conditions may tighten less than expected.

Executive Board Assessment

Executive Directors commended the authorities' policies that
contributed to the strong macroeconomic performance and a decline
in poverty and inequality. Noting that risks remain tilted to the
downside, Directors emphasized the need for prompt fiscal
adjustment to reduce the high public debt, and structural reforms
to raise potential growth, including measures to combat crime,
improve governance, and reduce poverty.

Directors welcomed the authorities' fiscal consolidation efforts
and the fiscal laws recently passed by the Legislative Assembly,
including the revised Fiscal Responsibility Law. In view of the
high public debt and the large financing needs, Directors called
for the authorities to adopt frontloaded fiscal measures to put
debt on a firmly declining path, while noting, in line with staff
recommendations, that the measures should be calibrated in a
growth-friendly way without adversely affecting social outcomes. In
that context, Directors also stressed the importance of improving
revenue collection and tax administration.

Directors commended the authorities' efforts to improve the
business environment and competitiveness, including through the
implementation of the El Salvador Seguro plan, regulatory
improvements to complete the Northern Triangle customs union, and
policies to help human capital formation. They noted that potential
growth could be further raised by increasing investment in public
infrastructure, including through public-private partnerships,
improving security, removing barriers to trade and investment, and
reducing informality and the gender gap in labor force
participation.

Directors noted that the banking sector is well capitalized and
welcomed the recent progress in risk-based and cross-border banking
supervision. To further improve the resilience of the banking
sector, they encouraged the authorities to approve the bank
resolution law, strengthen the emergency liquidity assistance
framework, and ensure full compliance with the risk-based
supervision framework. Director also noted the importance of
further promoting financial inclusion, including by expanding
access to fintech services.

Directors supported the recently adopted measures to improve the
governance, anticorruption and Anti-Money Laundering and Combating
the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) frameworks. Nevertheless,
these frameworks should be strengthened further by enhancing fiscal
transparency of the 2020 budget law, by improving the audit of
fiscal operations, and establishing better spending controls.
Directors recommended promptly implementing electronic invoicing,
and also noted that changes to the anticorruption legal framework
should be comprehensive, ensure harmonization of laws and consider
the impact on the budget.




=================
G U A T E M A L A
=================

GUATEMALA: Fitch Rates 2030 & 2050 USD Bonds 'BB'
-------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned a 'BB' rating to Guatemala's USD700
million in notes maturing June 1, 2050 with a coupon of 6.125% and
USD500 million in notes maturing June 1, 2030 with a coupon of
4.9%.

Proceeds from the issuance will be used for the general purposes of
the government of Guatemala, including the refinancing, repurchase
or retirement of its domestic and external indebtedness.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The bond rating is in line with the Guatemala's Long-Term Foreign
Currency Issuer Default Rating of 'BB'.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The bond rating would be sensitive to any changes in Guatemala's
Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR. Fitch affirmed Guatemala's
Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR at 'BB' and revised the Rating
Outlook to Negative from Stable on April 11, 2019.




=============
J A M A I C A
=============

FLY JAMAICA: In Talks With Prospective Purchasers
-------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports two sets of investors are seeking to purchase the
beleaguered airline Fly Jamaica.

Captain Ronald Reece, one of the owners of the airline, confirmed
in a brief interview with RJR News that two suitors were seeking to
acquire the airline.

Sources told RJR News that Fly Jamaica has been in talks with one
group for almost a year. That group, said to be out of France, has
offered to buy the airline, make redundancy payments and clear
other debts owed by Fly Jamaica.

RJR News notes that the airline currently owes several airports
various fees.

News of talks with the investors comes weeks after the Jamaica
Civil Aviation Authority (JCAA) confirmed that it had suspended the
airline's air operating certificate, the report says.

Nari Williams Singh, Director-General of the JCAA, said action was
taken as Fly Jamaica had not been operating for some time, the
report discloses.

It closed operations in March and made the positions of its workers
redundant, the report recalls.

The airline has been struggling since one of its planes crash
landed at Cheddi Jagan International Airport in Guyana last
November, the report adds.


JAMAICA: Cabinet Approves Fourth MTF for Vision 2030
----------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that the Jamaican cabinet has approved the fourth
Medium Term Socio-Economic Policy Framework (MTF), which underpins
implementation of the country's long-term National Development Plan
- Vision 2030 Jamaica.

This was disclosed by Dr. Wayne Henry, Director General of the
Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ), during the agency's recent
quarterly media briefing at the PIOJ's head office in New Kingston,
according to RJR News.

Vision 2030 Jamaica seeks to reposition the island to achieve
developed country status within 11 years and, in the process, make
it the place of choice to live, work, raise families and do
business, the report notes.

The fourth MTF covers fiscal years 2018/19 to 2020/21, and presents
the medium-term development priorities, strategies and actions to
be pursued under each of Vision 2030 Jamaica's 15 National
Outcomes, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on Sept.
27, 2018, S&P Global Ratings revised its outlook on Jamaica to
positive from stable. At the same time, S&P  affirmed its 'B'
long-and short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit
ratings, and its 'B+' transfer and convertibility assessment on the
country.




=======
P E R U
=======

FERREYCORP SAA: S&P Withdraws 'BB+' Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings withdrew its 'BB+' long-term issuer credit
rating on Peru-based capital goods distributor, Ferreycorp S.A.A.,
at the issuer's request. At the time of the withdrawal, the outlook
was stable.

S&P said, "At the end of the last 12 months ended March 2019,
Ferreycorp's operating and financial performance was in line with
our expectations, including revenue growth of 7.0%, EBITDA margin
of about 12.5%, net debt to EBITDA of 2.7x, and discretionary cash
flow (DCF) to debt of negative 5.0%.

"The stable outlook at the time of the withdrawal reflected our
view that Ferreycorp will maintain its leading market position in
the Peruvian market and its strategic alliance with Caterpillar
Inc. It also reflected our expectation that Ferreycorp will
maintain steady operating and financial performance over the next
12 months, thanks to a boost in mining equipment sales and its
resilient business model, because some of its business lines, such
as spare parts and rental services, cushion the impact from slow
activity in the construction sector. As a result, we believe the
company's net debt-to-EBITDA and DCF-to-debt ratios will remain
close to 3.0x and 1.0%, respectively, this year.

"In addition, on May 8, 2019, we withdrew our 'BB+' issue-level
rating on the company's outstanding $100 million senior unsecured
notes due 2020, following their full redemption on May 7, 2019. In
the past few years, Ferreycorp has gradually prepaid its notes
through a combination of new medium-term loans and cash from its
balance sheet, with the goal of reducing its financing costs and
making its capital structure more flexible."




=====================
P U E R T O   R I C O
=====================

AMERILIFE GROUP: Moody's Affirms B3 CFR & Alters Outlook to Stable
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the B3 corporate family
rating and B3-PD probability of default rating of AmeriLife Group,
LLC (AmeriLife) following the company's announcement that it plans
to refinance its existing senior secured credit facilities. The
rating agency has also assigned ratings of B2 and Caa2 to
AmeriLife's proposed first-lien and second-lien senior secured
credit facilities, respectively. Net proceeds will be used to
refinance the company's existing $234 million senior secured term
loans, fund near-term acquisitions, pay a shareholder dividend as
well as related fees and expenses. Moody's has changed Amerilife's
outlook to stable from positive based on the pending increase in
financial leverage.

RATINGS RATIONALE

According to Moody's, AmeriLife's ratings reflect its good market
position in delivering health, fixed annuity, life and supplemental
products to the growing senior population, especially in Florida.

The company distributes its products through multiple sources
including a network of independent and captive career agents, and,
to a lesser extent, through worksite, affinity groups and
direct-to-consumer channels. These strengths are offset by the
company's high financial leverage and modest size relative to other
rated insurance brokers and service companies. AmeriLife has a
business concentration in Medicare products, which are subject to
political and regulatory pressures, and a geographic concentration
in Florida, given its target market.

Giving effect to this proposed refinancing, Moody's expects that
AmeriLife will have a debt-to-EBITDA ratio in the 6.5x-7x range
over the next 12-18 months, with (EBITDA - capex) interest coverage
of 1.5x-2x, and a free-cash-flow-to- debt ratio in the
low-to-mid-single digits. These pro forma metrics reflect Moody's
accounting adjustments for operating leases, run-rate EBITDA from
acquisitions, and certain other non-recurring items. While Moody's
considers the issuance of debt to fund a shareholder dividend as
credit negative, the rating agency expects AmeriLife to maintain
its metrics consistent with its current ratings.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of AmeriLife's ratings
include: (i) debt-to-EBITDA ratio below 5.5x, (ii) (EBITDA - capex)
coverage of interest exceeding 2x, and (iii) free-cash-flow-to-debt
ratio exceeding 5%.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of AmeriLife's ratings: (i)
debt-to-EBITDA ratio remaining at or above 7x, (ii) (EBITDA -
capex) coverage of interest below 1.2x, or (iii)
free-cash-flow-to-debt ratio below 2%.

Moody's has affirmed the following ratings of AmeriLife (and loss
given default (LGD) assessments):

Corporate family rating at B3;

Probability of default rating at B3-PD;

$30 million senior secured first-lien revolving credit facility
(undrawn) maturing in July 2020 at B2 (LGD3);

$177.5 million senior secured first-lien term loan ($161
million outstanding) maturing in July 2022 at B2 (LGD3);

$72.5 million senior secured second-lien term loan ($72.5
million outstanding) maturing in January 2023 at Caa2 (LGD5).

Moody's has assigned the following ratings (and loss given default
(LGD) assessments):

$40 million senior secured first-lien five-year revolving
credit facility at B2 (LGD3);

$250 million senior secured first-lien seven-year term loan at
B2 (LGD3);

$35 million senior secured first-lien seven-year delay draw
term loan at B2 (LGD3);

$70 million senior secured second-lien eight-year term loan at
Caa2 (LGD6).

The outlook for the issuer was changed to stable from positive.

When the transaction closes, Moody's will withdraw the ratings
from
AmeriLife's existing first-lien and second-lien credit facilities
as these facilities will be repaid/terminated.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Insurance
Brokers and Service Companies published in June 2018.

AmeriLife develops and distributes annuities, life and health, and
Medicare insurance products across the US and Puerto Rico,
primarily to the senior market. The company operates through a
national distribution network of over 140,000 insurance agents and
brokers via nearly 20 marketing organizations, and over 50
insurance agency locations. In 2018, AmeriLife generated revenues
of $168 million.


AMERILIFE GROUP: S&P Alters Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'B' ICR
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said it affirmed its 'B' long-term issuer credit
rating on AmeriLife Group LLC and revised the outlook to stable
from negative.

S&P assigned its 'B' debt ratings to AmeriLife's planned $40
million, five-year, first-lien revolver; $250 million, seven-year,
first-lien term loan; and $35 million, seven-year, first-lien
delayed-draw term loan. The recovery ratings on these issues are
'3', reflecting meaningful recovery expectations (50%-70%, rounded
estimate: 55%) in the event of a payment default. The rating agency
also assigned its 'CCC+' debt rating to the planned $70 million,
eight-year, second-lien term loan. The recovery rating on this
issue is '6', reflecting negligible expectations for recovery
(0%)."

The affirmation reflects AmeriLife's positive strategic moves,
favorable demographic and market trends, strong revenue and
adjusted EBITDA growth in 2018 that may accelerate in 2019,
manageable post-transaction leverage (pro-forma 6.6x as of March
31, 2019, on S&P's basis), and adequate EBITDA interest coverage
(pro-forma 2x as of March 31, 2019).

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that AmeriLife will
grow revenue and adjusted EBITDA by 5%-10% and 10%-15%,
respectively, in 2019 on an organic basis; or by 20% each including
acquisitions. S&P expects leverage of close to 6x by year-end 2019
on a pro-forma basis (including a full year of acquisition EBITDA),
or in the mid 6x-7x range on a reported basis. It expects EBITDA
interest coverage of about 2x in 2019.

"We could lower the ratings in 2019-2020 if AmeriLife underperforms
our expectations with, for example, sustained leverage above
6.5x-7x and/or EBITDA coverage below 2x," S&P said.

"We expect limited ratings upside in 2019-2020 because we expect no
significant change to AmeriLife's business profile or financial
sponsor ownership. We could raise our ratings if the company can
lower and sustain leverage below 5x and coverage above 3x," S&P
said.


CARLOS ROBLES: Amends Treatment of Oriental Bank's Claims
---------------------------------------------------------
Carlos Robles Tile & Stone, Inc., filed an amended disclosure
statement referring to its proposed chapter 11 plan.

This latest filing amends the treatment of creditor Oriental Bank's
claims 7 and 8. The Debtor proposes to pay no later of 90 days from
May 14, 2019, a lump sum discount payment in the amount of $400,000
as a total payout and settlement of both claims. A stipulation will
be filed by the parties upon agreement.

A copy of the Amended Disclosure Statement is available at
https://tinyurl.com/yyxnmuvu from Pacermonitor.com at no charge.

A copy of the Amended Plan is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y3akjn5p from Pacermonitor.com at no charge.

              About Carlos Robles Tile & Stone

Carlos Robles Tile & Stone, Inc., operates a store that sells
tiles, stones and related materials.  Its business and office are
located at 383 Ave. Cesar Gonzalez, Urb. Eleanor Roosevelt, San
Juan, Puerto Rico.

Carlos Robles Tile & Stone previously sought bankruptcy protection
on March 19, 2015 (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 15-02004).

Carlos Robles Tile & Stone sought protection under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 18-05145) on Sept. 5,
2018.  In the petition signed by Carlos Robles Marin, president,
the Debtor disclosed $486,000 in assets and $3,517,613 in
liabilities.  Judge Mildred Caban Flores presides over the case.
The Debtor tapped the Law Offices of Luis D. Flores Gonzalez as its
legal counsel.




=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================

PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: Tankers to Be Detained for Lack of Payment
------------------------------------------------------------------
Julianne Geiger at OilPrice.com reports that three Petroleos de
Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA) tankers that are late with payments to
German operator Bernhard Schulte Shipmanagement (BSM) are being
detained, according to Reuters sources, as BSM gives up on waiting
for payments while conducting business as usual with floundering
state-run PDVSA.

BSM operates almost half of PDVSA's fleet of tankers, and has made
a move to "arrest" three tankers due to the outstanding debt PDVSA
has amassed.

BSM and PDVSA have a troubled past, as PDVSA struggles to pay its
bills while oil production and exports fall to new lows each month,
according to OilPrice.com.

In March, BSM was removing its crews from 10 of these tankers due
to a lack of payment, adding that it would return the tankers, the
report relays.  PDV Marina-PDVSA's shipping subsidiary -- had
declared an emergency following the announcement, saying it did not
have the staff to accept the return of the 10 tankers. The amount
of outstanding debt at that time was at least $15 million,
according to Reuters, the report notes.  Three other tankers
remained anchored in Portugal and Curacao while other financial
disputes with PDVSA came to light, and BSM abandoned two vessels in
Portugal after the staff had been onboard for 20 months, the report
discloses.

Mid-March, BSM said it was considering scrapping its agreement with
PDVSA entirely as of the end of March or in April due to the
sanctions levied against PDVSA, the report says.  What's more, BSM
said, the political situation in Venezuela made it "an almost
impossible task" to manage PDVSA's assets, the report relays.

Following that disclosure, another ship management firm, US-based
McQuilling, announced in March as well that it would end its
contracts with PDVSA due to the US Sanctions, the report
discloses.

The three tankers BSM arrested are the Arita in Singapore, and the
Parnaso and the Rio Arauca in Portugal, according to Reuters, the
report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on Aug.
24, 2018, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'SD' global scale issuer
credit rating and 'D' issue-level ratings on Petroleos de Venezuela
S.A. (PDVSA).



                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2019.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.
.


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