TCRLA_Public/190607.mbx        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                 L A T I N   A M E R I C A

          Friday, June 7, 2019, Vol. 20, No. 114

                           Headlines



A N T I G U A   A N D   B A R B U D A

LIAT: Barbados Discloses Plan to Sell Shares in Airline


A R G E N T I N A

SALTA: Fitch Affirms B Issuer Default Ratings, Outlook Negative


B R A Z I L

BANCO FIBRA: Moody's Alters Outlook on B3 Deposit Rating to Stable


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Paid US$14.3 Billion of Foreign Debt
[*] DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Ports Eyed by Dubai's Sultan


G U A T E M A L A

CEMENTOS PROGRESO: Fitch Affirms LT IDR & Unsec. Notes at BB+


M E X I C O

MEXICO: President Is Committed to Free Trade


P U E R T O   R I C O

ARQUIDIOCESIS DE SAN JUAN: Bid for Stay Pending Appeal Partly OK'd
J.C. PENNEY: Moody's Cuts CFR to Caa1 & Sr. Unsec. Notes to Caa3
KONA GRILL: Taps Keen-Summit as Real Estate Advisor
KONA GRILL: Taps Pachulski Stang as Legal Counsel
SEARS HOLDINGS: Wollmuth, Mulder Represent 2 Retirees



V E N E Z U E L A

VENEZUELA: Oil Exports Fall 17% in May

                           - - - - -


=====================================
A N T I G U A   A N D   B A R B U D A
=====================================

LIAT: Barbados Discloses Plan to Sell Shares in Airline
-------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that the Barbados government has announced plans
to sell its shares in the cash strapped regional airline, LIAT
Ltd., formerly known as Leeward Islands Air Transport.

Prime Minister Mia Mottley confirmed reports that Antigua and
Barbuda would be seeking to replace Barbados as the largest
shareholder government by seeking to acquire the shares Bridgetown
would be outing up for sale, according to RJR News.

Speaking in Parliament, Ms. Mottley said the decision was due to
the country's economic situation, the report notes.

However, she said Barbados would continue to hold minimum shares in
the Antigua-based carrier, the report relays.

Barbados along with Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica Grenada and St.
Vincent and the Grenadines are the main shareholders of the airline
that employs over 600 people and operates 491 flights weekly across
15 destinations, the report adds.

                            About LIAT

LIAT Ltd., formerly known as Leeward Islands Air Transport or LIAT,
is an airline headquartered on the grounds of V. C. Bird
International Airport in Antigua.  It operates high-frequency
inter-island scheduled services serving 15 destinations in the
Caribbean.  The airline's main base is VC Bird International
Airport, Antigua and Barbuda, with bases at Grantley Adams
International Airport, Barbados and Piarco International Airport,
Trinidad and Tobago.

The airline is owned by seven Caribbean governments, with three
being the major shareholders: Barbados, Antigua & Barbuda and St.
Vincent and the Grenadines along with Dominica(94.7 %); other
Caribbean governments, private shareholders and employees (5.3%).

In the last few years, LIAT has been challenged with financial
difficulties, often needing additional funding as the airline dealt
with the high cost of operations.  In November 2016, the
Barbadosgovernment defended LIAT's operations, even as opposition
legislators called for a cessation of the business.  In early
2015,
LIAT offered early retirement packages to employees in efforts to
downsize.  In 2014, LIAT knew it had to deal with unprofitable
routes to make operations viable.  In the third quarter of 2013,
the airline's top management was shaken, with news Chief Executive
Officer Captain Ian Brunton's sudden resignation.

LIAT's current chief executive officer is Julie Reifer-Jones,
chairman is Jean Holder, and chief financial officer is Rojer
Inglis.

Dr. Ralph Gonsalves, prime minister of St. Vincent & the
Grenadines, serves as chairman of LIAT shareholders.




=================
A R G E N T I N A
=================

SALTA: Fitch Affirms B Issuer Default Ratings, Outlook Negative
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Province of Salta's Long-Term
Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings at 'B' with a
Negative Rating Outlook. Fitch has also affirmed both the 'B'
long-term ratings on Salta's 9.5% senior secured notes for USD185
million due March 16, 2022 and 9.125% senior unsecured notes for
USD350 million due July 7, 2024.

Salta is rated at the same level as Argentina's sovereign rating
(B/Negative). Salta's 'B' IDRs factor its 'vulnerable' risk profile
resulting from structural country weaknesses that affect Argentine
local and regional governments, including a weak institutional
framework and fiscal regime and a macroeconomic context of high
inflation and currency depreciation that create risks to revenue,
expenditure and liquidity performance.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Revenue Robustness Assessed as Weaker

The Province of Salta is located in the northwest region of
Argentina with a small and weak local economy concentrated in the
tertiary sector with an important weight from social services and
the public sector. The primary sector is also important and
includes hydrocarbon extraction. The province is the eighth most
populated out of 24 jurisdictions with its GDP contributing to an
estimated 2% of the country's GDP. Salta has a low GDP per capita
and a higher than average percentage of population with unsatisfied
basic needs, which in turn translates into structurally high
infrastructure needs.

Relative to Argentine peers Salta's revenue structure has higher
than average dependence on federal transfers from the federal
co-participation tax-sharing regime, with around 67.4% of its
operating revenues being automatic transfers from the
co-participation scheme. These automatic transfers come from a
B/Negative sovereign counterparty with negative economic growth
prospects currently under economic recession; in 2018 national GDP
dropped 2.5% and is expected to decrease around 1.7% in 2019, which
was factored into Fitch's revenue robustness assessment.

Co-participation transfers are an important determinant of fiscal
performance for Argentine LRGs as on average these represent around
45% of consolidated provincial operating revenues. Although there
have been recent agreements between the nation and provinces to
address the structural imbalances between revenue and expenditure
decentralization, a profound comprehensive reform of the
co-participation law is still pending.

Revenue Adjustability Assessed as Weaker

Provincial jurisdictions have the legal autonomy to set tax rates
on local revenues that mainly consist on Turnover Tax (Ingresos
Brutos) and Stamps (Sellos). However, the affordability of
additional taxation is perceived as low, considering Salta's weak
economy and the legal pledge in place from the province's adherence
to the Fiscal Pact between the nation and provinces. The Pact
requires adhered provinces to gradually lower the maximum tax rates
on ingresos brutos in an attempt to partially relieve the country's
high tax burden.

Although the province also has some hydrocarbon royalties linked to
the USD they represent a small portion of operating revenues, at
around 2.7% in 2018. Other factors impacting revenue dynamics are
the current negative macroeconomic context and persistently high
inflation that as of March 2019 are causing an 11.7% real term drop
in operating revenues compared to the same period of 2018. This
reflects that the current macroeconomic context also limits the
ability to boost operating revenues.

Expenditure Sustainability Assessed as Weaker

Argentine provinces have high expenditure responsibilities,
including healthcare, education, water, transportation, and other
service provisions. The country's fiscal regime is structurally
imbalanced regarding revenue-expenditure decentralization and the
recent national SBA with the IMF is transferring some additional
expenditure weight to the provinces by cutting down subsidies.

Another weakness considered is the structurally high inflation in
Argentina that challenges expenditure sustainability, given the
lagged effect that inflation tends to have on expenditure. During
2018 the province managed to contain real-term operating
expenditure through diverse expenditure control policies. However,
2019 expenditure pressures will remain high as Fitch expects
inflation will end the year above 40% (down from 47.6% in 2018) and
a certain level of real term wage re-composition is expected.
According to the 2018 Fiscal Pact amendment, jurisdictions that had
an increase in their net current primary expenditure below consumer
price growth during fiscal year-2018 will be able to have an
increase above the limit imposed by the Federal Fiscal
Responsibility Regime during 2019. This weakened the budget balance
rules that were set in place, also in the context of an electoral
year.

Expenditure Adjustability Assessed as Weaker

In 2018 Salta's share of operating expenditure/ total expenditure
was of around 88%, with staff expenses representing a rigid 56% of
total expenses which is deemed high relative to international
peers. Salta's leeway or flexibility to cut expenses is viewed as
weak relative to international peers, considering that only a low
average 10.9% of the province's total expenditure corresponds to
capex. Similarly to other Argentine peers, the province has very
high infrastructure needs. According to the province increasing
capex does not translate into economic growth due to the important
infrastructure lag, which also reflects that there is not much
flexibility to adjust capex.

Liabilities and Liquidity Robustness Assessed as Weaker

Limited capital markets have caused a structural reliance on
external markets for financing sources. Salta has low debt levels
but has a high exposure to currency exchange risk. In 2018 Salta's
total debt was of ARS26.3 billion, and around 72% of its direct
debt was denominated in USD, unhedged and is mainly composed of
issuances in the external and local markets. There are some
revenues linked to the USD that partially mitigate FX risk. During
2018 debt grew a nominal 61.3% versus 2017 mainly because of
currency depreciation and also due to some new debt acquired with
the nation. Regarding Salta's debt maturity profile, there is some
refinancing risk towards the medium term as capital maturities peak
towards 2022-2024 due the use of bullet and capital balloon payment
debt instruments. Market vulnerability remains in Argentina, and
there have been no new external market issuances by provinces in
2018 and 2019.

Liabilities and Liquidity Flexibility Assessed as Weaker

For liquidity, Argentine provinces rely mainly on their own
unrestricted cash. The main available tool to cover seasonal cash
imbalances are short-term treasury bill issuances, but these have
growingly become riskier instruments after 2018 and 2019 interest
rate increases in Argentina. The national framework in place
regarding liquidity support and funding available to subnationals
is perceived by Fitch as weak, also currently high monetary policy
rates and the sovereign's external market access affect the
entity's refinancing capacity.

Debt Sustainability Assessment: 'a'

Salta's primary metric of payback (net adjusted debt/operating
balance) is expected to remain between 5-9 years in the next three
years, resulting in a 'aa' sustainability score , but Fitch revised
the final assessment to 'a'. The revision was based on the entity's
weak secondary metric score of 'b' from its actual debt service
coverage that is expected to remain close to/below 1x between
2019-2021.

SCP AND RATING DERIVATION

The combination of Salta's 'vulnerable' risk profile and 'a' debt
sustainability assessment lead to a Standalone Credit Profile (SCP)
of 'b'. There are no additional considerations regarding support
from upper tiers or asymmetric additive risk considerations.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within its base case for the issuer
include:

  -- A real term decrease in taxes and federal transfers in 2019.

  -- Real-term salary adjustments during 2019.

  -- A slight recovery in revenue and expenditure moderation
     towards 2020-2021 if inflation decreases.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Salta's ratings are at the same level as the sovereign rating. A
higher level of refinancing risk reflected in a higher payback or a
weaker coverage ratio could result in a downgrade of Salta's
ratings as well as a downgrade from the sovereign rating.
Stabilization of the sovereign rating could also stabilize Salta's
Rating Outlooks.




===========
B R A Z I L
===========

BANCO FIBRA: Moody's Alters Outlook on B3 Deposit Rating to Stable
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed Banco Fibra S.A.'s ratings,
including its long-term local and foreign-currency deposit rating
of B3, its long-term senior unsecured foreign currency debt program
rating of (P)B3 and its b3 baseline credit assessment (BCA). The
outlook was changed to stable from negative.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The change in outlook to stable, from negative, on Banco Fibra
acknowledges the modest improvements in the bank's profitability,
benefiting from lower credit costs and tight control on operating
expenses. The stable outlook also reflects Moody's expectation that
asset quality will stabilize, though at high levels, as loan
origination quality improves with new vintages and with a growing
share of loans backed by receivables to mid-sized companies.
Despite these credit positive developments, Fibra's capitalization,
measured by Moody's as tangible common equity relative to risk
weighted assets, remains weak and well below that of other
medium-size banks in the system.

Fibra's past due loans were essentially flat in 2018, but a 12.8%
contraction in total loans caused the problem loan ratio to spike
to 8.14%, while the bank continued to write off legacy
nonperforming loans. Fibra improved the quality of new loan
vintages by targeting increased loan granularity and guarantees,
which also allowed the bank to reduce provisioning expenses. Having
largely exited the consumer lending business, Fibra's has been
focused on higher-margined commercial loans to medium size
companies and agribusinesses, with revamped risk management and
governance. These efforts should support asset quality metrics
positively over the outlook horizon, although the slowly recovering
economy may yet affect lending volumes and borrowers' asset quality
overall.

As of December 2018, Fibra's Moody's core capitalization ratio
(TCE/RWA) was a low 3.78%, also reflecting Moody's deduction of
most of Fibra's sizable deferred tax assets (DTAs) and the risk
weighting of government securities at 100%. Although modest, the
capitalization ratio is bound to improve slightly in 2019 as the
bank manages to maintain positive profitability and reduce the
stock of DTAs. Fibra's ability to generate earnings, which
management plans to achieve by focusing on business diversification
and customer profitability, is therefore critical to ensure that
the bank reduces its balance sheet vulnerability, by rebuilding its
core capital and improving its asset quality.

The rating affirmation also incorporates Fibra's relatively steady
funding profile, as the bank has kept the participation of market
funds below 10% of total assets since 2016, while also extending
funding duration. In addition, Fibra's funding has become more
granular, a credit positive, but most of its deposits are now
sourced from brokers, which makes them potentially less stable than
core deposits. The bank mitigates funding risks by holding a
sizable volume of liquid assets, which equaled to more than 20% of
tangible banking assets as of December 2018. While Fibra's funding
tenor far exceed its assets, maintaining such a liquidity cushion
is costly and hurts its profitability.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING -- DOWN/UP

Upward pressure on Fibra's BCA could result from consistent
improvement in the bank's profitability and capitalization. Further
strengthening of asset risk metrics could also have positive
pressure on the bank's BCA.

Fibra's ratings could be downgraded if the bank is required to
increase provisions as a result of persistent deterioration of
asset quality, which could lead to a return of net losses. The
weakening of the bank's capital position would also put downward
pressure on its ratings.

METHODOLOGY USED

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks published
in August 2018.

Banco Fibra S.A., is headquartered in São Paulo, Brazil, and
reported BRL6.5 billion in assets and BRL1.0 billion in
shareholders' equity as of 31 December 2018.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS AND ASSESSMENTS

The following ratings and assessments of Banco Fibra S.A. were
affirmed:

  - Long-term global local currency deposit rating of B3, stable
outlook

  - Short-term global local currency deposit rating of Not Prime

  - Long-term global foreign currency deposit rating of B3, stable
outlook

  - Short-term global foreign currency deposit rating of Not Prime

  - Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program of (P)B3

  - Other Short Term of (P)Not Prime

  - Long-term global local currency counterparty risk rating of B2

  - Short-term global local currency counterparty risk rating of
Not Prime

  - Long-term global foreign currency counterparty risk rating of
B2

  - Short-term global foreign currency counterparty risk rating of
Not Prime

  - Long-term Brazilian national scale deposit rating of B2.br

  - Short-term Brazilian national scale deposit rating of BR-4

  - Long-term Brazilian national scale counterparty risk rating of
Ba2.br

  - Short-term Brazilian national scale counterparty risk rating of
BR-4

  - Baseline credit assessment of b3

  - Adjusted baseline credit assessment of b3

  - Long-term counterparty risk assessment of B2(cr)

  - Short-term counterparty risk assessment of Not Prime(cr)

Outlook Actions:

Outlook, changed to Stable from Negative




===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Paid US$14.3 Billion of Foreign Debt
--------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that the Dominican Government said it has
paid US$14.3 billion of foreign debt service in the last seven
years.

About US$8.9 billion of the paid debt correspond to capital
maturities and US$5.4 billion to commissions and interest,
according to Dominican Today.

In a press release, the Dominican Finance Ministry said it carried
out "prudent and responsible debt management, focused on ensuring
the maintenance of macroeconomic stability and the flow of
resources to meet social investment in education and health, as
well as infrastructure," the report notes.

"The responsibility to cover the maturities of capital and
interests of debts contracted in previous governments has
contributed to maintaining macroeconomic stability and stability in
the exchange rate," it said, the report relays.

It adds that the State has not only focused on the proper
fulfillment of its commitments for repayments, "but also to ensure
that financing benefits all Dominicans through the quality of
spending," the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on June
5, 2019, Dominican Today said that in the first quarter, retail
sustained one of the most intense slowdowns of all Dominican
economic sectors, from a 7.8% growth from January to March 2018, to
just 2.6% this year, Dominican Republic's Central Bank revealed.
National Merchants and Entrepreneurs Council (Conacerd) vice
president Antonio Cruz said the result, which denotes a drop in
demand in that period, is explained by a smaller amount of money
circulating in the economy, according to Dominican Today.

On June 3, TCRLA reported that  Fitch Ratings has assigned a 'BB-'
rating to Dominican Republic's DOP50.523 billion notes (equivalent
to USD1 billion ), maturing 2026 and to the USD1.5 billion bonds
maturing 2049.


[*] DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Ports Eyed by Dubai's Sultan
----------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that Dominican Republic's economic growth
and strategic geographic location were the main topics in the
speech by Dubai Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem, in a luncheon to mark the
National Business Council's (Conep) 56th anniversary.

"Growth, performance inspires us and encourages us to have more
confidence as foreign investors," he said, according to Dominican
Today.

The report notes that he said he's willing to contribute so that
the Dominican Republic can take more advantage of its ports because
the country has the potential to become a platform or a logistics
hub for all regional and global markets.  "We have the opportunity
to develop RD as a central. But we have to adapt to technology,
which is a key element to have more power," the report relays.

The Sultan stressed that the current trade war between the United
States and China and technological challenges can become
opportunities for the country, the report notes.

In that regard, Conep president, Pedro Brache, stressed that bin
Sulayem is one of the investors who has "wagered more decisively on
the country in recent years," the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
June 5, 2019, Dominican Today said that in the first quarter,
retail sustained one of the most intense slowdowns of all Dominican
economic sectors, from a 7.8% growth from January to March 2018, to
just 2.6% this year, Dominican Republic's Central Bank revealed.
National Merchants and Entrepreneurs Council (Conacerd) vice
president Antonio Cruz said the result, which denotes a drop in
demand in that period, is explained by a smaller amount of money
circulating in the economy, according to Dominican Today.

On June 3, TCRLA reported that  Fitch Ratings has assigned a 'BB-'
rating to Dominican Republic's DOP50.523 billion notes (equivalent
to USD1 billion ), maturing 2026 and to the USD1.5 billion bonds
maturing 2049.




=================
G U A T E M A L A
=================

CEMENTOS PROGRESO: Fitch Affirms LT IDR & Unsec. Notes at BB+
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Cementos Progreso, S.A.'s (Cempro)
Long-Term Foreign Currency and Local Currency Issuer Default
Ratings and senior unsecured notes due in 2023 at 'BB+'. The Rating
Outlook on the Foreign Currency IDR is Negative, while the Rating
Outlook on the Local Currency IDR is Stable.

The Stable Outlook on the company's LC IDR reflects Cempro's
dominant market position, low cost structure, and sound financial
profile characterized by strong credit metrics and robust projected
FCF. Further factored is Cempro's increasing access to local
currency debt financing which has allowed the company to maintain a
higher proportion of local currency debt in its capital structure
than anticipated when the company issued the 2023 notes.

Cempro's FC IDR and Rating Outlook are constrained by Guatemala's
'BB+' Country Ceiling. As a result, a downgrade of Guatemala's
(BB/Negative) Country Ceiling could result in a downgrade of
Cempro's FC IDR and of the 2023 notes given a lack of material
exports, operations abroad and/or committed lines of credit.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Dominant Market Position: Cempro's market share in Guatemala, as
measured by volume, has remained stable since 2007 at about 80%.
The company's solid market position is supported by its retail
network of independent distributors that allows the company to
serve a highly fragmented consumer base. Barriers to entry are high
in Guatemala, as Cempro maintains an exclusive relationship with
about 80% of these distributors. About 80% of the cement sold by
the company is sold in bags, which gives it a relatively strong
pricing position.

High Profitability: Medium-term EBITDA margins should remain robust
at around 40%, mainly due to the startup of Cempro's San Gabriel
cement plant. This plant is located on the opposite side of
Guatemala City from the company's existing plant. By having plants
on both sides of the city, the company should be able to reduce its
transportation costs significantly, which further improves its
competitiveness in the market. This plant, which is expected to
begin cement shipments efficiently by YE 2019, will solidify the
company's low cost structure and increase barriers to entry. With
this new plant Cempro's capacity increased to 5.1 million tons from
2.8 million tons.

Leverage Expected to Decline: Fitch estimates that Cempro's net
leverage will approach 1.5x within two years following the
completion of the access road to its new plant, which is expected
to be completed during 3Q19. This compares with 2.0x as of
first-quarter 2019. Road construction slowed in 2018 due to delays
in the acquisition of rights of way, which Cempro has now secured.
The company generated USD253 million of operating EBITDA in the LTM
ended March 31, 2019 unchanged from a year earlier. This compares
with debt of USD565 million in first-quarter 2019, slightly below
the USD583 million registered a year ago.

Solid FCF Expected: Cempro's total capex, excluding capitalized
interest, should decline significantly in 2020 as the company
completes its USD1,056 million multiyear investment plan for
construction of the San Gabriel plant. Fitch estimates modest
expansion capex and dividends averaging USD70 million per year will
result in recurring positive FCF of about USD80 million per year in
2021 and beyond. Robust positive FCF should support net debt
deleveraging to levels below 2.0x over the next two to three years,
compared with a projected peak close to 2.5x in 2019 as the company
makes the final investments to complete the infrastructure
surrounding the plant.

Country Constraints: Cempro's performance depends on continued
stability and economic development in Guatemala, where the company
derives almost all of its revenues. Fitch expects cement demand to
maintain annual growth rates in the 3% range, in line with
projected GDP growth. Growth expectations are supported by an
increasing population, high expected urbanization rates and growing
worker remittances. Infrastructure investment from public and
private partnerships has accelerated in recent months. Continued
traction under the new administration should result in incremental
demand for cement.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

  -- Cement volumes grow mid- to low single digits in 2019 and
     beyond;

  -- Prices in USD decline slightly over the rating horizon
     reflecting increased competition;

  -- Costs spike in 2019-2020 due to start-up expenses and to
     lesser extent higher fuel prices before declining because
     of distribution and other cost efficiencies of the new
     plant in subsequent years;

  -- Negative FCF in 2019 of about USD30 million, mostly due
     to expansion capex, with positive FCF in 2020 and beyond;

  -- The Guatemalan quetzal depreciates modestly over the next
     three years.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Positive Rating Action

  -- Cempro's FC ratings are capped at Guatemala's Country
     Ceiling, limiting positive rating actions;

  -- An upgrade to the LC IDR is unlikely in the near term,
     as company's operations and assets are substantially
     located in Guatemala.

Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Negative Rating Action

  -- The FC ratings would be downgraded in case of a downgrade
     of Guatemala's Country Ceiling.

  -- A significant deterioration in Guatemala's macroeconomic
     and business environment;

  -- Increasing competition from CEMEX;

  -- Operational efficiency loss resulting in EBITDA margin
     deterioration;

  -- Sustained leverage levels above 3.5x on a gross basis or
     3.0x on a net basis.

LIQUIDITY

Sound Liquidity: Cempro's liquidity is strong. This is due to the
company's ability to generate cash flow from operations (CFFO) of
around USD170 million per year, its low leverage and good access to
local bank lending. Additionally, Cempro faces no significant near
term maturities and its capex is projected to decline significantly
beginning in 2020 as the company completes the road and electricity
infrastructure surrounding the San Gabriel plant. The company
successfully secured 10-year local currency bank credit agreements
in 2016 and has paid down or refinanced short term maturities.
Total debt of USD565 million as of first-quarter 2019, consists of
amortizing local currency bank debt and USD350 million of notes due
2023. Cash balance was USD41 million as of March 2019.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings of Cementos Progreso,
S.A.:

  -- Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at
     'BB+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- Long-Term Local Currency IDR at 'BB+';Outlook Stable;

  -- Unsecured debt at 'BB+'.




===========
M E X I C O
===========

MEXICO: President Is Committed to Free Trade
--------------------------------------------
The Latin American Herald reports that President Andres Manuel
Lopez Obrador said that Mexico was committed to free trade and
would try to reach an agreement that avoided a confrontation with
the United States at the high-level meeting taking place in
Washington.

"Free trade is the best thing. Not imposing tariffs, duties, not
closing ourselves off," Lopez Obrador in response to a question
from a reporter, according to The Latin American Herald.

Foreign Relations Secretary Marcelo Ebrard is meeting in the US
capital with Vice President Mike Pence and Secretary of State Mike
Pompeo, the report notes.

Lopez Obrador said he was still "optimistic" that a deal would be
reached with the United States to avoid the imposition of tariffs,
the report says.

Mexico wants to maintain "the relationship of friendship" with the
United States once the tariff conflict is resolved, the president
said, the report discloses.

President Donald Trump said his administration would impose
escalating tariffs on Mexico unless that country took aggressive
steps to stop the flow of illegal migrants from Central America,
the report relays.

Trump said in a Twitter post that he would impose a 5 percent
tariff starting June 10 on all Mexican imports unless the
neighboring country halted the northward flow of US-bound migrants,
the report notes.

Lopez Obrador said he preferred dialogue and avoiding isolation to
the alternatives -- a trade war or preventing a conflict and no
longer communicating, the report discloses.

"We want to maintain our unity with the people and government of
the United States. And maintain good relations with President
Donald Trump," the president said, the report says.

In response to a question from reporters, Lopez Obrador said Mexico
had not ruled out expanding trade relations with China and Russia,
but he noted that it was still important to "cultivate" the
relationship with the United States, the report relays.

Lopez Obrador said Washington would cross the line in the conflict
if it interfered with the "sovereignty and dignity" of the Mexican
people, the report notes.

Trump said the US government would raise the tariffs on Mexican
goods each month until the rate hit 25 percent in October unless
the Lopez Obrador administration took action to stop the flow of
migrants, the majority of them from Central America, to the United
States, the report relays.

"The Tariff will gradually increase until the Illegal Immigration
problem is remedied," the US president said, the report adds.

As reported in Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on May 5,
2016, Moody's de Mexico upgraded State of Mexico's issuer ratings
to Ba1 (Global Scale, local currency) and A1.mx (Mexico National
Scale) from Ba2 and A2.mx, respectively.  The outlook on issuer
ratings was changed to negative.  This concludes the review that
began on April 1, 2016, when the rating was put under review with
uncertain direction.




=====================
P U E R T O   R I C O
=====================

ARQUIDIOCESIS DE SAN JUAN: Bid for Stay Pending Appeal Partly OK'd
------------------------------------------------------------------
Bankruptcy Judge Edward A. Godoy grants in part Debtor
Arquidiocesis de San Juan de Puerto Rico's motion for a stay
pending appeal.

Bankruptcy Rule 8007 governs motions for stay pending an appeal.
Courts consider the traditional four-part standard applicable to
preliminary injunctions. The Court must consider "(1) whether the
applicant has made a strong showing of success on the merits; (2)
whether the applicant will be irreparably harmed absent injunctive
relief; (3) whether issuance of the stay will injure other parties;
and (4) where the public interest lies."

As to the first prong, most if not all of the arguments raised by
the Debtor in its motion were considered and rejected by the Court
in its adjudication of the state court plaintiff's motion to
dismiss. Nevertheless, the Court acknowledges that this case is sui
generis in that the Debtor is an entity whose rights derive
ultimately from the Treaty of Paris of 1898. This is not a typical
Debtor incorporated under state law. Even the case law cited by the
state court plaintiffs in their motion to dismiss is not entirely
on point, since those cases concern churches incorporated under
state law. Thus, the Court finds that the Debtor meets the first
factor.

Regarding the second factor, the Court also finds in favor of the
Debtor. The testimonies of Father Saenz Ramos and Ms. Barroso, both
of whom the Court found credible, detailed the financial harm the
attachments caused the Debtor and would cause again if no stay were
put in place.

Turning to the third factor, the Court first notes that the state
court plaintiffs' counsel informed the court at the hearing that
they are currently unable to proceed with the execution of the
pre-judgment attachment orders for reasons unrelated to this
bankruptcy case. If this is the case, then the imposition of a stay
pending appeal would cause no further harm. In any event, the Court
finds that any harm to the state court plaintiffs from the issuance
of stay can be minimized by crafting a narrowly stay order. The
Court, therefore, finds that the third prong also favors the
Debtor.

Finally, as to the fourth factor, the Court is persuaded that
staying the case until the appeal is decided by BAP is in the
public's interest.

The Court, therefore, imposes a limited stay on any attempt to
attach any debtor-in-possession bank account(s) identified in the
Debtor's monthly operating reports until the appeal is decided by
BAP.

A copy of the Court's Opinion and Order dated April 25, 2019 is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y2tyrt89 from Pacermonitor.com at
no charge.

       About Arquidiocesis de San Juan de Puerto Rico

Arquidiocesis de San Juan de Puerto Rico -- http://www.arqsj.org/
-- is an unincorporated religious association in San Juan, Puerto
Rico.

Arquidiocesis de San Juan de Puerto Rico, a/k/a Iglesia Catolica
Apostolica Y Romana, Arquidiocesis De San Juan De Puerto Rico,
filed a petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code
(Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 18-04911) on Aug. 29, 2018.  In the
petition signed by Father Alberto Arturo Figueroa Morales, vicar
general, the Debtor estimated $10 million to $50 million in assets
and liabilities.  Carmen D. Conde Torres, Esq., at C. Conde &
Assoc., is the Debtor's counsel.


J.C. PENNEY: Moody's Cuts CFR to Caa1 & Sr. Unsec. Notes to Caa3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded Penney (J.C.) Company, Inc.
Corporate Family Rating to Caa1 from B3 and its Probability of
Default rating to Caa1-PD from B3-PD. Moody's also downgraded
Penney (J.C.) Corporation, Inc.'s senior secured ABL Revolving
Credit Facility to B2 from Ba3, its senior secured term loan and
senior secured notes to B3 from B1, its secured second lien notes
downgraded to Caa2 from Caa1 and its senior unsecured notes were
downgraded to Caa3 from Caa2. The rating outlook is stable. The
company's SGL-1 rating has been downgraded to SGL-2.

"J.C. Penney's continues its aggressive liquidation of inventory as
it works to recapture customers in a very competitive
environment,"
Moody's Vice President Christina Boni stated. "Further pressure on
sales performance in 2019 is expected to result in leverage
remaining elevated" Boni further added.

Downgrades:

Issuer: Penney (J.C.) Company, Inc.

  Probability of Default Rating, Downgraded to Caa1-PD from
  B3-PD

  Speculative Grade Liquidity Rating, Downgraded to SGL-2
  from SGL-1

  Corporate Family Rating, Downgraded to Caa1 from B3

Issuer: Penney (J.C.) Corporation, Inc.

  Senior Secured Term Loan, Downgraded to B3 (LGD3) from B1
  (LGD3)

  Senior Secured ABL Revolving Credit Facility, Downgraded to
  B2 (LGD3) from Ba3 (LGD2)

  Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to B3 (LGD3)
  from B1 (LGD3)

  Senior Secured 2nd Lien Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to
  Caa2 (LGD5) from Caa1 (LGD4)

  Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, Downgraded to
  (P)Caa3 from (P)Caa2

  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to Caa3
  (LGD5) from Caa2 (LGD5)

  Senior Unsecured Shelf, Downgraded to (P)Caa3 from (P)Caa2

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Penney (J.C.) Company, Inc.

  Outlook, Remains Stable

RATINGS RATIONALE

J.C. Penney's credit profile is supported by the company's good
liquidity with approximately $1.75 billion - $171 million of cash
and approximately $1.6 billion of undrawn revolving credit
commitments as of May 4, 2019. Moody's expects the company will
generate minimal free cash flow in fiscal 2019 as the company works
to improve its competitive position. Debt/EBITDA is estimated to be
in excess of 7 times at fiscal year-end 2019. The need to reduce
inventory levels and connect more effectively with its core
customer suggests that leverage levels will remain elevated as the
company works with new leadership to define and execute its
strategy to return to stabilizing its market position and improving
profitability. The credit is also constrained by the structural
challenges facing the department store segment, which include
market share losses to off-price retailers, and the cost of
investments associated with managing consumer preferences for
online shopping.

The stable rating outlook assumes that J.C. Penney will continue to
maintain good liquidity as its moves toward stabilizing both sales
and operating margins.

Ratings could be upgraded if the company maintains a good liquidity
profile and has consistent growth in sales and operating earnings
indicating its business initiatives are succeeding. Quantitatively,
the company could be upgraded if Debt/EBITDA was reduced and
sustained below 6.0x.

Ratings could be downgraded if credit metrics were to weaken such
that company's good liquidity profile were to erode.

J.C. Penney Company, Inc. is the holding company of J.C. Penney
Corporation, Inc., a U.S. department store operator headquartered
in Plano, Texas, with about 860 locations in the United States and
Puerto Rico. It also operates a website, www.jcp.com. Revenues are
approximately $11.9 billion.


KONA GRILL: Taps Keen-Summit as Real Estate Advisor
---------------------------------------------------
Kona Grill, Inc., received approval from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court
for the District of Delaware to hire Keen-Summit Capital Partners
LLC as its real estate advisor.

The firm will provide lease restructuring services to the company
and its affiliates and will be compensated pursuant to the terms of
this fee structure:

     (1) Lease Modification. Upon full execution of the lease
modification agreement, the Debtors will pay the firm on a per
property basis, $2,000, plus 6 percent of "savings."

     (2) Early Termination Right. For each acceptable lease
modification agreement that includes an early termination
right/kick-out right, the Debtors will pay an additional fee of
$750 per modification.

     (3) Lease Termination. Upon full execution of the lease
modification agreement, the Debtors will pay the firm, on a per
property basis, 5 percent of "savings." Rejecting a lease in a
bankruptcy situation does not trigger a transaction fee.

Matthew Bordwin, managing director of Keen-Summit, disclosed in
court filings that his firm is "disinterested" as defined in
Section 101(14) of the Bankruptcy Code.

The firm can be reached through:

     Matthew Bordwin
     Keen-Summit Capital Partners LLC
     1 Huntington Quadrangle, Suite 2C04
     Melville, NY 11747
     Telephone: (646) 381-9202
     Email: mbordwin@Keen-Summit.com

                       About Kona Grill

Kona Grill, Inc. -- https://www.konagrill.com/ -- owns and operates
27 casual dining restaurants in 18 states, as well as Puerto Rico,
serving contemporary American favorites, sushi, and alcoholic
beverages throughout the United States and Puerto Rico.

Kona Grill, Inc., and its subsidiaries sought protection under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. Del. Lead Case No.
19-10953) on April 30, 2019.  As of Dec. 31, 2018, the Debtors'
total assets is $53,613,000 and total liabilities of $74,049,000.
The petition was signed by Christopher J. Wells, chief
restructuring officer.

The Debtors tapped Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP as counsel;
Piper Jaffray as investment banker; Alvarez & Marsal North America,
LLC as restructuring advisor and Epiq Corporate Restructuring, LLC,
as claims and noticing agent.


KONA GRILL: Taps Pachulski Stang as Legal Counsel
-------------------------------------------------
Kona Grill, Inc., received approval from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court
for the District of Delaware to hire Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones
LLP as its legal counsel.

The firm will provide services to the company and its affiliates
in
connection with their Chapter 11 cases, which include legal advice
regarding their powers and duties under the Bankruptcy Code and
the
preparation of a bankruptcy plan.

The firm's hourly rates are:

     Partners              $725 - $1,395
     Of Counsel            $650 - $1,095
     Associates            $575 - $695
     Paraprofessionals     $325 - $425

Pachulski received payments from the Debtors in the amount of
$520,552.61 during the year prior to the petition date.

James O'Neill, Esq., a partner at Pachulski, disclosed in court
filings that his firm is "disinterested" as defined in Section
101(14) of the Bankruptcy Code.

In accordance with Appendix B-Guidelines for reviewing fee
applications filed by attorneys in larger Chapter 11 cases, Mr.
O'Neill disclosed that his firm has not agreed to a variation of
its standard or customary billing arrangements for its employment
with the Debtors, and that no Pachulski professional has varied his
rate based on the geographic location of the Debtors' bankruptcy
cases.

Pachulski represented the Debtors in the 12 months prior to the
petition date.  The billing rates and material financial terms for
the pre-bankruptcy period remain the same as the post-petition
period, according to Mr. O'Neill.

The attorney also disclosed that the Debtors have already approved
the firm's budget and staffing plan for the first 13 weeks of the
Debtors' bankruptcy cases.

Pachulski can be reached through:

     Jeremy V. Richards, Esq.
     James E. O'Neill, Esq.
     John W. Lucas, Esq.
     Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP
     919 N. Market Street, 17th Floor
     Wilmington, DE 91899
     Tel: (302) 652-4100
     Fax: (302) 652-4400
     Email: jrichards@pszjlaw.com
            jo'neill@pszjlaw.com
            jlucas@pszjlaw.com

                       About Kona Grill

Kona Grill, Inc. -- https://www.konagrill.com/ -- owns and operates
27 casual dining restaurants in 18 states, as well as Puerto Rico,
serving contemporary American favorites, sushi, and alcoholic
beverages throughout the United States and Puerto Rico.

Kona Grill, Inc., and its subsidiaries sought protection under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. Del. Lead Case No.
19-10953) on April 30, 2019.  As of Dec. 31, 2018, the Debtors'
total assets is $53,613,000 and total liabilities of $74,049,000.
The petition was signed by Christopher J. Wells, chief
restructuring officer.

The Debtors tapped Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP as counsel;
Piper Jaffray as investment banker; Alvarez & Marsal North America,
LLC as restructuring advisor and Epiq Corporate Restructuring, LLC,
as claims and noticing agent.


SEARS HOLDINGS: Wollmuth, Mulder Represent 2 Retirees
-----------------------------------------------------
Pursuant to Rule 2019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure,
the law firms of Wollmuth, Maher, & Deutsch LLP and Michael M.
Mulder provided notice that they are representing these creditors
in the Chapter 11 cases of Sears Holdings Corp., et al.:

     (1) Richard Bruce
         145 S. York St.
         Unit 228
         Elmhurst, IL 60126
         Creditor and Sears retiree
  
     (2) Ronald Olbrysh
         624 E. Central Ave
         Lombard, IL 60148
         Creditor and Sears retiree

On or about May 15, 2019, Michael M. Mulder was retained to
represent the Retirees of Sears Holding Corporate.  

On or about May 15, 2019, Messrs. Bruce and Olbrysh retained
Wollmuth as local co-counsel.

As of May 28, 2019, the Firms only represent Messrs. Bruce and
Olbrysh in the Chapter 11 Case.

The Firms can be reached at:

         WOLLMUTH MAHER & DEUTSCH LLP
         James N. Lawlor
         Cassandra Postighone
         500 Fifth Avenue
         New York, New York
         10110(212) 382-3300

                -and --

         THE LAW OFFICES OF MICHAEL M.MULDER
         Michael M. Mulder
         Elena N. Liveris
         1603 Orrington Avenue, Suite 600
         Evanston, Illinois 60201
         Telephone:  312-263-0272

                    About Sears Holdings

Sears Holdings Corporation (NASDAQ: SHLD) --
http://www.searsholdings.com/-- began as a mail ordering catalog
company in 1887 and became the world's largest retailer in the
1960s.  At its peak, Sears was present in almost every big mall
across the U.S., and sold everything from toys and auto parts to
mail-order homes.  Sears claims to be is a market leader in the
appliance, tool, lawn and garden, fitness equipment, and automotive
repair and maintenance retail sectors.

Sears and Kmart merged to form Sears Holdings in 2005 when they had
3,500 US stores between them.  Kmart emerged in 2005 from its own
bankruptcy.

Unable to keep up with online stores and other brick-and-mortar
retailers, a long series of store closings has left it with 687
retail stores in 49 states, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin
Islands as of mid-October 2018.  The Company employs 68,000
individuals, of whom 32,000 are full-time employees.

As of Aug. 4, 2018, Sears Holdings had $6.93 billion in total
assets, $11.33 billion in total liabilities and a total deficit of
$4.40 billion.

Unable to cover a $134 million debt payment due Oct. 15, 2018,
Sears Holdings Corporation and 49 subsidiaries sought Chapter 11
protection (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Lead Case No. 18-23538) on Oct. 15,
2018.

The Hon. Robert D. Drain is the case judge.

The Debtors tapped Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP as legal counsel;
M-III Partners as restructuring advisor; Lazard Freres & Co. LLC as
investment banker; DLA Piper LLP as real estate advisor; and Prime
Clerk as claims and noticing agent.

The U.S. Trustee for Region 2 appointed nine creditors, including
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., and landlord Simon Property
Group, L.P., to serve on the official committee of unsecured
creditors.  The committee tapped Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP
as legal counsel; FTI Consulting as financial advisor; and Houlihan
Lokey Capital, Inc., as investment banker.




=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================

VENEZUELA: Oil Exports Fall 17% in May
--------------------------------------
MecroPress, citing Reuters, reports that Venezuelan oil exports
fell by 17% in May compared to April, due to the difficulty to sell
barrels of heavy crude oil that US refiners used to buy and process
before the sanctions imposed on the Nicolas Maduro government.

According to documents published by the state company and data from
Refinitiv Eikpn, this harsh blow to the Venezuelan oil company is
due to the imposition of sanctions by the United States on PDVSA,
which has forced Venezuela to empty its crude inventories since the
end of January, MecroPress notes.  However, these inventories
allowed the company to maintain exports around 1 million bpd over
the next three months, despite the measures, MecroPress relays.

According to the British agency, during May PDVSA sent a total of
33 shipments of crude oil and fuel, mainly to Asian destinations.
Being the Russian oil company Rosneft, which takes the majority of
oil deliveries as reimbursement of billions of dollars in loans to
Venezuela, the report relays.  According to the data, Europe took
8% of the total, the report says.

The decline in Venezuela's crude oil exports is the main reason why
the US refineries have recently struggled to find heavy oil,
causing an impact on the prices of qualities such as the Maya of
Mexico, the report discloses.

To dilute the extra heavy oil, Venezuela has imported about 190,000
bpd of refined products such as heavy naphtha, as well as gasoline,
diesel and liquefied petroleum gas, products that PDVSA has stopped
producing in recent years, the report notes.  Most of the fuel
loads have been supplied by Rosneft itself, Reliance Industries of
India, Repsol and the unit of China National Petroleum Corp,
PetroChina, the report says.



                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2019.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.
.


                  * * * End of Transmission * * *