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       T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                 L A T I N   A M E R I C A

          Friday, December 6, 2019, Vol. 20, No. 244

                           Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

BUENOS AIRES: Province May Be First Test for Debt Talks
PSA FINANCE: Moody's Rates ARS600MM Bond Issuance Caa1  


B R A Z I L

BR PROPERTIES: S&P Alters Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'BB-' ICR
ODEBRECHT SA: Restructuring Plan Vote Postponed to Dec. 10


C A Y M A N   I S L A N D S

COMPASS CAYMAN: S&P Affirms B+ Issuer Credit Rating, Outlook Stable
FALCON GROUP: Moody's Hikes CFR to Ba1; Alters Outlook to Stable


C O L O M B I A

COLOMBIA TELECOMUNICACIONES: S&P Affirms 'BB+' ICR, Outlook Stable


G U A T E M A L A

GUATEMALA: S&P Affirms 'BB-' LT FC Sovereign Credit Ratings


T R I N I D A D   A N D   T O B A G O

CL FINANCIAL: High Court Judge Scraps HCL Land Sales


V E N E Z U E L A

PDVSA: Reaches Deal to Operate Curacao Refinery for Another Year

                           - - - - -


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BUENOS AIRES: Province May Be First Test for Debt Talks
-------------------------------------------------------
Scott Squires and Ben Bartenstein at Bloomberg News report that
bondholders are gearing up for a nasty fight as Argentina's largest
province stares down a debt payment it may not be able to make.

According to Bloomberg, the Province of Buenos Aires will owe
investors $571 million in January, and is unlikely to be able to
come up with the cash amid a sharp devaluation in the currency and
severe economic recession. Bloomberg says the region has few
dollar-generating industries, and tax revenue has dropped 14% in
inflation-adjusted terms this year. Refinancing isn't a realistic
option amid plans by the federal government to restructure its
debt, the report says.

To make matters worse for bondholders, their adversary in any
restructuring talks will be Axel Kicillof, who takes over as
governor Dec. 11, a day after his left-wing ally, Alberto
Fernandez, assumes the presidency, Bloomberg says. Mr. Kicillof is
known to creditors as the economy minister who fought the tail end
of an epic battle with debt investors after the nation's $95
billion default in 2001, raising concerns that this showdown could
also be fierce.

"I'm afraid of what Mr. Kicillof can do," Bloomberg quotes Joaquin
Almeyra, a fixed-income trader at Bulltick LLC in Miami, who trades
Argentine bonds, as saying. "He's shown he's not very market
friendly."

At least one group of bondholders is holding regular calls to
organize for potential restructuring talks with the province,
according to two people familiar with the matter. That contingent
expects to engage in more detailed discussions with their
counterparts after the inauguration, the people said, Bloomberg
relays.

According to Bloomberg, concerns about nonpayment are broadly
reflected in the market, where the province's $500 million of bonds
maturing in 2021 are already trading at about 50 cents on the
dollar. That signals investors expect a painful restructuring is
ahead.

Of course the province's troubles aren't occurring in isolation,
says Bloomberg. The federal government's notes are trading even
lower than the province's after President Mauricio Macri announced
in August that the country wouldn't be able to meet its obligations
and needed to push out debt maturities, Bloomberg relates.
Fernandez has said he wants to work with creditors to come up with
a fair solution. Argentina credit-default swaps imply a 96%
probability of non-payment sometime in the next five years.

A spokeswoman for Mr. Kicillof said the transition team is
coordinating with the incoming national government, and Mr.
Kicillof has said that he shares Fernandez's priorities for
renegotiating with creditors, Bloomberg relays.

Bloomberg says outgoing Governor Maria Eugenia Vidal told reporters
Dec. 3 she believed the province could meet its January debt
payments, but that it wouldn't be appropriate to tell the incoming
government how to do so. The outgoing government will leave the
province with 25 billion pesos ($417 million) after posting a 2019
fiscal deficit twice that big, Ms. Vidal said.

Part of the dilemma the province faces is that even if it could
scrape together the cash for the January payments, it still has
another $1.3 billion due through the remainder of the year,
according to Bloomberg. It might not make much sense to spend
precious resources in January and then seek debt relief soon
thereafter -- the province might as well stop payments right away,
save that money and start working on a restructuring, the thinking
goes.

"If you're going to default anyways, you might as well default as
soon as possible," Bloomberg quotes Paul McNamara, an investment
director at GAM U.K. in London, which holds Province of Buenos
Aires bonds, as saying.

Whatever strategy the province takes, it'll likely be in close
coordination with Fernandez and Vice President-elect Cristina
Fernandez de Kirchner, the former president who Mr. Kicillof served
as economy minister, Bloomberg relates. She's a champion of
Argentina's left whose political base is strong in Buenos Aires
province, the home to 40% of the country's population.

Broadly speaking, investors would see it as a sign of goodwill if
both the sovereign and province keep making debt payments until a
restructuring agreement is reached, Bloomberg notes. If instead it
misses payments, that could be taken as an ominous signal and hit
prices of sovereign bonds and notes from other provinces, according
to Walter Stoeppelwerth, the chief investment officer at Portfolio
Personal Inversiones, adds Bloomberg.

"Alberto Fernandez does not want to default in January, he wants to
line his ducks in a row," Mr. Stoeppelwerth said from Buenos Aires,
Bloomberg relays. "If Mr. Kicillof were to default, people will
start to think that there's a moral hazard, and that if they
default on PBA they default on everything."

While Mr. Kicillof has said the province would find a way to
renegotiate its debt, he's given little indication over the terms
of that restructuring, and how it would align with a
debt-renegotiation at the national level, Bloomberg states.

It's also possible that the province will ask the national
government for a bailout as a stopgap while it restructures its
debt alongside the sovereign, according to Carolina Gialdi, a
senior fixed-income strategist at BTG Pactual in Buenos Aires, adds
Bloomberg.

"Mr. Kicillof is not obliged to do what Fernandez tells him, but
Fernandez and Kicillof are politically aligned and it's probable
that they'll announce something similar in terms of how to deal
with the debt issue," Bloomberg quotes Ms. Gialdi as saying.

PSA FINANCE: Moody's Rates ARS600MM Bond Issuance Caa1  
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo S.A.
assigned a Caa1 global local currency senior debt rating and a
Ba1.ar national scale local currency debt rating to PSA Finance
Argentina Comp.Fin.S.A.'s 28th issuance of up to ARS 600 million,
maturing in six months.

The ratings on PSA Finance, including the bond being rated, are
under review for downgrade in line with the review of the Caa2
Argentine government bond rating.

The following ratings were assigned to PSA Finance's expected
issuances:

Class 28th in pesos up to ARS 600 million:

Caa1 Senior Unsecured Global Local Currency Debt Rating

Ba1.ar Senior Unsecured Argentina National Scale local Currency
Debt Rating

Outlook, ratings under review

RATINGS RATIONALE

PSA Finance's Caa1 debt ratings incorporate the entity's caa2
standalone baseline credit assessment (BCA) and Moody's assumption
of the high probability that the bank would receive financial
support from its co-parent, France's Banque PSA Finance (A3 stable,
BPF), in an event of stress. Hence, the Caa1 global local-currency
debt rating benefits from one notch of support from the bank's caa2
standalone BCA.

At the same time, the ratings incorporate the country's rising
policy uncertainly and consistent market turmoil that has led to
higher inflation and currency depreciation, exposing the bank and
all financial entities to a challenging operating environment that
weakens their credit profile. Current economic conditions,
including recession, high inflation and extraordinarily high
interest rates have eroded financial entities' asset quality, as
debtors' loan repayment capacity deteriorates, and high interest
rates increase their funding costs, hurting the inflation-adjusted
profitability.

PSA Finance ratings' capture the weak operating environment and the
uncertainties related to its funding condition, that offset the
entity's solid risk management policies, and good asset quality and
capitalization metrics. PSA Finance is owned equally by BPF, which
in turn is owned by Peugeot S.A. (Peugeot) (Baa3, stable), and
Argentina's BBVA Banco Frances S.A. (unrated). Moody's assesses
BPF's willingness to support PSA as high because of PSA's key role
as the financial agent for Peugeot Citroën Argentina S.A.
(unrated). The finance company currently finances almost 85% of
Peugeot's total financed sales in Argentina.

PSA Finance's prudent risk management practices and its focus on
middle- and high-income individuals supports its asset quality,
even though it has slightly worsened lately driven by weak economic
conditions. Nonperforming loans remain very low at 1.6% of gross
loans as of September 2019 , up from 1.4% as of 2018, while
loan-loss reserve coverage remain good, at 96.4% of non-performing
loans, despite lower than the 101.4% in 2018. Moreover, PSA
Finance's high level of collateralization supports asset quality.

PSA Finance's capitalization and profitability ratios remain
above-peers, but they are largely affected by a significant
contraction of its balance sheet. PSA Finance's capitalization,
measured by Moody's as tangible common equity relative to adjusted
risk weighted assets, climbed to 34.2% as of September 2019, from
20.5% as of year-end 2018driven by the 22.4% contraction in risk
weighted assets, in line with the 14.5% contraction in its loan
book, amidst declining loan demand and increased risk aversion.

Net income also increased significantly to a very high 9.5% of
tangible assets as of September 2019 from an already strong 3.5% in
year end 2018, but the increase was mainly explained by a 17%
contraction in tangible assets. Argentina's high inflation levels
caused nominal net income to increase by 124% in 12 months.

Consistent with other auto captive finance companies in Argentina,
PSA Finance's ratings also reflect risks associated with its weak
liquidity position and liability structure, which is mainly reliant
on market funds. Market funds to tangible assets, including credit
facilities provided by BBVA Banco Frances S.A. and senior unsecured
debts in the local market, equaled more than half of the entity's
tangible banking assets as of September 2019 at 53.1%, exposing it
to refinancing and interest rate risk.

Moody's believes PSA Finance's exposure to environmental risks is
low, consistent with its general assessment for the global banking
sector. PSA Finance's exposure to social risks is moderate,
consistent with Moody's general assessment for the global banking
sector. As well, governance risks are largely internal rather than
externally driven. Moody's does not have any particular concerns
with PSA Finance's governance.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

An upgrade is unlikely for banks in Argentina because the ratings
are on review for possible downgrade. However, the outlook could be
returned to stable following a stabilization of Argentina's
sovereign ratings outlook. PSA Finance's ratings could be lowered
if Argentine sovereign ratings are downgraded due to further
deterioration in the country's operating environment, and/or a
higher-than-expected deterioration of the financial institutions'
asset quality, that would lead to material decline in profitability
and thus, capital ratios, reducing their loss-absorption capacity
amidst a highly negative credit cycle.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Procedures
Manual for Rating of Deposits, Debt Instruments and Shares of
Financial Institutions published in September 2018.



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B R A Z I L
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BR PROPERTIES: S&P Alters Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'BB-' ICR
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings revised BR Properties S.A. outlook to stable
from negative and affirmed its 'BB-' global scale and 'brAA+'
national scale issuer credit ratings and issue-level ratings on the
company.

S&P said, "The stable outlook now reflects our expectation that BR
Properties should keep low leverage metrics while also posting an
improving vacancy rate in the next few quarters, due to an
improving economy and its focus on premium properties. We expect BR
Properties to post a vacancy rate of about 15% in 2020 and EBITDA
interest coverage of 2.5x."

The outlook revision to stable follows BR Properties recent actions
to decrease debt and improve operations. The company has already
raised about R$1 billion from selling the Paulista, Barra da
Tijuca, and Chucri Zaidan buildings. The asset sale proceeds could
increase by about R$610 million, once the company finalizes the
sale of a portfolio of 12 non-core assets in the cities of Sao
Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. S&P includes the sale of this portfolio
in its base case and expect to occur this month or in the beginning
of 2020. The company will use the total amount raised to pay down
debt, reducing gross debt to about R$1.9 billion by the end of the
year, compared with R$4 billion in 2018. With this decrease, BR
Properties will be able to reduce average cost of debt to about CDI
(Brazilian interbank deposit rate) + 1.5% from 10% at year-end
2018, and consequently boost EBITDA interest coverage to about 2.5x
in 2020, compared to 1.0x at the end of 2019. In addition, the
company raised an additional R$1 billion from a capital increase
this November. S&P believes BR Properties will use part of this
amount also to pay down debt, and the remaining for future mergers
and acquisitions (M&As).

S&P said, "The stable outlook reflects our view that BR Properties
should have low leverage metrics after it significantly reduced
debt and interest burden. We also expect the company to deliver
consistent vacancy rate improvements, resulting from better
economic conditions and its focus on premium properties, increasing
cash flow generation and improving EBITDA margin. We expect BR
Properties to post a vacancy rate of about 15%, debt-to-capital of
about 10%, and EBITDA interest coverage above 2x at the end of
2020."

ODEBRECHT SA: Restructuring Plan Vote Postponed to Dec. 10
----------------------------------------------------------
Carolina Mandl at Reuters reports that creditors for Brazilian
conglomerate Odebrecht SA decided on Dec. 4 to postpone a vote on
the company's bankruptcy restructuring proposal to Dec. 10, until
after it submits a revised restructuring plan.

Reuters reported earlier this week that Odebrecht and its larger
creditors, local lenders, are close to reaching an agreement on a
revised plan.  Odebrecht lawyer Eduardo Munhoz said he expects to
deliver the revised plan before Dec. 10, Reuters relates.

Creditors gathered at the creditors' assembly on Dec. 4 were only
able to reach a quorum to vote on the restructuring plans for five
of 21 subsidiaries that have joined the bankruptcy protection
proceedings, Reuters discloses.

According to Reuters, creditor banks are expected to allow the
conglomerate to receive around 80% of dividends of petrochemical
company Braskem SA for at least two years and delay the sale of the
stake in the company.

                      About Odebrecht SA

Odebrecht S.A. -- www.odebrecht.com -- is a Brazilian conglomerate
consisting of diversified businesses in the fields of engineering,
construction, chemicals and petrochemicals.  Odebrecht S.A. is a
holding company for Construtora Norberto Odebrecht S.A., the
biggest engineering and contracting company in Latin America, and
Braskem S.A., the largest petrochemicals producer in Latin America
and one of Brazil's five largest private-sector manufacturing
companies.  Odebrecht controls Braskem, which by revenue is the
fourth largest petrochemical company in the Americas.

On June 17, 2019, Odebrecht filed for bankruptcy protection, aiming
to restructure BRL51 billion (US$13 billion) of debt.

The bankruptcy filing comes after years of struggles for Odebrecht,
the biggest of the Brazilian engineering groups caught in a
sweeping political corruption investigation that has ripple Across
Latin America, Reuters relayed, as reported by The Troubled Company
Reporter - Latin America.

On August 28, 2019, the Troubled Company Reporter - Latin America,
citing The Wall Street Journal, reported that Odebrecht and its
affiliates filed for chapter 15 bankruptcy, seeking U.S.
recognition of the largest-ever bankruptcy in Latin America.
Odebrecht SA and several of its affiliates has filed for bankruptcy
protection in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District
of New York on  Aug. 26.  The case is assigned to Hon. Stuart M.
Bernstein.




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COMPASS CAYMAN: S&P Affirms B+ Issuer Credit Rating, Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B+' issuer credit rating on
Compass Cayman SPV Ltd. because its view of the group credit
profile does not change its view of Compass Cayman's credit
quality.

S&P said, "At the same time, we are affirming our issue-level
rating on the company's senior secured debt at 'B+'. The recovery
rating on this debt remains '3', indicating our expectation for
meaningful (50%-70%; rounded estimate: 65%) recovery in the event
of a payment default.

"Our reassessment of the company's credit profile does not change
now that is owned by JS Global Lifestyle Co. Ltd.  Following the
reorganization, 100% equity interest of Compass Cayman LLC was
transferred to JS Global Lifestyle Co. Ltd., a limited liability
company incorporated in the Cayman Islands. JS Global also holds a
58.9% interest in Joyoung Co. Ltd. (Joyoung), a Chinese home
appliance maker. The remaining equity interest in Joyoung is listed
on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. In summary, not factoring in an
IPO, JS Global is 69.6% owned by Chairman Wang Xuning, 12.8% by
private equity firm, CDH Group, and about 12.6% by SharkNinja
founders and shareholders. After JS Global pulled its IPO on Oct.
26, 2019, from the Hong Kong stock exchange due to insufficient
solid orders, we have reassessed Compass Cayman's credit profile
considering it a highly strategic subsidiary of JS Global
Lifestyle. We have conducted a group ratings analysis and
determined that there will be no ratings impact on the Compass
Cayman SPV Ltd. issuer credit rating with the restructuring and
ownership shift.

"The stable outlook reflects our expectation that the company
should continue to grow its revenues and EBITDA from new product
innovations and geographic expansion, maintain healthy free
operating cash flow generation, and maintain debt leverage in the
6.5x to 7.0x range inclusive of the put option agreement (3.5x-4.0x
excluding the put).

"We could lower the ratings if the company is unable to
successfully execute an IPO during the first half of fiscal 2020,
increasing the likelihood that the put option could become a debt
obligation. We could also lower the ratings if EBITDA does not grow
as forecast and the company is unsuccessful at managing a rapid
growth strategy, resulting in margin deterioration and adjusted
debt leverage maintained above 8x including the options, 5.0x
excluding the options, and does not generate at least $40 million
of free cash flow through its regular seasonal working capital peak
cycle, over the next 12 months. We believe this could occur if the
company does not grow revenues at a low-single-digit rate because
of unsuccessful product launches or increased competition,
resulting in market share losses and declining EBITDA margins
because of operational inefficiencies. In addition, free cash flow
could also be weaker if tariff headwinds are significantly stronger
than we forecast and investment needs for new product and
geographic expansion are much greater than expected.

"We could raise the ratings if SharkNinja successfully completes an
IPO, whereby the put option expires and it is no longer a potential
call on cash or future debt obligation, and some debt is repaid at
the stand-alone entity, Compass Cayman. The company would also need
to continue its successful new product launches and product
offerings, resulting in increased scale and rapid growth in its
international markets."


FALCON GROUP: Moody's Hikes CFR to Ba1; Alters Outlook to Stable
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded to Ba1 from Ba3 the Corporate
Family Rating and the issuer ratings of Falcon Group Holdings
(Cayman) Limited, a company providing inventory finance and supply
chain management solutions to corporate clients across different
jurisdictions. The outlook on the issuer has been changed to stable
from rating under review.

This rating action concludes the review for upgrade initiated on
August 30, 2019.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrade of Falcon's CFR and issuer ratings to Ba1 reflects the
strengthening of Falcon's overall credit profile as the company
increasingly shifts its business mix to the provision of
specialized inventory finance and receivables financing for mid and
large-cap customers, characterized by higher credit quality, lower
risk adjusted margins and higher recurring volumes. This is a
refinement from the previous strategy that relied on higher risk,
higher margin and lower volume business generated with small and
medium-sized enterprise (SME) clients. The company largely acts as
an intermediary, providing short term financing to both suppliers
and buyers with clients coming from a wide range of sectors. Falcon
retains minimal credit risk to suppliers of goods or ultimate
buyers, largely laying off credit risk to relationship and
correspondent banks or credit insurers.

Following Falcon's business model repositioning, which began in
2017, Moody's believes Falcon is now less exposed to credit and
operational risk and should be able to generate more sustainable
and less volatile earnings going forward. In addition, the revised
business strategy will result in: (1) increased diversification of
its geographic exposure and (2) create the opportunity for broader
and deeper client financing relationships supporting earnings
growth and stability going forward.

To complement the evolution of its service provider business model,
that relies on an increasing level of high velocity volumes, Falcon
has enhanced its IT platforms and digitalisation of its processes
in order to be able to manage its transaction cycles. To expand its
reach to a wider mid and large-cap client base, Falcon has also
strengthened its key bank partnerships and is currently working to
diversify them further.

The company's profitability and cash generation has historically
been relatively strong and stable, supported by operational
efficiency and low credit losses, despite low fee margins with the
cumulative growth rate of net income over average volume advancing
at a moderate level, which Moody's expects to gradually improve
benefiting from economies of scale. Falcon has a solid capital base
and is now entirely equity funded, which provides a solid loss
cushion against tail risk arising from any conduct related charges
or temporarily unhedged credit risk. Falcon's credit profile is
constrained by concentration risk in terms of key counterparty
banks facilitating its refinancing needs although the firm is
seeking to broaden these relationships.

The company has made material improvements in governance and risk
management frameworks and processes, establishing greater
non-executive independence on its board, and creating an
independent Chief Risk Officer role. The firm has had three lines
of defence risk framework for a number of years. Somewhat
offsetting these improvements, Falcon continues to have a sole
shareholder, who also serves as chairman of the board, elevating
key man risk and constraining Falcon's credit profile.

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that Falcon's
strong financial performance in terms of profitability, liquidity
and solvency will be maintained over the outlook period with cash
flow increasing on the back of higher volumes transacted with lower
risk counterparties.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP / DOWN

Falcon's CFR could be upgraded primarily, due to (1) maintenance of
its low risk business model that continues to deliver a steady
performance as Falcon expands its business model and gains a longer
track record under its revised strategy, (2) increase in the
granularity of Falcon's refinancing counterparties, (3) maintenance
of strong equity levels with no material debt reliance that would
lead to an increase in leverage, and (4) the reduction in key man
risk.

The CFR could come under downward pressure due to a significant
increase in leverage beyond its expectations or a considerable
decline in profitability and cash flow from operations, stemming
from higher than expected credit losses or decreasing margins. The
issuer rating may be downgraded if the group were to issue a
material amount of secured recourse debt, or other more senior
funding lines that would increase expected loss for unsecured
creditors.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Upgrades:

Issuer: Falcon Group Holdings (Cayman) Limited

LT Corporate Family Rating, upgraded to Ba1 from Ba3

LT Issuer Rating (Foreign), upgraded to Ba1 from Ba3

LT Issuer Rating (Domestic), upgraded to Ba1 from Ba3

Outlook Action:

Outlook, Changed To Stable from Rating Under Review

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Finance
Companies Methodology published in November 2019.



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COLOMBIA TELECOMUNICACIONES: S&P Affirms 'BB+' ICR, Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its long-term 'BB+' global scale issuer
credit rating on Colombian telecommunication services operator,
Colombia Telecomunicaciones S.A. E.S.P. (Coltel), and its 'BB+'
issue-level rating on the company's senior unsecured bond. At the
same time, S&P affirmed Coltel's hybrid capital securities rating
at 'BB-'.

S&P said, "The stable outlook reflects our expectation that Coltel
will maintain its position as the second-largest wireless player in
Colombia thanks to its planned LTE deployment and its "#RECONECTA"
strategy, which will increase the company's share in the fixed-line
and broadband markets. This, along with higher cash flows due to a
lower debt burden, should enable the company to post debt to EBITDA
of about 2.3x and funds from operations (FFO) to debt of between
30% and 45% in the next 12-18 months.

"This rating action reflects our view that Coltel still represents
a moderately strategic subsidiary for its parent Telefonica, based
mainly on its reasonably successful performance within the telecom
industry and the likelihood it will to receive support from
Telefonica if needed, as it has in the past. We believe that the
new operating strategy doesn't represent any immediate changes in
Coltel's ownership by Telefonica S.A., or its ongoing operations
under Telefonica's brand name. Thus, our ratings on Coltel continue
incorporating a one-notch uplift."



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GUATEMALA: S&P Affirms 'BB-' LT FC Sovereign Credit Ratings
-----------------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 3, 2019, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB-' long-term
foreign currency and 'BB' long-term local currency sovereign credit
ratings on Guatemala. The outlook on S&P's long-term ratings
remains stable. S&P's also affirmed our 'B' short-term foreign and
local currency ratings on Guatemala.

The transfer and convertibility assessment remains 'BB+'.

Outlook

S&P said, "The stable outlook reflects our expectation of
continuity in key economic policies following the change of
administration in January 2020. We expect Guatemala to maintain low
fiscal deficits and sound monetary policy amid still-weak economic
growth and a challenging political environment that affects public
policy effectiveness. Moreover, we expect that continued cautious
fiscal policies should maintain a stable general government debt
burden during 2019-2021.

"We could lower the ratings on Guatemala over the next 12-24 months
if unexpected deterioration in economic policies erodes prospects
for economic growth and contributes to worsening public finances.
We could also lower our ratings if fiscal slippage results in
higher-than-expected annual increases in net general government
debt.

"Conversely, we could raise the ratings over the next two years if
the new administration is able to propose and implement a reform
agenda that strengthens Guatemala's governability and public
institutions, increases its tax revenues, and bolsters its GDP
growth prospects."

Rationale

S&P said, "Our ratings on Guatemala reflect our view of
still-developing governing public institutions and a challenging
political environment that constrains policymaking effectiveness.
Despite a modest acceleration in economic growth, expected real GDP
growth around 3.5% in 2019-2022 would continue to be insufficient
to substantially reduce the country's poverty level. On a per
capita basis, Guatemala's GDP growth has been lower than that of
its rating peers. A persistently narrow tax base, as well as
shortfalls in basic public services and physical infrastructure,
also constrain the rating. Our ratings incorporate Guatemala's
solid external position despite terms of trade volatility, overall
stable and moderate general government debt to GDP, and sound
monetary policy that has kept inflation under control."

Institutional and economic profile: A challenging political
environment and still-developing governing public institutions are
affecting the sovereign´s ability to promote economic growth

-- S&P expects continuity in key economic policies following the
change of administration in January 2020.

-- A challenging political environment limits the government's
ability to advance meaningful reforms.

-- S&P expects economy growth to slightly increase around 3.5%
over 2019-2022.

President-elect Alejandro Giammattei of the center-right Vamos
party, will take office Jan. 14, 2020. He won the second round of
the presidential election on Aug. 11, 2019, with 58% of the vote,
against Sandra Torres of the Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza (UNE)
party. In the congressional election, Vamos won 17 of the 160 seats
in the 2020-2024 legislature, in contrast to UNE that won 52 seats;
nine other parties won between six and 12 seats each, while eight
parties won between one and four seats. President-elect Giammattei
will need to build alliances to pass laws in the divided Congress,
but S&P expects that political fragmentation will limit his ability
to advance meaningful reforms.

S&P's assessment of Guatemala's governance reflects weak checks and
balances between institutions, perceptions of corruption, and a
record of weak policy implementation. After months of constant
tensions with the outgoing president, Jimmy Morales, the mandate of
the Comisión Internacional contra la Impunidad en Guatemala
(CICIG, the U.N.-backed International Commission against Impunity
in Guatemala) came to end on September 2019. Corruption scandals
damaged President Morales' legitimacy to promote a comprehensive
fiscal reform.

President-elect Giammattei will face the challenge of either
implementing, or seeking to change, Guatemala's recent "safe third
country" agreement with the U.S. to restrict the flow of migrants
to the U.S. The government has not announced any plans for curbing
migration through Guatemala to the U.S.

S&P said, "We expect generally stable public finances without
substantial changes in macroeconomic policy over the next two
years. We expect the next administration to remain committed to
moderate fiscal deficits while trying to strengthen social programs
and implement an ambitious plan on infrastructure investment
through public-private partnerships.

"We forecast Guatemala's real per capita GDP growth to average 1.6%
in 2019-2021, slightly above the 1.3% of the previous three years.
Our economic assessment for Guatemala reflects its low per capita
income (estimated to be US$5,440 in 2019) and its history of
below-average economic growth compared with its rating peers.
Persistent low growth reflects, among other things, limited
provision of basic public services (such as education and health
care) and limited physical infrastructure, as well as a high crime
rate."

In 2018, economic growth increased to 3.1% from 2.8% in 2017,
supported by private consumption and improved budgetary execution.
Additionally, a 13.4% surge in remittances supported real domestic
demand. While remittances growth of 13% as of September 2019 would
continue supporting Guatemala's economic growth this year, S&P's
believe that double-digit increases in remittances could be
temporary, which could affect real domestic demand and economic
growth in the coming years. Over the long term, sustained economic
growth will also depend on the sovereign's ability to improve
productivity and strengthen the rule of law and the enforcement of
contracts, which will help to attract higher private investment.

Flexibility and performance profile: Macroeconomic stability
benefits from low fiscal deficits, a solid external position, and a
sound monetary policy that keeps inflation within target

-- S&P expects Guatemala's external profile to remain solid in the
coming three years.

-- A flexible exchange rate and sound monetary policy have
anchored inflation expectations.

-- Cautious fiscal policy should keep the net general government
debt burden around 18% of GDP over 2019-2021.

The current account continued to register a surplus in 2018 of 0.8%
of GDP, from 1.6% of GDP in 2017. Higher oil prices and lower
prices on some exports (e.g., coffee, sugar, and rubber), combined
with the impact of the suspension of operations at the San Rafael
mine, caused the trade balance to deteriorate. However, the trade
deficit was overshadowed by strong remittances, resulting in a
current account surplus. S&P said, "We expect the current account
surplus to decrease in 2019 and fall into a deficit in 2020 due to
a slowdown in the U.S. that will hit exports. Additionally, we
expect that toward 2020 remittance growth will return to single
digits."

S&P said, "Accordingly, we forecast Guatemala's narrow net external
debt to remain around 19% of current account receipts this year and
hover around 24% during 2020-2022, while its gross external
financing needs would average 82% of current account receipts and
usable reserves over the same period. Net foreign direct investment
has declined consistently since 2012, to 1.3% of GDP in 2018.
Nevertheless, it should continue to be enough to cover future
current account deficits. In our view, poor foreign direct
investment performance reflects low investor confidence given
political instability and the overall weak business climate. We
expect that planned initiatives to restore legal certainty for
large-scale investment projects could boost investors' confidence
over the next couple of years."

Guatemala's dependence on exports to the U.S.--which accounts for
33% of its exports--remains a source of vulnerability despite
increasing diversification. Along with this, close to 80% of
remittances comes from the U.S. Both expose the sovereign to sudden
changes in U.S. trade and immigration policies. S&P's external
assessment on Guatemala also incorporates its vulnerability to
sharp changes in its terms of trade, given the concentration of
exports in agricultural goods, which are prone to volatility in
prices.

Low public infrastructure investment, despite a pickup in 2018, and
a moderate fiscal policy have kept general government deficits low.
Guatemala's general government reported a deficit of 1.8% of GDP in
2018 (1.3% of GDP in 2017). Going forward, S&P expects higher
spending on social programs, which will weigh on the fiscal balance
slightly. Fiscal results also show the limited ability of the
sovereign to increase its revenues, which have remained slightly
below 10% of GDP in the last two years. Without fiscal reform, it
is highly unlikely that these revenues could rise substantially as
a share of GDP over the next three years, especially considering
the technological and personnel limitations of the revenue
collection authority (SAT).

Following low general government deficits, S&P expects net general
government debt to stay around 18% of GDP over the next two years.
Interest payments would remain below 15% of general government
revenues over the same period.

As of August 2019, 49% of the sovereign's debt was denominated in
U.S. dollars, which exposes the sovereign to a sudden quetzal
depreciation. Although this ratio is down from 58% in 2012, it
remains a negative rating factor. Balancing this exposure is that
77% of sovereign debt is at fixed interest rates, and its maturity
profile is stable over the next three years. In addition, most of
its external debt--which represented 45% of total debt--is with
multilateral institutions.

Monetary policy continues to reflect the central bank's mandate to
control inflation, as well as its operational independence, despite
recurrent political instability. Low inflation also reflects
overall currency stability over the last few years. S&P estimates
inflation will stay within the central bank's target of 4%
(plus/minus 1%) and the monetary policy rate will remain stable in
the short term.

The Guatemalan banking system is stable, but political instability
continued to constrain private investment in recent years,
restraining the banking system's credit expansion. Nonetheless, S&P
expects a rise in credit growth in 2020 and 2021 due to less
political uncertainty and higher investor confidence. Domestic
banks have not experienced significant asset quality deterioration;
nonperforming assets remain about 3% of total assets and credit
losses remain below 1%. S&P believes lending in foreign currency
will remain about 40% of total lending, which has been decreasing
over the last few years but still represents a source of
vulnerability to external shocks.

The banking system's compound annual growth rate for loan growth
over the past five years was 7.9%, while the average nonperforming
assets as a percentage of systemwide loans was 2.6% during the same
period. S&P Global Ratings classifies the banking sector of
Guatemala in group '7' under its Banking Industry Country Risk
Assessment (BICRA). S&P said, "BICRAs are grouped on a scale from
'1' to '10', ranging from what we view as the lowest-risk banking
systems (group '1') to the highest-risk (group '10'). We believe
that contingent liabilities from the banking system, as well as the
small nonbank financial system, are limited. We also believe that
nonfinancial public-sector enterprises pose limited contingent
liabilities for the sovereign."

The local currency rating on Guatemala is higher than the foreign
currency rating, reflecting the credibility of its monetary policy,
its floating exchange-rate regime, and the depth of its capital
markets.

  Ratings List

  Ratings Affirmed
  Guatemala

   Sovereign Credit Rating
    Foreign Currency       BB-/Stable/B
    Local Currency         BB/Stable/B

  Transfer & Convertibility Assessment
    Local Currency         BB+
  
    Guatemala

    Senior Unsecured       BB-




=====================================
T R I N I D A D   A N D   T O B A G O
=====================================

CL FINANCIAL: High Court Judge Scraps HCL Land Sales
----------------------------------------------------
Anthony Wilson at Trinidad Express reports that High Court Justice
Kevin Ramcharan, in September 2019, aborted an attempt by CL
Financial subsidiary, Home Construction Ltd (HCL), to sell two
highly coveted pieces of prime commercial real estate, following an
objection to the lack of transparency and the failure to properly
advertise the properties in the initial sales process by one of CL
Financial's joint liquidators, David Holukoff of the accounting
firm, Grant Thornton.

On September 18, 2019, Justice Ramcharan issued an order denying
permission to CL Financial and its subsidiaries HCL, Highgate
Development Ltd, Beta Realty Investments Ltd and Trincity
Commercial Centre Ltd to sell two parcels of prime commercial real
estate--one next to the South Park Mall and Business Park in San
Fernando and the other adjacent to the Trincity Shopping Mall,
according to Trinidad Express. The properties have been valued at
over $90 million.

Trinidad Express relates that Ramcharan's order was in response to
a notice of application and an affidavit filed by Mr. Holukoff on
June 10.

In accordance with the provisions of the Companies Act, all
commercial transactions by CL Financial and its subsidiaries must
be sanctioned by the High Court because in July 2017, Corporation
Sole (the Minister of Finance) applied to the courts for the
winding up of the group and the appointment of liquidators to
manage the disposal of its assets and the repayment of its
creditors, Trinidad Express relays.

Trinidad Express notes that the southern property is 15.5 acres and
is located on the Michael Rahael Boulevard, which is an offshoot of
one of the main arteries linking the Solomon Hochoy Highway to the
city of San Fernando. It is surrounded by the Cocoyea residential
neighbourhood, the University of Trinidad and Tobago and the South
Park Mall. The property was valued in 2016 at $60 million.

Express Business understands that Trincity Commercial Centre Ltd, a
subsidiary of HCL, drafted a sales agreement to dispose of the San
Fernando property to a company owned by a San Fernando accountant
and his family. The report notes that the draft sales agreement
indicated that the company submitted a bid of $60,000,522 for the
15.5 acre plot of land, which was $522 more than the official
property valuation. The accountant made a 10 per cent downpayment
of $6,000,052.20 to Trincity Commercial Centre.

Following Justice Ramcharan's court order, the sales agreement had
to be scrapped and the accountant reimbursed his downpayment, says
Trinidad Express.

In his September 18 order, the judge also directed CL Financial and
its subsidiaries "to take such steps as are necessary for the
advertisements of the two parcels of land mentioned at paragraph 18
of the affidavit of David Holukoff filed June 10, 2019."

According to the report, the joint liquidators have ensured that
the second sales process is widely publicised with newspaper
advertisments appearing in the three daily newspaper, the Wall
Street Journal and the Financial Times, internationally, and
regionally, the Barbados Nation, the Jamaica Observer, Guyana's
Stabroek newspaper and The Vincentian.

The deadline for the submission of offers for the properties is no
later than December 12 at 3:00 p.m. Atlantic Standard Time,
Trinidad Express notes.

                      About CL Financial/CLICO

CL Financial was one of the largest privately held conglomerate in
Trinidad and Tobago. It was originally founded as an insurance
company and has since expanded to be the holding company for a
diverse group of companies and subsidiaries.

CL Financial is the parent company of Colonial Life Insurance
Company (Trinidad) Limited (Clico).  CLICO is now the Company's
insurance division.

CL Financial however experienced a liquidity crisis in 2009 that
resulted in a "bail out" agreement by which the government of
Trinidad and Tobago loaned the company funds ($7.3 billion as of
December 2010) to maintain its ability to operate, and obtained a
majority of seats on the company's board of directors.

The companies to be bailed out were: CL Financial Ltd (CLF);
Colonial Life Insurance Company Ltd (CLICO); Caribbean Money Market
Brokers Ltd (CMMB); Clico Investment Bank (CIB) and British
American Insurance Company (Trinidad) Ltd (BAICO).

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America in July
2017, CL Financial Limited shareholders vowed to pay back a TT$15
billion (US$2.2 billion) debt to the Trinidad Government.



=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================

PDVSA: Reaches Deal to Operate Curacao Refinery for Another Year
----------------------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that Venezuela's state oil company PDVSA will
operate Curacao's 335,000 barrel-per-day Isla refinery for up to a
year more, a spokesman for Curacao's state refining company,
Refineria di Koursou (RdK), said.

PDVSA's contract to operate the refinery was set to expire at the
end of this year, the report says. The spokesman described the
agreement as a "transition" measure as RdK continued efforts to
find a new operator.

According to Reuters, RdK said in September that it had opened
exclusive talks with industrial commodities conglomerate Klesch
Group to operate the refinery.

Reuters relates that RdK said at the time that a definitive
agreement would be reached by the end of November. Talks with
Klesch are ongoing, the spokesman said.

Reuters says leaving Isla would be a further blow to PDVSA which
has seen its crude output plunge by more than half since 2016 due
to underinvestment and mismanagement, and more recently due to U.S.
sanctions intended to force out Venezuelan President Nicolas
Maduro.

PDVSA President Manuel Quevedo, also Venezuela's oil minister,
visited Curacao in July to discuss the possibility of the company
staying on to operate the refinery, the report recalls.

RdK officials met with Quevedo in Caracas on Nov. 30 to discuss the
transition arrangement, the company said in a statement, adding
that the parties discussed the possibility of doing maintenance
work on the refinery, Reuters relays.

In May, the U.S. government issued a license allowing Curacao's
refinery to keep working with PDVSA through January 2020 despite
the sanctions, Reuters recalls.

Reuters adds that RdK said in the statement that the license
allowed for an additional transition period of up to a year during
which the company can generate the revenue needed to maintain
refining operations and pay workers, but not turn a profit.

                            About PDVSA

Founded in 1976, Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA) is the
Venezuelan state-owned oil and natural gas company, which engages
in exploration, production, refining and exporting oil as well as
exploration and production of natural gas.  It employs around
70,000 people and reported $48 billion in revenues in 2016.

As reported in Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on June 3,
2019, Moody's Investors Service withdrew all the ratings of
Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. including the senior unsecured and
senior secured ratings due to insufficient information. At the time
of withdrawal, the ratings were C and the outlook was stable.

Citgo Petroleum Corporation (CITGO) is Venezuela's main foreign
asset.  CITGO is majority-owned by PDVSA.  CITGO is a United
States-based refiner, transporter and marketer of transportation
fuels, lubricants, petrochemicals and other industrial products.

However, CITGO formally cut ties with PDVSA at about February 2019
after U.S. sanctions were imposed on PDVSA.  The sanctions are
designed to curb oil revenues to the administration of President
Nicolas Maduro and support for the Juan Guaido-headed party.


                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2019.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
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