/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/191101.mbx        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                 L A T I N   A M E R I C A

          Friday, November 1, 2019, Vol. 20, No. 219

                           Headlines



B E R M U D A

CENTRAL EUROPEAN MEDIA: S&P Puts 'B+' ICR on Watch Negative


B O L I V I A

BOLIVIA: Election Audit Set to Begin


B R A Z I L

JBS SA: S&P Raises ICR to 'BB' on Substantial Deleveraging
LIGHT SA: Fitch Corrects July 15 Ratings Release


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Agriculture Counters Rising Prices on Bananas
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Industries Blast "Wages of Hunger" Label
[*] DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Talk of Natural Gas Complex Surges Again


M E X I C O

BENITO JUAREZ: Moody's Ups Issuer Ratings to Ba2, Outlook Stable


P A N A M A

BANCO INTERNACIONAL: Moody's Hikes Deposit Rating to B1


P U E R T O   R I C O

BETTEROADS ASPHALT: Involuntary Petitions Not Filed in Bad Faith
PUERTO RICO HOSPITAL: Objection to Disclosure Statement

                           - - - - -


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B E R M U D A
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CENTRAL EUROPEAN MEDIA: S&P Puts 'B+' ICR on Watch Negative
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings placed its 'B+' rating on Central European Media
Enterprises Ltd. (CME) on CreditWatch with negative implications.

The CreditWatch placement follows the announcement on Oct. 27,
2019, that subsidiaries of PPF Group N.V. (PPF) will acquire the
Bermuda-based broadcaster Central European Media Enterprises Ltd.
(CME) for approximately $2.1 billion. PPF is a Czech Republic-based
international investment conglomerate that owns telecom, financial
services, and real estate assets. AT&T Inc., CME's largest
shareholder, and CME's board of directors have approved the
proposed transaction. S&P expects the acquisition will close in
second-quarter 2020 after the company receives the approval from
the European Commission and from national regulatory authorities in
the countries where it operates.

S&P said, "We understand PPF plans to finance the acquisition with
a mix of equity and EUR1.15 billion debt facilities. This implies
that under the new capital structure CME's adjusted leverage could
significantly increase to 5x or more compared with about 3.0x-3.3x,
which we previously expected in 2019 under the current capital
structure.

"In resolving our CreditWatch placement we will consider CME's
operating performance, our view of the new ownership structure, the
group's financial policy under the new owner, and CME's credit
metrics.

"We expect CME to continue delivering solid operating performance
and EBITDA and cash flow generation in 2019, supported by the
positive macroeconomic environments in Central and Eastern Europe.
We expect in 2019 CME's reported revenue will decrease by about
1%-3% from 2018 to about $690 million, reflecting organic revenue
growth in local currencies that will be offset by a negative
foreign currency exchange movement. We also expect the group's
adjusted EBITDA margin will improve to 32%-35%, reflecting cost
management and gradually growing margins, especially in CME's
largest operational markets such as the Czech Republic.

"The CreditWatch placement reflects that we could lower our rating
on CME after it is acquired by PPF Group. We intend to resolve the
CreditWatch placement after the acquisition is completed, which we
anticipate will be in second-quarter 2020, and after we assess
CME's financial policy under the new owner and its new capital
structure.

"We could lower the rating if after the acquisition closes the S&P
Global Ratings-adjusted leverage increases to 4.5x or above,
reflecting increased financial debt at CME level."

Bermuda-based broadcaster CME operates as a media and entertainment
company in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Romania, Slovakia, and
Slovenia. It broadcasts 30 television channels, including general
entertainment and the Nova and Pro families channels in the Czech
Republic and Romania. The company also develops and produces
content for television channels, provides content through various
portals, including Voyo, a subscription video-on-demand service,
and advertising supported catch-up services on its websites, as
well as operates a portfolio of digital media products that
complement its news programming and other television
station-related brands. The group generated about $700 million
revenues in 2018 and a reported EBITDA of about $220 million, with
about 80% generated from TV advertising.




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B O L I V I A
=============

BOLIVIA: Election Audit Set to Begin
------------------------------------
Vivian Sequera at Reuters reports that the Organization of American
States (OAS) will begin an audit of Bolivia's fiercely contested
presidential vote, which sparked nationwide protests and
allegations of fraud, but the opposition candidate raised serious
doubts about it.

The OAS will start the audit which would be "binding" for all
parties, Bolivian Foreign Minister Diego Pary told reporters,
according to Reuters.  The audit should have results well within
two weeks, the OAS said, the report notes.

The Oct. 20 election handed socialist President Evo Morales a
first-round win with just above the 10-point lead needed to avoid a
risky runoff against main rival Carlos Mesa, the report says.

Reuters relays that Mesa, who had previously stated he believed the
audit would demonstrate clear election fraud and pushed for it to
be made binding, said however that he did not trust the audit
"agreed between OAS and (Morales' party) MAS."

He said in a statement that his party "did not accept the audit
under the current terms, agreed unilaterally," the report notes.

The election furor erupted when the initial vote count was
inexplicably disrupted, sparking the anger of opposition
supporters, allegations of vote-rigging and concern from the OAS
and foreign governments including the United States and Brazil, the
report discloses.

Morales, who swept to power in 2006 as the country's first
indigenous leader, has overseen almost 14 years of relative
stability and reliable economic growth in one of Latin America's
poorest nations, the report says.

Pary said Bolivia had invited observers from Spain, Mexico and
Paraguay to monitor the audit process, the report notes.

Reuters relays that OAS secretary general Luis Almagro said on
Twitter the audit would take between 10 to 12 days, including
verification of the voting tables and ballots, the digital
processes, statistical elements, and the chain of custody of
electoral material.

Protests over the election have convulsed Bolivia, with police
firing tear gas in the capital, the report notes.

Political consultant Jorge Dulon said that with both sides refusing
to back down, and the opposition seemingly not on board with the
OAS audit, the country was deadlocked with no clear way to end the
standoff, the report discloses.

"It's hard to see the way out of this crisis," he said.

Morales, a former coca farmers' union leader has faced a rising
tide of dissatisfaction, however, even among the indigenous groups
he has most visibly supported, with widespread anger about him
seeking a contentious fourth term despite term limits, the report
notes.

Allegations of cronyism and lavish projects - including a $34
million, 28-floor presidential palace in La Paz - have created a
sense of unease about him losing touch with the working people, the
report adds.




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B R A Z I L
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JBS SA: S&P Raises ICR to 'BB' on Substantial Deleveraging
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings, on Oct. 30, 2019, raised its long-term issuer
credit ratings on Brazil-based protein processor JBS S.A. (JBS) and
JBS USA Lux S.A. to 'BB' from 'BB-'. In addition, S&P raised its
national scale rating on JBS to 'brAAA' from 'brAA+'.

S&P also raised its senior unsecured debt ratings on JBS and JBS
USA to 'BB' from 'BB-' and the senior secured debt ratings on JBS
USA to 'BBB-' from 'BB+'.

The upgrade reflects JBS's resilient cash flows and ability to
quickly deleverage in 2019. S&P revised its business risk profile
on JBS to strong from satisfactory, despite the volatility inherent
in its commodities business, and its financial risk profile to
significant from aggressive, because of significantly improved
leverage profile, capital structure, and liquidity through the use
of cash flows and debt refinancing to reduce debt.

S&P said, "We took these actions despite our view of the company's
still weak governance resulting from the corruption scandal that
involved the two sons of the founder, who were previously the CEO
and chairman of the board. JBS implemented several new initiatives
to improve governance such as the creation of independent
committees and the hiring of a compliance director that reports
directly to the board. However, before we raise our management and
governance score on the company, we need a longer track record of
targeting, managing, and mitigating risks. While the corruption
allegations against Messrs. Batista are concentrated at the holding
company, J&F Investimentos, the upgrade of JBS also reflects our
expectations of its more transparent governance following the start
of a corruption probe in 2017.

"We view JBS as the ultimate company of the group. This is based on
our assessment of its control of the cash, given that any decision
on dividends increase or capital reduction requires majority of the
ownership votes, while the Batista family--through J&F--controls
only 40% of JBS's shares. Five board members--out of the total of
nine--represent the Batista family, but any shareholders
remuneration would be distributed equally to all stakeholders, as
well as any need to comply with potential fines and liabilities
stemming from the corruption probe of J&F.

"In our view, the company's geographic and portfolio
diversification that allow it to reach the world's largest consumer
markets and ability to quickly improve and maintain margins of
acquired assets underpin the strength of JBS's business. Trade
barriers or weaker industry fundamentals that could be offset by
stronger profits at other markets and proteins, and a sound working
capital management is likely to continue boosting cash flows. The
company is currently enjoying favorable industry fundamentals
across most of its businesses, because the African Swine Fever
(ASF) outbreak boosted export prices for all proteins and increased
demand for pork in the U.S., despite large import tariffs. These
factors, along with sound cattle availability in the U.S. and
Brazil, have bolstered JBS's consolidated margins to 9.5%-10.0%.
However, we also assume that the company would also be able to
deleverage while keeping consolidated margins at 7%-8%."

JBS generated R$6.7 billion in free operating cash flows (FOCF) in
the 12 months ended June 30, 2019. This, along with a part of cash
holdings and new issuances aiming at lowering interest burden and
extending maturity profile, allowed the company to repay R$26
billion (more than $6 billion) in debt in the past nine months. S&P
estimates that annual FOCF of more than R$8 billion in the next
several years, combined with dividend payments of 25%, will enable
JBS to continue deleveraging--despite potential acquisitions--and
maintain debt to EBITDA at 2x-3x.

Finally, S&P currently considers JBS is comparing unfavorably with
companies at the 'BB+' rating level, mainly because as closer to
investment grade the company gets, the more predictable earnings,
cash flows, and metrics we expect, despite potential acquisitions.
S&P will track JBS's ability to adhere to targeted debt levels.


LIGHT SA: Fitch Corrects July 15 Ratings Release
------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings replaced a ratings release on Light S.A. published on
July 15, 2019 to correct the name of the obligor for the bonds.

The amended ratings release is as follows:

Fitch Ratings affirmed Light S.A. and its wholly owned subsidiaries
Light Servicos de Eletricidade S.A. and Light Energia S.A.'s
Long-Term Local and Foreign Currency Issuer Default Ratings at
'BB-'. The National Scale ratings for the three companies were also
affirmed at 'A+(bra)'. In addition, the Rating Outlook for all the
corporate ratings was revised to Stable from Negative.

The revision of the Outlook reflects Light group's improved
financial profile due to the holding's BRL1.8 billion cash inflow
from its primary offering of common shares, which will bring the
consolidated credit metrics more in line with the current 'BB-'
Long-Term IDRs. Fitch believes the current high adjusted net
leverage ratio will reduce to 4.3x and 3.9x in 2019 and 2020,
respectively, with further gradual reduction to 3.0x-3.5x,
considering some strengthening of operating cash generation over
the next years. The primary offering should also improve Light
group's liquidity position and benefit its funds flow from
operations (FFO) through lower net interest payments. The pro forma
amount of cash and equivalents of BRL3.0 billion at the end of
March 2019, incorporating the cash inflow of the primary offering,
covers total debt maturities in 2019 and 2020 by 1.1x.

Fitch also considers as potentially positive the change in the
shareholder structure resulted from this public offering. Light's
main shareholder, Companhia Energetica de Minas Gerais (Cemig:
Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs B+/Outlook Positive),
sold part of its shares along with the primary offering, bringing
its participation in Light's total capital to 22.58% from 49.99%.
Fitch believes Cemig's lower participation in Light's shareholder
structure reduces the weight of the political risk inherent to the
public control of Cemig. Despite that, the IDRs do not incorporate
any eventual benefit from the new shareholder structure as the new
composition of the group's board and the eventual changes in the
management strategy were not already disclosed.

The ratings are still limited by the group's challenge to improve
its operational performance and translate it into higher
profitability. Light has been impacted by an unfavorable scenario
in the concession area of its most significant subsidiary, the
energy distribution company Light Sesa, in the Metropolitan Region
of the State of Rio de Janeiro, mainly in terms of energy losses
and delinquency rates, as well as disappointing results on the
recovery of energy demand.

Light and its subsidiaries' IDRs reflect the low to moderate
business risk profile resulting from Light Sesa's exclusive
electricity distribution rights in its concession area, combined
with assets on the power generation segment at Light Energia,
adding to cash flow predictability during favorable hydrological
conditions and risk dilution. Fitch's analysis takes into account
the group's consolidated sound cash position and financial
flexibility to manage its debt maturities, and an expected slightly
positive FCF. The IDRs reflect a consolidated view of Light group's
credit profile, due to the existence of cross-default clauses in
some debts. The regulatory risk of the Brazilian energy sector was
considered moderate, and that hydrological risk exposure, inherent
to the sector, is above the historical average and currently
pressures the group's consolidated cash flow and financial
profile.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Positive Results of the Follow On: On July 11, 2019, Light
concluded its capital increase through the sale of 133,333,333
common shares priced at BRL18.75 per share. The shares sold
contemplated 100,000,000 newly issued common shares (primary
offering) and 33,333,333 common shares sold by Cemig (secondary
offering). Under this process, the primary offering raised BRL1.8
billion to Light and Cemig will raise BRL625 million through its
stake sold. In the new shareholder structure Cemig's participation
in Light declines to 22.6% from 49.9% and the market free float
increases to 71.1% from 40.6%. Nevertheless, the main benefit in
the company's credit profile came from the meaningful cash inflow
from the primary offering.

Improved Capital Structure: Fitch expects Light's consolidated
adjusted financial leverage, according to the agency's criteria, to
be 4.3x in 2019 and 3.9x in 2020, migrating to more conservative
levels below 3.5x from 2021 on. On a pro forma basis, considering
the BRL1.8 billion cash inflow from the primary offering and the
company's financial statements as of March 31, 2019, Light's
consolidated adjusted net debt / adjusted EBITDA ratio reduces to
4.2x from the 5.3x reported.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Light's IDRs are lower than other electric energy groups in Latin
America such as Enel Americas S.A. (Enel Americas: BBB+/Stable),
Empresas Publicas de Medellin S.A E.S:P. (EPM: BBB/Rating Watch
Negative), Grupo Energia Bogota S.A. E.S.P. (GEB: BBB/Stable) and
AES Gener S.A. (AES Gener: BBB-/Stable). Light's business risk is
higher, reflecting its operating environment in Brazil (Republica
Federativa do Brasil: BB-/Stable), while its peers are more exposed
to investment countries, mainly Chile (A+/Stable) and Colombia
(BBB+/Stable). Furthermore, Light's business profile is more
concentrated in energy distribution than those companies, and
presents higher leverage.

Compared to a Brazilian electricity group with operations
predominantly in the distribution segment, Light's less diversified
asset base, lower operational performance and more aggressive
financial profile explain the difference from Energisa group's IDRs
(Local Currency IDR 'BB+' and Foreign Currency IDR 'BB'; both
Stable Outlooks).

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

The main assumptions of Fitch's base scenario for the issuer
include:

  - Light Sesa's demand increase of 2.0% in 2019 and 2.6% on
    average in the following three years;

  - Light Energia's disbursement of BRL515 million in two
    installments in 2019-2020 to liquidate its debt at Camara
    de Comercializacao de Energia Eletrica (CCEE);

  - Average annual consolidated capex of BRL798 million during
    2019-2021;

  - Light Sesa's recovery of BRL710 million in non-manageable
    costs in 2019-2020;

  - Dividend payout of 25%;

  - No asset sale.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Positive Rating Action:

  -- Improvements in the distribution segment operating
performance;

  -- Adjusted net leverage consistently equal or less than 3.0x;

  -- Adjusted total leverage consistently equal or less than 4.0x.

Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Negative Rating Action:

  -- Deterioration of the company's liquidity profile;

  -- Adjusted net leverage consistently above 4.0x;

  -- Adjusted total leverage consistently above 5.0x.

LIQUIDITY

Sound Liquidity Profile: Fitch believes that the BRL1.8 billion
cash injection increases Light's financial flexibility. Based on
the cash inflow, Light group will be able to support the debt
maturing in 2019 and 2020. In addition, a better financial profile
should allow the group to refinance existing debt at more
attractive conditions with lower funding cost and a longer debt
amortization. Light group already presented a satisfactory
liquidity position for its ratings level. The BRL3.7 billion raised
in 2018 strengthened the short-term debt coverage ratio and
lengthened the consolidated debt maturity profile to 3.8 years on
March 2019 from 2.7 years on December 2017. At the end of the first
quarter of 2019 the group still had significant BRL1.6 billion
short-term debt, and the cash and equivalents of BRL1.2 billion
covering this short-term debt by 0.7x.

According to Fitch's projections, the group is not expected to
increase its total debt over the next few years. Proceeds from
Light Sesa's debenture issuance of BRL618 million raised in May
2019 were used for debt refinancing and lengthen the debt profile.
The debentures were issued in three series, with final maturities
in 2022, 2024 and 2025. On March 2019, total consolidated adjusted
debt of BRL10.2 billion mainly consisted of debentures issuances
(BRL4.4 billion), Eurobonds (BRL2.3 billion), securitization of
receivables (FIDC) (BRL1.4 billion) and Law 4.131 credit lines
(BRL819 million). Off-balance-sheet debt was BRL810 million,
related to guarantees provided to nonconsolidated companies.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

Light

  -- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR at 'BB-';

  -- Long-Term Local Currency IDR at 'BB-';

  -- Long-Term National Scale rating at 'A+(bra)'.

Light Sesa

  -- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR at 'BB-';

  -- Long-Term Local Currency IDR at 'BB-';

  -- USD400 million Eurobonds due 2023 guaranteed by Light at
'BB-';

  -- Long-Term National Scale rating at 'A+(bra)';

  -- BRL470 million senior unsecured debentures due 2026 at
'A+(bra)';

  -- BRL1,600 million senior unsecured debentures due 2023 at
'A+(bra)';

  -- BRL400 million senior unsecured debentures due 2022 at
'A+(bra)';

  -- BRL400 million senior unsecured debentures due 2020 at
'A+(bra)'.

Light Energia

  -- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR at 'BB-';

  -- Long-Term Local Currency IDR at 'BB-';

  -- USD200 million Eurobonds due 2023 guaranteed by Light at
'BB-';

  -- Long-Term National Scale rating at 'A+(bra)';

  -- BRL425 million senior unsecured debentures due 2019 at
'A+(bra)';

  -- BRL30 million senior unsecured debentures due 2026 at
'A+(bra).

The Rating Outlook for the corporate ratings was revised to Stable
from Negative.




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D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Agriculture Counters Rising Prices on Bananas
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that Agriculture Minister Osmar Benitez
disclosed lower prices on bananas and plantains through popular
sales program of the Price Stability Institute INESPRE in Greater
Santo Domingo barrios to benefit poor inhabitants.

Benitez said the measure aims to counter the high prices on those
foods in recent weeks; 9 plantains 50 pesos; 22 plantains 30 pesos,
according to Dominican Today.

Homemakers from several barrios flocked to the INESPRE trucks to
buy the staples, the report relays.

                   About Dominican Republic

The Dominican Republic is a Caribbean nation that shares the island
of Hispaniola with Haiti to the west. Capital city Santo Domingo
has Spanish landmarks like the Gothic Catedral Primada de America
dating back 5 centuries in its Zona Colonial district.

The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America reported on April 4,
2019 that the Dominican Today related that Juan Del Rosario of the
UASD Economic Faculty cited a current economic slowdown for the
Dominican Republic and cautioned that if the trend continues,
growth would reach only 4% by 2023. Mr. Del Rosario said that if
that happens, "we'll face difficulties in meeting international
commitments."

An ongoing concern in the Dominican Republic is the inability of
participants in the electricity sector to establish financial
viability for the system.

Standard & Poor's credit rating for Dominican Republic stands at
BB- with stable outlook (2015). Moody's credit rating for Dominican
Republic was last set at Ba3 with stable outlook (2017). Fitch's
credit rating for Dominican Republic was last reported at BB- with
stable outlook (2016).


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Industries Blast "Wages of Hunger" Label
------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that Dominican Republic Industries
Association (AIRD) President Celso Juan Marranzini said
presidential candidate Gonzalo Castillo's labeling of the country's
salaries as "wages of hunger" don't contribute "at all" to national
development.

He said the entrepreneurs, with their defects and challenges,
respond to the needs of employees, the environment and
sustainability, according to Dominican Today.

"We believe that we must work hand in hand with society, the
Government and the collaborators to be better every day.  We have
to value the social peace and the economy we have," he said, the
report notes.

Marranzini added that countries that promote this type of dialogue,
"which should not be encouraged here, "end up destroying the
business sector and increasing the population's unemployment," the
report relays.

Castillo, presidential candidate of the ruling party (PLD), told
CDN that he will increase the salaries of "hunger," the report
adds.

                   About Dominican Republic

The Dominican Republic is a Caribbean nation that shares the island
of Hispaniola with Haiti to the west. Capital city Santo Domingo
has Spanish landmarks like the Gothic Catedral Primada de America
dating back 5 centuries in its Zona Colonial district.

The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America reported on April 4,
2019 that the Dominican Today related that Juan Del Rosario of the
UASD Economic Faculty cited a current economic slowdown for the
Dominican Republic and cautioned that if the trend continues,
growth would reach only 4% by 2023. Mr. Del Rosario said that if
that happens, "we'll face difficulties in meeting international
commitments."

An ongoing concern in the Dominican Republic is the inability of
participants in the electricity sector to establish financial
viability for the system.

Standard & Poor's credit rating for Dominican Republic stands at
BB- with stable outlook (2015). Moody's credit rating for Dominican
Republic was last set at Ba3 with stable outlook (2017). Fitch's
credit rating for Dominican Republic was last reported at BB- with
stable outlook (2016).


[*] DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Talk of Natural Gas Complex Surges Again
----------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that in recent weeks, talk of building a
natural gas terminal and power plant in Dominican Republic's
Northwest again surges.

Although the initiatives stem from a US agency and California-based
company North Energy Central (NEC), the proposal "doesn't seduce"
the CEO of AES Dominicana, also based in the US, according to
Dominican Today.

AES Dominicana president Edwin De los Santos discards the idea,
because "it is not very strategic," the report notes.

The United States and the Energy and Mines Ministry recently agreed
to finance a feasibility study to install a natural gas terminal in
the northern region of the country and the possible installation of
some 1,000 megawatts based on that fuel, the report says.

Quoted by El Dia, De los Santos considers it more viable for clean
energy, such as solar and wind, to be invested in the northwest
area. "Installing, for example, 400 megawatts and a natural gas
terminal would be an inefficient investment that the population
would eventually have to pay," the report discloses.

When asked if AES would participate in a tender to produce energy
in the northwest based on natural gas, De los Santos said that "for
now" they don't see economic sense.  "What we see as economic sense
in that region is renewable energy," the report adds.

                   About Dominican Republic

The Dominican Republic is a Caribbean nation that shares the island
of Hispaniola with Haiti to the west. Capital city Santo Domingo
has Spanish landmarks like the Gothic Catedral Primada de America
dating back 5 centuries in its Zona Colonial district.

The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America reported on April 4,
2019 that the Dominican Today related that Juan Del Rosario of the
UASD Economic Faculty cited a current economic slowdown for the
Dominican Republic and cautioned that if the trend continues,
growth would reach only 4% by 2023. Mr. Del Rosario said that if
that happens, "we'll face difficulties in meeting international
commitments."

An ongoing concern in the Dominican Republic is the inability of
participants in the electricity sector to establish financial
viability for the system.

Standard & Poor's credit rating for Dominican Republic stands at
BB- with stable outlook (2015). Moody's credit rating for Dominican
Republic was last set at Ba3 with stable outlook (2017). Fitch's
credit rating for Dominican Republic was last reported at BB- with
stable outlook (2016).




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M E X I C O
===========

BENITO JUAREZ: Moody's Ups Issuer Ratings to Ba2, Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's de Mexico S.A. de C.V. upgraded the issuer ratings for the
Municipality of Benito Juarez to Ba2/A2.mx from Ba3/A3.mx (Global
Scale, local currency/Mexico National Scale) and upgraded its
baseline credit assessment (BCA) to ba2 from of ba3. The stable
outlook on the ratings was maintained.

RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR THE BCA AND ISSUER RATINGS UPGRADE

The upgrade of the BCA to ba2 from ba3 and issuer ratings to
Ba2/A2.mx from Ba3/A3.mx reflect the sustained strengthening of
Benito Juarez's gross operating balance (GOB) in conjunction with a
positive track record of cash financing surpluses over the last
five years. In addition, the municipality prominently registers
very high own source revenues collection. These results have
favored a strong and stable liquidity position.

Benito Juarez's GOB improved from 2016 to 2018, reaching a maximum
of 10.1% of operating revenue in 2018. Own source revenues and
non-earmarked transfers ("participaciones") were the main triggers
of the positive growth in operating revenues. Meanwhile the cash
financing balance posted a surplus for the fifth consecutive year,
equivalent to 4.1% of the total revenues in 2018, despite the drop
of 85% in other earmarked transfers which are mainly used to fund
public infrastructure. This metric was stronger than the median of
Mexican peers rated at Ba2 (2.6%). As a result of the positive
operating and financial balances, the liquidity of Benito Juarez
has been strong and stable, equaling 0.70 times (x) the cash to
current liabilities, above the median of the Ba2 Mexican rated
municipalities (0.49x). Moody's forecasts that a continuation of
strong positive cash financing balances will increase liquidity
further in 2019-20, to an average 0.94x.

Benito Juarez stands apart from most peers by having a very high
own source revenues collection, with own source revenue averaging
63% of operating revenues, one of the highest ratios among the
Mexican municipalities rated by Moody's. These results have been
mainly driven by the collection of taxes and permits. For 2019-20
Moody's expects that Benito Juarez's own source revenues collection
will continue to be robust, at an average of 65%, as a result of
new policies that the municipality is contemplating to increase the
property tax collection rate in 2020.

Offsetting these credit strengths, Benito Juarez's net direct and
indirect debt was equivalent to 39.4% of its operating revenues, an
amount that is relatively higher to other Mexican municipalities.
However, the entity has no immediate plans to acquire long or
short-term debt, therefore for 2019-20 Moody's expects that the net
direct and indirect debt and debt service to operating revenues
will stand at an average of 31.7% and 4% of the operating revenues,
respectively. However, in July 2019 the municipality refinanced its
long-term debt, reducing the interest spread by 63%, which will
generate an estimated savings in the interest payment of 10.4% in
2020. The Ba2 rating also incorporates the municipality's labor
lawsuits for an estimated amount of MXN 650 million equivalent to
45% of 2018 total outstanding debt and for which the municipality
paid MXN 77.7 million (2.1% of operating revenues). Although the
municipality is taking measures to reduce these contingent
liabilities and its calculation can be variable, Moody's will
continue closely monitor the behavior of these labor lawsuits to
assess its impact in the credit profile.

RATIONALE FOR THE STABLE OUTLOOK

The stable outlook of Benito Juarez's Ba2/A2.mx ratings reflects
the forecast the municipality's debt burden will continue to be
elevated compared to other Ba2 Mexican rated peers as well as
Moody's expectation that the municipality will maintain stable key
financial metrics in the following 18 months. The stable outlook
also reflects Moody's expectation that contingent liabilities
related to labor lawsuits will not materially increase.

ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, GOVERNANCE CONSIDERATIONS

In Moody's assessment environmental considerations represent a
moderate risk given the municipality's exposure to extreme weather
events such as hurricanes as well as the recent recurrence of
sargassum seaweed growth on the Caribbean coast that can negatively
affect tourism, which is an important sector of the economy.
Nonetheless, these considerations are not currently material to the
municipality's credit profile because mitigating factors limit
credit impacts. Mexican municipalities receive federal aid through
a disaster fund to cover a portion of infrastructure reconstruction
following natural disasters, which helps limit financial pressure.
In addition, the municipality itself bears limited direct
responsibility for sargassum cleanup, which generally falls to the
hotels under the terms of their concessions. Social considerations
are not material to the municipality's credit profile. The
municipality's social development indicators are high compared with
peers and violence indicators are relatively low. Finally, in
governance, Benito Juarez has an average and similar profile to
other Mexican municipalities rated by Moody's.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

If the municipality decreases the contingent liabilities associated
with labor lawsuits while maintaining the financial and operating
surpluses and the declining trend in debt, the issuer ratings would
have upward pressure. Conversely, an increase in the contingent
obligations or a continued deterioration in the operating and
financial balances as well as in the liquidity could exert downward
pressure on the ratings.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Regional and
Local Governments published in January 2018.




===========
P A N A M A
===========

BANCO INTERNACIONAL: Moody's Hikes Deposit Rating to B1
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings and assessments of
Panama-based Banco Internacional de Costa Rica, S.A. BICSA's
long-term foreign currency deposit rating was upgraded to B1, from
B2, following the upgrade of its baseline credit assessment to b1,
from b2. BICSA's long-term counterparty risk assessment and
counterparty risk rating were upgraded to Ba3(cr) and Ba3, from
B1(cr) and B1, respectively. The bank's short-term foreign currency
deposit and short-term counterparty risk ratings of Not Prime, as
well as its short-term counterparty risk assessment of Not
Prime(cr) were affirmed. The outlook on the ratings is stable.

The following ratings and assessments were upgraded:

Banco Internacional de Costa Rica, S.A.:

  - Baseline Credit Assessment, to b1 from b2

  - Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, to of b1 from b2

  - Long-term foreign currency deposit rating, to B1 from B2,
stable outlook

  - Long-term foreign currency counterparty risk rating, to Ba3
from B1

  - Long-term counterparty risk assessment, to Ba3(cr) from B1(cr)

The following ratings and assessments were affirmed:

Banco Internacional de Costa Rica, S.A.:

  - Short-term foreign currency deposit rating of Not Prime

  - Short-term foreign currency counterparty risk rating of Not
Prime

  - Short-term counterparty risk assessment of Not Prime(cr)

Outlook Action:

Banco Internacional de Costa Rica, S.A.:

  - Outlook, remained stable

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's upgrade of BICSA's ratings reflects the improvements to its
corporate governance practices, and particularly, the support and
commitment of its shareholders, Banco de Costa Rica (BCR, B1
negative, b2) and Banco Nacional de Costa Rica (BNCR, B1 negative,
b1) to its long-term business strategy. Better coordination and
engagement of the management team and board of directors, in place
since 2017, have been positive for BICSA's funding profile,
liquidity and loan origination, which have stabilized and are now
above levels seen in 2016, when its governance crisis happened.
Moody's views the governance improvements as particularly important
given BICSA's high reliance on confidence-sensitive market funding
to finance its operations.

Among the measures taken by BICSA's shareholders to strengthen
oversight are the appointment of a permanent board of directors
composed of board members from both BCR and BNCR; an active
participation of the board of directors in BICSA's audit,
technology, risk and compliance committees, as well as a more
coordinated strategy around the development of BICSA's leasing
business in Costa Rica.

BICSA's asset risks have increased slightly over the past year, as
suggested by the bank's 90-day past-due loans, increasing to a
still manageable 1.9% as of June 2019, from 1.2% as of June 2018.
Stage-three loans, which exhibit evidence of deterioration,
increased to 2.8% of gross loans as of June 2019. BICSA's loan book
is predominantly made of corporate loans, many of which are
collateralized, reasonably diversified by sector, trade finance
related and short term in nature. However, high borrower
concentration, as suggested by the 20 largest exposures
representing about 2x TCE as of June 2019, or 28% of gross loans,
is a credit concern because they can lead to asset quality and
earnings volatility in situation of stress. Loan loss reserves
cover around 50% of stage three loans.

BICSA's capital is robust, reflecting the consistent earnings
retention policy by shareholders. The bank's TCE was 13.4% of
risk-weighted assets as of June 2019, up from the average of 12% in
the period 2012-15, and compares favorably to its Panamanian and
regional peers. The improvement in capitalization is largely
explained by a contained loan growth, which has hovered around 6%
annually for the past three years. Hence, as the bank resumes its
credit expansion, the TCE ratio should gradually decline toward the
historical metric of around 12%.

In regard to profitability, BICSA's net interest margins tend to be
narrow because of its predominantly expensive market funding and
low-margin corporate lending, though the bank's bottom line
benefits from associated low credit costs. BICSA's 1H 2019 net
income was a modest 0.5% of tangible assets on an annualized basis,
slightly lower than the 0.6% reported during the same period of the
prior year. The performance resulted from faster repricing of its
liabilities relative to assets, leading to BICSA's net interest
margin declining to 2.2%, from 2.6% over the same period. BICSA'a
costs to income ratio was above the Latin America's average, at 65%
in 1H19, affected by more subdued earnings generation, but relative
to assets, operating expenses are a modest 1.5%, indicating good
efficiency. Moody's expects growing business volumes to gradually
boost its profitability ratios going forward, including BICSA's
intention to operate in the leasing segment in Costa Rica,
supported by its shareholders dominant presence in that market.

BICSA relies on confidence-sensitive, expensive market funding,
which equaled about 50% of tangible banking assets as of June 2019.
The bank sources its funding from large US and European banks, as
well as from depositors in Panama and Costa Rica. Additionally,
almost all customer deposits are wholesale deposits, which make
them potentially volatile. In addition, funding is largely
short-term skewed, with around 70% of the bank's liabilities coming
due in less than a year. Because of its funding profile, the recent
improvements to corporate governance have been critical to reassure
funding providers of BICSA's strategic goals and the support of BCR
and BNCR to its operations.

Liquid banking assets were only 14% of tangible banking assets as
of June 2019. The metric is low in light of the bank's high
reliance on potentially more volatile wholesale funding. However,
management has decided to maintain liquidity buffers at around the
current levels, taking into consideration the recurrent cash flow
of the loan portfolio, with about half of it maturing in less than
a year. Also, the bank has access to unutilized unrestricted credit
lines with its correspondent banks of about 10% of tangible banking
assets.

BICSA is focused on providing trade finance in Central America.
Costa Rica and Panama are BICSA's core markets, with about 43% and
27% of total loans granted in these countries respectively.

BICSA's B1 deposit rating is now one notch above the foreign
currency long-term deposit rating of BCR and BICSA's ratings, and
as such, it no longer benefits from rating uplift for affiliate
support. Consequently, even if BCR's ratings were to be downgraded
further, in line with its negative outlook, there will be no direct
impact on BICSA´s ratings. In addition, Moody's expects the
ratings to be resilient to further deterioration in Costa Rica's
banks' operating environment (in line with the sovereign negative
outlook), which explains BICSA's ratings stable outlook.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS UP OR DOWN

BICSA's long-term deposit rating could be upgraded if its
profitability improves amid good asset quality on a continued
basis. Conversely, the bank's ratings could be downgraded if BICSA
faces further corporate governance challenges, or if the bank's
asset quality, profitability or capital deteriorate substantially.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks published
in August 2018.



=====================
P U E R T O   R I C O
=====================

BETTEROADS ASPHALT: Involuntary Petitions Not Filed in Bad Faith
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the bankruptcy cases captioned IN RE: BETTEROADS ASPHALT LLC,
Chapter 11, Debtor; and IN RE: BETTERCYCLING CORPORATION CHAPTER
11, Debtor, Case Nos. 17-04156 (ESL), 17-04157 (ESL) (Bankr.
D.P.R.), Bankruptcy Judge Enrique S. Lamoutte finds that the
involuntary petitions filed by Petitioning Creditors were not filed
in bad faith.

The Court says the act of seeking other creditors to join in filing
an involuntary petition in order to pursue debt collection in
bankruptcy court is not an improper bankruptcy purpose.  The Court
notes that the evidence presented showed that the involuntary
debtors had defaulted on their loan payments and that the lenders
had engaged in active collection actions. The discussions by and
between the lenders, including the syndicate lenders, and the
advice provided by their legal counsel show that the decision to
file the involuntary petitions was more in the nature of a studied
business decision that an action to harass or merely seek an
alternate collection forum.

The Petitioning Creditors are composed of Firstbank Puerto Rico,
Banco Santander de Puerto Rico, the Economic Development Bank for
Puerto Rico, and Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, Sargeant Marine,
Inc. and Sargeant Trading LTD, Facsimil Paper Connection, Inc.,
Champion Petroleum, Inc., Control Force, Corp., and St. James
Security, Inc.

The burden to prove that the petitioning creditors filed an
involuntary petition whether or not the involuntary petitions were
filed "in bad faith, that is, for an improper purpose that
constitutes an abuse of the bankruptcy process" lies on the alleged
debtors.  During an evidentiary hearing, the Court emphasized that
key to the alleged debtors prevailing in their allegations of bad
faith was to establish pursuant to the totality of the
circumstances that the involuntary petitions were filed for an
improper bankruptcy purpose.

Banco Popular de Puerto Rico and the involuntary debtors engaged in
extensive negotiations and discussions after the involuntary
debtors defaulted on their loan payments. As part of the
negotiations Banco Popular unsuccessfully tried to renegotiate the
terms of the loans which restricted the potential sale of the
loans. Banco Popular initiated state court actions for collection
of monies. Banco Popular as agent for a syndicate of lenders
contracted and provided legal advice on the filing of the
involuntary petitions.

Prior to the filing of the involuntary petitions the banks that
formed the syndicate -- Banco Popular, Banco Santander de Puerto
Rico, Firstbank, and the Economic Development Bank -- met to
discuss what steps to take in relation to the involuntary debtors'
loan. One action taken was the filing of two actions against the
involuntary debtors around September 2015. The discussions
concerning the filing of the state court actions and the filing of
the involuntary petitions were not directly related. The
considerations and analysis of the filing of the involuntary
petitions were made by counsel for the syndicate banks.

The Court says an involuntary petition has a presumption of good
faith, and it is the Debtor's burden to prove under the totality of
the circumstances that the filing was in bad faith.  The Court
agrees that there are several non-exclusive factors which may be
considered but have no particular importance or weight. The factors
are weighed to determine if the involuntary petition was filed for
an improper bankruptcy purpose, such as ill will or malice, intent
to harass or embarrass the debtor, or use the bankruptcy court as a
substitute for customary collection procedures.

A copy of the Court's Order and Opinion dated Oct. 10, 2019 is
available at https://bit.ly/2BPdeck from Leagle.com.

BETTEROADS ASPHALT LLC, Alleged Debtor, represented by ALEXIS A.
BETANCOURT VINCENTY , LUGO MENDER GROUP LLC & WIGBERTO LUGO MENDER
, LUGO MENDER & CO.

BETTEROADS ALPHALT LLC, Debtor, represented by ALEXIS A. BETANCOURT
VINCENTY , LUGO MENDER GROUP LLC.

SARGEANT TRADING LIMITED & SARGEANT MARINE INC., Petitioning
Creditors, represented by GUSTAVO A. CHICO BARRIS , FERRAIUOLI LLC,
SONIA COLON COLON , FERRAIUOLI, LLC, JORDI GUSO , BERGER SINGERMAN
LLP & CAMILLE N. SOMOZA , FERRAIUOLI LLC.

BANCO POPULAR DE PUERTO RICO, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT BANK FOR PUERTO
RICO & BANCO SANTANDER DE PUERTO RICO, Petitioning Creditors,
represented by Valerie M. Blay Soler , Marini Pietrantoni Muniz,
LLC., IGNACIO LABARCA MORALES , MARINI PIETRANTONI MUNIZ LLC, LUIS
C. MARINI BIAGGI , MARINI PIETRANTONI MUNIZ LLC, MAURICIO O. MUNIZ
LUCIANO , Marini Pietrantoni Muniz LLC & CAROLINA VELAZ RIVERO ,
MARINI PIETRANTONI MUNIZ LLC.

FIRSTBANK PUERTO RICO, Petitioning Creditor, represented by Valerie
M. Blay Soler , Marini Pietrantoni Muniz, LLC., FAUSTO DAVID
GODREAU ZAYAS , GODREAU & GONZALEZ LAW, RAFAEL A. GONZALEZ VALIENTE
, GODREAU & GONZALEZ LAW, IGNACIO LABARCA MORALES , MARINI
PIETRANTONI MUNIZ LLC, LUIS C. MARINI BIAGGI , MARINI PIETRANTONI
MUNIZ LLC, MAURICIO O. MUNIZ LUCIANO , Marini Pietrantoni Muniz LLC
& CAROLINA VELAZ RIVERO , MARINI PIETRANTONI MUNIZ LLC.

BetterRoads Asphalt LLC produces warm mix asphalt. Its products are
used in airports, highways, neighborhoods, and environment
projects.  Betterecycling produces gasoline, kerosene, distillate
fuel oils, residual fuel oils, and lubricants.  BetterRoads and
Betterecycling are affiliates of Coco Beach Golf & Country Club,
S.E., which sought bankruptcy protection on July 13, 2015 (Bankr.
D.P.R. Case No. 15-05312). Both companies are based in San Juan,
Puerto Rico.

The Petitioning Creditors filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition
(Bankr. D.P.R. Case Nos. 17-04156 to 57) on June 9, 2017.


PUERTO RICO HOSPITAL: Objection to Disclosure Statement
-------------------------------------------------------
Puerto Rico Hospital Supply Inc. and Customed Inc. are slated to
seek approval of the Disclosure Statement in support of their Joint
Plan of Reorganization on Nov. 5, 2019.

Johnson & Johnson International, Inc., which filed Claim No. 70 in
the amount of $7,264,100.66 against PRHS and Claim No. 31 in the
amount of $480,574.61 against Customed,  objects to approval of the
Disclosure Statement for these following reasons:

   a) The Disclosure Statement fails to provide adequate
information to creditors to enable them to decide whether to
accept
or reject the proposed Plan.

   b) The Disclosure Statement contains inadequate information
regarding Claims and their treatment.

   c) The Disclosure Statement lacks information and provides
inaccurate information in support of Debtor's assets and their
values.

Johnson & Johnson International requests that this Honorable Court
denies the approval of the Disclosure Statement, with any further
relief it deems proper.

A full-text copy of the Disclosure Statement is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y5tg58h5 from PacerMonitor.com at no charge.

              About Puerto Rico Hospital Supply

Puerto Rico Hospital Supply, Inc., distributes medical supplies in
Puerto Rico.  Customed Inc., founded in 1991, manufactures surgical
appliances and supplies.

Puerto Rico Hospital Supply, Inc. and Customed, Inc., filed
voluntary Chapter 11 petitions (Bankr. D. P.R. Case Nos. 19-01022
and 19-01023) on Feb. 26, 2019. The petitions were signed by Felix
B. Santos, president. The cases are assigned to Judge Enrique S.
Lamoutte Inclan.  

At the time of the filing, Puerto Rico Hospital estimated $50
million to $100 million in assets and $10 million to $100 million
in liabilities while Customed, Inc. estimated $10 million to $50
million in both assets and liabilities.

Alexis Fuentes Hernandez, Esq., at Fuentes Law Offices, represents
the Debtors.



                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
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Chapman, Editors.

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