/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/190916.mbx        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                 L A T I N   A M E R I C A

          Monday, September 16, 2019, Vol. 20, No. 185

                           Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

BUENOS AIRES CITY: Fitch Downgrades LT Issuer Default Rating to CCC
BUENOS AIRES: S&P Lowers LT ICR to 'CCC', Outlook Still Negative
[*] ARGENTINA: Obsession with Dollar a Vicious Cycle


B E R M U D A

GCX LIMITED: Moody's Withdraws Ca CFR for Business Reasons


B R A Z I L

BRAZIL: Indebtedness & Consumer Default Rate Remain High in August
BRAZIL: Sao Paulo's Cost of Living Index Rises 1.88% in 8 Months
BRF SA: Fitch Rates Proposed $500MM Sr. Unsec. Notes 'BB'
BRF SA: Moody's Rates Proposed Sr. Unsec. Notes Ba2, Outlook Neg.


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Weekly Losses of US$500,000 for Banana Growers


E L   S A L V A D O R

SALVADORENO DPR: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on 3 Series 2015 Loans


M E X I C O

GRUPO FAMSA: Fitch Affirms B- IDR; Alters Outlook to Stable
PETROLEOS MEXICANOS: Fitch Rates Proposed Debt Issuance 'BB+'


P U E R T O   R I C O

AMERICAN TOOLS: Voluntary Chapter 11 Case Summary
PUERTO RICO: FEMA Official, Contaractor Charged Over Grid Repairs
PUERTO RICO: Major Plan for Core Gov't Debt Coming This Month


X X X X X X X X

[*] BOND PRICING: For the Week September 9 to September 13, 2019

                           - - - - -


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A R G E N T I N A
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BUENOS AIRES CITY: Fitch Downgrades LT Issuer Default Rating to CCC
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded three Argentine Local and Regional
Governments following the downgrade of Argentina's Country Ceiling
to 'CCC' from 'B-' on Sept. 3, 2019.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrade of Argentina's Country Ceiling to 'CCC' reflects the
recent imposition of capital controls as of Sept. 2 and risks that
these could be tightened further given the sovereign's limited
foreign financing options, especially as the authorities attempt to
prevent a continued decline in international reserves. Fitch
believes the current controls and risks of further tightening could
potentially impair ability to access foreign exchange to meet debt
service, in spite of exceptions that have been included in the
controls for debt repayment.

Consequently, Fitch is downgrading the Long-Term Local and Foreign
Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) of the City of Buenos Aires,
Province of Santa Fe, and Province of Cordoba to 'CCC' from
'B-'/Outlook Negative and their senior unsecured issuances to 'CCC'
from 'B-' as, according to its Local and Regional Governments
rating criteria, they are capped by Argentina's Country Ceiling.

The standalone credit profiles (SCPs) of these issuers are 'bb-'
for the City of Buenos Aires, 'bb-' for Province of Santa Fe, and
'b+' for Province of Cordoba, which indicate that the entities
possess financial capacity in a vulnerable macroeconomic context
due to their strong budget, debt profiles, and sufficient
liquidity. Therefore, the rating action reflects increased risks
from transfer and convertibility restrictions, and not a material
deterioration of the LRGs financial profiles.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A downgrade of Argentina's Country Ceiling rating would negatively
impact LRG's ratings. On the other hand, an upgrade on the Country
Ceiling could positively impact the ratings of City of Buenos
Aires, Province of Cordoba, and Province of Santa Fe.

Buenos Aires, City of

LT IDR CCC; Downgraded from B-

ST IDR C; Downgraded from B

LC LT IDR CCC; Downgraded from B-

LC ST IDR C; Downgraded from B

senior unsecured LT CCC; Downgraded from B-

Cordoba, Province of

LT IDR CCC; Downgraded from B-

LC LT IDR CCC; Downgraded from B-

senior unsecured LT CCC; Downgraded from B-

Santa Fe, Province of

LT IDR CCC; Downgraded from B-

LC LT IDR CCC; Downgraded from B-

senior unsecured LT CCC; Downgraded from B-

BUENOS AIRES: S&P Lowers LT ICR to 'CCC', Outlook Still Negative
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its long-term credit ratings on the
province of Buenos Aires to 'CCC' from 'B-'. The outlook remains
negative.

OUTLOOK

The negative outlook on the province reflects the rising risks of
paying debt on time and in full in 2020 amid very complex
political, economic, and financial market dynamics in Argentina.
Although S&P considers that upcoming debt amortizations are not
significantly high in relation to the province of Buenos Aires's
budget, the persisting unfavorable market conditions and
uncertainty about the next administration's policies could
jeopardize the province's ability to service its debt.

Downside scenario

S&P could lower the long-term ratings on the province in the next
twelve months if it perceives the increasing likelihood of delays
in debt servicing or of debt exchange following the mounting
difficulties in rolling over the short- and long-term debt.

Upside scenario

S&P could revise the outlook on the province to stable over the
coming twelve months if it sees clear strategy for timely payment
of financial obligations. This would have to be accompanied by
policy signals from both the current and potential new
administrations to maintain the province's fiscal and financial
profile on a sustainable path.

RATIONALE

S&P said, "The downgrade reflects our view of rising liquidity
pressures that could hamper the province's ability to service its
debt in a timely manner in the next 12 months amid the political
and financial market turbulence. We don't consider the province's
fiscal profile and debt level are unsustainable over the longer
term. However, uncertainty about the potential new administration's
strategy has raised questions over the province's capacity and
willingness to make full and timely payments on its financial
obligations due in the next 12 months. The province of Buenos Aires
faces amortizations of $1.6 billion in the next 12 months, 50% of
which corresponds to debt to the international markets, and the
remainder consists of local debt instruments and intergovernmental
debt.

S&P considers that funding options have become diminished amid
financial instability in Argentina and following the sovereign's
recent selective default, including the province's capacity to roll
over its short-term debt and access to extraordinary financing from
the national government.

Although the general election will take place on October 27, the
resounding victory of the opposition over Governor Vidal signals a
potential policy shift in the province. The opposition candidate,
Axel Kicillof of the Peronist Party, won the gubernatorial primary
election on August 11 with more than 50% of the votes. During the
past three years, the province's disciplined fiscal policies
bolstered budgetary performance and caused infrastructure spending
to rise. However, the primary election results and the recent
increase in financial instability and economic recession in
Argentina have cast doubts over the continuity of the province's
fiscal and debt policies.

S&P said, "We expect the province of Buenos Aires to post a slight
operating deficit at the end of 2019, compared with a surplus of
1.9% of operating revenues in 2018. The deterioration in the fiscal
accounts is due to the energy and transportation subsidies,
(previously supported by the national government)and wage increases
above expected inflation for public-sector employees. Nonetheless,
we expect balance after capex in 2019 to be similar to that of
2018, given that spending on public works will be subdued in the
second half of the year. For the next two years, we expect a
gradual improvement in the province's fiscal accounts if the
administration maintains austerity policies and economy recovers
modestly."

2019 financing needs have been mostly covered with borrowings from
the national government and short-term debt instruments, given the
unfavorable market conditions during the year. S&P said, "We expect
the province to make use of its previously accumulated cash to
finance its deficit, given that market access will remain tight
amid potential renegotiation of the sovereign debt. We consider the
province's liquidity position to be sufficient to cover debt
service for the remainder of this year. However, we're concerned
about doing so in 2020, absent a recovery in market conditions. The
province of Buenos Aires faces amortizations for $1.6 billion in
the next 12 months, $500 million of which are intergovernmental
debt, which we expect to be rolled over." However, the $250 million
bond matures in January 2020, just after a month the potentially
new government takes office. Political uncertainty could result in
a liquidity crisis.  

Despite these short-term pressures, the province's medium- and
long-term debt level is manageable. S&P said, "We expect direct
debt to represent 68% of the province's operating revenue, and
interest payments to average 5% of operating revenue in the next
three years. Afterwards, we expect direct debt and interest
payments to gradually decrease in line with the peso's expected
appreciation. Amid limited access to market funding, we consider
that the national government could become a more important source
of funding for the province."

Economic growth of Argentina and the province of Buenos Aires has
been sluggish over the last few years, with a track record below
that of peers. An already weak economy took a hit from pronounced
market turmoil after the primary election results. S&P said, "We
expect Argentina's GDP to contract 2.3% this year, after it shrank
2.5% in 2018. We expect recovery in the coming years to be
moderate."

S&P said, "We believe that amid eroding macroeconomic conditions,
the sovereign could transfer part of the financial stress to the
subnational governments, especially given Argentina's history of
major changes in economic policy following shifts in political
leadership. Even in a very weak institutional framework, we
consider that provincial governments are facing this sovereign
stress environment with relatively more financial strengths
compared to past crisis. Nevertheless,  we assess the institutional
framework for Argentina's local and regional governments (LRGs) as
volatile and underfunded, reflecting our perception of the
sovereign's very weak institutional predictability and volatile
intergovernmental system that has been subject to various
modifications to fiscal regulations, and lack of consistency over
the years, which jeopardize the LRGs' financial planning, and
consequently, their credit quality."

  RATINGS LIST

  Downgraded
                                  To                 From
  Buenos Aires (Province of)
  Issuer Credit Rating         CCC/Negative/--    B-/Negative/--
  Senior Unsecured             CCC                B-


[*] ARGENTINA: Obsession with Dollar a Vicious Cycle
----------------------------------------------------
The Latin American Herald notes that in the bars, stores, at
lunchtime or when school's out, a lot of Argentina is asking itself
the same question: How much is the dollar worth today? The answer,
according to the report, is capable of sending shock waves across
the nation, battered by repeated crises with the currency as the
main protagonist that has the country's economy stuck in a vicious
circle.

Like the tango, soccer and barbecue, the dollar has earned a spot
among Argentina's beloved traditions in a society obsessed with a
currency that is not its own, but which has been adopted as the
best method to hang onto savings and get away from the weak and
unstable peso, the report notes.

When the value of the US dollar increases, particularly when this
happens suddenly, two things happen in Argentina: as the national
economy, based on pesos, weakens and inflation goes up, the dollars
stashed away by savers remain safe, the report says.

"It's an aversion to the peso, we don't want pesos in our pockets,"
one of the many Argentinians passing through the main banking
district of Buenos Aires, which houses many foreign exchange
bureaus, said, the report notes.

On Sept. 12, when these currency traders open, and above all during
times of recession, a cloud of uncertainty lingers over the country
for the five hours of market activity, the report says.  On
critical days, the exchange rate can undergo sharp lurches.

Television channels will place small windows somewhere on the
screen so that viewers can follow the developments live, the report
notes.

"In Argentina, knowing the value of the dollar four years ago could
be the winning question on a TV quiz show," Mariana Luzzi, a
sociologist who along with her colleague Ariel Wilkis has studied
the nation's behavior when it comes to the dollar, told Efe.
The researchers of the book "El dolar. Historia de una moneda
argentina (1930-2019)" (The dollar. History of an Argentine
currency," carried out an in-depth revision of the circumstances
that made the dollar "inseparable" from the South American country,
where a plethora of songs, theater shows, books and movies have
made reference to the currency since the start of the 20th century,
the report discloses.

The roots of Argentina's troublesome love story with the dollar
began in 1931 when the government of Jose Felix Uriburu established
the first exchange controls to counter the impact of the global
crisis of the previous decade, when the export of meat and grains
stopped being enough to maintain a functioning economy, the report
relays.

"The naturalization of the North American currency that we have in
the Argentine economy is a result of a very slow maturation process
over many years," said Luzzi.  "In the heat of many crises layers
built up that led the dollar to being so present in daily life," he
added.

Financial comings and goings have led successive democratic and
dictatorial governments to take measures that have not managed to
maintain a strong local currency, the report notes.

The most-remembered "plan" to stabilize the currency and placate
the consequent price increase came in 1991, when the then-economy
minister Domingo Cavallo brought in a law that equated the value of
the peso with that of the dollar for a decade, the report relays.

The report discloses that inflation was under control but the bomb
in this artificial system didn't take long to go off.  With the
2001 crisis, which limited cash withdrawals from the banks, the
country shelved currency convertibility policies in favor of an
independent peso that successive presidents attempted to clamp down
on this through restrictions, the report notes.

Amid fresh financial chaos mere days ago, President Mauricio Macro
was forced to bring in measures to stave off the constant flight of
capital, the report says.

Those who frequent Buenos Aires' financial center have got it
clear: "people are trying to protect themselves with a currency
with which after the crisis they'll have more buying power," said
Santiago, the report adds.

                             About Argentina

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on Sept.
5, 2019, Fitch Ratings has upgraded Argentina's Long-Term
Foreign-and Local-Currency Issuer Default Ratings to 'CC' from
'RD', and its Short-Term Foreign- and Local-Currency IDRs to 'C'
from 'RD'. The issue ratings on Argentina's senior unsecured
foreign-currency bonds remain at 'CC'. Fitch has downgraded the
Country Ceiling to 'CCC' from 'B-'. The rating action follows
several weeks of extreme financial instability triggered by the
adverse market reaction to the results of primary elections on
August 11.

On Sept. 4, 2019, the TCRLA reported that S&P Global Ratings raised
on Aug. 30, 2019, its foreign and local currency sovereign credit
ratings on Argentina to 'CCC-/C' from 'SD'. The outlook on the
long-term ratings is negative. In addition, S&P raised its
short-term issue ratings to 'C' from 'D'. S&P also raised the
national scale rating to 'raCCC-'from 'SD'. S&P said, "The negative
outlook reflects the prominent downside risks to payment of debt on
time and in full per our criteria over the coming months amid very
complex political, economic, and financial market dynamics. S&P
previously lowered its sovereign credit ratings on Argentina to
'SD' from a long-term rating of 'B-' and a short-term rating of 'B'
on Aug. 29, 2019.

On Sept. 3, 2019, the TCRLA reported that Moody's Investors Service
downgraded Argentina's foreign-currency and local-currency
long-term issuer and senior unsecured ratings to Caa2 from B2. The
senior unsecured ratings for shelf registrations were also
downgraded to (P)Caa2 from (P)B2. The outlook on these ratings has
been changed to ratings under review from negative.

Back in July 2014, Argentina defaulted on some of its debt, after
expiration of a 30-day grace period on a US$539 million interest
payment.  Earlier that day, talks with a court-appointed mediator
ended without resolving a standoff between the country and a group
of hedge funds seeking full payment on bonds that the country had
defaulted on in 2001. A U.S. judge had ruled that the interest
payment couldn't be made unless the hedge funds led by Elliott
Management Corp., got the US$1.5 billion they claimed. The country
hasn't been able to access international credit markets since its
US$95 billion default 13 years ago. On March 30, 2016, Argentina's
Congress passed a bill that will allow the government to repay
holders of debt that the South American country defaulted on in
2001, including a group of litigating hedge funds that won
judgments in a New York court. The bill passed by a vote of 54-16.




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B E R M U D A
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GCX LIMITED: Moody's Withdraws Ca CFR for Business Reasons
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service withdrawn GCX Limited's Ca corporate
family rating and negative outlook.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has decided to withdraw the rating for its own business
reasons.

GCX Limited, incorporated in Bermuda in 2014, wholly owns five
subsea cable systems on major data traffic routes, including the
world's largest private undersea cable system spanning more than
68,000 route kms.

GCX provides data connectivity solutions to major
telecommunications carriers and large multinational enterprises in
the US, Europe, Middle East and Asia Pacific with a need for
multinational IP-based solutions and connectivity.

GCX - held through intermediate holding companies Global Cloud
Xchange Limited and Reliance Globalcom BV - is ultimately a wholly
owned subsidiary of Reliance Communications Limited (RCOM).




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B R A Z I L
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BRAZIL: Indebtedness & Consumer Default Rate Remain High in August
------------------------------------------------------------------
The Rio Times Online reports the percentage of Brazilian families
with debts (not necessarily in arrears) reached 64.8 percent in
August, up from 64.1 percent in July this year and 60.7 percent in
August last year, as per a study released on Sept. 13 by the
National Confederation of Commerce of Goods, Services, and Tourism
(CNC).

Meanwhile, defaulters reached 24.3 percent, up from 23.9 percent in
July and 23.8 percent in August, the report notes.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on May
27, 2019, Fitch Ratings has affirmed Brazil's Long-Term
Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB-' with a Stable
Outlook.


BRAZIL: Sao Paulo's Cost of Living Index Rises 1.88% in 8 Months
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Rio Times Online reports that the Cost of Living Index in the
city of Sao Paulo rose 0.07 percent in August.

The inflation index measured by the Intersindical Department of
Statistics and Socioeconomic Studies (DIEESE) registered an
increase of 1.88 percent in the first eight months of 2019 and 3.15
percent in 12 months, according to The Rio Times Online.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on May
27, 2019, Fitch Ratings has affirmed Brazil's Long-Term
Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB-' with a Stable
Outlook.


BRF SA: Fitch Rates Proposed $500MM Sr. Unsec. Notes 'BB'
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned a 'BB' rating to the proposed US$500
million 10-year senior unsecured notes to be issued by BRF S.A.
These senior unsecured notes will rank equally with all of BRF's
existing and future senior and unsecured indebtedness. Proceeds
from the issuance will be used to refinance existing debt,
including the company's senior unsecured notes due in 2020, 2022,
2023 and 2024 and for general corporate purposes.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Expected Deleveraging: Fitch expects net leverage to decline
rapidly in 2019 towards 4.0x resulting from improved EBITDA and FCF
due to a better balance between supply and demand in the domestic
market, higher volumes sold in the foreign markets, solid increase
of average sales prices across all geographies and improved
operational performance, combined with proceeds from asset sales.
BRF's net adjusted debt to EBITDA ratio peaked in 2018 at 6.3x due
to the sharp increase of grain prices that were not offset by price
increases following the shutdown of the Russian pork market to
Brazilian exporters, and the closing of the EU market to BRF during
the middle of the year. BRF's Brazilian operations were also
hindered by a truckers' strike in 2018. Fitch's net adjusted debt
leverage ratios are around 0.6x higher than those reported by BRF
due to the exclusion of restricted cash and long-term investments,
as well as the inclusion of securitized receivables.

Improved Profitability: Fitch expects a sharp increase of BRF's
profitability in 2019 reflecting improved average prices, fewer
price discounts, and increased penetration of sales toward
foodservice segments. Profitability levels will also benefit from
operating efficiencies and moderate raw material cost pressures, as
well as the recovery in BRF's international division, notably Asia,
and the continuing good performance of the Halal segment. BRF
increased its average price by more than 17% y-o-y in 2Q19 at 7.65
BRL/KG (6.52 BRL/KG in 2Q18) and its EBITDA margin reached 14.6% in
2Q19. Adjusted EBITDA improved to BRL1,219 million in 2Q19 compared
to BRL356 million in 2Q18.

Asset Sales Improve Liquidity: BRF undertook various initiatives to
improve liquidity and reduce leverage in 2018 and early 2019. The
company sold its assets in Argentina, Europe, and Thailand, as well
as its plant in Varzea Grande, Mato Grosso, along with several real
estate assets for a total of BRL2.2 billion. BRF also securitized
receivables through a receivables investment fund for a total of
BRL875 million and reduced its inventories of frozen raw materials
and finished products.

Favorable International Protein Outlook: Fitch expects BRF's other
international segments (Asia, Africa, America and Europe)
profitability to improve in 2019 due to higher volumes and better
export prices. BRF increased its average price by 33.2% y-o-y in
2Q19 in its international segments at 7.81 BRL/KG (5.87 BRL/KG in
2Q18) and its EBITDA margin reached 20% in 2Q19. The company
reported an EBITDA of BRL323 million in 2Q19 compared to a loss of
BRL3 million in 2Q18. An outbreak of the African swine fever (ASF)
virus in China has severely hurt pork meat production across the
country. As China represents about half of the world pork product,
the reduction of China's pig herd as a result of this disease will
result in more protein products, including chicken, being directed
from foreign markets in 2019. Fitch expects BRF to benefit from the
ASF in 2H19 due to better volumes and prices to export markets. The
company has nine plants authorized to export to China, of which
seven of poultry and two of pork.

Trapaca Investigation: The company is currently under external
investigation as part of the "Trapaca Operation" that began in
2018. This lead to the suspension of operations for 12 BRF plants
across the EU. The main claims involve alleged misconduct relating
to quality violations, improper use of feed components, and
falsification of tests at certain BRF manufacturing plants and
accredited labs. The legal, marketing and operational costs related
to the Trapaca Operation amounted to BRL42.3 million for the six
months ended on June 30, 2019. These ongoing legal matters create
uncertainty regarding the timing and magnitude of potential fines
the company might face.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

BRF S.A.'s ratings reflect the group's business profile as one of
the largest poultry exporters in the world, solid processed foods
(71% of volumes) and good brand awareness in Brazil with a vast
distribution platform. The company is also a leader in the Halal
market with a market of over 43% in the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) countries.

BRF's ratings are tempered by the company's large exposure to
Brazil. Among the significant industry risks are a downturn in the
economy of a given export market, the imposition of increased
tariffs or sanitary barriers, and strikes or other events that may
affect the availability of ports and transportation. The company
has weaker credit metrics compared with other international peers
that operate with lower net leverage ratios, such as Tyson Foods
Inc. (BBB/Stable), Sigma de Alimentos SA (BBB), Gruma S.A. de C.V.
(BBB), and JBS S.A. (BB). The rating also factors the expectation
that BRF will deleverage rapidly in 2019.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's Key Assumptions Within Its Rating Case for the Issuer

  - High-single-digit revenue growth due to market fundamentals;

  - Net debt/EBITDA trending toward 4x in 2019;

  - No dividends or M&A.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Positive Rating Action

  - Net leverage at or below 3.5x for a sustained period;

  - EBITDA margin at or above 10%;

  - Positive FCF.

Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Negative Rating Action

  - Net debt/EBITDA above 4.5x on a sustained basis;

  - Sustained negative FCF generation;

  - EBITDA margin below 8%;

  - Weak liquidity;

  - A multinotch downgrade of Brazil;

  - Large legal fines that would pressure the company's liquidity
and deleveraging in the near term.

LIQUIDITY

Adequate Liquidity: As of June 30, 2019, BRF had BRL5.8 billion of
cash and cash equivalents and BRL4.8 billion of short-term debt
(mainly trade finance lines). In Fitch's view, the company's
liquidity is adequate since bonds are due starting in 2022. Around
23% of debt is short term. Approximately 51% of the total debt is
foreign currency denominated.

ESG CONSIDERATION:

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of 3 - which means that ESG issues
are credit neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the
entity, either due to their nature or the way in which they are
being managed by the entity.


FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch currently rates BRF as follows:

BRF S.A.:

  -- Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) 'BB';

  -- Long-Term Local Currency IDR 'BB';

  -- National scale rating 'AA+(bra)';

  -- Notes due 2022, 2023, 2024 'BB';

  -- Debentures due in 2022 and 2026 'AA+(bra)'.

BFF International Ltd

  -- Senior unsecured notes due 2020 guaranteed by BRF S.A. 'BB'.

BRF Gmbh
  -- Senior unsecured notes due in 2026 'BB'.

The Rating Outlook is Stable.

Fitch has assigned a 'BB' rating to BRF S.A.'s new proposed senior
unsecured notes.

BRF SA: Moody's Rates Proposed Sr. Unsec. Notes Ba2, Outlook Neg.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a Ba2 rating to BRF S.A. 's
proposed senior unsecured notes. The outlook is negative. BRF will
use the proceeds from the notes offering for liability management
and general corporate purposes.

The rating of the notes assumes that the final transaction
documents will not be materially different from draft legal
documentation reviewed by Moody's to date and assume that these
agreements are legally valid, binding and enforceable.

Ratings assigned:

Issuer: BRF S.A.

Proposed Senior Unsecured Notes: Ba2

RATINGS RATIONALE

The proposed issuance will be BRF's first in cross-border markets
since 2016 and will improve its debt maturity profile. The
transaction will have no material effect on BRF's leverage, as net
proceeds will be used mainly for liability management. The company
plans to refinance part of its $750 million notes due 2020 ($86.1
million outstanding), its $750 million ($118.7 million outstanding)
and EUR 500 million (fully outstanding) notes both due in 2022, its
$500 million (fully outstanding) notes due 2023, and its $750
million (fully outstanding) notes due 2024.

BRF has an adequate liquidity profile, with BRL7 billion in cash
and equivalents at the end of June 2019, which covers all debt
obligations through at least early 2021. The company started to
generate positive free cash flows in 2Q19, after posting negative
free cash flows since 2016. Still, BRF has a tight amortization
schedule, considering that there is about BRL8.9 billion debt due
in 2019-21, represented mostly by cross-border bonds (BRL 1.3
billion), BRL1.5 billion represented by CRAs (certificate of
agribusiness receivables) and BRL6.1 billion working capital lines.
Since the issuance will address part of the bonds maturing from
2020 through 2024, it will help extend the overall tenor of BRF's
debt amortization profile, while Moody's assumes that the bank
lines will be refinanced overtime.

BRF's Ba2 ratings reflect its strong business profile and
leadership in both processed foods in Brazil and global poultry
exports. After a strong deterioration in performance and credit
metrics between 2016-2018, the company's performance is in a clear
path of recovery, which Moody's expects to continue through 2020,
reflecting the rationalization measures already implemented and an
improvement in consumer confidence in Brazil, allowing BRF to focus
on a more profitable mix, along with a moderation in grain price
increases. Besides, the Halal segment, where BRF also has a strong
presence, will continue to post healthy margins, supported by an
improved mix, lower costs and higher volumes. International markets
should also improve, supported by the effect of the African Swine
Fever.

Offsetting these positive attributes are the deteriorated credit
metrics, in particular leverage and coverage metrics, low
geographic diversity in terms of production footprint, and strong
exposure to grain prices and currency volatility, because around
50% of its sales come from chilled and frozen meats and the export
markets. The company's exposure to foreign-exchange volatility is
mitigated by the use of effective hedging strategies.

The negative outlook on BRF's ratings incorporates the company's
currently weak credit metrics for the rating category and its
expectation that a recovery will be only gradual in the next 12-18
months.

An upgrade is unlikely in the short term, but the stabilization of
the ratings would be dependent on a recovery in key credit metrics
and an improvement in the overall business conditions. A downgrade
could result from a deterioration in BRF's liquidity or its
inability to deleverage. A deterioration in the Government of
Brazil's (Ba2 stable) credit quality could hurt BRF's ratings.
Quantitatively, a downgrade could also occur if total adjusted
debt/EBITDA remains above 3.5x on a sustained basis, EBITA/interest
expenses ratio remains below 2.0x and cash flow from operations/net
debt stays below 25%.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Protein and
Agriculture published in May 2019.

BRF S.A. is one of the largest food conglomerates globally and
posted consolidated net revenue of BRL31.8 billion ($8.3 billion,
considering average exchange rate) for the twelve months ending in
June 2019. Processed food and food services, which typically
generate higher and less volatile margins than the chilled and
frozen protein export business, represented over 60% of net
revenue. The company operates in 37 plants and 47 distribution
centers in the world, exports to more than 140 countries and has a
leading position in global poultry exports.



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D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Weekly Losses of US$500,000 for Banana Growers
------------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that losses as high as US$500,000 per week
punish banana producers  in the Dominican Republic due to the
drought that affects the country.

This situation has caused producers to go from producing 450
truckloads of bananas to as low as 400 weekly, according to Rafael
Sosa, a member of the Banana Producers Association, according to
Dominican Today.

Sosa told El Dia that a month ago the banana farmers of the
northwest were in a critical situation, but that these days it has
rained and improved a little, the report notes.

"The authorities are in contradiction with the irrigation boards,
especially with the authorities of the National Institute of
Hydraulic Resources, who like to proselytize with water," Sosa
said, the report says.

Standard & Poor's credit rating for Dominican Republic stands at
BB- with stable outlook (2015). Moody's credit rating for
Dominican Republic was last set at Ba3 with stable outlook (2017).
Fitch's credit rating for Dominican Republic was last reported at
BB- with stable outlook (2016).




=====================
E L   S A L V A D O R
=====================

SALVADORENO DPR: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on 3 Series 2015 Loans
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirmed Salvadoreno DPR Funding Ltd's Series 2015
Loans at 'BB' with a Stable Rating Outlook. The future flow program
is backed by existing and future U.S. dollar-denominated DPRs
originated by Davivienda Sal. The majority of DPRs are processed by
designated depositary banks (DDBs) that have signed acknowledgement
agreements (AAs) irrevocably obligating the DDBs to send DPRs to an
offshore account controlled by the trustee.

Fitch's ratings address timely payment of interest and principal on
a quarterly basis.

Salvadoreno DPR Funding, Ltd.
   
2015-1; LT BB Affirmed; previously at BB

2015-2; LT BB Affirmed; previously at BB

2015-3; LT BB Affirmed; previously at BB

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Originator's Credit Quality: In March 2019, Fitch affirmed Banco
Davivienda Salvadoreno, S.A.'s (Davivienda Sal) Long-Term (LT)
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B'. The Rating Outlook is Stable.
Fitch also affirmed the bank's Short-Term IDR at 'B' and its
Viability Rating (VR) at 'b-'. The LT IDR of Davivienda Sal
reflects the potential support from its shareholder Banco
Davivienda, S.A. (Davivienda; BBB/Negative).

Going Concern Assessment (GCA): Fitch assigned Davivienda Sal a
going concern assessment (GCA) score of 'GC2' based on the bank's
moderate systemic importance and the strong likelihood of parent
support. The agency tempers notching uplift for future flow
transactions originated by sponsors with support-driven ratings;
the DPR ratings are currently three notches above Davivienda Sal's
support-driven LT IDR.

Uplift from LT IDR: At the end of August 2019, Davivienda Sal's
total outstanding future flow debt (FF) represented around 4.65% of
the bank's consolidated liabilities and 18% of non-deposit funding.
Fitch considers these ratios small enough to differentiate the
credit quality of the transaction from the originator's LT IDR, but
the maximum uplift is tempered for the reasons described.

The reported quarterly maximum debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
has been close to 40x on average since the 2015 issuance. This
moderate coverage level is in line with Fitch's expectations.

Potential Redirection/Diversion Risk: The structure mitigates
certain sovereign risks by collecting cash flows offshore until the
collection of the periodic debt service amount. Fitch believes
diversion risk is partially mitigated by the acknowledgments signed
by designated depositary banks (DDBs).

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The future flow ratings are sensitive to changes in the credit
quality of Davividenda Sal, the ability of the DPR business line to
continue operating (as reflected by the GCA score) and the
performance of the DPR program. A downgrade of the bank's IDRs may
trigger a downgrade to the future flow ratings. In addition, severe
reductions in coverage levels or an increase in the level of future
flow debt as a percentage of the bank's liabilities could result in
rating downgrades.



===========
M E X I C O
===========

GRUPO FAMSA: Fitch Affirms B- IDR; Alters Outlook to Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Grupo Famsa, S.A.B. de C.V.'s ratings
and revised the Rating Outlook to Stable from Positive.

The revision of the Outlook to Stable from Positive reflects that
Famsa's financial results are below Fitch's expectations and that
potential profitability and operational improvements will take
longer than the next 12 months to achieve given Mexico's current
economic scenario. The Stable Outlook incorporates Fitch's
expectation that FAMSA will be able to refinance its senior notes
maturity for USD140 million before the end of 2019. Inability to
refinance this maturity before year-end would pressure liquidity
and result in negative rating actions.

The affirmation of the IDR is supported by Famsa's market position
within the Mexican retail sector, the relatively stable operating
cash flow generated by the Mexican retail operation and Fitch's
confidence in Famsa's ability to improve its U.S operating
results.

Fitch expects the company's FCF to remain neutral to positive for
the short to medium term. Furthermore, Fitch forecasts a Debt to
EBITDA (excluding banking deposits and operating leases related
debt) ratio close to 6.0x at end-2019, which is high for the
rating. Fitch expects Famsa to continue receiving, as scheduled,
significant additional payments from the collection rights to its
main shareholder, Humberto Garza Gonzalez. These proceeds are
expected to be directed toward repaying debt.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Results Below Expectations: Famsa has taken actions to improve
profitability and liquidity since 2017, such as improving
origination standards, reducing expenses, executing
maintenance-only capex and carrying out selective store closings.
The company also refinanced an important portion of its short-term
debt during 2017 and 2018.

These initiatives have not been enough to significantly improve
consolidated profitability and therefore reduce leverage, as
originally expected. An increasingly challenged competitive
environment along with a still weak portfolio quality and weaker
than expected results in U.S. operations have impeded Famsa's
efforts to reduce leverage. At Dec. 31, 2018, the company's debt
(excluding banking deposits and pre-IFRS16) to EBITDA ratio was
5.7x, higher than Fitch's expectations of less than 5.0x.

Sluggish Economic Environment in Mexico: During the past two years,
Mexico was affected by a weak and volatile peso as well as high
interest rates. Fitch believes the economic environment for 2019
will remain soft given lower investments and lower GDP growth
expectations. Consumer spending has slowed but has not reached the
levels of past economic slowdowns yet.

Fitch believes that in a case where a revenue slowdown takes place,
Famsa would be more vulnerable than its peers due to its high
leverage and limited financial flexibility. However, the company
has the option of managing its working capital inflows by adjusting
the pace of originations/collections in its credit business.

Fair Performance of Mexican Retail Sales: During the first half of
2019, Mexican retail sales performed well with an 11.2% increase
compared to the same period of 2018. The company is making efforts
to improve its commercial proposal by the use of digital tools for
its door-to-door sales, promotions to boost the repeat purchase
rate, and appointment of a new Director of Operations with
experience in strategic approach. Famsa's main challenge is to
retain market share and profitability amid the highly competitive
environment in Mexico and expectations of a slowdown in national
consumption.

Banco Famsa Supports Famsa's Business Model: The linkage between
Famsa's retail business and the financial division, Banco Famsa
(BAF), is strong as both depend on one another to complete service
offerings to customers. BAF has good brand equity and a good
competitive position in consumer finance, mainly in northeastern
Mexico. BAF's financial performance is constrained by high funding
costs and high loan impairment charges, which limit profitability
and internal capital generation.

Given BAF's ambitious growth strategy, the institution has required
consistent capital injections from Famsa. During 2016-2018, Famsa
made average capital increases of more than MXN400 million annually
to BAF. One of BAF's main strengths is its diversified and
relatively stable and resilient base of customer deposits. BAF also
shows organic growth in its loan portfolio, although its customers'
sensitivity to weak economic environments remains a limiting
factor.

U.S. Operations Still Pressured: Same-store sales at Famsa's U.S.
stores decreased the last three years beyond the company's
expectations, but this trend seems to be stabilizing and for the
first time since 2016 this operation presented positive EBITDA
during the first half of 2019. For the LTM ended June 30, 2019,
revenue from U.S. operations was MXN1.7 billion, down from MXN1.8
billion in 2017, mainly due to the closing of unprofitable stores
and less traffic. During the past few years U.S. operations have
been challenged by U.S. migration policy that negatively affects
Famsa's target market of U.S. Hispanic customers. The company
restructured these operations and is redirecting its commercial
strategy by targeting second- and third-generation Hispanics and
improving its social media presence.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Grupo Famsa's business risk profile is closer to the upper level of
the 'B' category when compared to peers. Grupo Famsa is less
geographically diversified than Grupo Elektra S.A.B. de C.V.
(BB+/Stable) and Grupo Unicomer Company Limited (BB-/Stable), but
it is well positioned in its influence area of northern Mexico. The
company also has smaller scale in number of stores than Grupo
Elektra and Grupo Unicomer, with 401 stores compared to more than
1,000.

From a financial risk profile view, Grupo Famsa leans towards the
low-level of the 'B' category when compared to peers. The company
has slightly similar adjusted leverage than J.C. Penney (JCP,
B-/Stable) and Rite Aid (B/Negative) with ratios of around 6.0x
versus the U.S. peers adjusted leverage ratios in the low-7.0
range. The three companies present neutral to negative FCF, but JCP
and Rite Aid have stronger liquidity position than Famsa's. On the
other hand, Famsa has higher profitability margins than JCP and
Rite Aid, and the prospects for the retail industry in Mexico are
stronger than in the U.S.

Compared with Latin American peers, the company maintains a weaker
financial position than Elektra and Unicomer. Grupo Famsa's
operating margins are lower than Unicomer's, while Elektra has the
best operating margins of the three companies.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's Key Assumptions Within Its Rating Case for the Issuer
Consolidated revenues grow 5.2% on average annually during
2019-2022;

Average EBITDA margin of 8.4% during 2019-2022;

EBITDA from the U.S. division recovers to 3% in 2019 and around 7%
in 2020-2022;

Average cash flow from operations of MXN0.5 billion per year for
2019-2022;

Consolidated debt (excluding bank deposits and operating leasings)
of MXN9.3 billion in average for 2019-2020;

The company refinances the remaining balance of its senior notes
due in 2020;

Average capex of MXN233 million during 2019-2022;

No dividend payments for 2018-2021;

Famsa receives MXN0.5 billion per year from Mr. Garza's guarantee
during 2019-2021;

BAF issues MXN0.5 billion of subordinated bonds per year during
2019 and 2020 to support its growth strategy and comply with
capital requirements.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Positive Rating Action

Developments that eventually may improve the company's credit
quality are:

Improvements in debt maturity profile;

Sustained reduction in consolidated total gross debt to EBITDA
(excluding deposits) to 5.0x or below;

Progress in the cash collection of Mr. Garza's pending guarantee;
A sustained recovery of U.S. operations;

Lower currency mismatch between debt and cash flows;

Decreasing capital injections from Famsa to BAF;

Continued strengthening of the consolidated credit portfolio's
quality.

Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Negative Rating Action

Failure to refinance the Senior Notes outstanding balance as per
the company's plan communicated to Fitch (before the end of 2019);
Additional or unexpected weaknesses in internal operating
controls;

Deterioration in BAF's creditworthiness beyond Famsa's ability to
lend support;

Failure to receive significant additional payments from Mr. Garza's
guarantee;

Consolidated gross debt to EBITDA (excluding bank deposits)
consistently above 6.5x;

Lower than expected EBITDA generation by Famsa USA;

Sustained deterioration in the quality of the consolidated loan
portfolio.

LIQUIDITY

Tight Liquidity: Famsa's liquidity is challenged by the large debt
maturity of USD140 million (app. MXN2.7 billion) due in May 2020,
against a cash balance of MXN1.8 billion, mostly at BAF.

To refinance part of the Senior Notes, Famsa signed a credit
agreement with Multiva for MXN0.5 billion. This new credit has a
seven-year term, interest of TIIE + 3%, and maturities start in
2022. The company relies on its negotiations with banks and
proceeds from Mr. Garza's collection rights to refinance the
remaining portion of the notes.

Famsa's short-term debt mostly consists of its senior notes
maturing in May 2020, short-term Cebures issuances, which the
company has been able to roll over, and short-term bank loans.

Recovery Analysis

For issuers with Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) of 'B+' and below,
Fitch performs a recovery analysis for each class of obligations of
the issuer. The issue rating is derived from the IDR and the
relevant Recovery Rating (RR) and notching, based on the going
concern enterprise value of a distressed scenario or the company's
liquidation value.

The recovery analysis assumes that Famsa would be considered a
going-concern in bankruptcy and that the company would be
reorganized rather than liquidated. Fitch has assumed a 10%
administrative claim.

Fitch's recovery analysis for Famsa places a going concern value
under a distressed scenario of approximately
MXN5.6 billion; based on a going-concern EBITDA of MXN1.0 billion
and a 5.5x multiple. The going concern value is higher than the
liquidation value, which Fitch estimates at about MXN2.0 billion.

The going-concern EBITDA estimate reflects Fitch's view of a
sustainable, post-reorganization EBITDA level upon which Fitch base
the valuation of the company. The MXN1.0 billion going-concern
EBITDA assumption reflects a 30% discount from average annual
EBITDA generation in the last six years. The discount reflects
deterioration of U.S. operations and, at the same time, a
significant consumer contraction in Mexico. The 5.5x multiple is
the median multiple for retail going-concern reorganizations.

The liquidation value considers no value for cash due to the
assumption that cash dissipates during or before the bankruptcy.
Fitch applied a 100% discount on the credit portfolio, given that
most of it is allocated within BAF, which is a regulated entity and
has another liquidation process. Fitch has also applied a 50%
discount on inventory and PPE as a proxy for the liquidation value
of those assets.

With these calculations, Famsa's waterfall results in a Recovery
Rating of 'RR3' for the senior unsecured debt. However, according
to Fitch's Country-Specific Treatment of Recovery Ratings Criteria,
published in March 2018, the Recovery Rating for Mexican corporate
issuers is capped at 'RR4', constraining the upward notching of
issue ratings in countries with a less reliable legal environment.
Therefore, the Recovery Rating for Famsa's unsecured senior notes
is 'RR4'.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of 3. ESG issues are credit neutral
or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity, either due to
their nature or the way in which they are being managed by the
entity.

Grupo Famsa has an ESG Relevance Score of 5 for Management Strategy
due to the number of operational restructures that have occurred
due to challenges the company has faced in implementing its
strategy, which has a negative impact on the credit profile and is
highly relevant to the rating in conjunction with other factors.

Famsa has an ESG Relevance Score of 4 for Governance Structure due
to board effectiveness and ownership concentration, which has an
unfavorable impact on the credit profile and is relevant to the
rating in conjunction with other factors.

Famsa has an ESG Relevance Score of 4 for Group Structure given
that the company presents a below average transparency of
related-party transactions. This has a negative impact on the
credit profile and is relevant to the rating in conjunction with
other factors.

Famsa has an ESG Relevance Score of 5 for Financial Transparency
due to a track record of material differences from audited
financial statements and the company's reported figures. This has a
negative impact on the credit profile and is highly relevant to the
rating in conjunction with other factors.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

Grupo Famsa S.A.B. de C.V.

  -- Long-Term, Foreign- and Local-Currency IDRs at 'B-', Outlook
revised to Stable from Positive;

  -- Long-term National rating at 'BB(mex)', Outlook revised to
Stable from Positive;

  -- Short-term National rating at 'B(mex);

  -- USD140 million senior unsecured notes due in 2020 at
'B-'/'RR4';

  -- MXN0.5 billion short-term Certificados Bursatiles program at
'B(mex)';

  -- MXN1.0 billion short-term Certificados Bursatiles program at
'B(mex)'.

PETROLEOS MEXICANOS: Fitch Rates Proposed Debt Issuance 'BB+'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings assigns long-term ratings of 'BB+' to Petroleos
Mexicanos' announced transactions to be issued in three tranches
with seven-, 10- and 30-year maturities. PEMEX expects to use the
proceeds from the issuance, together with an announced USD5 billion
capital injection from the Mexican government, to repay revolving
credit facilities and to launch a cash tender offer for any-and-all
outstanding amount of select notes with maturities between 2020 and
2023 in order to improve the company's liquidity and amortization
profile over the medium term. PEMEX also expects to launch in the
coming days an exchange offer targeting USD denominated notes with
maturities between 2022 and 2048 to be exchanged for the proposed
notes through a reopening.

Successful completion of this transaction will bolster PEMEX's
liquidity profile by reducing short-term debt, increasing
availability under its committed revolving lines of credit (RCF)
and smoothing medium-term maturities. The announced USD5 billion
capital injections is in line with Fitch's assumptions incorporates
on PEMEX's 'BB+' rating that the company will receive necessary
support from the government to ensure adequate liquidity and debt
service payments with this new issue. PEMEX intends to repay drawn
RCFs, which Fitch expect will remain available after repayment and
will support the company's liquidity going forward as the ensuing
amortization profile following the proposed transaction could range
between USD6 and USD7 billion per year between 2020 and 2023,
depending on the actual tender notes.

Despite the announced USD5 billion capital injection, Fitch
continues to assess the Mexican government's support-track record
as "moderate" given the ongoing heavy tax burden for the company,
which has historically limit PEMEX's reinvestment capacity. Total
support from the Mexican government towards PEMEX in 2019 may total
approximately USD9.5 billion after the capital injection and
provided the company is able to realize 100% of the tax benefits
the Mexican government extended to PEMEX for 2019. This support
compares with approximately USD27 billion of transfers from PEMEX
to the Mexican government in 2018 in the form of taxes, duties and
others. Mexico has announced additional support measures for PEMEX
for 2020 and 2021, which could amount to approximately USD11.4 in
total for both years. PEMEX is expected to partially use some
proceeds from these announced support measures to fund increased
investments in its downstream business.

PEMEX's standalone credit profile (SCP) is commensurate with a
'ccc' as a result of the company's weak capital structure resulting
from its elevated leverage. Fitch's assessment of the government's
incentive to support the company are currently "strong", which
together with the 'ccc' SCP, "very strong" ownership and control
and "moderate" support track record result in PEMEX's rating being
two notches below those of Mexico(IDR BBB/Stable) in accordance
with Fitch's Government-Related Entities (GRE) Criteria.

PEMEX's Negative Outlook reflects the potential for further
deterioration of the company's SCP to below 'ccc'. Although PEMEX
has implemented some cost cutting measures and received moderate
tax cuts from Mexico, the company continues to severely underinvest
in its upstream business, which could lead to further production
and reserves decline. The very high level of transfers from PEMEX
to the Mexican government continues to significantly pressure
PEMEX's cash flow generation and reinvestment ability and weaken
its SCP.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Strong Government Linkage: Although Fitch's assessment of the
strength of the linkage between PEMEX and the government was
revised downward this year as a result of the SCP deterioration,
Fitch continues to expect the government to ensure PEMEX maintains
a robust liquidity position to service debt, which supports the
material rating uplift from the SCP. PEMEX's linkage to the Mexican
government results from strong incentives to support the company
given the socio-political and financial consequences a PEMEX
default would have for the country. PEMEX is Mexico's largest
company and one of the government's major sources of funds,
historically contributing between 25% and 30% of government
revenues.

Transfers Weaken SCP: PEMEX's deteriorating SCP is primarily the
result of excessive distributions to the government. The company's
contributions to Mexico averaged approximately 10% of government
revenues or approximately USD27 billion) in 2018. Transfers from
PEMEX to the government remain high in relation to the company's
cash flow generation, and during the past five years transfers to
the government averaged 45% of sales, or more than 80% of adjusted
EBITDA. As a result, the company's balance sheet has steadily
weakened with a significant increase in debt and negative equity
since year-end 2009. PEMEX's debt lacks an explicit guarantee from
the Mexican government.

Strategic Importance for Energy Security: Linkage to the sovereign
stems from the company's strategic importance in supplying liquid
fuels to Mexico. A financial crisis at the oil company would have
very strong socio-political consequences for Mexico as it could
potentially disrupt the country's liquid fuel supply. Mexico is a
net importer of liquid fuels as a result of continued production
decline. The country relies on PEMEX for virtually all the supply
of gasoline and diesel, of which approximately two thirds come from
imports. A financial distress at PEMEX could also have very strong
financial consequences for the Mexican government and other GREs,
especially regarding their access to funding.

Moderate Government Support: Fitch considers Mexico's support of
PEMEX moderate, and it reflects modest capital injections, support
for pension liabilities and marginal tax reductions. This moderate
support assessment reflects the high level of transfers from the
company to the government. Fitch expects the government to execute
more meaningful supportive actions when needed; for example the
announced USD5 billion capital injection to bolster liquidity.
Total support for PEMEX in 2019 could amount to USD9.5 billion
after this injection and other support measures executed earlier in
the year. In the past, the company has also received other capital
injections for different purposes, and Fitch expects the Mexican
government to continue ensuring PEMEX has strong liquidity position
to service debt.

Deteriorating Underlying Credit Quality: PEMEX's SCP would be in
line with a Long-Term IDR of 'ccc' if it were not owned by the
state and if the government did not provide financial support.
PEMEX's SCP could continue deteriorating if the Mexican government
continues extracting large amounts of funds from the company,
resulting in weak FFO, negative FCF and increasing leverage. The
company's SCP could also continue deteriorating as a result of a
change in strategy that materially increases downstream capex,
especially if at the expense of lowering upstream Capex and/or
increasing leverage. During the LTM ended June 30, 2019, PEMEX
reported an adjusted EBITDA before net pension expenses of USD23
billion and negative Fitch defined FFO, while total financial debt
amounted to USD104 billion.

Weak Post-tax Credit Metrics: Although PEMEX reports moderately
solid pre-tax credit metrics, its post-tax credit protection
metrics are weak as a result of high transfers to the federal
government. As of the LTM ended June. 30, 2019, PEMEX reported a
Fitch calculated FFO adjusted leverage of roughly 22x. PEMEX's
total debt-to-proved reserves (1P) have deteriorated to around
USD15/boe as of year-end 2018 from USD9.2/boe in 2015.

Continued Upstream Underinvestment: Fitch expects production and
hydrocarbon reserves to continue declining over the medium term in
line with recent history as current and projected Capex is likely
to be insufficient to replenish reserves. Fitch estimates PEMEX
will require annual capex of around USD13 billion to USD18 billion
to replenish reserves. This is based on a finding, development and
acquisition cost (FD&A) estimate of between USD13/boe to USD18/boe.
Fitch estimates production could decline 5% per year over the next
few years, in line with historical trends. Recent discoveries,
namely Ixachi, which added an estimated 1.3bn boe of 3P reserves,
may help offset somewhat the company's production and reserve
decline but are not enough to reverse the declining trend.

Weak Corporate Governance: Fitch considers PEMEX's corporate
governance weak given the continued high level of government
interference in the company's strategy, financing and management
changes with changes in administration.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

PEMEX's linkage to the sovereign compares unfavorably with that of
Petrobras (BB-/Stable), Ecopetrol (BBB/Negative), Enap (A/Stable)
and Petroperu (BBB+/Stable). All of PEMEX's regional peers have
strong linkage to their respective sovereigns as a result of strong
government support. In Fitch's view, all governments in the region,
except for Mexico, have implemented different measures to ensure
the SCPs of their respective national oil and gas companies (NOCs)
remain viable in the long term.

PEMEX's ratings continue to reflect its close, albeit
deteriorating, linkage to the government of Mexico and the
company's fiscal importance to the sovereign and strategic
importance to the country. PEMEX's ratings also reflect the
company's competitive pre-tax cost structure, national and
export-oriented profile, sizable hydrocarbon reserves and its
strong domestic market position. The ratings are constrained by
PEMEX's substantial tax burden, high leverage, significant unfunded
pension liabilities, large capital investment requirements,
negative equity and exposure to political interference risk.

Fitch views PEMEX's SCP as commensurate with a 'ccc' rating, which
is seven notches below Petrobras' SCP of 'BB+' and nine notches
below Ecopetrol's SCP of 'BBB'. These differences are primarily due
to PEMEX's weaker capital structure and increasing debt and
leverage trajectory. PEMEX's SCP of 'ccc' reflects the company's
burdensome transfers to Mexico's federal government; its large and
increasing financial debt balance when compared with 1P reserves;
elevated FFO Adjusted leverage; and its decreasing production and
reserves trend. In comparison, Ecopetrol and Petrobras have
significantly strengthened their capital structure and maintain
stable operating profiles.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

  -- Average West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude prices of
USD57.5/bbl in 2019 and USD55/bbl in the long term:

  -- Upstream capex continues in line with the last three years
average;

  -- Production declines by 5% per year over the next few years;

  -- PEMEX will receive necessary support from the government to
ensure adequate liquidity and debt service payments.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Although not expected in the short term, developments that may,
individually or collectively, lead to positive rating action for
PEMEX include:

  -- An upgrade of Mexico's sovereign ratings;

  -- An irrevocable guarantee from Mexico's government sovereign of
sustainably more than 75% of PEMEX's debt;

  -- A material capitalization coupled with a material reduction of
PEMEX taxes together with a business plan that results in neutral
to positive FCF through the cycle, while implementing a sustainable
upstream capex that is sufficient to replace 100% of reserve and
stabilize production profitably;

  -- A sustainable FFO adjusted leverage below 5x.

PEMEX's Outlook could stabilize through material cost savings and
tax reductions that allow the company to have neutral to positive
FCF through the cycle, while implementing a sustainable upstream
capex that is sufficient to replace 100% of reserve and stabilize
production profitably.

Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Negative Rating Action for PEMEX include:

  -- Although not expected in the short term, a downgrade of
Mexico's sovereign rating;

  -- A sustained deterioration of PEMEX's financial flexibility
coupled with government inaction to support liquidity. This could
result from continued negative FCF and/or a material reduction of
the company's cash on hand, credit facilities and/or restricted
capital markets access;

  -- A FFO adjusted leverage materially above 8x and total debt to
1P reserve significantly higher than USD15/boe;

  -- A continued deterioration of the company's SCP to below the
current 'ccc' assessment, which could result if the company fails
to stabilize production and continues with unsustainable reserves
replacement ratios and negative FCF.

LIQUIDITY

Tight Liquidity to Improve After Proposed Issuance: As of June 20,
2019, PEMEX reported low liquidity with cash on hand of USD2.3
billion, or MXN44.4 billion, which compares with USD14.5 billion of
short-term debt, or MXN279.0 billion, including accrued interest.
PEMEX's recent USD8 billion of bank debt refinancing illustrates
continued access to funding but the liquidity ratio remains low for
a second consecutive quarter. PEMEX's availability and undrawn
committed lines of credit were USD3.4 billion or MXN64.9 billion.
The announced transaction is expected to bolster the company's
liquidity, although cash on hand will likely remain low throughout
2019 while available RCFs will increase to approximately USD8.4
billion. Liquidity is further bolstered by a robust pre-tax cash
flow generation supported by a competitive operational cost
structure.

ESG Considerations

Unless otherwise disclosed in the section, the highest level of ESG
credit relevance is a score of 3. ESG issues are credit-neutral or
have only a minimal credit impact on the entity, either due to
their nature or to the way in which they are being managed by the
entity.

PEMEX has an ESG Relevance Score of 4 for Community Relations &
Social Access (SCR) as oil and gas production companies are
typically exposed to social and community relationship issues in
their area of influence.

PEMEX has an ESG Relevance Score of 4 for Governance Structure
(GGV) resulting from its nature as a majority government owned
entity and the inherent governance risk that arise with a dominant
state shareholder.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch currently rates Petroleos Mexicanos as follows:

  -- Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) 'BB+';
Outlook Negative;

  -- Long-Term Local Currency IDR 'BB+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- National Scale Long-term Rating 'AA(mex)'; Outlook Negative;

  -- National Scale long-term senior unsecured notes 'AA(mex);

  -- National Scale Short-Term Rating notes 'F1+(mex)';

  -- Notes outstanding in foreign currency 'BB+';

  -- Notes outstanding in local currency 'BB+'.



=====================
P U E R T O   R I C O
=====================

AMERICAN TOOLS: Voluntary Chapter 11 Case Summary
-------------------------------------------------
Debtor: American Tools, Inc.
        PO Box 2317
        Guaynabo, PR 00970

Case No.: 19-05202

Business Description: American Tools, Inc. is engaged  in the
                      manufacturing of custom sheet metal
                      products in its physical facilities
                      located in Bayamon, Puerto Rico.  The
                      Debtor's business has been focused in
                      certain specialized industries such as
                      pharmaceutical, medical devices,
                      aeronautical, telecommunications,
                      electronics, military and restaurants
                      industries.  The Debtor previously sought
                      bankruptcy protection on Oct. 7, 2016
                      (Bankr. D. P.R. Case No. 16-08071).

Chapter 11 Petition Date: September 11, 2019

Court: United States Bankruptcy Court
       District of Puerto Rico (Old San Juan)

Judge: Hon. Brian K. Tester

Debtor's Counsel: Jesus Enrique Batista Sanchez, Esq.
                  THE BATISTA LAW GROUP, PSC
                  420 Ave Ponce de Leon
                  San Juan, PR 00918-3416
                  Tel: 787-620-2856
                  Fax: 787-620-2854
                  Email: jeb@batistasanchez.com

Estimated Assets: $0 to $50,000

Estimated Liabilities: $1 million to $10 million

The petition was signed by Armando Cepeda, president.

The Debtor failed to include in the petition a list of its 20
largest unsecured creditors.

A full-text copy of the petition is available for free at:

           http://bankrupt.com/misc/prb19-05202.pdf


PUERTO RICO: FEMA Official, Contaractor Charged Over Grid Repairs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Andrew Scurria, writing for The Wall Street Journal, reported that
federal prosecutors indicted Ahsha Tribble, a FEMA deputy regional
administrator who supervised the relief efforts following Hurricane
Maria, and Keith Ellison, former president of Cobra Acquisitions
LLC, a unit of Mammoth Energy Services Inc. -- charging them with
corruption in connection with repairs to the U.S. territory's
hurricane-ravaged electric grid.

According to the report, the U.S. Attorney's Office in Puerto Rico
filed fraud and conspiracy charges surrounding Cobra that billed
more than $1.4 billion turning Puerto Rico's lights back on after
its electrical system was destroyed by Hurricane Maria.

The indictment reached into the highest levels of the government
response to Puerto Rico's post-hurricane blackout, which left some
parts of the island without electricity for 11 months and
contributed to a death toll that Harvard University researchers
estimated at more than 4,600, the report related.

Mr. Ellison was charged with providing her various "things of
value" in return for special treatment, which included hotel
accommodations, use of a helicopter, airfare, personal security and
a credit card, the Journal related.

William Leone, Esq., an attorney for Mr. Ellison, told the Journal
there was "nothing corrupt, improper or illegal" about his
relationship with Ms. Tribble.

"The indictment strains to convert ordinary friendship between
people working long hours under stressful conditions into a crime,"
Mr. Leone further told the Journal.  "We look forward to getting
into a court where Mr. Ellison can clear his name of these
meritless charges."

Bridget Moore, Esq., an attorney for Ms. Tribble, told the Journal
she looked forward to vindicating her client and "bringing to light
the details of how this investigation has been handled by the
government."

                        About Puerto Rico

Puerto Rico is a self-governing commonwealth in association with
the United States that's facing a massive bond debt of $70 billion,
a 68% debt-to-GDP ratio and negative economic growth in nine of the
last 10 years.

The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has sought bankruptcy protection,
aiming to restructure its massive $74 billion debt-load and $49
billion in pension obligations.

The debt restructuring petition was filed by Puerto Rico's
financial oversight board in U.S. District Court in Puerto Rico
(Case No. 17-01578) on May 3, 2017, and was made under Title III of
2016's U.S. Congressional rescue law known as the Puerto Rico
Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act ('PROMESA').

The Financial Oversight and Management Board later commenced Title
III cases for the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation
(COFINA) on May 5, 2017, and the Employees Retirement System (ERS)
and the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (HTA) on
May 21, 2017.  On July 2, 2017, a Title III case was commenced for
the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority ("PREPA").

U.S. Chief Justice John Roberts has appointed U.S. District Judge
Laura Taylor Swain to oversee the Title III cases.  The Honorable
Judith Dein, a United States Magistrate Judge for the District of
Massachusetts, has been designated to preside over matters that may
be referred to her by Judge Swain, including discovery disputes,
and management of other pretrial proceedings.

Joint administration of the Title III cases, under Lead Case No.
17-3283, was granted on June 29, 2017.

The Oversight Board has hired as advisors, Proskauer Rose LLP and
O'Neill & Borges LLC as legal counsel, McKinsey & Co. as strategic
consultant, Citigroup Global Markets, as municipal investment
banker, and Ernst & Young, as financial advisor.

Martin J. Bienenstock, Esq., Scott K. Rutsky, Esq., and Philip M.
Abelson, Esq., of Proskauer Rose; and Hermann D. Bauer, Esq., at
O'Neill & Borges are on-board as attorneys.

McKinsey & Co. is the Board's strategic consultant, Ernst & Young
is the Board's financial advisor, and Citigroup Global Markets Inc.
is the Board's municipal investment banker.

Prime Clerk LLC is the claims and noticing agent.  Prime Clerk
maintains a case web site at
https://cases.primeclerk.com/puertorico

Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC is the service agent for ERS, HTA,
and PREPA.

O'Melveny & Myers LLP is counsel to the Commonwealth's Puerto Rico
Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority (AAFAF), the agency
responsible for negotiations with bondholders.

The Oversight Board named Professor Nancy B. Rapoport as fee
examiner and to chair a committee to review professionals' fees.

                    Bondholders' Attorneys

Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP and Toro, Colon, Mullet, Rivera
& Sifre, P.S.C. and serve as counsel to the Mutual Fund Group,
comprised of mutual funds managed by Oppenheimer Funds, Inc., and
the First Puerto Rico Family of Funds, which collectively hold over
$4.4 billion of GO Bonds, COFINA Bonds, and other bonds issued by
Puerto Rico and other instrumentalities.

White & Case LLP and Lopez Sanchez & Pirillo LLC represent the UBS
Family of Funds and the Puerto Rico Family of Funds, which hold
$613.3 million in COFINA bonds.

Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, Robbins, Russell,
Englert, Orseck, Untereiner & Sauber LLP, and Jimenez, Graffam &
Lausell are co-counsel to the ad hoc group of General Obligation
Bondholders, comprised of Aurelius Capital Management, LP, Autonomy
Capital (Jersey) LP, FCO Advisors LP, and Monarch Alternative
Capital LP.

Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP and Reichard & Escalera are
co-counsel to the ad hoc coalition of holders of senior bonds
issued by COFINA, comprised of at least 30 institutional holders,
including Canyon Capital Advisors LLC and Varde Investment
Partners, L.P.

Correa Acevedo & Abesada Law Offices, P.S.C., is counsel to Canyon
Capital Advisors, LLC, River Canyon Fund Management, LLC, Davidson
Kempner Capital Management LP, OZ Management, LP, and OZ Management
II LP (the QTCB Noteholder Group).

                          Committees

The U.S. Trustee formed an official committee of retirees and an
official committee of unsecured creditors of the Commonwealth.  The
Retiree Committee tapped Jenner & Block LLP and Bennazar, Garcia &
Milian, C.S.P., as its attorneys.  The Creditors Committee tapped
Paul Hastings LLP and O'Neill & Gilmore LLC as counsel.


PUERTO RICO: Major Plan for Core Gov't Debt Coming This Month
-------------------------------------------------------------
Luis Valentin Ortiz at Reuters reports that a long-awaited plan to
restructure Puerto Rico's core government debt will finally be
filed in court later this month, an attorney for the bankrupt U.S.
commonwealth's federally created financial oversight board told a
federal judge.

Martin Bienenstock said the latest delay was due to political
turmoil on the island that led to last month's resignation of
Governor Ricardo Rossello, who was eventually replaced by Wanda
Vazquez, according to Reuters.

He said while the board expected to file a plan in August, it held
off because "it would have jammed" the new governor, who took
office on Aug. 7, the report notes.

Reuters says that the board had signaled it could file a plan of
adjustment covering roughly $13 billion of bonds and almost $50
billion of unfunded pension obligations as early as April, then set
subsequent but vague deadlines in the following months.

Puerto Rico entered bankruptcy in May 2017 to restructure $120
billion of debt and pension obligations.

Bienenstock said "the relationship between the new government and
the oversight board is positive," the report notes.  Vazquez, who
had been Puerto Rico's justice secretary, has been meeting with
oversight board officials, the report says.  Her predecessor,
Rossello, had been at odds with the board over spending priorities
and other matters, including proposed pension cuts, the report
notes.

Earlier this year, the board asked U.S. District Court Judge Laura
Taylor Swain, who is hearing the island's bankruptcy cases, to void
billions of dollars of general obligation bonds, the report
recalls.  It also sued certain bondholders to recoup debt service
payments and Wall Street banks and firms that participated in debt
issuances, the report notes.

The board in June announced deals with some creditors over recovery
rates for certain bonds and for a pension restructuring, the report
relays.

In July, Swain ordered mediation that could extend into November
over the validity of Puerto Rico's GO and other bonds, as well as
for other disputes, the report discloses.

So far, Puerto Rico has won court approval for restructurings of
debt from its Government Development Bank and Sales Tax Financing
Corporation known as COFINA, the report says.  The Puerto Rico
Electric Power Authority move closer to exiting bankruptcy when two
holdout bond insurers joined a deal to restructure its debt, the
report adds.

                        About Puerto Rico

Puerto Rico is a self-governing commonwealth in association with
the United States that's facing a massive bond debt of $70 billion,
a 68% debt-to-GDP ratio and negative economic growth in nine of the
last 10 years.

The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has sought bankruptcy protection,
aiming to restructure its massive $74 billion debt-load and $49
billion in pension obligations.

The debt restructuring petition was filed by Puerto Rico's
financial oversight board in U.S. District Court in Puerto Rico
(Case No. 17-01578) on May 3, 2017, and was made under Title III of
2016's U.S. Congressional rescue law known as the Puerto Rico
Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act ('PROMESA').

The Financial Oversight and Management Board later commenced Title
III cases for the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation
(COFINA) on May 5, 2017, and the Employees Retirement System (ERS)
and the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (HTA) on
May 21, 2017.  On July 2, 2017, a Title III case was commenced for
the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority ("PREPA").

U.S. Chief Justice John Roberts has appointed U.S. District Judge
Laura Taylor Swain to oversee the Title III cases.  The Honorable
Judith Dein, a United States Magistrate Judge for the District of
Massachusetts, has been designated to preside over matters that may
be referred to her by Judge Swain, including discovery disputes,
and management of other pretrial proceedings.

Joint administration of the Title III cases, under Lead Case No.
17-3283, was granted on June 29, 2017.

The Oversight Board has hired as advisors, Proskauer Rose LLP and
O'Neill & Borges LLC as legal counsel, McKinsey & Co. as strategic
consultant, Citigroup Global Markets, as municipal investment
banker, and Ernst & Young, as financial advisor.

Martin J. Bienenstock, Esq., Scott K. Rutsky, Esq., and Philip M.
Abelson, Esq., of Proskauer Rose; and Hermann D. Bauer, Esq., at
O'Neill & Borges are on-board as attorneys.

McKinsey & Co. is the Board's strategic consultant, Ernst & Young
is the Board's financial advisor, and Citigroup Global Markets Inc.
is the Board's municipal investment banker.

Prime Clerk LLC is the claims and noticing agent.  Prime Clerk
maintains a case web site at
https://cases.primeclerk.com/puertorico

Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC is the service agent for ERS, HTA,
and PREPA.

O'Melveny & Myers LLP is counsel to the Commonwealth's Puerto Rico
Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority (AAFAF), the agency
responsible for negotiations with bondholders.

The Oversight Board named Professor Nancy B. Rapoport as fee
examiner and to chair a committee to review professionals' fees.

                    Bondholders' Attorneys

Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP and Toro, Colon, Mullet, Rivera
& Sifre, P.S.C. and serve as counsel to the Mutual Fund Group,
comprised of mutual funds managed by Oppenheimer Funds, Inc., and
the First Puerto Rico Family of Funds, which collectively hold over
$4.4 billion of GO Bonds, COFINA Bonds, and other bonds issued by
Puerto Rico and other instrumentalities.

White & Case LLP and Lopez Sanchez & Pirillo LLC represent the UBS
Family of Funds and the Puerto Rico Family of Funds, which hold
$613.3 million in COFINA bonds.

Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, Robbins, Russell,
Englert, Orseck, Untereiner & Sauber LLP, and Jimenez, Graffam &
Lausell are co-counsel to the ad hoc group of General Obligation
Bondholders, comprised of Aurelius Capital Management, LP, Autonomy
Capital (Jersey) LP, FCO Advisors LP, and Monarch Alternative
Capital LP.

Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP and Reichard & Escalera are
co-counsel to the ad hoc coalition of holders of senior bonds
issued by COFINA, comprised of at least 30 institutional holders,
including Canyon Capital Advisors LLC and Varde Investment
Partners, L.P.

Correa Acevedo & Abesada Law Offices, P.S.C., is counsel to Canyon
Capital Advisors, LLC, River Canyon Fund Management, LLC, Davidson
Kempner Capital Management LP, OZ Management, LP, and OZ Management
II LP (the QTCB Noteholder Group).

                          Committees

The U.S. Trustee formed an official committee of retirees and an
official committee of unsecured creditors of the Commonwealth.  The
Retiree Committee tapped Jenner & Block LLP and Bennazar, Garcia &
Milian, C.S.P., as its attorneys.  The Creditors Committee tapped
Paul Hastings LLP and O'Neill & Gilmore LLC as counsel.




===============
X X X X X X X X
===============

[*] BOND PRICING: For the Week September 9 to September 13, 2019
----------------------------------------------------------------
  Issuer Name              Cpn     Price   Maturity  Country  Curr
  -----------              ---     -----   --------  -------   ---

KrisEnergy Ltd             4.0    40.4     6/9/2022    SG     SGD
Noble Holding Internat     5.3    60.5    3/15/2042    KY     USD
Noble Holding Internat     6.2    62.2     8/1/2040    KY     USD
YPF SA                    16.5    67.3     5/9/2022    AR     ARS
Banco Macro SA            17.5    65.2     5/8/2022    AR     ARS
Odebrecht Finance Ltd      6.0    16.4     4/5/2023    KY     USD
Cia Latinoamericana de     9.5    73.9    7/20/2023    AR     USD
Automotores Gildemeist     8.3    54.2    5/24/2021    CL     USD
YPF SA                    16.5    67.3     5/9/2022    AR     ARS
Provincia del Chubut A     4.5    2208    3/30/2021    AR     USD
MIE Holdings Corp          7.5    56.2    4/25/2019    HK     USD
China Huiyuan Juice Gr     6.5    46.6    8/16/2020    CN     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd      7.0    17.0    4/21/2020    KY     USD
Yida China Holdings Lt     7.0    74.3    4/19/2020    CN     USD
Noble Holding Internat     6.1    62.0     3/1/2041    KY     USD
USJ Acucar e Alcool SA     9.9    74.0    11/9/2019    BR     USD
Avadel Finance Cayman      4.5    55.0     2/1/2023    US     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     6.9    75.2    1/11/2048    AR     USD
Polarcus Ltd               5.6    71.8     7/1/2022    AE     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     8.3    74.5   12/31/2033    AR     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     4.3    70.0   12/31/2033    AR     JPY
Automotores Gildemeist     6.8    54.9    1/15/2023    CL     USD
Cia Latinoamericana de     9.5    74.3    7/20/2023    AR     USD
Enel Americas SA           5.8    32.7    6/15/2022    CL     CLP
MIE Holdings Corp          7.5    56.4    4/25/2019    HK     USD
Banco Macro SA            17.5    65.2     5/8/2022    AR     ARS
Provincia de Rio Negro     7.8    70.3    12/7/2025    AR     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd      6.0    16.4     4/5/2023    KY     USD
Province of Santa Fe       6.9    75.2    11/1/2027    AR     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd      7.0    16.5    4/21/2020    KY     USD
Province of Santa Fe       6.9    74.7    11/1/2027    AR     USD
Embotelladora Andina S     3.5    37.9    8/16/2020    CL     CLP
USJ Acucar e Alcool SA     9.9    74.0    11/9/2019    BR     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     8.3    72.9   12/31/2033    AR     USD
Empresa Provincial de     12.5     0.0    1/29/2020    AR     USD
Cia Energetica de Pern     6.2     1.1    1/15/2022    BR     BRL
Provincia de Buenos Ai     7.9    75.3    6/15/2027    AR     USD
AES Tiete Energia SA       6.8     1.2    4/15/2024    BR     BRL
Provincia de Rio Negro     7.8    70.4    12/7/2025    AR     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     0.5    27.6   12/31/2038    AR     JPY
Plaza SA                   3.5    38.3    8/15/2020    CL     CLP
Banco Security SA          3.0     5.6     7/1/2019    CL     CLP
Argentina Bonar Bonds      5.8    75.2    4/18/2025    AR     USD
Corp Universidad de Co     5.9    64.2   11/10/2021    CL     CLP
City of Cordoba Argent     7.9    73.1    9/29/2024    AR     USD
Automotores Gildemeist     8.3    54.2    5/24/2021    CL     USD
Provincia de Cordoba       7.1    72.7     8/1/2027    AR     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     6.3    74.1    11/9/2047    AR     EUR
Provincia del Chaco Ar     4.0     0.0    12/4/2026    AR     USD
Fospar S/A                 6.5     1.2    5/15/2026    BR     BRL
Empresa de Transporte      4.3    30.9    7/15/2020    CL     CLP
Argentina Bonar Bonds      7.6    74.4    4/18/2037    AR     USD
Automotores Gildemeist     6.8    54.9    1/15/2023    CL     USD
SACI Falabella             2.3    50.6    7/15/2020    CL     CLP
Sylph Ltd                  2.4    65.1    9/25/2036    KY     USD
Banco Security SA          3.0    27.4     6/1/2021    CL     CLP
Empresa Electrica de l     2.5    63.8    5/15/2021    CL     CLP
Sociedad Austral de El     3.0    17.0    9/20/2019    CL     CLP
Provincia del Chaco Ar     9.4    74.8    8/18/2024    AR     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     7.1    75.7    6/28/2117    AR     USD
Provincia de Cordoba       7.1    74.7     8/1/2027    AR     USD
Metrogas SA/Chile          6.0    41.6     8/1/2024    CL     CLP
Esval SA                   3.5    49.9    2/15/2026    CL     CLP



                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2019.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
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                  * * * End of Transmission * * *