TCRLA_Public/190906.mbx        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                 L A T I N   A M E R I C A

          Friday, September 6, 2019, Vol. 20, No. 179

                           Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

ARGENTINA: DBRS Downgrades Short-Term FC/LC Issuer Ratings to SD
BANCO MACRO: Moody's Downgrades Sr. Unsec. Debt Rating to Caa2
LA SEGUNDA: Moody's Downgrades Global IFS Rating to B3


B O L I V I A

DISTRIBUIDORA DE ELECTRICIDAD: Moody's Withdraws Ba3 CFR


B R A Z I L

BRAZIL: Meat Packers Cleared to Export Beef to Indonesia
LIGHT SA: Moody's Affirms Ba3 CFR, Outlook Stable
LIGHT SERVICOS: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Sr. Unsec. Notes Rating
RIO DE JANEIRO: Fitch Upgrades LT IDR to BB-, Outlook Stable
RIO PARANAPANEMA: S&P Withdraws Long-Term 'BB' Global Scale ICR



D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Security Committee Aims to Safeguard Tourism
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: US$674.5MM From Bank Reserve Head to Sectors


M E X I C O

JUST ONE MORE: Dunning Rievman Represents Gary Ganzi, 2 Others
JUST ONE MORE: Genovese Joblove Represents Gary Ganzi, 2 Others
JUST ONE MORE: Hoguet Newman Represents Gary Ganzi, 2 Others


P U E R T O   R I C O

KONA GRILL: One Group to Purchase Restaurants for $25 Million


V E N E Z U E L A

CITGO PETROLEUM: S&P Affirms 'B-' Long-Term ICR
PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: May Be Replaced by Klesch at Isla Refinery

                           - - - - -


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A R G E N T I N A
=================

ARGENTINA: DBRS Downgrades Short-Term FC/LC Issuer Ratings to SD
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. downgraded the Republic of Argentina's Long-Term Foreign
and Local-Currency - Issuer Ratings from B/B (high) to CC. At the
same time, DBRS downgraded the Short-Term Foreign and
Local-Currency - Issuer Ratings to Selective Default (SD). The
Long-Term Foreign and Local-Currency - Issuer Ratings have also
been placed Under Review with Negative implications (URN).

KEY RATING CONSIDERATIONS

The downgrade to SD follows Argentina's announcement on August 28
that the government would seek an extension of maturities on a
range of debt instruments. Details released on August 29 and 30
indicate that the rescheduling will apply to Argentina's short-term
local debt, both peso- and dollar-denominated. It includes a
partial deferment of payments on short-term instruments, including
some that mature on August 30. This deferment of payments meets
DBRS's definition of default; consequently, the Short-Term ratings
have been downgraded to SD. The authorities also announced that
they will subsequently launch a "voluntary" debt swap to extend
maturities on additional longer-term securities maturing within the
next ten years. This expected change in duration combined with the
implicit threat of nonpayment if creditors do not participate in
the exchange is also likely to meet DBRS's definition of default,
but the terms and timing of the exchange are not yet clear.
Consequently, the Long-Term Issuer Ratings have been downgraded to
CC and have been placed Under Review with Negative Implications.

Assuming this rescheduling is sufficient to keep Argentina's IMF
program on track (particularly the $5.4 billion September
disbursement) and to alleviate near-term financing requirements,
Argentina's outlook is nonetheless expected to remain challenging
in the wake of the recent election results and exchange rate
pressures. The loss of confidence in the peso, unless reversed
quickly, will increase risks to debt sustainability given the high
levels of a foreign currency debt. IMF forecasts are expected to be
revised with material adverse effects on growth forecasts,
inflation and on public debt, though the devaluation should reduce
somewhat the current account deficit and a sizeable portion of
federal government debt is in the hands of other public sector
entities. The "Debt and Liquidity" and "Political Environment"
Building Blocks are the primary factors contributing to the
deterioration in Argentina's credit fundamentals.

Primary election results from August 11 suggest that the opposition
candidate, Alberto Fernandez, is likely to win the general election
on October 27. The prospect of a Fernandez victory has increased
policy uncertainty, particularly given the track record of his
running mate, former President Cristina Fernandez. The market
reaction has weakened the peso significantly (down 21.8% in the
three weeks since the election), increased spreads significantly,
and caused the stock market to plummet. If elected, DBRS expects
Fernandez to have limited policy and financing flexibility. In the
days following the primary elections, Fernandez signaled that
efforts to gradually lower inflation will remain a priority in his
administration. Nonetheless, Fernandez has openly questioned the
affordability of Argentina's foreign currency debts, particularly
the payments coming due to the IMF during 2021-23. Fernandez's
policy agenda remains unclear, but the return of a less orthodox
approach to monetary and fiscal policy would complicate relations
with the IMF and could further undermine Argentina's medium-term
prospects.

Political uncertainty has increased, limiting near-term policy
options. A Macri victory in the presidential election cannot be
entirely ruled out but appears unlikely. A Fernandez administration
may be willing to maintain fiscal discipline in support of the
central bank's disinflationary policies. Nonetheless, risks of
prolonged market and exchange rate turmoil have increased since
DBRS's June review. Regardless of who wins, the incoming
administration is likely to face persistent inflationary pressures
amid a weak economic environment and may struggle to obtain new
financing in the absence of continued close engagement with the
IMF. A voluntary rescheduling should alleviate the short-term
pressures on the exchange rate, but DBRS expects volatile
conditions to persist through the election period and subsequent
transition. Pressure on Argentina's foreign exchange reserves may
persist, as subsequent negotiations over a new program or
precautionary arrangement may take many months. In the absence of
continued engagement from the IMF and a well-designed macroeconomic
adjustment program, DBRS sees continued risks to debt
sustainability in the medium-term.

RATING DRIVERS

The Long-Term Foreign and Local-Currency – Issuer Ratings are
likely to be downgraded to Selective Default (SD) if Argentina
compels creditors to extend maturities or risk non-payment.
Otherwise, downward pressure on the ratings could emerge if (1)
fiscal or monetary policy discipline weakens considerably in the
lead up to or following any change in administration; or (2) the
incoming government proves unwilling to make policy commitments
similar to those agreed under the current IMF program, generating
continued market pressures and limiting the availability of
non-inflationary financing heading into 2020 and 2021.

Stabilization of the ratings will likely hinge on the
administration's commitment to (1) preserve fiscal policy
discipline; and (2) maintain the main pillars of the existing
macroeconomic program, for example through the passage of the law
on central bank independence.

RATING COMMITTEE SUMMARY

The DBRS Sovereign Scorecard generates a result in the B (high) –
B (low) range. Additional considerations factoring into the Rating
Committee decision included the announced reprofiling of
Argentina's debt obligations and near-term external liquidity
position. The main points discussed during the Rating Committee
include Argentina's primary election results, implications of
exchange rate dynamics for domestic inflation, external financing
requirements, the IMF program and risks to future disbursements,
and the potential implications of policy uncertainty through the
presidential election and transition period.

Notes: All figures are in USD unless otherwise noted. Public
finance statistics reported on a general government basis unless
specified. Forecasts are drawn from the IMF. Governance indicator
represents an average percentile rank (0-100) from Rule of Law,
Voice and Accountability and Government Effectiveness indicators
(all World Bank). Human Development Index (UNDP) ranges from 0-1,
with 1 representing a very high level of human development.

BANCO MACRO: Moody's Downgrades Sr. Unsec. Debt Rating to Caa2
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the senior unsecured debt
ratings of Banco Macro S.A., Banco Hipotecario S.A., Banco
Supervielle S.A., Banco de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires and Tarjeta
Naranja S.A., as well as Tarjeta Naranja's corporate family rating,
to Caa2 from B2, and Banco de Galicia y Buenos Aires S.A.U. and
Banco Macro's senior unsecured MTN program to (P)Caa2 from (P)B2.
Moody's also downgraded the foreign currency subordinated debt
ratings assigned to Banco Macro and Banco de Galicia y Buenos Aires
S.A.U. to Caa3 from B3. In addition, all ratings have been placed
on review for further downgrade.

The rating actions follow the announcement by Moody's Latin America
A.C.R. S.A. that it has taken a similar action on the banks' local
currency deposit ratings. Both rating actions follow the
announcement by Moody's Investors Service published on August 30,
2019 that it had downgraded Argentina's government bond rating to
Caa2, from B2, and lowered Argentina's country ceilings for debt
and deposits.

The following debt ratings of Banco Macro S.A. were downgraded and
placed under review for further downgrade:

Global Local Currency Senior Unsecured MTN Rating to (P)Caa2 from
(P)B2

Global Foreign Currency Senior Unsecured MTN Rating to (P)Caa2 from
(P)B2

Global Foreign Currency Subordinated Debt Rating to Caa3 from B3

Global Foreign Currency Senior Unsecured Debt Rating to Caa2 from
B2

Outlook, Changed To Under Review for Downgrade from Negative

The following debt ratings of Banco de Galicia y Buenos Aires
S.A.U. were downgraded and placed under review for further
downgrade:

Global Local Currency Senior Unsecured MTN Rating to (P)Caa2 from
(P)B2

Global Foreign Currency Senior Unsecured MTN Rating to (P)Caa2 from
(P)B2

Global Foreign Currency Subordinated Debt Rating to Caa3 from B3

Outlook, Changed To Under Review for Downgrade from Negative

The following debt ratings of Banco Hipotecario S.A. were
downgraded and placed under review for further downgrade:

Global Foreign Currency Senior Unsecured Debt Rating to Caa2 from
B2

Outlook, Changed To Under Review for Downgrade from Negative

The following debt ratings of Banco Supervielle S.A. were
downgraded and placed under review for further downgrade:

Global Foreign Currency Senior Unsecured Debt Rating to Caa2 from
B2

Outlook, Changed To Under Review for Downgrade from Negative

The following debt ratings of Banco de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires
were downgraded and placed under review for further downgrade:

Global Foreign Currency Senior Unsecured Debt Rating to Caa2 from
B2

Outlook, Changed To Under Review for Downgrade from Negative

The following ratings of Tarjeta Naranja S.A. were downgraded and
placed under review for further downgrade:

Global Foreign Currency Senior Unsecured Debt Rating to Caa2 from
B2;

Long-Term Corporate Family Rating to Caa2 from B2;

Outlook, Changed To Under Review for Downgrade from Negative

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions were prompted by the downgrade of Argentina's
government bond rating to Caa2, from B2, to reflect the rising
risks to investors as a consequence of mounting pressures on the
government's finances, most recently reflected in the government's
decision to delay repayment on over $8 billion of short-term debt.
In addition, the decision to place ratings under review for further
downgrade reflects the risks of continued losses to investors as
the government has signalled the intent to also restructure
portions of Argentina's medium- and long-term debt.

Rising policy uncertainly and market turmoil have led to higher
inflation and foreign exchange rates, exposing banks to a
challenging operating environment that weakens their credit
profile. Moreover, the rating actions take into account the high
underlying inter-linkages between the banks' standalone credit risk
profiles and that of the sovereign, in light of their direct and
indirect exposures to the sovereign risk, in the form of sizable
government and central bank securities holdings. Moody's estimates
that these holdings represented about 20% of banks' total assets in
early August 2019, and account for a relevant share of the banks'
total earnings.

Current economic conditions, including recession, high inflation
and extraordinarily high interest rates will significantly erode
banks' asset quality, as loan repayment capacity deteriorates, and
will increase their funding costs, hurting banks'
inflation-adjusted profitability. In addition, even though banks'
predominantly deposit-based funding was relatively stable since
Argentina's currency crisis in May 2018, deposits have been
declining since the primary elections in early August. Total
private sector bank dollar deposits fell by 18% amid increased
political uncertainty, weakening banks' funding and liquidity
profiles. Risks arising from recent currency control measures by
the Central Bank of Argentina limiting access to dollars are
largely incorporated in the ratings, but further measures could yet
affect banks' creditworthiness as market conditions evolve. Hence,
ratings were placed on review for further possible downgrade, in
line with the review for downgrade of the sovereign ratings.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE/DOWNGRADE

An upgrade is unlikely for banks in Argentina because the ratings
are on review for possible downgrade. However, the outlook could be
returned to stable following a stabilization of Argentina's
sovereign ratings outlook. A downgrade could be driven by a
downgrade of Argentine sovereign ratings, by further deterioration
in the country's operating environment, and/or a
higher-than-expected deterioration of the financial institutions'
asset quality, that would lead to material decline in profitability
levels, and thus, capital ratios, reducing their loss-absorption
capacity amidst a highly negative credit cycle.

The principal methodology used in rating Banco de Galicia y Buenos
Aires S.A.U., Banco Hipotecario S.A., Banco Macro S.A., Banco de la
Ciudad de Buenos Aires and Banco Supervielle S.A. was Banks
published in August 2018. The principal methodology used in rating
Tarjeta Naranja S.A. was Finance Companies published in December
2018.

LA SEGUNDA: Moody's Downgrades Global IFS Rating to B3
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo has
downgraded the global local currency and national scale (NS)
insurance financial strength ratings of 12 insurers and 5
reciprocal guarantors in Argentina. This action follows Moody's
August 30, 2019 downgrade of the Argentine government's bond rating
to Caa2 (under review for downgrade) from B2 with negative outlook,
and the lowering of Argentina's sovereign local currency ceiling to
B2 from Ba2. All ratings remain under review for downgrade,
consistent with the review on the sovereign rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating downgrades on these entities reflect Moody's assessment
of the correlation between their credit profiles and that of the
Argentine sovereign, primarily taking into account their direct and
indirect exposures to sovereign assets as well as other investments
that are correlated to the sovereign. The deterioration in
Argentina's credit profile as captured in the sovereign rating
downgrade has direct implications for the ratings of insurers and
reciprocal guarantor, given that it also expresses the increase of
systemic risks for all local credits. This reflects increased risks
to investors such as insurers and reciprocal guarantors, of holding
Argentine government bonds. Because of these sovereign linkages,
the downgrade of the Argentine government bond and related ratings
led to the downgrade of the 17 entities' IFS ratings given their
asset concentrations in such investments.

The exposures affect three credit parameters for insurers' and
reciprocal guarantors' IFS ratings: Asset Quality, Capital
Adequacy, and Financial Flexibility, consistent with Moody's key
rating factors. Specifically, the insurers' investment exposures to
sovereigns, banks (through cash and time deposits), and other
affected corporate, structured and mutual fund assets has weakened
the insurers' asset quality and risk-adjusted capitalization.
Furthermore, as insurers' and reciprocal guarantors' financial
flexibility is constrained by the breadth and depth of local
capital markets, deterioration in the sovereign rating negatively
impacts financial flexibility as well. These pressures have an
impact on a specific entity's rating that varies based on a number
of factors that include 1) the significance of the investment
exposure to sovereign and related assets, 2) ownership and parental
support, 3) how strongly or weakly the insurer was positioned
previously at its rating level, and 4) its credit rating position
relative to the country ceiling.

Moody's notes, however, that Argentine insurers' and reciprocal
guarantors' broadly benefit from very low reliance on debt funding
and financing and their liquidity positions are relatively strong,
given premium revenue streams that derive largely from
legally-mandated insurance coverages. The insurers and reciprocal
guarantors' also benefit from their profitability and from the
internal capital generation that derives from underwriting, as well
as investment activities. These considerations, in addition to past
experience whereby most insurers and reciprocal guarantors
continued paying their policyholders obligations during sovereign
crisis, broadly support stronger ratings relative to the country's
bond rating.

Moody's has downgraded the following insurers' GLC and NS IFS
ratings, given their significant direct investment exposure to
sovereign and bank assets. All of the following ratings are under
review for downgrade:

  - Allianz Argentina Compania de Seguros S.A.: GLC and NS IFS
ratings downgraded to B2 and Aa3.ar, from Ba2 and Aaa.ar,
respectively

  - BBVA Consolidar Seguros: GLC and NS IFS ratings downgraded to
B2 and Aa3.ar, from Ba2 and Aaa.ar, respectively

  - Caja de Seguros S.A.: GLC and NS IFS ratings downgraded to B2
and A1.ar, from Ba3 and Aaa.ar, respectively

  - Chubb Seguros Argentina S.A.: GLC and NS IFS ratings downgraded
to B2 and Aa3.ar, from Ba2 and Aaa.ar, respectively

  - Fianzas y Credito S.A. Cia. de Seguros: GLC and NS IFS ratings
downgraded to B3 and Baa2.ar, from B2 and A2.ar, respectively

  - La Segunda ART: GLC and NS IFS ratings downgraded to B3 and
A3.ar, from B1 and Aa2.ar, respectively

  - La Segunda Compania de Personas S.A.: GLC and NS IFS ratings
downgraded to B3 and A3.ar, from B1 and Aa2.ar, respectively

  - La Segunda Coop. Ltda Seguros: GLC and NS IFS ratings
downgraded to B3 and A3.ar, from B1 and Aa2.ar, respectively

  - Origenes Seguros S.A.: GLC and NS IFS ratings downgraded to B3
and Baa1.ar, from B1 and Aa3.ar, respectively

  - Provincia Seguros: GLC and NS IFS ratings downgraded to B3 and
Baa2.ar, from B2 and A1.ar, respectively

  - San Cristobal Seguros Generales: GLC and NS IFS ratings
downgraded to B3 and A3.ar, from B1 and Aa2.ar, respectively

  - Seguros Sura S.A. (Argentina): GLC and NS IFS ratings
downgraded to B2 and A2.ar, from Ba3 and Aa1.ar, respectively

Financial guarantors:

  - Affidavit S.G.R.: GLC and NS IFS ratings downgraded to Caa1 and
Baa3.ar, from B2 and A2.ar, respectively

  - Aval Rural S.G.R.: GLC and NS IFS ratings downgraded to B3 and
Baa1.ar, from B1 and Aa3.ar, respectively

  - Fondo de Garantias del Chaco (FOGACH): GLC and NS IFS ratings
downgraded to Caa1 and Baa3.ar, from B2 and A3.ar, respectively

  - Garantias BIND SGR: GLC and NS IFS ratings downgraded to B3 and
Baa1.ar, from B1 and Aa3.ar, respectively

  - Vinculos SGR: GLC and NS IFS ratings downgraded to Caa1 and
Baa3.ar, from B2 and A3.ar, respectively

The rating agency said that the review process on these ratings
will focus on further analysis of the impact of the deterioration
of Argentina's sovereign rating profile on the individual entities'
credit profile, as well as the conclusion of the review process on
the Argentina sovereign rating. The process will also look at the
level of rating uplift granted to entities owned by stronger
parents, in the context of a very lowly rated sovereign.

Among the factors that could lead to a further downgrade of the
Argentine insurers' and reciprocal guarantors' ratings include: 1)
an additional downgrade in Argentina's sovereign bond rating, 2)
deterioration in the country's operating environment, or 3) a
worsening trend in the companies' capital adequacy, asset quality
and profitability. Given that the ratings are under review for
downgrade, an upgrade is unlikely. That said, the following factors
could prompt ratings confirmations with stable outlooks 1) a
confirmation of Argentina's sovereign bond rating with a stable
outlook, 2) improvement in the country's operating environment, or
3) a sustained improving trend in the companies' capital adequacy,
asset quality, and profitability.

Moody's insurance financial strength ratings are opinions of the
ability of insurance companies to pay punctually senior
policyholder claims and obligations.

The principal methodology used in rating ALLIANZ Argentina Compania
de Seguros S.A., BBVA Consolidar Seguros, Caja de Seguros S.A.,
Chubb Seguros Argentina S.A., Fianzas y Credito S.A. Cia. de
Seguros, La Segunda ART, La Segunda Coop. Ltda Seguros, Provincia
Seguros, San Cristobal Seguros Generales, Seguros Sura S.A.
(Argentina), La Segunda Compania de Personas S.A. and Origenes
Seguros S.A. was Procedures Manual for Insurance Companies
published in January 2017. The principal methodology used in rating
Affidavit S.G.R., Aval Rural S.G.R., Fondo de Garantias del Chaco
(FOGACH), Garantias BIND SGR, and Vinculos SGR was Procedures
Manual for the Rating of Guarantor Entities published in January
2017.



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B O L I V I A
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DISTRIBUIDORA DE ELECTRICIDAD: Moody's Withdraws Ba3 CFR
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo S.A.
withdrawn Distribuidora de Electricidad La Paz S.A. Ba3/Aa1.bo
ratings for its own business reasons.

The following ratings were withdrawn:

  - LT Corporate Family Rating: Ba3

  - NSR LT Corporate Family Rating: Aa1.bo

  - LT Senior Unsecured: Ba3

  - NSR LT Senior Unsecured: Aa1.bo

  - Outlook: changed to rating withdrawn from stable

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has decided to withdraw the ratings for its own business
reasons.



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B R A Z I L
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BRAZIL: Meat Packers Cleared to Export Beef to Indonesia
--------------------------------------------------------
Bworldonline.com reports that Indonesia has authorized beef exports
from 10 Brazilian meat-packing plants, Brazil's agriculture
minister said in a statement.

The plants have the potential to export at least 25,000 tonnes of
beef products, Minister Tereza Cristina Dias said in the statement,
without elaborating, according to Bworldonline.com.

The authorization came after Dias held talks with Indonesian
Agriculture Minister Amran Sulaiman in May as part of a tour of
Asian countries to open new markets for Brazilian farm products,
notes the report.

Five of the authorized plants are operated by Minerva SA, the
company said in a securities filing, the report relays.  In 2018,
Indonesia imported approximately 150,000 tonnes of beef, with
Australia accounting for around 40% of that volume, the company
said, the report notes.

Brazil, home of Minerva and other large meat processors like JBS
SA, BRF SA and Marfrig Global Foods, is the world's largest
exporter of chicken and beef, the report relays.  The country
provides some 20% of total global beef exports, according to the
USDA, the report adds.

It is also the fourth-biggest global supplier of pork, notes
Bworldonline.com.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on May
27, 2019, Fitch Ratings has affirmed Brazil's Long-Term
Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB-' with a
Stable Outlook.

LIGHT SA: Moody's Affirms Ba3 CFR, Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina Ltda., affirmed the Corporate Family Rating
of Light S.A. and the issuer ratings of its operating subsidiaries
Light Servicos de Eletricidade S.A. and Light Energia S.A (Light
Energia) at Ba3 on the global scale. At the same time, Moody's
upgraded the national scale ratings to A2.br from A3.br. The
outlook is stable for all ratings.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions reflect Moody's updated views on Light
consolidated credit profile amid the company's evolving capital
structure and ongoing operating challenges.

Light's Ba3/A2.br CFRs recognize the supportive regulatory
framework for Brazil electricity distribution sector that
consistently compensates operators for high energy costs through
tariffs increases based on a transparent methodology, and the
relatively stable cash flow profile supported by Light's
unregulated generation business (representing about 28% of Light's
consolidated EBITDA in the last twelve months ended June 30, 2019).
Despite adverse hydrology conditions in recent years, the
commercialization strategy has contributed to mitigate higher
energy cost with positive effect on Light's consolidated cash flow
generation. The ratings also incorporate Light's improved liquidity
position and capital structure following the conclusion of a
BRL1.875 billion capital increase through the issuance of new
shares last July, along with the expectation of a more gradual
improvement in company's prospective operating performance, driven
by governance changes.

On the other hand, the high level of energy losses in the
distribution segment that reached 25.76% in the last twelve months
ended June 30, 2019 (compared to 19.62% of its regulatory target
and 22.98% compared to same period of 2018) constrains Light's
ratings, because the weak socioeconomic conditions of its
concession area, with high unemployment rate and elevated
electricity thefts challenges the growth in consumption levels and
cash flow conversion rate. The weak operating performance
contributed to a deterioration in Light's consolidated credit
metrics, as illustrated by the Cash Flow Pre-Working Capital (CFO
pre-WC)-to-debt ratio falling to 12.6% in June 2019, from 16.5% in
December 2017, with the interest coverage ratio in the range of
2.5x - 2.7x.

The ratings consider a gradual improvement in credit metrics so
that Light's CFO pre WC to Debt and interest coverage ratios to
remain consistently above 15% and 3.0x respectively over the next
12 to 18 months. Such improvement is possible with the proceeds
from equity increase supporting an immediate net debt reduction.
The company's renewed corporate governance, following the
appointment of new executive officers and changes in the
compensation structure that are more closely aligned with the
company's results, should also contribute to a gradual improvement
in operating performance.

However, the pace of deleveraging remains limited by consolidated
capital spending of approximately BRL800 million per year for
network expansion and to improve quality standards in the
distribution business, along other investments. Moody's also notes
other potential pressures from contingencies that weights
negatively on the company's free cash flow generation in the near
term.

The Issuer Ratings assigned to Light SESA and Light Energia are in
line with the ratings assigned to its parent company, due to the
corporate guarantee provided by Light and the cross default clauses
embedded in the entire amount of debts issued within the group.
Because of these financial and structural linkages, Light SESA and
Light Energia's credit profile are best assessed through Light's
consolidated profile, as the holding company of the group.

RATINGS OUTLOOK

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectations that Light's
consolidated credit metrics will improve driven by a reduction in
leverage following the equity injection, which will lead Light's
CFO pre WC to Debt and interest coverage ratios to remain
consistently above 15% and 3.0x respectively over the next 12 to 18
months.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Another rating upgrade could be considered should the company
demonstrate sustained improvements in operating performance and
reduce its leverage position such that CFO pre WC / Debt exceeds
18% and CFO pre WC Interest coverage reaches 3.5x on a sustainable
basis. A rating upgrade would also require a comfortable liquidity
profile ahead of the company's working capital needs and debt
maturities in the short term.

A rating downgrade could result from Light's failure to improve its
operating performance and cash flow generation or to reduce its
debt outstanding, such that CFO pre WC to Debt falls below 15% and
CFO pre WC interest coverage remains sustainably below 3.0x.
Perception of a weakening liquidity profile could also exert
negative pressures on the ratings.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Issuer: Light S.A.

Affirmations:

Corporate Family Rating: Ba3 (global scale)

Rating changes:

Corporate Family Rating: upgraded to A2.br from A3.br (National
Scale Rating)

Issuer: Light Servicos de Eletricidade S.A.

Affirmations:

Issuer Rating: Ba3 (global scale)

Rating changes:

Issuer Rating: upgraded to A2.br from A3.br (National Scale
Rating)

Issuer: Light Energia S.A.

Affirmations:

Issuer Rating: Ba3 (global scale)

Rating changes:

Issuer Rating: upgraded to A2.br from A3.br (National Scale
Rating)

The outlook for all ratings remains stable.

COMPANY PROFILE

Headquartered in Rio de Janeiro - Brazil, Light is an integrated
utility company with activities in generation, distribution and
commercialization of electricity. Light SESA and Light Energia are
wholly owned subsidiaries of Light. The company's major shareholder
is Companhia Energetica de Minas Gerais - CEMIG (CEMIG; B1/Baa1.br
positive), with a direct and indirect stake of 22.6% in Light's
equity capital. In the last twelve months ended June 2019, Light
reported BRL11.5 billion in consolidated net revenues (excluding
construction revenues) and BRL1.7 billion in EBITDA.

RATING METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in rating Light S.A., and Light
Servicos De Eletricidade S.A. was Regulated Electric and Gas
Utilities published in June 2017. The principal methodology used in
rating Light Energia S.A was Unregulated Utilities and Unregulated
Power Companies published in May 2017.

LIGHT SERVICOS: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Sr. Unsec. Notes Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the foreign currency Ba3 senior
unsecured notes ratings of Light Servicos de Eletricidade S.A. and
Light Energia S.A.

At the same time Moody's America Latina affirmed the Corporate
Family Rating of Light S.A. and the issuer ratings of its operating
subsidiaries Light Servicos de Eletricidade S.A. and Light Energia
S.A at Ba3 on the global scale. The outlook is stable for all
ratings.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions reflect Moody's updated views on Light
consolidated credit profile amid the company's evolving capital
structure and ongoing operating challenges.

The ratings assigned to Light SESA and Light Energia are in line
with the rating assigned to its parent company, due to the
corporate guarantee provided by Light and the cross default clauses
embedded in the entire amount of debts issued within the group.
Because of these financial and structural linkages, Light SESA and
Light Energia's credit profile are best assessed through Light's
consolidated profile, as the holding company of the group.

Light's Ba3/A2.br CFRs recognize the supportive regulatory
framework for Brazil electricity distribution sector that
consistently compensates operators for high energy costs through
tariffs increases based on a transparent methodology, and the
relatively stable cash flow profile supported by Light's
unregulated generation business (representing about 28% of Light's
consolidated EBITDA in the last twelve months ended June 2019).
Despite adverse hydrology conditions in recent years, the
commercialization strategy has contributed to mitigate higher
energy cost with positive effect on Light's consolidated cash flow
generation. The ratings also incorporate Light's improved liquidity
position and capital structure following the conclusion of a
BRL1.875 billion capital increase through the issuance of new
shares last July, along with the expectation of a more gradual
improvement in company's prospective operating performance, driven
by governance changes.

On the other hand, the high level of energy losses in the
distribution segment that reached 25.76% in the last twelve months
ended June 30, 2019 (compared to 19.62% of its regulatory target
and 22.98% compared to same period of 2018) constrains Light's
ratings, because the weak socioeconomic conditions of its
concession area, with high unemployment rate and elevated
electricity thefts challenges the growth in consumption levels and
cash flow conversion rate. The weak operating performance
contributed to a deterioration in Light's consolidated credit
metrics, as illustrated by the Cash Flow Pre-Working Capital (CFO
pre-WC)-to-debt ratio falling to 12.6% in June 2019, from 16.5% in
December 2017, with the interest coverage ratio in the range of
2.5x - 2.7x.

The ratings consider a gradual improvement in credit metrics so
that Light's CFO pre WC to Debt and interest coverage ratios to
remain consistently above 15% and 3.0x respectively over the next
12 to 18 months. Such improvement is possible with the proceeds
from equity increase supporting debt reduction. The company's
renewed corporate governance, following the appointment of new
executive officers and changes in the compensation structure that
are more closely aligned with the company's results, should also
contribute to a gradual improvement in operating performance.

However, the pace of deleveraging remains limited by consolidated
capital spending of approximately BRL800 million per year for
network expansion and to improve quality standards in the
distribution business, along other investments. Moody's also notes
other potential pressures from contingencies that weights
negatively on the company's free cash flow generation in the near
term.

RATINGS OUTLOOK

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectations that Light's
consolidated credit metrics will improve driven by a reduction in
leverage following the equity injection, which will lead Light's
CFO pre WC to Debt and interest coverage ratios to remain
consistently above 15% and 3.0x respectively over the next 12 to 18
months.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Another rating upgrade could be considered should the company
demonstrate sustained improvements in operating performance and
reduce its leverage position such that CFO pre WC / Debt exceeds
18% and CFO pre WC Interest coverage reaches 3.5x on a sustainable
basis. A rating upgrade would also require a comfortable liquidity
profile ahead of the company's working capital needs and debt
maturities in the short term.

A rating downgrade could result from Light's failure to improve its
operating performance and cash flow generation or to reduce its
debt outstanding, such that CFO pre WC to Debt falls below 15% and
CFO pre WC interest coverage remains sustainably below 3.0x.
Perception of a weakening liquidity profile could also exert
negative pressures on the ratings.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Issuer: Light Servicos de Eletricidade S.A.

Affirmation:

Senior Unsecured Bond FC Rating: Ba3

Issuer: Light Energia S.A.

Affirmation:

Senior Unsecured Bond FC Rating: Ba3

The outlook for all ratings remains stable.

COMPANY PROFILE

Headquartered in Rio de Janeiro - Brazil, Light is an integrated
utility company with activities in generation, distribution and
commercialization of electricity. Light SESA and Light Energia are
wholly owned subsidiaries of Light. The company's major shareholder
is Companhia Energetica de Minas Gerais - CEMIG (CEMIG; B1/Baa1.br
positive), with a direct and indirect stake of 22.6% in Light's
equity capital. In the last twelve months ended June 2019, Light
reported BRL11.5 billion in consolidated net revenues (excluding
construction revenues) and BRL1.7 billion in EBITDA.

RIO DE JANEIRO: Fitch Upgrades LT IDR to BB-, Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings upgraded the State of Rio de Janeiro's long-term
foreign- and local-currency Issuer Default Ratings to 'BB-' from
'C'. Fitch has also upgraded the state's national rating to
'AA(bra)' from 'C(bra)'. Fitch has also assigned a Stable Rating
Outlook to the long-term ratings. In addition, Fitch has assigned
ERio a Standalone Credit Profile (SCP) of 'd'.

The upgrade of ERio's ratings reflects the federal government's
(Brazil; 'BB-'/Stable) continuous support to provide timely service
of ERio's debt. The rating actions are based on Fitch's new "Rating
Criteria for International Local and Regional Governments" (LRGs)
published on April 9, 2019. Under these criteria, the LRGs can
benefit from external support, including the potential for bail-out
by an upper tier of government.

The state has been unable to fully service its debt since mid-2016
given the increased deep financial imbalances that became evident
in late 2015. This led the state to adhere to the Fiscal Recovery
Regimen (FRR) signed with the federal government in September
2017.

Virtually all of ERio's financial debt has been serviced by the
federal government on its behalf. The federal government has
temporarily waived the state's significant federal debt contingent
to some FRR conditions being met, including the successful adoption
of several measures to increase revenues and curb expenditures.
This waiver can be extended once (until 2023).

ERio's payment capacity is irrevocably impaired. The state has
entered into a grace period following non-payment of a material
financial obligation in mid-2016. This is commensurate with a SCP
of 'd'.

Government effectiveness and institutional & regulatory quality
were not sufficient to prevent the state from resorting to external
financial support to pursue fiscal balance.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Risk Profile Assessment: Weaker

There are six weaker assessments for the risk factors that, in
combination with the sovereign rating of 'BB-', resulted in a
weaker risk profile assessment.

Revenue Robustness: Weaker

ERio presents revenue growth prospects below the national GDP
average given the poor local economic performance expected. The
state has posted a history of deep fiscal imbalances since 2015
given its dependency on oil-related activities, which were
negatively impacted by the historical low international prices, and
due to the deep economic recession affecting the state's most
relevant tax payers that belong to the oil sector.

Revenue Adjustability: Weaker

The state presents average tax autonomy, leading to a suboptimal
level for revenue increase in response to an economic downturn. Tax
revenues has represented on average 57.6% of operating revenues
over the last five years in a decreasing trend.

Revenue from oil royalties reached the equivalent to 18% of
operating revenues in 2018. Revenue adjustment is more difficult
because tax tariffs are close to the constitutional limit even
considering the option to increase tariffs derived from an average
GDP per capita of around USD10,000.

Expenditure Sustainability: Weaker

ERio presents moderate control over expenditure growth given the
high percentage of committed expenditures. In light of the recent
severe fiscal imbalances and restrictions imposed by the FRR, the
state has reported mounting unpaid short-term obligations that are
higher than the local average. Pension payments represent a
relevant stake of the state's opex structure, accounting for
roughly 25% of operating expenditures in 2018 in a rising trend.

Expenditure Adjustability: Weaker

Despite the restrictions imposed by the FRR, the proportion of
inflexible costs remains high with more than 90% of expenditures
being mandatory and committed. ERio has a limited track record of
stimulus packages aside from tax exemptions given to companies.

Liabilities and Liquidity Robustness: Weaker

There is a moderate national framework for debt and liquidity
management. Given its adherence to the FRR, ERio is authorized to
raise debt to cover for operating expenditures. In 2018, credit
operations totaled BRL1.2 billion.

The federal government guarantees all financial debt of the state
including the USD denominated portion. As of December 2018, USD
denominated debt portion totalled BRL12.4 billion. Debt directly
and indirectly owed to the federal government represented 67.4% of
total debt in 2018.

Liabilities and Liquidity Flexibility: Weaker

There is a framework of providing emergency liquidity support from
the federal government via the granting of extended maturity over
the prevalent federal debt portion. Nevertheless, all liquidity is
held at institutions rated below 'BBB-', leading this factor to be
weaker.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch assumes ERio will be under the FRR until 2023 when the state
should be required to service its debt without resorting to federal
support.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRs Linked to the Sovereign: Any rating action affecting Brazil
would result in a similar rating action for ERio. Once ERio
recovers and it is able to honor its committed financial
obligations in due time with no federal government aid, then Fitch
will revise its Standalone Credit Profile.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has taken the following rating actions on ERio:

  -- Long-term foreign and local-currency IDR upgraded to 'BB-'
from 'C'; Stable Outlook assigned;

  -- Short-term foreign and local-currency IDR upgraded to 'B' from
'C';

  -- National Long-term Rating upgraded to 'AA(bra)' from 'C(bra)';
Stable Outlook assigned;

  -- National Short-term Rating upgraded to 'F1+(bra)' from
'C(bra)';

  -- SCP assigned of 'd'.

RIO PARANAPANEMA: S&P Withdraws Long-Term 'BB' Global Scale ICR
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings withdrew its long-term 'BB' global scale and
'brAAA' national scale issuer credit ratings on Brazil-based power
generator, Rio Paranapanema Energia S.A., at its request. The
outlook was stable at the time of the withdrawal.

At the time of the withdrawal, the issuer credit ratings on Rio
Paranapanema reflected S&P's view that it would maintain solid
credit metrics, with debt to EBITDA of about 1.0x and funds from
operations to debt above 60%. These metrics, combined with prudent
risk management, compensated for potential swings in hydroelectric
power generation.

Strong liquidity enabled the company to have a higher rating than
the sovereign foreign currency rating on Brazil (BB-/Stable/B),
because Rio Paranapanema would be able to service its debt even
under the much more conservative assumptions of our stress test for
a hypothetical sovereign default scenario. Nevertheless, the
ratings were limited to one notch above those on Brazil, given the
company's sensitivity to the domestic economy and because all of
its assets are located in the country.




===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Security Committee Aims to Safeguard Tourism
----------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that President Danilo Medina created the
National Tourism Security Committee, to eradicate threats against
the industry, the country's main source of foreign income. It's
going through a decline after the death of several tourists in
hotels this year.

The Committee aims to design policies, strategies and programs for
the prevention, detection, prosecution and to eradicate threats to
the security of the tourism industry, the Presidency said on its
website, according to Dominican Today.

"It will be responsible for coordinating security activities among
the different entities that comprise it, including the Ministries
of Tourism, Defense and Interior, as well as the Attorney General's
Office and the National Hotels and Restaurants Association
(Asonahores)," the report relays.

"Its responsibility will be to foster a climate of integral
security in the national tourism sector through the adoption of
coordination and integration measures for the effective performance
of the civil, military and police authorities, as well as the other
State security agencies and the private sector," he added, the
report notes.

Standard & Poor's credit rating for Dominican Republic stands at
BB- with stable outlook (2015). Moody's credit rating for
Dominican Republic was last set at Ba3 with stable outlook (2017).
Fitch's credit rating for Dominican Republic was last reported at
BB- with stable outlook (2016).

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: US$674.5MM From Bank Reserve Head to Sectors
----------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that the Central Bank said that the RD$34.4
billion (US$674.5 million) released from the bank reserve to
finance productive sectors, financial institutions have already
channeled 50% of the funds, reaching more than 5,000 beneficiaries,
of which 4,700 have obtained loans of less than RD$5.0 million for
retailers, SME, the consumer and personal loans sectors.

"The amount exceeds RD$17 billion and loans in excess of RD$5.0
million have been granted to 418 companies in the different
productive sectors, especially manufacturing, agriculture, commerce
and export," it said, according to Dominican Today.

The Central Bank adds that the amount authorized for the
construction and acquisition of homes was RD$13.6 billion, or 40%
of the authorized total, distributed as follows: RD$4.2 billion for
low-cost housing of up to RD$3.5 million; RD$4.2 million for homes
of up to RD$8.0 million, and RD$5.2 billion in interim loans for
the construction of homes of any price, the report notes.

Standard & Poor's credit rating for Dominican Republic stands at
BB- with stable outlook (2015). Moody's credit rating for
Dominican Republic was last set at Ba3 with stable outlook (2017).
Fitch's credit rating for Dominican Republic was last reported at
BB- with stable outlook (2016).



===========
M E X I C O
===========

JUST ONE MORE: Dunning Rievman Represents Gary Ganzi, 2 Others
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the Chapter 11 cases of Just One More Restaurant Corp. and Just
One More Holding Corp., the law firm of Dunning Rievman & Davies,
LLP, submitted a verified statement under Rule 2019 of the Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure to disclose that it is representing
these Entities:

(1) Gary Ganzi, individually
    Gary Ganzi, as Attorney-in-Fact for the Estate of Charles Cook
    74 Valleyfield Street
    Lexington, MA 02421

(2) Claire Breen, individually
    Claire Breen, as Attorney-in-Fact for the Estate of Charles
    Cook
    7 Ryan Street
    Syosset, NY 11791 -2129

(3) Hoguet Newman Regal & Kenney, LLP
    c/o Fredric S. Newman, Esq.
    One Grand Central Pace
    60 East 42nd Street, 48th Floor
    New York, NY 10165

Each of the Entities may hold claims against and/or interests in
the Debtors arising out of applicable agreements, law or equity
pursuant to their relationship with the Debtors.

DRD represented each of the Entities prior to the Debtors' chapter
11 cases. Each of the Entities separately requested that DRD
represent them in connection with the Debtors' chapter 11 cases.

DRD has represented Gary Ganzi and Claire Breen, individually and
as Attorneys-in-Fact for the Estate of Charles Cook since 2012;
first, as a partner of Hoguet Newman Regal & Kenney LLP, then as a
partner of another law firm from February 27, 2017 through December
31, 2018, and finally as a partner of DRD from January 1, 2019
through the present. By virtue of these efforts, both as a partner
of HNR&K and as co-counsel with it, DRD and Joshua D. Rievman, Esq.
are entitled to a share of the attorneys' fees that HNR&K actually
receives from its claim in the above-captioned cases. DRD does not
otherwise possess any claims against or interests in the Debtors.

The Firm can be reached at:

          DUNNING RIEVMAN & DAVIES, LLP
          Joshua D. Rievman, Esq.
          434 W. 33d St.
          New York, NY 10001
          Telephone: (646) 435-0027

A copy of the Rule 2019 filing, downloaded from PacerMonitor.com,
is available at https://is.gd/KBrL8V

                    About Just One More

Just One More Restaurant Corp. holds the Palm Restaurant
steakhouse's intellectual property -- a series of trademarks and
service marks, design elements of the Palm.  JOMR licenses the Palm
IP to the Palm Restaurants through individual licensing
agreements.

There are 24 Palm Restaurants currently operating in the United
States and Mexico.  Just One does not own any of the Palm
Restaurants.

Just One More Restaurant Corp. and Just One More Holding Corp.
sought protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. Lead Case No. 19-01947) on March 7, 2019.  At the time of
the filing, Just One More Restaurant estimated assets of between
$100 million and $500 million and liabilities of between $10
million to $50 million.  Just One More Holding estimated assets and
liabilities of between $1 million and $10 million.

The Debtors tapped Berger Singerman LLP as their legal counsel, and
McHale, P.A., as their restructuring advisor.

JUST ONE MORE: Genovese Joblove Represents Gary Ganzi, 2 Others
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the Chapter 11 cases of Just One More Restaurant Corp. and Just
One More Holding Corp., the law firm of Genovese Joblove &
Battista, P.A. submitted a verified statement under Rule 2019 of
the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure to disclose that it is
representing these Entities:

(1) Gary Ganzi, individually
    Gary Ganzi, as Attorney-in-Fact for the Estate of Charles Cook
    74 Valleyfield Street
    Lexington, MA 02421

(2) Claire Breen, individually
    Claire Breen, as Attorney-in-Fact for the Estate of Charles
    Cook
    7 Ryan Street
    Syosset, NY 11791 -2129

(3) Hoguet Newman Regal & Kenney, LLP
    c/o Fredric S. Newman, Esq.
    One Grand Central Pace
    60 East 42nd Street, 48th Floor
    New York, NY 10165

Each of the Entities may hold claims against and/or interests in
the Debtors arising out of applicable agreements, law or equity
pursuant to their relationship with the Debtors.

The following are the facts and circumstances in connection with
GJB's employment in these cases. GJB did not represent any of the
Entities prior to the Debtors' chapter 11 cases. After these cases
were commenced, each of the Entities separately requested that GJB
represent them in connection with the Debtors' chapter 11 cases.

GJB does not possess any claims against or interests in the
Debtors.

Counsel for the Respondents can be reached at:

         GENOVESE JOBLOVE & BATTISTA, P.A.
         Robert F. Elgidely, Esq.
         200 East Broward Boulevard, Suite 1110
         Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
         Telephone: (954) 453-8000
         Telecopier:(954) 331-2907
         E-mail: relgidely@gjb-law.com

A copy of the Rule 2019 filing, downloaded from PacerMonitor.com,
is available at https://is.gd/olRCja

                    About Just One More

Just One More Restaurant Corp. holds the Palm Restaurant
steakhouse's intellectual property -- a series of trademarks and
service marks, design elements of the Palm.  JOMR licenses the Palm
IP to the Palm Restaurants through individual licensing
agreements.

There are 24 Palm Restaurants currently operating in the United
States and Mexico.  Just One does not own any of the Palm
Restaurants.

Just One More Restaurant Corp. and Just One More Holding Corp.
sought protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. Lead Case No. 19-01947) on March 7, 2019.  At the time of
the filing, Just One More Restaurant estimated assets of between
$100 million and $500 million and liabilities of between $10
million to $50 million.  Just One More Holding estimated assets and
liabilities of between $1 million and $10 million.

The Debtors tapped Berger Singerman LLP as their legal counsel, and
McHale, P.A., as their restructuring advisor.

JUST ONE MORE: Hoguet Newman Represents Gary Ganzi, 2 Others
------------------------------------------------------------
In the Chapter 11 cases of Just One More Restaurant Corp. and Just
One More Holding Corp., the law firm of Hogue Newman Regal &
Kenney, LLP submitted a verified statement under Rule 2019 of the
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure to disclose that it is
representing each of these Entities:

(1) Gary Ganzi, individually
    Gary Ganzi, as Attorney-in-Fact for the Estate of Charles Cook
    74 Valleyfield Street
    Lexington, MA 02421

(2) Claire Breen, individually
    Claire Breen, as Attorney-in-Fact for the Estate of Charles
    Cook
    7 Ryan Street
    Syosset, NY 11791 -2129

(3) Hoguet Newman Regal & Kenney, LLP
    c/o Fredric S. Newman, Esq.
    One Grand Central Pace
    60 East 42nd Street, 48th Floor
    New York, NY 10165

Each of the Entities may hold claims against and/or interests in
the Debtors arising out of applicable agreements, law or equity
pursuant to their relationship with the Debtors.

The following are the facts and circumstances in connection with
HNR&K's employment in these cases. HNR&K represented each of the
Entities prior to the Debtors' chapter 11 cases. Each of the
Entities separately requested that HNR&K represent them in
connection with the Debtors' chapter 11 cases.

On June 28, 2019, HNR&K filed a Proof of Claim in the amount of
$4,566,296.93. See Proof of Claim No. 4. HNR&K's claim stems from
its representation of Gary Ganzi and Claire Breen, individually and
as Attorneys-in-Fact for the Estate of Charles Cook in that certain
action styled Gary Ganzi, Claire Breen, and Gary Ganzi and Claire
Breen, as Attorneys-in-Fact for the Estate of Charles Cook,
Individually and Derivatively on Behalf of Nominal Defendants Just
One More Restaurant Corporation and Just One More Holding
Corporation v. Walter Ganzi, Jr. and Bruce Bozzi, Sr., Supreme
Court of the State of New York, County of New York, Index Number
653074/2012. The Derivative Action resulted in a Decision After
Non-Jury Trial issued on November 13, 2018 and a $119.5 million
judgment entered on February 11, 2019 in favor of the Debtors and
against Walter Ganzi, Jr. and Bruce Bozzi, Sr. The Decision After
Non-Jury Trial determined that, "[p]ursuant to BCL Sec. 626(e),
plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys' fees".

Upon the commencement of these Chapter 11 cases, the Minority
Shareholders consented to HNR&K's simultaneous representation of
them and HNR&K in the above- captioned Chapter 11 cases.

Additionally, on August 1, undersigned explained to Debtors'
counsel the details of the fee arrangement between his firm and the
Minority Shareholders and those details establish that HNR&K's and
the Minority Shareholders' interests are identical.

The Firm can be reached at:

          HOGUET NEWMAN REGAL & KENNEY, LLP
          Fredric S. Newman, Esq.
          One Grand Central Place
          60 E. 42nd St., 48th Fl.
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 689-8808

A copy of the Rule 2019 filing, downloaded from PacerMonitor.com,
is available at https://is.gd/gWR4zi

                     About Just One More

Just One More Restaurant Corp. holds the Palm Restaurant
steakhouse's intellectual property -- a series of trademarks and
service marks, design elements of the Palm.  JOMR licenses the Palm
IP to the Palm Restaurants through individual licensing
agreements.

There are 24 Palm Restaurants currently operating in the United
States and Mexico.  Just One does not own any of the Palm
Restaurants.

Just One More Restaurant Corp. and Just One More Holding Corp.
sought protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. Lead Case No. 19-01947) on March 7, 2019.  At the time of
the filing, Just One More Restaurant estimated assets of between
$100 million and $500 million and liabilities of between $10
million to $50 million.  Just One More Holding estimated assets and
liabilities of between $1 million and $10 million.

The Debtors tapped Berger Singerman LLP as their legal counsel, and
McHale, P.A., as their restructuring advisor.



=====================
P U E R T O   R I C O
=====================

KONA GRILL: One Group to Purchase Restaurants for $25 Million
-------------------------------------------------------------
The ONE Group Hospitality, Inc. (Nasdaq: STKS) and Kona Grill
Acquisition, LLC ("KGA"), its wholly owned subsidiary, on Sept. 3,
2019, disclosed that KGA has entered into an Asset Purchase
Agreement (the "APA") with Kona Grill, Inc. and affiliated entities
to purchase substantially all of Kona's restaurants for
approximately $25 million.  The final purchase price will be
determined at the closing of the transaction based on the
completion of due diligence, subject to certain agreed upon
adjustments.  The Company expects to finance the acquisition with a
new financing facility and cash on hand.

Under the terms of the APA, subject to certain conditions, the
Company has agreed to purchase the remaining 24 of Kona's domestic
restaurants and assume certain contracts, including two
international franchise licenses, for approximately $25 million in
cash plus the assumption of working capital liabilities of
approximately $11 million.  If completed, the Company expects the
integration to take approximately 12 months.  Once fully
integrated, the acquisition is expected to add approximately $100
million in annualized revenue and to be accretive to earnings per
diluted share and Adjusted EBITDA.

"Kona Grill is an excellent brand that has maintained a strong
position in the remaining 24 restaurants where it operates due to
its elevated dining experience, contemporary, freshly prepared
food, award-wining sushi, and specialty cocktails.  Through this
transaction, we believe we can leverage our corporate
infrastructure and operating expertise, particularly our
bar-business know-how and VIBE dining, to drive improved
performance in many of the same ways we have substantially improved
comparable store sales and overall profitability at STK," said
Emanuel "Manny" Hilario, President and CEO of The ONE Group.

"The acquisition of Kona Grill also provides us with a
complementary concept to STK, potentially creating another
long-term growth vehicle once we fully integrate the restaurants
into The ONE Group.  The remaining 24 domestic restaurants, down
from 40 at year-end 2018, reflect a strong base of high performing
restaurants in attractive markets. We look forward to maximizing
the multiple opportunities that this acquisition will provide to
create long-term shareholder value," concluded Mr. Hilario.

The Kona assets include the worldwide rights to the name "Kona
Grill" and other intellectual property, including trademarks,
domain names, menu recipes, and customer databases.  The
acquisition is subject to financing conditions, the approval of the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, and
other customary closing conditions.

                      About The ONE Group

The ONE Group (NASDAQ: STKS) -- http://www.togrp.com/-- is a
global hospitality company that develops and operates upscale,
high-energy restaurants and lounges and provides hospitality
management services for hotels, casinos and other high-end venues
both nationally and internationally.  The ONE Group's focus is to
be the global leader in Vibe Dining, and its primary restaurant
brand is STK, a modern twist on the American steakhouse concept
with locations in major metropolitan cities in the U.S., Europe and
the Middle East.  ONE Hospitality, The ONE Group's food and
beverage hospitality services business, develops, manages and
operates premier restaurants and turn-key food and beverage
services within high-end hotels and casinos.

                        About Kona Grill

Kona Grill, Inc. -- https://www.konagrill.com/ -- owns and operates
27 casual dining restaurants in 18 states, as well as Puerto Rico,
serving contemporary American favorites, sushi, and alcoholic
beverages throughout the United States and Puerto Rico.

Kona Grill, Inc., and its subsidiaries sought protection under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. Del. Lead Case No.
19-10953) on April 30, 2019.  As of Dec. 31, 2018, the Debtors
disclosed total assets of $53,613,000 and total liabilities of
$74,049,000.  The petition was signed by Christopher J. Wells, the
CRO.

The Debtors tapped Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP as counsel;
Piper Jaffray as investment banker; Alvarez & Marsal North America,
LLC as restructuring advisor and Epiq Corporate Restructuring, LLC,
as claims and noticing agent.

Andrew Vara, acting U.S. trustee for Region 3, on May 16, 2019,
appointed five creditors to serve on an official committee of
unsecured creditors in the Chapter 11 cases.  The Committee
retained Kelley Drye & Warren LLP, as lead counsel; Bayard, P.A.,
as co-counsel; and Province, Inc., as financial advisor.



=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================

CITGO PETROLEUM: S&P Affirms 'B-' Long-Term ICR
-----------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B-' long-term issuer credit
ratings on CITGO Holding Inc. and core subsidiary CITGO Petroleum
Corp.

The 'B+' issue-level rating on CITGO Petroleum's senior secured
debt and 'B' issue-level rating on CITGO Holding's outstanding
senior secured debt is unchanged. The recovery rating on CITGO
Petroleum's debt remains '1', which indicates the likelihood of
very high (90%-100%; rounded estimate: 95%) recovery following a
default. The recovery rating for CITGO Holding's debt remains '2',
reflecting its expectation for substantial (70%-90%; rounded
estimate: 80%) recovery.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that the rating on CITGO
will continue to be constrained by parent PDVSA Petroleo S.A.,
which remains in selective default on most of its obligations. S&P
does not foresee a near-term change in this group status. Since
the
interim (Guaido) Venezuelan government appointed a new board of
directors at CITGO, the rating agency does not believe the Maduro
government could take any action that harms the company's
operational capability. Operationally, S&P expects the refineries
to continue to run at high utilization and manage leverage between
2x-3x.

"While we consider it unlikely, we could lower the rating if a
PDVSA bankruptcy proceeding were to include CITGO Holding, such
that assets could be sold to cover PDVSA's debts," S&P said.

"We could raise the rating, possibly by multiple notches, if CITGO
is sold to a company with a stronger credit profile than PDVSA,"
the rating agency said.

PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: May Be Replaced by Klesch at Isla Refinery
------------------------------------------------------------------
spglobal.com reports that refinery (RdK) Curacao has chosen Klesch
Petroleum as the possible new operator of its stalled Isla
Refinery, replacing Venezuela's Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A.
(PDVSA).

"RdK took an important step to keep the refinery, the Bullenbay
terminal and the industrial services plant running," it said,
according to spglobal.com.

Negotiations between RdK and Klesch, based in London and Geneva,
are scheduled to continue for three months with the intention of
reaching a final agreement in November, RdK said in a statement
obtained by the news agency.

The Isla Refinery has been operated by Venezuelan state PDVSA since
1985 under a rental agreement with the Dutch Caribbean autonomous
island government, the report notes.  The agreement has been
renewed periodically and the current contract expires in 2019, the
report relays.

The Curacao refinery has a capacity to process 335,000 b/d but in
practice this volume is not possible because of infrastructure
limits, the report says.  The maximum throughput is estimated at
between 270,000 b/d and 290,000 b/d, depending on the type of
crude. In 2017 and 2018, the refinery was impacted by failures in
its industrial services functions, by a fire that occurred in the
CD-3 distillation unit and by the lack of crude availability, the
report discloses.

In the last 12 months, however, the processing level has been
nearly zero because of the lack of crude supply due to US sanctions
against PDVSA, the report says.

The failure of PDVSA to live up to its contractually obligated
investments in the refinery has forced Curacao to look for a new
operator, the report notes.

PDVSA had planned to reactivate the Isla Refinery in July with
imported crude from third parties, but the promise was not
fulfilled, the report relays.

RdK in July said it received several "non-binding offers" to
replace PDVSA as operator but did not give details of how many or
which had expressed interest, the report discloses.

RdK's financial situation remains delicate.

"There was enough money to pay August's payroll," said an RdK
official, who spoke on condition of anonymity with S&P Global
Platts.

"To pay workers until December there are two sources," the official
said, notes the report.  "One, to collect outstanding debts from
Curoil and Aqualectra, the two local companies covering the local
fuel and electricity market.  And two, use funds reserved for
payments in areas that have not been impacted by the US sanctions
against PDVSA.

"PDVSA remains out. The only option [for PDVSA] is that the
negotiations between RdK and Klesh will not be successful," the
source said, the report relays.

"The current value is estimated between $750 million and $1.5
billon," said the RdK official, the report relays.

Reaching a new agreement to operate the refinery faces additional
challenges, the report says.  Environmental groups want to close
the facility, and in late August a Curacao court ruled that the
refinery should reduce its SO2 emissions to 20 ppm by 2020 from
from 80 ppm currently, according to local media, the report notes.

"Reducing emissions is impossible without investing and burning
gas," the RdK official said, according to the report.  "With this
environmental pressure it will be difficult to sign a new contract
in the short term."

According to the Curacao central bank, the refinery represents 14%
of total economic output of the island.  It is the second-largest
employer after the government and its economic impact influences
almost all sectors of the economy, the report adds.

Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. is the Venezuelan state-owned oil and
natural gas company. It has activities in exploration, production,
refining and exporting oil as well as exploration and production
of
natural gas.

As reported in Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on June 3,
2019, Moody's Investors Service withdrew all the ratings of
Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. including the senior unsecured and
senior secured ratings due to insufficient information. At the time
of withdrawal, the ratings were C and the outlook was stable.


                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
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Chapman, Editors.

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