/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/191210.mbx        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                 L A T I N   A M E R I C A

          Tuesday, December 10, 2019, Vol. 20, No. 246

                           Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

ALBANESI SA: Fitch Affirms CCC LT Issuer Default Rating
ARGENTINA: Government Urged to Begin Negotiations With Creditors
ARGENTINA: President-elect Alberto Fernandez Unveils New Cabinet
BUENOS AIRES: Unlikely to Repay US$571MM Debt to Bondholders
METROGAS SA: S&P Withdraws 'CCC-' Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating

VICENTIN: Struggles to Repay US$350 Million in Debt


B O L I V I A

BOLIVIA: Moody's Reviews Ba3 Sr. Unsec. Debt Rating for Downgrade


B R A Z I L

GLOBO COMUNICACAO: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Issuer Credit Rating
STATE OF MINAS GERAIS: S&P Affirms 'SD' Issuer Credit Rating


P A R A G U A Y

FRIGORIFICO CONCEPCION: S&P Assigns Prelim B- ICR, Outlook Stable


T R I N I D A D   A N D   T O B A G O

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO: Gas and Oil Output Down in 2nd Quarter
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO: Imbert Defends Decision re IMF Programme

                           - - - - -


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A R G E N T I N A
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ALBANESI SA: Fitch Affirms CCC LT Issuer Default Rating
-------------------------------------------------------
Ratings affirmed Albanesi S.A.'s Long-Term Foreign and Local
Currency Issuer Default Ratings at 'CCC'. In addition, Fitch has
affirmed the senior unsecured USD336 million notes due 2023
co-issued by Central Termica Roca S.A. and Generacion Mediterranea
S.A., which are guaranteed by Albanesi, at 'CCC'/'RR4'. Albanesi
and each of the issuers are jointly and severally liable for any
payment obligations under the notes.

Fitch believes that Albanesi's exchanges of its USD35 million
February 2020 and USD30 million October 2020 bonds provide the
company with additional short-term financial flexibility. In
December 2019, Albanesi announced that it would offer existing
investors in its locally registered notes (the USD35 million ON
Clase VI due February 2020 and USD30 million ON Clase I
co-issuance) the opportunity to enter new amortizing bonds maturing
in February and April 2021, respectively. In exchange, investors in
the new bonds were offered increased coupon rates that step up on
each amortization date reaching 13% at maturity. Fitch does not
rate the bonds, nor does it consider the offers to be distressed
debt exchanges (DDE). Per its criteria, investors choosing to
remain in the existing bonds will not experience a reduction in
terms, covenants will remain the same for remaining investors and
failure to complete the transactions would not have necessarily
resulted in a default by the company.

Albanesi's ratings continue to reflect its dependence on the
country's offtaker and electricity market coordinator, CAMMESA.
Fitch believes Albanesi is vulnerable to payment delays from
CAMMESA, given its expected tight FFO debt service coverage over
the next two years as it seeks to meet its financial and commercial
debt obligations.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Uncertain Refinancing Ability: Fitch believes that Albanesi has
demonstrated an ability to refinance upcoming maturities with the
completion of its bond exchanges in December 2019 and issuance of a
USD80 million secured amortizing note due 2023 in August 2019. The
transactions provide the company with the funds necessary to
largely satisfy its commercial debt to turbine suppliers and
moderately improve its debt maturity profile. Despite the
transactions, Albanesi remains vulnerable to refinancing risk given
its tight liquidity in 2020 and 2021 and will likely require a
greater thawing of financial conditions in Argentina by 2021 in
order to continue to meet its commercial and financial
obligations.

Heightened Counterparty Exposure: Albanesi depends on payments from
CAMMESA, which acts as an agent for an association representing
electricity generators, transmission and distribution companies,
large consumers and wholesale market participants. Albanesi is
exposed to potential delays in payment from CAMMESA and to risks in
fuel supply, although the latter is mitigated by Albanesi's
affiliated gas trading business. CAMMESA has been able to comply
with its commercial agreements to provide payments within 51 days,
even after recent Argentinian peso depreciation, but Fitch
estimates that due to the company's financial and commercial
obligations, it cannot afford prolonged delays in payments.

Uncertain Regulatory Environment: Fitch believes Argentina's
current economic and political environment increases the
uncertainty that the current administration will be able to
effectively implement the required electricity regulatory tariff
adjustments in order for the system to be self-sustainable.
Albanesi operates in a strategic sector where the government has a
role as both the price/tariff regulator and controls subsidies for
industry players. Fitch assumes the current administration remains
committed to and prioritizes the development of a long-term
sustainable regulatory environment, and moving toward a more
unregulated market, and reducing the deficit.

Tight Debt Service Coverage: Albanesi's cash flow is relatively
stable and predictable provided that CAMMESA continues to pay
within its current time of 51 days. As of 2Q19, 100% of the
company's revenue was denominated in U.S. dollars, and 90% of
EBITDA was derived from long-term take-or-pay contracts under
Resolutions 220/2007 and 21/2016. Fitch estimates Albanesi's 2019
leverage, including commercial debt, at 4.0x, which is expected to
decline to 3.2x over the rating horizon as the company pays off
maturing obligations with cash flow. In 2019 and 2020, FFO interest
coverage will be tight at 2.2x and 2.1x, respectively, due to new
debt added and high financing costs.

Expansion Projects Postponed Indefinitely: Fitch's rating case no
longer assumes Albanesi will add 275MW of combined cycle capacity
at two of its plants by 2020 after the company postponed a USD300
million bond issuance to finance the projects. CAMMESA had awarded
Albanesi power purchase agreements (PPAs) for the projects under
Resolution 287/2017, which would have added about USD86 million of
annual EBITDA. The company remains responsible for USD26 million in
payments to turbine suppliers as of 3Q19 and a penalty of USD36.8
million, payable in 48 monthly installments beginning in 2022, to
CAMMESA for failure to complete the expansions as scheduled.

Energia Base Compensation Reduced: Payments to legacy generation
units without a PPA in Argentina are determined by a regulatory
framework called Energia Base. Resolution 1/2019 enacted in
February 2019 reduced capacity payments made to generation
companies under Energia Base in order to lower deficits caused by
peso depreciation in 2018. Between the end of 2020 and 2022,
Albanesi has 300MW of nominal capacity, with PPAs under Resolution
220/2007 set to expire. Fitch expects this capacity to become
remunerated under Energia Base, which will be a driving factor in
annual EBITDA declining by approximately USD30 million over the
rating horizon.

Legal Uncertainty Surrounding Shareholder: In August 2018,
Albanesi's former chairman and principal shareholder Armando
Roberto Loson was arrested as part of a federal graft
investigation. Loson, head of the controlling shareholder family,
was detained together with 10 business executives and former public
employees as part of an alleged graft case. Original allegations
included collusion and bribery; however, charges were reduced to
illegal campaign contributions. His son, Armando Loson Jr., now
serves as chairman of the board. Fitch believes uncertainty remains
regarding how Loson's arrest will affect the company.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Albanesi's expected 2019 gross leverage, measured as total
debt/EBITDA, is 4.0x, weaker than Capex's 1.2x for 2020, AES
Argentina's 3.3x and Pampa Energia's 2.6x, but lower than Genneia's
4.8x and MSU Energy's 7.8x. Similar to Albanesi, MSU Energy is
currently executing a combined cycle expansion due 1H20 under the
same resolutions. Thus, leverage is heightened to finance its
expansion. Genneia's expansion is concentrated on renewable
projects, under the RenovAR program where select projects
ultimately have a guarantee from the World Bank. Both MSU Energy's
and Albanesi's working capital levels are vulnerable to delays in
payments from CAMMESA.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's Key Assumptions Within Its Rating Case for the Issuer

  -- Combined cycle expansions at the Maranzana and Ezeiza plants
have been postponed indefinitely;

  -- Remaining commercial debt repaid over the rating horizon;

  -- CAMMESA levies a fine of USD36.8 million in 2022, payable over
48 months;

  -- No refinancing of short-term debt in 2019 and 2020;

  -- Resolution 220/2007 and 21/2016 PPAs expiring in 2020-2022
will move to Energia Base upon termination;

  -- Outstanding debt and cash flows are adjusted for expected
currency exchange rate fluctuations;

  -- Construction capex payments to suppliers pursuant to
Resolution 287/2017 are delayed indefinitely;

  -- Average FX rate of 44.40 for 2019 and 57.40 for 2020;

  -- Payments from CAMMESA are delayed 51 days.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Positive Rating Action

  -- Given the issuer's high dependence on CAMMESA subsidies from
the national treasury, any further regulatory developments leading
to a market less reliant on support from the Argentine government
could positively affect the company's collections/cash flow;

  -- Improved access to capital markets and the ability to finance
its combined cycle expansions at its Maranzana and Ezeiza plants.

Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Negative Rating Action

  -- Inability to refinance short-term debt coming due by 2H19 and
2020, leading to an event of default;

  -- A substantial worsening of near-term operating performance
relative to Fitch's expectations;

  -- A reversal of government policies that result in a
significant increase in subsidies and/or a delay in payments for
electricity sales;

  -- A significant deterioration of credit metrics and/or
significant payment delays from CAMMESA;

  -- A sustained debt/EBITDA ratio of 4.0x or higher, or FFO
interest coverage below 2.0x.

LIQUIDITY

Tight Liquidity: The approximately USD55 million in newly issued
notes moderately improve the company's liquidity in 2020. In
addition, the proceeds of a 2023 USD80 million secured amortizing
note issued in August 2019, together with ongoing cash flow helped
satisfy short-term commercial debt and provide critical financial
flexibility. Nonetheless, Fitch expects the company to exhibit
tight FFO interest coverage of 2.2x in 2019 and 2.1x in 2020.

Despite its relatively strong cash flow, Fitch expects the company
to have tighter liquidity in 2021 as the majority of the company's
approximately USD55 million in newly-issued notes will mature in
1H2021. In addition, the USD80 million secured note begins to
amortize and penalty payments to CAMMESA (USD36 million payable
over four years) begin in 2022. The company believes it will have
some working capital flexibility in payment timing to its
affiliated gas supplier, RG Albanesi. The covenants of the USD336
million bond due in 2023 limit the company's ability to pay
dividends to shareholders. As of Sept. 30, 2019, the company had a
cash balance of ARS1,789 million (USD32 million).

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch affirms the following ratings:

Albanesi S.A.

  -- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR at 'CCC';

  -- Long-Term Local Currency IDR at ' CCC '.

Central Termica Roca S.A.

  -- International senior unsecured bond due 2023 at 'CCC '/'RR4'.

Generacion Mediterranea S.A.

  -- International senior unsecured bond due 2023 at 'CCC '/'RR4'.

ARGENTINA: Government Urged to Begin Negotiations With Creditors
----------------------------------------------------------------
Colby Smith and Benedict Mander at The Financial Times report that
an industry group representing a large portion of Argentina's
bondholders wrote a letter to newly appointed economy minister
Martin Guzman on Dec. 9, advocating for negotiations between
creditors and the government to begin promptly.

In the letter seen by the Financial Times, Timothy Adams, president
and chief executive of the Washington-based Institute of
International Finance, wrote to Mr. Guzman that "early discussion
between the representative private creditor committee and the
sovereign debtor, in close consultation with the official sector,
is particularly important in facilitating an effective voluntary
debt restructuring agreement".

The FT relates that the IIF, which represents more than 450
institutions across the financial industry, also sent Mr. Guzman a
set of principles it had previously published about best practices
for debt restructurings, stressing the importance of broad fiscal
policy targets to anchor any deal.

"Such a discussion is important in facilitating an effective
voluntary debt restructuring agreement on a fair burden sharing,
thus promoting high private sector participation, restored market
access, renewed output growth, and debt sustainability," the
industry group wrote in its publication, the FT relays.

According to the FT, President-elect Alberto Fernandez, who will be
inaugurated today, Dec. 10, announced Mr. Guzman's appointment on
Dec. 6.  The FT, citing local reports, says the incoming economy
minister is set to unveil a plan to begin renegotiating some US$100
billion of debt with private creditors and the IMF as early as Dec.
11.  Last year, the fund extended a record US$57 billion bailout to
Argentina.

The FT says Mr. Guzman, a disciple of the Nobel laureate Joseph
Stiglitz, favours a swift resolution to Argentina's debt
negotiations, as soon as March, given the urgent need for debt
relief in order to resume economic growth. Mr. Guzman has also
argued that Argentina should not request any further disbursements
from the IMF, with some US$12 billion in payments pending.

According to local reports, he will seek to suspend capital and
interest payments for at least two years, in order to give the
country a chance to escape from recession and be in a stronger
position to pay its debt once the economy is growing again, the FT
relays.

It remains unclear whether the plan would include a haircut on
principal, the FT states. An analysis by Elypsis, an economic
consultancy in Buenos Aires, argued that with a primary surplus of
1 per cent of gross domestic product in 2021 and the economy
growing at 2 per cent, it would be "realistic" to assume a haircut
of at least 20 per cent to assure debt sustainability, the FT says.
At present, Argentina's primary fiscal deficit is almost 1 per cent
of GDP, but the deficit including interest payments is closer to 4
per cent.

According to the FT, bondholders have pushed back on any
restructuring plans that include sizeable losses on the face value
of the bonds they hold, warning that the too harsh use of so-called
haircuts could make the debt "uninvestable". Multiple groups have
formed in recent months in preparation for forthcoming
negotiations.

Greylock Capital Management, T Rowe Price and GMO are among at
least 20 members involved in one creditor committee, while
Connecticut-based hedge fund Gramercy and London-based investment
manager Macrosynergy Partners have teamed up with other creditors
in a second group, the FT discloses. A third group representing
investors holding debt issued by the Province of Buenos Aires has
also formed.

The country's dollar bonds edged higher on Dec. 9, with the century
bond maturing in 2117 rising more than 1 per cent to 42 cents on
the dollar, the FT adds.


                         About Argentina

Argentina is a country located mostly in the southern half of
South
America.  It's capital is Buenos Aires. Alberto Angel Fernandez is
the President-elect of Argentina after winning the October 2019
general election. He succeeded Mauricio Macri in the position.

Argentina has the third largest economy in Latin America.  The
country's economy is an upper middle-income economy for fiscal
year
2019 according to the World Bank.  Historically, however, its
economic performance has been very uneven, with high economic
growth alternating with severe recessions, income maldistribution
and -- in the recent decades -- increasing poverty.

Standard & Poor's foreign and local currency sovereign credit
ratings for Argentina stands at CCC- with negative outlook. S&P
said, "The negative outlook reflects the prominent downside risks
to payment of debt on time and in full per our criteria over the
coming months amid very complex political, economic, and financial
market dynamics."  Moody's credit rating for Argentina was last
set
at Caa2 from B2 with under review outlook. Fitch's credit rating
for Argentina was last reported at CC with n/a outlook. DBRS's
credit rating for Argentina is CC with under review outlook.  S&P,
Moody's and DBRS ratings were issued on Aug. 30, 2019; Fitch
rating
on Sept. 3, 2019.

Back in July 2014, Argentina defaulted on some of its debt, after
expiration of a 30-day grace period on a US$539 million interest
payment.  The country hasn't been able to access international
credit markets since its US$95 billion default 13 years ago.  On
March 30, 2016, Argentina's Congress passed a bill that will allow
the government to repay holders of debt that the South
American  country defaulted on in 2001, including a group of
litigating hedge  funds that won judgments in a New York court.
The
bill passed by a vote of 54-16.

ARGENTINA: President-elect Alberto Fernandez Unveils New Cabinet
----------------------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that Argentine President-elect Alberto Fernandez
unveiled his cabinet on Dec. 6, laying out his core team days
before the center-left leader takes office facing a stalled
economy, rising debt fears and painful inflation.

According to Reuters, Mr. Fernandez named Martin Guzman as economy
minister, who will need to help steer debt restructuring
negotiations with international creditors and the International
Monetary Fund over around $100 billion in sovereign debt.

Mr. Guzman, a young academic and protege of Nobel Prize-winning
economist Joseph Stiglitz, is considered an expert in the field of
debt restructuring, though he has little hands-on experience in
policy making, Reuters says.

Matias Kulfas, who previously held government and central bank
positions, was named as production minister, Reuters discloses.
Young political scientist Santiago Cafiero, heir to a historic
Peronist family, was named Cabinet chief, and former Buenos Aires
Governor Felipe Sola was tapped as foreign minister, says Reuters.

Peronist Fernandez, who takes over from conservative leader
Mauricio Macri, will be sworn into office today, Dec. 10, Reuters
notes.

Vice President-elect Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, a divisive
former president, was not present at the event when Mr. Fernandez
announced his picks, Reuters says.

                         About Argentina

Argentina is a country located mostly in the southern half of
South
America.  It's capital is Buenos Aires. Alberto Angel Fernandez is
the President-elect of Argentina after winning the October 2019
general election. He succeeded Mauricio Macri in the position.

Argentina has the third largest economy in Latin America.  The
country's economy is an upper middle-income economy for fiscal
year
2019 according to the World Bank.  Historically, however, its
economic performance has been very uneven, with high economic
growth alternating with severe recessions, income maldistribution
and -- in the recent decades -- increasing poverty.

Standard & Poor's foreign and local currency sovereign credit
ratings for Argentina stands at CCC- with negative outlook. S&P
said, "The negative outlook reflects the prominent downside risks
to payment of debt on time and in full per our criteria over the
coming months amid very complex political, economic, and financial
market dynamics."  Moody's credit rating for Argentina was last
set
at Caa2 from B2 with under review outlook. Fitch's credit rating
for Argentina was last reported at CC with n/a outlook. DBRS's
credit rating for Argentina is CC with under review outlook.  S&P,
Moody's and DBRS ratings were issued on Aug. 30, 2019; Fitch
rating
on Sept. 3, 2019.

Back in July 2014, Argentina defaulted on some of its debt, after
expiration of a 30-day grace period on a US$539 million interest
payment.  The country hasn't been able to access international
credit markets since its US$95 billion default 13 years ago.  On
March 30, 2016, Argentina's Congress passed a bill that will allow
the government to repay holders of debt that the South
American  country defaulted on in 2001, including a group of
litigating hedge  funds that won judgments in a New York court.
The
bill passed by a vote of 54-16.

BUENOS AIRES: Unlikely to Repay US$571MM Debt to Bondholders
------------------------------------------------------------
Scott Squires and Ben Bartenstein at Bloomberg News report that
bondholders are gearing up for a nasty fight as Argentina's largest
province stares down a debt payment it may not be able to make.

According to Bloomberg, the Province of Buenos Aires will owe
investors US$571 million in January, and is unlikely to be able to
come up with the cash amid a sharp devaluation in the currency and
severe economic recession.  The region has few dollar-generating
industries, and tax revenue has dropped 14% in inflation-adjusted
terms this year, Bloomberg discloses.  Refinancing isn't a
realistic option amid plans by the federal government to
restructure its debt, Bloomberg notes.

To make matters worse for bondholders, their adversary in any
restructuring talks will be Axel Kicillof, who takes over as
governor Dec. 11, a day after his left-wing ally, Alberto
Fernandez, assumes the presidency, Bloomberg states.

According to Bloomberg, two people familiar with the matter said at
least one group of bondholders is holding regular calls to organize
for potential restructuring talks with the province.  The people
said that contingent expects to engage in more detailed discussions
with their counterparts after the inauguration, Bloomberg notes.

Concerns about nonpayment are broadly reflected in the market,
where the province's US$500 million of bonds maturing in 2021 are
already trading at about 50 cents on the dollar, Bloomberg relays.
That signals investors expect a painful restructuring is ahead,
Bloomberg states.

According to Bloomberg, a spokeswoman for Mr. Kicillof said the
transition team is coordinating with the incoming national
government, and Mr. Kicillof has said that he shares Fernandez's
priorities for renegotiating with creditors.

Outgoing Governor Maria Eugenia Vidal told reporters Dec. 3 she
believed the province could meet its January debt payments, but
that it wouldn't be appropriate to tell the incoming government how
to do so, Bloomberg recounts.  Ms. Vidal, as cited by Bloomberg,
said the outgoing government will leave the province with 25
billion pesos (US$417 million) after posting a 2019 fiscal deficit
twice that big.

Part of the dilemma the province faces is that even if it could
scrape together the cash for the January payments, it still has
another US$1.3 billion due through the remainder of the year,
Bloomberg says.  It might not make much sense to spend precious
resources in January and then seek debt relief soon thereafter --
the province could stop payments right away, save that money and
start working on a restructuring, the thinking goes, according to
Bloomberg.

Whatever strategy the province takes, it'll likely be in close
coordination with Fernandez and Vice President-elect Cristina
Fernandez de Kirchner, the former president who Mr. Kicillof served
as economy minister, Bloomberg states.

According to Bloomberg, while Mr. Kicillof has said the province
would find a way to renegotiate its debt, he's given little
indication over the terms of that restructuring, and how it would
align with a debt-renegotiation at the national level.

Carolina Gialdi, a senior fixed-income strategist at BTG Pactual in
Buenos Aires, said it's also possible that the province will ask
the national government for a bailout as a stopgap while it
restructures its debt alongside the sovereign, Bloomberg relays.


METROGAS SA: S&P Withdraws 'CCC-' Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings withdrew its 'CCC-' long-term issuer credit
ratings on Argentine gas distributor Metrogas S.A. at the issuer's
request. The outlook was negative at the time of withdrawal.

S&P said, "Our ratings on Metrogas at the time of the withdrawal
reflected the company's very high refinancing risk in the short
term. In the next twelve months as of September 2019, the company
has to cancel about $125 million of short-term debt, of which $65
million is due in the next six months. We expect Metrogas to
generate operating cash flows of $65 million to cover its mandatory
capital expenditures of about $45 million. In this context, we
believe the company will need to raise additional funds in the
domestic market amid Argentina's turbulent economy in a very short
period, or will need to refinance its existing loan."

On Feb. 8, 2019, Metrogas started paying principal payments on its
$250 million syndicated bank loan from Industrial and Commercial
Bank of China (ICBC; A/Stable/A-1) and from Itau Unibanco Holding
S.A. (Itau; BB-/Stable/B). The company will face five additional
quarterly installments of about $28 million each.


VICENTIN: Struggles to Repay US$350 Million in Debt
---------------------------------------------------
Maximilian Heath at Reuters reports that Argentine soy crushing
giant Vicentin is struggling to repay over US$350 million in debt
and some plants are likely to halt production while it seeks relief
amid an economic slowdown in the country, a source close to the
firm said on Dec. 5.

According to Reuters, the grains crusher, Argentina's top exporter
of processed soy last year according to government data, said it
had been hurt by increasing financing costs and rising country
risk, and was looking at how to meet its obligations.

"We are evaluating different alternatives and working to meet the
commitments made," Reuters quotes the firm as saying, adding that
it had operated continuously for 90 years.

A source close to the firm, who asked not to be named, said the
restructuring talks involved around S$350 million in debts to
supplier for raw materials and a further undisclosed but also
significant amount of bank loans, Reuters relates.

The person, as cited by Reuters, said the company had been hit hard
by rising debt repayment costs in the country, which have soared
amid fears of a default and a plunge in the value of the peso
currency.  He said the issue would likely hit activity at the
firm's plants, Reuters notes.




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B O L I V I A
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BOLIVIA: Moody's Reviews Ba3 Sr. Unsec. Debt Rating for Downgrade
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed the Ba3 local and foreign currency
issuer and senior unsecured debt ratings of the Government of
Bolivia under review for downgrade.

The decision to place Bolivia's ratings under review for downgrade
is driven by Moody's view that, following the resignation of
President Evo Morales, heightened political risk has materially
increased policy uncertainty and will likely lead to an economic
slowdown that could exacerbate the ongoing erosion of fiscal and
foreign exchange reserve buffers, potentially resulting in a
materially weaker overall sovereign credit profile. While Bolivia's
past history of recurrent political tensions is captured in Moody's
assessment of political risk, a prolonged period of political
uncertainty would undermine medium-term sovereign credit
prospects.

During the review period, Moody's will assess the extent to which
political conditions are likely to impact macroeconomic stability
and hinder the country's ability to adopt policy measures that
would restore economic growth prospects and preserve the country's
fiscal and foreign exchange reserve buffers at levels consistent
with a Ba3 rating.

The review may extend beyond the usual three-month horizon as a
longer time period may be required by the new government to define
its policy agenda following another round of presidential
elections.

Bolivia's long-term foreign currency (FC) bond ceiling at Ba2, its
long-term FC deposit ceiling at B1, and its local currency bond and
deposit ceilings at Ba1 remain unchanged.

RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR INITIATING THE REVIEW FOR DOWNGRADE

The key driver behind Moody's decision to place Bolivia's rating
under review for downgrade is the adverse effect of political
events, given heightened uncertainty about the outlook for
policymaking, on the country's near- and medium-term economic and
financial prospects with particular attention to the potential
further erosion of fiscal and foreign exchange reserve buffers.

Over the years, fiscal and foreign exchange reserve buffers have
been key supporting features of Bolivia's Ba3 sovereign credit
profile. However, these buffers have been eroding over time, driven
by large and sustained fiscal and current account deficits.

With general government deficits of around 5% to 6% of GDP over the
last five years, Moody's expects Bolivia's fiscal savings buffer to
decline to around 13% of GDP in 2019 from about 27% of GDP in 2013.
Over the same period, the government's debt burden increased to
about 55% of GDP from 38% at the non-financial public sector
level.

Since 2014, Bolivia's balance of payments has been reporting
current account deficits of around 4% to 5% of GDP with foreign
exchange reserves falling steadily to $5.3 billion as of September
2019 from $13.2 billion in 2014.

A sharp increase in political uncertainty, following the
resignation of President Evo Morales, raises the risk that economic
growth could slow significantly, leading to material further
deterioration of Bolivia's fiscal accounts. In the absence of
corrective and credible policy measures that reduce existing
imbalances, Moody's anticipates that heightened political risk and
social unrest would exert material negative pressures on Bolivia's
credit profile that would undermine the sovereign's
creditworthiness.

ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, GOVERNANCE CONSIDERATIONS

Environmental considerations are material to Bolivia's rating.
Increased deforestation and large forest fires in the Bolivian
Amazon rainforest have contributed to rising climate change and
environmental risks. Natural resources development also pose
environmental risks.

Social considerations are also material to Bolivia's credit
profile, driven by a historically high incidence of poverty and
inequality. Sustained high growth rates and government spending on
social welfare have helped to reduce poverty and improve incomes.
For instance, the share of the population living in extreme poverty
declined to 15% in 2018 from 38% in 2006, and the Gini coefficient
of inequality fell from about 0.60 in 2000 to around 0.47 in 2018.
Meanwhile, GDP per capita has more than tripled from around $1,000
in 2005 to around $3,500 in 2018 (about $7,800 in purchasing power
parity, PPP, terms). Nonetheless, overall poverty remains high,
with a general poverty rate of around 38% of the population in
2018, and incomes remain very low compared to the Ba-rated peer
median of per capita $11,600 in PPP terms, indicating more limited
capacity of households to absorb income shocks.

Governance poses further material risks for Bolivia. This
consideration is reflected in Moody's assessment of institutions
and governance strength, which reflects relatively weak
institutional arrangements and a high incidence of corruption and
weak rule of law, balanced by somewhat stronger economic and
monetary policy effectiveness.

WHAT COULD LEAD TO A DOWNGRADE

Moody's would downgrade Bolivia's rating if the review concludes
that, in light of an increasingly complicated and contentious
domestic political environment, government policies are unlikely to
prove effective in materially reducing macroeconomic imbalances and
preventing the continued erosion of Bolivia's fiscal and foreign
exchange reserve buffers.

WHAT COULD LEAD TO CONFIRMATION OF THE RATING AT THE CURRENT LEVEL

Moody's would confirm the current rating if it concluded that there
is clear evidence that the authorities are willing and able to
implement policies that are likely to restore sustained high
economic growth and preserve fiscal and foreign exchange reserve
buffers near current levels.

GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 7,842 (2018 Actual) (also known as
Per Capita Income)

Real GDP growth (% change): 4.2% (2018 Actual) (also known as GDP
Growth)

Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 1.5% (2018 Actual)

Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -6% (2018 Actual) (also known as
Fiscal Balance)

Current Account Balance/GDP: -4.9% (2018 Actual) (also known as
External Balance)

External debt/GDP: 33% (2018 Estimate)

Level of economic development: Low level of economic resilience

Default history: No default events (on bonds or loans) have been
recorded since 1983.

On December 02, 2019, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of Bolivia, Government of. The main points raised during the
discussion were: The issuer's economic fundamentals, including its
economic strength, have not materially changed. The issuer's
institutions and governance strength have not materially changed.
The issuer's fiscal or financial strength, including its debt
profile, has materially changed. The issuer's susceptibility to
event risks has materially increased.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Sovereign
Ratings Methodology published in November 2019.



===========
B R A Z I L
===========

GLOBO COMUNICACAO: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Issuer Credit Rating
---------------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 4, 2019, S&P Global Ratings revised downward Globo
Comunicacao's stand-alone credit profile (SACP) to 'bbb-' from
'bbb' on weaker-than-expected profitability metrics.

S&P said, "Still, we affirmed our 'BB+' issuer credit and
issue-level ratings on Globo because we expect it to maintain its
strong market position as Brazil's largest media conglomerate with
solid cash flows and a positive net cash position for the same
timeframe.

"We believe it will take longer than we initially expected for
Globo's profitability to recover. The company has been putting
efforts on content development, marketing and digital initiatives
to increase attractiveness of its streaming platform, "Globoplay",
amid a still sluggish advertising market. Elevated costs supporting
these initiatives haven't been fully compensated by revenue due to
increasing advertisement competition from online competitors,
resulting in Globo's historical low EBITDA margin of 6%-7% during
2019, which will remain at that level in 2020. Such a significant
decline in revenue and EBITDA margins in the past quarters prompted
us to revise Globo's SACP to 'bbb-'from 'bbb'.

"We expect some recovery in Globo's advertising revenue in 2020 due
to Brazil's firming economic growth and the Olympics. However,
margins should start to recover only by 2021 following the
corporate restructuring and content investments in the next few
years."

The development of exclusive local content for Globoplay should be
the company's main competitive response to major global operators
such as Netflix, Brazil's market leader, and Disney, which will
start operating domestically by 2020. S&P said, "In addition to the
focus on video on demand, as part of Globo's corporate
restructuring ("Uma so Globo" program), we expect several digital
initiatives to support operations, such as tailoring the content
offering to customers. Through its reorganization, the company is
unifying TV Globo, Globosat, Som Livre, Globo.com, and Globoplay
into one single brand, "Globo". We believe these initiatives will
support business continuity, but we believe the company could have
initiated these changes some years ago, when global operators
started to attract Brazilian customers and local advertisement. For
this reason, we're revising the company's management and management
modifier to fair from satisfactory.

"We expect Globo to remain a leading company in the Brazilian media
market, with the larger scale, audience share, and diversification
than those of domestic peers. Also, it has a historical solid net
cash position and solid cash flows."


STATE OF MINAS GERAIS: S&P Affirms 'SD' Issuer Credit Rating
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its global scale and national scale
ratings on the state of Minas Gerais at 'SD'.

Rationale

S&P said, "The ratings on Minas Gerais reflect our opinion that it
will continue to selectively default on its debt obligations, given
its current fiscal and liquidity weaknesses. Most of the debt on
which Minas Gerais is selecting to default are owed to the central
government or guaranteed by it. However, in our opinion, the
guarantees on the debt owed to the Inter-American Development Bank
(IADB) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD) are vague, and we find no evidence that Minas
Gerais will ensure that payments are made within an acceptable
timeframe. We would only raise the ratings once the state presents
a feasible and credible plan for a full and timely payment of all
debt obligations."

Minas Gerais' fiscal situation is precarious, with mounting
expenditure pressures and little capacity to boost revenue. The
state estimates that about 90% of its expenditures are
non-discretionary, due to fixed education and health care
commitments, other indexed expenditure mandates, mounting pension
expenditures, and other costs. Minas Gerais has had to rely on
extraordinary and questionable measures to close its budget gaps
for a number of years. In addition, since 2018, it has passed its
fiscal stress to other levels of government. During 2018 and
January 2019, the state retained about 50% of the transfers slated
to the municipalities totaling about R$7 billion.

S&P said, "Moreover, since late 2018, the state stopped paying all
debt due to the central government or guaranteed by it, which makes
up for almost all of its debt. We don't consider delaying payments
on debt owed to the central government (77% of outstanding debt) as
a default, given its intergovernmental nature. The central
government guarantees on debt owed to international commercial
banks and the government-owned banks, in our opinion, are clear to
establish payment mechanisms and timeframes which are in line with
S&P's criteria to avoid defaults."

However, guarantees on loans from the IADB and IBRD are vague,
don't establish a defined timeframe, and the state government has
been unable to provide evidence that it meets payments within five
business days. Based on the latest data, and in accordance with our
criteria, Minas Gerais continues to default on this type of debt.

The federal Treasury has continued to honor the debt guarantee
contracts, but a state court decision prevents the central
government from enforcing counter-guarantee contracts. The latter
are the legal mechanism by which the central government recoups the
funds it used to meet Minas Gerais' debt service if guarantees are
activated. We estimate that the state's debt service due to the
central government or that triggered the guarantees would
represented R$7.5 billion in 2019 (9% of operating revenues) and an
annual average of R$8.3 billion for 2020 and 2021.

Even by delaying debt service payments to the central government,
Minas Gerais' finances are precarious. S&P estimates the state's
operating deficits to average 4% of operating revenues in
2019-2021. And with almost no capex, the deficit after capex will
reach an average of 6% during the same time period. Among Minas
Gerais' budgetary struggles, S&P highlights its unfunded pension
system. S&P estimates that as of 2018, total pension expenditure
reached 30% of operating revenue, its annual deficit (netted from
contributions) is 23%, while actuarial deficit is estimated at
almost 9 times the state's operating revenue.

As a result of a weak budgetary performance, liquidity is also
structurally meager. The state lacks free cash available, while a
cash flow deficit will make the expected debt service coverage
extremely low. Moreover, the state's payables and budget
commitments represent up to almost 50% of operating revenue. Given
its weak financial profile and Brazil's fiscal prudential rules for
local governments, Minas Gerais lacks access to external debt.

The state's nominal stock of debt would continue to grow. S&P said,
"Our forecast captures the impact of depreciation on
foreign-currency denominated debt, as well as compounding interest
and penalization not paid by the state on debt owed to the central
government. Our base-case scenario assumes that Minas Gerais' debt
will remain at about 150% of operating revenues during 2019-2021."

Romeu Zema became Minas Gerais' governor on Jan. 1, 2019 (Partido
Novo, 2019-2022) and currently faces a precarious fiscal and
liquidity situation, and a very high debt level. The new
administration is planning to take steps to strengthen the
finances, such as a recent agreement with the municipalities to
address arrears on transfers, which would reduce the overall
payables amount over time. S&P believes the state has made progress
at meeting pre-required criteria to join the central government's
Fiscal Consolidation Regime, and it's currently working with the
central government to present a meaningful financial plan in the
short term. Nevertheless, the governing party has a relatively weak
position in the state legislature, coupled with a very short track
record of passing and implementing unpopular fiscal measures, which
results in uncertainty over the administration's capacity to pass
and implement reforms.

S&P said, "We estimate that the state's GDP per capita was $8,912
for 2018, higher than Brazil's $7,785. Minas Gerais' economy
generates about 8.7% of the national GDP. Most of the state's
economy is based on the services sector, which accounts for a 58%
share, while the manufacturing sector makes up 33%, and agriculture
9%. But in line with the sovereign's economy, we expect subdued
economic recovery in Minas Gerais, which would make it more
difficult to boost revenue or taking meaningful measures to tackle
expenditures."

Commitment and ability in implementing policies to promote fiscal
sustainability is key for Brazilian local and regional governments
(LRGs). This is because S&P's base-case scenario assumes--despite
the current reform momentum in the country--that structural
rigidities will persist in the next two years. The benefits of the
potential reforms will materialize in the medium term, while
passing and adopting them will most likely take a few years.
Moreover, other structural rigidities in the intergovernmental
framework prevail, such as constitutional mandates that link
revenue increases to higher spending on health and education,
complicated tax codes, and burdensome red tape. S&P said, "We
believe these factors inhibit LRGs' capacity to address crucial
long-term spending trends and financing options. Therefore, we
believe the institutional framework for Brazilian LRGs is volatile
and unbalanced."

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the methodology
applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair confirmed that
the information provided to the Rating Committee by the primary
analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and was sufficient
for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot above.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision. The
views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized in
the above rationale and outlook. The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

  Ratings List
  Ratings Affirmed
  Minas Gerais (State of)

   Issuer Credit Rating
    Global Scale              SD/--/--
   Brazil National Scale      SD/--/--




===============
P A R A G U A Y
===============

FRIGORIFICO CONCEPCION: S&P Assigns Prelim B- ICR, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its 'B-' preliminary issuer credit
rating on Frigorifico Concepcion S.A. (Concepcion) and its proposed
senior secured notes.

The stable outlook incorporates the issuance of the private bond.
It also reflects S&P's expectation that the company will post
stable credit metrics, leading to debt to EBITDA above 4.0x and
funds from operations (FFO) to debt below 12% in 2019 and 2020.

The preliminary rating incorporates the issuance of the $145
million senior secured private bond, which the company will use to
cancel most of its debts, extending the amortization schedule. S&P
said, "In our opinion, Concepcion's liquidity is currently fragile
and its capital structure is unsustainable in the short term. Thus,
we expect Concepcion to use the proceeds to cancel about $100
million in debt and the remainder to support its liquidity,
providing the company enough cushion to recover its sales and
improve its financials."

S&P said, "The stable outlook reflects our expectation that
Concepcion will issue the full amount of the private bond and won't
have any additional debt other than the $10.25 million loan from
Banco de Fomento. We expect the company's profitability to improve
amid the industry's favorable fundamentals, the high cattle
availability, and low prices, posting more stable credit metrics in
its financial risk profile."




=====================================
T R I N I D A D   A N D   T O B A G O
=====================================

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO: Gas and Oil Output Down in 2nd Quarter
-----------------------------------------------------------
Trinidad Express reports that the Central Bank reported on Dec. 4
that Trinidad & Tobago's energy sector experienced further setbacks
in the second quarter, with natural gas production falling
"primarily due to production curtailments at Atlantic LNG which is
a major user of natural gas".

In its November Monetary Policy Report (MPR), the Central Bank said
LNG production from the Atlantic LNG facility at Point Fortin
"declined primarily due to a maintenance shutdown and power outages
at the Atlantic LNG facility in June 2019."

According to the report: "The petrochemicals sub-sector experienced
a boost in the production of ammonia and urea, largely representing
a recovery from significant downtime in the comparable period the
year before," Trinidad Express relays.

It said that preliminary estimates for the first half of 2019
suggest that activity remained moderate in the non-energy sector.

"Activity declined in several crucial sub-sectors such as
manufacturing and construction, while the distribution sub-sector
was almost flat. There was, however, an improvement in activity in
the finance sector over the review period," the MPR stated.

Trinidad Express relates that the report said according to the
Central Bank's Quarterly Index of Real Economic Activity (QIEA),
energy sector output was lower year-on-year by 3.4 per cent in the
first six months of 2019.

"This was driven by the lower output of crude oil and liquefied
natural gas (LNG) over the period. Additionally, non-energy sector
activity fell marginally," according to the MPR.

In a footnote, the Central Bank explained that the CSO is the
official source of National Accounts (GDP) data in Trinidad and
Tobago. It added the Central Bank compiles a Quarterly Index of
Real Economic Activity (QIEA) to gauge short-term economic
activity, Trinidad Express relays.

"The QIEA differs from the CSO's national accounts statistics in
terms of methodologies and coverage. The QIEA is based on
production indicators, excludes price effects and does not
comprehensively cover all sub-industries measured by the CSO," the
Central Bank, as cited by Trinidad Express, explained.

Expanding on the output of energy products, the MPR stated: "For
the first half of the year, total natural gas production declined
by 0.7 per cent to 3,654 million standard cubic feet per day
(mmscf/d).

"Crude oil output fell by 12.1 per cent to an average of 59,218
barrels of oil per day (bopd), largely reflecting inadequate
investment in the industry over time, especially given the mature
nature of the acreage.

"As crude oil production continued to decline, depth drilled also
retreated by 22.6 per cent, which occurred alongside a fall of 16.6
per cent in rig days.

"Refining activity contracted by 17.7 per cent due to the closure
of the Petrotrin refinery, and lower LNG production. LNG output
declined by 1.3 per cent owing to scheduled maintenance at the
production facilities, and a power outage in June 2019."

On the other hand, real activity in the petrochemicals sub-sector
grew by 6.2 per cent owing to an increase of 9.3 per cent in
ammonia production and a 4.3 per cent rise in methanol production.
Urea production declined marginally (0.5 per cent), Trinidad
Express relates.

Trinidad Express adds that the report said a
better-than-anticipated revenue outturn aided Government's position
resulting in a smaller fiscal deficit for FY 2018/19 and inflation
remained contained during the first nine months of 2019.

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO: Imbert Defends Decision re IMF Programme
-------------------------------------------------------------
Trinidad Express reports that Finance Minister Colm Imbert said
that the Trinidad and Tobago government was being urged to adopt a
structural adjustment programme more than two decades after the
oil-rich twin island republic ended a similar programme with the
Washington-based International Monetary Fund (IMF).

"Indeed, 25 years after we got ourselves out of an IMF programme,
we were advised to embrace the same old sterile measures from 1990,
focused on contraction without due consideration of the short- and
long-term adverse effects on our citizens," Mr. Imbert told a
Development Bank of Latin America (CAF) seminar at the Hilton
Trinidad and Conference Centre, Trinidad Express relays.

Mr. Imbert, speaking on the theme, "Restructuring a Commodity
Dependent Economy for Growth Without External Intervention" said
the adverse effects of the IMF's structural adjustment programme
created the necessity for a wide-ranging programme of economic and
financial reform in Trinidad and Tobago.

"For the most part, monetary policy was conducted within the
framework of a stabilisation programme, whose main focus was on
restricting domestic demand and restoring external balance.
However, the decline in government expenditure and in real wages,
created considerable social and economic pressure especially among
the most vulnerable income groups in the society."

Trinidad Express relates that Mr. Imbert said this period of
economic austerity also had a profound impact on the fortunes of
some non-bank financial institutions and the Central Bank suspended
the operations of three such institutions which ran into financial
difficulties.

According to the report, the finance minister said that by 1991,
the economy began to respond to the stabilisation measures and to
show signs of a recovery.

"For the next ten years, from 1991 to 2001, there was slow growth,
followed by a tripling of our GDP (gross domestic product) between
2001 and 2008 as both our energy and non-energy sectors took off,
as commodity prices skyrocketed."

But Mr. Imbert said that in 2015, when the present Keith Rowley
administration came to power, oil prices were again dropping "like
a stone, gas production was on the decline and gas prices were
depressed, sending our economy into turmoil".

Mr. Imbert said over the years, several missions from the IMF had
conducted their own in-depth review of the local economy whose
reports were shared with major stakeholder groups.

Trinidad Express adds that the finance minister said the country
also benefited from a visit by an IMF technical team that came to
the country soon after 2015 and that many of the proposals from the
various interest groups, organisations and experts had a common
theme including implementing a property tax system; expanding the
tax base; increasing tax collection as well as increasing personal
income tax and corporate tax.

But he said Trinidad and Tobago would not implement the measures as
had been recommended by the IMF, noting that "blind adherence to
this severe model of structural adjustment at the expense of our
human capital was not a road that we wished to travel again," the
report relays.

"While understanding the lessons of the past, we focused on our
future, and carefully reviewed all of these proposals. Some, but
not all of them, were found to be appropriate, fair and equitable,
and were included in our first fiscal consolidation packages in
2016 and 2017."

But Mr. Imbert said the economy was in an even more perilous state
than was initially envisaged, adding "although our economy was
basically flat over the 2010-2015 period, with just a two per cent
overall increase in real GDP over that period, the previous
government had grown government expenditure to unsustainable
levels, from $46 billion in 2010 . . . to $63 billion in 2014".

But Mr. Imbert insisted despite this economic situation "we chose
not to return to the IMF for financial assistance".

"We had had enough of that. We chose a different path. We
immediately embarked on reducing government expenditure to what we
felt were manageable levels, from $63 billion, to $52 billion in
the first year, and eventually down to $50 billion by 2018. It may
sound facetious, but we were able to do this by cutting out waste,
mismanagement and inflated costs, also known as corruption," the
report quotes Mr. Imbert as saying.

Mr. Imbert said the new government also chose not to reduce the
size of the public service and to pay public sector salaries on
time, despite being faced with a huge backpay bill of almost $6
billion.

"We did increase some taxes, notably taxes on wealthy corporations,
such as banks, and taxes on imported motor cars, and we increased
the royalty rate on oil and natural gas.

"We also decided that it was time to reduce the fuel subsidy, which
had reached as high as US$1 billion per year, a sum that we could
no longer afford as a country . . .."

Mr. Imbert said consistent with the Government's fiscal and
monetary policy, and against advice from the IMF and local pundits,
"we also resisted the temptation to drastically devalue the
Trinidad and Tobago dollar," adds Trinidad Express.


                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

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