/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/191216.mbx        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                 L A T I N   A M E R I C A

          Monday, December 16, 2019, Vol. 20, No. 250

                           Headlines



B A R B A D O S

BARBADOS: S&P Raises Long-Term FC Sovereign Credit Rating to 'B-'


B R A Z I L

BRAZIL: S&P Affirms BB-/B Sovereign Credit Rating, Outlook Now Pos.


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Drought Ups Food Prices 7.8% Over Last Year


G U A T E M A L A

BANCO AGROMERCANTIL: Fitch Affirms BB+ LT FC IDR, Outlook Negative
BANCO DE DESARROLLO: Fitch Affirms BB LT IDR, Outlook Negative
BANCO DE LOS TRABAJADORES: Fitch Affirms BB- IDR, Outlook Stable
BANCO G&T: Fitch Affirms BB LT IDRs, Outlook Negative
BANCO INDUSTRIAL: Fitch Affirms BB LT IDR, Outlook Negative



J A M A I C A

JAMAICA: NIR Drops Due to Interventions in Foreign Exchange Market


M E X I C O

ELEMENTIA SAB: Fitch Maintains BB+ IDR on Rating Watch Negative


T R I N I D A D   A N D   T O B A G O

RBC CARIBBEAN: Cuts 65 Branches in Region Since 2013


V E N E Z U E L A

CONSIS INT'L: In Settlement Talks With La Boliviana and Asesuisa


X X X X X X X X

[*] BOND PRICING: For the Week December 9 to December 13, 2019

                           - - - - -


===============
B A R B A D O S
===============

BARBADOS: S&P Raises Long-Term FC Sovereign Credit Rating to 'B-'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 11, 2019, S&P Global Ratings raised its long- and
short-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on Barbados to
'B-/B' from 'SD/SD' (selective default). At the same time, S&P
Global Ratings assigned its 'B-' issue-level foreign currency
rating to Barbados' long-term foreign currency debt issued in its
debt exchange. S&P Global Ratings also affirmed its 'B-/B' long-
and short-term local currency sovereign credit ratings and 'B-'
issue-level rating on Barbados' long-term local currency debt.

Outlook

The stable outlook balances the administration's strong mandate to
implement broad fiscal and macroeconomic reforms with the political
and economic challenges of doing so. S&P said, "Multilateral
lending institutions, which we expect will continue to commit and
disburse financial and technical assistance to Barbados, will also
support the government's mandate. We expect over the next 12-18
months the government will continue to implement policies that
achieve fiscal consolidation and instil institutional safeguards,
while strengthening macroeconomic stability."

Failure to meet fiscal and debt targets over the next year could
weaken investor confidence and result in a loss of official capital
inflows. This outcome could place renewed pressure on the country's
foreign exchange reserves and reduce funding sources. Under this
scenario of diminished liquidity, S&P could lower the ratings.

S&P could raise the ratings over the next year should the
government adhere to its ambitious fiscal targets and reform
agenda, which could strengthen investor confidence and contribute
to improved GDP growth prospects. Higher economic growth would
facilitate a reduced debt burden, which, together with an
expectation of continued access to official funding, could lead us
to raise the rating.

Rationale

The raised foreign currency sovereign credit rating follows
Barbados' foreign currency debt exchange, which has addressed the
government's commercial U.S. dollar debt outstanding. The
government received creditor participation above the required 75%
voting thresholds for debt containing collective action clauses or
equivalent, and extraordinary resolutions passed by bondholders
such that all debt instruments covered by the government's
invitation have been exchanged. S&P said, "Given this outcome, we
believe that this exchange will be the final resolution of
Barbados' foreign currency default that began in June 2018. At the
same time, we believe that the near-term litigation risk to future
debt service posed by non-consenting creditors is limited." In
addition to some immediate debt cancelation, the new bonds extend
the previous debt maturities of between 2018 and 2022, to 2029, and
with a 6.5% interest rate, contribute to a reduced government
interest burden. This exchange follows the government's local
currency debt exchange in November 2018, which addressed all local
currency treasury bills, treasury notes, debentures, loans, certain
government arrears, and debt issued by state-owned enterprises and
other entities that receive transfers from the state budget. Before
these exchanges, S&P had lowered its foreign currency issuer credit
rating on the country to 'SD', following the administration's
announcement that it would suspend external debt service payments
after assuming office.

The 'B-' long-term issuer rating reflects the country's still-high
debt burden, despite an improved debt profile and fiscal outlook
following the local currency and foreign currency debt exchanges
and diminished refinancing risks, given the commitment of official
funding. S&P said, "At the same time, Barbados's economic growth
has been low since the 2008 global financial crisis, and we expect
muted growth over the next year as the government progresses in its
ambitious fiscal consolidation program. Although we expect foreign
exchange reserve levels will strengthen on the back of official and
private investment inflows, we believe that external liquidity will
remain a credit weakness, which limited market access will
exacerbate following the government's 2018 defaults. The
government's plans for increasing foreign exchange reserve levels,
end dependence on central bank financing of the central government,
and reforms to central bank regulation should improve confidence in
Barbados' exchange-rate regime. However, we expect it will take
time to strengthen the credibility and effectiveness of the
country's monetary policy."

Flexibility and performance profile: Budget surpluses and reduced
financing risks will support fiscal performance, though a
still-high debt burden and weak monetary policy will limit policy
flexibility.

-- S&P expects net general government debt will keep falling, and
the interest burden will remain at a much lower level than it was
before the debt exchanges, over the forecast horizon.

-- Nevertheless, the government's falling, but still-high, debt
burden will limit fiscal policy flexibility.

-- Barbados' pegged exchange rate regime and weakened monetary
policy effectiveness will limit the ability of monetary policy to
respond to imbalances.

The foreign currency and local currency debt exchanges, along with
fiscal consolidation, will lead to a decreasing debt and interest
burden over the forecast horizon. S&P expects net general
government debt, including debt held by the Central Bank, the
National Insurance Scheme (NIS), and government-supported entities
that had debt incorporated in the exchanges, will fall to 111% of
GDP in 2019, and below 100% by 2022, from 137% in 2017. At the same
time, S&P expects the general government interest burden will fall
to about 7% of general government revenues, on average, from
2019-2022, from nearly 16% in 2017.

While this debt level will remain high, S&P believes that official
financing inflows that will cover borrowing requirements over the
next several years somewhat offset the associated risks. IMF
resources under the US$290 million extended fund facility (EFF)
approved in October 2018 will provide balance of payment support,
with about US$97 million already disbursed under the program and an
additional US$48 million expected in December 2019. However, the
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the Caribbean Development
Bank (CDB) have provided, and we expect will continue to provide,
budgetary support. The CDB and IDB approved policy-based loans in
2018 for US$75 million and US$100 million, respectively. The CDB
has also approved a US$40 million loan to upgrade infrastructure
and services at Barbados' international airport, and, in November
2019, the IDB approved an additional US$40 million loan to support
the modernization of the public sector in Barbados. This financing
has favorable repayment terms, which should further support the
country's fiscal consolidation plans.

S&P believes that contingent liabilities are limited, considering
its view of commercial bank risks. Although banks' capital levels
fell following the domestic restructuring in 2018, with the capital
adequacy ratio in the banking system falling to 13% from 17%,
capital is still significantly above the prudential threshold, and
liquidity in the system remains high. S&P also believes that the
banks' ownership structure somewhat mitigates contingent
liabilities in Barbados, given that most banks operating in the
country are Canadian-owned.

Fiscal reforms, including new taxes, a broader tax base, and
restructuring of the state-owned enterprise sector, will contribute
to the government's fiscal consolidation. S&P said, "We forecast
that the general government fiscal balance will be in a surplus
position, at an average of 1.96% of GDP for 2019-2022. We expect
this will contribute to a yearly change in the net general
government debt to GDP, on average, of nearly negative 1% during
2019-2022." The government's long-term fiscal goal is to reduce
public debt-to-GDP to 60% by 2033-2034. Among its policies designed
to help with this goal, the government aims to produce an annual
primary fiscal surplus of 6% of GDP, before arrear repayment,
beginning in the 2019-2020 fiscal year, and continue thereafter.
Early indications suggest the government is on track to meet its
goal this fiscal year.

Despite the likely improved fiscal performance, S&P believes that
the government's policy flexibility will be extremely limited over
the next several years. As part of the domestic debt exchange in
2018, in addition to write-offs of debt held by the private sector
resulting in net present value (NPV) losses of about 30%, debt held
by the Central Bank of Barbados' (CBB) and NIS were also written
off, such that NPV losses for the CBB were about 76%, while NPV
losses for the NIS were about 41%. These two entities met a
significant part of the government's financing needs before the
exchange as the government increasingly lost access to affordable
market funding. According to available data, government securities
represented at least 75% of NIS' investment assets before the
exchange. Although the government plans to address challenges at
the NIS under the EFF program, no concrete policies have been
implemented. We believe these issues might limit the government's
medium-term fiscal policy flexibility. At the same time, given the
economy's concentration in tourism, any downturns in the tourism
sector could negatively affect the government's fiscal performance.
This is particularly relevant, given the government's increased
reliance on tourism revenues as part of its fiscal reform efforts.

In addition, given the CBB's weak financial position, with negative
capital levels of about 16% of GDP, following years of significant
monetary financing and central government debt write-off, the
government will develop plans to recapitalize the CBB by mid-2020.
Although the government, under the EFF program, plans to strengthen
the CBB's governance and autonomy, monetary policy credibility is
difficult to restore quickly. In S&P's view, historical monetary
financing of the central government has been at odds with
sustaining Barbados' currency peg to the U.S. dollar and has
significantly curtailed the central bank's ability to act as a
lender of last resort to the financial system. That said, although
we expect inflation will continue to average below 5% over the
forecast horizon, S&P believes this largely reflects global
commodity prices rather than effective monetary policy execution,
given the fixed exchange-rate regime. Transmission mechanisms of
monetary policy will remain weak in the near term, in part due to
shortcomings of the domestic capital market.

S&P said, "Although we expect central bank foreign exchange
reserves will rise over the next several years on official and
private investment inflows, reversing the negative usable reserve
position that the central bank has maintained over the past several
years will be difficult in the short term. Usable international
reserves, which we consider in assessing external liquidity, have
been negative since 2013; we subtract the monetary base from
international reserves because the base's reserve coverage
maintains confidence in the exchange rate regime. Furthermore, we
believe that Barbados will continue to have limited access to
external commercial debt, in part due to its debt exchanges.
Nevertheless, we expect rising foreign official and other
investment inflows will improve, in part, the country's narrow net
external debt position over the forecast horizon, which we expect
will average 54% of current account receipts (CAR) from 2019-2022.
Our external assessment also considers that net external
liabilities of a projected 208% of CAR during 2019-2022 are
substantially higher than narrow net external debt. In addition,
while we expect external liquidity needs to improve, we expect
gross external financing needs to average over 185% of CAR and
usable reserves over the forecast horizon. Data on Barbados'
international investment position have inconsistencies and are not
timely."

Institutional and economic profile: Government's strong mandate
will facilitate progress on fiscal reform, though economic growth
will continue to pose challenges

-- The Barbados Labor Party's (BLP) absolute parliamentary
majority will continue to facilitate institutional reform
progress.

-- Nevertheless, S&P believes that it will take time to see the
dividends of the government's reform efforts.

-- A contractionary fiscal stance will continue to subdue growth.

S&P said, "Despite the country's macroeconomic challenges, we
expect that Barbados will maintain its position as an upper-middle
income economy in the Caribbean over the outlook horizon. We
anticipate that GDP per capita will reach US$17,979 by year-end
2019. Nevertheless, historical growth has been below that of peers
with a similar level of economic development, and we believe that
the economy will contract further this year, and stay below 1% next
year, on the back of comprehensive fiscal consolidation. We expect
real GDP growth of negative 0.1% and positive 0.6% in 2019 and
2020, respectively. At the same time, while the country has
benefited from a traditionally strong tourism sector, and long-stay
tourist arrivals grew by 4% in the first nine months of 2019,
shorter visits and fewer cruise ship arrivals have limited growth.
In our view, the economy's concentration in tourism will remain a
credit weakness, because it exposes the country to greater economic
cyclicality."

Barbados has a stable, predictable, and mature political system,
which has traditionally benefited from consensus on major economic
and social issues. Governance has alternated between the Democratic
Labour Party and the BLP. After winning all the seats in parliament
in 2018, the BLP, led by Prime Minister Mottley, has a strong
mandate to implement fiscal and macroeconomic reform. After taking
office, the administration acted swiftly to restructure domestic
debt, agree with the IMF on an EFF, and present the initial stages
of its economic recovery and transformation plan. Nevertheless, S&P
believes that improving policymaking and political institutions
will be gradual. Before the most recent election, policymaking in
Barbados was slow to respond to fiscal and economic challenges.
Transparency and timeliness of data publication have also weighed
on its institutional profile assessment. While initial indications
suggest that the administration seeks to reverse these trends,
developing a strong track record will take time.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the methodology
applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair confirmed that
the information provided to the Rating Committee by the primary
analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and was sufficient
for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot above.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision. The
views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized in
the above rationale and outlook. The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

  Ratings List

  New Rating  

  Barbados
   Senior Unsecured     B-
                Not Rated Action
                        To      From
  Barbados

   Senior Unsecured NR D

  Ratings Affirmed

  Barbados
   Sovereign Credit Rating
    Local Currency      B-/Stable/B
   Transfer & Convertibility Assessment
     Local Currency     B-

  Barbados
   Senior Unsecured     B-
  
  Upgraded; CreditWatch/Outlook Action
                        To            From
  Barbados
   Sovereign Credit Rating
   Foreign Currency     B-/Stable/B   SD/--/SD





===========
B R A Z I L
===========

BRAZIL: S&P Affirms BB-/B Sovereign Credit Rating, Outlook Now Pos.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 11, 2019, S&P Global Ratings revised the outlook on its
long-term ratings on Brazil to positive from stable. At the same
time, S&P affirmed its 'BB-/B' long- and short-term foreign and
local currency sovereign credit ratings. S&P also affirmed its
'brAAA' national scale rating, with a stable outlook, and its
transfer and convertibility assessment of 'BB+'.

Outlook

The positive outlook reflects prospects for an upgrade in the next
two years if further progress--prioritization, passage, or
execution--on the government's broad fiscal and growth agenda
allows for a more rapid reduction of Brazil's fiscal deficits and a
stabilization of debt dynamics.

S&P said, "We could also upgrade Brazil if real GDP growth dynamics
begin comparing more favorably with peers with a similar level of
economic development. Finally, we could raise the ratings if,
contrary to our expectations, Brazil's sound external profile
strengthens further, despite global volatility, particularly if it
maintains a net narrow external creditor position in the coming two
years."

Alternatively, policy or economic developments that undermine the
passage and implementation of additional corrective reforms in the
next two years, harming the prospects for declining government
deficits and stabilizing debt trends as well as limiting
medium-term growth prospects, would lead S&P to revise the outlook
to stable.

Rationale

The outlook revision to positive from stable reflects S&P's view
that the approval of social security reform and the expected
progress on other fiscal and growth measures, combined with
moderate growth driven by stronger domestic demand, could improve
Brazil's fiscal position over the medium term (next three years).
The combined set of initiatives, including a potentially
structurally lower interest rate, could lead to stronger fiscal and
growth dynamics. In addition, a low interest rate has reduced the
interest burden for the government and increased the room for
stabilizing Brazil's heavy debt burden.

Nevertheless, S&P currently expects debt to continue to increase
over the next three years in terms of GDP.

Despite the success in passing pension reform, execution risk
remains. Advancing legislation tends to be slow and requires strong
political leadership and negotiation--in particular because several
of the fiscal reforms require constitutional amendments, a critical
and very particular condition of Brazil's institutional framework.
In addition, because of the narrow room for policy execution,
reforms tend to have a marginal short-term impact and a bigger
effect in the medium and long term, which makes a sustained agenda
and robust political backing even more important.

As a result, success in advancing the rest of the agenda will
likely depend on this broader political support and advocacy as
well as on the leadership of economic policy officials. (Leadership
from Congress has pushed the agenda so far and was key to the
approval of pension reform.)

S&P said, "Our ratings on Brazil remain supported by a
macroeconomic framework based on inflation targeting and a floating
exchange rate. We believe the political system has maintained
important checks and balances through political transitions and
even during recent episodes of weaker policy performance." Brazil's
moderate external vulnerabilities are also a relative credit
strength.

Institutional and economic profile: Brazil's reform agenda likely
will continue to advance in 2020, though the risk of setbacks
remains material

-- The government and Congress have been moving forward with their
fiscal and growth reforms agenda, although implementation risks
subsist.

-- A slow economic recovery is underway, underpinned by low
interest rates and the prospect for passage of additional
market-friendly measures.

-- S&P expects GDP growth of 1% in 2019 and 2% in 2020, mostly
stemming from domestic demand.

During its first year in power, the administration of President
Jair Bolsonaro has pursued policies and structural reforms aimed at
strengthening Brazil's fiscal accounts and encouraging greater
private-sector participation in the economy. The passage of solid
pension reform in October 2019 marked important progress because
the executive and legislative branches worked together to redress
one of the fastest-growing components of government spending, which
should facilitate compliance with the constitutional spending cap.
However, several more complex fiscal issues and economic growth
bottlenecks remain.

President Bolsonaro cannot rely on a solid coalition in Brazil's
fragmented Congress because he decided not to build coalitions in
the same manner previous administration did. Legislators, in office
since February 2019, have nonetheless showed broad support to push
ahead with needed fiscal and economic reforms. Nevertheless, in the
context of a polarized domestic political environment, and the
recent protests in South America, passing controversial pieces of
legislation that involve changes to Brazil's constitution could
prove challenging, especially approaching the municipal elections
in October 2020.

The list of reforms envisaged is extensive. The so-called "Mais
Brasil" Plan, which was recently sent to Congress, comprises:

-- The Fiscal Emergency Plan (to reduce spending at the three
levels of government in episodes of fiscal emergency),

-- A revision of public funds (to eliminate earmarking of public
funds and use part of the resources to eliminate public debt), and

-- The Federal Pact (comprises several measures to strengthen the
current system, including decentralizing more revenues to local and
regional governments).

S&P expects some parts of these bills to be approved in the next
two years. President Bolsonaro has delayed submitting his proposal
of administrative reform (focused on new rules regarding public
careers for new entrants) because of concerns over the social
protests that have hit the region. This is an example of the very
narrow room for policy reform that exists. The presentation by the
executive power of a tax reform proposal, aiming at simplifying the
complicated and distortive tax system, has also been delayed (the
Lower House and the Senate have presented their proposals).

Fiscal reforms are not popular, and the process of constructing a
pro-reform coalition could take time, as was seen with the pension
reform approval process.

Other measures in the agenda include ambitious concessions and
privatizations, as well as efforts to open the economy and increase
financial intermediation and the formal autonomy of the central
bank.

S&P believes that the performance of the Brazilian economy in the
next two years will be key to maintaining political support for
advancing other necessary reforms through Congress. Economic growth
in the first half of 2019 was disappointing but expansion in the
third quarter marginally exceeded expectations, mainly because of
private investment and consumption. The monetary easing cycle
should contribute to an acceleration of credit growth in the coming
quarters.

The reduction in interest rates combined with the release of the
formal employee severance funds (FGTS)--which started in September
2019 and will continue through March 2020--should ensure more solid
growth in the coming quarters. In addition, a reduction in fiscal
risks, following the approval of the pension reform, and the
passage of growth-enhancing policies should contribute to a more
positive path for economic activity.

On the other hand, a more significant slowdown in the global
economy could hinder the recovery of private investment. S&P
projects 1% GDP growth in 2019, 2% in 2020, and 2.4% on average in
2021-2022--growth that remains weak given the underperformance of
the last five years. With per capita GDP of about US$8,658,
Brazil's growth prospects are, in S&P's opinion, below those of its
peers.

Flexibility and performance profile: Congress is expected to
discuss parts of the ample fiscal agenda and the autonomy of the
central bank in the coming quarters

-- S&P expects fiscal deficits to slowly decline in 2020-2022, but
net debt will continue to rise.

-- The current account deficit should remain relatively stable
just below 3% of GDP in 2019-2020.

-- Formal autonomy of the central bank could be approved in 2020.

The fiscal deficit is likely to decline in the coming years--from
its currently very high levels--on prospects for a slow
acceleration in economic activity, additional nonrecurring
revenues, and the gradual impact of fiscal consolidation measures.
The new pension legislation seeks to save about Brazilian real (R$)
800 billion over the next decade (about US$195 billion) and is
crucial to help comply with the constitutional cap on spending.
Although, its positive impact on the fiscal balance will be
gradual.

Beyond the pension reform, fiscal adjustment measures will be key
to turning around Brazil's fiscal profile--this includes
controlling mandatory spending (the main pressure coming from
social security and personnel expenditures). Several fiscal
initiatives of this kind will be discussed in Congress next year.

The decline in the Selic rate should also contribute to an
improvement of the fiscal balance by reducing interest payments.
The government now anticipates a lower primary deficit than its
budget target of R$139 billion, largely as a result of
underspending, higher dividends from public companies, and
nonrecurring revenue from the transfer of rights auction. In 2019,
S&P expects the general government deficit will fall to 5.9% of
GDP, from 7.1% in 2018.

Brazil's indebtedness will likely increase in 2020-2022 despite
lower fiscal deficits. S&P expects general government debt, net of
liquid assets (around 19% of GDP, mainly government deposits at the
central bank), to reach 61% of GDP in 2019, from 57% in 2018.
Although, the acceleration in transfers from public banks to the
Treasury could improve this ratio (including around US$30 billion
by Brazilian Development Bank BNDES). The fiscal reforms proposed
by the government, if implemented, will help achieve this
consolidation.

A solid composition of debt supports Brazil's higher debt burden,
with low shares of debt in foreign currency (around 4% of the
total) and held by nonresidents (12% of the government commercial
debt). The banking system's holdings of Brazilian government bonds
account for around 26% of the system's total assets. S&P said, "We
expect interest to revenues to average 13% during 2019-2022, down
from 15% in 2018 and 25% in 2015. We assess contingent liabilities
from the financial sector and all Brazilian nonfinancial public
enterprises (including Petrobras) as limited."

Brazil's state and municipal governments face similar budgetary
challenges as the federal government--notably the issue of rising
nondiscretionary spending (payroll and pensions). That reduces
capacity to spend on impaired infrastructure and basic services.
Higher spending pressures would translate into generally weak
liquidity conditions, while access to external financing is narrow
due to prudential rules and debt levels.

Currently, Congress is considering a bill to facilitate the
replication of the pension reform at the federal level to LRGs.
Even though S&P expects some states to promote reforms in local
legislatures in 2020, progress could be hindered by political
considerations ahead of October's municipal election. In addition,
the proposed Federative Pact submitted recently to Congress seeks
to address some fragilities of Brazil's federal fiscal framework.

S&P said, "We expect Brazil's external profile to remain solid.
With the slowdown of global growth and commodity prices, Brazil's
export performance has been weakening since the beginning of the
year. We expect the current account deficit (CAD) to widen from
2.2% of GDP in 2018 (following the central bank recent revision of
its balance of payment statistics) to 2.9% of GDP for 2019." The
higher payments of profits and dividends have also been leading to
an increase in the CAD. Stronger exports growth will be sustained
by higher production of oil, iron ore, and soybeans, while the more
robust domestic demand will underpin higher imports.

Brazil is still receiving a strong flow of direct investment,
around 4% of GDP, sufficient to finance the CAD. As the government
and private sector's external debt continues to rise, S&P expects
narrow net external debt to gradually return to a debtor position
in 2019-2022.

S&P said, "We calculate our estimates of external debt on a
residency basis. They include nonresident holdings of locally
issued real-denominated government debt projected at about US$119
billion as of December 2019 (about 40% of current account
receipts). Our external debt data, however, does not include debt
raised offshore by Petrobras and other Brazilian companies that is
transferred in the form of foreign direct investment to head
offices in Brazil." This is captured in Brazil's net external
liability position, estimated at 220% of current account receipts
in 2019.

Brazil's very large external liability position suggests that there
are greater risks to its external accounts should market conditions
deteriorate. Although foreign direct investment generally presents
a much smaller risk than external debt, it still exposes the
economy to swings in investor confidence, potentially resulting in
balance-of-payments pressure in case of accelerated repatriation of
profits and equity.

Trade liberalization is one of the government priorities since it
should help support Brazil's longer-term growth prospects. The
administration aims to forge trade deals with several partners and
to gradually reduce tariffs and nontariff barriers.

The Brazilian real floats and is an actively traded currency.
Brazil has lower external financing needs compared with its current
account receipts (68% in 2019) and high international reserves
relative to some of its peers.

The Central Bank of Brazil (BCB) has consolidated credibility over
the past three years. Actions under the inflation-targeting regime
enabled it to anchor inflation expectations. S&P expects average
annual inflation of around 3.7% in 2019-2022, in line with targets.
The low inflation in a context of weak economic growth and easing
monetary policy in developed countries allowed the BCB to reduce
the Selic rate in 2019 to historically low levels.

The government and Congress back the approval of legal independence
for the central bank. The bills currently being discussed in
Congress establish fixed terms of four years for the board members
that do not coincide with the presidential term. In S&P's opinion,
the enhanced framework could reduce uncertainties related to
electoral cycles and shield the BCB from possible political
interference in the conduct of monetary policy. The central bank
has also been moving forward initiatives to improve financial
system efficiency and increase financial inclusion.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the methodology
applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair confirmed that
the information provided to the Rating Committee by the primary
analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and was sufficient
for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot above.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision. The
views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized in
the above rationale and outlook. The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

  Ratings List

  Ratings Affirmed; CreditWatch/Outlook Action  
                                          To     From
  Brazil
   Sovereign Credit Rating    BB-/Positive/B     BB-/Stable/B

  Ratings Affirmed  

  Brazil
   Sovereign Credit Rating  
   Brazil National Scale                   brAAA/Stable/--
   Transfer & Convertibility Assessment    BB+

  Brazil
   Senior Unsecured                        BB-
   Senior Unsecured                        brAAA




===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Drought Ups Food Prices 7.8% Over Last Year
---------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that the drought has increased food prices
7.8% over the past year, although the Dominican Republic's Central
Bank doesn't observe significant inflationary pressures in the
medium term, according to data in its Monetary Policy Report
published recently.

The rise in food products is well above the inflationary average of
the last year, of 2.48% accumulated in twelve months, and the Bank
considers that the main incidence factor is related to the dry
spell that has affected agro producers since 2018 and that has
reduced the supply of farm goods, according to Dominican Today.

"However, no significant inflationary pressures are anticipated in
the medium term, as the effects of adverse climatic conditions on
agricultural goods prices dissipate and pressures on the side of
aggregate demand remain moderate," says the Monetary Policy Report
corresponding to November, which projects inflation at around 4%
for 2020, the report notes.

                   About Dominican Republic

The Dominican Republic is a Caribbean nation that shares the island
of Hispaniola with Haiti to the west. Capital city Santo Domingo
has Spanish landmarks like the Gothic Catedral Primada de America
dating back 5 centuries in its Zona Colonial district.

The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America reported on April 4,
2019, that the Dominican Today related that Juan Del Rosario of
the
UASD Economic Faculty cited a current economic slowdown for the
Dominican Republic and cautioned that if the trend continues,
growth would reach only 4% by 2023. Mr. Del Rosario said that if
that happens, "we'll face difficulties in meeting international
commitments."

An ongoing concern in the Dominican Republic is the inability of
participants in the electricity sector to establish financial
viability for the system.

Standard & Poor's credit rating for Dominican Republic stands at
BB- with stable outlook (2015). Moody's credit rating for
Dominican Republic was last set at Ba3 with stable outlook (2017).
Fitch's credit rating for Dominican Republic was last reported at
BB- with stable outlook (2016).



=================
G U A T E M A L A
=================

BANCO AGROMERCANTIL: Fitch Affirms BB+ LT FC IDR, Outlook Negative
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirmed Banco Agromercantil de Guatemala, S.A.'s
Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating at 'BB+' and
Long-Term Local Currency IDR at 'BBB-'. The Ratings Outlook is
Negative. Fitch has also affirmed the Short-Term FC IDR at 'B' and
the Short-Term LC IDR at 'F3'. Additionally, Fitch affirmed the
long- and short-term national ratings of BAM, Financiera
Agromercantil, S.A. and Mercom Bank Ltd. at 'AAA(gtm)' and
'F1+(gtm)', respectively for both. The Rating Outlook for all
National Long-Term ratings is Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

BAM - IDRs AND NATIONAL RATINGS

BAM's IDRs and national ratings are based on the potential support
the entity would receive from its shareholder Bancolombia, S.A. if
necessary. Bancolombia (BBB/Negative) is Colombia's largest bank in
terms of assets, deposits and loans, with an important presence in
Central America. BAM's FC IDR is at the same level of Guatemala's
country ceiling of 'BB+', which captures transfer and
convertibility risks. The LC IDR shows the maximum uplift of two
notches above the sovereign rating, which in Fitch's opinion
reflects the parent's solid commitment to its subsidiary. In
addition, BAM's national ratings are at the highest point of the
national rating scale given the relative strength of Bancolombia in
relation to other issuers rated in Guatemala.

In the agency's view, Bancolombia's propensity to provide support
is highly influenced by the huge reputational risk that BAM's
potential default would constitute to its parent, which could
damage its franchise. A key factor of moderate importance
underpinning the parents' propensity for support is BAM's position
as an important part of the group given its role in Bancolombia's
diversification in the Central American region. In addition, that
any required support would be manageable for the shareholder, as
the bank represented about 5.3% of its assets at September 2019.

VR

A challenging operating environment and lower profitability
compared to the system and its closest peers (large commercial
banks in Guatemala) highly influence BAM's VR. As the fifth largest
bank by assets and loans with a market share of 7.9% and 11.3%,
respectively, BAM's franchise is moderate in Guatemala. The VR also
considers the bank's adequate asset quality and appropriate funding
structure relative to its rating level, as well as the
deteriorating trend in capitalization.

In recent years, the bank's profitability has weakened, mainly
influenced by higher loan impairment charges. However, in
third-quarter 2019 (3Q19), profitability improved slightly, since
the operating profit to risk weighted assets (RWA) ratio moved to
0.9% from 0.7% in 2018. Additionally, BAM's profitability lags that
of its closest peers and the industry average (2.3%). Fitch expects
the bank to maintain the positive trend in profitability as a
result of different measures taken by it. However, if this trend
isn't sustained, it could affect the agency's evaluation of the
earnings and profitability factor.

Fitch believes BAM's asset quality is appropriate, although it has
experienced a deteriorating trajectory in recent years, as is the
case across the system. As of 3Q19, the delinquency ratio (+90 days
past due loans) registered 2.6% (industry: 2.5%), compared with an
average of 1.9% (industry: 2.0%) between 2015 and 2018. Even though
the prevailing operating environment could slightly pressure loan
quality, Fitch expects it to remain at similar levels by the end of
2019 as a result of the strengthening of the credit controls.

BAM's capitalization is the weakest factor in its financial profile
and compares unfavorably to its peers. From 2015 to 2017, the Fitch
Core Capital (FCC) to RWA ratio averaged 11.1%, but in 2018 and at
3Q19 it fell to 10.0% and 9.7%, respectively. Fitch expects BAM's
capital position to remain at reasonable levels over the rating
horizon. Furthermore, in an adverse event, the agency anticipates
that Bancolombia would provide support to its subsidiary if
required.

In Fitch's view, BAM's funding structure is appropriate, with
financial flexibility, and also benefits from Bancolombia's support
and its recognized franchise. Customer deposits are an important
and stable source of financing, which accounted for 78.1% of total
funding in 3Q19 (system: 86.2%). Additionally, BAM exhibits a wide
variety of funding alternatives. As of 3Q19, the loans to deposits
ratio was 113.0% (industry: 74.3%).

SUPPORT RATING (SR)

BAM's SR of '3' reflects the Bancolombia's moderate ability and
propensity to support to BAM, if necessary. This rating is mostly
influenced by the current level of the country ceiling.

FINANCIERA AGROMERCANTIL and MERCOM - NATIONAL RATINGS

Financiera Agromercantil and Mercom's national ratings are driven
by the potential assistance from their shareholder, Bancolombia, if
it would be necessary. Their national ratings are at the highest
level of the rating scale, which reflects the relative strength of
their owner, with respect to other rated issuers in the country.

In addition, Fitch considers with high importance in its
evaluation, that Bancolombia's ability and willingness to support
its Guatemalan subsidiaries is influenced by the huge reputational
risk that the institutions' default could constitute to its parent,
damaging its franchise. Fitch also factors with moderate
importance, the entities' role in the group in Guatemala, which
includes operations in complementary market segments that boost
BAM's business model.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

BAM - IDRs and VR

The Negative Outlook on BAM's Long-Term Local and Foreign Currency
IDRs is aligned with the sovereign. A downgrade of Guatemala's
sovereign ratings and Country Ceiling would trigger similar rating
actions on the bank's IDRs and VR. The Ratings Outlook could return
to Stable if Guatemala's sovereign rating Outlook is revised to
Stable.

In addition, the VR could be downgraded in a scenario of a material
deterioration in the local operating environment. This rating could
be pressured if the operating profit to RWA metric remains
constantly below 1% and/or the Fitch Core Capital ratio
consistently falls below 9%.

SUPPORT RATING

BAM's SR is sensitive to modifications in Guatemala's sovereign
rating, or in the assessment of Bancolombia's propensity or ability
to provide support to its subsidiary.

BAM, FINANCIERA AGROMERCANTIL and MERCOM - NATIONAL RATINGS

The ratings are at the highest level of the national rating scale
and therefore have no upside potential. In turn, a rating downgrade
could occur if Fitch's assessment of Bancolombia's ability or
willingness to support its subsidiaries is modified.

SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL ADJUSTMENTS

BAM: Prepaid expenses and other deferred assets were reclassified
as intangible assets and were deducted from Fitch Core Capital
since the agency considers these to have low capacity to absorb
losses.

PUBLIC RATINGS WITH CREDIT LINKAGE TO OTHER RATINGS

Banco Agromercantil de Guatemala, Financiera Agromercantil and
Mercom Bank's ratings are based on the potential support the
entities would receive from their shareholder Bancolombia, S.A. if
necessary. Bancolombia (BBB/Negative) is Colombia's largest bank in
terms of assets, deposits and loans, with an important presence in
Central America.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of 3 - ESG issues are credit
neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity, either
due to their nature or the way in which they are being managed by
the entity.

BANCO DE DESARROLLO: Fitch Affirms BB LT IDR, Outlook Negative
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirmed Banco de Desarrollo Rural, S.A.'s Long-Term
Issuer Default Rating at 'BB', Short-Term IDR at 'B' and Viability
Rating at 'bb'. The Rating Outlook on the Long-Term IDR is
Negative. In addition, Fitch has affirmed Banrural and Financiera
Rural S.A.'s National Long-Term Ratings at 'AA+(gtm)' and National
Short-Term Ratings at 'F1+(gtm)'. The Rating Outlooks on the
Long-Term National Ratings for Banrural and Finrural are Negative.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRs, VR AND NATIONAL RATINGS

Banrural's ratings are driven by its intrinsic creditworthiness
reflected in its VR, which is highly influenced by Guatemala's
sovereign rating and broader operating environment. The VR also
considers with higher importance Banrural's company profile, as
Fitch considers the bank systemically important in Guatemala, given
its size, national coverage and services provided. Fitch also
considers still adequate profitability to withstand increasing
impairment charges and capitalization levels that provide
sufficient cushion to absorb unexpected losses in the context of
increasing impaired loans.

Banrural is rated at the sovereign level (BB/Negative), which
constrains the VR, given the bank's exposure to government related
securities and its sensitivity to the broader operating
environment. Banrural is the second largest bank in Guatemala with
close to USD9.6 billion in assets as of September 2019. The bank's
market share in the system approached 18% of total loans and 24% of
total deposits.

As of September 2019, impaired loans, according to local
regulation, reached 4.97% of gross loans (90 days past due/gross
loans was 4.5%), which is above the system average and close to
breaching the 5% limit established by covenants, which are under
review with wholesale providers. Fitch believes asset quality
deterioration remains at manageable levels, as reserve coverage
levels have remained adequate (September 2019: 136.5%; December
2018: 126.7%) sustained by higher loan impairment charges.

Increasing loan impairment charges, which accounted for 55.8% of
pre-impairment operating profit as of September 2019, reduced
profitability. At this same date, the bank's operating profit to
risk-weighted assets (RWA) accounted for 2.4% down from 3.1% as of
December 2018. Although Banrural currently maintains profitability
levels sufficient to withstand additional impairment charges,
further asset quality deterioration and lower profitability could
have rating implications mainly in the National Scale.

Capital metrics remain at adequate levels despite a slight decrease
caused by loan growth and reduced profitability. As of September
2019, the Fitch Core Capital (FCC) declined slightly to 16.9%
(December 2018: 17.2%), level that still provides a sufficient
cushion to absorb unexpected losses.

Banrural has a strong local deposit franchise (97.5% of total
funding) which is almost entirely comprised of local currency funds
(98%). The loan/deposit ratio remained low (September 2019: 56.7%;
September 2018: 58.1%) reflecting adequate levels of liquidity on
the balance sheet and continuous deposit growth.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOORBanrural's Support Rating
(SR) and Support Rating Floor (SRF) reflect Fitch's opinion
regarding the likelihood that the bank will receive extraordinary
support from the sovereign.

The bank's SR of '3' reflects Fitch's opinion that there is a
moderate probability of support from the state. The SRF is one
notch below the sovereign rating at 'BB-', which indicates the
minimum level to which the entity's Long-Term IDR could fall if the
agency does not change its view on potential sovereign support.

Fitch's assessment considers the size of the banking system
relative to the size of the economy, and Banrural's local systemic
importance as one of the largest banks in Guatemala.

FINANCIERA RURAL NATIONAL RATINGS Finrural's ratings are driven by
the support it would receive from Banrural, if required. In the
agency's view, Finrural is highly integrated to Banrural and a
default of Finrural would constitute an important reputational risk
for the bank. Finrural provides services to Banrural as managing
trustees while its size is considered immaterial relative to the
ability of Banrural to provide support.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRs AND VR There is limited upside potential given the sovereign's
Negative Outlook. Banrural's Long-term IDRs could be downgraded if
Guatemala's sovereign rating is downgraded. The Rating Outlooks
could return to Stable if Guatemala's sovereign Rating Outlook is
revised to Stable. Banrural's VR is also constrained by its
operating environment (Guatemala's IDR is BB/Negative). A sustained
decline in profitability (operating profit to RWAs below 2%), along
with a decline in capitalization (FCC/RWA close to 12%) would also
be negative for the bank's ratings. SUPPORT RATING Banrural's SR
and SRF are sensitive to changes in the sovereign rating as well as
its capacity and/or propensity to provide support. NATIONAL RATINGS
There is limited upside potential given the Negative Outlook. In
addition to a downgrade of the bank's Long-Term Local Currency IDR,
a sustained deterioration in asset quality that reduces
profitability (operating profit to RWAs below 2.5%) and/or
capitalization (FCC/ RWA below 14%) could also result in negative
rating actions. FINANCIERA RURAL NATIONAL RATINGS Changes in
Finrural's ratings would mirror movements in Banrural's ratings as
well as changes in its capacity and/or propensity to provide
support.

SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL ADJUSTMENTS

Banrural Summary of Financial Statement Adjustments - Prepaid
expenses and other deferred assets were reclassified as intangible
assets and were deducted from FCC since the agency considers these
to have low capacity to absorb losses. Equity interests in
insurance companies are also deducted from FCC. Impaired Loans were
adjusted to reflect only loans that are overdue by 90 days or more
to be consistent with Fitch's criteria and global industry
practices.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

ESG CONSIDERATIONSUnless otherwise disclosed in this section, the
highest level of ESG credit relevance is a score of 3 - ESG issues
are credit neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the
entity, either due to their nature or the way in which they are
being managed by the entity.

BANCO DE LOS TRABAJADORES: Fitch Affirms BB- IDR, Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirmed Banco de los Trabajadores' Viability Rating
at 'bb-' and, accordingly, affirmed the bank's Long-Term Issuer
Default Ratings at 'BB-'. The Rating Outlook remains Stable.

In addition, Fitch has affirmed Bantrab's Long-Term National Rating
at 'A-(gtm)'/Positive, and the rating for Bantrab Senior Trust's
long-term rating at 'BB-'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRs, VR and NATIONAL RATINGS - Bantrab

Bantrab's ratings are driven by its intrinsic profile, as reflected
in its VR. The VR is mainly driven by the bank's risk control
framework and risk appetite, which are similar to the industry
average.

Bantrab's underwriting standards and risk controls indicate a
favorable evolution towards better practices, which in Fitch's
opinion, have begun to boost financial results and governance
practices. Fitch also takes into account Guatemala's economic
prospects and heightened political tensions, which could hinder the
overall business environment and limit the bank's financial
prospects.

The bank's capitalization, as reflected in its Fitch Core Capital
ratio of 18.4% as of 3Q19, buttresses the issuer's growth prospects
and provides a strong loan loss absorption capacity in case of
potential losses. The bank compares favorably against the industry
median and its closest competitors.

Bantrab's loan quality is good for its consumer-focused business
model. This is due to debt collection via automatic payroll
deductions. Both NPLs and net charge-offs ratios are lower than
previous fiscal periods (1.48% and 1.25%). Reserve coverage ratio
remains at an adequate 111%. Bantrab ranks second in consumer loans
in the Guatemalan market.

The bank's profitability is increasing, based on a high net
interest margin (NIM), good operational efficiency and moderate
loan loss provisions. NIM benefits from adequate pricing of
products by business segments and a reduction of financial cost,
namely in term deposits. As of 3Q19, operating profitability on
risk weighted assets was 4.8% versus the industry's 2.3%.

Bantrab's funding structure is based on term deposits of higher
than average cost but with good stability due to high renewal
rates. However, the bank is implementing a sound strategy of term
deposit repricing in order to boost profitability. As of 3Q19, the
bank's interest expense is 7.3% of average interest-bearing
liabilities compared to the industry median of 4.3%. The funding
structure remains less diversified than other large banks, although
Fitch expects it to evolve positively in the medium term.

Bantrab's liquidity is above industry parameters and would allow a
timely response to liquidity needs that might arise. The bank
benefits from the stability of its deposits through the economic
cycles. Liquid asset (cash and equivalents) coverage of total
deposits is higher than the Guatemalan industry average.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR - Bantrab

Bantrab's SR and SRF of '5' and 'NF', respectively, indicate that,
although possible, external support cannot be relied upon given the
currently low state ownership and relatively limited systemic
importance.

SENIOR DEBT - Bantrab Senior Trust

Bantrab's Senior Trust's (BST) seven-year U.S.-dollar loan
participation notes' rating is in line with Bantrab's VR,
reflecting that the senior unsecured obligations rank equally with
the bank's unsecured and unsubordinated obligations.

NATIONAL RATINGS - Fintrab

Fintrab's National ratings are underpinned by institutional support
it would likely receive from its shareholder, Bantrab. Fitch's
opinion of support is based on the significant reputational risk
that a default would pose to Bantrab. As a result, Fintrab's
National ratings are aligned with Bantrab's credit profile.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRs, VR and NATIONAL RATINGS - Bantrab

Bantrab's IDR and VR have limited upside potential in the medium
term due to the constraining operating environment. However, if a
negative rating action on the sovereign were severe (i.e. a
downgrade of more than notch) or if the bank's evolution of its
risk framework and financial profile regressed, its ratings could
be downgraded accordingly.

Bantrab's National ratings could be upgraded if further
improvements of its funding and liquidity profiles materialize,
aligning the bank to the level of higher-rated competitors. Namely,
the establishment of more alternative funding sources, including
additional correspondent banking relationships, along with further
demonstration of a strong refinancing capacity could be positive
for creditworthiness. By contrast, the bank's National ratings
would remain at their current levels if the bank's funding profile
does not continue to progress in accordance to current
expectations.

SR and SRF - Bantrab

Guatemala's propensity or ability to provide timely support to
Bantrab is not likely to change given the bank's low systemic
importance. As such, the SR and SRF remain at their current
levels.

SENIOR DEBT - BST

Changes to the notes' long-term rating would be contingent upon
rating actions on Bantrab.

NATIONAL RATINGS - Fintrab

Fintrab's National ratings would mirror changes in the National
scale ratings of its parent.

SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL ADJUSTMENTS

Pre-paid expenses and other deferred assets were reclassified as
intangible and deducted from Fitch Core Capital.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

ESG Considerations

Environmental & Social Factors

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of 3 - ESG issues are credit
neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity, either
due to their nature or the way in which they are being managed by
the entity.

Governance Factor

Fitch highlights the following general issues with scores of '4'
and '5' on governance factors, as it believes they could be
relevant to the rating.

  - Management Strategy

Strategy has been under review since the corporate events between
2016 and 2017. After making important managerial changes, the bank
has an above-average execution of strategy.

  - Governance Structure

Alleged fraud attempt by three then board members on the bank's
shareholders triggered a rating downgrade in 2016. Fitch expects
the consolidation of the corporate governance framework in the
foreseeable future.

BANCO G&T: Fitch Affirms BB LT IDRs, Outlook Negative
-----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirmed Banco G&T Continental S.A.'s Long-Term
Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings at 'BB' and
Viability Rating at 'bb'. G&TC's Rating Outlook on the Long-Term
IDRs is Negative. Fitch has also affirmed the National Scale
ratings of the bank and its subsidiaries. The Rating Outlook for
all the National Long-Term ratings in Guatemala is Stable; while
the National Long-Term rating in Panama is Negative.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

G&TC's IDRS, VR AND NATIONAL RATINGS

G&TC's IDRs and National ratings are driven by its intrinsic
profile, as reflected in its VR. The bank's VR is highly influenced
by the challenging operating environment in Guatemala and its
company profile due to its sound local franchise. G&TC's IDRs
Negative Outlooks are aligned with Guatemala's Negative Outlook
(BB/Negative), as the bank is rated at the sovereign level. The
country's mild economic prospects and strained political
conjuncture could continue influencing the business environment and
the local banks' performance, thus constraining the bank's
international ratings.

G&TC's VR is also highly influenced by its sound franchise in the
Guatemalan financial market along with its corporate-oriented
business; however, its franchise and model are still moderate
compared with higher-rated regional peers. The entity is the third
largest bank in Guatemala. Management will seek to expand its
service toward medium-sized enterprises and consumer segments in
order to increase diversification and profitability.

In Fitch's opinion, G&TC's increasing delinquency rates reflects a
higher risk exposure compared with local peers. The bank maintains
a high concentration in large corporate clients whose performance
may deteriorate under challenging economic conditions. Despite the
recent changes to its risk management framework, impairment levels
remain above similarly-rated banks. As of Sep 2019, the
non-performing loans (NPL) ratio increased to 2.7%, from a
four-year average of 1.8%, due to the deterioration of large credit
exposures. In the agency's view, higher effectiveness in G&TC's
risk controls will be relevant to contain loan book deterioration.

G&TC's profitability is commensurate with its corporate orientation
and remains moderate and below its local peers. In Fitch's opinion,
the entity's profitability focus could drive a modest rise in its
profits as it will maintain its corporate orientation. As of
September 2019, G&TC's operating profitability to risk weighted
assets (RWAs) ratio was 1.3%, a level that contributed to sustain
its equity position. As of September 2019, its FCC ratio was 13%,
higher than average levels of 11.3% between 2015 and 2018. Fitch
believes that the slightly improving growth trend in G&TC's capital
levels may continue due to sustained low growth and moderate
profits.

G&TC's strong deposit base continues with its stable trend and
favors the entity's funding sources. The bank's deposits also
maintain their favorable franchise with respect to similarly rated
local peers. As of September 2019, its loan to deposit ratio was
62.1%, although recently benefited by the loan growth deceleration.
Unlike its loan book, deposits come mainly from individuals
contributing to moderate concentration levels. G&TC's liquidity is
good as its liquid assets represented close to 73% of total
deposits as of the same date, a robust position for responding to
liquidity requirements.

G&TC'S SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

G&TC's Support Rating (SR) of '3' reflects Fitch's opinion
regarding the moderate probability of the bank receiving
extraordinary support from the sovereign if needed. Fitch's
considers the sovereign's ability to provide support, as reflected
in its rating and the small relative size of the banking system.
The SR also reflects the G&TC's deposit-based funding structure and
systemic importance in Guatemala. As of September 2019, the bank's
market share in deposits was around 15%.

The Support Rating Floor (SRF) of 'BB-' is one notch below the
sovereign rating of Guatemala and, according to Fitch's criteria,
indicates the minimum level to which the entity's Long-Term IDR
could fall if the agency does not change its view on potential
sovereign support.

CONTICREDIT, FIN G&TC AND GTC'S NATIONAL RATINGS

G&T Conticredit S.A. (Conticredit), Financiera G&T Continental,
S.A. Fin G&TC) and GTC Bank Inc. (GTC) national ratings in
Guatemala are based on the institutional support they would receive
from their shareholder, G&TC, if needed. Fitch's opinion of the
support is based on the relevant role these subsidiaries have on
its parent's strategy and the significant reputational risk that a
default of one of them would pose to G&TC. As a result, their
Guatemalan scale ratings are at the same levels of G&TC's national
ratings. GTC's National Ratings in Panama also reflect the
potential support from G&TC and its risk profile within the
Panamanian operating environment.

CONTICREDIT'S DEBT ISSUANCES NATIONAL RATINGS

Conticredit's senior debt issuances' national ratings are aligned
to those of their respective issuer as their probability of default
is the same as of Conticredit.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

G&TC's IDRS, VR AND NATIONAL RATINGS

The bank's Outlooks would only return to Stable if similar action
is taken on the sovereign's Rating Outlook. A downgrade of
Guatemala's sovereign ratings and Country Ceiling would trigger
similar rating actions on G&TC's IDRs and VR. Significant
deterioration of its main customers, which increases the bank's
impairment levels, and results in a sustained decline in the bank's
operating profits to risk weighted assets ratio consistently below
1% and FCC ratio below 9%, would also trigger negative rating
actions. G&TC'S SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR G&TC's SR
and SRF are sensitive to changes in the sovereign rating as well as
its capacity and/or propensity to provide support. CONTICREDIT, FIN
G&TC AND GTC'S NATIONAL RATINGS Changes in the National Ratings of
G&TC's subsidiaries would mirror changes in its parent's ability
and propensity to provide timely support when required. The
Negative Outlook on GTC's Panamanian Long-Term Rating indicates
that these ratings would be downgraded should G&TC's IDR be
downgraded.

CONTICREDIT'S DEBT ISSUANCES NATIONAL RATINGS

Changes in Conticredit's National Ratings on its debt issuances
would move in line with the issuer's ratings.

SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL ADJUSTMENTS

Prepaid expenses and other deferred assets were reclassified as
intangible assets and were deducted from FCC since the agency
considers these to have low capacity to absorb losses. Impaired
loans were adjusted to reflect only loans that are overdue by 90
days or more to be consistent with Fitch's criteria and global
industry practices.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
G&TC's ESG credit relevance is a score of 3. ESG issues are credit
neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity, either
due to their nature or the way in which they are being managed by
the entity.

BANCO INDUSTRIAL: Fitch Affirms BB LT IDR, Outlook Negative
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirmed Banco Industrial, S.A.'s Long-Term Issuer
Default Rating at 'BB', Short-Term IDR at 'B' and Viability Rating
at 'bb'. The Rating Outlook is Negative. In addition, Fitch has
affirmed the bank's National Ratings and its subsidiaries Westrust
Bank International Limited; Contecnica, S.A., Financiera Industrial
S.A. and the affiliate bank in Panama BIBank, S.A. The Rating
Outlook for the National Ratings of the subsidiaries is Stable, and
the Outlook for BIBank is Negative.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Industrial's IDRs are driven by its intrinsic credit quality as
reflected by its VR. The bank's operating environment and company
profile highly influence its ratings. Industrial's strong local
franchised and growing regional footprint in Central America
benefits its financial performance and prospects despite the
Negative Outlook on Guatemala's Sovereign Rating. In addition,
Industrial's VR considers its improving profitability, good asset
quality and increasing capital metrics.

Guatemala's operating environment highly influences the bank's
performance and prospects, given its large size and exposure to
most economic sectors. A material deterioration in Guatemala's
operating environment could pressure industrial's VR, which is
rated at the sovereign level.

Industrial is the largest Guatemalan bank with market shares of 28%
of total assets and 25.3% of deposits as of September 2019.
Industrial is the largest subsidiary of BICapital Corporation. The
bank's strong franchise in Guatemala and its large branch network
underpins an ample deposit base and low funding costs. Industrial's
consistent strategy benefits its performance, as shown by the
steady improvements in profitability and capitalization.

Increasing profitability has sustained a positive trend in the
bank's FCC to Risk Weighted Assets (RWAs) ratio. As of September
2019, Industrial's core capital metric has increased to 12.0%. The
bank's loss absorption capacity is enhanced by non-core loss
absorbing hybrid capital and sound loan loss reserves coverage;
however, moderate earnings retention may detract from the positive
trend.

Industrial has consistently increased its core profitability metric
of operating profits to RWAs to 2.5% as of September 2019 from
average levels of 2.23% in the last four years. Moderate asset
growth, improvements in efficiency and a relatively stable margin
due to stable funding profile which is reliant on low cost customer
deposits underpinned this improvement. In Fitch's view, continued
asset growth and consistently good asset quality will sustain the
positive trend in profitability over the rating horizon.

Asset quality is sound due to good underwriting standards. Past due
loan metrics stand out positively among regional peers at 1.1% as
of September 2019, despite a moderate increasing trend driven by a
higher exposure in retail segments and the deterioration of the
operating environment. Concentration risk by individual client and
economic sectors is a concern, as more challenging economic
conditions may affect the performance of the loan book, in Fitch's
view. Concentration is expected to remain high given the Guatemalan
economy's small size and structure.

Support Rating and Support Rating Floor

Industrial's support rating (SR) of '3' reflects Fitch's opinion of
the moderate probability of extraordinary support that the bank
will receive from the Sovereign if needed. Fitch's assessment of
support is based on the sovereign's ability to provide support, as
reflected in its rating and the small relative size of the banking
system. Fitch's assessment of the sovereign's propensity to support
the bank mainly considers Industrial's systemic importance in
Guatemala. Fitch's support assessment also considers the bank's
deposit-based funding structure.

Industrial's SRF is one notch below Guatemala's Sovereign rating,
and according to Fitch's criteria, indicates the minimum level to
which the entity's Long-Term IDR could fall in the event of a VR
driven downgrade.

Subordinated Debt and Other Hybrid Securities

Industrial's subordinated Tier I capital notes (IST-I) are rated
four notches below the bank's VR given its deep subordination
status and discretionary coupon omission.

Industrial Subordinated Trust's Notes (ISbT), a special issuance
vehicle of Industrial, are rated one notch below Industrial's VR,
reflecting the subordinated status, ranking junior to all
Industrial's present and future senior indebtedness, pari passu
with all other unsecured subordinated debt and senior to
Industrial's capital and tier I hybrid securities.

Industrial Senior Trust's Notes' (ISnT), another special issuance
vehicle of Industrial, ratings are in line with Industrial's VR,
reflecting that the senior unsecured obligations rank equally to
Industrial's unsecured and unsubordinated obligations.

Subsidiaries and Affiliated Company

The national ratings of Industrial's subsidiaries in Guatemala:
Westrust Bank, Contecnica and Financiera Industrial, are aligned
with Industrial's national ratings. The national ratings of the
subsidiaries reflect Fitch's assessment of the potential support
they would receive from Industrial, if necessary. Fitch's
assessment of Industrial's ability to support its subsidiaries is
reflected in the bank's rating and the agency's assessment of the
bank's propensity to support the subsidiaries considers the
integral role these entities have for Industrial's local business
model and strategy.

In turn, BIBank's National Ratings in Panama reflect the potential
support from its sister company, Industrial through their holding
company Bicapital Corporation. Fitch's support assessment considers
that a default would constitute high reputational risk to its
parent and to Industrial.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating Sensitivities

The Negative Outlooks on the Local and Foreign Currency IDRs of
Industrial are aligned with the sovereign. A downgrade of
Guatemala's sovereign ratings and Country Ceiling would trigger
similar rating actions on Industrial's IDRs and VRs. The Outlooks
on the IDRs would return to Stable only if the Outlook of the
sovereign is revised to Stable.

The Bank's VR has limited upside potential given the constraining
operating environment. A sustained deterioration in the bank's
asset quality and financial performance that drives its FCC ratio
to a level consistently below 9% could negatively affect the bank's
IDRs VR and National ratings.

A national ratings upgrade could be driven by consistent increases
in the bank's FCC ratio to a level above 12%, while the bank
sustains its current asset quality and profitability metrics.

Support Rating and Support Rating Floor

Industrial's SR and SRF are sensitive to changes in the sovereign
rating as well as its capacity and/or propensity to provide
support.

Subordinated Debt and Other Hybrid Securities

Changes in the ratings of IST-I, ISnT and ISbT's, are contingent on
changes in Industrial's VR.

Subsidiaries and Affiliated Company

Changes in the ratings of Contecnica, Financiera Industrial,
Westrust Bank are contingent on changes in Industrial's ability and
propensity to provide support.

Changes in the National Scale Ratings of BIBank are contingent on
changes in Industrial's ability, as reflected by its Foreign
Currency IDR, and propensity to provide support. The Negative
Outlook on the National Long-Term Rating indicates that the ratings
would be downgraded should Industrial's IDR be downgraded.

SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL ADJUSTMENTS

Banco Industrial: Prepaid expenses and other deferred assets were
reclassified as intangible assets and were deducted from FCC since
Fitch considers these to have low capacity to absorb losses.

PUBLIC RATINGS WITH CREDIT LINKAGE TO OTHER RATINGS

The ratings of the subsidiaries of Banco Industrial: Contecnica,
Westrust, BI Bank and Financiera Industrial are driven by support
from Banco Industrial; while the ratings of the special purpose
vehicles Industrial Senior Trust and Industrial Subordinated Trust
are linked to the rating of Banco Industrial

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of 3 - ESG issues are credit
neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity, either
due to their nature or the way in which they are being managed by
the entity.



=============
J A M A I C A
=============

JAMAICA: NIR Drops Due to Interventions in Foreign Exchange Market
------------------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that interventions in the foreign exchange market
in November contributed to a decline in the Net International
Reserves (NIR).

Bank of Jamaica data show the NIR fell by US$75 million during the
month, according to RJR News.

At the end of November, the reserves were valued at US$3.58 billion
which was enough to purchase 33 weeks of imports, the report
notes.

                           About Jamaica

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on Oct.
1, 2019,  S&P Global Ratings, on Sept. 27, 2019, raised its
long-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on
Jamaica to 'B+' from 'B'. The outlook is stable. At the same time,
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B' short-term foreign and local
currency sovereign credit ratings on the country. S&P Global
Ratings also raised its transfer and convertibility assessment to
'BB-' from 'B+'.

RJR News reported in June 2019 that Steven Gooden, Chief Executive
Officer of NCB Capital Markets, warned that the increasing
liquidity in the Jamaican economy might result in heightened risk
to the financial market if left unchecked.  This, he said, is
against the background of the local administration seeking to
reduce the debt to GDP to 60% by the end of the 2025/26 fiscal
year, which will see Government repaying more than J$600 billion
which will get back into the system, according to RJR News.



===========
M E X I C O
===========

ELEMENTIA SAB: Fitch Maintains BB+ IDR on Rating Watch Negative
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings maintains Elementia, S.A.B. de C.V.'s 'BB+' Issuer
Default Rating on Rating Watch Negative. The Rating Watch reflects
the potential loss of geographic and cash flow diversification of
Elementia resulting from the proposed spin-off of its metals and
building systems segments. It also reflects the company's high
leverage relative to regional cement peers. Considerations to
resolve the Rating Watch include the ultimate debt allocation to
the cement business and the guarantee structure between both
entities. Fitch expects to resolve the watch once the effects on
Elementia's capital structure from the spinoff transaction can be
determined.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Broad Product Offering: Elementia's profitability is supported by a
diversified revenue base and wide distribution network and product
offerings. The cement division (56% of consolidated EBITDA) should
remain the highest margin segment. The metal segment (24%) applies
a cost-plus margin formula, allowing it to pass through metal price
variations to end customers, which has resulted historically in
more stable profitability. The building systems segment (20%) sells
a variety of roofing, sidings, water-storage tanks and other
products throughout the Americas.

Asset Sale Reduces Rating Pressure: Elementia announced that its
55% owned subsidiary, Giant Cement Holding Inc., reached an
agreement to sell its Pennsylvania assets to Lehigh Hanson, Inc., a
subsidiary of HeidelbergCement, for USD151 million. Giant plans to
use the proceeds from the sale, which may occur prior to the
spin-off of Elementia's metals products and building systems
(Elementia Materials) businesses, to partially reduce its USD305
million intercompany loan with Elementia, which, in turn, would use
this cash primarily to reduce debt. Giant's divestment of its
Keystone plant in Pennsylvania is mildly rating positive and may
reduce the pressure on Elementia's financial profile, which has
resulted from its spin-off transaction and depressed demand for
cement in Mexico.

Rating Outcome Drivers: The final rating outcome post spin-off for
Elementia's IDR and notes due in 2025 will depend upon the
allocation of debt between Elementia and the newly created entity,
as well as the duration of the guarantees of Elementia's notes due
in 2025 that will be provided by subsidiaries of the newly created
entity. An additional rating consideration will be whether the
company's bank debt receives guarantees similar to those held by
the bond holders from the subsidiaries that are being spun off. It
is possible that Elementia's IDR could have a different rating than
the notes depending upon the final guarantee structures.

Elementia Post Spin-off: Elementia post spin-off of its metals and
building systems business will consist of three cement plants in
central Mexico with 3.5 million metric tons (MT) of cement
production capacity; a 55% stake in U.S.-based Giant, which the
company will continue to consolidate in its results; and cement
grinding facilities in Southern Mexico and in Costa Rica. Giant's
capacity will be approximately 1.7 million MT spread in plants in
South Carolina and Maine, after the sale of the Keystone plant,
which has a capacity to produce 1.1 million MT.

Weak Operating Performance: The performance of Elementia's metals
and building systems segments has been pressured by rising costs
and weak demand. The EBITDA from both segments combined declined to
USD55 million in LTM as of September 2019 from USD104 million in
2017, which saw an acceleration of a progressive decline since 2014
when these segments combined generated USD148 million. Elementia's
cement segment grew rapidly through 2018 as it gained market share
in the Mexican market. However, cement demand weakened in that
market in 2019 and it is not projected to grow materially in 2020.
In addition, new capacity in the market has increased competition
and wakened pricing.

Balanced Funding Strategy: Elementia's leverage has been volatile,
partly due to greenfield investments in the cement division, as
well as asset acquisitions and dispositions within its business
portfolio. Most recently, depressed construction markets in Mexico
and in most Latin American markets where Elementia operates have
pressured Elementia's credit metrics. The company has partially
financed its funding needs by issuing shares in the equity markets
for MXN3.9 billion (USD231 million) during 2015 and MXN4.4 billion
(USD233 million) in 2016 through a rights offering, which it used
to partially fund the acquisition of its stake in Giant.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Elementia's 'BB+' ratings reflect the company's broad product
offering relative to regional cement producers such as Grupo
Cementos de Chihuahua (BB+/Stable) and U.S. market leader of
fiber-cement siding and backerboard, James Hardie (BBB-/Stable).
This diversification is offset by Elementia's higher and more
volatile leverage metrics as well as relatively weaker standalone
business profiles in cement or fiber-cement products. James
Hardie's gross debt/EBITDA is expected at below 3x in 2021
following a recent acquisition. This compares with Elementia's
gross leverage of around 4x. Elementia's strong financial access
due to the strength of its shareholders, who form part of large
Mexican business groups, its geographic and product
diversification, and its use of a balanced funding strategy have
been positive drivers behind its ratings. Grupo Cementos de
Chihuahua (GCC), has a stronger cement business and its credit
metrics position it well to capitalize on potential opportunities.

Elementia's weaker competitive position and geographic
diversification relative to major global peers, notably Cemex,
S.A.B. de C.V. (BB/Stable) based on scale and size of cement
operations is offset by Elementia's balanced funding strategy,
solid financial flexibility due to shareholder strength, product
diversification and lower leverage relative to Cemex. Fitch
projects Elementia's net leverage still above 3x by 2020, which
compares against expectations of around 4.5x for Cemex. Aside from
Elementia's lower projected leverage, Fitch believes Elementia's
growth profile is higher than Cemex's.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's Key Assumptions Within Its Rating Case for the Issuer

  -- Cement volumes on average grow single digits over the
intermediate term;

  -- Copper prices follow Fitch's price deck (USD6,500/ton in 2020
and USD6,700/ton in 2021);

  -- Operating EBITDA of approximately MXN4 billion on average for
2020 and 2021;

  -- Cement volumes grow low-single digits on average over the
intermediate term

  -- The exchange rate averages about 19.5 Mexican pesos per U.S.
dollar.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Positive Rating Action

  -- Positive FCF generation and stable operating results through
industry and economic cycles;

  -- A track record of sustained total debt/EBITDA around 2.5x and
net debt/EBITDA below 2.0x.

Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Negative Rating Action

  -- Declining market shares along business lines and loss of
competitive position;

  -- Reduced operating cash flows, profitability, and liquidity;

  -- Expectations of total debt/EBITDA above 4.0x or net
debt/EBITDA above 3.5x.

The resolution of the Rating Watch Negative could take longer than
six months depending on the speed of the definition of guarantee
structures involving Elementia's main subsidiaries as well as the
execution timing of the spin-off transaction.

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

Adequate Liquidity: Elementia's liquidity is adequate, supported
primarily by cash flow generation expectations and good access to
bank funding. The company is expected to generate approximately
MXN1.5 billion in cash flow from operations over the forecast
horizon. Elementia's cash balance as of Sept. 30, 2019 was MXN1.5
billion, which compares with short-term debt maturities of MXN1.1
billion in 2019 and 2021. The closing of the sale of Elementia's
Keystone plant is expected to improve Elementia's liquidity. Fitch
estimates Elementia's consolidated 2019 net leverage pro forma with
the asset sale to be at around 3.3x, which compares with 3.6x at YE
2018.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Elementia has an ESG Relevance Score of 4 for Waste and Hazardous
Materials due to a risk of litigation caused by its past use of
chrysotile asbestos for fiber cement production.

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of 3. ESG issues are credit neutral
or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity, either due to
their nature or the way in which they are being managed by the
entity.



=====================================
T R I N I D A D   A N D   T O B A G O
=====================================

RBC CARIBBEAN: Cuts 65 Branches in Region Since 2013
----------------------------------------------------
Trinidad Express reports that RBC Caribbean has confirmed it has
reduced its branch network in the region by over 50 per cent in the
last six years, even as the Canadian bank admitted it has closed 11
and perhaps 12 branches in Trinidad and Tobago.

According to the report, RBC cut 65 branches in the region since
2013. Consolidation is part of digital adaptation, the bank
insists.

RBC announced its intention to re-enter the T&T and Jamaican
markets in September, notes Trinidad Express.



=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================

CONSIS INT'L: In Settlement Talks With La Boliviana and Asesuisa
----------------------------------------------------------------
Consis International filed its petition for relief in the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida under chapter
11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code on Oct. 2, 2018.

The catalyst for the Chapter 11 filing was an unfavorable Bolivian
arbitration award and a $5,000 daily fine, allegedly acceptable in
that country's system, for failure to immediately satisfy a simple
commercial dispute.  The Debtor believes the award in favor of the
Bolivians in Bolivia was politically influenced.  

Prepetition, the Bolivian creditor and Consis had agreed to engage
in settlement talks.  Another court denied the opportunity.  As of
the Petition Date, according to the Bolivian creditors, their claim
exceeded $5,000,000 (upon a $1,000,000 contract).

On March 4, 2019, immediately upon entry of an order clarifying no
stay was in effect, the Debtor filed its Disclosure Statement and
Proposed Plan.  The Debtor subsequently amended its original plan
and disclosures: First Amended Disclosure Statement for First
Amended Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization and most recently the
Second Amended Disclosure Statement for Second Amended Chapter 11
Plan of Reorganization.

By Order of the Court, representatives of the Debtor, La Boliviana
and Asesuisa attended  a  day-long mediation session on Oct. 10,
2019.  La Boliviana and Asesuisa representatives travelled from
their respective countries.  The mediation resulted in a tentative
settlement agreement, terms of which are being drafted.

According to a Dec. 2, 2019 filing by the Debtor, the Second
Amended Disclosure Statement and the soon-to-be filed Third Amended
Disclosure Statement, with specific reference to the Bates-Stamped
production to key stakeholders, is the product of earlier plans and
disclosure statements, modified by prior objections, as well as the
multiple negotiations among the Debtor and these stakeholders who
are parties to the mediation.  The Second Amended Plan and the
soon-to-be filed Third Amended Plan are also the product of
extensive, good faith negotiations between the Debtor and the
stakeholders in this Chapter 11 Case.

If the Debtor is able to finalize its settlement agreement with
Asesuisa and La Boliviana, confirmation of the draft Third Amended
Plan will be supported by members of certain classes, Asesuisa and
La Boliviana.

In the Dec. 2 filing, the Debtor seeks expedited consideration of
an Amended Disclosure Statement and Amended Plan, proposed ballot
and other relief sought.  Consis requested that the Bankruptcy
Court schedule a hearing for the conditional approval of the
Disclosure Statement on or before Dec. 5, 2019; and a final hearing
on or before Dec. 16, 2019.

A full-text copy of the Motion is available at
https://is.gd/iIgaGM
from PacerMonitor.com at no charge.

The Debtor filed its Third Amended Chapter 11 Plan of
Reorganization on Dec. 4, 2019.  A copy of the Disclosure
Statement
in support of the Third Amended Plan is available at
https://is.gd/d2lge0 from PacerMonitor.com.

Counsel of the Debtor:

     Aleida Martinez-Molina, Esq.
     WEISS SEROTA HELFMAN COLE & BIERMAN, P.L.
     2525 Ponce de Leon Boulevard, Suite 700
     Coral Gables, Florida 33134
     Tel: (305) 854-0800
     E-mail: amartinez@wsh-law.com

                    About Consis International

Consis International LLC -- https://www.consisint.com/ -- provides
computer systems design and related services. It was founded in
August 1987 in Caracas, Venezuela.

Consis International sought protection under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Case No. 18-22233) on Oct. 2,
2018.  In the petition signed by Oscar Carrera, manager, the Debtor
was estimated to have assets of less than $1 million and
liabilities of $1 million to $10 million.  Judge John K. Olson
oversees the case.  Weiss Serota Helfman Cole & Bierman, P.L., is
the Debtor's legal counsel.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============

[*] BOND PRICING: For the Week December 9 to December 13, 2019
--------------------------------------------------------------
  Issuer Name              Cpn     Price   Maturity  Country  Curr
  -----------              ---     -----   --------  -------   ---

Odebrecht Finance Ltd      6.0    16.4     4/5/2023    KY     USD
Province of Santa Fe       6.9    74.7    11/1/2027    AR     USD
Embotelladora Andina S     3.5    37.9    8/16/2020    CL     CLP
USJ Acucar e Alcool SA     9.9    74.0    11/9/2019    BR     USD
KrisEnergy Ltd             4.0    40.4     6/9/2022    SG     SGD
Noble Holding Internat     5.3    60.5    3/15/2042    KY     USD
AES Tiete Energia SA       6.8     1.2    4/15/2024    BR     BRL
Empresa de Transporte      4.3    30.9    7/15/2020    CL     CLP
Argentina Bonar Bonds      7.6    74.4    4/18/2037    AR     USD
Automotores Gildemeist     6.8    54.9    1/15/2023    CL     USD
SACI Falabella             2.3    50.6    7/15/2020    CL     CLP
Sylph Ltd                  2.4    65.1    9/25/2036    KY     USD
Banco Security SA          3.0    27.4     6/1/2021    CL     CLP
Argentine Republic Gov     4.3    70.0   12/31/2033    AR     JPY
Automotores Gildemeist     6.8    54.9    1/15/2023    CL     USD
Cia Latinoamericana de     9.5    74.3    7/20/2023    AR     USD
Provincia de Rio Negro     7.8    70.3    12/7/2025    AR     USD
MIE Holdings Corp          7.5    56.4    4/25/2019    HK     USD
Banco Macro SA            17.5    65.2     5/8/2022    AR     ARS
Provincia de Rio Negro     7.8    70.3    12/7/2025    AR     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd      6.0    16.4     4/5/2023    KY     USD
Province of Santa Fe       6.9    75.2    11/1/2027    AR     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd      7.0    16.5    4/21/2020    KY     USD
Noble Holding Internat     6.2    62.2     8/1/2040    KY     USD
YPF SA                    16.5    67.3     5/9/2022    AR     ARS
Banco Macro SA            17.5    65.2     5/8/2022    AR     ARS
Odebrecht Finance Ltd      6.0    16.4     4/5/2023    KY     USD
Cia Latinoamericana de     9.5    73.9    7/20/2023    AR     USD
Automotores Gildemeist     8.3    54.2    5/24/2021    CL     USD
Province of Santa Fe       6.9    75.2    11/1/2027    AR     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd      7.0    16.5    4/21/2020    KY     USD
Province of Santa Fe       6.9    74.7    11/1/2027    AR     USD
Embotelladora Andina S     3.5    37.9    8/16/2020    CL     CLP
USJ Acucar e Alcool SA     9.9    74.0    11/9/2019    BR     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     8.3    72.9   12/31/2033    AR     USD
MIE Holdings Corp          7.5    56.2    4/25/2019    HK     USD
Enel Americas SA           5.8    32.7    6/15/2022    CL     CLP
Empresa Provincial de     12.5     0.0    1/29/2020    AR     USD
Cia Energetica de Pern     6.2     1.1    1/15/2022    BR     BRL
Provincia de Buenos Ai     7.9    75.3    6/15/2027    AR     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     8.3    72.9   12/31/2033    AR     USD
MIE Holdings Corp          7.5    56.2    4/25/2019    HK     USD
China Huiyuan Juice Gr     6.5    46.6    8/16/2020    CN     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd      7.0    17.0    4/21/2020    KY     USD
Yida China Holdings Lt     7.0    74.3    4/19/2020    CN     USD
Noble Holding Internat     6.1    62.0     3/1/2041    KY     USD
USJ Acucar e Alcool SA     9.9    74.0    11/9/2019    BR     USD
YPF SA                    16.5    67.3     5/9/2022    AR     ARS
Provincia del Chubut A     4.5    2208    3/30/2021    AR     USD
Avadel Finance Cayman      4.5    55.0     2/1/2023    US     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     6.9    75.2    1/11/2048    AR     USD
Polarcus Ltd               5.6    71.8     7/1/2022    AE     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     8.3    74.5   12/31/2033    AR     USD
Provincia de Rio Negro     7.8    70.4    12/7/2025    AR     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     0.5    27.6   12/31/2038    AR     JPY
Plaza SA                   3.5    38.3    8/15/2020    CL     CLP
Banco Security SA          3.0     5.6     7/1/2019    CL     CLP
Argentina Bonar Bonds      5.8    75.2    4/18/2025    AR     USD
Corp Universidad de Co     5.9    64.2   11/10/2021    CL     CLP
City of Cordoba Argent     7.9    73.1    9/29/2024    AR     USD
Automotores Gildemeist     8.3    54.2    5/24/2021    CL     USD
Provincia de Cordoba       7.1    72.7     8/1/2027    AR     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     6.3    74.1    11/9/2047    AR     EUR
Provincia del Chaco Ar     4.0     0.0    12/4/2026    AR     USD
Fospar S/A                 6.5     1.2    5/15/2026    BR     BRL
Empresa Electrica de l     2.5    63.8    5/15/2021    CL     CLP
Sociedad Austral de El     3.0    17.0    9/20/2019    CL     CLP
Provincia del Chaco Ar     9.4    74.8    8/18/2024    AR     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     7.1    75.7    6/28/2117    AR     USD
Provincia de Cordoba       7.1    74.7     8/1/2027    AR     USD
Metrogas SA/Chile          6.0    41.6     8/1/2024    CL     CLP
Esval SA                   3.5    49.9    2/15/2026    CL     CLP


                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2019.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.
.


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