/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/230731.mbx        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                 L A T I N   A M E R I C A

          Monday, July 31, 2023, Vol. 24, No. 152

                           Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

ARGENTINA: Bonds Climb after IMF, Massa Say Deal is Coming
ARGENTINA: Peso Reaches All-Time Low In Parallel Markets
ARGENTINA: Says IMF Deal Would Include August Disbursement


B R A Z I L

AMERICANAS SA: Some Creditors Object to Reorganization Plan
BRAZIL: Fitch Upgrades Long Term IDR to 'BB', Outlook Stable
BRAZIL: Pushing the U.S. Out of World's Biggest Soybean Market


C O L O M B I A

ARIS MINING: S&P Alters Outlook to Stable, Affirms 'B+' ICR
GEOPARK LIMITED: Fitch Affirms 'B+' IDRs & Alters Outlook to Neg.


M E X I C O

CEMEX SAB: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' IDRs & Alters Outlook to Positive


P U E R T O   R I C O

BED BATH: Unsecureds to Get Share of Distributable Proceeds


X X X X X X X X

[*] BOND PRICING COLUMN: For the Week July 17 to July 21, 2023

                           - - - - -


=================
A R G E N T I N A
=================

ARGENTINA: Bonds Climb after IMF, Massa Say Deal is Coming
----------------------------------------------------------
Scott Squires at Bloomberg News reports that Argentina's overseas
bonds climbed to their highest in almost six months after
government officials and the International Monetary Fund said they
were nearing a deal to bring forward billions of dollars in
disbursements from a US$44 billion lending program.

Bonds due 2030 climbed as much as 0.7 cent to nearly 35 cents on
the dollar, their highest since early February, according to
Bloomberg News.  Notes due 2041 followed suit, gaining 0.8 cent to
33 cents on the dollar, Bloomberg News notes.  Debt from the South
American nation was leading gains in an index of emerging market
sovereign bonds, Bloomberg News says.

Argentina Economy Minister Sergio Massa, who's running for
president in elections later this year, said that the IMF would
disburse funds in August and November after a staff-level agreement
is reached sometime, Bloomberg News notes.  Details are still
scarce, with Massa saying the exact figures would be announced by
the fund, which hasn't issued a full statement on the deal,
Bloomberg News discloses.

"I was surprised they called it an agreement without a true press
release from the Fund," said Edwin Gutierrez, head of
emerging-market sovereign debt at abrdn plc in London, Bloomberg
News notes.  "But the market is rallying regardless, as it sounds
like the IMF is caving," he added.

Investors have been bidding up the bonds in recent weeks on
expectations the nation would rework its IMF agreement and avoid a
sharp currency devaluation before October's elections as the
central bank's reserves sink and inflation surges past 115%,
Bloomberg News notes.

Earlier, the fund had said in a tweet on its Spanish-language
account it had reached "understandings" on goals and parameters
underlying a staff-level agreement that will then be submitted to
its board for approval, Bloomberg News discloses.

                       US$2.6 Billion Due

Argentina is said to be publishing a temporary exchange rate of 340
pesos per dollar for some agricultural exports, and will apply new
tariffs on imports of goods and services, Bloomberg News says.

The nation owes the IMF US$2.6 billion before July 31, and it's not
clear how it'll make the payment. In June, the government took the
extraordinary step of paying part of an IMF maturity with Chinese
yuan, Bloomberg News notes.

Concern around the IMF talks and the upcoming elections have
Argentines seeking more and more hedges against a possible
devaluation, Bloomberg News relays.  The currency has tumbled 34%
year to date, the worst in emerging markets, Bloomberg News
discloses.  The official exchange rate trades at 271 pesos per
dollar - in the black market, it's closer to 500 per dollar,
Bloomberg News says.

                     About Argentina

Argentina is a country located mostly in the southern half of South
America. Its capital is Buenos Aires. Alberto Angel Fernandez is
the current president of Argentina after winning the October 2019
general election. He succeeded Mauricio Macri in the position.

Argentina has the third largest economy in Latin America.  The
country's economy is an upper middle-income economy for fiscal year
2019, according to the World Bank. Historically, however, its
economic performance has been very uneven, with high economic
growth alternating with severe recessions, income maldistribution
and in the recent decades, increasing poverty.

In March 25, 2022, Argentina finalized agreement with the IMF for a
new USD44 billion Extended Funding Facility (EFF) intended to fund
USD40 billion in looming repayments of the defunct Stand-By
Arrangement (SBA), with an extra USD4 billion in up-front net
financing. This has averted the risk of a default to the IMF
and is facilitating a parallel rescheduling of Paris Club debt.

S&P Global Ratings, on June 13, 2023, raised its local currency
sovereign credit ratings on Argentina to 'CCC-/C' from 'SD/SD' and
its national scale rating to 'raCCC+' from 'SD'. S&P also affirmed
its 'CCC-/C' foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on
Argentina. The outlook on the long-term ratings is negative. S&P's
'CCC-' transfer and convertibility assessment is unchanged. None
of
its rated bond issues are affected.

S&P said the negative outlook  on the long-term ratings is based on

the risks surrounding pronounced  economic imbalances and policy
uncertainties before and after the 2023 national elections.
Divisions
within the government coalition, and infighting among the
opposition,
constrain the sovereign's ability to implement timely changes in
economic policy.

Fitch Ratings also upgraded on June 13, 2023, Argentina's
Long-Term Foreign Currency (FC) Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to
'CC' from 'C' and affirmed the Long-Term Local Currency (LC) IDR
at 'CCC-'. Fitch typically does not assign Outlooks to sovereigns
with a rating of 'CCC+' or below.

The upgrade of the FC IDR reflects that Fitch no longer deems a
default-like process to have begun, as the authorities have not
signaled a clear intention to follow through with an intra-public
debt swap announced in March. The new 'CC' rating signals a default

event of some sort appears probable in the coming years, regardless

of the outcome of upcoming elections. The affirmation of the LC IDR

at 'CCC-' follows the peso debt swap in June that Fitch did not
deem to be a "distressed debt exchange" (DDE).

Moody's Investors Service, in September 2022, affirmed Argentina's
Ca foreign-currency and local-currency long-term issuer and senior
unsecured ratings.  The outlook remains stable.  The decision to
affirm the Ca ratings balances Argentina's limited market access,
weak governance, and history of recurrent debt restructurings with
recent efforts to marshal fiscal and monetary measures to start
addressing underlying macroeconomic imbalances in the context of
the IMF program that was approved in 2022, according to Moody's.

DBRS, Inc. confirmed Argentina's Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer
Rating at CCC and downgraded its Long-Term Local Currency Issuer
Rating to CCC from CCC (high) on March 3, 2023.

ARGENTINA: Peso Reaches All-Time Low In Parallel Markets
--------------------------------------------------------
Buenos Aires Times reports that after the pre-agreement with the
International Monetary Fund, the Government moved forward with the
request of the international body and conducted a partial
devaluation, in addition to making a few measures official, such as
pushing the value of the dollar up and implementing a new agro
dollar.

Earlier, the parallel currency continued to climb and hit a new
record high on July 17, which meant a cumulative increase of $62
over the last 11 days, and $211 since the beginning of the year,
according to Buenos Aires Times. It partially fell to $536 by the
end of the session on July 18.

At the start, and after minister Sergio Massa's announcements which
sought to bring calm after a pre-agreeement with the International
Monetary Fund, the informal market once again showed high
volatility and reached an unprecedented $552 (after adding $24
since it opened at $528), something analysts had been dismissing,
regardless of an agreement with the IMF, partly due to the strong
volatility displayed by this small market where variations are
quickly exposed and devaluation gives a new floor to rates, the
report notes.

Andres Reschini from F2 Soluciones, explained this to PERFIL and
said: "The pressure may be eased at some point, but anyway I don't
see the blue dollar at a panic level; and thus I think that,
besides any downward variation, it will continue to leap forward",
he anticipated, the report relays.

Natalia Motyl, in turn, explained to PERFIL that "The new measures
are a sort of devaluation which gave a floor to all dollar rates",
and added that ". . . the sign of maintaining a delayed exchange
rate is totally unsustainable, which is why the dollarisation of
portfolios accelerated," the report discloses.

Among other things, Motyl pointed out that: "The market dismisses a
greater rise in prices due to more expensive costs and tries to
cover itself up by demanding more foreign currency", she said and
anticipated: "It's very likely that the gap will widen over the
next few days.  Besides, the target of the differential exchange
rate is an indicator that it may not be enough for more than USD 60
million of intervention. It all points to a correction of the
exchange rate which may take place before the elections," she
concluded, the report notes.

According to Salvador Di Stefano, an agreement with the IMF brings
peace and quiet to the market: "we won't see a run to alternative
dollars, but this may affect future inflation. I believe the
scenario will play between recessive and inflationary, many prices
will go up and consumption will go down," he pointed out, the
report notes.

As for the possibility of a strong hike in the American currency he
said: "The plan being studied is very recessive and would affect
consumption. For alternative dollars to go up we need money, and
here we are increasing tax pressure by 0.8% of the GDP, the report
relays.  I don't know if this part of the agreement is clear," he
questioned, the report notes.

           PASO Primaries, Uncertainty and The IMF

Jose Maria Segura, Chief economist and partner at PWC explained to
PERFIL that in his point of view, the market dismissed any kind of
agreement with the IMF and that showed in the price of bonds which
are not falling and were somehow recovering, the report relays.

"Now, the agreement does not give fire power to the Central Bank to
avoid or prepare for what normally happens during elections, which
is a transfer of portfolios from pesos to dollars, that is a
dollarisation of portfolios, the report notes.  And somehow that's
what we probably expect will happen until the election is over," he
anticipated, the report notes.

According to the economist, "what we have to expect is some kind of
volatility up to the general election.  It partly has to do with
correction, even though the exchange rate was adjusted this month,
it was a bit delayed compared to the inflation," the report
discloses.

In terms of the blue dollar, he explained that "somehow some of
that ground is being gained back and part of the volatility is
typical of the election, which doesn't necessarily mean it will
always go up, but it will probably be exacerbated until that
process is done," the report says.

The reaction to the measures announced by Economy minister, Sergio
Massa, has had immediate repercussions in the market, the report
relays.

Perhaps eyes were turned to the jump of the blue dollar, which
reached $550, more than $20 in a day, the report notes.  However,
Lautaro Moschet, Economist from the Libertad y Progreso Foundation,
stated that financial exchange rates stayed calm and did not show
great ups or downs. Even shares in Argentine companies had positive
variations, as did sovereign bonds, which resulted in the country
risk falling, the report relays.

"This is due to increasing rumours of an agreement with the IMF,
which gives the government a break to face debt payments over the
next few months, and, naturally, avoiding an economic collapse
caused by a default", he assured, the report notes.

Concerning the hike of the blue dollar, Moschet stated that "what
may be appreciated is that the announced measures caused greater
fear among small savers," the report discloses.

In that respect, the economist pointed out that the blue market is
not representative, but small and volatile, the report says.  He
also said that people with a small saving capacity usually operate
there, who occasionally have a little extra which allows them to
buy foreign currency, or those moving undeclared money, the report
notes.

"Therefore, movements are usually sharp, since fear leads to a herd
effect and then can remain calm, as it happened over the last few
months", he stated, the report says.  "This shows a clear contrast
with the MEP (exchange dollar via shares) or the CCL (exchange
dollar via bonds), where daily operations move great volumes and
are constant, which may reflect the 'actual' value of the exchange
rate more accurately."

                   Dollar Values Today

It is worth remembering that earlier it opened at $528, and
following the first transactions, at 3.30 pm it hit a new historic
high: $550 for sales, the report notes.  The MEP dollar is
currently at $497.86 for purchases and $498.04 for sales, the
report discloses.

The CCL dollar is listed at $530.85 for purchases and $542.60 for
sales, the report relays.

The country risk is an indicator prepared by JP Morgan measuring
between the difference of US Treasury Bonds against those of other
countries, the report says.

On July 24 it was 2.021 basis points.

During the close, the blue dollar had reached $529 and the Central
Bank once again lost foreign currency with the sale of dollars and
yuans, the report notes.

It is worth remembering that earlier the Government announced a 10%
devaluation of the savings dollar, in order to equate it to the
tourist exchange rate, which means at least one less exchange rate,
one of the requests of the IMF, the report notes.

Thus, the 900,000 buying on average USD 150 will go from paying an
exchange rate of $464.47 -- which they paid until July 28 -- to
$492.63, the report relays.

Economy minister, Sergio Massa, highlighted that an agreement was
reached with the IMF for the "next five months" which "takes the
discussion on the Fund off the campaign," the report notes.  The
official announced that there would be "strong disbursements in
August and November, largely covering obligations this year," the
report relays.

On the other hand, he clarified that he does not expect to travel
to Washington, as was speculated, because the Economy envoys "did a
great job to close everything," the report says.

                          Upward Bonds

In the case of Argentine bonds abroad, as explained by Bloomberg,
they reached their highest level in nearly six months after the
International Monetary Fund and Government authorities stated that
they were near an agreement to reformulate the credit programme of
USD 44 billion for the country, the report notes.

Bonds with a maturity in 2030 rose by 0.7 cents to nearly 35 cents
on the dollar, their highest level since early February, the report
relays.  Values with a maturity in 2041 followed suit, rising by
les 0.8 cents to 33 cents on the dollar. Both bonds were the best
performing in an index of sovereign bonds in emerging markets, the
report adds.

                     About Argentina

Argentina is a country located mostly in the southern half of South
America. Its capital is Buenos Aires. Alberto Angel Fernandez is
the current president of Argentina after winning the October 2019
general election. He succeeded Mauricio Macri in the position.

Argentina has the third largest economy in Latin America.  The
country's economy is an upper middle-income economy for fiscal year
2019, according to the World Bank. Historically, however, its
economic performance has been very uneven, with high economic
growth alternating with severe recessions, income maldistribution
and in the recent decades, increasing poverty.

In March 25, 2022, Argentina finalized agreement with the IMF for a
new USD44 billion Extended Funding Facility (EFF) intended to fund
USD40 billion in looming repayments of the defunct Stand-By
Arrangement (SBA), with an extra USD4 billion in up-front net
financing. This has averted the risk of a default to the IMF
and is facilitating a parallel rescheduling of Paris Club debt.

S&P Global Ratings, on June 13, 2023, raised its local currency
sovereign credit ratings on Argentina to 'CCC-/C' from 'SD/SD' and
its national scale rating to 'raCCC+' from 'SD'. S&P also affirmed
its 'CCC-/C' foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on
Argentina. The outlook on the long-term ratings is negative. S&P's
'CCC-' transfer and convertibility assessment is unchanged. None
of
its rated bond issues are affected.

S&P said the negative outlook  on the long-term ratings is based on

the risks surrounding pronounced  economic imbalances and policy
uncertainties before and after the 2023 national elections.
Divisions
within the government coalition, and infighting among the
opposition,
constrain the sovereign's ability to implement timely changes in
economic policy.

Fitch Ratings also upgraded on June 13, 2023, Argentina's
Long-Term Foreign Currency (FC) Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to
'CC' from 'C' and affirmed the Long-Term Local Currency (LC) IDR
at 'CCC-'. Fitch typically does not assign Outlooks to sovereigns
with a rating of 'CCC+' or below.

The upgrade of the FC IDR reflects that Fitch no longer deems a
default-like process to have begun, as the authorities have not
signaled a clear intention to follow through with an intra-public
debt swap announced in March. The new 'CC' rating signals a default

event of some sort appears probable in the coming years, regardless

of the outcome of upcoming elections. The affirmation of the LC IDR

at 'CCC-' follows the peso debt swap in June that Fitch did not
deem to be a "distressed debt exchange" (DDE).

Moody's Investors Service, in September 2022, affirmed Argentina's
Ca foreign-currency and local-currency long-term issuer and senior
unsecured ratings.  The outlook remains stable.  The decision to
affirm the Ca ratings balances Argentina's limited market access,
weak governance, and history of recurrent debt restructurings with
recent efforts to marshal fiscal and monetary measures to start
addressing underlying macroeconomic imbalances in the context of
the IMF program that was approved in 2022, according to Moody's.

DBRS, Inc. confirmed Argentina's Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer
Rating at CCC and downgraded its Long-Term Local Currency Issuer
Rating to CCC from CCC (high) on March 3, 2023.

ARGENTINA: Says IMF Deal Would Include August Disbursement
----------------------------------------------------------
Patrick Gillespie at Bloomberg News reports that Argentina Economy
Minister Sergio Massa said that the International Monetary Fund
would disburse funds to the government in August and November after
a staff-level agreement of its US$44 billion financing program is
reached sometime soon.   

"There's a very big package of disbursements in August and an
additional one in November. It's a very significant number for
Argentina," Massa said on the C5N TV network, adding that he wants
the IMF to announce the exact figures, Bloomberg News notes.

Massa said the pending agreement would cover the next five months.
The IMF said that it expects to conclude a review of the program in
the coming days, potentially giving the South American nation a
lifeline to keep its economy afloat until a new president takes
office in December, Bloomberg News notes.

The IMF said it had reached "understandings" on goals and
parameters underlying a staff-level agreement that will then be
submitted to its board for approval, Bloomberg News discloses.  The
review's core technical work has been finished by its staff, as
well as teams from Argentina's Economy Ministry and central bank,
which have been in Washington, Bloomberg News notes.

"The agreement seeks to enhance fiscal sustainability and rebuild
reserves, while recognizing the strong impact of the drought, the
damage to exports and the country's fiscal income," the IMF said in
a statement obtained by Bloomberg News.

Time is running out for Argentina to repay previous debts owed to
the Washington-based lender after a record drought cost the country
US$20 billion of agricultural exports, Bloomberg News notes.  The
government's foreign reserves have fallen to critical levels,
partly because the central bank has been selling dollars to avoid a
major devaluation of the peso three months before the presidential
election, Bloomberg News relays.

Argentina owes the IMF US$2.6 billion before July 31, and it's not
clear how it'll make payment. In June, the government took the
extraordinary step of paying part of an IMF maturity with Chinese
yuan.

While repaying the IMF in yuan again in July remains an option,
it's not the government's first choice, according to a senior
government official, who asked not to be named discussing ongoing
talks, Bloomberg News discloses.

Argentine sovereign bonds due in 2030 have climbed in recent weeks
to around 34 cents on the dollar on expectations the nation would
rework its IMF agreement and on bets voters will install a more
market-friendly administration in the October election.

Investors see a peso devaluation as all but inevitable sometime
this year or next, Bloomberg News says.  The currency has tumbled
34% this year, the worst performance among emerging markets.  The
official exchange rate was at 269 pesos per dollar as of July 28 -
in the black market, the peso trades closer to 500 per dollar,
Bloomberg News relays.

As part of the ongoing IMF talks, two senior government officials
said Argentina will roll out another temporary exchange rate for
agriculture exports while raising tariffs on goods and services in
a bid to preserve its central bank reserves, Bloomberg News notes.
Some commodity exporters, including corn producers, will be able to
sell abroad at 340 pesos per dollar until Aug. 31, Bloomberg News
says.

The government hopes the temporary rate will generate an extra $2
billion of exports, Bloomberg News discloses.

                    Political Spotlight

The newest version of the program refinances payments from a record
2018 bailout. Argentina has struggled to meet the terms as
annualised inflation soared to more than 100% and the economy
slowed, Bloomberg News notes.

Talks have dragged on for months as Massa, Argentina's chief
negotiator, emerged as the ruling coalition's top presidential
candidate, pushing the deal further into the political spotlight,
Bloomberg News relays.

                     About Argentina

Argentina is a country located mostly in the southern half of South
America. Its capital is Buenos Aires. Alberto Angel Fernandez is
the current president of Argentina after winning the October 2019
general election. He succeeded Mauricio Macri in the position.

Argentina has the third largest economy in Latin America.  The
country's economy is an upper middle-income economy for fiscal year
2019, according to the World Bank. Historically, however, its
economic performance has been very uneven, with high economic
growth alternating with severe recessions, income maldistribution
and in the recent decades, increasing poverty.

In March 25, 2022, Argentina finalized agreement with the IMF for a
new USD44 billion Extended Funding Facility (EFF) intended to fund
USD40 billion in looming repayments of the defunct Stand-By
Arrangement (SBA), with an extra USD4 billion in up-front net
financing. This has averted the risk of a default to the IMF
and is facilitating a parallel rescheduling of Paris Club debt.

S&P Global Ratings, on June 13, 2023, raised its local currency
sovereign credit ratings on Argentina to 'CCC-/C' from 'SD/SD' and
its national scale rating to 'raCCC+' from 'SD'. S&P also affirmed
its 'CCC-/C' foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on
Argentina. The outlook on the long-term ratings is negative. S&P's
'CCC-' transfer and convertibility assessment is unchanged. None
of
its rated bond issues are affected.

S&P said the negative outlook  on the long-term ratings is based on

the risks surrounding pronounced  economic imbalances and policy
uncertainties before and after the 2023 national elections.
Divisions
within the government coalition, and infighting among the
opposition,
constrain the sovereign's ability to implement timely changes in
economic policy.

Fitch Ratings also upgraded on June 13, 2023, Argentina's
Long-Term Foreign Currency (FC) Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to
'CC' from 'C' and affirmed the Long-Term Local Currency (LC) IDR
at 'CCC-'. Fitch typically does not assign Outlooks to sovereigns
with a rating of 'CCC+' or below.

The upgrade of the FC IDR reflects that Fitch no longer deems a
default-like process to have begun, as the authorities have not
signaled a clear intention to follow through with an intra-public
debt swap announced in March. The new 'CC' rating signals a default

event of some sort appears probable in the coming years, regardless

of the outcome of upcoming elections. The affirmation of the LC IDR

at 'CCC-' follows the peso debt swap in June that Fitch did not
deem to be a "distressed debt exchange" (DDE).

Moody's Investors Service, in September 2022, affirmed Argentina's
Ca foreign-currency and local-currency long-term issuer and senior
unsecured ratings.  The outlook remains stable.  The decision to
affirm the Ca ratings balances Argentina's limited market access,
weak governance, and history of recurrent debt restructurings with
recent efforts to marshal fiscal and monetary measures to start
addressing underlying macroeconomic imbalances in the context of
the IMF program that was approved in 2022, according to Moody's.

DBRS, Inc. confirmed Argentina's Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer
Rating at CCC and downgraded its Long-Term Local Currency Issuer
Rating to CCC from CCC (high) on March 3, 2023.



===========
B R A Z I L
===========

AMERICANAS SA: Some Creditors Object to Reorganization Plan
-----------------------------------------------------------
Leonardo Lara of Bloomberg News reports that Americanas says that
some of its creditors presented objections to its reorganization
plan.

The Company confirms the filings of objections to the Judicial
Reorganization Plan (PRJ) presented on March 20, 2023 and the
request for the General Creditors Meeting (AGC) made by Banco BTG
Pactual, Americanas says in filing.

Americanas says that "such facts do not cause any direct impact on
the regular progress of the judicial reorganization."

"Such objections are extremely common in judicial recovery
proceedings and are formally necessary to prevent the judicial
recovery plan from being tacitly accepted."

"It is therefore not surprising that objections were presented,"
Americanas says.
            
                       About Americanas SA

Americanas was one of the largest diversified retail chains in
Brazil, with a wide platform of physical stores, robust e-commerce,
fintech, and has just entered into the niche food retail.  It is
listed on B3, being indirectly controlled by billionaire Jorge
Paulo Lemann, Carlos Alberto Sicupira and Marcel Telles.

The retailer nosedived in January 2023 after becoming mired in an
accounting scandal.  The firm filed for bankruptcy at a court in
Rio de Janeiro on Jan. 19, 2023.

Americanas sought protection under Chapter 15 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 23-10092) on Jan. 25,
2023.  White & Case LLP, led by John K. Cunningham, is the U.S.
counsel.

BRAZIL: Fitch Upgrades Long Term IDR to 'BB', Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Brazil's Long-Term Foreign-Currency
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'BB', from 'BB-', with a Stable
Outlook.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Ratings Upgrade: Brazil's upgrade reflects better-than-expected
macroeconomic and fiscal performance amid successive shocks in
recent years, proactive policies and reforms that have supported
this, and Fitch's expectation that the new government will work
toward further improvements.

Despite lingering political tensions since its 2018 downgrade,
Brazil has achieved progress on important reforms to address
economic and fiscal challenges. The new leftist Lula government
advocates a shift away from the liberal economic agenda of past
governments; however, Fitch expects pragmatism and broader
institutional checks-and-balances should preclude radical macro- or
micro-policy deviations, while the government is also pursuing
initiatives to support the private sector (e.g. tax reform). The
fiscal position is deteriorating in 2023 after a prior improvement,
but Fitch expects new fiscal rules and tax measures to anchor a
gradual consolidation. Fitch still projects debt/GDP to rise, but
at a slower pace and from a much better starting point than
previously forecast.

Brazil's ratings are supported by its large and diverse economy,
high per-capita income, and deep domestic markets and a large cash
cushion that support the sovereign's financing flexibility and its
high local-currency debt share. The ratings are also supported by
shock-absorption capacity, underpinned by a flexible exchange rate,
robust international reserves and a sovereign net external creditor
position. The ratings are constrained by high government debt,
fiscal rigidities, weak economic growth potential, and relatively
low governance scores.

Reform Progress: Since a period of gridlock during its 2015-2016
crisis, Brazil has achieved important policy breakthroughs,
including pension reform and central bank independence. Since
taking office in January, President Luiz Inacio "Lula" da Silva has
been able to secure governability and advance his policy agenda,
despite a conservative congress and lingering polarization that
manifested in violent protests at the start of his term.

Key fiscal reforms are still pending final approval but have seen
important progress, including a new fiscal framework, a major
consumption tax reform (which has eluded governments for decades),
among other smaller bills. Other initiatives have faced greater
resistance in congress, including those related to environmental
regulation. Political tensions persist, but have not resulted in
adverse economic or policy outcomes, and are reflective of
checks-and-balances working effectively in some cases.

Resilient Growth: Economic momentum continues in 2023 after a
healthy post-pandemic rebound, supported by a bumper agricultural
harvest. Consumption has cooled on tight monetary policy, but it
remains supported by a strong labor market, fiscal spending, and
continued credit growth. Fitch projects real GDP growth of 2.3% in
2023, up from 0.7% previously, a moderation to 1.3% in 2024 as
agricultural output normalizes, and convergence to a trend pace of
2.0% thereafter. The authorities project higher medium-term growth
of 2.6%; while it is not yet clear if they can advance an economic
agenda potent enough to achieve this, this could offer some
upside.

Upside from Economic Agenda: President Lula advocates a shift from
the liberal economic agenda of prior governments, but appears
likely to adopt a pragmatic rather than interventionist approach,
and his agenda still includes initiatives to boost private
investment. Lula appears unlikely to pursue major reversals of
liberal reforms enacted in recent years (e.g. labor reform,
Electrobras privatization), or unable to do so given
checks-and-balances (e.g. the sanitation bill, attempted changes to
which have been blocked by Congress).

State-run Petroleo Brasileiro (Petrobras) and Banco Nacional de
Desenvolvimento Economico e Social (BNDES) are adopting moderate
changes to their corporate strategies that are unlikely to rekindle
the distortions that impaired economic performance in the past. The
consumption tax reform offers the most upside, as it addresses one
of Brazil's greatest competitiveness bottlenecks. It aims to
simplify the highly complex system and eliminate distortions that
fuel capital misallocation.

Prudent Monetary Policy: Inflation fell to 3.2% yoy in June 2023
from 11.9% a year earlier, as a result of lower food and energy
costs and tight monetary policy. The central bank (BCB) has
maintained prudent and proactive monetary policy during the recent
inflation shock, and has kept its Selic rate at a restrictive
13.75% since August 2022 amid fiscal uncertainties, stickiness in
core inflation and some upward drift in inflation expectations.
These factors are receding, and Fitch expects rate cuts to begin by
August. Lula's explicit criticism of the BCB has not resulted in
attempts to introduce major changes to the inflation-targeting
framework, and inflation expectations are improving after some
prior jitters.

New Fiscal Rule Takes Shape: The general government primary balance
improved to a 1.2%-of-GDP surplus in 2022 - its best outturn in a
decade - but is on track to deteriorate in 2023 (Fitch projects a
0.8% deficit) due to a cyclical ebb in revenue and social spending
increases. Fiscal outturns in coming years will be guided by a new
fiscal framework to replace a spending cap, which imposes a looser
limit on spending set as a function of past revenue growth, targets
gradually improved primary balances and includes contingency
measures (ex ante and ex post) to prevent and correct for target
noncompliance. The new rule should contain spending/GDP, but does
not require much (if any) reduction, making consolidation reliant
on a large revenue effort that the authorities expect to achieve by
reducing numerous tax exemptions.

Fitch expects these tax efforts and the ex-ante contingency
measures to bring the federal primary balance to the lower bounds
of the target ranges of 0% of GDP in 2024 and 0.5% in 2025 (+/- 25
basis points). Risks are to the downside, however, given technical
and political challenges to reducing tax exemptions. Even the
looser spending limit may be hard to comply with given budget
rigidities, restoration of revenue earmarking for health and
education, and plans to re-link the minimum wage (to which pensions
are indexed) to GDP growth.

Better Debt Trajectory: General government debt fell to 73% of GDP
in 2022, still above the 'BB' median of 56%, but below its
pre-pandemic 2019 level. Fitch expects weaker primary balances and
high real interest rates to lift debt to 75% in 2023 and gradually
thereafter, but at a slower pace and much better starting point
than Fitch previously expected, particularly at the time of
Brazil's 2018 downgrade. The interest/revenues ratio at around 15%
in 2023 is high, but will decline as monetary policy eases, and
remains below the 2015-2016 peak of around 20%. Financing risks are
mitigated by a deep local market, the treasury's sizeable cash
cushion (currently 11% of GDP), a high share of local-currency debt
(94%), and an improved maturity profile.

Robust External Position: Brazil is on track to achieve a record
trade surplus in 2023, supported by strong agricultural output and
lower import costs. Fitch projects this will reduce the current
account deficit to 1.8% of GDP, from 3.0% in 2022. The strong
inflows and easing of concern around the policy direction under
Lula have strengthened the Brazilian real in 2023. International
reserves have risen by 7% so far in 2023 to USD346 billion on
valuation effects and the unwinding of FX credit lines provided
last year. Reserves cover 8.4 months of estimated current external
payments in 2023 - among the strongest in the 'BB' category.

ESG - Governance: Brazil has an ESG Relevance Score (RS) of '5' for
both Political Stability and Rights and for the Rule of Law,
Institutional and Regulatory Quality and Control of Corruption.
Theses scores reflect the high weight that the World Bank
Governance Indicators (WBGI) have in Fitch proprietary Sovereign
Rating Model. Brazil has a medium WBGI ranking at the 41st
percentile, reflecting a record of political tension, but peaceful
political transitions, a moderate level of rights for participation
in the political process, moderate institutional capacity, moderate
rule of law and a relatively high level of corruption.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade

-- Public Finances: Material policy shifts that undermine fiscal
policy credibility and threaten medium-term public debt
sustainability;

-- Public Finances: A deterioration in the sovereign's domestic
and/or external market borrowing conditions; for example, due to
economic policy mismanagement;

-- Macro: Policies that increase macroeconomic instability and/or
undermine medium-term growth prospects.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade

-- Public Finances: Progress on fiscal consolidation that puts
government debt/GDP on a downward path over the medium term;

-- Macro: Evidence of an improvement in investment and economic
growth prospects in the context of macroeconomic stability and
contained inflation.

SOVEREIGN RATING MODEL (SRM) AND QUALITATIVE OVERLAY (QO)

Fitch's proprietary SRM assigns Brazil a score equivalent to a
rating of 'BBB-' on the Long-Term Foreign-Currency (LT FC) IDR
scale.

Fitch's sovereign rating committee adjusted the output from the SRM
to arrive at the final LT FC IDR by applying its QO, relative to
SRM data and output, as follows:

-- Macro: -1 notch, to reflect weak potential growth, largely held
back by a low albeit increased investment rate and structural
impediments, such as a difficult business environment, which make
it more challenging to consolidate public finances and address
social pressures.

-- Public Finances: -1 notch, to reflect fiscal flexibility that
is hampered by the highly rigid spending profile and heavy tax
burden, which complicates adjustment to economic shocks, and a high
debt that Fitch projects to rise further over the medium term.

Fitch has removed a -1 notch on Structural Features that was
previously applied to capture political challenges that reduce
policy visibility and hamper reform prospects. Although political
challenges persist, these have not precluded important progress on
important reforms to improve growth and public finances, and Fitch
expects broad governability and reform progress to continue.

Fitch's SRM is the agency's proprietary multiple regression rating
model that employs 18 variables based on three-year centred
averages, including one year of forecasts, to produce a score
equivalent to a LT FC IDR. Fitch's QO is a forward-looking
qualitative framework designed to allow for adjustment to the SRM
output to assign the final rating, reflecting factors within Fitch
criteria that are not fully quantifiable and/or not fully reflected
in the SRM.

COUNTRY CEILING

The Country Ceiling for Brazil is 1 notch above the LT FC IDR. This
reflects moderate constraints and incentives, relative to the IDR,
against capital or exchange controls being imposed that would
prevent or significantly impede the private sector from converting
local currency into foreign currency and transferring the proceeds
to non-resident creditors to service debt payments.

Fitch's Country Ceiling Model produced a starting point uplift of
+0 notches above the IDR. Fitch's rating committee applied a +1
notch qualitative adjustment to this, under the Balance of Payments
Restrictions pillar to reflect Brazil's relatively open capital
account, and ongoing efforts to make the currency fully
convertible, that are not reflected by the high number of
capital-account restrictions recorded in the IMF's AREAER report
that feed into the model score.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Sovereigns, Public Finance
and Infrastructure issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario
(defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in
a positive direction) of three notches over a three-year rating
horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative
direction) of three notches over three years. The complete span of
best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating
categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario
credit ratings are based on historical performance.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Brazil has an ESG Relevance Score of '5' for Political Stability
and Rights as WBGIs have the highest weight in Fitch's SRM and are
therefore highly relevant to the rating and a key rating driver
with a high weight. As Brazil has a percentile rank below 50 for
the respective Governance Indicator, this has a negative impact on
the credit profile.

Brazil has an ESG Relevance Score of '5' for Rule of Law,
Institutional & Regulatory Quality and Control of Corruption as
WBGIs have the highest weight in Fitch's SRM and are therefore
highly relevant to the rating and a key rating driver with a high
weight. As Brazil has a percentile rank below 50 for the respective
Governance Indicators, this has a negative impact on the credit
profile.

Brazil has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' [+] for Human Rights and
Political Freedoms as the Voice and Accountability pillar of the
WBGIs is relevant to the rating and a rating driver. As Brazil has
a percentile rank above 50 for the respective Governance Indicator,
this has a positive impact on the credit profile.

Brazil has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' [+] for Creditor Rights as
willingness to service and repay debt is relevant to the rating and
is a rating driver for Brazil, as for all sovereigns. As Brazil has
track record of 20+ years without a restructuring of public debt
and captured in Fitch's SRM variable, this has a positive impact on
the credit profile.

The highest level of ESG credit relevance is a score of '3', unless
otherwise disclosed in this section. A score of '3' means ESG
issues are credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on
the entity, either due to their nature or the way in which they are
being managed by the entity. Fitch's ESG Relevance Scores are not
inputs in the rating process; they are an observation on the
relevance and materiality of ESG factors in the rating decision.

BRAZIL: Pushing the U.S. Out of World's Biggest Soybean Market
--------------------------------------------------------------
Buenos Aires Times reports that the world's soybean market is
dominated by one major buyer: China. For years, Brazil has taken an
increasingly bigger share of that trade away from the US.

Now, South America's shippers are even starting to dominate during
the typical season lull, notes the report.

BA Times relates that Chinese buyers are snapping up Brazilian
soybeans for delivery in October, a time of year when US exports
are typically at their peak, according to people familiar with the
trades. More deals for the fourth quarter are still likely to be
done, according to people, who asked not to be identified because
the deals are private, notes the report.

The sales come as Brazil is reaping a record crop and offering much
lower prices than rival producers, says the report. They also
reflect President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva's plan to seek closer
ties with China as part of his growth plan for Latin America's
largest economy.

"We still have competitive premiums for at least another month or
so," the report quotes Thiago Milani, head of trading and
origination for 3Tentos, a family-owned agribusiness company in
Brazil, as saying, referring to the country's shipping prices.

The report relates that American farmers are losing their
competitive edge in the global agriculture markets as Brazilian
production expands. Geopolitical tensions have also prompted China
to seek deeper ties with the South American nation and reduce its
historical reliance on the US.

According to BA Times, Lula's plan to deepen relations with China
includes getting more funding from the Asian nation and reducing
the role of the dollar in foreign trade transactions. A Brazilian
delegation's trip to China earlier this year yielded more than 15
agreements worth about US$10 billion in Chinese investment
pledges.

It's currently profitable for Chinese processors to crush Brazilian
beans to make cooking oil and animal feed, whereas margins are
negative for US supplies, data compiled by Bloomberg show, BA Times
relays. As a result, Chinese buyers are snapping up Brazilian
cargoes earlier in the season.

In fact, notes the report, purchases were so early that there are
already five vessels scheduled to pick up cargoes in Brazil in
September, according to Alphamar shipping agency. This is the
earliest ever in the season for that kind of trade, shipping data
show.

"There's huge stocks at farms now that will find their way to the
ports over the next few months, so we will see more vessels on the
lineup soon," said Arthur Neto, Alphamar's commercial director, BA
Times notes.

The purchases also come as US crops, which typically get harvested
starting in September, are under pressure from hot, dry weather,
says the report. In June, the American soy crop was in the worst
condition in three decades, before rains returned to the Midwest.

Still, the weather is now set to turn hot and dry again, notes the
report. Soybean futures in Chicago are up more than 5% this quarter
to about US$14.20 a bushel.

"From the weather point of view, the chance of an improvement in
crop conditions isn't high," Chinese broker Huatai Futures said in
a report, according to BA Times. "The supply of new-season US
soybean crop is unlikely to expand greatly."

                              About Brazil

Brazil is the fifth largest country in the world and third largest
in the Americas. Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva won the 2022
Brazilian general election. He was sworn in on January 1, 2023, as
the 39th president of Brazil, succeeding Jair Bolsonaro.

As recently reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin
America, Fitch Ratings, in December 2022, affirmed Brazil's
Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB-'
with a Stable Outlook. The ratings are constrained by high
government indebtedness, a rigid fiscal structure, weak economic
growth potential, and a record of governability challenges that
have hampered efforts to address these fiscal and economic issues
and clouded policy predictability. The Stable Outlook reflects
Fitch's expectation that growth will slow in the coming year and
that recent fiscal improvement will erode under a new government,
but within a margin consistent with the current rating, and from a
better starting point than previously expected. Uncertainty is
elevated regarding the plans of the incoming government and the
extent to which these could ease or aggravate fiscal and economic
challenges. However, Fitch does not expect policies that
jeopardize broad economic stability.

Standard & Poor's affirmed its 'BB-/B' long- and short-term
foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on Brazil, and
the outlook remains stable (June 2022).  The stable outlook
reflects S&P's base-case assumption that Brazil will maintain its
fiscal anchors over the next two years despite an increasing
interest burden, preventing significant fiscal slippage and
limiting the rise in its already high debt burden.

Moody's credit rating for Brazil was last set at Ba2 in 2018 with
stable outlook.  Moody's affirmed the Ba2 issuer ratings and
senior unsecured bond ratings in April 2022.

DBRS's credit rating for Brazil is BB (low) with stable outlook
(March 2018).




===============
C O L O M B I A
===============

ARIS MINING: S&P Alters Outlook to Stable, Affirms 'B+' ICR
-----------------------------------------------------------
On July 27, 2023, S&P Global Ratings revised its outlook on Aris
Mining Corp. to stable from positive and affirmed its 'B+' issuer
credit and issue-level credit ratings on the company.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that despite lesser
prospects for increasing cash flow in the upcoming two to three
years because of the delays of its expansion projects, Aris Mining
will maintain adjusted leverage below 3x for the upcoming 12
months.

During the third quarter of 2022, Aris Mining completed the merger
between former companies GCM Mining and Aris Gold, enabling it to
consolidate as a leading Colombian gold producer. At the time, we
expected the merger to bolster prospects for gold production growth
beginning in 2024. This view stemmed from the expansion of Aris
Mining's Marmato mine and from the construction of the Toroparu
mine in Guyana, for which the company issued the $300 million
senior unsecured notes in 2021. S&P forecasted that Aris Mining
would cut its adjusted leverage below 2x and expand free operating
cash flow (FOCF), once both projects were completed.

However, the company's increased output at Marmato will take longer
than S&P previously expected as a result of the following factors:

-- Lower production at the existing upper mine following a
shortage of explosives in Colombia during the first months of 2023;
and

-- The lower mine project achieving full commercial production
later than expected, in 2025.

At the same time, the company has announced that it will pause the
development of Toroparu to reduce the liquidity and execution risk
of developing both projects simultaneously and because updated
studies point to a lower mineral reserve for the facility. Thus, we
have revised our base-case scenario to reflect a slower forecasted
EBITDA growth.

Therefore, S&P now expects a lesser likelihood that Aris Mining
will improve its financial risk profile and expand its operations
by adding a third asset in the next 12-18 months. This prompted our
revision of the outlook to stable.

At the end of 2022, the leverage metric increased after the merger
and the associated consolidation of Aris Gold's debt. Nevertheless,
S&P expects the company to maintain adjusted debt to EBITDA below
3x in 2023-2025, which would remain in line with the 2x-3x
threshold for our current assessment of the company's financial
risk profile. This is thanks to Aris Mining's solid profitability
stemming from its competitive ore grades and cash costs at Segovia,
and an increasing contribution from Marmato going forward.

S&P said, "At the same time, we don't expect incremental debt in
the short term, as the funding for Marmato's lower mine capital
expenditures (capex) is already in place through the company's cash
balance and its streaming agreement with Wheaton Precious Metals
(not rated).

"In addition, we believe that Aris Mining will maintain adequate
liquidity, in line with its high cash balance, funds from
operations (FFO) generation, low debt maturities for the upcoming
three years, and the $122 million available from its Wheaton
streaming facility. As a result, even though we expect capex to
rise sharply for 2024, we forecast the company will maintain a
broad liquidity headroom. These are the main reasons for the
ratings affirmation.

"In our view, Aris Mining benefits from large production and a high
ore grade, as well as from its ability to replace and increase
reserves at the Segovia mine in Colombia. However, on a
consolidated basis, the company lags similarly rated peers, such as
Hecla Mining Co. (B+/Stable/--) and Eldorado Gold Corp.
(B+/Stable/--), whose revenues were 1.8x and 2.2x larger,
respectively, in fiscal 2022. While the company has posted similar
revenue to those of other peers, such as Aura Minerals Inc.
(B+/Stable/--), the latter has a somewhat wider geographic and
product diversification through its three operating assets for gold
and copper operations.

"Furthermore, following the revision of the growth strategy, we now
forecast the company's operations won't surpass the scale of its
peers during 2023-2025, while the portfolio will remain
concentrated its two operating assets in Colombia. Therefore, for
us to consider a positive rating action, we would look for the
company to have a tangible plan in terms of output increase and
diversification that's in line with those of other global gold
mining players."

ESG credit indicators: E-3, S-3, G-2

S&P said, "Environmental factors are a moderately negative
consideration in our credit rating analysis of Aris Mining. In
2013, the Colombian environmental authority assessed fees for
environmental discharges in 2010-2011 related to the Segovia
project's prior owner's waste management, which resulted in water
pollution in Antioquia. Aris Mining now owns the Segovia project
and is pursuing a legal resolution related to these fees, although
there are no implications for credit metrics. The company has
established better controls and procedures and constructed a
water-treatment plant for its operations. In addition, Aris Mining
has an ongoing reforestation program, seeking to reduce carbon
emissions on a net basis.

"Social factors are also a moderately negative consideration in our
credit rating analysis, given the exposure of the mining industry
to health and safety risks. However, the company seeks to reduce
them through the implementation of proper operational standards, as
well as by its program for artisanal miners at Segovia, which
intends to incentivize formality for workers. Aris Mining is
currently working to implement similar programs at the Marmato
operations."


GEOPARK LIMITED: Fitch Affirms 'B+' IDRs & Alters Outlook to Neg.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed GeoPark Limited's Long-Term Foreign- and
Local-Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'B+'. The Rating
Outlook has been revised to Negative from Stable. Fitch has also
affirmed GeoPark's USD500 million notes due 2027 at 'B+'/'RR4'.

The Negative Outlook reflects the tightening of GeoPark's 1P
reserve life, which decreased to 5.4 years in 2022, from 6.8 in
2021, and the expectation of the trend persisting in the next 12-18
months. The 'B+' ratings reflect the company's track record of
increasing production and implementation of an effective
cost-reduction plan. Fitch's base case scenario assumes that the
company will reach production of nearly 40,000 barrels of oil
equivalent per day (boed) by 2024 and will have average pro-forma
total debt/operating EBITDA of below 1.0x over the rating horizon.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Declining Reserve Life: GeoPark's reserve life has steadily
deteriorated in the last two years, reaching a ratio below seven
years, which would place the company firmly in the 'B+' rating
category. Absent a material discovery resulting from the current
exploratory campaign, Fitch does not expect the ratio to
dramatically reverse in the next 12 months, which is why it could
become a constraining factor for the rating.

As of Dec. 31, 2022, GeoPark had proved, developed and producing
(PDP) oil and gas reserves of 56 million barrels of equivalent
(mmboe), while its proved reserves (1P) totaled 76.1 mmboe. This
translates into a 1P reserve life of 5.4 years when applying 2022
average production. Fitch estimates the company's 1P reserve life
will decrease modestly to 4.6 years in 2023. GeoPark is
strategically deploying capital in Ecuador and continues to build
reserves in Colombia, which could bolster reserves later in the
rating horizon.

Small Production Profile: GeoPark's ratings remain constrained by
its relatively small operations and the low diversification of its
oilfields following the sale of its Argentine and Brazilian blocks.
Fitch expects GeoPark's daily production to increase yoy, reaching
close to 40,000 boed by 2024. During 2022, the company reported
relatively flat production reaching 38,810 boed compared to 2021.
Fitch expects that Geopark will increase production to around
39,000 in 2023 and grow through the rating horizon as Brent prices
continue to be favorable and the existing operation in Colombia
continues to strengthen.

Effective Cost Producer: Fitch expects that the company will
continue to maintain its cost-efficient production profile despite
some softening in oil prices environment. GeoPark's competitive
advantages are derived from its operations in onshore oilfields in
Colombia, which results in lower exploration costs, partially
driven by its low transportation costs by selling at the wellhead.
For 2022, Fitch estimates GeoPark's half cycle cost was
USD14.26/boe, and full-cycle cost was USD25.91/boe. Since 2015, the
company has focused on lower risk projects and concentrated
production in Colombia, specifically in the Tigana and Jacana oil
fields in the Llanos 34 block.

Capital Structure: Fitch estimates that GeoPark's gross leverage,
defined as total debt to EBITDA ratio, will continue to decrease
through the rating horizon averaging 1.0x as GeoPark used strong
cash generation from favorable oil prices to improve balance sheet
structure. Fitch also expects the company will maintain an EBITDA
to interest expense ratio above 20.0x in 2023 and 2024. Geopark's
total debt to 1P decreased to $6.54/boe in 2022 from $7.08/boe
2021, but Fitch expects this will decrease to $5.64boe in 2023,
which assumes a reserve replacement ratio annual average of 116%.
Fitch calculated GeoPark's leverage to be 0.8x in 2022, down from
2.2x in 2021.

Financial Flexibility: Fitch's rating case assumes Geopark will
maintain its conservative financial policies, which incorporate
hedging a portion of its production, supporting its cost production
profile, and maintaining a conservative leverage and liquidity
position. Over the rating horizon, funds from operations are
estimated to cover capex by an average of 2.6x times under Fitch's
price deck assumption. The company has a healthy PDP and 1P reserve
life of 4.0 years and 5.4 years respectively, giving it flexibility
in allocating capital in the event of price volatility. The rating
case assumes dividends will be paid each year but not materially
exceed FCF.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

GeoPark's credit and business profile is comparable to other small
independent oil producers in Latin America. The ratings of
SierraCol Energy Limited (B+/Stable), Frontera Energy Corporation
(B/Stable), Compania General de Combustibles S.A. (CGC; B-/Stable)
and Gran Tierra Energy International Holdings Ltd. (B/Stable) are
all constrained to the 'B' category, given the inherent operational
risk associated with the small scale and low diversification of
their oil and gas production.

GeoPark's production profile compares favorably with other 'B'
rated Latin American oil exploration and production companies. Over
the rating horizon, Fitch expects GeoPark's production will average
40,000 bbld, which is lower than SierraCol (41,000 boed) and CGC
(55,000 boed), but higher than Frontera (37,000 bbl/d) and Gran
Tierra Energy (33,000 bbl/d).

GeoPark's PDP reserve life is 4.0 years, and its 1P reserve life
was 5.4 years in 2021 vs. SierraCol at 5.9 years PDP and 8.0 years
1P, Frontera at 2.4 years PDP and 8.7 years 1P, Gran Tierra 5.3
years PDP and 7.5 year 1Ps, and CGC at 2.3 years PDP and 5.4 years
1P.

Geopark's half-cycle cost at $14.26 bbl and full-cycle cost at
$25.91 are on the lower side of the range for producers in the
region. Frontera's costs were at the higher side of the spectrum at
$28.60bbl and $42.20 bbl, respectively, in 2021.

Geopark had gross leverage of 0.8x, Debt to 1P of $6.54 bbl in 2022
vs. Gran Tierra at 7.5x and $6.90 bbl; SierraCol at 0.8x and $7.22
bbl; and Frontera at 2.3x and $4.98 bbl.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's Key Assumptions Within Our Rating Case for the Issuer:

-- Fitch's revised price deck for Brent per barrel (bbl) of USD80
bbl for 2023, USD75 bbl for 2024, USD 65 bbl for 2025 and USD 60 in
the long term;

-- Production average of 40,000 bbld from 2023 through 2026;

-- Effective tax rate of 45% in 2023, 40% in 2024, 35% onwards;

-- Average annual dividends of USD30 million, plus 40% of FCF;

-- Annual capex of USD 165 million;

-- Royalties per boe of USD 11.50 bbl in 2023, USD 9.00 bbl in
2024, USD 6.00 bbl thereafter;

-- Production cost per boe of $8.25 between 2023-2026;

-- Exploration cost per boe of $1.50 between 2023-2026;

-- SG&A cost per boe of $4.00 between 2023-2026;

-- Reserve replenishment ratio annual average of 1P of 84% in
2023, 116% thereafter.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- Net production rising consistently to 75,000 boed on a
sustained basis while maintaining a total debt to 1P reserves of
USD8.00 barrel or below;

-- Reserve life is unaffected as a result of production increases,
at approximately 10 years;

-- Maintenance of a conservative financial profile, with gross
leverage of 2.5x or below;

-- Cash flow generated from take-or-pay contracts from
high-quality off-takers covering interest expense by 1.0x;

-- Diversification of operations and improvements in realized oil
and gas differentials.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- Sustainable production falls below 30,000 boed;

-- Reserve life declines to below 7.0 years on a sustained basis;

-- A significant deterioration of total debt/EBITDA to 3.0x or
more.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Non-Financial Corporate
issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of three notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of four notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings are
based on historical performance.

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

Adequate Liquidity: GeoPark had cash on hand of USD128 million at
Dec. 31, 2022. This compares favorably to short-term debt of USD13
million. The company has additional funding available through a
USD15 million oil prepayment facility, which has not been drawn,
and USD150 million of uncommitted credit lines.

ISSUER PROFILE

GeoPark Ltd. is a small but growing oil and gas E&P company with
producing operations in Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Brazil. It was
founded in 2002, after the acquisition of AES's upstream oil and
gas assets in Chile and Argentina.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

The highest level of ESG credit relevance is a score of '3', unless
otherwise disclosed in this section. A score of '3' means ESG
issues are credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on
the entity, either due to their nature or the way in which they are
being managed by the entity. Fitch's ESG Relevance Scores are not
inputs in the rating process; they are an observation on the
relevance and materiality of ESG factors in the rating decision.



===========
M E X I C O
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CEMEX SAB: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' IDRs & Alters Outlook to Positive
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Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Foreign and Local Currency Issuer
Default Ratings (IDRs) of CEMEX, S.A.B. de C.V. (CEMEX) at 'BB+',
its unsecured notes at 'BB+' and hybrid issuances at 'BB-'. At the
same time, CEMEX's National Scale Long-Term rating is being
upgraded to 'AA(mex)' from 'AA-(mex)', and its National Scale
Short-Term rating to 'F1+' from 'F1'. The Rating Outlook is revised
to Positive from Stable.

The Positive Outlook reflects ongoing improvements in CEMEX
operating cash flow generation that could lead to stronger FCF,
which if used to prepay debt, would bring leverage ratios to levels
commensurate with investment grade peers. CEMEX's ability to reduce
its net adjusted debt to around USD7 billion, on a sustainable
basis, is likely to positively impact ratings. The upgrades in the
national scale reflects the strengthening of the company's credit
profile within the 'BB+' rating. Fitch expects Cemex to remain
proactive regarding liability management to reduce exposure to
refinancing risks within the next 18-24 months horizon.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increasing Cash Flow: CEMEX is expected to post strong operating
cash flow generation during 2023 driven by pricing ability, easing
of cost headwinds, as well as incremental contribution from growth
investments and developments of its urban solutions business. The
company was efficient in pass-along cost increases during 2022 and
so far in 2023 which has helped to offset a more challenging
scenario in terms of volumes. The company's aggressive pricing
strategy has impacted market-share in few important markets, such
as Mexico. For 2024, pricing movements will soften and volumes are
expected to remain relatively flat, which could limit profitability
within core segments. Fitch forecasts CEMEX's adjusted EBITDA
(excluding IFRS16 leasing) to reach around USD2.8 billion during
2023 and 2024, with EBITDA adjusted margin moving around 16%-17%.
This represents an improvement from USD2.3 billion average of
2021-22 period, and margin of 15%.

Strategic Capex to Drive FCF: CEMEX has an important ESG agenda
that together with business growth initiatives should result in
increasing capex levels within the next years, and, ultimately,
will drive its leverage ratios. The company's ESG agenda has been
moving relatively well in terms of its targets, and Fitch does not
estimate any major capex acceleration on this regard in the medium
term, besides the USD150 million, on an annual basis (around 10% of
Fitch´s estimated capex). Fitch estimates CEMEX's FCF to be around
USD88 million during 2023-24, after average capex of USD1.6
billion, with strategic capex being around USD500 million. The
company has linked its dividend strategy to achieving investment
grade level, which is also likely to reduce the short-term
pressures on FCF.

Declining Leverage Trend: Fitch estimates CEMEX's EBITDA net
leverage hovering around 2.7x in 2023-2024, per Fitch's
calculations. This favorably compares to an average of 3.3x during
2021-22. Fitch considers that small bolt-on acquisitions, such
recent acquisition of aggregates sources in the U.S. or related to
urban solutions opportunities are likely to continue to occur, but
should not materially impact its credit profile. The company's
ability to reduce its net debt to around USD7 billion should favor
its ratings. Fitch estimates CEMEX's debt around USD7.6 billion at
the end of 2023. This calculation excludes leasing obligations, and
includes USD1 billion of its two hybrid issuances (50%
equity-credit) and USD670 million of receivables securitization.

Investments to Enhance Business Profile: CEMEX benefits from
product and geographic diversification as one of the world's
largest cement producers, selling 63 million metric tons of cement
in 2022. It is the leading cement producer in Mexico and one of the
top producers in the U.S. CEMEX also has a large global presence in
ready-mix and aggregates, with 2022 sales of 50 million cubic
meters of ready-mix and 139 million metric tons of aggregates.
CEMEX's main geographic markets by EBITDA are Mexico at 38%, the
U.S. at 26%, Europe at 12%, Central and South America at 11%, and
Asia, the Middle East and Africa at 13%. CEMEX is making progress
on its goal to optimize and rebalance its portfolio for growth. The
company seeks to diversify its operations, increasing its urban
solutions business, and has invested in bolt-on acquisitions,
margin enhancement projects as well as capacity additions. The
company's main focus on urban solutions includes performance
materials, industrialized construction, circularity and related
services. This segment generated around USD70 million EBITDA during
1Q23, an increase of 34% from past quarter. Fitch estimates this
EBITDA representing around 10% in the next 2-3 years. Its
relatively stronger margins and less cyclical nature should benefit
CEMEX's business risks.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

CEMEX's ratings reflect its diversified business position across
several large markets, notably Mexico, the U.S. and certain
European countries; its vertical integration and economies of
scale; and positive FCF. The company is the leading cement producer
in Mexico, one of the top producers in the U.S. and the largest in
Spain.

CEMEX's closest peers are large global cement producers such as
Holcim Ltd. (BBB/Positive), which CEMEX competes with in several
markets. Holcim has broader geographic diversification, yet
recently has also increasing its exposure to the U.S. Latin America
is CEMEX's largest region, representing close to 57% of EBITDA, of
which 42% is generated in Mexico. The U.S. represented 28% of
CEMEX's EBITDA, with the remainder from Europe at about 14% and, to
a lesser extent, Israel and the Philippines.

CEMEX's broader geographic diversification and larger scale compare
well with its regional building materials companies such as Martin
Marietta Materials, Inc. (BBB/Stable) and cement producers
Votorantim Cimentos S.A. (VCSA; BBB-/Stable) and InterCement
Participacoes S.A. (C).

VCSA, which has a dominant position in Brazil and operations in the
U.S., Canada and throughout the world, is not a direct peer, as the
rating is tied to parent Votorantim S.A.'s (BBB-/Stable), which
includes mining, utilities and financial services subsidiaries.
Martin Marietta is focused in the U.S. and the Caribbean.
InterCement's portfolio is weighted heavily toward volatile
emerging markets such as Brazil and Argentina, which creates cash
flow uncertainty and much higher exposure to foreign currency risk
than CEMEX.

CEMEX's ratings reflect its weaker credit metrics than higher rated
global peers. CEMEX's net EBITDA leverage is forecast around 2.7x
in 2023, while Holcim and Votorantim were around 1.5x and 2.0x,
respectively. CEMEX's global scale, business position and funding
access are all positive, as is the company's record of reducing
debt. CEMEX's adjusted EBITDA interest coverage forecast of around
5.0x is still in line with a 'BB' category building materials
issuer.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's Key Assumptions Within the Rating Case for the Issuer:

-- Low single digit decrease in cement and ready-mix and low
single digit increase on aggregates for 2023, with limited recovery
during 2024;

-- Fitch adjusted EBITDA of USD2.8 billion in 2023 and 2024, with
margins moving around 16%-17%;

-- Capex of about USD1.5 billion and USD1.65 billion in 2024.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- Sustainable net debt/EBITDA of below 2.5x;

-- Sustainable FCF generation that leads to a reduction in net
debt to around USD7 billion;

-- Continued growth in the U.S. market coupled with sustained cash
flows in Mexico and a rebound in other key markets, leading to more
stable cash flows;

-- A strengthening of CEMEX's business position outside of Mexico
that leads to expectations of higher operating cash flows.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- A weakening of operating cash flow and FCF expectations such
that net debt/EBITDA is forecast above 3.5x;

-- Expectations of a pronounced deterioration of Mexico's economic
environment that weakens EBITDA prospects.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Non-Financial Corporate
issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of three notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of four notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings are
based on historical performance.

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

Sound Liquidity: CEMEX's liquidity is solid and Fitch expects the
company to maintain an active approach in terms of liability
management in order to avoid refinancing risks in the short to
medium term. The company does not face meaningful maturities until
2025, when approximately USD1.1 billion of its syndicated credit
agreement is due. In addition to USD758 million of cash, CEMEX has
undrawn committed credit facilities for USD1.3 billion (USD1.75
billion as of March 31, 2023), which support liquidity. Fitch
expects the company to generate USD88 million in FCF in 2023.

As of March 31, 2023, CEMEX's total debt per Fitch's calculation
was USD8.3 billion, which mainly includes market bonds (50%),
syndicated loans (24%), hybrid issuance (11%) and receivables
securitization (8%). During March 2023, CEMEX issued USD1 billion
of hybrid issuance, which qualify for 50% equity credit under
Fitch's criteria.

ISSUER PROFILE

CEMEX is a large global cement producer, selling 63.4 million
metric tons of cement in 2022. The company is the leading cement
producer in Mexico and one of the top producers in the U.S.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

The highest level of ESG credit relevance is a score of '3', unless
otherwise disclosed in this section. A score of '3' means ESG
issues are credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on
the entity, either due to their nature or the way in which they are
being managed by the entity. Fitch's ESG Relevance Scores are not
inputs in the rating process; they are an observation on the
relevance and materiality of ESG factors in the rating decision.



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P U E R T O   R I C O
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BED BATH: Unsecureds to Get Share of Distributable Proceeds
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Bed Bath & Beyond Inc. and its Debtor Affiliates filed with the
U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey a Joint
Chapter 11 Plan dated July 20, 2023.

The Debtors believe that the Plan maximizes stakeholder recoveries
in these Chapter 11 Cases.

The Plan contemplates a wind down of the Debtors' operations. The
Debtors, the DIP Lenders, and the Creditors' Committee negotiated a
value-maximizing transaction to effectuate an orderly Wind Down as
set forth in the Plan. The Plan contemplates, among other things,
distributions to Holders of Allowed Claims in accordance with its
terms, followed by the Wind Down of the Wind-Down Debtors.

Although for purposes of administrative convenience and efficiency
the Plan has been filed as a joint plan for each of the Debtors and
presents together Classes of Claims against, and Interests in, the
Debtors, the Plan does not provide for the substantive
consolidation of any of the Debtors.

Class 6 consists of all General Unsecured Claims. In full and final
satisfaction, compromise, settlement, release, and discharge of its
Claim (unless the applicable Holder agrees to a less favorable
treatment), each Holder of an Allowed General Unsecured Claim shall
receive its Pro Rata share of (i) the Shared Proceeds Pool, only if
such proceeds are available after all senior Claims (other than the
DIP Claims and FILO Claims) are paid in full and (ii) any remaining
Distributable Proceeds available after payment in full of all
senior Claims. Class 6 is Impaired.

Class 8 consists of all Intercompany Interests. Intercompany
Interests shall be canceled, released, and extinguished as of the
Effective Date, and will be of no further force or effect, and
Holders of Intercompany Interests will not receive any distribution
on account of such Intercompany Interests.

Class 9 consists of all Interests in BBB. In full and final
satisfaction of each Allowed Interest in BBB, each Allowed Interest
in BBB shall be canceled, released, and extinguished, and will be
of no further force or effect and no Holder of Interests in BBB
shall be entitled to any recovery or distribution under the Plan on
account of such Interests.

Any Asset Sale Transaction will be either (a) conducted pursuant to
the Bidding Procedures or Lease Sale Procedures, (b) approved by
the Bankruptcy Court prior to the Effective Date, or (c) otherwise
authorized by the Plan.

The Plan Administrator, subject to the Sharing Mechanism, will fund
distributions under the Plan from (a) the Combined Reserve; (b) the
WARN Reserve; and (c) Distributable Proceeds in accordance with the
Waterfall Recovery, unless, as it relates to each of the foregoing,
such distributions are provided for in the DIP Budget.
Distributable Proceeds will be created by, among other things, the
prosecution and monetization of Non-Released Claims.

On and after the Effective Date, if applicable, the Wind-Down
Debtors shall continue in existence for purposes of (a) winding
down the Debtors' business and affairs as expeditiously as
reasonably possible; (b) resolving Disputed Claims, (c) making
distributions on account of Allowed Claims as provided hereunder,
(d) establishing and, to the extent not already funded, funding the
Distribution Reserve Accounts; (e) enforcing and prosecuting
claims, interests, rights, and privileges under all Causes of
Action in an efficacious manner and only to the extent the benefits
of such enforcement or prosecution are reasonably believed to
outweigh the costs associated therewith, (f) filing appropriate tax
returns, (g) complying with its continuing obligations under the
Purchase Agreements, if any, (h) liquidating all assets of the
Wind-Down Debtors, and (i) otherwise administering the Plan in an
efficacious manner consistent with the Plan.

Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, the Plan
Administrator may, with the consent of the DIP Agent, the FILO
Agent, and the Creditors' Committee, or (following the Effective
Date) with the consent of the DIP Agent, FILO Agent and Oversight
Committee transfer all or any portion of the assets of the Wind
Down Debtors to a trust (the "Liquidating Trust"), which shall be a
liquidating trust.

On or after the Effective Date, the Debtors shall make
distributions on account of Allowed Claims using the Distributable
Proceeds. In accordance with the Final DIP Order, (a) Distributable
Proceeds of Prepetition Collateral shall be paid to Holders of
Allowed Claims until paid in full from time to time in the
following priority: (i) first, on account of Allowed FILO Claims;
(ii) second, on account of DIP Claims; (iii) third, on account of
Allowed Administrative Claims (other than DIP Claims) and Priority
Tax Claims; (iv) fourth, on account of Allowed Other Secured
Claims; (v) fifth, on account of Allowed Other Priority Claims;
(vi) sixth, on account of any Allowed Junior Secured Claims; and
(vii) seventh, on account of any Allowed General Unsecured Claims;
and (b) Distributable Proceeds of DIP Collateral that does not
constitute Prepetition Collateral shall be paid to Holders of
Allowed Claims until paid in full from time to time in the
following priority: (i) first, on account of Allowed DIP Claims;
(ii) second, on account of Allowed FILO Claims; (iii) third, on
account of Allowed Administrative Claims (other than DIP Claims)
and Priority Tax Claims; (iv) fourth, on account of Allowed Other
Secured Claims; (v) fifth, on account of Allowed Other Priority
Claims; (vi) sixth, on account of any Allowed Junior Secured
Claims; and (vii) seventh, on account of any Allowed General
Unsecured Claims (collectively, the "Waterfall Recovery").

A full-text copy of the Joint Plan dated July 20, 2023 is available
at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=EqhteP from Kroll LLC, the claims
agent.

Co-Counsel to the Debtors:             

                     Joshua A. Sussberg, P.C.
                     Emily E. Geier, P.C.
                     Derek I. Hunter, Esq.
                     KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
                     KIRKLAND & ELLIS INTERNATIONAL LLP
                     601 Lexington Avenue
                     New York, New York 10022
                     Tel: (212) 446-4800
                     Fax: (212) 446-4900
                     Email: joshua.sussberg@kirkland.com
                            emily.geier@kirkland.com
                            derek.hunter@kirkland.com

Co-Counsel to the Debtors:             

                     Michael D. Sirota, Esq.
                     Warren A. Usatine, Esq.
                     Felice R. Yudkin, Esq.
                     COLE SCHOTZ P.C.
                     Court Plaza North, 25 Main Street
                     Hackensack, New Jersey 07601
                     Tel: (201) 489-3000
                     Email: msirota@coleschotz.com
                            wusatine@coleschotz.com
                            fyudkin@coleschotz.com

                     About Bed Bath & Beyond

Bed Bath & Beyond Inc., together with its subsidiaries, is an
omnichannel retailer selling a wide assortment of merchandise in
the Home, Baby, Beauty & Wellness markets and operates under the
names Bed Bath & Beyond, buybuy BABY, and Harmon, Harmon Face
Values.  The Company also operates Decorist, an online interior
design platform that provides personalized home design services.

At its peak, Bed Bath & Beyond operated the largest home furnishing
retailer in the United States with over 970 stores across all 50
states, consistently at the forefront of major home and bath
trends. Operating stores spanning the United States, Canada,
Mexico, and Puerto Rico, Bed Bath & Beyond offers everything from
bed linens to cookware to electric appliances, home organization,
baby care, and more.

Bed Bath & Beyond closed over 430 locations across the United
States and Canada before filing chapter 11 cases, implementing full
scale winddowns of their Canadian business and the Harmon branded
stores.

Left with 360 Bed Bath & Beyond and 120 buybuy BABY stores, Bed
Bath & Beyond Inc. and 73 affiliated debtors on April 23, 2023,
each filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the
United States Bankruptcy Code to pursue a wind down of operations.
The cases are pending before the Honorable Vincent F. Papalia and
have requested joint administration of the cases under Bankr.
D.N.J. Lead Case No. 23-13359.

Kirkland & Ellis LLP and Cole Schotz P.C. are serving as legal
counsel, Lazard Frares & Co. LLC is serving as investment banker,
and AlixPartners LLP is serving as financial advisor.  Bed Bath &
Beyond Inc. has retained Hilco Merchant Resources LLC to assist
with inventory sales.  Kroll LLC is the claims agent.




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[*] BOND PRICING COLUMN: For the Week July 17 to July 21, 2023
--------------------------------------------------------------
Issuer               Cpn    Price      Maturity   Country    Curr
------               ---    -----      --------   -------    ----
Chile  Bond           1.3     52        01/22/2051   CL        EUR
Chile  Bond           3.1     66.9      01/22/2061   CL        USD
Chile  Bond           1.3     65.4      01/29/2040   CL        EUR
Chile  Bond           1.3     71.2      07/26/2036   CL        EUR
Chile  Bond           3.3     66.6      09/21/2071   CL        USD
Ecopetrol SA          4.6     75        11/02/2031   CO        USD
Ecopetrol SA          5.9     63.9      11/02/2051   CO        USD
Ecopetrol SA          5.9     65.5      05/28/2045   CO        USD
Lani Finance          3.1     68.6      10/19/2048   KY        AUD
Lani Finance          1.9     63.3      10/19/2048   KY        EUR
Lani Finance          1.7     60        03/14/2049   KY        EUR
Lani Finance          1.9     62.3      09/20/2048   KY        EUR
QNB Finance           3.4     75.4      10/21/2039   KY        AUD
QNB Finance          13.5     55.7      10/06/2025   KY        TRY
QNB Finance           2.9     75.3      12/04/2035   KY        AUD
China Maple Leaf      2.3     75        01/27/2026   KY        USD
China SCE Group       6       29        02/04/2026   KY        USD
China SCE Group       7.4     56.2      04/09/2024   KY        USD
China SCE Group       7       35.2      05/02/2025   KY        USD
China SCE Group       6       42.9      09/29/2024   KY        USD
Ruta del Maipo        2.3     53.5      12/15/2024   CL        CLP
Santander Consumer    2.9     73.1      11/27/2034   CL        AUD
Seagate HDD Cayman    3.4     73.4      07/15/2031   KY        USD
Seazen Group          4.5     63.6      07/13/2025   KY        USD
Silk Road Investments 2.9     68.8      01/23/2042   KY        AUD
Simpar Finance       10.8     73.8      02/12/2028   BR        BRL
Simpar Finance       10.8     73.8      02/12/2028   BR        BRL
Skylark               1.8     58.2      04/04/2039   KY        GBP
Panama  Bond          4.5     73.5      01/19/2063   PA        USD
Panama  Bond          4.3     74.8      04/29/2053   PA        USD
Panama  Bond          3.9     66.8      07/23/2060   PA        USD
Pearl Holding III     9       30.5      10/22/2025   KY        USD
Pearl Holding III     9       30.5      10/22/2025   KY        USD
Peruvian  Bond        3.6     68.6      01/15/2072   PE        USD
Peruvian  Bond        2       69.5      11/17/2036   PE        EUR
Peruvian  Bond        2.8     61.1      12/01/2060   PE        USD
Peruvian  Bond        1.3     72.1      03/11/2033   PE        EUR
Peruvian  Bond        3.2     60.9      07/28/2121   PE        USD
Earls Eight           0.1     63.8      12/20/2031   KY        AUD
Earls Eight           2.3     75.2      05/20/2032   KY        AUD
Colombia Bond         7.3     71.3      10/18/2034   CO        COP
Colombia Bond         7.3     71.3      10/18/2034   CO        COP
Colombia Bond         7.3     61.5      10/26/2050   CO        COP
Colombia Bond         7.3     61.5      10/26/2050   CO        COP
Colombia Bond         3.9     54.8      02/15/2061   CO        USD
Colombia Bond         4.1     61.9      02/22/2042   CO        USD
Colombia Bond         5.6     72.7      02/26/2044   CO        USD
Colombia Bond         3.1     74        04/15/2031   CO        USD
Colombia Bond         3.3     72.1      04/22/2032   CO        USD
Colombia Bond         5.2     67.3      05/15/2049   CO        USD
Colombia Bond         4.1     58.8      05/15/2051   CO        USD
Colombia Bond         5       66.9      06/15/2045   CO        USD
Colombia Bond         6.3     63        07/09/2036   CO        COP
Colombia Bond         6.3     63        07/09/2036   CO        COP
YPF SA                1       69.8      01/10/2026   AR        USD
YPF SA                7       61.6      12/15/2047   AR        USD
YPF SA                7       61        12/15/2047   AR        USD
UEP Penonome II SA    6.5     73.6      10/01/2038   PA        USD
UEP Penonome II SA    6.5     74.1      10/01/2038   PA        USD
Guaranteed            5.4     73.7      01/29/2038   KY        USD
Guaranteed            5.3     71.9      03/23/2038   KY        USD
Banco Davivienda SA   6.7     66.5                   CO        USD
Banco de Chile        2.7     75.4      03/09/2035   CL        AUD
Banco de Chile        1.7     69.5      04/26/2032   CL        EUR
Banco del Estado      3.1     72.5      02/21/2040   CL        AUD
Banco del Estado de   1.7     70        03/01/2032   CL        EUR
Banco del Estado      2.8     68.9      03/13/2040   CL        AUD
Banco del Estado      1.7     69.2      07/05/2032   CL        EUR
Banco GNB Sudameris   7.5     73.3      04/16/2031   CO        USD
Banco GNB Sudameris   7.5     73.4      04/16/2031   CO        USD
Banco Santander Chile 1.3     57.6      11/29/2034   CL        EUR
Banco Santander Chile 3.1     72.3      02/28/2039   CL        AUD
Earls Eight           1.7     71.4      06/20/2032   KY        AUD
Helenbergh China      8       32.9      11/07/2024   KY        USD
             
Agile Group Holdings  6.1     41        10/13/2025   KY        USD
Agile Group Holdings  5.5     45        04/21/2025   KY        USD
Agile Group Holdings  5.5     39.2      05/17/2026   KY        USD
Alfa Desarrollo SpA   4.6     72.1      09/27/2051   CL        USD
Alfa Desarrollo SpA   4.6     72.1      09/27/2051   CL        USD
Alibaba Group         2.7     67.4      02/09/2041   KY        USD
Alibaba Group         3.2     65.2      02/09/2051   KY        USD
Agile Group Holdings  5.8     50.2      01/02/2025   KY        USD
QNB Finance          11.5     62.1      1/30/2025    KY        TRY
SYN prop e tech SA   13.6     20.3      3/15/2024    BR        BRL
Yango Cayman          12      3.9       09/15/2023   KY        USD
MSU Energy SA         6.9     70.8      02/01/2025   AR        USD
MSU Energy SA         6.9     71.2      02/01/2025   AR        USD
Itau Unibanco SA      5.8     19.4      05/20/2027   BR        BRL
Jamaica Government    8.5     68.9      12/21/2061   JM        JMD
Jamaica Government    6.3     72.7      07/11/2048   JM        JMD
Kaisa Group Holdings 10.9      9.1                   KY        USD
Fospar S/A            6.5      1.3      05/15/2026   BR        BRL
Frigorifico           7.7     71.1      07/21/2028   PY        USD
Frigorifico           7.7     71.4      07/21/2028   PY        USD
Galaxy Digital        3       62.5      12/15/2026   KY        USD
Generacion            9.9     73.1      12/01/2027   AR        USD
Generacion           12.5      0        02/16/2024   AR        USD
Gol Finance Inc       8.8     40.5                   KY        USD
Gol Finance Inc       8.8     42                     KY        USD
Goldman Sachs         2.3     75.9      06/30/2040   KY        EUR
Greenland Hong Kong  10.2     45.9                   KY        USD
Guacolda Energia SA   4.6     40.8      04/30/2025   CL        USD
Guacolda Energia SA   4.6     40.8      04/30/2025   CL        USD
Tencent Holdings      3.2     66.2      06/03/2050   KY        USD
Tencent Holdings      3.2     66.5      06/03/2050   KY        USD
Tencent Holdings      3.3     63        06/03/2060   KY        USD
Tencent Holdings      3.3     63.5      06/03/2060   KY        USD
Three Gorges Finance  3.2     74.2      10/16/2049   KY        USD
VTR Comunicaciones    5.1     55.3      01/15/2028   CL        USD
VTR Comunicaciones    5.1     53.6      01/15/2028   CL        USD
VTR Comunicaciones    4.4     54.4      04/15/2029   CL        USD
VTR Comunicaciones    4.4     54.5      04/15/2029   CL        USD
Vista Energy          1       73        03/03/2028   AR        USD
Voyager II            3.3     74.3      03/23/2034   KY        AUD
Transocean Inc        6.8     67.6      03/15/2038   KY        USD
Inversiones Latin     5.1     44.6      06/15/2033   CL        USD
Inversiones Latin     5.1     44.8      06/15/2033   CL        USD
KWG Group Holdings    7.4     15.8      01/13/2027   KY        USD
KWG Group Holdings    6       40.8      01/14/2024   KY        USD
KWG Group Holdings    5.9     22.2      11/10/2024   KY        USD
KWG Group Holdings    6.3     17.6      02/13/2026   KY        USD
KWG Group Holdings    7.4     26.5      03/05/2024   KY        USD
KWG Group Holdings    6       19.4      08/10/2025   KY        USD
KWG Group Holdings    6       16.8      08/14/2026   KY        USD
KWG Group Holdings    7.9     27.5      08/30/2024   KY        USD
KWG Group Holdings    7.9     60.2      09/01/2023   KY        USD
Telecom Argentina SA  1       56.5      02/10/2028   AR        USD
Telecom Argentina SA  1       64.2      03/09/2027   AR        USD
Tencent Holdings      3.8     74.1      04/22/2051   KY        USD
Tencent Holdings      3.8     74.1      04/22/2051   KY        USD
Tencent Holdings      3.9     72.3      04/22/2061   KY        USD
Tencent Holdings      3.9     72.3      04/22/2061   KY        USD
eHi Car Services      7       64.9      09/21/2026   KY        USD
El Salvador Bond      6.4     62.3      01/18/2027   SV        USD
El Salvador Bond      6.4     62        01/18/2027   SV        USD
El Salvador Bond      7.1     48.5      01/20/2050   SV        USD
El Salvador Bond      7.1     48.6      01/20/2050   SV        USD
El Salvador Bond      5.9     46        01/30/2025   SV        USD
El Salvador Bond      7.6     49.4      02/01/2041   SV        USD
El Salvador Bond      7.6     49.4      02/01/2041   SV        USD
El Salvador Bond      8.6     58.1      02/28/2029   SV        USD
El Salvador Bond      8.6     57.9      02/28/2029   SV        USD
El Salvador Bond      8.3     56.4      04/10/2032   SV        USD
El Salvador Bond      8.3     56.3      04/10/2032   SV        USD
El Salvador Bond      7.7     50        06/15/2035   SV        USD
El Salvador Bond      7.7     50        06/15/2035   SV        USD
El Salvador Bond      9.5     54.6      07/15/2052   SV        USD
El Salvador Bond      9.5     54.5      07/15/2052   SV        USD
El Salvador Bond      7.6     49.9      09/21/2034   SV        USD
El Salvador Bond      7.6     50        09/21/2034   SV        USD
Banda de Couro        8       69.1      01/15/2027   BR        BRL
Alibaba Group         3.3     63        02/09/2061   KY        USD
AMTD IDEA Group       4.5     52.5                   KY        SGD
AAC Technologies      3.8     68.6      06/02/2031   KY        USD
ACEN Finance          4       70.9                   KY        USD
AES Tiete             6.8      0.7      04/15/2024   BR        BRL
Agile Group Holdings 13.5      40.7                  KY        USD
Agile Group Holdings  8.4      38.1                  KY        USD
Agile Group Holdings  7.9      31                    KY        USD
Argentina Bonar Bonds 1        19.8      7/09/2029   AR        USD
Argentina Bonar Bonds 1        27.5      08/05/2023  AR        USD
Argentina Treasury    2.5      25.3      11/30/2031  AR        ARS
Argentine  Bond       0.5      19.5      07/09/2029  AR        EUR
Argentine  Bond       1        23.7      07/09/2029  AR        USD
Argentine  Bond       0.1      21.5      07/09/2030  AR        EUR
Argentine Bonos      16        72.6      10/17/2023  AR        ARS
Argentine Bonos      15.5      22.2      10/17/2026  AR        ARS
Ascent Finance        3.4      58.4      02/06/2043  KY        AUD
Ascent Finance        3.8      59.8      06/28/2047  KY        AUD
Ascent Finance        1.2      61.4      07/12/2047  KY        EUR
Astra Cumulative      1.5      60.6      11/01/2029  KY        USD



                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2023.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.
.


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