TCRLA_Public/190716.mbx        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                 L A T I N   A M E R I C A

          Tuesday, July 16, 2019, Vol. 20, No. 141

                           Headlines



A N T I G U A   A N D   B A R B U D A

LIAT: Antigua Prime Minister 'Not Aware' Talks Stalled
LIAT: Shares Divesting Negotiation Continue


A R G E N T I N A

ARGENTINA: IMF Approves US$5.4 Billion Disbursement
ARGENTINA: Moody's Affirms B2 Issuer Ratings, Alters Outlook to Neg


B R A Z I L

BRF S.A.: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Issuer Credit Rating, Off Watch Pos.
OURO VERDE: Fitch Raises IDRs to B, Outlook Positive


C O S T A   R I C A

INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE: Fitch Affirms B+ IDRs, Outlook Negative


J A M A I C A

DIGICEL GROUP: Moody's Downgrades CFR to Caa2, Outlook Negative


M E X I C O

BAJA CALIFORNIA: Moody's Lowers Issuer Rating to B2, Outlook Neg.
UNIFIN FINANCIERA: Fitch Rates USD450MM Sr. Unsec. Notes Final 'BB'


P U E R T O   R I C O

ADVANCE PAIN: Case Summary & Unsecured Creditors
EL PATIO BBQ: Seeks Court Approval to Hire Accountant
EL PATIO BBQ: Seeks to Hire Hatillo Law Office as Counsel
J.C. PENNEY: Egan-Jones Withdraws CCC- Sr. Unsec. Debt Ratings
PUERTO RICO: Lawmakers Advance Bill to Boost Medicaid Funding



V E N E Z U E L A

PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: Trading Chief Leaves as Exports Fall

                           - - - - -


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A N T I G U A   A N D   B A R B U D A
=====================================

LIAT: Antigua Prime Minister 'Not Aware' Talks Stalled
------------------------------------------------------
Winn reports that the Antigua and Barbuda government said it is not
aware that negotiations with Barbados regarding the sale of the
shares of the cash-strapped regional airline, LIAT Ltd., formerly
known as Leeward Islands Air Transport or LIAT, owned by Bridgetown
are in limbo.

Media reports in Barbados had suggested that the talks, which
began, had broken down after only "a few hours," according to
Winn.

But in a WhatsApp message sent to the Caribbean Media Corporation
(CMC), Prime Minister Gaston Browne said that he is "not aware that
it has stalled", adding, "not to my knowledge," the report notes.

Mr. Browne said that "a counter offer was made by Antigua" telling
CMC he would not be disclosing the counter offer "at this time, the
report relays.

"I am not at liberty to discuss the details," Mr. Browne added.

Barbados's negotiating team is led by Attorney General Dale
Marshall and includes the Minister for Tourism Kerrie Symmonds and
Director of Finance and Economic Affairs Ian Carrington, the report
relays.

The Barbados media reports had indicated that Bridgetown was not
impressed with St John's initial proposals, the report notes.

Antigua and Barbuda is seeking to become the largest shareholder
government of the airline and is in negotiations with Barbados to
acquire most of that country's shareholding in the Antigua-based
airline, the report says.  The other shareholders are Dominica, St
Vincent and the Grenadines and Grenada, the report relays.

Antigua and Barbuda currently holds 34 per cent of the shares and
if it succeeds in convincing Bridgetown to part with its LIAT
shares, would have 81 per cent of the airline that employs over 600
people and operates 491 flights weekly across 15 destinations, the
report notes.

St John's said it would seek to acquire the LIAT shares owned by
Barbados through a take-over of the liability of Barbados to the
Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), the report adds.

                            About LIAT

LIAT Ltd., formerly known as Leeward Islands Air Transport or LIAT,
is an airline headquartered on the grounds of V. C. Bird
International Airport in Antigua.  It operates high-frequency
inter-island scheduled services serving 15 destinations in the
Caribbean.  The airline's main base is VC Bird International
Airport, Antigua and Barbuda, with bases at Grantley Adams
International Airport, Barbados and Piarco International Airport,
Trinidad and Tobago.

The airline is owned by seven Caribbean governments, with three
being the major shareholders: Barbados, Antigua & Barbuda and St.
Vincent and the Grenadines along with Dominica(94.7 %); other
Caribbean governments, private shareholders and employees (5.3%).

In the last few years, LIAT has been challenged with financial
difficulties, often needing additional funding as the airline dealt
with the high cost of operations.  In November 2016, the Barbados
government defended LIAT's operations, even as opposition
legislators called for a cessation of the business.  In early 2015,
LIAT offered early retirement packages to employees in efforts to
downsize.  In 2014, LIAT knew it had to deal with unprofitable
routes to make operations viable.  In the third quarter of 2013,
the airline's top management was shaken, with news Chief Executive
Officer Captain Ian Brunton's sudden resignation.

LIAT's current chief executive officer is Julie Reifer-Jones,
chairman is Jean Holder, and chief financial officer is Rojer
Inglis.

Dr. Ralph Gonsalves, prime minister of St. Vincent & the
Grenadines, serves as chairman of LIAT shareholders.

LIAT: Shares Divesting Negotiation Continue
-------------------------------------------
Winn reports that Antigua and Barbuda Prime Minister Gaston Browne
is disputing claims that negotiations between his country and
Barbados to purchase Bridgetown's LIAT Ltd., formerly known as
Leeward Islands Air Transport or LIAT, shares have broken down.

A Barbados Today report indicated that the Barbados Government
wants Antigua and Barbuda to pay US$44 million dollars, almost
EC$100 million dollars for the shares, according to Winn.

That sum is linked to Barbados' debt to the Caribbean Development
Bank for the purchase of three airplanes for LIAT, the report
notes.

However, Prime Minister Browne says the sum put forward by the
Barbados negotiating team is exorbitant, and he has been in touch
with Prime Minister Mia Mottley making that case, the report
discloses.

Mr. Browne explained, "My understanding is that the planes are
worth between US$10 and US$12 million dollars apiece.  Let's say
it's even US$12 million apiece that's US$36 million dollars,
Barbados owns about let's say 50 percent, not quite 50 but just for
simple mathematics let's say 50 percent, it means therefore that
the debt associated with the planes and I'm looking at it based on
the value of the planes will be US$18 million.  So if we decided
that we want to buy 50 percent of the Barbados shares then the 50
percent would be US$9 million.  We are aware that Barbados would
have put in additional funds over the years to support LIAT but as
far as we're concerned those are sunk costs, Barbados would have
already gotten the benefits of those investments. Antigua had to
treat all of its prior investment as a  sunk cost, so there is a
precedent for that already and what we are saying now is that any
additional investment that Barbados would have given to LIAT those
are sunk costs so we are not concerned about those."

Prime Minister Browne appeared to signal his disappointment with
the Antigua and Barbuda negotiating team.

                            About LIAT

LIAT Ltd., formerly known as Leeward Islands Air Transport or LIAT,
is an airline headquartered on the grounds of V. C. Bird
International Airport in Antigua.  It operates high-frequency
inter-island scheduled services serving 15 destinations in the
Caribbean.  The airline's main base is VC Bird International
Airport, Antigua and Barbuda, with bases at Grantley Adams
International Airport, Barbados and Piarco International Airport,
Trinidad and Tobago.

The airline is owned by seven Caribbean governments, with three
being the major shareholders: Barbados, Antigua & Barbuda and St.
Vincent and the Grenadines along with Dominica(94.7 %); other
Caribbean governments, private shareholders and employees (5.3%).

In the last few years, LIAT has been challenged with financial
difficulties, often needing additional funding as the airline dealt
with the high cost of operations.  In November 2016, the Barbados
government defended LIAT's operations, even as opposition
legislators called for a cessation of the business.  In early 2015,
LIAT offered early retirement packages to employees in efforts to
downsize.  In 2014, LIAT knew it had to deal with unprofitable
routes to make operations viable.  In the third quarter of 2013,
the airline's top management was shaken, with news Chief Executive
Officer Captain Ian Brunton's sudden resignation.

LIAT's current chief executive officer is Julie Reifer-Jones,
chairman is Jean Holder, and chief financial officer is Rojer
Inglis.

Dr. Ralph Gonsalves, prime minister of St. Vincent & the
Grenadines, serves as chairman of LIAT shareholders.



=================
A R G E N T I N A
=================

ARGENTINA: IMF Approves US$5.4 Billion Disbursement
---------------------------------------------------
The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
completed the fourth review of Argentina's economic performance
under the 36-month Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) that was approved on
June 20, 2018. The completion of the review allows the authorities
to draw SDR 3.9 billion (about US$5.4 billion), bringing total
disbursements since June 2018 to SDR 31.91371 (about US$44.1
billion).

Following the Executive Board discussion of Argentina's economic
plan, Mr. David Lipton, the IMF's Acting Managing Director and
Chair, stated:

"The Argentine authorities continue to show a strong commitment to
their economic policy program, meeting all the applicable targets
under the Fund-supported program. While it has taken time, these
policy efforts are starting to bear fruit. Financial markets have
stabilized, the fiscal and external positions are improving, and
the economy is beginning a gradual recovery from last year's
recession. The Fund is strongly supportive of these important
policy efforts.

"Although inflation is still high, it is now on a downward path
that is expected to continue in the coming months. The BCRA's
prudent management of monetary policy remains an essential anchor
for both the exchange rate and the disinflation process.

"The Argentine government has consistently demonstrated its
commitment to fiscal discipline and has well-exceeded its fiscal
targets for March and June. The authorities have asked the IMF to
support raising the end-September primary balance target as a
signal of their priority of ensuring that Argentina's debt-to-GDP
ratio is placed decisively on a downward path.

"The government was able to meet its fiscal targets while also
protecting social programs and using fiscal tools to shield the
most vulnerable from the effects of the recession. The authorities
have also requested the IMF to support an expansion of the social
spending floor to incorporate assistance programs targeted at
adults without children and low-income working mothers. These
commendable efforts will both expand coverage of the social safety
net and help improve gender equity.

"The authorities' efforts to increase rollover rates on public debt
and to lengthen the maturity of new debt issuance should help
mitigate financing risks in the period ahead. Ongoing efforts to
improve the functioning of local sovereign debt markets will help
improve market liquidity and lower financing costs.

"Steadfast implementation of the policies underlying the
IMF-supported program will be critical for continued progress. As
macroeconomic stability becomes more entrenched, policy efforts
will need to focus more on reinvigorating plans for structural
reforms. The recent MERCOSUR-EU trade agreement is an important
step in that direction. Further efforts are needed to redesign the
tax system; increase competition in domestic product markets; and
deepen efforts to strengthen governance and confront corruption.
Such reforms have significant potential to raise Argentina's growth
potential, create jobs, reduce poverty, and improve the standard of
living for all Argentineans."

                         About Argentina

Argentina is a country located mostly in the southern half of South
America.  It's capital is Buenos Aires.  Mauricio Macri is the
incumbent president of Argentina.

Argentina has the third largest economy in Latin America.  The
country's economy is an upper middle-income economy for fiscal year
2019 according to the World Bank.  Historically, however, its
economic performance has been very uneven, with high economic
growth alternating with severe recessions, income maldistribution
and--in the recent decades--increasing poverty.

Standard & Poor's credit rating for Argentina stands at B with
stable outlook (November 2018). Moody's credit rating for Argentina
was last set at B2 with stable outlook (November 2017). Fitch's
credit rating for Argentina was last reported at B with negative
outlook (November 2018). DBRS's credit rating for Argentina is B
with stable outlook.

ARGENTINA: Moody's Affirms B2 Issuer Ratings, Alters Outlook to Neg
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service changed the outlook for the Government of
Argentina to negative from stable. Concurrently, Moody's has
affirmed the B2 foreign-currency and local-currency long-term
issuer and senior unsecured ratings. The senior unsecured ratings
for shelf registrations were also affirmed at (P)B2.

At the same time Argentina's short-term rating was affirmed at Not
Prime (NP). The senior unsecured ratings for unrestructured debt
were affirmed at Ca and the unrestructured senior unsecured shelf
affirmed at (P)Ca.

Moody's decision to change the outlook to negative for Argentina's
B2 ratings reflects:

1. Increased uncertainty regarding the continued implementation of
policies that, by addressing Argentina's fundamental imbalances,
restore reliable access to international capital markets and
contain the risk of further damaging currency shocks.

2. And, relatedly, the rising risk that policy uncertainty itself
leads to a material, sustained shift in sentiment that increases
financing pressures and erodes buffers.

The B2 rating affirmation reflects Moody's central expectation that
Argentina's core credit metrics will not worsen materially still
further over the coming period. The rating level balances a rising
debt burden and a history of economic volatility with comparatively
high economic development and support from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF).

Argentina's long-term foreign-currency bond ceiling remains
unchanged at B1 and the foreign-currency deposit ceiling unchanged
at B3. The local-currency country ceilings for bonds and bank
deposits remain unchanged at Ba2. The short-term foreign-currency
bank deposit ceiling and the short-term foreign-currency bond
ceiling remain unchanged at Not Prime (NP).

RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR CHANGING THE OUTLOOK TO NEGATIVE FROM STABLE

INCREASED UNCERTAINTY REGARDING CONTINUED IMPLEMENTATION OF
POLICIES THAT WILL RESTORE RELIABLE ACCESS TO INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL
MARKETS AND REDUCE THE RISK OF FURTHER CURRENCY SHOCKS

The structural reform program initiated by President Macri's
government, and the accelerated fiscal consolidation efforts that
sit at its core, have played a crucial role in restoring a modicum
of credit stability after last year's severe currency shocks. They
have done so both by reassuring investors as to the government's
medium-term objectives; and by allowing the government to reach a
three year, $57 billion Stand By Arrangement (SBA) with the IMF,
which has been a key liquidity support. The government aims to end
2020 with a 1% of GDP primary surplus, which it expects will
support a return to the international capital markets in 2020 or
2021. In the meantime, IMF lending will provide over 60% of
Argentina's medium and long-term funding in 2019. And even though
the importance of IMF funding will fall in 2020 and 2021, strong
relations with the IMF will remain vital if financial and exchange
rate stability is to be sustained over the next few years.

However, the government's ability to continue to implement its
desired policies and to sustain its commitment to reform over the
medium term is increasingly uncertain. Rising domestic discontent
at the near-term impact of government policies on growth and living
standards is raising the prospect of a different, and potentially
credit negative, policy path in the period following the national
elections in October. Argentina has a long history of policy
changes following changes in government. The main opposition
candidates have raised questions about commitments made as part of
the IMF program. They have not ruled out seeking to renegotiate
some or all of the SBA conditions and pursuing alternative fiscal
strategies and monetary policies that could complicate the
country's relationship with the IMF.

But whatever the result of the upcoming elections, shifts in the
domestic political environment suggest that the future path of
policy is increasingly uncertain. The risk is rising of changes or
potentially reversals to a fiscal consolidation program that
Moody's currently estimates will reduce the government's primary
balance to a 0.5% of GDP deficit in 2019 from a 4.2% of GDP deficit
in 2016. A significant reversal of these targets could threaten the
continuation of the SBA program and close the door on international
market funding. That funding will be needed to meet the
government's financing requirements from 2021 onwards. The absence
of it would put significant pressure on the liquidity position of
the government and increase the possibility of a debt restructuring
in the next two or three years.

RISING RISK THAT POLICY UNCERTAINTY ITSELF LEADS TO A SUSTAINED
SHIFT IN SENTIMENT THAT INCREASES FINANCING PRESSURES AND ERODES
BUFFERS

Recent months have illustrated Argentina's vulnerability to vicious
cycles of worsening investor sentiment, exchange rate depreciation,
rising inflation expectations, rising interest rates, falling
growth, rising debt and falling debt affordability. Since April of
last year Argentina has gone through several exchange rate shocks,
which have left most credit metrics significantly weaker than when
the country's rating was upgraded to B2 in 2017. Government debt
will reach 76% of GDP this year, up from 50% in 2017. Over the same
time period interest payments have jumped to 17% of revenues from
11%. Both debt and interest payments are now higher than the median
for B2 and B3-rated sovereigns. The exchange rate shocks have also
pushed inflation close to 60% over the last twelve months and will
result in two consecutive years of falling economic output.

Moody's decision to affirm the B2 rating reflects its central
expectation that core metrics will not materially worsen still
further. However, the negative outlook reflects balance of risk to
the downside and the country's vulnerability to unpredictable
shifts in sentiment. In the last two months, exchange rate
pressures have eased and sovereign spreads have fallen. But
volatility remains high, and much rests on the administration's
policy credibility after many years of highly idiosyncratic
policymaking. Concerns on the part of investors and consumers,
before or after the elections, about the likely emergence and
consequences of a credit negative policy shift could lead to a
fresh vicious cycle triggered by a new round of currency
devaluations which would further worsen already weak credit
metrics. Another sudden and sharp devaluation would push inflation
still higher, ending the nascent economic recovery and delaying
still further the recovery from recession, and rapidly worsen the
debt burden and debt affordability.

RATIONALE FOR AFFIRMING THE RATINGS AT B2

The affirmation of the B2 rating reflects Moody's central
expectation that Argentina's core metrics will not materially
worsen still further and that support from the IMF will sustain the
issuer until it is able to regain affordable access to
international capital markets. Notwithstanding the rise in the
government's debt and interest burdens, the sovereign benefits from
its strong commitment to consolidation under its IMF program to
date. This should, provided policy continuity persists, see
domestic and external imbalances continue to adjust, with IMF
financing shielding the government from external refinancing risks
through 2019. As confidence returns, so should growth, allowing
Argentina to build on fundamental strengths including a large,
highly developed and comparatively wealthy economy.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP

Although a rating upgrade is unlikely in the near future, a return
to a stable outlook could result if it becomes clear that fiscal
consolidation, central bank independence, and continued support
from the IMF will be sustained in the coming years.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING DOWN

The rating would likely be downgraded were Moody's to observe a
further material worsening in Argentina's fiscal strength and a
heightened exposure to domestic or external financing shocks, or
were it to conclude that the risk of such an outcome had materially
risen. Such a conclusion would likely be driven by revised
assumptions around the future path of government economic and
fiscal policy, particularly if supported by a worsening in
relations with the IMF and by a further erosion in financial
buffers.

GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 20,537 (2018 Actual) (also known
as Per Capita Income)

Real GDP growth (% change): -2.5% (2018 Actual) (also known as GDP
Growth)

Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 47.6% (2018 Actual)

Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -5.2% (2018 Actual) (also known as
Fiscal Balance)

Current Account Balance/GDP: -5.4% (2018 Actual) (also known as
External Balance)

External debt/GDP: 53.5% (2018 Actual)

Level of economic development: Low level of economic resilience

Default history: At least one default event (on bonds and/or loans)
has been recorded since 1983.

On July 09, 2019, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of the Argentina, Government of. The main points raised
during the discussion were: The issuer's economic fundamentals,
including its economic strength, have materially decreased. The
issuer's institutional strength/framework, have materially
decreased. The issuer's fiscal or financial strength, including its
debt profile, has materially decreased. The systemic risk in which
the issuer operates has materially increased. The issuer has become
increasingly susceptible to event risks.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Sovereign Bond
Ratings published in November 2018.



===========
B R A Z I L
===========

BRF S.A.: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Issuer Credit Rating, Off Watch Pos.
----------------------------------------------------------------
On July 12, 2019, S&P Global Ratings removed all the ratings on BRF
S.A. and Marfrig Global Foods S.A. from CreditWatch with positive
implications.

S&P said, "We're also affirming our global scale 'BB-' issuer
credit and issue-level ratings and our national scale the 'brAA+'
issuer ratings on BRF and Marfrig. We also assigned a stable
outlook on both companies.

"We have placed the ratings on BRF and Marfrig on CreditWatch
positive on May 31, 2019, due to the potential merger of their
operations, which could have had a positive impact on the combined
entity's credit quality in our view."

After a period of less than 45 days of discussions, the companies
announced yesterday the end of the negotiations due to
disagreements on the terms and conditions on the governance of the
combined entity. As a result, S&P's removing the ratings on both
entities from the CreditWatch listing.

S&P expects BRF and Marfrig to return their focus on improving
their operating performances, while benefiting from the more
favorable fundamentals for the South American protein export
players.

OURO VERDE: Fitch Raises IDRs to B, Outlook Positive
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings upgraded Ouro Verde Locacao e Servico S.A.'s
Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings to 'B',
from 'RD'. Fitch has also upgraded the company's national scale
rating and its 7th debenture issuance to 'BBB(bra)' from 'RD(bra)'.
The Rating Outlook for the corporate ratings is Positive.

The upgrade reflects Ouro Verde's improved financial profile
following Brookfield's acquisition of 100% of the issuer's shares
and it BRL500 million capital injection, as well as the completion
of the company's debt restructuring, which led to lengthening of
the company's debt maturities through 2034, and lower interest
rate. The Positive Outlook reflects Fitch's perception that Ouro
Verde's recovery should occur within the next 12 to 24 months due
to Brookfield's ownership of the company and its improved liquidity
position.

On July 8, 2019, Cedar Fundo de Investimento em Participacoes
Multiestrategia (Cedar), a Brookfield investment vehicle in Brazil,
acquired 100% of Ouro Verde's shares and voting rights. On the same
date, the company received a BRL500 million cash injection and
concluded the debt restructure of its 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th
debenture issuance. The cash injection was comprised of a BRL365
million capital increase and a BRL135 million receivable pay down
from the previous main shareholder.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

New-Ownership Strengthens Business Profile: Ouro Verde's business
profile should improve on the medium term. The financial strength
of its new controlling shareholder should help the company to face
competition from larger participants, with stronger financial
profiles, and to grow in the fragmented, incipient and capital
intensive Brazilian market of heavy vehicles and machinery rentals.
Fitch views Brookfield, which has numerous investments in Brazil,
as a strategic owner due to its ability to support an increase in
Ouro Verde's scale and operating competitiveness.

Improved Capital Structure: Fitch expects the recently concluded
debt restructure and the BRL500 million cash injection to improve
Ouro Verde's capital structure, helping the company to manage its
growth while keeping leverage at moderate levels in the medium term
-- depending on the company's strategy in terms of capex. On a pro
forma basis, adding BRL300 million into Ouro Verde's cash position,
assuming BRL200 million of the cash injection would support capex,
the adjusted net debt-to-EBITDA ratio should be at 3.8x, based on
BRL274 million annualized EBITDA and BRL1.4 billion of pro-forma
total debt.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Ouro Verde's ratings reflect the company's better position to
recover its operating performance and improved financial profile
after the BRL500 million cash injection, but still weaker
competitive position compared to its bigger domestic peers such as
Localiza Rent a Car S.A. (Foreign Currency IDR BB, Local Currency
IDR BBB-/Stable), JSL S.A. (Foreign Currency and Local Currency
IDRs BB/Negative) and Companhia de Locacao das Americas -
Locamerica (National Scale Rating AA[bra]/Positive). Those
comparable peers also present a better financial profile.

After its debt restructuring, Ouro Verde has slightly lower
leverage and higher rental margins than those of JSL. However, the
company's access to new funding has yet to be tested. Additionally,
compared with Localiza, JSL and Locamerica, Ouro Verde has smaller
scale and lower bargain power within the industry, which are key
variables in an industry that demands high capital investing and an
established network for asset disposal.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's Key Assumptions Within Its Rating Case for the Issuer

  - Cash inflow of BRL500 million;

  - Lengthened debt maturity profile.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Positive Rating Action

  - Improvement in Ouro Verde's business position and client base
without jeopardizing its financial profile.

Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Negative Rating Action

The Positive Outlook may be removed in case of a dificulty in
achieving the triggers for the upgrade. The ratings may be
downgraded in case of:

  - Further deterioration of the company's business position;

  - Deterioration of the liquidity profile, leading to refinancing
risks;

  - Declining EBITDA and profitability levels.

LIQUIDITY

Improved Liquidity: The expected BRL500 million cash injection
should support capex and strengthen the company's cash position,
significantly improving the financial flexibility of Ouro Verde,
which has a track record of weak liquidity. Additionally, expected
lower funding cost and a better spread debt amortization schedule
should improve Ouro Verde's financial profile. To better predict
liquidity and cash flow levels, Fitch has yet to have a clear view
on the management growth strategy. After the debt restructure,
total and short-term debt reached BRL1.4 billion and BRL150
million, respectively, with expected cash/short-term debt around
2.5x.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has upgraded the following ratings:

Ouro Verde Locacao e Servico S.A

  -- Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs to 'B' from 'RD';

  -- Long-Term National Scale Rating to 'BBB(bra)' from 'RD(bra)';

  -- 2021 senior unsecured 7th debenture issuance to 'BBB(bra)'
from 'RD(bra)'.

The Rating Outlook is Positive.



===================
C O S T A   R I C A
===================

INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE: Fitch Affirms B+ IDRs, Outlook Negative
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad
y Subsidiarias' Foreign- and Local-Currency Issuer Default Ratings
(FC/LC IDRs) at 'B+'. In addition, Fitch has also revised its
assessment of ICE's consolidated Standalone Credit Profile to 'b+'
from 'bb-'. The Rating Outlook remains Negative. Simultaneously,
Fitch affirmed ICE's national scale long-term rating at 'AAA(cri)'
with a Stable Rating Outlook.

The Negative Outlook reflects its strong linkage to the sovereign
of Costa Rica (B+/Negative), given its strategic importance to the
country and the potentially significant negative socio-political
and financial implications of any financial distress at the company
level. The ratings are supported by government ownership and the
implicit and explicit expectation of government support.
Additionally, the ratings incorporate the company's diversified
asset portfolio, moderate capex program and its strong market share
position in the telecommunications business.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Weak Corporate Governance and Financial Transparency: ICE's
Standalone Credit Profile (SCP) was revised to 'b+' from 'bb-' due
to uncertain management strategy coupled with defective financial
transparency reporting and a high leverage profile, consistent with
a weak single 'b' rating. Per Fitch's Government Related Entity
Criteria (GRE Criteria), ICE's ratings are now at the same level of
Costa Rica's sovereign rating due to the agency's assessment of the
company's strong linkage with the government and the strong to very
strong incentive of government support. Hence, the primary driver
of the GRE's IDR will be that of the supporting government,
limiting ICE's IDR to 'B+'.

Diquis Project Cancellation: Diquis was a 650MW hydro-power plant
project designed under the previous Expansion Generation Plan (PEG
2014-2018), which previously estimated electricity demand by 2026
of 14.000GWh/Year (30% increase from 2017); nonetheless, PEG
2018-2040 determined that the plant was no longer part of the
optimum minimum cost plan. As a result, CRC88,556 million of
pre-investing costs were transferred to other expenses. After
adjusting this for non-recurring/non-cash item, EBITDAR generation
was CRC488,365 million in 2018 (2017: CRC524,360 million), and
EBITDAR margin was 34.9% (2017: 38.6%). Adjusted leverage was 6.2x
and adjusted coverage ratio of 2.2x. LTM as of March 2019 showed
EBITDAR of CRC486,520 million and adjusted leverage of 6.7x. For FY
2019, Fitch expects adjusted leverage of 6.9x and adjusted coverage
ratio of 1.6x, improving to 5.1x and 2.4x toward 2022, under
favorable tariffs adjustments and results on cost contingency
plan.

High Exposure to Regulatory and Political Interference:  ICE is
exposed to regulatory interference risk given the lack of clear and
transparent electricity tariff schedules. The company proposes
electricity tariffs for end-users to the regulator annually; in
previous years, regulatory and political interference affected the
tariff adjustment process. Electricity tariffs are set using two
mechanisms: through the quarterly adjustment of variable costs of
fuel (CVC) in place since 2013, and the ordinary tariff review that
considers the operating costs. Tariff for consumption of less than
200kwh for residential users is capped at CRC85.46/kwh.

Diversified Asset Portfolio: ICE is a vertically integrated
monopoly in the electricity industry and the incumbent player in
the telecommunications industry in Costa Rica. ICE's mobile market
share in terms of subscribers was approximately 50% as of December
2017. The ratings reflect the company's low business risk resulting
from its business diversification and positive characteristics as a
utility service provider. The company had an installed capacity of
2,524 MW as of March 2019, including the generation plants of its
subsidiary, Compania Nacional de Fuerza y Luz, S.A. (CNFL). ICE is
the exclusive owner of the national transmission grid. The National
Electric System (SEN) is composed of ICE, two municipal companies,
and four rural electrification cooperatives. There are also private
generators that sell energy to ICE. The SEN installed capacity is
3,516MW as of March 2019, a 2.8% decrease compared with December
2018.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

ICE's linkage to the sovereign is similar to its peers such as
Comision Federal de Electricidad (CFE) (BBB/Stable) and Centrais
Eletricas Brasileiras S.A. (Eletrobras) (BB-/Stable). These
companies all have strong linkages to their respective sovereigns
given their strategic importance to each country and the
potentially significant negative socio-political and financial
implications of any financial distress at these companies.

ICE's ratings are supported by its linkage to Costa Rica's
sovereign rating, which stems from the company's government
ownership and the implicit and explicit expectation of government
support. The ratings reflect the company's diversified asset
portfolio, moderate capex program and its strong market share
position in the telecommunications business. ICE has a lower scale
of operations compared with its peers; ICE's adjusted leverage of
6.2x is higher than CFE's 4.2x but lower than Eletrobras' 9.9x as
of December 2018. Regarding adjusted coverage ratio, ICE's 2.2x
compares negatively with its peers' average of 4.0x.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's Key Assumptions Within Its Rating Case for the Issuer

  - ICE remains important to the government as a strategic asset
for the country;

  - Electricity demand organic growth around 1%;

  - Adjusted leverage close to 6.9x 2019, before improving toward
5.7x in 2021;

  - Tariffs adjustments for 2019-2020 reflect appropriate operating
expenses and higher prices payed to private generators;

  - ICE's Telco market share remains strong;

  - The recovery analysis assumes that ICE would be a going concern
in bankruptcy, and Fitch has assumed a 10% administrative claim,
with a going-concern EBITDA close to CRC378,000 million and an EV
multiple of 5.0x;

  - The Recovery Rating is limited, however, to 'B+'/'RR4' as Costa
Rica is categorized as Group D, per Fitch's Country-Specific
Treatment of Recovery Ratings Criteria, which caps the Recovery
Ratings at 'RR4.'

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Positive Rating Action

  - Upgrade on the sovereign's ratings.

Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Negative Rating Action

  - A sovereign downgrade;

  - Sustained and consistently adjusted leverage over 6.0x;

  - Regulatory intervention that negatively affects the company.

LIQUIDITY

Adequate Liquidity: ICE has historically financed capex with owned
resources and new debt. The cancelation of the Diquis project
should ease capex expense through the rating horizon, generating
expected positive FCF through 2020-2022. Debt related to
electricity projects represents approximately 90% of total debt,
and the remaining debt is capex spent on the telecommunications
sector projects. ICE's cash balance as of March 2019 was CRC444,520
million, where CRC216,144 million is part of a liquidity reserve
account that is used exclusively for debt payments.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings of Instituto Costarricense
de Electricidad y Subsidiarias:

  - Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR at 'B+'; Outlook Negative;

  - Long-Term Local Currency IDR at 'B+'; Outlook Negative;

  - Senior unsecured debt at 'B+'/'RR4';

  - Long-Term National Scale rating affirmed at 'AAA(cri)'; Outlook
Stable;

  - Senior unsecured debt National Scale rating affirmed at
'AAA(cri)'.



=============
J A M A I C A
=============

DIGICEL GROUP: Moody's Downgrades CFR to Caa2, Outlook Negative
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded Digicel Group Limited's
corporate family rating to Caa2 from Caa1 and its probability of
default rating to Caa2-PD from Caa1-PD. At the same time, Moody's
downgraded the senior unsecured rating of Digicel Limited to Caa2
from B3, the senior secured rating of Digicel International Finance
Limited to B3 from B1, the senior secured rating of Digicel Group
One Limited to Caa2 from Caa1 and the senior unsecured ratings of
both Digicel Group Two Limited and Digicel to Ca from Caa3. The
outlook is negative.

Downgrades:

Issuer: Digicel Group Limited

Corporate Family Rating, Downgraded to Caa2 from Caa1

Probability of Default Rating, Downgraded to Caa2-PD from Caa1-PD

Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to Ca from
Caa3

Issuer: Digicel Group Two Limited

Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to Ca from
Caa3

Issuer: Digicel Group One Limited

Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to Caa2 from
Caa1

Issuer: Digicel Limited

Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to Caa2 from
B3

Issuer: Digicel International Finance Limited

Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Downgraded to B3 from B1

Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to B3 from B1

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Digicel Group Limited

Outlook, Changed to Negative from Stable

Issuer: Digicel Group Two Limited

Outlook, Changed to Negative from Stable

Issuer: Digicel Group One Limited

Outlook, Changed to Negative from Stable

Issuer: Digicel Limited

Outlook, Changed to Negative from Stable

Issuer: Digicel International Finance Limited

Outlook, Changed to Negative from Stable

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade of Digicel's CFR to Caa2 and the change of its
outlook to negative reflect Moody's view that the risk of Digicel
making another distressed exchange or debt restructuring within the
next 12-18 months has increased, considering the still weak
operating results and liquidity of the group. In fiscal year ending
March 31, 2019 (FY19), Digicel has continued to report declining
earnings, negative free cash flow and increasing leverage (gross
debt/EBITDA, including Moody's adjustments) which was in excess of
7x at the end of March 2019. A return to sustained revenue and
earnings growth has not materialized and any improvement to the
company's financial profile will only be very gradual, resulting in
Digicel still facing high refinancing risk.

The downgrade of DL's senior unsecured rating to Caa2 from B3 as
well as the downgrade of the senior secured rating of DIFL to B3
from B1 reflects Moody's view of materially increased refinancing
risk to the group. Digicel's next large debt maturity is the USD1.3
billion senior unsecured notes at DL due April 2021. DL's senior
unsecured notes rating is aligned with that of the DGL1 senior
secured notes, also rated Caa2. Both entities had a similar
leverage level of around 5.4x (as reported by Digicel) at the end
of FY19. While DL bondholders would have access to the residual
value of the Caribbean operations before the DGL1 bondholders in
the case of a bankruptcy, the notes at DGL1 benefit from collateral
which includes the capital stock of Digicel Pacific Limited, a
material contributor to the group's cash flow (around 20% of
Digicel's consolidated EBITDA), and DGL1's receivable under the
Digicel (Central America) Group Limited credit facility.

Digicel's liquidity remains overall weak. Digicel improved its cash
balance and debt maturity profile when it issued, in March 2019,
USD600 million of senior secured notes at DIFL, with related
proceeds used to repay DIFL's existing term loan A of USD300
million, repay the drawings under the DIFL revolving credit
facility (RCF), and increase the group cash balance. However, as
long as free cash flow remains negative, liquidity will weaken
again. As of March 2019, Digicel had USD279 million in cash and its
USD100 million RCF was again available. The increase in leverage
has nevertheless resulted in tight leeway under financial
covenants: while these are only tested if the RCF is drawn, it
could challenge Digicel drawing under its RCF in case of need.

Digicel's ratings could be upgraded if the company's liquidity
improves and its leverage declines, driven by a clear improvement
in its operating performance and a return to positive free cash
flow generation, enabling the company to refinance its upcoming
large debt maturities.

A further downgrade could happen in case of a debt restructuring
that results in higher than expected losses to creditors.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was
Telecommunications Service Providers published in January 2017.

Incorporated in Hamilton, Bermuda, Digicel is the largest provider
of wireless telecommunication services in the Caribbean. The
company operates in 31 markets in the Caribbean and South Pacific
regions. In addition, the company provides a comprehensive range of
business solutions, cable TV and broadband and other related
products and services. The company also operates a wireless network
in Panama through its 45% ownership interest in affiliate, Digicel
Holdings (Central America) Limited. Digicel generated revenue of
$2.3 billion in FY19.



===========
M E X I C O
===========

BAJA CALIFORNIA: Moody's Lowers Issuer Rating to B2, Outlook Neg.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's de Mexico downgraded the State of Baja California ratings
to B2/Ba1.mx (Global Scale issuer rating/Mexican National Scale
rating) from B1/Baa2.mx. At the same time the Baseline Credit
Assessment (BCA) was also downgraded to b2 from b1. The outlook on
the ratings remains negative.

RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR THE RATINGS DOWNGRADE

The downgrade of Baja California's BCA to b2 and issuer ratings to
B2/Ba1.mx reflects structural pressures stemming from expenditures,
mainly related to education and pension contributions, that have
led to recurrent financial deficits and to very weak liquidity
levels.

Baja California has posted, on average, financial deficits
equivalent to 5.3% of total revenues during the 2014-2017 period.
Despite measures implemented by the state to decrease the growth of
current expenditures, mainly related to personnel services, and
that revenue continue to increase, the state registered a deficit
equivalent to 1.8% of total revenues in 2018. Moody's expects that
the state will continue registering deficits around 4% of total
revenues during 2019 and 2020 as a result of pressures mainly
related to expenditures in education and transfers to the state's
pension system (ISSSTECALI). Total transfers to ISSSTECALI were
equivalent to roughly 6% of total revenues during 2018. Moody's
estimates that in 2019 and 2020 Baja California will continue
dedicating similar levels of support to ISSSTECALI given its high
level of unfunded pension liabilities (196% of total revenues
compared to the Mexican states median of 100% as of 2018) and its
low reserve levels. According to the actuarial study, pension
contributions will grow 9% per year, exerting additional pressure
if no measures are taken.

In order to finance its cash needs, Baja California contracted both
long and short-term debt during 2018. Debt to total revenues
increased to 27.1% in 2018 from 25.7% in 2017. Despite this
increase, the debt burden is still considered manageable although
Moody's notes that the debt structure represents a material credit
challenge for the state. Short-term debt represented 21.3% of gross
debt as of December 2018, compared to 14.8% in 2014.

While Moody's expects the state to adhere to the Fiscal Discipline
Law which requires Baja California to fully pay its short-term debt
by July 31 (three months prior to the change of administration),
Moody's notes that this will require the state to increase other
current liabilities as funds are diverted to debt repayment. This
will result in a deterioration in the state's liquidity metrics.

Moody's also expects that Baja California will recur to the use of
short-term debt during the last two months of 2019 in order to
finance the deficit. As a result, Moody's expects the state's
liquidity metrics will deteriorate further in 2019 and 2020. As of
December 2018, liquidity measured as cash to current liabilities
was equivalent to 0.1x, one of the lowest levels compared to
national peers. As of March 2019, Baja California registered a
negative cash position and Moody's expects liquidity to be nearly
depleted as of December 2019.

RATIONALE FOR THE NEGATIVE OUTLOOK

The negative outlook reflects Moody's expectation that absent the
implementation of structural measures to reduce operating
expenditures and stem cash financing needs, the state will increase
its short-term debt exposure. This will lead to a weaker debt
profile than currently recorded, with additional risk stemming from
a continued weak liquidity position.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Given the negative outlook, a rating upgrade is unlikely. However,
the state's ratings could be stabilized if Baja California
registers a sustainable improvement of cash financing results
leading to a debt stabilization and stronger liquidity metrics.
Conversely, if the state does not implement clear measures to
decrease cash financing needs in the near future, maintaining high
levels of short-term debt alongside weak liquidity, the ratings
could face further downward pressure.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Regional and
Local Governments published in January 2018.

UNIFIN FINANCIERA: Fitch Rates USD450MM Sr. Unsec. Notes Final 'BB'
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned a final rating of 'BB' to Unifin
Financiera, S.A.B. de C.V.'s (BB/Stable) US dollar senior unsecured
notes of up to USD450 million Reg S/144A due 2028. The final rating
is in line with the expected rating assigned on July 8, 2019.

The notes have a maturity of eight years at a fixed rate with
semi-annual interest payments. The principal will be paid at
maturity, may be redeemed at the option of the issuer and is fully
and unconditionally guaranteed by two operating subsidiaries of
Unifin.

The net proceeds from the offering will be used for general
corporate purposes and to continue matching the asset-liability
tenor profile.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The rating assigned to these senior notes is at the same level as
Unifin's Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) of 'BB' as the
likelihood of default on the notes is the same as Unifin's.

There will not be increased exposure to market risk as a result of
this transaction, as the company will hedge both FX rate risk and
interest rate risk with cross-currency swaps for both the principal
and interest payments.

Unifin's ratings are highly influenced by its national leadership
in the independent leasing sector in Mexico (non-related to
financial holding company) and its ample expertise in its core
market focused on SME typically unattended by the banking sector.
The ratings are also significantly influenced by its relatively
tight capitalization metrics. The ratings also consider Unifin's
good earnings, controlled asset quality, and well-managed liquidity
and funding.

The adoption of IFRS accounting standards in 1Q19 gives better
clarity on Unifin's asset quality, which has led to stronger
reserve coverage. However, this put further pressure on the
company's already tight capitalization and leverage position under
Fitch's core metric. As of March 2019 and following the adoption of
IFRS, Unifin's leverage ratios (measured as total debt to tangible
common equity) exceeded Fitch's sensitivity according to its
ratings level, as it reached 8.5x. This ratio was mainly impacted
by around 190 bps, after IFRs application by an immediate and
sizeable effect on retained earnings, but Fitch expects a leverage
recovery in the following 18 to 24 months through internally
generated capital, to levels around 7x. The company projections
consider leverage gradually improving to nearly 7.1x as of YE 2020,
a ratio that Fitch believes is still relatively tight but
consistent with the current rating level. If the company does not
show a consistent improvement of leverage metrics toward the 7x
threshold, negative rating actions could occur in the near future.
Fitch does not expect a greater deterioration of leverage metrics
after the issuance of the new senior notes as they will refinance
some existing liabilities, some others will mature and the new
notes will continue to effective match the asset-liability tenor
profile.

Unifin's profitability remains at good levels but lower than
historical records. As of March 2019, Unifin's pre-tax income to
average assets ratio was 2.7% from historic average levels of 4.0%,
still a credit strength to the current rating level. Under IFRS
there is more visibility on non-performing loans (NPLs) and more
prudential loan loss allowance approach. As of March 2019, Unifin's
NPL ratio stood at 3.6%, which was lower than its closest peers,
while its loan loss allowance coverage of NPLs increased to 57.0%,
which continues to be relatively limited, in Fitch's opinion.

Unifin continues with a more diversified and unsecured funding
structure than local peers. However, the entity is heavily reliant
on wholesale financing through local debt issuances via
securitizations and international senior bonds. Nevertheless, this
funding structure has proven effective for Unifin because it helps
to properly match the asset-liability tenor profile. As of March
2019, the unsecured debt to total debt stood at 56%, a sound level
than compares better than peers. Unencumbered loans to total loans
were around 62% as of March 2019.



=====================
P U E R T O   R I C O
=====================

ADVANCE PAIN: Case Summary & Unsecured Creditors
------------------------------------------------
Two affiliates that concurrently filed voluntary petitions for
relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code:

      Debtor                                          Case No.
      ------                                          --------
      Advance Pain Management and Rehabilitation      19-03941
      E22 Calle Santa Cruz
      Bayamon, PR 00961

      JG & RM Realty Inc.                             19-03942
      E22 Calle Santa Cruz
      Bayamon, PR 00961

Business Description: Advance Pain Management and Rehabilitation
                      owns and operates ambulatory health care
                      facilities.  Ambulatory surgery centers (or
                      outpatient surgery centers) are health care
                      facilities where surgical procedures not
                      requiring an overnight hospital stay are
                      performed.

Chapter 11 Petition Date: July 11, 2019

Court: United States Bankruptcy Court
       District of Puerto Rico (Old San Juan)

Judge: Hon. Enrique S. Lamoutte Inclan

Debtors' Counsel: Isabel M. Fullana, Esq.
                  GARCIA-ARREGUI & FULLANA PSC
                  252 Ponce De Leon Avenue Suite 1101
                  San Juan, PR 00918
                  Tel: 787 766-2530
                  Fax: 787 756-7800
                  E-mail: isabelfullana@gmail.com

Advance Pain's
Total Assets: $69,818

Advance Pain's
Total Liabilities: $122,108

JG & RM's
Total Assets: $1,291,294

JG & RM's
Total Liabilities: $1,749,258

The petitions were signed by Dr. Renier Mendez, president.

A full-text copy of Advance Pain's petition containing, among other
items, a list of the Debtor's four unsecured creditors is available
for free at:

         http://bankrupt.com/misc/prb19-03941.pdf

A full-text copy of JG & RM's petition containing, among other
items, a list of the Debtor's five unsecured creditors is available
for free at:

         http://bankrupt.com/misc/prb19-03942.pdf

EL PATIO BBQ: Seeks Court Approval to Hire Accountant
-----------------------------------------------------
El Patio BBQ & Grill Inc. seeks authority from the U.S. Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Puerto Rico to hire an accountant.

In an application filed in court, the Debtor proposes to employ
Ingrid Hassan, an accountant based in Guaynabo, to prepare and
review its monthly operating reports and other accounting reports,
tax returns, and financial projections required for the proposal
and confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan.  Hassan will also supervise
the Debtor's accounting affairs and operations.  

The Debtor will pay $75 per hour for the services of the
accountant
and $25 per hour for the supporting staff.

Hassan is a "disinterested person" as defined in Section 101(14)
of
the Bankruptcy Code, according to court filings.

Hassan maintains an office at:

     Marginal Buchanan
     Flamingo Apartments 9404
     Bayamon, PR 00959
     Tel: 787-398-0166
     Email: ingridhassanoffice@gmail.com

             About El Patio BBQ & Grill Inc

Based in Vega Baja, P.R., El Patio BBQ & Grill Inc. sought
protection for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code
(Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 19-03639) on June 26, 2019, listing under
$1 million in both assets and liabilities. Jaime Rodriguez Perez,
Esq., at Hatillo Law Office, represents the Debtor as counsel.

EL PATIO BBQ: Seeks to Hire Hatillo Law Office as Counsel
---------------------------------------------------------
El Patio BBQ & Grill Inc. seeks authority from the U.S. Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Puerto Rico to hire Hatillo Law Office,
PSC as its legal counsel.

The firm will advise the Debtor of its powers and duties in the
continued operation of its business and management of its property;
prepare applications, reports and other legal papers; and provide
other legal services in connection with the Debtor's Chapter 11
case.

Hatillo's standard hourly rates are:

     Jaime Rodriguez-Perez, Attorney    $250
     Paralegal                           $50
     Law Clerks                          $50

Hatillo is disinterested and has no connection with the creditors
and other parties in interest or their respective attorneys,
according to court filings.

The firm can be reached through:

     Jaime Rodriguez-Perez
     Hatillo Law Office, PSC
     URB Rexville
     BB 21 Calle 38
     Bayamon, PR 00957
     Phone:  787 797-4174
     Fax:  787-730-5454
     Email: Email: jrpcourtdocuments@gmail.com

             About El Patio BBQ & Grill Inc

Based in Vega Baja, P.R., El Patio BBQ & Grill Inc. sought
protection for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code
(Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 19-03639) on June 26, 2019, listing under
$1 million in both assets and liabilities. Jaime Rodriguez Perez,
Esq., at Hatillo Law Office, represents the Debtor as counsel.

J.C. PENNEY: Egan-Jones Withdraws CCC- Sr. Unsec. Debt Ratings
--------------------------------------------------------------
Egan-Jones Ratings Company, on July 5, 2019, withdrew its 'CCC-'
foreign currency and local currency senior unsecured ratings on
debt issued by J. C. Penney Company, Incorporated.

J. C. Penney Company, Inc. is an American department store chain
with 864 locations in 49 U.S. states and Puerto Rico.

PUERTO RICO: Lawmakers Advance Bill to Boost Medicaid Funding
-------------------------------------------------------------
Karen Pierog at Reuters reports that a bill that would give Puerto
Rico a substantial boost in federal Medicaid funding advanced out
of a U.S. House subcommittee after lawmakers agreed to work on
stricter safeguards for the money in the wake of a government
corruption scandal in the island territory.

The Health Subcommittee sent the legislation, which would give the
bankrupt U.S. commonwealth an additional $12 billion over four
years, to the full House Committee on Energy and Commerce,
according to Reuters.

On July 10, U.S. law enforcement officials disclosed a 32-count
indictment and arrests of six people, including two former
high-ranking Puerto Rico government officials, who were charged
with conspiracy and other crimes in connection with millions of
dollars in federal Medicaid and education funds.

Angela Avila-Marrero, former executive director of Puerto Rico's
Health Insurance Administration, was indicted for her role in a
scheme to steal federal Medicaid dollars through a corrupt bidding
process with private contractors, the report notes.  Her lawyer,
Jason Gonzalez, said she pleaded not guilty to the charges, the
report relays.  He declined to comment further.

U.S. Representative Frank Pallone, a New Jersey Democrat who chairs
the Energy and Commerce Committee, said while the indictments were
"very troubling," there was no time to address the allegations in
the bill, the report notes.

"We can't lose sight of the fact that unless we act there will be a
massive shortfall of federal funds for the Puerto Rico Medicaid
program that would be devastating to the people that live there,"
he said, adding he hoped lawmakers will work together to add
"rigorous" oversight to the bill, the report discloses.

U.S. Representative Greg Walden, an Oregon Republican, said he was
committed to ensuring measures are in the bill "to stop these types
of fraudulent activities that are alleged from happening," the
report notes.

Federal funding to the five U.S. territories to support the
healthcare program for low-income residents is capped, often
leading to shortfalls during economic downturns or natural
disasters like the devastating hurricanes that hit Puerto Rico in
2017 just months after it filed a form of bankruptcy in U.S.
District Court, the report relays.

Meanwhile, Puerto Rico Governor Ricardo Rossello, who is under fire
for not preventing corruption in his administration, scheduled a
news conference, the report discloses.  U.S. Representative Raul
Grijalva, an Arizona Democrat who chairs the House Natural
Resources Committee, which oversees U.S. territories, is calling
for Rossello to step down as governor, Grijalva's spokesman said,
the report relays.

Rossello was not implicated in the indictments, the report adds.

                          About Puerto Rico

Puerto Rico is a self-governing commonwealth in association with
the United States that's facing a massive bond debt of $70 billion,
a 68% debt-to-GDP ratio and negative economic growth in nine of the
last 10 years.

The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has sought bankruptcy protection,
aiming to restructure its massive $74 billion debt-load and $49
billion in pension obligations.

The debt restructuring petition was filed by Puerto Rico's
financial oversight board in U.S. District Court in Puerto Rico
(Case No. 17-01578) on May 3, 2017, and was made under Title III of
2016's U.S. Congressional rescue law known as the Puerto Rico
Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act ('PROMESA').

The Financial Oversight and Management Board later commenced Title
III cases for the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation
(COFINA) on May 5, 2017, and the Employees Retirement System (ERS)
and the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (HTA) on
May 21, 2017.  On July 2, 2017, a Title III case was commenced for
the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority ("PREPA").

U.S. Chief Justice John Roberts has appointed U.S. District Judge
Laura Taylor Swain to oversee the Title III cases.  The Honorable
Judith Dein, a United States Magistrate Judge for the District of
Massachusetts, has been designated to preside over matters that may
be referred to her by Judge Swain, including discovery disputes,
and management of other pretrial proceedings.

Joint administration of the Title III cases, under Lead Case No.
17-3283, was granted on June 29, 2017.

The Oversight Board has hired as advisors, Proskauer Rose LLP and
O'Neill & Borges LLC as legal counsel, McKinsey & Co. as strategic
consultant, Citigroup Global Markets, as municipal investment
banker, and Ernst & Young, as financial advisor.

Martin J. Bienenstock, Esq., Scott K. Rutsky, Esq., and Philip M.
Abelson, Esq., of Proskauer Rose; and Hermann D. Bauer, Esq., at
O'Neill & Borges are on-board as attorneys.

McKinsey & Co. is the Board's strategic consultant, Ernst & Young
is the Board's financial advisor, and Citigroup Global Markets Inc.
is the Board's municipal investment banker.

Prime Clerk LLC is the claims and noticing agent.  Prime Clerk
maintains a case web site at
https://cases.primeclerk.com/puertorico

Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC is the service agent for ERS, HTA,
and PREPA.

O'Melveny & Myers LLP is counsel to the Commonwealth's Puerto Rico
Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority (AAFAF), the agency
responsible for negotiations with bondholders.

The Oversight Board named Professor Nancy B. Rapoport as fee
examiner and to chair a committee to review professionals' fees.

                    Bondholders' Attorneys

Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP and Toro, Colon, Mullet, Rivera
& Sifre, P.S.C. and serve as counsel to the Mutual Fund Group,
comprised of mutual funds managed by Oppenheimer Funds, Inc., and
the First Puerto Rico Family of Funds, which collectively hold over
$4.4 billion of GO Bonds, COFINA Bonds, and other bonds issued by
Puerto Rico and other instrumentalities.

White & Case LLP and Lopez Sanchez & Pirillo LLC represent the UBS
Family of Funds and the Puerto Rico Family of Funds, which hold
$613.3 million in COFINA bonds.

Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, Robbins, Russell,
Englert, Orseck, Untereiner & Sauber LLP, and Jimenez, Graffam &
Lausell are co-counsel to the ad hoc group of General Obligation
Bondholders, comprised of Aurelius Capital Management, LP, Autonomy
Capital (Jersey) LP, FCO Advisors LP, and Monarch Alternative
Capital LP.

Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP and Reichard & Escalera are
co-counsel to the ad hoc coalition of holders of senior bonds
issued by COFINA, comprised of at least 30 institutional holders,
including Canyon Capital Advisors LLC and Varde Investment
Partners, L.P.

Correa Acevedo & Abesada Law Offices, P.S.C., is counsel to Canyon
Capital Advisors, LLC, River Canyon Fund Management, LLC, Davidson
Kempner Capital Management LP, OZ Management, LP, and OZ Management
II LP (the QTCB Noteholder Group).

                          Committees

The U.S. Trustee formed an official committee of retirees and an
official committee of unsecured creditors of the Commonwealth.  The
Retiree Committee tapped Jenner & Block LLP and Bennazar, Garcia &
Milian, C.S.P., as its attorneys.  The Creditors Committee tapped
Paul Hastings LLP and O'Neill & Gilmore LLC as counsel.



=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================

PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: Trading Chief Leaves as Exports Fall
------------------------------------------------------------
Luc Cohen at Reuters reports that the top trade and supply official
at Venezuelan state oil company Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A.
(PDVSA) has left the post, according to a recent copy of the
government's official gazette, as the OPEC nation's crude exports
fall after U.S. sanctions and gasoline supplies dry up.

Jose Rojas Reyes, who was named vice president of trade and supply
last October, is no longer on PDVSA's board of directors, according
to a decree in the gazette dated June 12. Marcos Rojas, who remains
vice president of international affairs, has assumed the role on an
interim basis, according to Reuters.

The report relays that Rojas Reyes' departure comes as PDVSA, which
was already reeling from corruption, mismanagement and
underinvestment, was hit this year by Washington-imposed sanctions
preventing U.S. companies from importing Venezuelan oil, part of
the Trump administration's effort to oust socialist President
Nicolas Maduro.

The company's exports of crude and refined products fell 17% in May
from the previous month to 874,500 barrels per day, the report
relays.  A plunge in gasoline imports due to the sanctions, coupled
with severe refinery outages, have forced motorists to wait hours
or even days to fill their tanks, the report notes.

Manuel Quevedo, a National Guard general who also serves as
Venezuela's oil minister, remains as chairman of PDVSA, according
to the decree, the report relays.

Critics say PDVSA has done little to stem the fall in production
since Quevedo's 2017 appointment ushered in a new era of military
rule at the firm, the report discloses.

Rojas is also a National Guard general and previously held jobs at
the Defense Ministry and the Housing Ministry, which Quevedo led
before his surprise appointment to lead PDVSA, the report says.

                          About PDVSA

Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. is the Venezuelan state-owned oil and
natural gas company. It has activities in exploration, production,
refining and exporting oil as well as exploration and production of
natural gas.

As reported in Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on June 3,
2019, Moody's Investors Service withdrew all the ratings of
Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. including the senior unsecured and
senior secured ratings due to insufficient information. At the time
of withdrawal, the ratings were C and the outlook was stable.


                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2019.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.
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