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       T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                 L A T I N   A M E R I C A

          Friday, February 11, 2022, Vol. 23, No. 25

                           Headlines



C O L O M B I A

EMPRESA DE TELECOM: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' IDRs, Outlook Stable


E C U A D O R

ECUADOR: Trade Deal with China at End of Year, Debt Talks to Begin


E L   S A L V A D O R

EL SALVADOR: Fitch Lowers LT Foreign-Currency IDR to 'CCC'


J A M A I C A

JAMAICA: Government Revenue Shortfall Continues


M E X I C O

CREDITO REAL: Fitch Cuts Ratings to Default After Missed Payment


P E R U

MINAS BUENAVENTURA: Fitch Affirms 'BB' LT IDRs, Outlook Stable


P U E R T O   R I C O

PUERTO RICO: Court Orders State Senate to End PREPA Contract Suit


T R I N I D A D   A N D   T O B A G O

CL FIN'L: State Challenges Payment Sought by CLF Liquidators


U R U G U A Y

PARQUE EOLICO: S&P Lowers ICR to 'BB+' with Stable Outlook

                           - - - - -


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C O L O M B I A
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EMPRESA DE TELECOM: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' IDRs, Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Empresa de Telecomunicaciones de Bogota,
S.A., E.S.P.'s (ETB) Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency Issuer
Default Ratings (IDR) at 'BB+'. Fitch has also affirmed ETB's
National Long-Term Rating at 'AA+(col)'. The Rating Outlook is
Stable.

ETB's credit profile reflects low leverage and its business
concentration in the city of Bogota, with a revenue structure
concentrated mainly in its business-to-business (B2B) and
government segment (41% of revenues), and home and
small-medium-enterprise segment (54% of revenues). The affirmation
reflects ETB's continued network deployment that has resulted in
roughly 1.3 million homes being passed with fiber-to-the-home
(FTTH). ETB's ratings are constrained by its limited geographic
diversification and the low 30% up take ratio on its FTTH network,
which limits the company's ability to achieve meaningful revenue
and EBITDA growth in the short term.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Low Leverage: Fitch expects ETB's total gross and net EBITDA
leverage to be 1.2x and 0.4x respectively, as of Dec. 30, 2021.
Gross leverage came down as ETB successfully tendered COP176,106
million worth of its international notes in 2019. Fitch's forecasts
leverage will temporarily increase due to higher financing needs to
fund COP1.3 trillion of capex between 2022-2024, COP411 billion of
dividends owed to the District of Bogotá to be paid between
2022-2027, and COP115 billion of contingencies that materialized
during 2021. Gross leverage is expected to reach a maximum of 2.3x
during 2023, trending below 2.0x from 2024, which is commensurate
with ETB's 'BB+' rating.

Continued Revenue Diversification: ETB's commercial strategy seeks
to reduce the percentage of revenues coming from its copper network
(24% as of September 2021) and increase revenues coming from its
fiber network. This restructuring of the company's revenue
structure is key for ETB and will help improve EBITDA margin and
obtain payback on its major network investments. Fitch estimates
nearly 41% of the company's revenues comes from the more stable B2B
services, while 54% comes from the home business.

Growth Potential: Fitch expects future growth to come from ETB's
FTTH businesses, as the company focuses on increasing network
penetration. ETB's recent partnership announcement with UFINET
could benefit ETB in the form of additional revenues in the medium
to long term. Together, ETB and UFINET will offer fiber coverage to
an estimated 2.4 million homes within a period of three years.

UFINET operates a network of telecommunications infrastructure
across in Latin America, with more than 75,000km of optical fiber
deployed across Mexico, Peru, Brazil, Colombia, Argentina, Chile
and other countries across the region. The partnership is waiting
for the approval of the Superintendence of Industry and Commerce
(SIC) to start operations.

Intense Competition: Fitch expects the company's competitive
position to remain under pressure as local integrated telecom
operators push their commercial strategies to retain and/or grow
their subscriber base in Bogota, while ETB continues to implement
its strategy of replacing legacy copper subscribers with FTTH
clients. ETB is the second leading fixed operator in Bogota, after
the leader Claro, based on subscriber market share, with estimated
market shares of 40% in fixed telephony, 30% in broadband, and 9%
in pay TV. Claro is the market leader within the city of Bogota
with estimated subscriber market shares of 46%, 53%, and 63% in the
same fixed businesses.

Profitability Pressured: Fitch expects EBITDA margins will decline
over the rating horizon as the company resumes commercial capex
execution and associated operating expenditure to support revenue
growth. Although recent cost efficiencies helped to improve EBITDA
margin up to 32%, Fitch considers these levels as not sustainable
and expect the competitive environment to push these below 30% over
the rating horizon.

Sustained Negative FCF: ETB's FCF is expected to be negative over
the rating horizon, given the lower profitability and increased
capital expenditures related to improving penetration of its FTTH
network in Bogota. Capex intensity is expected to be around 30% in
2022 as ETB continues to improve the quality and maintenance of its
FTTH network. Capex outlay is expected to decrease toward 24% of
revenues by 2024. The beginning of the dividend payment agreement
with the District of Bogota will add pressure on FCF.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

ETB is rated one notch lower than Colombia Telecomunicaciones S.A.
E.S.P. (ColTel; BBB-/Stable), a more diversified telecom, with a
growing fixed operation and a strong mobile foot print in Colombia.
ColTel exhibits a more levered capital structure at 3.2x than ETB
at 1.5x. ETB is rated at the same level as Telefonica Celular del
Paraguay (BB+/Stable), the leading mobile operator in Paraguay
(BB+/Stable), which exhibits a strong competitive position and
higher leverage of 3.8x. ETB is rated two notches above WOM S.A.
(BB-/Stable), a Chilean based mobile service provider with a low
diversification and a weaker financial profile. WOM's net leverage
is expected to average 4.0x over the rating horizon.

ETB is rated on a standalone basis, as any recurring support from
the District of Bogota, its controlling shareholder, is unlikely.
Fitch views the district's 2017 decision to restructure ETB's
dividend liability into a 10-year obligation with a two-year grace
period as an extraordinary support of the company's cash position,
which is not likely to reoccur in the future. No Country Ceiling
and/or operating environment constraint were in effect for these
ratings.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

-- Total and operating revenues grow at 1.2% and 2.1% in 2021-
    2022, backed by increased FTTH network penetration;

-- Gross and net leverage is projected to reach a maximum of 2.3x
    and 1.3x, respectively, during 2023;

-- Capital intensity of 32% in 2021 and trending down toward 24%
    over the medium term;

-- Payment of dividends owed to the District of Bogota;

-- Negative FCF over the rating horizon.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factor that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- A positive rating action would require an upgrade of the
    rating of the District of Bogota to 'BBB-' from 'BB+' plus
    improvements in the company's operating performance.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- Muted revenue growth, due to slower than expected subscriber
    growth in non-traditional services, amid continued material
    revenue erosion in copper-based services;

-- EBITDA margin deterioration without a material improvement in
    market position;

-- Consistently negative FCF generation with a low cash balance;

-- Total debt/EBITDA above 2.0x and/or net debt/EBITDA above 1.5x
    on a sustained basis.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Non-Financial Corporate
issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of three notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of four notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings are
based on historical performance.

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

Liquidity Temporarily Pressured: ETB's liquidity is expected to be
temporarily pressured during 2022, considering the maturity of its
COP354 billion international notes due January 2023. The company's
free cash flow is expected to continue to be negative over the
rating horizon given the burden of higher capex requirements and
COP411 billion of extraordinary dividend to be paid to the District
of Bogota between 2022-2027.

As of September 2021, the company cash on hand declined to COP314
billion from COP424 billion as of YE 2020 and no short-term debt.
Fitch expects the company will refinance its international notes
when it comes due and considers refinancing risk as low. ETB
reported lines of credit of COP715 billion available as of Sept.
30, 2021, 54% of which were short term, further bolstering its
liquidity position.

ISSUER PROFILE

ETB is an integrated Colombian telecommunication company owned
86.36% by the District of Bogota. The company's main services
offered include fixed voice traditional services (local and long
distance), broadband (BB) and subscription TV services on its
copper and fibre networks.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.



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E C U A D O R
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ECUADOR: Trade Deal with China at End of Year, Debt Talks to Begin
------------------------------------------------------------------
globalinsolvency.com, citing Reuters, reports that Ecuador expects
to pull together a trade deal with China at the end of this year
and will begin formal debt re-negotiations with the Asian country,
Ecuadorean President Guillermo Lasso said, after a Beijing visit
with his counterpart Xi Jinping.

China became Ecuador's top lender over the last decade, with
millions of dollars in long-term credit tied to the handover of
crude oil, large investments in hydro-electric and mining projects
and other loans, according to globalinsolvency.com.

"In China we had a productive meeting with the President Xi
Jinping," Lasso posted on Twitter. "We achieved great results in
commercial openings, cooperation in health and debt
re-negotiation," the report notes.

At the meeting the two countries signed a memorandum of
understanding meant to pave the way for a trade deal at the end of
the year, which would benefit Ecuadorean exports of shrimp,
bananas, cacao, other fruit and minerals, the report relays.

Lasso, who took office in May, has said more trade and foreign
investment are key to stimulating the South American country's
COVID-battered and liquidity-poor economy, the report discloses.

"It would increase the market by nearly $1 billion more in export
opportunities," commerce minister Julio Jose Prado said during a
virtual press conference, the report relays.

"And that will mean we could almost be doubling the exports we make
to China in various products," he added.  The countries have agreed
their finance ministries will conduct initial talks on debt
re-negotiation, as Ecuador seeks to improve its payment periods and
interest rates, the report notes.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on Sept.
29, 2021, Egan-Jones Ratings Company, on September 10, 2021,
maintained its 'CCC' foreign currency and local currency senior
unsecured ratings on debt issued by Republic of Ecuador. EJR also
maintained its 'B' rating on commercial paper issued by the
Company.




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E L   S A L V A D O R
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EL SALVADOR: Fitch Lowers LT Foreign-Currency IDR to 'CCC'
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgrade El Salvador's Long-Term Foreign
Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'CCC' from 'B-'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrade reflects heightened financing risks stemming from
increased reliance on short-term debt, an USD800 million Eurobond
repayment due in January 2023, a still-high fiscal deficit, limited
scope for additional local market financing, uncertain access to
additional multilateral funding and external market financing given
high borrowing costs. Furthermore, debt to GDP is expected to rise
to 86.9% in 2022 after modest improvement in 2021, increasing
concerns around debt sustainability over the medium term.

In Fitch's view, weakening of institutions and concentration of
power in the presidency have increased policy unpredictability, and
the adoption of bitcoin as legal tender has added uncertainty about
the potential for an IMF program that would unlock financing for
2022-2023.

Despite the authorities stated commitment to service debt, El
Salvador faces increasing risks from high and growing financing
needs in 2022-2023. Fitch estimates total financing needs of
USD4.85 billion in 2022 (16% of GDP), rising to USD5.4 billion in
2023 (18% of GDP). Fitch expects El Salvador's 2022 fiscal deficit
to narrow marginally to 5.5% of GDP from 5.7% of GDP in 2021.
Short-term debt has risen sharply over the last two years with
Cetes and Letes short-term debt increasing to USD2.6 billion in
January 2022 from USD896 million at YE 2019, adding to 2022 funding
needs.

The government faces only USD305 million in external debt
amortizations in 2022, but faces close to USD1.2 billion in 2023
(with a USD800 million Eurobond due in January 2023). Fitch
estimated a financing gap of USD1.2 billion in 2022, assuming the
rollover of short-term debt and nearly USD1 billion the government
has identified in multilateral disbursements and pension-related
debt issuance. The gap rises to USD2.5 billion in 2023.

Financing options in the local market are limited, given that the
government has nearly reached the legal upper limit of USD1.6
billion in short-term Letes debt. The government has also issued
almost USD1.3 billion in one-year Cetes in the local market over
the last year. The local private pension funds and banks have
limited appetite for increasing their exposure to such instruments.
In fact, Letes auctions in January 2022 were not fully subscribed.

The large stock of short-term debt will complicate the government's
debt service capacity, increasing roll-over risks. Although Fitch
expects the sovereign to meet near-term debt service payments,
financing constraints will become more onerous as the year
progresses. The government faces a bunching of short-term debt
maturities in August-October 2022, with a total of nearly USD1.3
billion due in these three months.

External financing options are also uncertain. Rates in the
external bond markets are prohibitive (15%+). There is a high
degree of uncertainty surrounding other sources of external
financing, such as additional multilateral funding, given doubts
surrounding an IMF program, as well as the capacity to issue
"bitcoin backed bonds" through new distribution channels.

The government has been in extended discussions with the IMF for
nearly a year for a possible USD1.3 billion three-year program;
however, there are important differences between the two sides in
many key areas, in Fitch's view. A deal would help cover the
government's financing gap and likely unlock other multilateral
loans. It would also help provide more clarity on the government's
medium-term fiscal strategy.

The recently published IMF Article IV recommends a fiscal
adjustment of 4pp of GDP to put the debt burden on a steady
downward path, strengthening the medium-term fiscal framework,
improvements in governance in reporting and audits, implementing
revised anti- money laundering laws, and removing bitcoin as legal
tender while improving regulation and oversight of the virtual
currency system.

The 2021 improvement in the fiscal deficit to 5.7% of GDP from
10.1% in 2020 was largely a result of the sharp increase in tax
revenues, which grew by 27%, reflecting the recovery in VAT and
import tax receipts and successful anti-tax evasion measures. On
the expenditure side, the government reduced pandemic related
spending in 2021, which were partially offset by higher capital
expenditures and interest costs. Debt to GDP fell to 84.5% in 2021
from 89,2% in 2020, largely as a result of the sharp rebound in
economic growth.

The economy grew by an estimated 10.5%, after contraction of 7.9%
in 2020, with reopening of the economy and strong remittance growth
(27%). However, Fitch expects economic growth to slow significantly
to 3.5% in 2022, still above potential, thereby adding to the
uncertainty of the strength of future government revenue growth.
The government is planning to introduce revenue enhancing measures
but there is uncertainty regarding their scale and implementation.

Debt to GDP is slated to rise again in 2022 to 86.9% of GDP and
continue to rise over the forecast period, raising concerns around
debt sustainability over the medium term. Moreover, interest to
revenues is set to rise to 20% in 2022 from 18% in 2021. However,
almost 25% of the total public debt is related to pensions with low
fixed rates and a captive market, as private pension funds are
mandated to buy the Certificados de inversion previsional (CIP)
debt.

El Salvador's ratings are supported by higher human development and
governance indicators compared to peers, and history of relative
macroeconomic and financial stability, anchored by official
dollarization. However, high government debt, recent history of
default on local pension related debt and low growth potential
constrain the ratings.

ESG - Governance: El Salvador has an ESG Relevance Score (RS) of
'5' for both Political Stability and Rights and for the Rule of
Law, Institutional and Regulatory Quality and Control of
Corruption, as is the case for all sovereigns. These scores reflect
the high weight that the World Bank Governance Indicators (WBGI)
has in Fitch's proprietary Sovereign Rating Model. El Salvador has
a medium WBGI percentile ranking of 39.1%, reflecting a recent
track record of peaceful political transitions, a moderate level of
rights for participation in the political process, moderate
institutional capacity, established rule of law and a moderate
level of corruption.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factor that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- Public Finances—Increased signs of a probable default event,
    such as a severe liquidity stress and reduced capacity to
    access financing.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- Public Finances--A sustained easing of financing constraints
    through progress in unlocking predictable sources of
    financing.

-- Public Finances--A fiscal adjustment consistent with
    improvement in public debt sustainability.

SOVEREIGN RATING MODEL (SRM) AND QUALITATIVE OVERLAY (QO)

In accordance with the rating criteria for ratings in the 'CCC'
range and below, Fitch's sovereign rating committee has not used
the SRM and QO to explain the ratings, which are instead guided by
the rating definitions.

Fitch's SRM is the agency's proprietary multiple regression rating
model that employs 18 variables based on three-year centered
averages, including one year of forecasts, to produce a score
equivalent to a Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR. Fitch's QO is a
forward-looking qualitative framework designed to allow for
adjustment to the SRM output to assign the final rating, reflecting
factors within Fitch's criteria that are not fully quantifiable
and/or not fully reflected in the SRM.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Sovereigns, Public Finance
and Infrastructure issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario
(defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in
a positive direction) of three notches over a three-year rating
horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative
direction) of three notches over three years. The complete span of
best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating
categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario
credit ratings are based on historical performance.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

El Salvador has an ESG Relevance Score of '5' for Political
Stability and Rights as World Bank Governance Indicators have the
highest weight in Fitch's SRM and are therefore highly relevant to
the rating and a key rating driver with a high weight. As El
Salvador has a percentile rank below 50 for the respective
Governance Indicator, this has a negative impact on the credit
profile.

El Salvador has an ESG Relevance Score of '5' for Rule of Law,
Institutional, Regulatory Quality and Control of Corruption as
World Bank Governance Indicators have the highest weight in Fitch's
SRM and are therefore highly relevant to the rating and are a key
rating driver with a high weight. As El Salvador has a percentile
rank below 50 for the respective Governance Indicators, this has a
negative impact on the credit profile.

El Salvador has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Human Rights and
Political Freedoms as the Voice and Accountability pillar of the
World Bank Governance Indicators is relevant to the rating and a
rating driver. As El Salvador has a percentile rank below 50 for
the respective Governance Indicator, this has a negative impact on
the credit profile.

El Salvador has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Creditor Rights
as willingness to service and repay debt is relevant to the rating
and is a rating driver for El Salvador, as for all sovereigns. As
El Salvador has a fairly recent default and restructuring of public
pension related debt in 2017, this has a negative impact on the
credit profile.

Except for the matters discussed above, the highest level of ESG
credit relevance, if present, is a score of 3. This means ESG
issues are credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on
the entity(ies), either due to their nature or to the way in which
they are being managed by the entity(ies).



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J A M A I C A
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JAMAICA: Government Revenue Shortfall Continues
-----------------------------------------------
Durrant Pate at Jamaica Observer reports that there continues to be
a shortfall in the Government's revenue operations based on the
latest returns for the period April to December 2021.

Data from the Ministry of Finance show that total revenues and
grants for the period amounted to $492.22 billion to $1.23 billion
behind projection. However, the inflows represent an increase of
approximately 23.6% relative to the $398.26 billion recorded for
the corresponding period in 2020, according to Jamaica Observer.

On the other hand, total expenditure for the period April to
December 2021 amounted to $501.25 billion, $9.34 billion less than
the budgeted amount of $510.59 billion. Recurrent expenditure,
which totaled $466.35 billion, accounted for 93.04% of overall
expenditures, the report notes.

Under the recurrent expenditure categories for the review period,
the category above the budgeted amount was Interest, the report
relays.  This totaled $91.85 billion, 1.8% above the budgeted
amount of $90.23 billion, the report discloses.

The categories below the budgeted amount included programs, which
amounted to $193.51 billion, which was $4.75 billion or 2.4% less
than budgeted, the report says.  Comparably, Compensation of
Employees totaled $180.99 billion, $2.92 billion below the budgeted
amount of $183.92 billion, the report relays.

Wages and Salaries totaled $166.30 billion, 1.6% less than
budgeted, the report notes.  Additionally, Employee Contribution
totaled $14.70 billion, which was 1.7% less than the budgeted
amount of $14.94 billion, the report notes.

Jamaica's fiscal deficit, which occurs when the Government spends
more than it earns was $9.02 billion, relative to a projected
deficit of $17.13 billion, which was good news for the
Administration, the report discloses.

Additionally, the primary surplus balance, which happens when a
country has larger levels of income relative to current spending
for the period amounted to $82.83 billion, relative to the budgeted
primary surplus balance of $73.10 billion, which was also good news
for the Government, the report relays.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on Nov.
25, 2021, Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the Government of
Jamaica's long-term issuer and senior unsecured ratings at B2. The
senior unsecured shelf rating has also been affirmed at (P)B2. The
outlook on the ratings remains stable.




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M E X I C O
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CREDITO REAL: Fitch Cuts Ratings to Default After Missed Payment
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Credito Real, S.A.B. de C.V., SOFOM,
E.N.R.'s (Credito Real) Long-Term (LT) Local- and Foreign-Currency
Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) to 'RD' from 'CC' and its Short-Term
(ST) Foreign- and Local-Currency IDRs to 'RD' from 'C'. Fitch has
also downgraded Credito Real's unsecured debt notes to 'C'/'RR4'
from 'CC'/'RR4' and affirmed the hybrid notes at 'C'/'RR6'.

Fitch has downgraded the LT and ST national scale ratings to
'RD(mex)' from 'CC(mex)' and to 'RD(mex)' from 'C(mex)',
respectively. The ratings were removed from Rating Watch Negative
(RWN).

Fitch downgraded the expected rating of the senior notes to
'C(EXP)'/'RR4' from 'CC(EXP)'/'RR4'. Fitch subsequently withdrew
Credito Real's senior notes expected rating as it is no longer
expected to convert to a final rating.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrades follow Credito Real's default on the principal
payment of its CHF170 million global unsecured bond due on Feb. 9,
2022. Potential cross-acceleration clauses in its other debt may be
triggered by the non-payment of the Swiss bond, according to
Credito Real's public offering memorandums. There is no grace
period for the bond repayment. Fitch will re-assess Credito Real's
ratings once Fitch has clarity on the company's plans. Ongoing
negotiation did not end on a timely payment, and the entity has not
publicly articulated if the previous plans and funding in process
remain unchanged after the missed payment.

Today Credito Real announced it has engaged a legal and a
consulting firm as restructuring and legal advisors. If a debt
restructuring process is initiated, it may constitute a "distressed
debt exchange" (DDE) under Fitch's Non-Bank Financial Institutions
Rating Criteria. Under this scenario, Fitch will evaluate the
entity's financial flexibility after the restructuring process is
completed, which could result in a positive rating action if the
exchange improves funding and liquidity prospects.

The 'RD' rating indicates that Credito Real has experienced an
uncured payment default but has not entered into bankruptcy filings
or ceased operating.

Some of Credito Real's global bond issuances and existing credit
facilities have cross-default or acceleration provisions, according
to the company's public information. Fitch will closely monitor the
company's plans to service the debt obligations that become
immediately due and payable and if any additional debt covenant is
breached.

Fitch's downward revision of the assessment of the company's
funding and liquidity to 'f' from 'cc' reflects, with high
importance, the company´s failure to meet the payment due today.
After the missed payment, Fitch expects that Credito Real's access
to unsecured and secured funding from financial markets and fund
providers will be highly limited in the coming months.

SENIOR DEBT

Credito Real's senior global notes are rated 'C', per Fitch's
rating definitions due to some recovery prospects from the
entity´s outstanding assets. The Recovery Rating of 'RR4' assigned
to the notes indicates 'Average' recovery prospects of current
principal and related interest upon default.

HYBRID SECURITIES

Credito Real's hybrid securities rated at 'C' reflects the
increased loss severity due to its deep subordination and
heightened risk of non-performance relative to existing senior
obligations. The Recovery Rating of 'RR6' assigned to the notes
indicates 'Poor' recovery prospects of current principal and
related interest upon default. Based on Fitch's assessment, the
hybrid qualifies for 50% equity credit under Fitch's criteria.

Credito Real has an ESG Relevance Score of '5' for Governance
Structure given the agency's concerns over intrinsic governance
practices as well as the effectiveness of the supervisory board
regarding protection of creditor's rights. Credito Real also has an
ESG Relevance Score of '5' for Management Strategy as management's
ability to handle risks and controls to service debt obligations on
time has relevantly deteriorated. This has a negative impact on the
credit profile and is highly relevant to the rating.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch will monitor the sufficiency of information for the ongoing
evaluation of the entity's creditworthiness, which could result in
a rating withdrawal at the current level if the entity does not
disclose sufficient information to Fitch and the market.

Factor that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- The IDRs would be downgraded to 'D' if the entity enters into
    bankruptcy proceedings, administration, receivership,
    liquidation or other formal winding-up procedures or if it
    ceases operations.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- Fitch would reassess Credito Real's credit profile and its
    debt issuances if a debt restructuring process is completed
    and sufficient disclosure of the company's plans and financial
    information is provided.

SENIOR DEBT and HYBRID SECURITIES

-- The company's debt ratings direction would mirror any changes
on those of Credito Real's IDRs.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Financial Institutions and
Covered Bond issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario
(defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in
a positive direction) of three notches over a three-year rating
horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative
direction) of four notches over three years. The complete span of
best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating
categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario
credit ratings are based on historical performance.

SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL ADJUSTMENTS

Pre-paid expenses and other deferred assets were reclassified as
other intangibles and deducted from capital. Results from
investments in associates were reclassified as operating income.
Income from leasing and factoring operations were reclassified as
interest income. The operational lease portfolio and factoring
operations were included in gross loans, with the portion of
delinquent leases classified as impaired loans. The coupons of the
perpetual notes were reclassified as interests.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Credito Real has an ESG Relevance Score of '5' for Governance
Structure ESG due to the agency's significant concerns over the
effectiveness of the supervisory board with regards to perceived
weakness towards the protection of creditors' rights. This has a
negative impact on the credit profile, and is relevant to the
ratings in conjunction with other factors.

Credito Real has an ESG Relevance Score of '5' for Management
Strategy due to Fitch's perception of management's diminishing
ability to manage risks and control to service debt obligations on
time, which has a negative impact on the credit profile, and is
relevant to the ratings in conjunction with other factors.

Credito Real has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Exposure to
Social Impacts due to its exposure to shifts in social or consumer
preferences or changes in government regulation, or contract
agreements on payroll deduction loan products, which has a negative
impact on the credit profile, and is relevant to the ratings in
conjunction with other factors.

Credito Real has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Customer Welfare
- Fair Messaging, Privacy & Data Security due to its exposure to
reputational and operational risks, as its payroll deduction loans
business targets government employees and dependencies offering
relatively high interest rates, which has a negative impact on the
credit profile, and is relevant to the ratings in conjunction with
other factors.

Credito Real has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Financial
Transparency due to the issuer's approach for reporting and
registering accrued interest and the loan portfolio differ from
practices disclosed by other payroll lenders, and Credito Real's
public information disclosure is weaker than international best
practices and lack sufficient detail in some accounts. This has a
negative impact on the credit profile, and is relevant to the
ratings in conjunction with other factors.

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.



=======
P E R U
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MINAS BUENAVENTURA: Fitch Affirms 'BB' LT IDRs, Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Compania de Minas Buenaventura S.A.A.'s
local currency (LC) and foreign currency (FC) Issuer Default
Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB'. It also affirmed the rating on the
company's USD550 million senior unsecured notes due 2026 at 'BB'.
The Rating Outlook is Stable.

Buenaventura's ratings and Outlook reflect the company's stake in
high quality assets, which offset its low reserve life and
production profile of its aging mines. The company's net debt to
EBITDA is estimated to improve to slightly above 2.0x in 2022 from
3.9x in 2021, after it is expected to repay debt from the sale of
its stake in Yanacocha, coupled with the consolidation of La
Zanja.

Buenaventura is expected to continue strengthening its balance
sheet, through a potential equity issuance of treasury stock to
fund improvements in its existing operations and embark upon
greenfield projects to tackle declining volumes, rising costs and
short mine lives.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Asset Sale Improves Financial Flexibility: Buenaventura's sale of
its minority stake in Yanacocha, a gold mine joint venture with
Newmont, is in line with the previous rating and Outlook, as it
strengthens its financial flexibility and improves its leverage
profile. Buenaventura will no longer need to invest in the USD2
billion Yanacocha Sulphides project, but can still receive up to
USD100 million upon completion. Moreover, Buenaventura will keep
royalties from the Yanacocha concession ownership. Fitch was not
expecting Yanacocha to pay dividends in the rating horizon.

The net proceeds of USD300 million from the sale of its 43.65%
stake in Yanacocha to Newmont and the USD45 million obtained from
the consolidation of La Zanja is expected to be used to repay the
outstanding of the USD275 million loan syndicate. As a result,
proforma net leverage is estimated to decrease to about 2.0x from
3.9x in 2021.

Quality Asset Stake Kept: Buenaventura' s minority stake in high
quality copper asset, Cerro Verde, supports its cash flow profile
and offsets its declining production and weak reserve life. The
company maintains its 19.58% share in Cerro Verde, copper and
molybdenum joint venture with Freeport McMoRan (BBB-/Stable) and
Sumitomo. Fitch projects that Buenaventura will receive USD60
million and USD100 million in dividends from Cerro Verde in 2022
and 2023. Cerro Verde is an open pit with 30+ years of life of
mine. The asset offsets the lower reserve base of Buenaventura's
mostly underground direct operations. Aside from its direct
precious metals mines, Buenaventura also keeps smaller polymetallic
operations El Brocal, La Zanja and Tantahuatay (40.1%).

Moderate Leverage: Fitch forecasts Buenaventura's net leverage to
be around 3.9x in 2021 before falling to approximately 2.0x in
2022. The company's EBITDA adjusted by dividends received from
affiliates and paid to minorities in partially owned consolidated
mines is expected to increase to approximately USD235 million in
2021 and USD285 million in 2022, a 60% to 95% improvement compared
with its 2020 EBITDA of USD146. Buenaventura's net debt is
projected to decrease to USD575 million in 2022 from USD1.1 billion
in 2021, when the figure increased due to the materialization of a
tax liability that was paid under protest and remains under
dispute.

Neutral to Positive FCF: Buenaventura's FCF is expected to be
neutral to slightly positive in 2022 and 2023, supported by strong
gold, silver, zinc and copper prices and the improvement of its
production output to 200,000oz of gold and 12 million oz of silver
in 2022. Exploration expenditures should return to around USD60
million per year, while capex should grow to be around USD135
million in 2022 and in 2023 while the company rebuilds production
volumes.

Output Recovery: Fitch expects that the company's gold and copper
production will increase by 24% and 23%, respectively, in 2022
compared with 20% and 29% in 2021 and -30% and -29% in 2020, but
the company's ability to improve its mine life, suspend non-core
and aging assets, while growing production through 2024 will be key
to sustaining its ratings. Gold production is improving by
realigning Tambomayo and fully consolidating La Zanja. Silver and
zinc production are expected to fall by 11% and 49% in 2022, mostly
because of the Uchucchacua suspension due to cost optimization and
the integration with Yumpaq. The development of USD400 million San
Gabriel is not factored into Fitch's expectations.

Receding Cost Pressure: Cost control efforts started to lower the
attributable All-in Sustaining Cost (AISC) of Buenaventura's mines
by 5% to reach USD1,482/oz of gold at the end of September 2021,
down from USD1,559/oz at the end of 2020, but costs are still
higher than USD1,314/oz at the end of 2019. Most of Buenaventura's
largest operations are located in the third cost quartile of the
industry pressured by lower volumes that the company aims to
tackle. The adjusted EBITDA margin from direct operations is
expected to reach 22% in 2021, similar to that of 2020, and remain
around 22% in the near future while stronger production
consolidates and COGS as well as SG&A approach 2019 levels in
2022.

Short Mine Life: Buenaventura's average mine life of four years in
its most important gold and silver mines is low when compared with
Fitch's Mining Navigator rating factors and is considered a
constraint to the rating. The company's low amount of reserves and
resources is partially mitigated by the significant number of
hectares and mining concessions it owns, coupled with its proven
ability to replenish its reserves for over 60 years. An ability to
prove out more reserves and resources to at least 10 years would be
viewed favorably.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Buenaventura's 'BB' rating reflects its position as one of Peru's
largest publicly traded precious and base metals miners with a
diversified portfolio of operations and quality stakes in world
class assets. Buenaventura operates across a country of vast
mineral resources and favorable mining regulations, despite recent
social opposition to large scale greenfield projects such as
Southern Copper Corporation's (BBB+/Stable) Tia Maria copper
project.

Buenaventura's ratings are underpinned by its diversified
production of base and precious metals similar to Volcan Compania
Minera S.A.A. (BB/Positive), and is more diversified than its peer
Minsur S.A. (BBB-/Stable). Buenaventura's single country exposure
compares to that of higher rated Industrias Penoles (BBB/Stable) in
Mexico and of lower cost producer and higher reserve base miner
PJSC Polyus (BB+/Stable) in Russia.

Buenaventura's scale of operations from its direct mines is small
compared with larger gold miners such as Agnico Eagle Mines
(BBB/RWP), Kinross Gold Corporation (BBB/Stable), Yamana Gold
Corporation (BBB-/Stable), PJSC Polyus or Penoles and slightly
lower (in direct EBITDA and gold output) than lower-rated Eldorado
Gold (B+/Stable).

The company is less dependent upon precious metals than Agnico,
Kinross, Polyus, Yamana, or Eldorado. Similar to the leading silver
producer Penoles, or Chinese miner Zijin Mining Group
(BB+/Positive), Buenaventura has base metals diversification, which
mitigates its exposure to precious metals pricing volatility.
Buenaventura generated 53% of its revenue during 2020 from precious
metals, 43% from base metals and 4% from other sources such, as
energy or manganese sulphate.

Buenaventura exhibits a very low mine life of four years across its
portfolio of mines, which is considered a constraint on its 'BB'
rating. Lower proven and probable ore reserves are common to
underground mines in Peru, as it is typically economically
inefficient to prove reserves for longer periods due to the high
cost involved. Penoles, Yamana, Kinross and AngloGold Ashanti
(BBB-/Stable) are also underground miners that have reserve levels
of around 10 years. This is mitigated by Buenaventura's 19.58%
stake in copper miner Cerro Verde, a JV with Freeport McMoRan
(BBB-/Stable), which has 30+ years in reserves, and by
Buenaventura's history of replacing reserves.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within the rating case for the issuer
include:

-- Gold prices of USD1,800/oz in 2021, USD1,600/oz in 2022 and
    USD1,300/oz in 2023;

-- Silver prices of USD22.5/oz in 2021, USD20/oz in 2022 and
    USD17.5/oz in 2023;

-- A 24% rise in gold production and an 11% decrease in silver
    production during 2022;

-- A 3% fall in gold production and a 5% decrease in silver
    production during 2023;

-- Capex reaches USD115 million in 2021, USD135 million in 2022
    and USD135 million in 2023;

-- No dividends paid in 2021, and dividends of USD20 million in
    2022 and in 2023;

-- Dividends received from Cerro Verde of USD140 million in 2021,
    USD60 million in 2022 and USD100 million in 2023.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- A positive resolution of the tax liability paid under protest
    and currently under litigation, obtaining reparations of about
    USD530 million;

-- Sustained net debt/EBITDA levels of less than 2.0x;

-- Increased output from mines;

-- Increase in the mine lives of the company's key operations to
    more than 10 years;

-- Decrease in the AISC of the company's gold mines to the high
    end of second quartile of the cost curve.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- Sustained net debt/EBITDA levels of more than 3.0x with an
    unwillingness or inability to deleverage;

-- Inability to replenish reserves and resources leading to a
    significantly lower mine life at key operations;

-- Continued elevated AISC;

-- Consistently negative FCF, driving down the company's
    comfortable liquidity position;

-- An adverse change in the overall framework toward mining
    projects in Peru.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Non-Financial Corporate
issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of three notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of four notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings are
based on historical performance.

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

Improving Liquidity Profile: Buenaventura ended September 2021 with
USD288 million in cash and marketable securities, a 22% increase
from year-end 2020. The company's USD1.1 billion of debt comprises
a USD550 million bond, a USD275 million syndicated loan, which is
expected to be fully repaid in 2022 with the proceeds of its
Yanacocha stake sale, and a USD113 million financing lease related
to the Huanza hydro power plant. The short-term debt consists
primarily of USD50 million for working capital.

ISSUER PROFILE

Buenaventura is Peru's largest publicly traded precious metals
company with over 60 years of mining operations and holder of
stakes in world class assets. It explores, mines and process gold,
silver, zinc, lead and copper.

Criteria Variation

Since Fitch Updated its Corporate Rating Criteria following the
implementation of IFRS 16, lease-related debt for mining companies
has been reclassified as "other liabilities" and has been excluded
from leverage calculations.

For Buenaventura, Fitch has treated the financing lease of Huanza,
Buenaventura's hydroelectric subsidiary, as financial debt in its
leverage calculations, as the company intends to refinance this
debt with either a private placement, bank loan or capital markets
bond.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.



=====================
P U E R T O   R I C O
=====================

PUERTO RICO: Court Orders State Senate to End PREPA Contract Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Rick Archer of Law360 reports that a federal judge has ordered
Puerto Rico's Senate to withdraw a suit seeking to invalidate the
Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority's (PREPA) power grid
management contract, saying the action violates the bankruptcy stay
protecting the utility from litigation.

In an order issued February 7, 2022, U.S. District Court Judge
Laura Taylor Swain said the Senate's suit
seeking a ruling that PREPA's grid contract violated Puerto Rican
law is an attempt to exercise control over the utility's property
in violation of the Bankruptcy Code and must come to an end. In
2017, PREPA filed for bankruptcy under the Puerto Rico Oversight,
Management and Economic Stability Act of 2016.

                      About Puerto Rico

Puerto Rico is a self-governing commonwealth in association with
the United States that's facing a massive bond debt of $70 billion,
a 68% debt-to-GDP ratio and negative economic growth in nine of the
last 10 years.

The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has sought bankruptcy protection,
aiming to restructure its massive $74 billion debt-load and $49
billion in pension obligations.

The debt restructuring petition was filed by Puerto Rico's
financial oversight board in U.S. District Court in Puerto Rico
(Case No. 17-01578) on May 3, 2017, and was made under Title III of
2016's U.S. Congressional rescue law known as the Puerto Rico
Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act ('PROMESA').

The Financial Oversight and Management Board later commenced Title
III cases for the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation
(COFINA) on May 5, 2017, and the Employees Retirement System (ERS)
and the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (HTA) on
May 21, 2017. On July 2, 2017, a Title III case was commenced for
the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority ("PREPA").

U.S. Chief Justice John Roberts has appointed U.S. District Judge
Laura Taylor Swain to oversee the Title III cases. The Honorable
Judith Dein, a United States Magistrate Judge for the District of
Massachusetts, has been designated to preside over matters that may
be referred to her by Judge Swain, including discovery disputes,
and management of other pretrial proceedings.

Joint administration of the Title III cases, under Lead Case No.
17-3283, was granted on June 29, 2017.

The Oversight Board has hired as advisors, Proskauer Rose LLP and
O'Neill & Borges LLC as legal counsel, McKinsey & Co. as strategic
consultant, Citigroup Global Markets, as municipal investment
banker, and Ernst & Young, as financial advisor.

Martin J. Bienenstock, Esq., Scott K. Rutsky, Esq., and Philip M.
Abelson, Esq., of Proskauer Rose; and Hermann D. Bauer, Esq., at
O'Neill & Borges are on-board as attorneys.

McKinsey & Co. is the Board's strategic consultant, Ernst & Young
is the Board's financial advisor, and Citigroup Global Markets Inc.
is the Board's municipal investment banker.

Prime Clerk LLC is the claims and noticing agent. Prime Clerk
maintains a case web site at
https://cases.primeclerk.com/puertorico

Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC is the service agent for ERS, HTA,
and PREPA.

O'Melveny & Myers LLP is counsel to the Commonwealth's Puerto Rico
Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority (AAFAF), the agency
responsible for negotiations with bondholders.

The Oversight Board named Professor Nancy B. Rapoport as fee
examiner and to chair a committee to review professionals' fees.





=====================================
T R I N I D A D   A N D   T O B A G O
=====================================

CL FIN'L: State Challenges Payment Sought by CLF Liquidators
------------------------------------------------------------
Trinidad Express reports that an appellate court has reserved its
ruling in a procedural appeal filed by the Office of the Attorney
General against the decision of a High Court judge to approve the
fees claimed by the joint liquidators of CL Financial (CLF) for
their work done in 2019.

For almost four hours, attorneys representing CLF and the AG's
Office were in debate before Justices of Appeal Prakash Moosai and
Charmaine Pemberton over the ruling of Justice Kevin Ramcharan last
July, according to Trinidad Express.

Justice Ramcharan had ruled in favor of the liquidators, Hugh
Dickson and David Holukoff, of international accounting firm Grant
Thornton, after the State raised objection over the amount of money
requested as payment over the one-year period, the report notes.

That amount was in the sum of approximately $24 million, the report
discloses.

At the hearing, lead attorney for the Office of the Attorney
General Deborah Peake SC said the liquidators failed to provide
specifics to the State as to how that amount was arrived at, the
report relays.

The State, she said, was provided with the amount of work carried
out in terms of hours, but this was insufficient to prove the
actual work done, the report notes.

In fact, the attorney said there was the possibility that there was
a "duplication of hours" that was being claimed for, the report
says.

While she said the State had no issue paying for services rendered,
it simply needed more details and a breakdown of works carried out
before this is done, the report discloses.

The report relays that Peake said Justice Ramcharan was wrong in
his decision for ruling against the State after assuming it was
seeking full disclosure of the "thousands of pages" of documents,
the report notes.

"We are not asking for every single bit of information, but the
specifics. You must specify the task and the complexity of each
task," she added.

While Peake said the State had no issue in providing payment for
actual services rendered, the liquidators simply failed to provide
adequate information to prove they had actually carried out the
works they claimed they did, the report relays.

In fact, the attorney said the amount being claimed for 2019 was
even higher than what was claimed for in previous years after
Justice Ramcharan put CL Financial into liquidation to clear its
remaining debt from when it received a multi-billion dollar
bail-out in 2009, the report discloses.

This, she said, does not add up since it would have been expected
that in the latter years, the cost of services would have been
decreased as opposed to being increased, the report says.

This was expected to be so because by the time 2019 had arrived the
liquidators would have already done all their preliminary works,
get a better understanding of issues at hand and therefore, as time
went by, the works required would become significantly less, the
report relays.

Lead attorney for the liquidators Fyard Hosein SC disagreed there
was a lack of information provided, the report notes.

All the State had to do was to request the specific pieces of
information it was seeking and it would have been provided with it,
he added.

Hosein pointed out there were thousands of pages of documents
relative to the liquidation and that it was practically impossible
for all this information to be provided, the report relays.  He
added that so far, "there were seven bi-annual reports and they all
contained a great amount of details," the report relates.  The work
of the liquidators, he said, was not simply "to sell off
everything" but to "also bring everything up to scratch", and this
was a large amount of work given the complexity of the issue, the
report discloses.

Hosein added that the State only had to request the specific pieces
of information it wanted disclosure of and it would be provided,
the report notes.  He denied his client was seeking payment for
works it did not perform, the report says.  He also stated the
money being sought was at a 30 per cent discount, the report
relays.

Following submissions from both sides, Justices Moosai and
Pemberton said they needed additional time to consider the
authorities referred to by the attorneys, the report notes.  They
said they will deliver their ruling on a date that is yet to be
determined, the report says.

Appearing alongside Peake for the AG's Office were attorneys Ravi
Heffes-Doon and Romney Thomas, while attorneys Sasha
Bridgemohansingh and Krystal Richardson-Dumitriu appeared with
Hosein for the liquidators, the report adds.

                   About CL Financial/CLICO

CL Financial was one of the largest privately held conglomerate in
Trinidad and Tobago. It was originally founded as an insurance
company and has since expanded to be the holding company for a
diverse group of companies and subsidiaries.

CL Financial is the parent company of Colonial Life Insurance
Company (Trinidad) Limited (Clico).  CLICO is now the Company's
insurance division.

CL Financial however experienced a liquidity crisis in 2009 that
resulted in a "bail out" agreement by which the government of
Trinidad and Tobago loaned the company funds ($7.3 billion as of
December 2010) to maintain its ability to operate, and obtained a
majority of seats on the company's board of directors.

The companies to be bailed out were: CL Financial Ltd (CLF);
Colonial Life Insurance Company Ltd (CLICO); Caribbean Money Market
Brokers Ltd (CMMB); Clico Investment Bank (CIB) and British
American Insurance Company (Trinidad) Ltd (BAICO).

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America in July
2017, CL Financial Limited shareholders vowed to pay back a TT$15
billion (US$2.2 billion) debt to the Trinidad Government.




=============
U R U G U A Y
=============

PARQUE EOLICO: S&P Lowers ICR to 'BB+' with Stable Outlook
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its long-term issue rating on Parque
Eolico Kiyu S.A.'s senior secured notes to 'BB+' from 'BBB-'.

The downgrade also reflects the correction of an analytical error
on the rating, because in S&P's previous research on this entity,
it maintained flat Uruguayan peso (UYU)/$ exchange forecasts after
2023, which S&P now believes is inaccurate.

S&P said, "The stable outlook reflects our expectation of still
relatively steady cash flows in the next 12 months thanks to the
project's power purchase agreements (PPA) with UTE that eliminates
market and price risk exposure, the proven technology, and our
expectations for wind availability to generate 166,630 megawatts
hour (MWh), resulting in a DSCR of about 1.4x in 2022.

"The downgrade reflects our expectations of a weaker minimum DSCRs
than we previously anticipated. This performance mainly results
from higher depreciation of the UYU in our base case scenario,
particularly in the longer-term horizon. We are hereby correcting
an analytical error: in the past, we maintained flat foreign
exchange (FX) forecasts after 2023, which we now believe is
inaccurate. Additionally, our current approach applies our "Foreign
Exchange Risk in Structured Finance--Methodology And Assumptions"
criteria that factors in stress assumption for the UYU FX rates
into our downside case, given that the project has currency
exposure stemming from its tariff adjustment mechanism.

Although Kiyu's tariffs are fixed in dollars, 60% of the tariff
mechanism adjusts by a component that includes the variation of the
U.S. PPI, Uruguay PPI, and the UYU/$ exchange rate. S&P said, "As
such, higher UYU depreciation in our base case scenario, which we
expect will gradually depreciate until 2041, will lead to lower PPA
prices than we previously anticipated, while the cost structure of
the project is mostly dollar-denominated and doesn't benefit from
the UYU depreciation. Therefore, we now expect a lower minimum DSCR
in our base case of about 1.28x in 2036 (from about 1.35x in our
last publication)."

Additionally, in S&P's downside case, it now anticipates the
project would survive only four years of stress without depleting
its liquidity reserves. The lower resilience to the downside
scenario caps the issue rating at the 'BB' category.



                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2022.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
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.


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