TCRLA_Public/190624.mbx        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                 L A T I N   A M E R I C A

          Monday, June 24, 2019, Vol. 20, No. 125

                           Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

ARGENTINA: DBRS Confirms B/B(high) LongTerm Issuer Ratings
ARGENTINA: To Get $600MM-IDB Loan to Strengthen Social Programs


B O L I V I A

BOLIVIA: Fitch Affirms BB- Foreign Curr. IDR, Alters Outlook to Neg


B R A Z I L

NETSHOES CAYMAN: Hires Advisors to Address Financial Struggles
NETSHOES CAYMAN: KPMG Raises Going Concern Doubt


P U E R T O   R I C O

PUERTO RICO: US Court Takes on Financial Oversight Board Dispute
SEARS HOLDINGS: Ex-Employees Defend Retirees Committee Appointment
SEARS HOLDINGS: Posts $175 Million Net Income at Apr. 6


T R I N I D A D   A N D   T O B A G O

CARIBBEAN AIRLINES: Faces Suit From American Passenger


U R U G U A Y

MINERAL LOGISTICS: Fitch Withdraws BB+(EXP) on $483MM Notes


X X X X X X X X

[*] BOND PRICING: For the Week June 17 to June 21, 2019
[*] LATAM: Needs Innovation, Planning For Sustainability

                           - - - - -


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A R G E N T I N A
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ARGENTINA: DBRS Confirms B/B(high) LongTerm Issuer Ratings
----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed the Republic of Argentina' Long-Term Foreign
Currency - Issuer Rating at B, and the Long-Term Local Currency -
Issuer Rating at B (high). At the same time, DBRS confirmed the
Short-Term Foreign and Local Currency – Issuer Ratings at R-4.
The trend on all ratings is Stable.

KEY RATING CONSIDERATIONS

Argentina has made considerable progress reducing macroeconomic
imbalances, but inflation remains stubbornly high and the economy
remains in recession with a general election approaching in
October. A combination of tax increases, reductions in public
subsidies, and other efforts to streamline public expenditure are
expected to produce a cumulative adjustment in the primary deficit
from 4.6% in 2016 to 0% in 2019. Taking into account the remaining
disbursements from the IMF program, this eliminates the need for
net new financing this year. The political outlook nonetheless
remains highly uncertain, as austerity measures have deepened the
economic downturn just as the election campaign is about to start.
This has weighed on the popularity of President Macri and could
increase the risk of policy reversals by the next administration.

The Stable trend reflects DBRS's assessment that the upside and
downside risks to the rating are broadly balanced. On the one hand,
policy continuity appears likely if President Macri is reelected or
if a new administration broadly adheres to critical elements of the
current IMF program, even if mixed with some increased
interventionism. On the other hand, an administration that
reintroduces domestic subsidies, price controls, and distortionary
taxes would likely undermine fiscal and monetary policy
discipline.

RATING DRIVERS

One or a combination of the following developments would likely put
upward pressure on Argentina's ratings: (1) continued progress on
disinflation and on the establishment of a credible inflation
targeting framework; (2) fiscal discipline in line with existing
2019/2020 targets, combined with efforts to strengthen the tax base
and improve the quality of public expenditure; (3) continued
progress on structural reforms to boost investment and enhance
medium-term growth prospects; or (4) increased evidence of a
political consensus around the main pillars of macroeconomic
stability, including through passage of the law on central bank
independence.

Downward pressure could emerge on the ratings if (1) fiscal or
monetary policy discipline slips in the lead up to or following the
general elections; or (2) the incoming government reneges on key
policy commitments agreed under the IMF program, generating
continued market pressures and limiting the availability of funding
headed into 2020 and 2021.

RATING RATIONALE

Pivotal 2019 Elections Will Determine the Path of Argentina's
Economic Policies

Argentina's national elections will be held on October 27. Voters
will select the next President and close to half of Congress. If no
Presidential candidate receives more than 45% of the vote (or more
than 40% with at least 10% more than the next candidate), a runoff
election between the top two contenders will be held on November
24. The final list of primary candidates will not be known until
June 22, and the list of candidates for the general election will
be finalized on September 7.

Just as the last presidential election brought about a major policy
shift, voters are faced with a similarly consequential decision in
2019. Mauricio Macri came into office promising change and has, in
spite of some setbacks, delivered substantial reforms to cut
Argentina's primary deficit, reduce indiscriminate public
subsidies, roll back distortionary taxes and controls, and increase
the efficiency of the public sector. The administration has worked
to strengthen the independence of the central bank and introduce a
credible inflation targeting regime. The initial gradual approach
to deficit reduction and disinflation did not deliver the expected
results, forcing the administration to accelerate the adjustment
process in an election year. This has in turn posed a serious test
to the political sustainability of the reform program.

In this context, Macri's reelection prospects appear challenging.
His vice presidential pick, Miguel Pichetto, could help to
significantly broaden his appeal to Peronists. Cristina Fernandez's
earlier move to declare herself the vice presidential running mate
to Alberto Fernandez, her late husband's former chief of staff,
appears to have had similar motivations. There are other moderate
Peronist candidates that could declare as candidates before the
campaign officially begins, but polls suggest they will have an
upward climb to defeat either of these leading candidates. Given
that either administration will likely need the support of
Peronists in Congress, this is likely to be a moderating force for
both. However, the Argentine presidency has some leverage through
revenue sharing arrangements with the provinces that is usually
sufficient to obtain needed legislative support for key policy
initiatives.

Argentina's institutional weaknesses and the high degree of policy
uncertainty remain a key credit challenge. The fate of several
recent and proposed reforms, particularly the new law on central
bank independence and the continuation of the IMF program, appears
to be at risk in this election. Alberto Fernandez has expressed
concerns regarding Argentina's debt burden, though he has also
pledged to meet Argentina's payment obligations. The precise policy
platform of a Fernandez government remains unclear, and could be
more moderate than DBRS expects, closer to the moderate Peronists
than to the administration of Cristina Fernandez (2007-15).
However, DBRS sees a considerable risk of prolonged market and
exchange rate turmoil if the new government appears unwilling to
maintain fiscal discipline and adhere to key components of the
existing IMF program.

Considerable Progress on Fiscal Adjustment, but More Work to Do
Following the Election

The administration has reduced Argentina's primary deficit from a
peak of 4.6% in 2016 to a projected 0% in 2019. The government will
need to achieve a modest primary surplus in the months leading up
to the election in order to achieve the 2019 target, as December
wage payments usually result in a sizeable deficit for that month.
Although there could be pressures to ease on fiscal policy in
support of a weak economy, the target appears to be within reach.
The government aims to achieve a primary surplus of 1% of GDP in
2020. More critically, additional efforts to improve the quality of
the ongoing adjustment would help to ensure fiscal sustainability:
tax reforms to broaden the tax base and rely less on distortionary
export taxes; pension reforms to curb the growth of social
spending, and other measures to boost the resources available for
public investment.

Argentina's public debt increased dramatically as a percentage of
GDP during 2018, reflecting a major exchange rate shock combined
with increased borrowing from the IMF. Debt increased from 57% of
GDP in 2017 to 86% of GDP in 2018, as the peso lost 53% of its
value against the US$ over the course of the year. Extensive
dollarization within the public debt stock and a relatively shallow
domestic market makes the government vulnerable to confidence
shocks. Over one-third of public debt remains in the hands of the
central bank and other public sector companies, and Argentina's
overall reserve levels (bolstered by the IMF program) appear to be
adequate. Refinancing needs are limited in 2019 due to the expected
primary balance and continued disbursements under the IMF program.
Nonetheless, repayments to the IMF in 2021 and 2022 could be
challenging in the absence of a return of market confidence or a
successor program.

Having already experienced a large exchange rate-induced debt shock
and benefiting (at least temporarily) from a more competitive
currency, the risk of additional debt shocks appears relatively
lower than in the recent past. However, domestic and international
interest rates are presently at very high levels. For now, the
reduced fiscal deficit and availability of IMF financing should
enable the government to wait until real interest rates return to
sustainable levels before tapping market financing. In the event of
another adverse shock, the government will be forced to choose
between additional IMF financing (likely with deeper conditionality
to address structural challenges) or a return to monetization. The
latter path may look easier to some policymakers in the short run,
but would ultimately undermine Argentina's ability to repay its
external debts.

Tepid Economic Recovery in the Context of Strong Disinflationary
Policies

Economic activity has been depressed for the past four quarters (Q2
2018 through Q1 2019), as the impact of a severe drought and
broader loss of confidence in the gradual adjustment effort have
dampened consumption and investment. Fiscal policy has
simultaneously turned contractionary, with subsidy reductions and
increased export taxes affecting real disposable incomes.
Argentina's economy is likely to stabilize and return to growth
over coming quarters, supported by the agricultural sector, which
is experiencing a huge increase in production following the 2018
drought. Measured on a year-over-year basis, the economy is
expected to contract 1.2% in 2019. The IMF projects growth of 2.2%
in 2020, close to Argentina's estimated potential, but DBRS sees
risks as skewed strongly to the downside. Tight monetary and fiscal
policies, a need for wage restraint to support disinflationary
objectives, and risks stemming from global trade restrictions are
likely to dampen Argentina's growth performance this year and next.
Growth could receive a temporary boost if the new government seeks
to reverse some of the austerity measures enacted by the current
administration, but this would likely be short-lived and ultimately
counter to the objectives of restoring macroeconomic stability.

The BCRA's disinflationary efforts have experienced significant
setbacks, in spite of strong government support for the program's
objectives. Inflation has surged to 55.8% as of April 2019, driven
by a combination of higher administered prices, a weaker peso, and
the strong inertial effects of successive wage negotiations to
compensate for past inflation. The BCRA's policy framework was
revised in October to establish a base money target, which is
adjusted regularly to keep inflationary pressures in line with BCRA
objectives. As of end-May 2019, base money growth was just under
30% y/y and short-term interest rates remain above 70%. Measured on
a month-on-month basis, inflation appears to be slowing, and
inflation expectations declined from over 40% in April to 36% in
May. No further administered price increases are scheduled in the
lead up to elections. Nonetheless, inflation will be significantly
higher than the BCRA's 2019 inflation target of 17%.

Financial intermediation remains limited and credit markets
continue to have limited influence over Argentina's economy and
economic cycle. Funded by a limited deposit base of 21% of GDP, 37%
of which is denominated in foreign currency, long-term borrowing is
generally unavailable to most of the population. Credit to the
private sector amounts to a mere 13% of GDP, with a similar
proportion denominated in foreign currency (predominantly US$).

Reduced External Imbalances and Enhanced Exchange Rate
Competitiveness Bode Well for Economic Stabilization.

Argentina's external accounts have largely rebalanced following the
major devaluation of the peso during 2018, the domestic recession,
and the ongoing recovery of the agricultural sector from last
year's drought. The current account deficit fell to 1.8% of GDP in
the fourth quarter, versus 5.2% of GDP for the full year, with the
goods balance shifting into a surplus of 3.5% of GDP in the fourth
quarter. For the first four months of 2019, exports have fallen
1.8% y/y, though the harvest season is beginning and should provide
some increased support to exports in coming months. Goods imports
have fallen 28.9% y/y in the same period, showing the significant
impact from the domestic recession, combined with income and
substitution effects. The IMF expects the current account to remain
in deficit this year and then widen slightly as the economy
recovers, with a small surplus in the goods and services balance
(1-2% of GDP) more than offset by a deficit in the income account
(3-4% of GDP). DBRS remains concerned regarding the outlook for
exports, given the global environment. A recovery in Brazil
combined with increased trade integration within the region could
provide some needed support to Argentina's manufacturing sector and
boost growth prospects.

Reliance on external borrowing and the widespread use of the US
dollar are legacies of Argentina's lack of monetary policy
credibility will remain a challenge for the foreseeable future. If
the disinflationary process is ultimately successful and Argentina
is able to allow for a more flexible exchange rate regime while
achieving greater price stability, this could lay the foundation
for growth in the domestic financial system, gradual
depolarization, and increased resilience in external accounts.

In the event of a deterioration in credit fundamentals or in the
external environment, DBRS considers it likely that Argentina would
face material constraints on its access to foreign exchange. This
reflects the extent of foreign currency borrowing within the
economy and the likely use of foreign exchange reserves to support
the peso. In addition, evidence suggests that Argentina would be
reasonably likely to differentiate between its local currency and
foreign currency debts. Although domestic financial repression
(characterized by severely negative real interest rates) has eased
significantly under the current administration and new central bank
leadership, the value of most local currency debt has been
gradually eroded by past (underreported) inflation and is held
predominantly by public sector entities and other domestic banks.
Accordingly, DBRS considers the risk of a default on Argentina's
foreign currency debt to be somewhat higher than the risk of a
default on local currency debt.

RATING COMMITTEE SUMMARY

The DBRS Sovereign Scorecard generates a result in the BB (high)
– BB (low) range. Additional considerations factoring into the
Rating Committee decision included: Argentina's limited market
access, the high level of uncertainty surrounding the upcoming
elections and policy outlook, and elevated risks to debt
sustainability associated with domestic real interest rates and the
potential for additional exchange rate shocks. The main points
discussed during the Rating Committee include the potential policy
implications of upcoming national elections, recent and expected
progress on fiscal adjustment, inflationary pressures, the ongoing
adjustment in the current account, exchange rate dynamics and
prospects for stronger export growth, and risks to debt
sustainability.

KEY INDICATORS

Fiscal Balance (% GDP): -5.1 (2018); -2.7 (2019F); -1.5 (2020F)
Gross Debt (% GDP): 86.3 (2018); 75.9 (2019F); 69.0 (2020F)
Nominal GDP (USD billions): 518.9 (2018); 477.7 (2019F); 515.4
(2020F)
GDP per capita (USD thousands): 11.6 (2018); 10.6 (2019F); 11.3
(2020F)
Real GDP growth (%): -2.5 (2018); -1.2 (2019F); 2.2 (2020F)
Consumer Price Inflation (%, eop): 47.6 (2018); 30.5 (2019F); 21.2
(2020F)
Domestic credit (% GDP): 22.6 (2017); 22.9 (2018)
Current Account (% GDP): -5.4 (2018); -2.0 (2019F); -2.5 (2020F)
International Investment Position (% GDP): 2.7 (2017); 12.1 (2018)
Gross External Debt (% GDP): 34.9 (2017); 60.9 (2018)
Foreign Exchange Reserves (% short-term external debt + current
account deficit): 92.5 (2017); 138.2 (2018F)
Governance Indicator (percentile rank): 55.8 (2017)
Human Development Index: 0.83 (2017)

Notes: All figures are in USD unless otherwise noted. Public
finance statistics reported on a general government basis unless
specified. Governance indicator represents an average percentile
rank (0-100) from Rule of Law, Voice and Accountability and
Government Effectiveness indicators (all World Bank). Human
Development Index (UNDP) ranges from 0-1, with 1 representing a
very high level of human development.


ARGENTINA: To Get $600MM-IDB Loan to Strengthen Social Programs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Argentina will ensure the sustainability and effectiveness of its
social protection programs with a $600 million loan approved by the
Inter-American Development Bank.

This project marks the second phase of two separate and sequential
operations. The goal of both phases is to guarantee the
sustainability of money disbursement programs for the poor and
encourage improvements in the effectiveness of these initiatives by
strengthening their management through the use of digital
transformation tools.

The second phase of the program will finance for one year
disbursements to 213,000 people taking part in the program known as
Hacemos Futuro (We are Building the Future). It will also work to
see that the availability of workplace training for these people
meets demand in the public and private sectors.

The project will also help improve public transport and finance for
one year the public transport discount that those who are eligible
receive.

Finally, the project will support implementation of a pilot program
that will aim to complement so-called Progesar grants with other
policies designed to keep low-income youths from dropping out of
university level studies.

The $600 million IDB loan is payable over 25 years, with a grace
period of five years and an interest rate pegged to the LIBOR.

                            About Argentina

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America, S&P
Global Ratings in June 2018 affirmed its 'B+' long-term sovereign
credit ratings on the Republic of Argentina. S&P's long-term
sovereign credit ratings on Argentina was raise to 'B+' from 'B' in
October 2017. The outlook on the long-term ratings remains stable.

In May 2018, Fitch Ratings affirmed Argentina's Long-Term
Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B' and revised the
Outlook to Stable from Positive.

In December 2017, Moody's Investors Service upgraded the Government
of Argentina's local and foreign currency issuer and senior
unsecured ratings to B2 from B3. The senior unsecured shelves were
upgraded to (P)B2 from (P)B3. The outlook on the ratings is
stable.

At the same time, Argentina's short-term rating was affirmed at Not
Prime (NP). The senior unsecured ratings for unrestructured debt
were affirmed at Ca and the unrestructured senior unsecured shelf
affirmed at (P)Ca. Moody's said the key drivers of the upgrade of
the rating to B2 are: (1) a record of macro-economic reforms that
are beginning to address long existing distortions in Argentina's
economy; and (2) the likelihood that reforms will continue and in
turn sustain the recent return to positive economic growth.

The stable outlook on Argentina's B2 ratings balances Argentina's
credit strengths of its large, diverse economy and moderate income
levels against the credit challenges posed by still high fiscal
deficits and a reliance on external financing, which increases its
vulnerability to external event risk, said Moody's.

Back in July 2014, Argentina defaulted on some of its debt, after
expiration of a 30-day grace period on a US$539 million interest
payment.  Earlier that day, talks with a court-appointed mediator
ended without resolving a standoff between the country and a group
of hedge funds seeking full payment on bonds that the country had
defaulted on in 2001. A U.S. judge had ruled that the interest
payment couldn't be made unless the hedge funds led by Elliott
Management Corp., got the US$1.5 billion they claimed. The country
hasn't been able to access international credit markets since its
US$95 billion default 13 years ago. On March 30, 2016, Argentina's
Congress passed a bill that will allow the government to repay
holders of debt that the South American country defaulted on in
2001, including a group of litigating hedge funds that won
judgments in a New York court. The bill passed by a vote of 54-16.




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B O L I V I A
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BOLIVIA: Fitch Affirms BB- Foreign Curr. IDR, Alters Outlook to Neg
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Bolivia's Long-Term Foreign Currency
Issuer Default Rating at 'BB-' and revised its Outlook to Negative
from Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The revision of Bolivia's Outlook to Negative reflects rising
macroeconomic vulnerability posed by the rapid erosion of external
and fiscal buffers, being driven in part by adverse developments
and future uncertainties in the gas sector - a key source of FX and
fiscal revenues. High twin deficits have not fallen as Fitch
previously projected despite improved terms of trade, due to a
shock to gas export volumes that may not be transitory in nature,
and policies fuelling firm domestic demand. Fitch believes these
developments have made stabilization of eroding financial buffers
more difficult and dependent upon policy adjustments after October
2019 elections. While Fitch expects adjustments will be forthcoming
in any election outcome, their magnitude, pace and composition are
difficult to predict given a lack of detailed plans among
candidates, posing uncertainty around the post-election
macroeconomic outlook.

The ratings are supported by an external liquidity position
projected to remain relatively strong despite on-going erosion, and
the sovereign's favorable debt profile and cash buffers that reduce
financing risks. These strengths are balanced by low per capita
income and governance scores, high commodity dependence, and a weak
private investment climate rendering growth reliant on expansive
policies.

Bolivia's gas sector is being challenged by a demand shock and
supply-side issues. Gas production fell 7% in 2018 and has done so
even more sharply in 2019 so far (-22% through May), as Brazil and
Argentina's weak growth and growing own energy production have
reduced their import demand. Bolivia recently agreed to a two-year
addendum to its contract with Argentina that could pose revenue
risks, as it sets lower gas shipments throughout the year and a new
price linked to LNG in the winter that may not be higher enough to
compensate, although the authorities estimate it will generate an
annual revenue gain of up to USD500 million. Supply-side issues
pose further uncertainty in the gas sector outlook after a decade
of lacklustre investment. Several exploration projects are in
progress in 2019, but it is unclear if some key ones are
commercially viable (eg. Boyuy), and could take years to begin
production if they are.

Falling gas export volumes offset the boost from better prices in
2018, keeping the current account deficit high at 4.9% of GDP, and
Fitch projects it will reach 6.0% in 2019 due to the fall in gas
revenues so far this year. Large and negative "errors and
omissions" in the balance of payments (eg. USD1 billion in 2018)
suggest even greater external pressures, which may reflect
measurement issues, unregistered contraband or capital flight.
These pressures reduced international reserves to USD8.3 billion as
of May from USD8.9 billion at end-2018 and USD15.1 billion at
end-2014, and the decline has been even greater net of several
boosts as the central bank (BCB) has "bolivianized" (ie. converted
into local currency) other FX funds corresponding to banks and the
sovereign for around USD2 billion since 2014.

Reserves remain high in 2019 in terms of coverage of current
external payments (six months) and liquid external liabilities
(supporting a 600% liquidity ratio), offering ample scope to manage
external shocks. However, they have fallen below the 'BB' medians
to 20% of GDP and 29% of broad money as of May, signalling
potential vulnerability to any home-grown shocks or capital flight.
This highlights a difficult policy dilemma surrounding the
stabilized XR regime: a devaluation could narrow the current
account deficit, but also fuel FX demand in the capital account
should it unsettle well-internalised expectations around a stable
currency.

The general government deficit rose to 6.0% of GDP in 2018 from
5.0% in 2017 (8.1% from 7.8% at the public sector level), as higher
gas prices were not enough to offset lower production volumes, weak
non-gas revenues, and resumption of a yearend salary bonus. Fitch
expects the general government deficit to rise to 6.4% of GDP in
2019, and 8.5% at the public sector level.

Fiscal deficits lifted general government debt to 39.5% of GDP in
2018 (in line with the historic 'BB' median) from 31.2% in 2013,
but have been financed to an even greater degree by drawdown of
deposits to 11.8% of GDP from 23.2%. Fitch expects financing to
rely more heavily on borrowing starting in 2019 (namely via a
Eurobond issuance), lifting debt to 44% of GDP by 2020. Fitch
estimates a 4%-of-GDP fiscal adjustment over the medium term would
stabilise debt/GDP. This could be facilitated by a flexible
spending profile dominated by public investment (13% of GDP in
2018), but large cuts would pose trade-offs with growth
objectives.

Bolivia's strong debt profile remains a key credit strength.
Near-term maturities are very low, averaging just 1.5% of GDP in
2019 and 2020, and amply covered by cash deposits. Most of the debt
stock is owed to multi- or bilateral creditors and the central bank
and on concessional terms - reflected in a low interest/revenue
ratio of 4.3%, well below the historic 9.3% 'BB' median. External
bonds total a modest USD2 billion (5.0% of GDP).

Expansive policies guided by an ambitious state-led investment plan
(PDES) supported firm real GDP growth of 4.2% in 2018. Fitch
projects growth of 3.8% in 2019, but believes the post-2019 outlook
is uncertain. The government expects industrialisation projects to
lift growth and yield revenues that lower the twin deficits,
avoiding a need for a major policy adjustment, but this has not yet
occurred as previously projected in the PDES amid delays and
profitability issues. In the absence of a greater windfall from
these projects or external tailwinds, pressure for policy
adjustments could build. Fitch projects policy tightening to slow
growth to 3% in 2020 and beyond, but this is hard to predict given
uncertainty around the post-election policy strategy, and risks of
a greater slowdown cannot be ruled out.

Monetary policy has been further loosened to support credit
objectives as liquidity has sagged. Credit growth of 10.4% yoy as
of May is far above deposit growth of 3.7%. Fitch expects credit
growth to ease now that banks have mostly achieved credit
allocation quotas set in a 2013 law, and given lower bank capital
and liquidity ratios, though adequate, offer less scope for lending
without commensurate deposit funding. Inflation at 1.7% as of May
remains low despite monetary stimulus and direct BCB lending to
SOEs and the Treasury, given the demand this has supported has
largely gone to imported goods and accommodated via reserve
drawdown.

President Evo Morales will run for a fourth term in upcoming
elections in October, following the overturning of constitutional
term limits by the courts last year. Polls suggest the election
could be competitive, with Morales leading polls but with a large
number of undecided voters. Fitch expects macroeconomic policy
adjustments to contain economic risks would be forthcoming in any
election scenario, although the result could condition the
adjustment strategy and timing, while microeconomic policies could
vary significantly.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch expects Brent oil prices to average USD65/b in 2019 and
USD62.5/b in 2020, affecting Bolivian gas prices (linked to global
oil benchmarks with a three to six month lag).

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The main factors that could individually, or collectively, lead to
a downgrade include:

  -- Persistence of high twin deficits that erode external and
fiscal liquidity buffers; for example, due to lack of policy
adjustments and/or a lasting decline in gas exports;

  -- A pronounced slowdown leading to macroeconomic or financial
instability;

  -- Evidence of external financing constraints.

The Rating Outlook is Negative. Consequently, Fitch does not
currently anticipate developments with a high likelihood of leading
to a positive rating change. However, the main factors that could
lead Fitch to Stabilize the Outlook include:

  -- A reduction in the current account deficit that helps
stabilise FX liquidity metrics; for example, driven by policy
adjustments or higher export revenues;

  -- Sustained fiscal deficit reduction that improves public debt
dynamics and preserves fiscal liquidity buffers;

  -- Evidence of improvement in governance and the business climate
that supports stronger investment and growth prospects.




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B R A Z I L
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NETSHOES CAYMAN: Hires Advisors to Address Financial Struggles
--------------------------------------------------------------
Netshoes (Cayman) Limited has hired financial advisors to help out
address its liquidity needs, according to the Company's Form 20-F
filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2018.

The Company stated: "We experienced net losses and significant cash
outflows from cash used in operating activities in 2018, and our
business performance and financial condition has faced increasing
pressure since December 31, 2018.  We are currently engaged in
preserving our cash, liquidity and financial position and obtain
access to alternative sources of capital necessary to meet our
ongoing liquidity needs.  We have engaged financial and other
advisors to assist us in that effort.  Although our management has
a reasonable expectation that we have adequate resources to
continue in operational existence for the foreseeable future, there
can no assurance that we will be able to meet our funding
requirements and have the ability to gain continued access to
short-term financing. If for any reason we are unable to continue
as a going concern, this could have an impact on our ability to
realize assets at their recognized values, and to settle
liabilities in the ordinary course of business (including with
suppliers and creditors) at the amounts stated in our audited
consolidated financial statements, resulting in defaults in
agreements with our creditors and suppliers and may experience
additional defaults in the future, including as a result of
cross-defaults. Most of our financing agreements are subject to
termination in the event of default, and our indebtedness may be
accelerated in the event of continuing default."

Netshoes (Cayman) Limited, through its subsidiaries, operates as a
sports and lifestyle online retailer in Brazil and internationally.
It offers various products, including athletic shoes, jerseys,
apparels, accessories, and sporting equipment of international,
local, and private brands, as well as fashion primarily under the
Netshoes and Zattini brands. The company operates through its
e-commerce Websites, such as netshoes.com, shoestock.com, and
zattini.com.  Netshoes (Cayman) Limited was incorporated in 2000
and is headquartered in Sao Paulo, Brazil.


NETSHOES CAYMAN: KPMG Raises Going Concern Doubt
------------------------------------------------
Netshoes (Cayman) Limited filed its Form 6-K, disclosing a net loss
of BRL332,374,000 on BRL1,808,064,000 of revenue for the year ended
Dec. 31, 2018, compared to a net loss of BRL170,345,000 on
BRL1,835,212,000 of net sales for the year ended 2017.

The audit report of KPMG Auditores Independentes states that the
Company has incurred operating losses, negative cash flow from
operating activities and has a working capital deficiency that
raise substantial doubt about its ability to continue as a going
concern.

At Dec. 31, 2018, the Company had total assets of BRL994,332,000,
total liabilities of BRL837,782,000, and BRL156,550,000 in total
shareholders' equity.

A copy of the Form 6-K is available at:

                       https://is.gd/aUe6la

Netshoes (Cayman) Limited, through its subsidiaries, operates as a
sports and lifestyle online retailer in Brazil and internationally.
It offers various products, including athletic shoes, jerseys,
apparels, accessories, and sporting equipment of international,
local, and private brands, as well as fashion primarily under the
Netshoes and Zattini brands. The company operates through its
e-commerce Websites, such as netshoes.com, shoestock.com, and
zattini.com.  Netshoes (Cayman) Limited was incorporated in 2000
and is headquartered in Sao Paulo, Brazil.




=====================
P U E R T O   R I C O
=====================

PUERTO RICO: US Court Takes on Financial Oversight Board Dispute
----------------------------------------------------------------
Lawrence Hurley at Reuters reports that the U.S. Supreme Court
agreed to decide whether members of Puerto Rico's federally created
financial oversight board were lawfully appointed in a dispute that
could disrupt the panel's restructuring of about $120 billion of
the bankrupt U.S. commonwealth's debt.

The justices will hear an appeal by the board after a lower court
ruled in February that the 2016 appointments of its seven members
violated the U.S. Constitution's "appointments clause" because they
were not confirmed by the Senate, according to Reuters.

Creditors challenging the appointments filed appeals separately,
asking the Supreme Court to find that the decisions made by the
board are invalid because its members were unlawfully installed,
the report notes.  The justices also agreed to hear that part of
the dispute, the report relays.

The court scheduled oral arguments for October in a bid to resolve
the issue quickly, the report says.  The board is overseeing the
restructuring of debt and pension obligations through a form of
bankruptcy, the report discloses.

The board welcomed the court's decision to hear the case and said
in a statement that its members "look forward to continuing their
service," the report notes.

The legal challenge to the board's composition was brought in 2017
by Puerto Rico creditors including Aurelius Investment, LLC, a
hedge fund that holds Puerto Rico bonds, and Union de Trabajadores
de la Industria Electrica y Riego, Inc, a labor group that
represents workers at Puerto Rico's government-owned electricity
utility, Reuters discloses.

Bondholders face losses as a result of debt restructuring while the
labor group has said that the board's proposed restructuring of the
utility's debt would lead to its members having worse working
conditions, the report relays.

In an effort to resolve the dispute, the White House on June 18
officially sent nominations for the board's current members to the
Senate, the report notes.  The Trump administration filed its own
appeal to the Supreme Court defending the appointments, the report
relays.

In the meantime, the oversight board has asked an appeals court to
extend a July 15 deadline it set for the board's seven members to
be reappointed or replaced, the report notes.

While the Boston-based 1st U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals declined
in its February ruling to void actions taken by the board, the
decision created uncertainty as the panel continues its efforts to
restructure Puerto Rico's debt and pension obligations, the report
says.

Congress created the board in 2016 to address Puerto Rico's fiscal
crisis, the report discloses.  The law stated that the board is
part of the U.S. territory's government, not a separate federal
agency, and that the president can appoint members without Senate
approval from a list approved by lawmakers, Reuters relays.

The appeals court said that members are federal officers and
therefore must be confirmed by the Senate, the report notes.  The
board argues that because Puerto Rico is a territory not a state,
the appointments clause does not apply, the report adds.

                       About Puerto Rico

Puerto Rico is a self-governing commonwealth in association with
the United States that's facing a massive bond debt of $70 billion,
a 68% debt-to-GDP ratio and negative economic growth in nine of the
last 10 years.

The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has sought bankruptcy protection,
aiming to restructure its massive $74 billion debt-load and $49
billion in pension obligations.

The debt restructuring petition was filed by Puerto Rico's
financial oversight board in U.S. District Court in Puerto Rico
(Case No. 17-01578) on May 3, 2017, and was made under Title III of
2016's U.S. Congressional rescue law known as the Puerto Rico
Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act ('PROMESA').

The Financial Oversight and Management Board later commenced Title
III cases for the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation
(COFINA) on May 5, 2017, and the Employees Retirement System (ERS)
and the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (HTA) on
May 21, 2017.  On July 2, 2017, a Title III case was commenced for
the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority ("PREPA").

U.S. Chief Justice John Roberts has appointed U.S. District Judge
Laura Taylor Swain to oversee the Title III cases.  The Honorable
Judith Dein, a United States Magistrate Judge for the District of
Massachusetts, has been designated to preside over matters that may
be referred to her by Judge Swain, including discovery disputes,
and management of other pretrial proceedings.

Joint administration of the Title III cases, under Lead Case No.
17-3283, was granted on June 29, 2017.

The Oversight Board has hired as advisors, Proskauer Rose LLP and
O'Neill & Borges LLC as legal counsel, McKinsey & Co. as strategic
consultant, Citigroup Global Markets, as municipal investment
banker, and Ernst & Young, as financial advisor.

Martin J. Bienenstock, Esq., Scott K. Rutsky, Esq., and Philip M.
Abelson, Esq., of Proskauer Rose; and Hermann D. Bauer, Esq., at
O'Neill & Borges are on-board as attorneys.

McKinsey & Co. is the Board's strategic consultant, Ernst & Young
is the Board's financial advisor, and Citigroup Global Markets Inc.
is the Board's municipal investment banker.

Prime Clerk LLC is the claims and noticing agent.  Prime Clerk
maintains a case web site at
https://cases.primeclerk.com/puertorico

Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC is the service agent for ERS, HTA,
and PREPA.

O'Melveny & Myers LLP is counsel to the Commonwealth's Puerto Rico
Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority (AAFAF), the agency
responsible for negotiations with bondholders.

The Oversight Board named Professor Nancy B. Rapoport as fee
examiner and to chair a committee to review professionals' fees.

                    Bondholders' Attorneys

Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP and Toro, Colon, Mullet, Rivera
& Sifre, P.S.C. and serve as counsel to the Mutual Fund Group,
comprised of mutual funds managed by Oppenheimer Funds, Inc., and
the First Puerto Rico Family of Funds, which collectively hold over
$4.4 billion of GO Bonds, COFINA Bonds, and other bonds issued by
Puerto Rico and other instrumentalities.

White & Case LLP and Lopez Sanchez & Pirillo LLC represent the UBS
Family of Funds and the Puerto Rico Family of Funds, which hold
$613.3 million in COFINA bonds.

Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, Robbins, Russell,
Englert, Orseck, Untereiner & Sauber LLP, and Jimenez, Graffam &
Lausell are co-counsel to the ad hoc group of General Obligation
Bondholders, comprised of Aurelius Capital Management, LP, Autonomy
Capital (Jersey) LP, FCO Advisors LP, and Monarch Alternative
Capital LP.

Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP and Reichard & Escalera are
co-counsel to the ad hoc coalition of holders of senior bonds
issued by COFINA, comprised of at least 30 institutional holders,
including Canyon Capital Advisors LLC and Varde Investment
Partners, L.P.

Correa Acevedo & Abesada Law Offices, P.S.C., is counsel to Canyon
Capital Advisors, LLC, River Canyon Fund Management, LLC, Davidson
Kempner Capital Management LP, OZ Management, LP, and OZ Management
II LP (the QTCB Noteholder Group).

                          Committees

The U.S. Trustee formed an official committee of retirees and an
official committee of unsecured creditors of the Commonwealth.  The
Retiree Committee tapped Jenner & Block LLP and Bennazar, Garcia &
Milian, C.S.P., as its attorneys.  The Creditors Committee tapped
Paul Hastings LLP and O'Neill & Gilmore LLC as counsel.


SEARS HOLDINGS: Ex-Employees Defend Retirees Committee Appointment
------------------------------------------------------------------
Former employees of Sears, Roebuck and Co. defended their motion to
appoint a committee to represent retirees in the Chapter 11 cases
of the company and its affiliates.

In court filings, retirees Richard Bruce and Ronald Olbrysh argued
the company's objection to the appointment is "based on the faulty
premise that a summary of the benefit plan issued in 2007 -- not
the actual plan documents and not a court-approved class action
settlement -- control whether the benefits are vested."

According to their attorney, James Lawlor, Esq., at Wollmuth Maher
& Deutsch LLP, in New York, the stipulation of settlement was
approved by a federal district court and is the governing document
as a matter of law.  

"Courts in this Circuit enforce such settlements and reject
subsequent attempts to rewrite them more favorably.  Thus, the
summary relied upon by the debtors cannot, as a matter of law,
alter that settlement agreement's binding terms," Mr. Lawlor
argued.

"The debtors argue that several provisions of the summary render
the benefits terminable at will.  The debtors are wrong," the
attorney further said.

Mr. Lawlor said there is also no valid reason not to appoint a
committee at this stage of the company's bankruptcy case.  

"The retirees moved promptly and the limited role and scope of any
such committee will not undermine any plan," he said.

Mr. Lawlor maintains an office at:

     James N. Lawlor, Esq.
     Cassandra Postighone, Esq.
     Wollmuth Maher & Deutsch LLP
     500 Fifth Avenue
     New York, NY 10110
     Telephone: (212) 382-3300
     Fax: (212) 382-0050
     Email: jlawlor@wmd-law.com
     Email: cpostighone@wmd-law.com

                     About Sears Holdings

Sears Holdings Corporation (NASDAQ: SHLD) --
http://www.searsholdings.com/-- began as a mail ordering catalog
company in 1887 and became the world's largest retailer in the
1960s.  At its peak, Sears was present in almost every big mall
across the U.S., and sold everything from toys and auto parts to
mail-order homes.  Sears claims to be is a market leader in the
appliance, tool, lawn and garden, fitness equipment, and automotive
repair and maintenance retail sectors.

Sears and Kmart merged to form Sears Holdings in 2005 when they had
3,500 US stores between them.  Kmart emerged in 2005 from its own
bankruptcy.

Unable to keep up with online stores and other brick-and-mortar
retailers, a long series of store closings has left it with 687
retail stores in 49 states, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin
Islands as of mid-October 2018.  The Company employs 68,000
individuals, of whom 32,000 are full-time employees.

As of Aug. 4, 2018, Sears Holdings had $6.93 billion in total
assets, $11.33 billion in total liabilities and a total deficit of
$4.40 billion.

Unable to cover a $134 million debt payment due Oct. 15, 2018,
Sears Holdings Corporation and 49 subsidiaries sought Chapter 11
protection (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Lead Case No. 18-23538) on Oct. 15,
2018.

The Hon. Robert D. Drain is the case judge.

Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP is serving as legal counsel and M-III
Partners is serving as restructuring advisor.  Aebersold, Managing
Director, and Levi Quaintance, Vice President of Lazard Freres &
Co. LLC serve as investment banker to Holdings.  DLA Piper LLP is
the real estate advisor.  Prime Clerk is the claims and noticing
agent.

The U.S. Trustee for Region 2 appointed nine creditors, including
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., and landlord Simon Property
Group, L.P., to serve on an official committee of unsecured
creditors.  Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP is counsel to the
creditors' committee.  FTI Consulting is financial advisor to the
creditors' committee.  Houlihan Lokey Capital, Inc., is providing
investment banking services to the committee.


SEARS HOLDINGS: Posts $175 Million Net Income at Apr. 6
-------------------------------------------------------
Sears Holdings Corporation, et al., filed with the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission their monthly operating report for March 3,
2019 through April 6, 2019.

The Debtors' consolidated statement of operations reflected a net
income of $175 million on $29 million of total revenues for the
current reporting period.

As of April 6, 2019, the Debtors listed $27.42 billion in
consolidated total assets, $34.07 billion in consolidated total
liabilities, and a $6.65 billion in consolidated total
shareholders' deficit.

The Debtors listed total cash receipts of $45.93 million and total
cash disbursements of $42.27 million for the reporting period.

A copy of the monthly operating report is available at the SEC at:

                     https://is.gd/Md275A  

                     About Sears Holdings

Sears Holdings Corporation (NASDAQ: SHLD) --
http://www.searsholdings.com/-- began as a mail ordering catalog  

company in 1887 and became the world's largest retailer in the
1960s.  At its peak, Sears was present in almost every big mall
across the U.S., and sold everything from toys and auto parts to
mail-order homes.  Sears claims to be is a market leader in the
appliance, tool, lawn and garden, fitness equipment, and automotive
repair and maintenance retail sectors.

Sears and Kmart merged to form Sears Holdings in 2005 when they had
3,500 US stores between them.  Kmart emerged in 2005 from its own
bankruptcy.

Unable to keep up with online stores and other brick-and-mortar
retailers, a long series of store closings has left it with 687
retail stores in 49 states, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin
Islands as of mid-October 2018.  The Company employs 68,000
individuals, of whom 32,000 are full-time employees.

As of Aug. 4, 2018, Sears Holdings had $6.93 billion in total
assets, $11.33 billion in total liabilities and a total deficit of
$4.40 billion.

Unable to cover a $134 million debt payment due Oct. 15, 2018,
Sears Holdings Corporation and 49 subsidiaries sought Chapter 11
protection (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Lead Case No. 18-23538) on Oct. 15,
2018.

The Hon. Robert D. Drain is the case judge.

Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP is serving as legal counsel and M-III
Partners is serving as restructuring advisor.  Aebersold, Managing
Director, and Levi Quaintance, Vice President of Lazard Freres &
Co. LLC serve as investment banker to Holdings.  DLA Piper LLP is
the real estate advisor.  Prime Clerk is the claims and noticing
agent.

The U.S. Trustee for Region 2 appointed nine creditors, including
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., and landlord Simon Property
Group, L.P., to serve on an official committee of unsecured
creditors.  Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP is counsel to the
creditors' committee.  FTI Consulting is financial advisor to the
creditors' committee.  Houlihan Lokey Capital, Inc., is providing
investment banking services to the committee.




=====================================
T R I N I D A D   A N D   T O B A G O
=====================================

CARIBBEAN AIRLINES: Faces Suit From American Passenger
------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that an American woman who was allegedly injured
when a Caribbean Airlines flight attendant reportedly pushed a food
serving cart into her arm has filed a federal lawsuit against the
air carrier.

The lawsuit, filed in U.S. District Court for the District of
Connecticut, says Julie Swaby Smith was sleeping in an aisle seat
during the June 2017 flight from John F. Kennedy International
Airport in New York City to the Norman Manley International
Airport, when the incident happened, according to RJR News.

The lawsuit said the airline was negligent and breached its duty
because it failed to properly train, supervise and monitor the
flight attendants under its care, the report notes.

Ms Smith's attorney, Louis Flynn, told the Connecticut Law Tribune
his client, a nurse's aide, suffered long-term consequences, the
report says.

                      About Caribbean Airlines

Caribbean Airlines Limited - http://www.caribbean-airlines.com/-
provides passenger airline services in the Caribbean, South
America, and North America.  The company also offers freighter
services for perishables, fish and seafood, live animals, human
remains, and dangerous goods.  In addition, it operates a duty free
store in Trinidad.  Caribbean Airlines Limited was founded in 2006
and is based in Piarco, Trinidad and Tobago.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
November 2, 2015, RJR News said that Michael DiLollo, Chief
Executive Officer of Caribbean Airlines Limited, quit after just 17
months on the job. The 48-year-old Canadian national, citing
personal reasons, resigned with immediate effect.  His resignation
was accepted by the airline's board of directors. Mr. DiLollo was
appointed Caribbean Airlines CEO in May 2014, following the sudden
resignation of Robert Corbie in September 2013.

In early February 2015, Larry Howai, then Finance Minister, told
Parliament that unaudited accounts for 2014 showed the airline made
a loss of US$60 million, inclusive of its Air Jamaica operations,
and the airline planned to break even by 2017. Mr. Howai told the
Parliament that a five-year strategic plan had been completed and
was in the process of being approved for implementation.

In an interview with the Trinidad & Tobago Guardian in early
November 2015, Mr. DiLollo said CAL did not need a bailout just
yet. Mr. DiLollo said the airline had benefited from extremely
patient shareholders for years and he believed the airline was
strategically positioned to break even in three years.




=============
U R U G U A Y
=============

MINERAL LOGISTICS: Fitch Withdraws BB+(EXP) on $483MM Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has withdrawn the BB+(EXP)' rating with a Stable
Outlook assigned to the proposed senior secured notes to be issued
by Mineral Logistics in the amount of US$483 million. The expected
rating was assigned on June 7, 2019.

Fitch is withdrawing the expected rating as Mineral Logistics
decided not to proceed with the issuance of the senior secured
notes as previously envisaged and the expected rating is no longer
expected to convert to final rating.




===============
X X X X X X X X
===============

[*] BOND PRICING: For the Week June 17 to June 21, 2019
-------------------------------------------------------
  Issuer Name              Cpn     Price   Maturity  Country  Curr
  -----------              ---     -----   --------  -------   ---

Noble Holding Internat     5.3    60.5    3/15/2042    KY     USD
Noble Holding Internat     6.2    62.2     8/1/2040    KY     USD
YPF SA                    16.5    67.3     5/9/2022    AR     ARS
Banco Macro SA            17.5    65.2     5/8/2022    AR     ARS
Odebrecht Finance Ltd      6.0    16.4     4/5/2023    KY     USD
Cia Latinoamericana de     9.5    73.9    7/20/2023    AR     USD
MIE Holdings Corp          7.5    56.2    4/25/2019    HK     USD
China Huiyuan Juice Gr     6.5    46.6    8/16/2020    CN     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd      7.0    17.0    4/21/2020    KY     USD
Yida China Holdings Lt     7.0    74.3    4/19/2020    CN     USD
KrisEnergy Ltd             4.0    40.4     6/9/2022    SG     SGD
Noble Holding Internat     6.1    62.0     3/1/2041    KY     USD
USJ Acucar e Alcool SA     9.9    74.0    11/9/2019    BR     USD
Avadel Finance Cayman      4.5    55.0     2/1/2023    US     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     6.9    75.2    1/11/2048    AR     USD
Polarcus Ltd               5.6    71.8     7/1/2022    AE     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     8.3    74.5   12/31/2033    AR     USD
MIE Holdings Corp          7.5    56.4    4/25/2019    HK     USD
Automotores Gildemeist     8.3    54.2    5/24/2021    CL     USD
YPF SA                    16.5    67.3     5/9/2022    AR     ARS
Provincia del Chubut A     4.5    2208    3/30/2021    AR     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     4.3    70.0   12/31/2033    AR     JPY
Automotores Gildemeist     6.8    54.9    1/15/2023    CL     USD
Cia Latinoamericana de     9.5    74.3    7/20/2023    AR     USD
Enel Americas SA           5.8    32.7    6/15/2022    CL     CLP
Banco Macro SA            17.5    65.2     5/8/2022    AR     ARS
Provincia de Rio Negro     7.8    70.3    12/7/2025    AR     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd      6.0    16.4     4/5/2023    KY     USD
Province of Santa Fe       6.9    75.2    11/1/2027    AR     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd      7.0    16.5    4/21/2020    KY     USD
Province of Santa Fe       6.9    74.7    11/1/2027    AR     USD
Embotelladora Andina S     3.5    37.9    8/16/2020    CL     CLP
USJ Acucar e Alcool SA     9.9    74.0    11/9/2019    BR     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     8.3    72.9   12/31/2033    AR     USD
Empresa Provincial de     12.5     0.0    1/29/2020    AR     USD
Cia Energetica de Pern     6.2     1.1    1/15/2022    BR     BRL
Provincia de Buenos Ai     7.9    75.3    6/15/2027    AR     USD
AES Tiete Energia SA       6.8     1.2    4/15/2024    BR     BRL
Provincia de Rio Negro     7.8    70.4    12/7/2025    AR     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     0.5    27.6   12/31/2038    AR     JPY
Plaza SA                   3.5    38.3    8/15/2020    CL     CLP
Banco Security SA          3.0     5.6     7/1/2019    CL     CLP
Argentina Bonar Bonds      5.8    75.2    4/18/2025    AR     USD
Corp Universidad de Co     5.9    64.2   11/10/2021    CL     CLP
City of Cordoba Argent     7.9    73.1    9/29/2024    AR     USD
Automotores Gildemeist     8.3    54.2    5/24/2021    CL     USD
Provincia de Cordoba       7.1    72.7     8/1/2027    AR     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     6.3    74.1    11/9/2047    AR     EUR
Provincia del Chaco Ar     4.0     0.0    12/4/2026    AR     USD
Fospar S/A                 6.5     1.2    5/15/2026    BR     BRL
Empresa de Transporte      4.3    30.9    7/15/2020    CL     CLP
Argentina Bonar Bonds      7.6    74.4    4/18/2037    AR     USD
Automotores Gildemeist     6.8    54.9    1/15/2023    CL     USD
SACI Falabella             2.3    50.6    7/15/2020    CL     CLP
Sylph Ltd                  2.4    65.1    9/25/2036    KY     USD
Banco Security SA          3.0    27.4     6/1/2021    CL     CLP
Empresa Electrica de l     2.5    63.8    5/15/2021    CL     CLP
Sociedad Austral de El     3.0    17.0    9/20/2019    CL     CLP
Provincia del Chaco Ar     9.4    74.8    8/18/2024    AR     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     7.1    75.7    6/28/2117    AR     USD
Provincia de Cordoba       7.1    74.7     8/1/2027    AR     USD
Metrogas SA/Chile          6.0    41.6     8/1/2024    CL     CLP
Esval SA                   3.5    49.9    2/15/2026    CL     CLP


[*] LATAM: Needs Innovation, Planning For Sustainability
--------------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that Latin America faces big challenges in social
and environmental sustainability, especially with regard to climate
change, which will not be solved with money alone and demands
planning for the future," according to an executive with IDB
Invest, the private-sector arm of the Inter-American Development
Bank.

"It's a challenge of course, but it also offers the chance for
countries to enter early in the process of planning for the future
with measures of mitigation and adaptation, because we already feel
the effects" of climate change, Luiz Gabriel Azevedo, IDB Invest's
head of Environmental, Social and Corporate Governance, said in an
interview with EFE.



                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2019.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.
.


                  * * * End of Transmission * * *