TCRLA_Public/190614.mbx        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                 L A T I N   A M E R I C A

          Friday, June 14, 2019, Vol. 20, No. 119

                           Headlines



B R A Z I L

BANCO DA AMAZONIA: Fitch Affirms LT IDRs at 'BB-', Outlook Stable
BANCO DO BRASIL: Fitch Affirms LT IDRs at 'BB-', Outlook Stable
BANCO DO NORDESTE: Fitch Affirms LT IDRs at 'BB-', Outlook Stable
BANCO PAN: Fitch Affirms 'B+' LongTerm IDRs, Outlook Stable
BNDES: Fitch Affirms LT IDRs at 'BB-', Outlook Stable

BRASIL PHARMA: Judge Approves Bankruptcy for Drugstore Operator
CAIXA ECONOMICA: Fitch Affirms LT IDRs at 'BB-', Outlook Stable


C A Y M A N   I S L A N D S

BANORTE: Moody's Gives (P)Ba2 (hyb) Rating to New $1BB Tier 1 Notes


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Minimum Wage Hike Deal Could Be Reached


E L   S A L V A D O R

EL SALVADOR: Fitch Affirms Longterm IDRs at 'B-', Outlook Stable


H O N D U R A S

HONDURAS: Moody's Affirms 'B1' LT Issuer & Unsecured Bond Ratings


J A M A I C A

JAMAICA: Opposition Warns Gov't. Not to Privatize Mortgage Bank


M E X I C O

MEXICO: Gang Violence, Algae & No Publicity Shrink Tourism


P E R U

INTERCORP PERU: Moody's Hikes Unsec. Debt Rating to Ba1


P U E R T O   R I C O

LABORATORIO ACROPOLIS: Hires CSS Accounting as Accountant


V E N E Z U E L A

PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: S&P Withdraws 'SD' Issuer Credit Rating

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B R A Z I L
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BANCO DA AMAZONIA: Fitch Affirms LT IDRs at 'BB-', Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Banco da Amazonia S.A.'s (BASA)
Long-Term, Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings at
'BB-', its Support Rating at '3' and its Support Rating Floor at
'BB-'. At the same time, Fitch affirmed BASA's Long-Term National
Rating at 'AA(bra)'. Fitch does not assign a Viability Rating to
the entity, given its role as a regional development bank. The
Rating Outlook for the IDRs and Long-Term National Rating remains
Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS, NATIONAL RATINGS

BASA's SRF is equalized with and linked to Brazil's sovereign
ratings. As a result, the bank is rated at the same level as the
country's SRF of 'BB-'. BASA's ratings also reflect the important
and relatively stable funding from shareholders and the important
role that the bank plays in the implementation of government
development policies in Brazil's Northern region. The Outlook on
BASA's Long-Term ratings remains Stable, reflecting the Outlook of
the sovereign's ratings. Fitch believes that BASA, like other
public entities, is subject to political influence given its
state-owned nature and strong links with the government. Changes in
the bank's senior management have not been frequent in recent
years.

BASA is the sole manager of the Constitutional Fund of the North
(FNO) and receives a significant fee to manage it. The bank's
strategy is to increase efforts to expand its business however, the
revenues related to FNO and its role as a development bank in the
North will remain relevant.

The bank's financial profile has no direct impact on the ratings,
but it has remained relatively stable since Fitch's last review.

As a development bank, profitability remains influenced by
government policies focusing on the development of the region.
BASA's profitability historically is more volatile than the average
for private sector banks, reflecting its intrinsic higher credit
costs and lower margins, stemming partly from its public policy
role. During the first quarter of 2019, the bank reported a small
net loss of BRL8.7 million, mainly due to higher-than-expected
provisioning expenses and lower origination, still reflecting a
still challenging operating environment, mainly in Brazil's
Northern region.

Fitch expects asset quality and credit costs to remain under
pressure during 2019, but at a slower pace than the previous years,
as most of BASA's impaired credit exposures have already been
provisioned. The bank has reviewed its loan portfolio,
reclassifying some companies and increasing the provision for
losses. The bank has focused on reducing the concentration of
clients in its loan portfolio and also on improving its efficiency
in passing on the revenues from FNO. As a result, partnerships with
third parties may arise. Over the past three years, the bank has
seen a retraction in its loan portfolio.

BASA's funding structure is less vulnerable to withdrawals as the
bank is considered a safe haven in times of crisis. In addition,
the revenues from FNO continue to be its largest source of funding.
The bank's liquidity remains adequate, with its more liquid assets
invested mostly in federal government securities.

Capitalization has remained adequate over the past three years,
although BASA's Fitch Core Capital ratio has remained negative due
to weaker internal capital generation. The reduction of
risk-weighted assets has partially offset this decline. This
allowed Tier 1 Regulatory Capital to remain acceptable at 12.4% in
May 2019, which is above the regulatory minimum and allows for the
expected resumption of growth throughout 2019. Should it be
necessary, Fitch believes the bank's controller, Brazilian National
Treasury (Tesouro Nacional), shall ensure that BASA meets the
minimum required by the Basel III rules. Fitch monitors the
possible risk of pressure on capital due to a potential court
ruling requiring BASA to provision the actuarial deficit of its
proprietary pension plan for employees.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

The SR of '3' reflects Fitch's expectations of moderate probability
of support from the federal government to the bank, if needed. The
agency believes that the Brazilian government would have a high
willingness to support BASA. BASA's SRF was affirmed at 'BB-', in
line with the Brazilian sovereign rating.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRS, SUPPORT RATING, SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

Any changes in Brazil's sovereign ratings or in Fitch's assessment
of the government's willingness and capacity to provide support to
BASA, if needed, would directly affect the bank's IDRs, SR and SRF,
all of which are driven by expected sovereign support.

NATIONAL RATINGS

BASA's National Ratings may be affected by a change in Fitch's
perception of the bank's local relativities with respect to other
Brazilian entities.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings of Banco da Amazonia:

  -- Long-Term, Foreign- and Local-Currency IDRs at 'BB-'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- Short-Term Foreign- and Local-Currency IDRs at 'B';

  -- Long-Term National Rating at 'AA(bra)'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Short-Term National Rating at 'F1+(bra)';

  -- Support Rating at '3';

  -- Support Rating Floor at 'BB-'.


BANCO DO BRASIL: Fitch Affirms LT IDRs at 'BB-', Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency
Issuer Default Ratings of Banco do Brasil S.A. at 'BB-' and its
long-term National rating at 'AA(bra)'. The Rating Outlooks on the
Long-Term IDRs and National Rating are Stable. In addition, Fitch
has affirmed BdB's Viability Rating at 'bb-', Support Rating at '3'
and Support Rating Floor at 'BB-'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRs, NATIONAL RATINGS

The affirmations of BdB's IDRs reflect Fitch's view that the bank
would receive support from the federal government, if needed. BdB's
IDRs are driven by sovereign support and are aligned with Brazil's
sovereign ratings. This reflects the majority federal government
ownership and its key policy role, particularly in rural lending
and systemic importance.

The Outlook on BdB' Long-Term IDRs and National Rating is Stable,
mirroring the Outlook of the sovereign ratings. Fitch believes that
BdB, similar to other public entities, remains potentially subject
to political influence given its state owned nature, despite its
solid corporate governance structure underpinned by its listing in
the most stringent Novo Mercado segment of the Brazilian stock
exchange B3. Fitch believes that BdB's disclosure remains high
quality.

VIABILITY RATING

The affirmation of BdB's VR reflects the constraints imposed by the
still challenging operating environment, and by the ratings of its
majority shareholder, the federal government. The latter reflects
the strong links between the two entities that limit the
possibility to differentiate BdB's ratings from Brazil's ratings.
The VR also reflects the bank's strong company profile, stable
funding and good asset quality. In addition, it captures the
adequate profitability and capitalization indicators that have
steadily improved since 2016, following the reformulation of BdB's
strategic objectives. The recent management changes that took place
following the inauguration of the new government are unlikely to
affect the bank's strategy.

BdB has leading franchises in multiple business segments, including
lending, insurance, asset management and debit/credit cards. It is
Brazil's largest bank in terms of assets and deposits. Its business
model is stable and well diversified.

BdB's Fitch Core Capital ratio continued to rise through March
2019, when it reached an adequate 13.40% (12.68% and 12.32%, in
2018 and 2017, respectively), reflecting both increasing
profitability and contraction of RWAs over the last three years.
Likewise, the bank's regulatory capital ratios continued to
improve. In March 2019, BdB's Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1), Tier 1
(T1) and total regulatory capital ratios stood at 10.50%, 14.00%
and 19.30%, respectively (10.00%, 13.40% and 18.90%, in 2018,
respectively).

In the future, there is a chance that BdB, similar to other federal
government owned banks, might have to pay back part or the full
amount of the hybrid instruments subscribed by the National
Treasury (Tesouro Nacional, or TN) and considered CET1 capital. The
timing and schedule is not yet defined. In March 2019, these
corresponded to 11% of BdB's CET1 capital. Furthermore, the portion
of the funding provided by the Fundo Constitucional de
Financiamento do Centro-Oeste (FCO) that makes up 80% of the bank's
Tier 2 capital is subject to a 10% annual phase out between
2020-2029. Given the bank's good internal capital generation
prospects, the two changes are likely to be manageable from a
capital adequacy point of view.

BdB's asset quality indicators improved further in 2018 and
remained broadly stable through March 2019. At March 2019, BdB's
NPLs as a percentage of gross loans stood at 2.6% of gross loans
(2.5% in 2018 and 3.7% in 2017). The companies segment continues to
have highest NPL ratio (3.3% at March 2019), while NPLs ratios in
the rural and individual segments remained lower (1.7% and 3.0%,
respectively), reflecting the exposure to lower risk loans with
solid guarantee structures in these segments. Fitch expects BdB's
asset quality to remain broadly stable through 2019, even
considering the possibility of further deterioration of the credit
profile of some of its largest and weaker borrowers, such as the
Odebrecht group. However, an unexpected significant deterioration
in the operating environment would be negative for asset quality.

BdB attained solid and sustainable progress in its profitability
since 2016. In March 2019, the bank's operating profit/RWA ratio
rose to 2.9% (2.5% and 2.3%, in 2018 and 2017, respectively).
Profitability is supported by a continuous decline in
pre-impairment operating income that reached 40% of pre-impairment
operating income in this period (45% and 56%, in 2018 and 2017,
respectively) and an incremental improvement in efficiency.

BdB's funding is diversified and retail-based. Customer deposits
and local financial bills, which are very similar to deposits, made
up 47% of total funding at March 2019. Locally, the bank is
considered a safe haven during times of crisis. BdB's liquidity is
very comfortable. At March 2019, BdB's liquidity coverage ratio was
239% broadly unchanged since 2017, while the loans to deposits
(including deposit-like products) ratio stood at an adequate 110%
(115% at March 2018).

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

The affirmation of BdB's SRs at '3' reflects the moderate
probability of sovereign support. Fitch believes that the Brazilian
government's willingness to support BdB in case of need is high;
however, its capacity to do so has fallen recently, as reflected in
the successive sovereign rating downgrades between 2016 and 2018.
BdB's SRF has been affirmed at 'BB-' and aligned with the sovereign
rating.

SENIOR DEBT RATING

The affirmation of BdB's senior debt ratings at 'BB-' reflects the
affirmation of the bank's Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR, which is
the anchor rating for the debt ratings.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRs, SUPPORT RATING, SUPPORT RATING FLOOR, SENIOR DEBT RATINGS

Any changes in Brazil's sovereign ratings or in Fitch's evaluation
of the government's willingness to provide support to BdB, in case
of need, would directly affect the bank's IDRs, SR, SRF and debt
ratings, all of which are driven by expected sovereign support.

NATIONAL RATINGS

BdB's National ratings may be affected by a change in Fitch's
perception of the bank's local relativities with respect to other
Brazilian entities.

VIABILITY RATING

BdB's VR would be reviewed in the case of a sovereign upgrade or a
downgrade, but currently has a limited upside potential, as it
captures operating environment constraints. BdB's VR would be
negatively affected if its FCC ratio falls below 9% and/or its
regulatory capital ratios to approach the minimum requirements, due
to a combination of asset quality deterioration, weakening of
profitability or higher than expected growth.

Fitch has affirmed BdB's ratings as follows:

  -- Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'BB-;, Outlook
Stable;

  -- Short-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'B';

  -- National long-term rating at 'AA(bra)'; Outlook Stable;

  -- National short-term rating at 'F1+(bra)';

  -- Support Rating at '3';

  -- Support Rating Floor at 'BB-';

  -- Senior unsecured notes due 2019, 2020, 2022, 2023 and 2025
ratings at 'BB-';

  -- Viability Rating at 'bb-'.


BANCO DO NORDESTE: Fitch Affirms LT IDRs at 'BB-', Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Banco do Nordeste do Brasil SA's
Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings at
'BB-' and Long-term National rating at 'AA(bra)'. The Rating
Outlooks for the Long-Term IDRs and National Rating are Stable. In
addition, Fitch has affirmed BNB's Support Rating at '3' and
Support Rating Floor at 'BB-'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRs, NATIONAL RATINGS

The affirmations of BNB's IDRs reflect Fitch's view that the bank
would receive support from the federal government support, if
needed. BNB's IDRs are driven by sovereign support and are aligned
with Brazil's sovereign ratings. The ratings also reflect the
important and relatively stable source of funding, the
shareholders, and the important role of the bank in the
implementation of policies to promote development in northeast
Brazil. Fitch considers BNB a policy bank and, as per Fitch's Bank
Rating Criteria, does not assign the entity a Viability Rating. The
agency believes that BNB, like other public entities, may be
subject to political influence, given its public control and strong
ties with the government. The Outlook on BNB's Long-term IDRs and
National Rating is Stable, mirroring the Outlook of the sovereign
ratings.

BNB's strategy is in line with the government's goal of developing
and supporting the northeast. By law, the bank manages the
Constitutional Financing Fund of the Northeast (FNE), and its
operations are largely guided by its political role. The
institution grants credit to 11 states, which demonstrates its
development policy importance to the government.

The bank's financial profile has no direct impact on the ratings,
but has remained relatively stable since Fitch's last review.
Due to its public mission, BNB's asset quality ratios are
historically lower than those of its private sector peers, as there
are more risks involved in development portfolios, since they
present lower asset quality and higher expected losses, which in
turn could lead to earnings volatility. The dynamics of credit
expansion for regional development banks, such as BNB, tend to be
different from those of commercial banks, given the countercyclical
role of their policies, in addition to longer tenors. For 2019, BNB
forecast another strong year of credit expansion of its operations
related to infrastructure, given the strong position of the bank in
the region and competitive cost, benefited by subsidized funding
lines.

Fitch believes that credit expansion will be higher than seen in
other development banks and in the private sector. However, BNB
continues with its strategic alignment, which seeks to maintain
capital, improve efficiency, and reduce delinquency, which will
gradually increase profitability.

Over the last three years, BNB has shown a positive trend in asset
quality improvement. Impaired loans, or loans classified between
'D-H' over total loans went down to 7.7% at March 2019, from 7,8%,
13.7% and 18.3% at the end of 2018, 2017 and 2016 respectively. The
reduction in delinquency (at both BNB and FNE), and consequently
the decrease of provisioning expenses, which in 2018 were 22% and
57% lower in comparison with 2017 and 2016, respectively, were
mainly due the approval of laws (especially federal law No. 13.340)
that allowed the bank to renegotiate a relevant part of FNE
problematic portfolio related with rural clients.

As a result, BNB had a profitability ratio above its historical
average, with ROEA above 20% over the last three years, 26.8%
annualized ROAE on the first quarter of 2019. However, BNB's
profitability in the upcoming years could be pressured by changes
to the law regarding FNE administration fees, which is an important
source of revenues for the bank. Staring this year, FNE
administration fees will gradually decrease until 2023, reaching
1.5% or half the fee received by the bank until 2018.
BNB has a solid funding base, which, because of its nature, is less
exposed to withdrawals. This assumption is justified by FNE
deposits and, like other public banks, is considered a safe haven
in times of crisis. FNE's resources continue to be the bank's
largest source of funding, reaching BRL25,9 billion at March 2019,
from BRL 24,6 billion at 2018 end, or about 50% of total funding.

Compared to the two other federal development banks, BNDES and
BASA, BNB has the tightest capital base, despite the overall good
profitability and low dividends levels over the last years. BNB's
pressured capital base is a result of the rapid expansion of loan
origination, especially in FNE, in which the bank assumes a portion
of the credit risk originated. However, capitalization has remained
relative stable, but close to Basel III minimum levels. In March
2019, BNB's Tier I capital was at 9.5%, from 10.2% in March 2018,
higher in comparison with YE18, 9% compared to the current minimum
requirement of 8.5%. Fitch's base scenario does not consider the
need for capital contributions. However, it underlines the need for
BNB to maintain current dividend levels, combined with sustained
growth in its operations, in line with the internal capital
generation

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

The affirmation of BNB's SRs at '3' reflects the moderate
probability of sovereign support. Fitch believes that the Brazilian
government willingness to support BNB if needed is high; however,
its capacity to do so has fallen in the recent past, as reflected
in the successive sovereign rating downgrades. BNB's SRF has been
affirmed at 'BB-' and aligned with the sovereign rating.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRs, SUPPORT RATING, SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

Changes in control, sovereign ratings, or Fitch's assessment of the
government's propensity to support BNB, if necessary, could affect
the ratings. Changes in BNB control or the Treasury's propensity to
support it may also affect the ratings.

NATIONAL RATINGS

BNB's national ratings may be affected by a change in Fitch's
perception of a change in local relativities to other local
issuers.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

Banco do Nordeste do Brasil:

  -- Long-term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'BB-'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- Short-term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'B';

  -- National Long-Term Rating at 'AA(bra)'; Outlook Stable;

  -- National Short-Term rating at 'F1+(bra)';

  -- Support Rating at '3';

  -- Support Rating Floor at 'BB-'.


BANCO PAN: Fitch Affirms 'B+' LongTerm IDRs, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Long-Term Issuer Foreign and Local
Currency Issuer Default Ratings of Banco Pan S.A. at 'B+' and its
long-term National rating at 'A(bra)'. The Rating Outlooks of the
Long-Term IDRs and National Rating are Stable. Fitch also affirmed
Pan's Support Rating at '4'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS AND NATIONAL RATINGS

The affirmation of Pan's IDRs and National Ratings reflects Fitch's
assessment on the likelihood of support from its co-controlling
shareholders, Caixa Economica Federal (Caixa: BB-/Stable) and Banco
BTG Pactual S.A. (BTG: BB-/Stable), which remains unchanged. Pan's
IDRs are one notch lower than Caixa's and BTG's IDRs, as Fitch
considers the bank a strategically important subsidiary for both,
despite the differences in strategy, policies controls and brand.

Since the beginning of its restructuring in 2011, Pan has been
supported by its co-controlling shareholders. This support takes
place both through successive capital injections, liquidity lines
and loan sales. In the last few years, Pan has reduced the use of
these agreements even though they still remain an important source
of revenues for the bank and support the viability of its
franchise. Revenues generated by assignments are anticipated as
Pan's recurring operating results (excluding the anticipated
revenues) remain below market peers. Pan's operating results are
still impacted by fixed-rate legacy deposits, which will start
maturing in significant amounts by 2020. In March 2019, Pan
recorded a credit portfolio of BRL21.8 billion (BRL19.1 billion in
March 2018), while the balance of the credit portfolio without risk
retention in Caixa's balance sheet totaled BRL10.3 billion on the
same date (BRL15.8 billion a year earlier).

Pan has invested in a strategy to build a more independent funding
franchise of its shareholders and to relate more closely to the
market. However, this move will be gradual and will depend greatly
on an improvement in the bank's performance. Fitch believes this
will happen progressively. In addition, once the market offers
better growth opportunities, Pan will face the challenge of
increasing the volume of credits retained on its balance sheet,
increasing profitability and internal capital generation. Its
capital is close to regulatory limits, and there is no expectation
of additional capital injections in the short term. However, Fitch
believes that due to Pan's relatively small size compared to its
shareholders that support (from BTG and Caixa), if necessary, can
be easily managed.

Although Pan's IDRs are one notch lower than Caixa's and BTG's,
Fitch believes both banks place the same degree of importance on
supporting Pan should a stress scenario occur. This support would
be, and is currently, made through large credit assignments, (if
capital indices decline abruptly) and increased liquidity lines in
cases of market stress that could reduce Pan's liquidity.

VR

Pan's (VR) 'b' continues to be influenced by its business model,
which still benefits from loan sales and funding lines carried out
by Caixa. Pan's strategy has changed over time, most recently when
it discontinued its SME and real estate products/portfolios, but
its focus on the payroll-deductible and financing used vehicles has
remained unchanged. Similarly to other midsize banks, the bank has
recently adopted the strategy to build its digital bank. Pan
expects the new strategy to be in place during the second half of
2019 and to become an additional channel for reaching its clients.

Profitability, although still below its peers, has been rising in
recent periods. ROEA was close to 9.5% in March 2019, from 5.6% at
the end of 2017 and 6.1% a year earlier, operating profit/RWA of 3%
in March 2019, from 2.7% and 0.7% in 2018 and 2017 respectively.
The increase in portfolio retention given a larger capital base,
previously sold to Caixa, combined with improvements in efficiency
and reduction in provisioning expenses resulted in improved
profitability. Fitch expects that Pan's profitability will remain
lower than its peers, although better than historical figures.

Pan's capitalization remains adequate after the capital injection
made in 2018 (BRL400 million) and improving profitability. At March
2019, common equity tier 1 (CET1) and total regulatory capital
ratios stood at 11.9% and 13.8% respectively, while the Fitch Core
Capital (FCC) ratio was 13.1%. Fitch no longer considers this a
short-term need but believes that, if necessary, shareholders would
provide capital for the bank with ease due to the relatively small
size of Pan compared to its controlling shareholders.

Fitch's assessment of Pan's funding and liquidity is positively
influenced by Caixa's significant and stable support, which it
realizes by acquiring loans from Pan and interbank deposit
agreements. Pan's dependency on Caixa is declining as part of its
funding diversification and higher loan portfolio retention
following the 2018 capital injection. As of March 2019, Caixa's
representation in Pan's funding base dropped to 35% from 45% and
60% in March 2018 and 2017, respectively.

SUPPORT RATING

The affirmation of Pan's Support Rating at '4' reflects the
moderate likelihood of support from Caixa. Fitch believes that the
cost of not providing support to Pan would be greater than
providing it because of the reputational risk to the federal bank.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRS, NATIONAL RATINGS AND SUPPORT RATINGS IDRs

Pan's National and Support ratings may be downgraded if Fitch
believes that there has been a weakening in the willingness or
ability of Caixa and/or BTG to provide Pan with support. Changes in
the funding limits and the assignment of credit agreement to Caixa
or in Pan's shareholding structure may also lead to a negative
rating action. Pan's National ratings may be affected by a change
in Fitch's perception of a change in local relativities to other
local issuers.

VR

VR Pan's VR would benefit from the consolidation of its company
profile and the successful development of its business model
together with further sustained improvement in the bank's key
credit metrics, especially regarding recurring earnings and asset
quality.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

  Long-term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'B+'; Outlook
Stable;

  Short-term Foreign- and Local-Currency IDRs at 'B';

  Viability Rating at 'b';

  Long-Term National Rating at 'A(bra)'; Outlook Stable;

  Short-term National Rating at 'F1(bra)';

  Support Rating at '4';


BNDES: Fitch Affirms LT IDRs at 'BB-', Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency
Issuer Default Ratings of Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento
Economico e Social (BNDES) at 'BB-' and its long-term National
rating at 'AA(bra)'. The Outlooks of the Long-Term IDRs and
National Rating are Stable. Fitch also affirmed BNDES's Support
Rating at '3' and Support Rating Floor at 'BB-'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS, NATIONAL RATINGS

The affirmation of BNDES's IDRs reflect Fitch's view that the bank
would receive support from the federal government, should the need
arise. BNDES's IDRs are driven by sovereign support and are aligned
with Brazil's sovereign ratings. This reflects the full federal
government ownership and its key policy role in the implementation
of government economic policies. Fitch considers BNDES a policy
bank and, as per the Bank Rating Criteria, it does not assign the
entity a Viability Rating. The Outlook on BNDES's Long-Term IDRs
and National Rating is Stable, mirroring the Outlook of the
sovereign ratings.

As a state-owned development bank, BNDES's strategy is directly
linked to government economic policies, and potentially subject to
political influence. Top management turnover has been high at BNDES
in the recent years, and the bank has had four CEO changes since
2016, the latest in January 2019. The recent management changes
that took place following the inauguration of the new government
are unlikely to affect the bank's strategy.

BNDES's loan disbursements remain relatively modest due to tighter
underwriting standards, loss of competitiveness in some sectors
following the adoption of TLP (Taxa de Longo Prazo) as the
benchmark lending rate in early 2018, replacing the previous
benchmark TJLP (Taxa de Juros de Longo Prazo)and lower risk
appetite. Furthermore, the decline in BNDES funding base stemming
from the pre-payments of part of its debt to the National Treasury
(Tesouro Nacional; TN) has also constrained the bank's loan
origination capacity. As of June 2019, BNDES has pre-paid
approximately a total of BRL340 billion of its debt to TN (BRL100bn
in 2016, BRL50bn in 2017, BRL130bn in 2018 and BRL30bn as of June
2019). Further payments through 2019 are likely.

At March 2019, TN funds, excluding hybrid capital, made up 38% of
the bank's total liabilities, while funds from the Workers'
Assistance Fund (Fundo de Amparo ao Trabalhador; FAT) corresponded
to a further 39% (47% and 34%, respectively, in March 2018).

BNDES's capitalization ratios continued to rise due to the
continuous decline in loan disbursements, solid profitability and
the recovery of local stock market that has resulted in the
significant increase in the security revaluation reserves (from
negative BRL12.3 billion at year-end 2015 to positive BRL 28.4
billion at March 2019). At March 2019, the bank's Fitch Core
capital (FCC) and Core Equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratios stood at a
comfortable 22.1% and 22.7%, respectively (19.1% and 19.8%, in
2018, respectively). Total regulatory capital was very comfortable
at 32% (29% in 2018). The bank's maximum 60% dividend payout policy
adopted in 2017 is supportive of the bank's capitalization.

There is a chance that BNDES, similar to other federal government
owned banks, might be required to pay back part or the full amount
of the hybrid instruments subscribed by the TN and considered CET1
capital in the future. The timing and schedule is not yet defined.
In March 2019, these corresponded to a meaningful 28% of BNDES'
CET1 capital. Furthermore, the portion of FAT funding that makes up
the entirety of the bank's Tier 2 capital is subject to a 10%
annual phase out between 2020-2029. Given the bank's strong CET1
capital, even excluding the hybrids, the two changes are likely to
be manageable from a capital adequacy point of view. However, the
potential fall in the CET1 ratio following the payment of hybrids
could prove a challenge for the bank to meet the legal lending
limits by the deadline set for 2027.

Over the last four years, BNDES's disbursements dropped by
two-thirds between 2014 and year-end 2018, resulting in negative
loan growth since 2016. As of March 2019, the bank's outstanding
loans were 27% below the peak reached in 2015. BNDES's loan quality
indicators remain better than sector averages. The relatively low
impairment ratios are partly explained by BNDES's loans to
financial institutions for on-lending which made up 51% of total
loans in the first quarter of 2019. In the same period, impaired
loans classified in the 'D-H' range and non-performing loans above
90 days stood at 5% and 2.6% respectively, 4.4% and 2.1% at March
2018. Fitch expects BNDES asset quality to remain broadly stable
through 2019 even considering the possibility of the further
deterioration of the credit profile of some of its largest and
weaker borrowers, such as Odebrecht group. However, an unexpected
significant deterioration in the operating environment would be
negative for asset quality.

Despite lower origination levels, BNDES's profitability has
improved since 2017, mainly due to a significant decline in
impairment charges for loans and strong investments gains, which
led the operating profit/RWA ratio to reach 11.6% at March 2019
(1.7% on average between 2014 and 2018). Downside risk is a
significant deterioration in the operating environment, which could
result from the failure of the government to pass the pension
reforms, and, in turn, hamper economic growth and/or cause market
volatility.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

The affirmation of BNDES's SRs at '3' reflects the moderate
probability of sovereign support. Fitch believes that the Brazilian
government would have a high willingness to support BNDES in case
of need; however, its capacity to do so has fallen in the recent
past, as reflected in the successive sovereign rating downgrades.
BNDES's SRF is affirmed at 'BB-' and aligned with the sovereign
rating.

SENIOR DEBT RATING

The affirmation of BNDES's senior debt rating at 'BB-' reflects the
affirmation of the bank's Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR, which is
the anchor rating for the debt rating.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRS, SUPPORT RATING, SUPPORT RATING FLOOR, SENIOR DEBT RATING

Any changes in Brazil's sovereign ratings or in Fitch's evaluation
of the government's willingness to provide support to BNDES, in
case of need, would directly affect the bank's IDRs, SR, SRF and
debt rating, all of which are driven by expected sovereign support.


NATIONAL RATINGS

The National ratings of BNDES may be affected by a change in
Fitch's perception of the bank's local relativities with respect to
other Brazilian entities.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

  -- Long-term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'BB-', Outlook
Stable;

  -- Short-term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'B';

  -- National long-term Rating at 'AA(bra)', Outlook Stable;

  -- National Short-term Rating at 'F1+(bra)';

  -- Support Rating at '3';

  -- Support Rating Floor at 'BB-';

  -- Senior unsecured notes due 2023 'BB-'.


BRASIL PHARMA: Judge Approves Bankruptcy for Drugstore Operator
----------------------------------------------------------------
Gabriela Mello at Reuters reports that Brazilian drugstore operator
Brasil Pharma said a Sao Paulo court judge had approved the
bankruptcy request it filed on June 6, when the company warned it
could no longer obtain the resources to execute a restructuring
plan.

Reuters, citing a securities filing, relates that the bankruptcy
court has named Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Consultores as judicial
administrator of Brasil Pharma's in-court restructuring and ordered
the sale of all of its brands.

Brasil Pharma owns three different drugstore chains: Big Ben,
Farmais and Farmacia Sant'anna, the report notes.  Difficulties
integrating the chains and a rift among shareholders are among the
reasons for its bankruptcy, as well as a high level of debt, the
report relays.

The company is currently controlled by Stigma II LLC, which holds a
94.49% stake and is managed by private equity group Lyon Capital,
the report adds.


CAIXA ECONOMICA: Fitch Affirms LT IDRs at 'BB-', Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency
Issuer Default Ratings of Caixa Economica Federal at 'BB-' and its
long-term National rating at 'AA(bra)'. The Rating Outlooks of the
Long-Term IDRs and National Rating are Stable. Fitch has also
affirmed Caixa's Support Rating (SR) at '3' and Support Rating
Floor (SRF) at 'BB-'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS
IDRS, NATIONAL RATINGS

The affirmation of Caixa's IDRs reflects Fitch's view that the bank
would receive support from the federal government should the need
arise. Caixa's IDRs are driven by sovereign support and are aligned
with Brazil's sovereign ratings. This reflects the majority federal
government ownership, its key policy role in the implementation of
government economic policies, and the bank's systemic importance.
Fitch considers Caixa a policy bank and, as per its Bank Rating
Criteria, does not assign the entity a Viability Rating. The
Outlook on Caixa's Long-Term IDRs and National Rating is Stable,
mirroring the Outlook of the sovereign ratings.

Fitch believes that Caixa, similarly to other public entities,
remains subject to potential political influence given its
state-owned nature and strong links with the government. Caixa has
historically played a crucial policy role in implementing the
government's anticyclical measures, with a particular focus on
mortgages and lending to the lower-income section of the
population. Caixa is Brazil's largest mortgage lender, with a
market share of 69%, as of December 2018.

There is a chance that Caixa, similarly to other federal government
owned banks, might be required in the future to pay back part or
the full amount of the hybrid instruments subscribed by the
National Treasury (Tesouro Nacional, TN) and considered Core Equity
Tier 1 (CET1) capital. In December 2018, these corresponded to a
meaningful 60% of Caixa's CET1 capital. Although the timing and
schedule is not yet defined, Fitch believes that the repayment will
occur in a timely manner, so as not to compromise the bank's
capitalization. Furthermore, the portion of the funding provided by
the Fundo de Garantia do Tempo de Servico (FGTS) that made up 93%
of the bank's Tier 2 capital in 2018 is subject to a 10% annual
phase out between 2020-2029.

To address these payments and strengthen focus on its core
businesses, the bank has announced that it intends to sell some
subsidiaries and operations. Nevertheless, given the meaningful
contribution of these companies or areas to Caixa's revenues, Fitch
expects the bank to remain the controlling shareholder, selling
only a portion to the market.

Since 2016, Caixa's strategic objectives shifted from aggressive
growth to the improvement of profitability and internal capital
generation. To that end, the bank has implemented measures to
increase efficiency and policies to grow only in segments with
adequate return on capital, which started bearing fruit in 2017,
given its effective execution. Caixa's loan growth was negative
0.4% in 2017 and dropped further to negative 1.6% in 2018. The
recent management changes that took place following the
inauguration of the new government are unlikely to significantly
affect the bank's overall strategic direction.

At the end of 2018, the bank's Fitch Core Capital (FCC) ratio
increased to 14.32% (the highest historical level) from 11.90% in
2017 and 9.62% in 2016. The improvement was due to the slowdown of
loan growth, higher earnings and lower dividend payouts. During the
same period, regulatory ratios have also improved despite the
gradual phase-in of the Basel III framework. As of December 2018,
Caixa's CET1 and total regulatory capital ratios were 12.88% and
19.60%, respectively. The bank has no Additional Tier 1 (AT1)
capital.

Pressures on Caixa's asset quality indicators have eased since 2017
leading to a drop in the bank's loan impairment charges. This
improvement has been supported by renegotiations and better
collections over the past few years. As a result, Caixa's NPLs as a
percentage of gross loans have remained broadly stable through
December 2018, when they stood at 2.1% (2.3% in 2017 and 2.9% in
2016). In the mortgage portfolio, NPLs remained stable in 1.3% in
2018. In 2017, there was a high volume of loan renegotiations in
this segment that corresponded to 6% of total outstanding
mortgages. In the companies lending segment the NPL ratio increased
to 5.6% from 5.3% at year-end 2017, in part, due to the contraction
in outstanding loans. The bank's impaired loans (those in the
central bank's D-H range) stood at a relatively high 9.8% and 9.7%
in 2018 and 2017, respectively. Fitch expects Caixa's asset quality
ratios to remain broadly stable through 2019 even considering the
possibility of the further deterioration of the credit profiles of
some of its largest and weaker borrowers, such as Odebrecht group.
However, an unexpected significant deterioration in the operating
environment would be negative for asset quality.

After reaching its lowest level in 2015, Caixa's operating profit
recovered steadily reaching a high 3.0% of RWAs in 2018 from 1.5%
in 2017. The significant increase was aided by the steady fall in
loan impairment charges and progress in the reductions of costs.
The former fell to 40% of pre-impairment operating profit at
December 2018, from 66% in 2017 and 86% in 2016. An improvement in
net interest margin (NIM) has also been instrumental. Fitch expects
the improvement to be sustainable, although a severe deterioration
in the operating environment could again lead to an increase in
credit costs and affect overall profitability.

Caixa's funding base is highly diversified and supported by the
bank's extensive network. It is predominantly retail funded, with
customer deposits and deposit-like local financial bills making up
58% of total funding at December 2018.

Caixa funds its mortgages via savings deposits, local financial
bills linked to mortgages and on-lending from FGTS. The share of
mortgages funded by FGTS has increased gradually since
first-quarter 2015. At December 2018, FGTS funding made up 59% of
all mortgages (54% at December 2017). Caixa has a structural
maturity mismatch between its mortgage loans and liabilities,
except for those funded by FGTS, which are fully matched. This
maturity mismatch risk is mitigated by the historic stability of
Caixa's funding base and comfortable liquidity.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

The affirmation of Caixa's SRs at '3' reflects the moderate
probability of sovereign support. Fitch believes that the Brazilian
government would have a high willingness to support Caixa in case
of need, but its capacity to do so has fallen in the recent past,
as reflected in the successive sovereign rating downgrades between
2016 and 2018. Fitch has affirmed Caixa's SRF at 'BB-' and aligned
it with the sovereign rating.

SENIOR AND SUBORDINATED DEBT

The affirmation of Caixa's senior and subordinate debt ratings at
'BB-' and 'B' reflects the affirmation of the bank's Long-Term
Foreign Currency IDR, which is the anchor rating for both debt
ratings. Caixa's senior unsecured debt rating corresponds to the
bank's Long-Term IDR, while its subordinated debt is rated two
notches below its Long-Term IDR. The notching is driven by the
expected high loss severity of the notes. No notching for
non-performance is applied because coupons are not deferrable and
the write-down trigger is close to the point of non-viability. As a
result, Fitch believes the non-performance risk is not material
from the rating perspective. In addition, since Caixa is a fully
government-owned domestic systemically important bank, it likely
would receive owner (i.e. government) support before the
loss-absorption features of the notes are triggered.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRS, SUPPORT RATING, SUPPORT RATING FLOOR, SENIOR and SUBORDINATED
DEBT RATINGS

Any changes in Brazil's sovereign ratings or in Fitch's evaluation
of the government's willingness to provide support to Caixa, in
case of need, would directly affect the bank's IDRs, SR, SRF and
debt ratings, all of which are driven by expected sovereign
support.

NATIONAL RATINGS

The national ratings of Caixa may be affected by a change in
Fitch's perception of the bank's local relativities with respect to
other Brazilian entities.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

  Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'BB-'; Outlook
Stable;

  Short-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'B';

  National Long-Term Rating at 'AA(bra)'; Outlook Stable;

  National Short-Term Rating at 'F1+(bra)';

  Support Rating at '3';

  Support Rating Floor at 'BB-';

  Senior unsecured notes due 2022 at 'BB-';

  Subordinated notes due 2024 at 'B'.




===========================
C A Y M A N   I S L A N D S
===========================

BANORTE: Moody's Gives (P)Ba2 (hyb) Rating to New $1BB Tier 1 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a (P)Ba2 (hyb) foreign
currency junior subordinated debt rating to Banco Mercantil del
Norte, S.A.'s (Banorte) proposed issuance of perpetual callable
subordinated non-preferred non-cumulative Additional Tier 1 capital
notes, with an optional redemption on the first call date. The
Contingent Convertible Capital Notes (the notes) will be issued
through Banorte's Cayman Islands branch, Banco Mercantil del Norte,
S.A. (Cayman Islands) for an aggregate amount of about USD1.5
billion. The outlook remains negative.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS:

The following rating was assigned to Banco Mercantil del Norte,
S.A.'s Convertible Capital Notes issued through Banco Mercantil del
Norte, S.A. (Cayman I):

Long-term foreign currency junior subordinated debt rating of
(P)Ba2 (hyb)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The assigned (P)Ba2 (hyb) rating is positioned three notches below
Banorte's baa2 adjusted baseline credit assessment (adjusted BCA),
in line with Moody's standard notching guidance for contractual
non-viability securities and reflects both the high probability of
default of these notes as well as the high loss given default
resulting from their subordination to the bank's senior debt and
deposits.

Under the terms of the notes, principal will be partially or fully
written down in the event that (i) the bank's fundamental capital
ratio, as calculated pursuant to applicable Mexican capitalization
regulations, is equal to or below 5.125%; (ii) the bank's license
is revoked, or (iii) if Mexico's Banking Stability Committee makes
a determination that Banorte requires financial assistance, prior
to the revocation of its license, in order to avoid a systemic
risk.

In the case that any of the aforementioned events occur, the notes
would be written down, together with any concurrent pro rata write
down or conversion of any other subordinated non-preferred
indebtedness issued by the bank and then outstanding, in an amount
sufficient to return the bank's common equity Tier 1 (capital
basico fundamental, or CET1) ratio to the minimum level required by
local regulations at that time and to restore any countercyclical
and/or systemically important bank (D-SIB) supplemental capital
requirements then in place. The current minimum plus conservation
buffer for fundamental capital and the bank's D-SIB buffer are 7.0%
and 0.9% respectively.

Banorte will automatically cancel interest due on the notes (a) if
the bank is classified as Class II or below pursuant Articles 121
and 122 of the Mexican Banking Law, or (b) if the bank would be
classified as Class II or below as a result of the applicable
interest payment. Based upon current regulations, the bank will be
classified as Class II if its capital levels fall below the
following minimum thresholds: 10.5% for the Total Capital (Capital
Neto) ratio, 8.5% for the Tier 1 (Capital Basico) ratio, and 7.0%
for the CET1 ratio. The bank will also be classified as Class II if
it fails to meet any additional D-SIB and countercyclical capital
supplements required by the regulator.

In addition to the contractual write-down provisions, interest on
the notes will be due and payable subject to Banorte's sole and
absolute discretion, always and for any reason, to cancel any
interest payment in whole or in part. These notes constitute
subordinated non-preferred indebtedness and will rank: (i)
subordinate and junior in right of payment and in liquidation to
all of the Bank's present and future Senior Indebtedness; (ii) pari
passu without preference among themselves and with all the Bank's
present and future other unsecured Subordinated Non-Preferred
Indebtedness and; (iii) senior only to all classes of the bank's
equity or capital stock.

Despite the very high probability that the government will support
Banorte's depositors considering the bank's large deposit market
share of 13.3% as of March 2019, the ratings assigned to these
notes do not benefit from uplift stemming from government support
because they are intended to provide loss absorption.

The bank plans to use a portion of the proceeds of the notes to
repay some of its outstanding Tier 2 bonds issued under Basel II
norms, which will improve the structure of its regulatory capital
of 18.1% as of March 2019. However, the notes will not benefit the
bank's regulatory CET1 or Total Capital ratios, or Moody's
preferred ratio of tangible common equity to risk-weighted assets,
which was an ample 14.8% as of March 2019.

Moody's issues provisional (P) ratings in advance of the final sale
of notes, but these ratings only represent Moody's preliminary
credit opinion. Upon a conclusive review of the transaction and
associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to assign
definitive ratings to the hybrid subordinated notes. A definitive
rating may differ from a provisional rating.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS UP OR DOWN

This subordinated rating is likely to face downward pressure if the
bank's core capitalization levels significantly decrease or if its
expansion into consumer and commercial lending leads to a
substantial deterioration of asset quality in the event the
operating environment deteriorates sharply.

Upward pressure could accumulate in the assigned rating if
Banorte's asset quality is sustained while the bank diversifies its
loan book into retail in a decelerating economy while maintaining
its ample core capitalization and profitability levels.




===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Minimum Wage Hike Deal Could Be Reached
-----------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that despite the lack of consensus on the
issue of the reclassification of companies and other points, the
National Wage Committee will meet June 11 when an agreement is
expected to be reached to increase the minimum salary.

Nonetheless the contradictions continue to emerge on the issue of
reclassification of companies that could brake a possible salary
increase, according to Dominican Today.

"There was no progress because that issue of reclassification is
still there permanently latent," said National Unions (CNUS) leader
Rafael Abreu, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on June
3, 2019, Fitch Ratings has assigned a 'BB-' rating to Dominican
Republic's DOP50.523 billion notes (equivalent to USD1 billion ),
maturing 2026 and to the USD1.5 billion bonds maturing 2049.




=====================
E L   S A L V A D O R
=====================

EL SALVADOR: Fitch Affirms Longterm IDRs at 'B-', Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed El Salvador's Long-Term Foreign-Currency
Issuer Default Rating at 'B-'/Stable Outlook.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

El Salvador's 'B-' rating reflects recent history of local currency
defaults (2017) as well as political uncertainties that weigh on
congressional passage of key economic reform measures, including
budgets and associated financing (a 2/3 majority in the legislature
is needed for external debt authorization), high debt burden and
weak economic growth prospects.

The political landscape in El Salvador has shifted with Nayib
Bukele, who ran under the umbrella of the GANA party, and took
office on June 1, 2019. He won resoundingly in the presidential
election in the first round vote in February 2019, and is the first
president since the country's civil war not allied with either the
traditional ARENA or FMLN parties. Bukele has pledged to focus on
creating jobs, boosting investment, downsizing the government by
merging ministries and government agencies and tackling corruption
and insecurity.

Prospects for President Bukele's reform agenda will depend on his
ability to negotiate important legislation through the National
Assembly. His GANA party only has 10 out 84 seats in the National
Assembly (ARENA has 37 and FMLN has 23). His political capital,
however, is high with approval ratings above 75% (and negative
ratings only at 4%) ahead of taking office.

Public disaffection with corruption allegations and political
gridlock contributed to the loss of votes in absolute terms for
both the major parties, FMLN and ARENA, in the 2018 legislative
elections. Support for both parties continues to fall with approval
ratings below 10% for each. Historically, political polarization
has led to gridlock with failure to approve budgets as well as a
default on local pension related debt in 2017.

El Salvador's financing needs (excluding short-term debt and
pension related debt) have risen significantly in 2019 to USD1.3
billion, including the USD800 million bond amortization in December
and a higher fiscal deficit. Congressional approval of the 2019
budget and authorization of external issuance for its financing
needs have reduced rollover risk to near-term payments. The stock
of short-term debt is high with the Letes totalling USD741.9
million as of June 5 and short-term Cetes at USD220 million (as
bridge financing until the upcoming issuance of an external bond),
leaving little room for additional local financing. El Salvador's
financing needs fall to an estimated USD800 million in 2020 (not
including ST debt or pension related debt).

El Salvador's fiscal deficit rose to 2.7% of GDP in 2018, up from
2.5% in 2017 due to increased spending on subsidies, wages and
interest. The deficit is expected to reach 3.0% of GDP in 2019 and
remain at this level over the next two years, due to a drop in
revenues stemming from a court ruling that stated the financial
transactions tax is unconstitutional, and continued spending
pressures, including recent mandates from the National Assembly to
increase government transfers to FODES (local government fund).
Debt to GDP has risen to nearly 70% of GDP and is expected to
gradually rise over the forecast period absent fiscal adjustment.
El Salvador's debt and interest burdens remain above the 'B'
median. Fitch expects that further fiscal adjustment and/or
stronger economic performance would be necessary to place the
government debt/GDP ratio firmly on a downward trajectory.

Although the government passed a pension reform in September 2017
that alleviated pension related costs to the government (estimated
at 0.8% of GDP in 2018), several reform proposals are being
considered to address low replacement rates and coverage, and a new
reform could be introduced by 2020, which could push up pensions
costs.

El Salvador's economic growth rose modestly to 2.5% in 2018 from
2.3% in 2017, largely because of increased investment. Remittances
grew by 8.1%, helping drive consumption as well as imports. Fitch
expects growth to remain relatively steady over 2019-2020; however,
remittance growth is expected to moderate to around 5% in 2019. El
Salvador's potential growth remains weak, near 2.5%, due to a
number of factors including high crime rates, poor infrastructure
and net outward migration. Inflation and inflation expectations
remain low due to official dollarization.

El Salvador's current account deficit rose to 4.8% of GDP in 2018,
up from 1.9% of GDP in 2017 as a result of strong growth in imports
and a slowdown in the growth of remittances. The current account
deficit is expected to remain wide in 2019 and 2020 at nearly 5% of
GDP due to a continued slowdown in remittance growth and higher
imports (some related to capital goods as a result of higher
investment).

El Salvador's external indicators are weaker than the 'B' median.
External debt service, 26% of CXR in 2018, is more than double the
'B' median of 12%. El Salvador's sovereign net external debt at 25%
of GDP in 2018 is higher than the 15% for the 'B' median and its
international reserve buffer at 2.9 months of current external
payments in 2018 is below the 3.8 months for the 'B' median.
However, El Salvador's commodity export dependence is also well
below most 'B' peers.

SOVEREIGN RATING MODEL (SRM) and QUALITATIVE OVERLAY (QO)

Fitch's proprietary SRM assigns El Salvador a score equivalent to a
'B' rating on the Long-Term Foreign-Currency (LT FC) IDR scale.

Fitch's sovereign rating committee adjusted the output from the SRM
to arrive at the final LT FC IDR by applying its QO, relative to
rated peers, as follows:

  -- Public Finances: -1 notch, to reflect El Salvador's high
reliance on short-term debt, shallow local capital market and track
record of difficulty in obtaining the 2/3rd majority in the
National Assembly needed for external debt issuance authorization.

Fitch's SRM is the agency's proprietary multiple regression rating
model that employs 18 variables based on three-year centred
averages, including one year of forecasts, to produce a score
equivalent to a LT FC IDR. Fitch's QO is a forward-looking
qualitative framework designed to allow for adjustment to the SRM
output to assign the final rating, reflecting factors within its
criteria that are not fully quantifiable and/or not fully reflected
in the SRM.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Developments That Could, Individually or Collectively, Result in A
Positive Rating Action Include:

  -- Easing of financing constraints;

  -- Further fiscal adjustment that would lead to improved debt
dynamics.

Developments That Could, Individually or Collectively, Result in A
Negative Rating Action Include:

  -- Political stalemate that leads to failure in achieving timely
passage of the 2020 budget and the associated external financing.

  -- An external shock that negatively impacts economic growth and
debt dynamics.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch assumes that El Salvador successfully issues an external bond
to complete its financing needs, including to refinance its USD 800
million bond amortizing in December 2019.

U.S. growth remains solid, underpinning El Salvador's economic
growth and balance of payments through remittances and exports.

Fitch affirmed the following:

  -- Long-Term Foreign-Currency IDR at 'B-'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Long-Term Local-Currency IDR at 'B-'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Short-Term Foreign-Currency IDR at 'B';

  -- Short-Term Local-Currency IDR at 'B;'

  -- Country Ceiling at 'B';

  -- Issue ratings on long-term senior unsecured foreign-currency
bonds at 'B-'.




===============
H O N D U R A S
===============

HONDURAS: Moody's Affirms 'B1' LT Issuer & Unsecured Bond Ratings
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the Government of Honduras'
B1 long-term issuer and B1 senior unsecured bond ratings. The
outlook remains stable.

The rating affirmation at B1 balances:

1. A comparatively strong fiscal framework that has stabilized debt
at levels lower than rated peers'

2. Rating constraints stemming from weak institutions, domestic
political risk and comparatively low wealth levels

Honduras' long-term foreign-currency bond ceiling remains unchanged
at Ba2. The foreign-currency bank deposit ceiling remains at B2,
while the local-currency bond and bank deposit ceilings remain at
Ba2. The short-term foreign-currency bond and bank deposit ceilings
remain unchanged at NP.

RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR THE RATING AFFIRMATION AT B1

FIRST DRIVER: FISCAL FRAMEWORK THAT HAS STABILIZED DEBT LEVELS

On May 6, the government of Honduras and the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) reached a staff-level agreement on a precautionary
Stand-By Arrangement and Standby Credit Facility program. The
agreement with the IMF will further support the fiscal
consolidation efforts in place since 2014 and will likely improve
the financial position of the public electricity company.

As a result of fiscal consolidation efforts, Moody's expects
Honduras' general government to post modest fiscal surpluses
averaging 0.2% of GDP in 2019 and 2020, compared to fiscal deficits
averaging 2% of GDP in 2013-2017. Improvements in the fiscal
balance are a result of both higher revenue intake and lower
expenditures. A new streamlined tax agency has enabled the
government to increase its revenue intake by 3% of GDP since 2013
-- a notable accomplishment considering that most Central American
sovereigns have been unsuccessful in their efforts to increase
their tax intake.

Honduras' fiscal balance compares favorably to the -2.5% of GDP
median for B1-rated sovereigns (2019), and has been sufficient to
stabilize general government debt at around 41% of GDP, lower than
the 52% of GDP median for similarly rated sovereigns. Debt as a
percentage of government revenue, which the rating agency projects
will reach 152% this year, also compares favorably to the 229%
median for B1-rated peers. Because Moody's expects the government
debt burden to remain relatively stable over the next two to three
years, only fiscal consolidation measures beyond what is currently
planned would allow for debt ratios to fall in the coming years.

SECOND DRIVER: CONSTRAINTS ON THE RATING STEM FROM WEAK
INSTITUTIONS, DOMESTIC POLITICAL RISK AND LOW WEALTH LEVELS

Honduras' rating is constrained by a weak institutional framework,
evidenced by the country's low rankings in the Worldwide Governance
Indicator scores. Honduras scores in the 10th percentile of all
rated sovereigns in terms of both government effectiveness and the
rule of law. Domestic political risk is also a relevant factor, as
evidenced by the administration's decision to backtrack on
education and health reforms that were approved last year after
protests against government policies.

The rating is also constrained by the small size of the economy,
its limited degree of diversification given high dependence on
maquila- and agriculture-based activities, and a low level of
overall economic development. Honduras' nominal GDP, which Moody's
estimates at $25 billion in 2019, is less than half the $52 billion
median for B1-rated sovereigns. GDP per capita on PPP terms in 2018
(latest available data) reached $5,212, compared to the $9,804 B1
median. The income gap will likely increase over time as Honduras
is growing slower than similarly rated sovereigns, with an average
annual real GDP growth of 3.4% for the next three years compared
with a 4.2% average for B1 peers.

RATIONALE FOR THE STABLE OUTLOOK

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that medium-term
growth prospects and the government's commitment to prudent fiscal
and monetary policies will maintain debt ratios at close to current
levels, despite pressures arising from high poverty levels and
relatively weak institutions.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP

Faster and sustained GDP growth coupled with continued fiscal
discipline that leads to declining government debt ratios could
generate upward pressure on the credit profile.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING DOWN

Conversely, downward pressure could emerge on Honduras' credit
profile if future policy behavior is not consistent with recently
created institutional arrangements, preventing additional progress
on fiscal consolidation and stalling the positive trends observed
in recent years.

GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 5,212 (2018 Actual) (also known as
Per Capita Income)

Real GDP growth (% change): 3.7% (2018 Actual) (also known as GDP
Growth)

Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 4.2% (2018 Actual)

Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: 0.2% (2018 Actual) (also known as
Fiscal Balance)

Current Account Balance/GDP: -4.2% (2018 Actual) (also known as
External Balance)

External debt/GDP: 37.6% (2018 Actual)

Level of economic development: Low level of economic resilience

Default history: No default events (on bonds or loans) have been
recorded since 1983.

On June 7, 2019, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of the Honduras, Government of. The main points raised
during the discussion were: The issuer's economic fundamentals,
including its economic strength, have not materially changed. The
issuer's institutional strength/framework, have materially
decreased. The issuer's fiscal or financial strength, including its
debt profile, has not materially changed. The issuer has become
less susceptible to event risks.




=============
J A M A I C A
=============

JAMAICA: Opposition Warns Gov't. Not to Privatize Mortgage Bank
---------------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that Dr. Morais Guy, Opposition Spokesman on
Housing, is warning the Jamaican government not to go through with
its planned privatization of the Jamaica Mortgage Bank.

Following the listing of Wigton Windfarm on the Jamaica Stock
Exchange, the government disclosed that the mortgage bank would be
next in line for privatization, according to RJR News.

But Dr. Guy disagrees with the plan, arguing that the main problem
facing the entity is under-capitalization, which is affecting its
ability to lend to developers, the report relays.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on Sept.
27, 2018, S&P Global Ratings revised its outlook on Jamaica to
positive from stable. At the same time, S&P  affirmed its 'B'
long-and short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit
ratings, and its 'B+' transfer and convertibility assessment on the
country.




===========
M E X I C O
===========

MEXICO: Gang Violence, Algae & No Publicity Shrink Tourism
----------------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that the hotel sector on the Mexican Caribbean in
the southeastern part of the country faces financial losses in the
first five months of the year following a 6 percent drop in tourist
arrivals compared with the same period in 2018 due to the sargasso
algae plague, gang violence and the lack of publicity.

The report notes that by the end of 2018, Quintana Roo had 102,890
hotel reservations. Of those 41,416 were in Cancun and Puerto
Morelos, 46,969 on the Riviera Maya and the rest in other
destinations like Chetumal and Holbox Island.

According to the president of the Riviera Maya Hotel Association
(AHRM), Conrad Bergwerf, the Riviera Maya alone has calculated
losses of $12 million between January and May 2019, EFE News
relays.

In Cancun and Puerto Morelos, estimated losses are between $10
million and $11 million, according sources in the sector, the
report cites.

Tourism in Mexico represents 8.8 percent of GDP and generates 4.1
million direct jobs and 6.5 million indirect sources of employment,
with the Mexican Caribbean being one of the main attractions, EFE
News says.




=======
P E R U
=======

INTERCORP PERU: Moody's Hikes Unsec. Debt Rating to Ba1
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the senior unsecured debt
rating of Intercorp Peru Ltd.'s to Ba1 from Ba2 with stable
outlook, following the upgrade of its main operating company, Banco
Internacional del Peru - Interbank 's standalone assessment to baa2
from baa3 on June 5.

The outlook on the rating is now stable.

The following rating of Intercorp Peru Ltd. was upgraded:

Senior Unsecured Foreign Currency debt rating, upgraded to Ba1 from
Ba2, stable (changed from positive)

Outlook, changed to stable from positive

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrade of Intercorp's debt rating follows the upgrade of its
primary operating subsidiary, Banco Internacional del
Peru-Interbank (Baa1/Baa1 stable, baa2), which has been Intercorp's
main dividend contributor. The rating action incorporates the
structural subordination of Intercorp's rating to that of
Interbank, its moderate double leverage, and growing, but still
limited dividend diversification.

Intercorp's rating is based on the relatively robust and sustained
dividend contributions reflecting the strong pricing power and
income generation capacity of the holding group's main operating
subsidiaries, particularly Interbank, the group's largest earnings
and dividend generator, and, to a lesser extent, Inteligo
(unrated), Interseguro (unrated) and Intercorp Retail (unrated).

Interbank, which has contributed on average almost 60% of
Intercorp's total dividends over the past three years, is Peru's
largest consumer lender with a strong focus on credit cards, a
strong balance sheet and recurring profitability. Inteligo, a
private banking and wealth management operation, accounts for
almost 21% of Intercorp's dividends during the same period, while
Interseguro, an important player in life insurance and annuities,
contributes with 19% of the holding company's dividends.

Intercorp Retail, a holding group with businesses that include
supermarkets, pharmacies, shopping centers, and department stores,
paid dividends in 2017 but earnings in 2018 and 2019 were retained
to fund acquisitions in the pharmacy business. The holding company
is expected to resume paying dividends in 2020. Intercorp's other
investments, largely in education and health care, are in an early
stage and are not expected to pay dividends over the next three
years.

Moody's Ba1 rating is positioned two-notches below Interbank's baa2
baseline credit assessment, reflecting the structural subordination
of Intercorp to the bank and its other operating subsidiaries, and
its moderate double leverage (a measure of the degree to which the
holding company's equity stakes are financed with debt), which was
113% in 2018, declining from 118% in 2016. As a holding company,
Intercorp's rating does not incorporate any government support,
unlike Interbank's deposit rating, which benefits from one notch of
ratings uplift to reflect the moderate likelihood that the
government will provide financial support to the bank in an event
of stress. Moody's does not believe that any support provided to
the bank will extend to the holding company.

Intercorp's rating also takes into account the interest coverage
above three times over the past three years - measured by net
dividends received relative to financial expenses, and also the
fact that the holding group has a cash and liquid investments
position that well exceeds its annual debt service requirements,
with a ratio of 1.4x.

Intercorp had assets of $ 25.9 billion, net income of $ 126.8
million, and equity of $ 4.1 billion as of March 2019 on a
consolidated basis.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Intercorp's ratings could be upgraded if and when Interbank's
rating is upgraded given the structural subordination to
Interbank's rating. The rating could also face upward pressure if
its dividend stream becomes substantially more diversified such
that the company is no longer dependent on dividend payments from
Interbank, and depending on the stability and quality of any new or
larger sources of dividends. Conversely, Intercorp's ratings could
be downgraded if its main dividend contributors were to be
downgraded or if metrics were to weaken materially, either because
of interest costs or weak performance at the subsidiaries level and
thus lower upstream dividends.




=====================
P U E R T O   R I C O
=====================

LABORATORIO ACROPOLIS: Hires CSS Accounting as Accountant
---------------------------------------------------------
Laboratorio Acropolis Inc. seeks authority from the U.S. Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Puerto Rico to employ CSS Accounting
Services, as accountant to the Debtor.

Laboratorio Acropolis requires CSS Accounting to:

   a. provide assistance to the Debtor in preparing the Monthly
      Reports of Operation;

   b. prepare the necessary financial statements;

   c. assist the Debtor in preparing the cash flow projections
      and any other projections needed for the Disclosure
      Statement;

   d. assist the Debtor in any financial accounting pertaining
      to, or in connection with the administration of the estate;

   e. assist the Debtor in the preparation and filing of federal,
      state and municipal tax returns; and

   f. assist the Debtor in any other assignment that might be
      properly delegated.

CSS Accounting will be paid at the hourly rate of $50.

CSS Accounting will also be reimbursed for reasonable out-of-pocket
expenses incurred.

Carlos J. Soto Soto, partner of CSS Accounting Services, assured
the Court that the firm is a "disinterested person" as the term is
defined in Section 101(14) of the Bankruptcy Code and does not
represent any interest adverse to the Debtor and its estates.

CSS Accounting can be reached at:

     Carlos J. Soto Soto
     CSS ACCOUNTING SERVICES
     HC 8 Box 50616
     Hatillo, PR 00659
     Tel: (787) 307-5403

                   About Laboratorio Acropolis

Laboratorio Acropolis, Inc., was incorporated in 2004 to purchase
as a going concern a business named "Laboratorio Acropolis," a
provider of clinical laboratory services.

The Debtor previously filed a Chapter 11 petition (Bankr. D.P.R.
Case No. 16-04609) on June 9, 2016.  

Laboratorio Acropolis again sought protection under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 19-02601) on May 8,
2019.  At the time of the filing, the Debtor estimated assets of
less than $500,000 and liabilities of between $1 million and $10
million.  Judge Mildred Caban Flores oversees the case.  The Law
Office of Gloria Justiniano Irizarry is the Debtor's counsel.




=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================

PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: S&P Withdraws 'SD' Issuer Credit Rating
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings withdrew its 'SD' issuer credit rating on
Venezuela-based oil and gas company Petroleos de Venezuela S.A.
(PDVSA). At the same time, S&P withdrew its 'D' issue-level rating
on the company's debt.

S&P said, "The withdrawal of our ratings on PDVSA follows our
repeated attempts to obtain timely information of satisfactory
quality from the company in order to maintain our ratings in
accordance with our criteria and policies. PDVSA has been unable to
meet the coupon payments on its 2017, 2021, 2024, 2026, 2027, and
2037 notes since November 2017 (or we have been unable to obtain a
confirmation that the bondholders had received the funds by that
date). This constitutes an event of default under our
methodology."




                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2019.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.
.


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