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       T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                 L A T I N   A M E R I C A

          Wednesday, January 27, 2021, Vol. 22, No. 14

                           Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

CLISA: S&P Raises Rating on Secured Debt to 'CCC', Outlook Negative


B R A Z I L

BRAZIL: Bolsonaro Wants Free Trade Deal With U.S.
CASA & VIDEO: Files for Initial Public Offering
COMPANHIA DE DESENVOLVIMENTO: Moody's Lowers Issuer Rating to B3
ZARA: To Close Smaller Stores in Brazil, Focus on Online Sales


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Participates in EUR346MM Euro Programs


H O N D U R A S

BANCO ATLANTIDA: Fitch Affirms 'B+' LT IDRs, Outlook Negative


J A M A I C A

JAMAICA: Government Promises to Abolish Asset Tax


V E N E Z U E L A

VENEZUELA: Stake in Citgo Must Be Put Up for Sale, US Judge Says

                           - - - - -


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A R G E N T I N A
=================

CLISA: S&P Raises Rating on Secured Debt to 'CCC', Outlook Negative
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S&P Global Ratings raised its senior secured notes rating on
Argentina-based corporate conglomerate, CLISA-Compania
Latinamericana de Infraestructura y Servicios S.A. (CLISA) to 'CCC'
from 'D'. S&P also affirmed the issuer credit and senior unsecured
notes ratings at 'CCC'.

The outlook remains negative, based on the risks stemming from the
company's heavy dependence on variables that are out of its
control, such the upturn of the construction segment. The outlook
also incorporates the potential further deterioration in CLISA's
credit quality because of worsening business conditions in
Argentina.

On Jan. 20, 2021, CLISA exercised the pay-in-kind (PIK) option on
the senior secured notes interest. Given that the interest was now
capitalized and will be payable at maturity, S&P understands that
the company is again current on its obligations.

The positive rating action reflects the completion of the exercise
of the PIK option on the company's January 2021 interest payment,
which is now capitalized and will be payable at the notes' maturity
in 2023. The PIK exercise brings a substantial relief to CLISA's
cash flows, which are pressured amid the unprecedented business
disruption stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic and Argentina's
depressed economy. Given that the PIK option was valid only for the
past two interest payments, S&P believes that the company will
likely need to evaluate other liability management options to
preserve cash.

Between mid-March and mid-November, Argentina imposed a strict
lockdown, which halted CLISA's construction segment activities.
Despite recent easing of the lockdown, the company's operations are
normalizing somewhat slower than we expected. S&P believes the
company will struggle to increase its construction backlog amid
Argentina's fragile economy and CLISA's dependence on public works.
This could hinder CLISA's ability to generate cash and meet its
financial obligations.

A key credit factor is the company's diversified revenue structure,
given that more than 50% of cash flows come from business units
that were more resilient to the pandemic-induced economic shock.
The waste management concessions are providing more stable cash
flows, stemming from contracts that provide some protection against
inflation and foreign-exchange variation.

The pandemic caused Argentina's recession to deepen, widen fiscal
deficit, further weaken the peso's value, and the sovereign to
default. Even after lockdown relaxation, we believe the country's
deep economic crisis will cause a delay in the public
construction's recovery, limiting the rebound in CLISA's cash flows
over the next few quarters.




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B R A Z I L
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BRAZIL: Bolsonaro Wants Free Trade Deal With U.S.
-------------------------------------------------
globalinsolvency.com, citing Reuters, reports that Brazilian
right-wing President Jair Bolsonaro wrote to newly inaugurated U.S.
President Joe Biden that he hoped the two countries would pursue a
broad free trade agreement during Biden's tenure.

The letter is Bolsonaro's most amicable overture yet to Biden, a
Democrat, according to globalinsolvency.com.

The Brazilian president was a close ally of former Republican
President Donald Trump and refused for weeks to accept the result
of the Nov. 3 U.S. election, repeating baseless allegations of
fraud, the report notes.  It took him 42 days to recognize Biden's
victory, the report relays.

                         About Brazil

Brazil is the fifth largest country in the world and third largest
in the Americas.  Jair Bolsonaro is the current president, having
been sworn in on Jan. 1, 2019.

S&P Global Ratings affirmed on December 14, 2020, its 'BB-/B'
long-and short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit
ratings on Brazil. The outlook on the long-term ratings remains
stable.

Fitch Ratings' credit rating for Brazil stands at 'BB-' with a
negative outlook (November 2020). Moody's credit rating for Brazil
was last set at Ba2 with stable outlook (April 2018). DBRS's credit
rating for Brazil is BB (low) with stable outlook (March 2018).

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America, S&P
Global Ratings' stable outlook assumes that timely implementation
of fiscal adjustment and modest economic recovery will help
preserve market confidence and adequate funding conditions for the
government in local markets in the next two years, despite a
sustained increase in the debt burden.


CASA & VIDEO: Files for Initial Public Offering
-----------------------------------------------
Carolina Mandl and Tatiana Bautzer at Reuters report that Brazilian
appliance retailer Casa & Video filed for an initial public
offering, according to a preliminary prospectus on the securities
industry watchdog CVM website.

Reuters said that the Rio de Janeiro-based company has hired the
investment banking units of Itau Unibanco Holding SA, Banco
Santander Brasil SA, Citigroup, BTG Pactual SA and XP Investments
to manage the offering, confirming a previous report.

The company did not disclose in the filing a pricing range for its
shares nor the pricing date.

The retailer, which operates 150 stores in southeastern Brazilian
states, expects the IPO to fetch around 1 billion reais ($184
million), according to sources with knowledge of the matter, the
report relays.

Casa & Video is one of the few Brazilian companies to have
successfully emerged from bankruptcy protection.


COMPANHIA DE DESENVOLVIMENTO: Moody's Lowers Issuer Rating to B3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina Ltda. has downgraded to B3, from B2,
Companhia De Desenvolvimento Habitacional e Urbano do Estado de Sao
Paulo's ("CDHU") long-term global local currency issuer rating, as
well as the long-term Brazilian national scale local currency
issuer rating to B1.br, from Ba1.br. At the same time, Moody's
confirmed CDHU's baseline credit assessment at caa1 as well as its
short-term global local currency issuer rating at Not Prime and
short-term national scale local currency issuer rating at BR-4. The
outlook on the ratings is stable.

The rating action concludes the review with direction uncertain
that was initiated on September 8, 2020, following the announcement
of a proposed law under which CDHU as an institution could be
extinguished and liquidated with its assets transferred to other
parts of the housing operations of the State of Sao Paulo (Ba2,
stable). The proposed law, Sao Paulo State Law - Lei no. 17.293/
2020, was ratified on 15 October 2020.

The following ratings of Companhia De Desenvolvimento Habitacional
e Urbano do Estado de Sao Paulo were downgraded:

Long-term global local currency issuer rating to B3, from B2

Long-term Brazilian national scale issuer rating to B1.br, from
Ba1.br

The following rating of Companhia De Desenvolvimento Habitacional e
Urbano do Estado de São Paulo were confirmed:

Short-term global local currency issuer rating of Not Prime

Short-term Brazilian national scale issuer rating of BR-4

The issuer outlook of Companhia De Desenvolvimento Habitacional e
Urbano do Estado de Sao Paulo was changed to stable, from rating
under review.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action reflects Moody's assessment that the support CDHU
will receive from the State Government of Sao Paulo in the form of
annual capital contributions will decline overtime following the
recently passed law that allows for it to be liquidated. Moody's
ratings for CDHU's incorporate the assessment of support it
receives from its owner, the State of Sao Paulo, which drives the
company's very high level of capitalization despite loss-making
operations and helps offset its weak asset quality. Moody's noted
that in accordance with its methodology for rating
Government-Related Issuers, the ratings for CDHU are determined by
(1) the company's baseline credit assessment of caa1; and (2)
moderate support from its shareholder, the State of Sao Paulo,
resulting in one notch of ratings uplift.

In October 2020, Sao Paulo State Law - Lei nº 17,293/ 2020 was
ratified, authorizing the State of São Paulo to extinguish CDHU.
Although CDHU is yet to be liquidated and continues operating, CDHU
is currently in the process of restructuring its size and workforce
in order to reduce costs and increase efficiency. In addition, the
amount of funding CDHU has received from its state owner has been
in a declining trend, from an average of BRL801 million between
2012 and 2018 to BRL371 in 2019, BRL453 million in 2020. In the
2021 fiscal budget, the state has budgeted a transfer of BRL253
million. As a result, Moody's assessment of government support was
lowered to moderate, from strong, and the rating now incorporates
one notch of uplift from its BCA of caa1, from two notches
previously. In assigning support, Moody's takes into consideration
CDHU's role as an arm of the government, its mission to provide
subsidized housing to low-income borrowers in the state, the
limited capacity of other government entities to provide comparable
services, and the high level of recurring capital injections it
receives from the state.

On a standalone basis, CDHU's credit profile reflects very high
delinquency ratios and the recurring net losses it reports due to
the large subsidies it offers its borrowers, both of which are
directly related to its mission. Total past due loans represented
13.6% of CDHU’s loan book as of December 2019 (the company does
not report 90-day past due loans). The company continues to be
structurally loss making once adjusting for one-off provisioning
reversals. In addition to subsidies, losses have been driven by
continued increases in production and commercialization costs of
new housing units.

CDHU’s very high level of capitalization, however, supports its
rating. From 2012 to 2019, the State of Sao Paulo transferred R$6.0
billion to CDHU to maintain its day to day operations. These
annually budgeted transfers are a normal part of CDHU's business
model and the company has been entirely reliant on capital
injections from its shareholder. Thanks to these capital
injections, tangible common equity equaled a very strong 88% of
tangible managed assets in 2019. Moody's notes that CDHU also has
very low level of debt outstanding,

Notwithstanding its high level of capital, CDHU's very low
standalone credit profile also reflects the high level of
uncertainty about the recovery value of its assets -- particularly
the mortgage loan book -- given its unique role in social housing,
and consequently Moody's expectation that it has limited ability to
securitize these assets to raise additional funds should capital
injections be significantly reduced.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS

Following the ratings downgrade, there is no upward pressure to
CDHU's ratings. However, a significant improvement in CDHU's
problem loan ratio and profitability would likely lead to an
improving standalone profile. A downgrade of the State of Sao
Paulo's ratings or a significant deterioration in CDHU's capital
levels driven by an increase in losses or continuing reduction in
the level of capital injections from the state government would put
downward pressure on CDHU's ratings.

Companhia De Desenvolvimento Habitacional e Urbano do Estado de Sao
Paulo is headquartered in Sao Paulo and had total assets of BRL
11.6 billion (US$ 2.2 billion) and equity of BRL 10.3 billion as of
December 31, 2019.

The methodologies used in these ratings were Finance Companies
Methodology published in November 2019.


ZARA: To Close Smaller Stores in Brazil, Focus on Online Sales
--------------------------------------------------------------
Dorah Feliciano at Rio Times Online reports that Fashion retailer
Zara, from Spanish group Inditex, will close seven stores in
Brazil.  The number represents a little over 10% of the total
number of physical stores the company operates in Brazil, according
to Rio Times Online.

People linked to the company, who asked to remain anonymous, say
that the move is not linked to the novel coronavirus pandemic, the
report notes.

According to them, closures began last year and are part of the
company's digitalization strategy, which had been announced seven
years ago and is also being carried out in other countries where
the company maintains operations, the report relays.




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D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Participates in EUR346MM Euro Programs
----------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that the Dominican Republic participates
with Caribbean countries in programs and projects for economic
cooperation, regional integration, climate change, risk management
and the environment, and crime and security, with EUR346 million.

Economy Ministry Regional Cooperation director Lidia Encarnacion
manages the work, who specified that every five years, a schedule
is made and at this time, the Eleventh European Development Fund is
being implemented, according to Dominican Today.

She said three areas are highlighted in the programming: economic
cooperation, regional integration, climate change, risk management
and the environment, and crime and security, the report notes.

                     About Dominican Republic

The Dominican Republic is a Caribbean nation that shares the island
of Hispaniola with Haiti to the west. Capital city Santo Domingo
has Spanish landmarks like the Gothic Catedral Primada de America
dating back 5 centuries in its Zona Colonial district. Luis Rodolfo
Abinader Corona is the current president of the nation.

The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America reported in April 2019
that the Dominican Today related that Juan Del Rosario of the UASD
Economic Faculty cited a current economic slowdown for the
Dominican Republic and cautioned that if the trend continues,
growth would reach only 4% by 2023. Mr. Del Rosario said that if
that happens, "we'll face difficulties in meeting international
commitments."

An ongoing concern in the Dominican Republic is the inability of
participants in the electricity sector to establish financial
viability for the system.

Fitch Ratings on Jan. 18, assigned a 'BB-' rating to Dominican
Republic's USD1.5 billion 5.3% notes due Jan. 21, 2041.
Concurrently, the Dominican Republic reopened its 2030 4.5% notes
for an additional USD1.0 billion, which Fitch rates 'BB-', raising
the total outstanding amount of the 2030 notes to USD2.0 billion.

Standard & Poor's, on December 4, 2020, affirmed its 'BB-'
long-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on
the Dominican Republic. The outlook remains negative. S&P also
affirmed its 'B' short-term sovereign credit ratings. The negative
outlook reflects S&P's view that it could lower the ratings on the
Dominican Republic over the next six to 18 months, given the severe
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the sovereign's already
vulnerable fiscal and external profiles, as well as the potential
for a weaker-than-expected economic recovery.

Moody's credit rating for Dominican Republic was last set at Ba3
with stable outlook (July 2017). Fitch's credit rating for
Dominican Republic was last reported at BB- with negative outlook
(May 8, 2020).




===============
H O N D U R A S
===============

BANCO ATLANTIDA: Fitch Affirms 'B+' LT IDRs, Outlook Negative
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Banco Atlantida, S.A.'s (Atlantida)
Long-Term (LT) Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'B+'. Fitch also
affirmed Atlantida's Viability Rating (VR) at 'b+' and its National
Ratings at 'A+(hnd)' and 'F1(hnd)'. The Rating Outlook on the LT
ratings is Negative. Fitch also affirmed the National LT ratings on
Atlantida's Bonos Bancatlan 2016 and Bonos Bancatlan 2018 senior
unsecured notes.

Fitch has removed Inversiones Atlantida, S.A. y Subsidiarias
(Invatlan) from Rating Watch Negative (RWN) and affirmed its LT and
Short-Term IDRs at 'B' and 'B' respectively, and the USD150 million
senior secured notes at 'B'/'RR4' LT. Invatlan's LT IDR has been
assigned a Negative Outlook. The Long- and Short-term National
Ratings of Invatlan's subsidiaries, Leasing Atlantida, S.A.
(Leasing Atlantida) and Inversiones Financieras Atlantida, S.A.
(IFA), were affirmed and removed from RWN. The LT National Ratings
have been assigned Negative Outlook.

The Negative Outlooks on Atlantida's LT IDRs and National Rating
reflect the downside risks from the economic implications of the
coronavirus pandemic. Fitch believes that there are still economic
uncertainties that could materially affect the banks' financial
performance.

Fitch has removed Invatlan's ratings from RWN, reflecting more
comprehensive access to the company's financial information and
strategy. This provides more clarity in Fitch’s assessment of
Invatlan's ratings, which are based on the risk profile of its main
subsidiary, Atlantida. This followed a previous delay in receipt of
financial information that has now been resolved. The Negative
Outlook on Invatlan's LT IDR reflects the Negative Outlook for
Atlantida, which is Invatlan's main subsidiary.

Invatlan's subsidiaries' Negative Outlooks mirror the Outlook for
its parent company.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

ATLANTIDA

IDRS, VR AND SENIOR DEBT

The bank's IDRs and National ratings are driven by its intrinsic
creditworthiness as reflected in its VR of 'b+'. Atlantida's
ratings continue to be highly influenced by the Honduran operating
environment and its company profile. The VR is moderately
influenced by asset quality and profitability that is facing
pressures given the current challenges, along with a limited
capitalization that could also be pressured in the scenario of
unexpected asset quality deterioration. The robust, stable and
diversified funding profile of the bank was also considered in the
VR.

Atlantida has a leading local franchise and a consolidated business
model that has enabled it to manage properly its financial
performance over the business cycle. However, in terms of size of
operations, Atlantida is small on a global basis. As of September
2020 (3Q20), Atlantida was the largest bank in Honduras in terms of
both loan portfolio and customer deposits, with a participation of
around 20% in each one.

Atlantida's asset quality has been under pressure as the operating
environment has been mostly challenged by the pandemic. As of
September 2020, Atlantida's NPL ratio increased to around 3.3%,
comparing above its last three fiscal years average (2.3%), and
below some regional peers. However, according to the management,
this metric decreased to around 2.6% as of December 2020 due to
efforts in the collection mechanisms and an acceleration in the
business dynamics in 4Q20.

Relief measures to clients affected by the pandemic remains
material and concentrated in the corporate sector, which has shown
repayment capacity as of December 2020. Debtors' concentration
remains high by international standards. The top 20 borrowers
represented 2.7x Atlantida's Fitch Core Capital (FCC), which is a
material risk exposure in case of unexpected impairments on its
largest debtors and given the continued decreasing of its reserve
coverage. This coverage stood at 107% as of 3Q20 from an average of
146% in the last three fiscal years.

The bank's profitability has decreased during 2020. As of September
2020, its operating profit to risk weighted assets (RWAs) reached
1.46%, impacted by increased credit costs and a lower Net Interest
Margin. Fitch expects Atlantida's will continue to face pressures
on its profitability due to a slow credit growth as well as from
high credit costs in order to be prudent as the challenges in the
operating environment persist.

Atlantida's funding structure reflects its leading franchise and
wide geographic coverage. Its key funding source, customer
deposits, continued increasing during 2020 (22%). Atlantida's loan
to deposits ratio is still below 100% and decreased due to the
relatively accelerated deposits expansion and the low loan
portfolio growth. Fitch considers that the bank's exposure to
liquidity risk is mitigated by its historical deposit stability, a
wide access to alternative funding sources such as wholesale and
the local capital market, and material liquid assets.

The bank's FCC to RWAs ratio stood at 9.52% as of September 2020.
This capitalization is still commensurate to the 'B' category
range. According to management, dividend distribution is not
planned for 2021 in order to maintain an appropriate level of
capitalization.

Atlantida's outstanding senior unsecured notes issued in the local
capital market Bonos Bancatlan 2016 and Bonos Bancatlan 2018 are
rated at the same level as the bank's National Rating of 'A+(hnd)'
due to its senior unsecured features.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

Atlantida's Support Rating (SR) of '5' and Support Rating Floor
(SRF) of 'NF' reflect Fitch's belief that despite the bank's large
market share in deposits, it cannot rely on external support due to
Honduras' limited ability to provide such support.

INVATLAN

IDRS AND SENIOR DEBT

Invatlan's IDRs reflect the creditworthiness of its main
subsidiary, Atlantida, rated 'B+'. The ratings also consider
Invatlan's high operational integration with its subsidiaries,
mostly with those considered as the most representative in the
group (whether in terms of assets or profitability) and extensive
track record as part of the Invatlan, such as Atlantida. As of
September 2020, the double leverage ratio remained above 120%
(127%). Invatlan has operations in Honduras, El Salvador and
Nicaragua. The transaction in Ecuador through an acquisition did
not take place as initially announced last year.

Fitch affirmed the USD150 million senior secured notes rating at
'B'/'RR4' as these follow Invatlan's IDRs. Despite being senior
secured obligations, Fitch believes the collateral mechanism would
not have a significant impact on recovery rates. In accordance with
Fitch's rating criteria, recovery prospects for the notes are
average and are reflected in their Recovery Rating of 'RR4'.

LEASING ATLANTIDA and IFA

Leasing Atlantida and IFA's ratings reflect Invatlan's propensity
and ability to support the subsidiaries if needed. In Fitch's view,
both entities are a key and integral part of Invatlan's diversified
financial business model as well as the international expansion
strategy.

Moreover, a clear branding identification among these entities with
Invatlan and the rest of subsidiaries, and the reputational risk at
which they would be exposed in the case of potential financial
difficulties in Leasing Atlantida or IFA ultimately result in a
high probability of direct or indirect support by Invatlan, should
it be required.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

ATLANTIDA

IDRs, VR, National Ratings and Senior Debt

-- Atlantida's IDRs are sensitive to changes in Honduras'
    operating environment. The economic disruption from the
    coronavirus pandemic is still underway. Unexpected and
    material economic deterioration related to the pandemic could
    lead to a lower operating environment score for Honduran
    banks, which would pressure Atlantida's VR and National
    Ratings;

-- Downgrades of Atlantida's VR and National Ratings could also
    come from a sustained and significant pressure on the bank's
    financial profile, due to the weakening in economic activity,
    such as a sustained deterioration of the asset quality or
    profitability combined with a sustained fall of the Fitch core
    capital to risk weighted assets ratio to below 8.5%.

-- The bank's national long-term senior unsecured debt is
    sensitive to changes in Atlantida's National Long-Term rating.

SR AND SRF

-- Because these are the lowest levels in the respective scale,
    there is no downside potential for these ratings.

INVATLAN

IDRs AND SENIOR DEBT

-- Invatlan's ratings will likely move in line with those of its
    main subsidiary, Atlantida;

-- A significant reduction on dividends transfers from Invatlan's
    main subsidiaries that ultimately affect its liquidity to
    service debt.

-- The global senior secured debt rating would mirror any change
    to Invatlan's IDRs.

LEASING ATLANTIDA and IFA

National Ratings

-- A negative change in Invatlan's ability or propensity to
    provide support could put pressure on Leasing Atlantida and
    IFA's national-scale ratings.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

ATLANTIDA

IDRs, VR, National Ratings and Senior Debt

-- Given Atlantida's current ratings, there is limited upside
    potential;

-- A positive change in Fitch's operating environment assessment;

-- The Negative Outlook on Atlantida's ratings would be revised
    to Stable if the operating environment assessment is
    maintained in the 'b' range and its Outlook revised to Stable,
    while credit metrics return to pre-crisis levels.

-- Atlantida's VR and National Ratings could be upgraded if the
    bank shows a sustained improvement in capital and
    profitability metrics, which would be materialized in an FCC
    to RWA ratio standing above 10% and an operating profitability
    to RWA ratio consistently above 2%, respectively.

-- The bank's national long-term senior unsecured debt is
    sensitive to changes in Atlantida's National Long-Term rating.

SR AND SRF

-- Honduras's propensity or ability to provide timely support to
    Atlantida is not likely to change given the operating
    environment's structural weaknesses. As such, the SR and SRF
    have limited upside potential.

INVATLAN

IDRS AND SENIOR DEBT

-- Given Atlantida's current ratings, there is limited upside
    potential;

-- Invatlan's IDRs could be upgraded by one notch if the
    company's double-leverage ratio remains consistently below
    120% resulting from a continued expansion financed by capital
    injections;

-- The global senior secured debt rating would mirror any change
    to Invatlan's IDRs.

LEASING ATLANTIDA and IFA

National Ratings

-- There is limited upside potential for Leasing Atlantida and
    IFA's national ratings. However, any perception by Fitch of a
    greater strategic importance of Leasing Atlantida and IFA to
    its parent could lead to an upgrade of their ratings.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Financial Institutions and
Covered Bond issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario
(defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in
a positive direction) of three notches over a three-year rating
horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative
direction) of four notches over three years. The complete span of
best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating
categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario
credit ratings are based on historical performance.

SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL ADJUSTMENTS

Pre-paid expenses were reclassified as intangible and deducted from
total equity to reflect its low absorption capacity.

PUBLIC RATINGS WITH CREDIT LINKAGE TO OTHER RATINGS
Invatlan's IDRs are linked to Banco Atlantida's IDRs.

Leasing Atlantida's ratings are linked to Invatlan's ratings.

IFA's ratings are linked to Invatlan's ratings.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Atlantida's ESG credit relevance score for Exposure to Social
Impact has been revised to '2' from '3'. This is irrelevant to the
rating.

Atlantida's ESG credit relevance score for Group Structure has been
revised to '3' from '4' due to the improvement in the
appropriateness of intra-group dynamics. This has a very low impact
on the rating.

Invatlan has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Financial
Transparency due to an improvement in the clarity and timing in
delivering the most updated financial information and qualitative
attributes, which has a negative impact on the credit profile, and
is relevant to the ratings in conjunction with other factors.
Invatlan's ESG Relevance Score for Financial Transparency has been
revised to '4' from '5'.

Except for the matters discussed above, the highest level of ESG
credit relevance, if present, is a score of '3'. This means ESG
issues are credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on
the entity, either due to their nature or the way in which they are
being managed by the entity.




=============
J A M A I C A
=============

JAMAICA: Government Promises to Abolish Asset Tax
-------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that Jamaica Finance Minister Dr. Nigel Clarke has
said the government will abolish the asset tax once the country's
economic performance improves.

He has reiterated that the tax is counterproductive for businesses
and consumers, according to RJR News.

"The Government of Jamaican is of the firm view that that tax needs
to go as soon as we can find the space, and not for the benefit of
financial institutions and their bottom line at all, for the
benefit of their consumers and customers because ultimately
financial institutions - banks and insurance companies and broker
dealers - they just pass it on to you, the consumer," he asserted,
the report notes.  

Dr. Clarke noted that Jamaica runs the risk of losing valuable
business because of the restrictive nature of the tax on corporate
entities, the report relays.

"What is even a greater negative impact from asset tax is that
financial institutions move assets out of Jamaica because when the
assets are out of Jamaica, they don't attract the asset tax. Now,
everybody at home, I think, can see for yourself that that's not
good for Jamaica, so removing it would bring assets back on shore
to Jamaica which benefits us all," the minister concluded, the
report discloses.

In opening the Budget Debate last year, Dr. Clarke announced a
reduction in the asset tax as part of an $18 billion tax cut, the
report relays.

However, financial institutions agreed to forgo the reduction for a
year in light of the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, the report
adds.

                         About Jamaica

Jamaica is an island country situated in the Caribbean Sea. Jamaica
is an upper-middle income country with an economy heavily dependent
on tourism.  Other major sectors of the Jamaican economy include
agriculture, mining, manufacturing, petroleum refining, financial
and insurance services.

Standard & Poor's credit rating for Jamaica stands at B+ with
negative outlook (April 2020).  Fitch's credit rating for Jamaica
was last reported at B+ with stable outlook (April 2020). Moody's
credit rating for Jamaica was last set at B2 with stable outlook
(December 2019).  

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America, Fitch's
revision of Jamaica's outlook in April 2020 to Stable from Positive
reflects the shock to Jamaica from the coronavirus pandemic, which
is expected to lead to a sharp contraction in its main sources of
foreign currency revenues: tourism, remittances and alumina
exports.




=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================

VENEZUELA: Stake in Citgo Must Be Put Up for Sale, US Judge Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
globalinsolvency.com, citing the Wall Street Journal, reports that
a federal judge ordered that Venezuela's stake in oil refiner Citgo
Petroleum Corp. be put up for sale to satisfy creditors, calling
the country's nonpayment an affront while acknowledging that no
auction can occur under current U.S. sanctions.

Judge Leonard Stark of the U.S. District Court in Wilmington, Del.,
said that Venezuela's shares in Citgo's parent company should be
positioned for sale "to the extent possible," according to
globalinsolvency.com.  No such sale can occur under rules
promulgated by the Trump administration that restrict transfers of
Venezuelan state property, the report notes.

Judge Stark nonetheless said that he would appoint a special master
to map out a sale process, granting a request by Crystallex
International Corp., a defunct Canadian mining enterprise that
partnered with Venezuela on a gold project that was nationalized in
2011, the report says.

Crystallex went bankrupt as a result and has been trying to collect
its lost investment from Venezuela ever since, targeting Citgo, the
report recalls.

Other Venezuela creditors owed large debts are also circling the
oil company, the report notes.

Judge Stark said that each day Crystallex's roughly $1 billion
judgment goes unpaid is "arguably something of an affront" to the
U.S. judicial system, the report discloses.

The judge also laid out a rough framework for auctioning
Venezuela's shares of Citgo parent PDV Holding Inc. to the highest
bidder, including a requirement that financial disclosures about
the asset be made available to serious bidders, the report notes.

Crystallex has applied with the U.S. Treasury Department for a
license that would allow the shares to be sold, according to court
papers, the report relays.

A decision on the license application likely falls to the incoming
Biden administration, the report adds.

                            Venezuela

Venezuela, officially the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, is a
country on the northern coast of South America, consisting of a
continental landmass and a large number of small islands and islets
in the Caribbean sea.  The capital is the city of Caracas.

Hugo Chavez was president to Venezuela from 1999 to 2013.  The
Chavez presidency was plagued with challenges, which included a
2002 coup d'etat, a 2002 national strike and a 2004 recall
referendum.  Nicolas Maduro was elected president in 2013 after the
death of Chavez.  Maduro won a second term at the May 2018
Venezuela elections, but this result has been challenged by
countries including Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Brazil, Canada,
Germany, France and the United States who deemed it fraudulent and
moved to recognize Juan Guaido as president.

The presidencies of Chavez and Maduro have challenged Venezuela
with a socioeconomic and political crisis.  It is marked by
hyperinflation, climbing hunger, poverty, disease, crime and death
rates, social unrest, corruption and emigration from the country.

S&P Global Ratings, in May 2019, removed its long- and short-term
local currency sovereign credit ratings on Venezuela from
CreditWatch with negative implications and affirmed them at
'CCC-/C'. The outlook on the long-term local currency rating is
negative. At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'SD/D' long- and
short-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on Venezuela.

Moody's credit rating (long term foreign and domestic issuer
ratings) for Venezuela was last set at C with stable outlook in
March 2018.  Meanwhile, Fitch's long term issuer default rating for
Venezuela was last in 2017 at RD and country ceiling was CC. Fitch,
on June 27, 2019, affirmed then withdrew the ratings due to the
imposition of U.S. sanctions on Venezuela.



                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2021.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.
.


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